About the order

The treatise “On Order” (2 books) was written by Bl. Aurelius Augustine in 386-391. in Cassiciac (probably the current city of Cassago Brianza in Italy). Belongs to a group of works in which the influence of Neoplatonism is noticeable. Blzh. Augustine gives his philosophical reasoning about the Providence of God, about the order that reigns in the universe, about the meaning of evil, which exists despite the fact that the world was created by God and is still governed by His Providence. *The title of the essay in Latin is De ordine. First competition * Second competition 1. It is common for everyone, Zinovy, to explore and understand the order of things; but, at the same time, to comprehend and explain the general order that holds and governs this world is a very difficult and rarely feasible task. Moreover, even if someone achieves this, he cannot achieve something else, namely: to find for such divine and mysterious subjects a listener worthy both in terms of a virtuous life and in a certain way of his scientific studies. Nevertheless, some of the best minds do not search for anything so passionately, and those who observe with possible courage the kind of rocks and storms of this life do not try to learn and study anything with greater zeal than how it happens that God cares about human affairs, and, meanwhile, in these human affairs everywhere and always there is such vicissitude that it is difficult to attribute not only to divine, but even to slave government, if, of course, such power is given to a slave. Therefore, those who take this kind of question to heart are left, as if by necessity, to come to the conclusion that divine providence does not extend to this far and wide, or that all this evil is in fact accomplished by the will of God. Both are wicked, but especially the latter. However, to come to the conclusion that something was abandoned by God is equally ignorant and extremely dangerous for the soul. No one, however, will blame anyone for what they cannot do. And blasphemy in contempt is much more excusable than blasphemy in anger and cruelty. Therefore, the mind, not alien to piety, is forced to believe that the deity cannot rule this earthly world, or that it rather neglects and despises it than controls it so that any complaint against God would still be a meek complaint and not worthy of blame. But who is so blind in mind that he doubts attributing to divine action and control everything rational in the movement of bodies that occurs independently of human order and will? or, perhaps, will he attribute to chance the formation of so precisely and subtly proportioned members of some of the smallest animals? and if he rejects the case, he will have to admit that this is a matter of reason. And in the entire totality of nature, will we dare, guided by some nonsense of vain opinion, to present as alien to the mysterious will of the Supreme Ruler that which in some individual objects surprises us with its structure, which does not require human art at all? On the contrary, this is what is striking, that the members of a flea are arranged and organized in the most amazing way, and yet human life, meanwhile, rotates and flows in the impermanence of countless vicissitudes. But this is the same as if someone, having such poor eyesight that his gaze on a mosaic floor could not cover a space larger than one square, began to reproach the artist for his inability to give these squares order and a certain arrangement. Is it the artist’s fault that his critic is not able to perceive his mosaic works, which in their entirety merge into one beautiful whole? But this is exactly what happens to those narrow-minded people who, not being able with their weak minds to grasp the whole totality and harmony of things, if something causes them harm, and, in their opinion, this harm is great, they believe that great abomination reigns in everything else. 2. The most important reason for this misconception is that man does not know himself. To know yourself, you need a great habit of distracting yourself from feelings, focusing your soul and keeping it within yourself. And this is achieved only by those who either cauterize all wounds of opinion inflicted by the course of everyday life with solitude, or heal them by practicing the liberal sciences. The soul thus returned to itself comprehends what is the beauty of the universe (/universitatis/), correctly named from the word “unity” (/abuno/). Such beauty is inaccessible to a soul that is drawn to many individual objects, greedily pursues poverty and does not know that it can be avoided simply by moving away from the crowd. By crowd I do not mean a crowd of people, but a crowd of everything that affects the senses. And it is not surprising that the soul suffers the greater poverty the more it tries to embrace. However vast a circle may be, there is one middle point in it, towards which everything inclines, called by geometers the center, and although the parts of its circumference may be infinitely divisible, there is no other point in the circle from which all the others are at an equal distance and which dominates all, as if by some right of equation. Go out from here into any part of the circle, and you will lose everything that holds the multitude together in unity. So the soul, having poured out of itself, is scattered in a certain infinity and exhausted to the point of complete poverty, since its nature forces it to seek one thing in everything, and multitude prevents it from finding it. The meaning of what I said, the reason on which the delusion of souls depends, as well as how everything merges into one and is perfect, and yet sins should be avoided - all this, my Zinovy, you will easily understand. After all, I am well aware of both your natural gifts and your soul, which loves beauty of every kind without passionate immoderation and impurity. This seal of the wisdom to come in you serves you in the name of God as protection against destructive passions; do not give up your business, carried away by false pleasures - nothing can be more vile and dangerous than such a deal. So, believe me, you will comprehend everything that was discussed above if you devote yourself to scientific pursuits, which purify and form the soul, even if it was not previously at all capable of perceiving the seeds of divine wisdom. How all this can happen and what order it will lead to, what reason promises for the learned and the good, what kind of life we, your friends, lead, and what fruit we collect from our noble leisure - all this, I believe, you will learn from these books, more pleasant to us by your name than by our processing, especially if you yourself, choosing the best, want to introduce and include yourself in the order about which I am writing to you. When a stomach illness forced me to leave school - I, who, as you know, even without such an extreme thought of giving up everything and indulging in philosophy, I immediately moved to the dacha of my closest friend Verekund. Needless to say, this is - with the consent he willingly gave - you know very well the rare goodwill of this wonderful man towards people in general, and towards me in particular. there we talked about everything that seemed useful to us, prudently avoiding harsh arguments, for, as I noticed, lack of restraint in expression and immoderate ardor aggravated my illness. and besides, if we wanted to write something down, it is much easier to remember a leisurely and reasonable conversation. Disputes, or, if you prefer, competitions were conducted with me by Alypius, my brother Navigius and Licensius, who had suddenly become interested in poetry. At the same time, Trigetius returned from military service and, as a veteran, fell in love with history. We had something for this in books. 3. One night, while awake as usual, I silently thought to myself about everything that came to mind. Out of love for the investigation of truth, I developed the habit of meditating at night. At the same time, I did not allow the young men to distract me from these night vigils with their chatter. However, I am unfair to them, for they worked hard throughout the whole day, and often tried to continue their reasoning long after midnight, which seemed excessive to me. In addition, I wanted to teach them, in addition to conversations and books, to work in silence, alone with their souls. So, I repeat, I was awake when suddenly the sound of water flowing behind the baths reached my ears, and I listened to it more attentively than usual. It seemed very strange to me then that the water running over the cobblestones rumbled now more clearly, now more muffled. I thought about what could be the reason for this, and, I admit, I couldn’t come up with any. At this time, Licentius, hitting the wood of his bed, scared away the annoying mice and thereby made it clear that he was not sleeping. “Have you noticed, Licentius (for I see that your muse has lit the fire for your nightly activities), how this stream makes unequal noise? “For me,” he answered, “this is not news.” One day, dreaming of good weather, I woke up and listened to see if it was raining. Then I noticed how strangely this water made noise. Trigetius also confirmed the same, for he, lying on his bed in the same bedroom, was awake, although we did not know about it. Nowadays in Italy even wealthy people can rarely afford to burn lamps all night, so it was completely dark in our room. So, I saw that my school in its existing composition (Alypius and Navigius had gone to the city) was not sleeping, and since the mentioned flow of water encouraged me to start talking about it, I said: – What do you think is the reason that this sound changes so much? After all, it is unthinkable that someone would stop the stream during these hours by crossing it or washing something in it? “Isn’t it because,” answered Licentius, “that the leaves, which fell in abundance in the fall, accumulated in the narrow places of the canal, either yielding to the pressure of the water, or again gathering together and creating a dam?” Moreover, can’t the different positions of the floating leaves do something else to similarly either delay or release the flow? Since I had no other explanation, this seemed probable to me, and, praising the wit of Licensius, I admitted that I had not come up with anything worthwhile, although I had been looking for the reasons for the phenomenon for a long time. Then, after a short silence, I said: – You had the right not to answer, but to hover in thought near Calliope. “Yes, I have the right,” responded Licentius, “but, I must admit, you surprised me extremely.” “And so,” he answered, “that this phenomenon surprised you.” “But what,” I objected, “is it surprising if not an unusual thing that appears outside the obvious order of causes?” “I agree that it’s “beyond the obvious,” he answered; but, in my opinion, nothing happens “out of order.” Since the mind of this young man, who literally only the other day turned to philosophical studies, so quickly embraced such a lofty subject, I decisively and much more animatedly than usual, when I address them with any questions, said: - Excellent, excellent thought in all respects and courageous courage. With this great step, believe me, you have stepped far beyond the helicon, the top of which you are trying to reach, as if to the sky. But I would like you to defend this idea, because I will try to refute it. “Please leave me alone at the moment,” he answered, “because I am very busy with something else.” Then I, partly fearing that, having devoted himself entirely to poetry, he would not be too distracted from philosophy, said: “I am angry that you, singing and howling in every way, torture yourself with these poems of yours, which erect between you and the truth a wall greater than that which existed between your lovers, because the latter at least whispered to each other through the crack that naturally formed in the wall (Licentius was going to sing the praises of Pyramus at that time). Since I expressed this in a voice more stern than I myself expected, he fell silent for a while. And I was thinking of leaving what I had started and concentrating again within myself, so as not to needlessly and pointlessly occupy myself with what was already preoccupied. But he spoke: “Terence doesn’t say it as opportunely as I could now say about myself: “I am as unhappy as a mouse that has discovered itself.” Only what follows next can turn into the opposite. He says: “now I am lost”; and maybe now I’ll find it. After all (if you attach any significance to the fact that soothsayers have the custom of performing fortune-telling on mice) if I convinced that house or field mouse, which gave me up to you as if I was awake, with my knocking to return to its hole and calm down, then why didn’t this severity of your voice convince me that it is better to philosophize than to sing? for philosophy (I have already begun to believe your daily proofs) is our true and unshakable abode. Therefore, if it is not unpleasant for you and if you find that this is how it should be, ask about whatever you want - as far as I can, I will defend the order of things and will prove that nothing can exist outside of order. I was so imbued with the thought of him that even if someone defeated me in a real competition, I would attribute this not to chance, but to the order of things. The victory will be won not over the subject itself, but over the License. 4. I was happy to contact them again. – What do you think? - I asked Trigetius. “I, as a military man, speak out in favor of order,” he answered, “but I have some doubts and want to subject such an important subject to the most thorough discussion.” “That side also spoke out in favor of order,” I say, “and the fact that you are in a state of doubt is, I believe, something you have in common with both Licentius and myself.” “Not at all,” Licentius objected, “I am firmly convinced of this idea.” Why should I hesitate to destroy that wall that you mentioned before it rises completely? for it is not so much poetry that can turn me away from philosophy as uncertainty about the possibility of discovering the truth. Then Trigetius solemnly proclaimed: - What is it like? Our Licensius is no longer an academician! but usually he protects them with special jealousy! “Please leave it at this moment,” he answered, “let this kind of tricks and tricks not deviate or tear me away from any divine object that has begun to present itself to my thoughts and to which I greedily strive.” Then, feeling joy filling me, I recited with admiration a verse from the Aeneid: So the father of the gods, so the Almighty Apollo Let him do it; make a start. For he himself, who is currently giving an omen and penetrating into our souls, he himself will bring, if only we go where he tells us to go. But the Almighty Apollo is not the same Apollo who, in caves, on mountains, in groves, excited by the fumes of incense and the death of sacrificed animals, takes possession of the souls of the frenzied, but a completely different Apollo, rightly called the Almighty, and to put it bluntly - the truth itself. Its diviners are all who can be wise. So, Licentius, encouraged by the piety of our worship of God, let us set out on the road, and with our feet we will trample down the destructive fire of stinking passions. “Ask, I beg you,” he said, “if only I will be able to explain this something great, using both your and my own words.” “First of all,” I say, “explain to me why it seems to you that this water flows this way not by chance, but by virtue of some order.” The fact that the water is sent through wooden gutters and carried out for our use may, of course, refer to the order. Reasonable people made it so that, having given it the appropriate direction, they can now use it for drinking and bathing, and, obviously, they were led to this idea by the convenient location of the source. But that the leaves attacked this water in exactly this way and not otherwise, which caused the phenomenon that surprised us - will we consider this to have happened in the order of things, and not due to simple chance? “That is,” he answered, “to someone who understands perfectly well that nothing happens without a reason, it may seem that the leaves should or could have fallen differently than they did.” But why do you absolutely want me to go into a detailed explanation of trees and branches, and the very heaviness that nature imparted to the leaves? Why should I examine the mobility of the air which makes them fly, their heaviness which causes them to fall, all the variety of their fall, depending on the state of the weather, on their weight, shape, and other innumerable and more secret causes? Such things are hidden from our feelings, completely hidden. But somehow one thing is not hidden from the soul: nothing happens without a reason; this is sufficient for the question we are considering. An unbearably annoying person can continue to interrogate what was the reason that trees were planted there? I will answer: people wanted to use the fertility of the soil. What if these trees are not fruit trees and grew by accident? And in that case I will answer that we know little. For the nature that raised them is not at all accidental. Should I add anything else? Either prove to me that anything can happen without a cause, or believe that there can be nothing outside a certain order of causes. 5. “Although,” I told him, “you call me unbearably annoying (and I could hardly not be, because I interfered with your conversations with Pyramus and Thisbe), however, I will continue my questions.” This nature, in which you want to see order, for what good (not to talk about other countless objects) has produced these very trees that do not bear fruit? While he was wondering what to say, Trigetius answered: - Are trees useful for their fruits alone? And how much else is there: how much obvious benefit do they bring with their thick shadow, their logs and boards, branches and leaves? “Please don’t answer his questions like that,” said Licentius. - there are countless things from which people have no benefit, or, if there is, it is so unclear and doubtful that it is impossible to reveal or prove it. It would be better if he himself proves to us that something happens that is not preceded by a cause. “We’ll see it,” I answered, “later.” Because I no longer need to be a teacher until you, who openly declared that you have accurate information on this subject, teach me, who is extremely eager to learn and therefore spends days and nights without sleep. – What do you mean by this? - he objected. “Is it not that I follow you more easily than those leaves follow the wind, which throws them into the water flowing past, so that they not only fall, but are also carried away?” Something similar will happen if Licentius becomes Augustine’s teacher, and, moreover, on the essential subjects of philosophy. “Please don’t humiliate yourself,” I said, “and don’t extol me.” For I, too, am a child in philosophy, and when I ask, I am not particularly concerned about through whom the one who hears my prayers daily will answer me. I believe that you too will one day be his prophet; and this time, perhaps, is not far away. And, meanwhile, even others who are completely alien to activities of this kind can teach something when they are attracted to a circle of people who reason, as it were, in chains of questions. “Something” is by no means “nothing”. or do you not see (I will gladly use your comparison) that the very leaves that fly in the wind and float away on the water, to a certain extent resist the current that carries them away and remind people of the order of things, if only what you defend is just. At these words, he jumped out of bed with joy and said: – Who will deny, great God, that you manage everything in order? How everything was directed to what precisely calculated sequence everything was intertwined, how much and what was done so that we could start talking about it; How much is being done so that we can find you! For where, if not from the order of things, does it follow and explain that we did not sleep, that you noticed this noise, that you sought its cause, that you found no reason for such a trifle? Even a mouse turned up so that I, who had not slept, would give myself away. Finally, your very speech, perhaps without your knowledge (for no one has power in what comes to mind), is conducted somehow in such a way that it teaches me how I should answer you. agree, if what we said, if it were written down, would become somewhat more widely known, would not all these events seem so significant that any soothsayer or Chaldean asked about them would have to predict them much earlier than they happened? and if he had predicted it, wouldn’t everyone have been delighted with his providence, wouldn’t they have seen him off with such great praise that no one would even dare to find out from him why a leaf falls from a tree or why a mouse bothers a lying man? for did any of them ever speak of any such thing? Was he forced to predict something similar to those who approached him with a question? and, meanwhile, if he had predicted that some extraordinary book was about to appear, and saw that this would necessarily happen (for otherwise he could not have predicted), then everything that the flying leaves in the field or the most insignificant animal in the house does is absolutely as necessary in the order of things as these letters. for the latter depend on our words, which without those previous most insignificant circumstances could neither come to mind nor be expressed and transmitted to posterity. So please don’t let anyone ask me why things happen. It is enough that nothing is done, nothing happens without some reason that caused it. 6. “From this it should be concluded,” I said, “that you, young man, do not know how often and what worthy men spoke out against the predictions.” But since, I see, you absolutely do not want to answer this question, then tell me: do you think this order that you are defending is something good or evil? He answered grumpily: – You proposed such a question that I can answer “first” or “second”. I see this as something in between. Order, in my opinion, is neither good nor evil. “But tell me, at least,” I continued, “what do you consider contrary to order?” “Nothing,” he answered. - for how can anything be contrary to that which embraces everything, contains everything? For everything that is contrary to order will, of necessity, be out of order. And in my opinion, there is nothing outside of order. Therefore, nothing should be considered contrary to order. “Is it really,” objected Trigetius, “that error is not contrary to order?” – It’s not disgusting at all. For I do not think that anyone is mistaken without a reason. The sequence of causes is included in order. And error itself is not only the effect of a cause, but also produces something of which it itself is the cause. Then Trigetius became thoughtful, but I couldn’t remember myself for joy, seeing that the young man, the son of a dear friend, had become my son, and even more, he had risen to the occasion and become my friend, and while I was struggling, trying to discourage him from pursuing mediocre sciences, he suddenly found himself, as it were, as a complete master, at once entering into the very essence of philosophy. While I was silently surprised and joyfully excited, he, as if suddenly overcome by a certain thought, exclaimed: - Oh, if only I could express what I want! Where are you, words, where? Help me. For good and evil are in the order of things. Believe it if you want. Because I don't know how to explain it. 7. I was surprised and silent. Trigetius, on the contrary, perked up, becoming more and more sociable and talkative, and said: “It seems to me, Licencius, that what you assert is absurd and completely alien to the truth; Just please let me speak and don’t interrupt me with your exclamations. “Say what you want,” he answered, “I’m not afraid that you will dissuade me from what I see and what I have almost mastered.” “If,” said the first, “you had not already deviated from the order you defend, then you would not have attributed to God (to put it mildly) such negligence.” For what can be said more wickedly than that even evil comes into order? After all, God undoubtedly loves order. - He really does. Order flows from Him and is maintained by Him. And what could be said more appropriately about such a sublime subject, please think about it yourself. I am not in a position to teach you at this time. - Why think? - Trigetius objected, - I simply take your words and be content with what I understand in them. After all, you said that evil also enters into order, and order itself flows from the Most High God, Who loves it. It follows from this that evil comes from the Most High God and, therefore, God loves evil. This conclusion made me worry about Licensius. But he, continuing to express regret about the difficulty of finding the necessary and precise words, and caring not at all about what he should answer, but about how to express what he intended to answer, said: – God does not love evil, and does not love it precisely because it is not in order for God to love evil. But why couldn't even evil itself be okay even if God doesn't love it? for this is the order of evil, that God does not love it. Or does such an order of things seem contemptible to you, that God loves goodness, and at the same time loves order itself; for he loves precisely because he loves good and does not love evil. And all this is part of the great order and divine decree, which, since it protects the unity of everything in its very opposition, leads to the fact that evil itself is necessary. Through this, as if in some way from antithesis (which happens to us pleasantly in speech), that is, from oppositions, the beauty of all things taken together is formed. After that he fell silent for a while. But then, getting up and turning in the direction where Trigetius’s bed was, he suddenly spoke: – Tell me, please, is God just? He was silent, extremely, as he admitted later, surprised and amazed by the new unexpected inspiration that came through in the speech of his fellow student and friend. Licencius continued: - If you answer that God is unjust, then you will understand, of course, what danger you are in, who just reproached me for impiety; if, as order itself forces us to think, God is just, then he is just precisely because everyone is distributed what is theirs. What kind of distribution can there be where no distinction is observed? or what difference can there be if everything is good? and what can be recognized as existing outside of order, if God’s justice rewards both the good and the evil, to each according to his deserts? But we all recognize God as just. Therefore, order embraces everything. Having said this, he jumped out of bed, and, since no one said a word to him, in a quieter voice he said: “Won’t you, who called me to this, answer me anything?” “I see that a new spirit of piety has now found itself in you, well, I’m ready to answer,” I told him. “But I’d better answer you during the day, which, apparently, is already coming, unless this light penetrating through the windows is the light of the moon.” For, on the one hand, care must be taken that everything that you have said so beautifully, Licencius, is not forgotten. Haven't we tried to record conversations like this before? I will tell you without further ado what I think, but I will argue with you as much as I can, since for me there can be no greater triumph than to be defeated by you. If, in the face of the tricks or subtlety of any error of those people whose side I will try to take, your weak mental powers, not strengthened by the study of science, turn out to be insufficient to defend your ideas about God, then this circumstance will allow you to understand what strength you must stock up on in order to defend them with greater firmness later. On the other hand, I wish that our present competition would be more processed, because I intend it for a person with refined taste. Our Zinovy ​​often and for a long time discussed with me about the order of things, and I could never satisfy his inquisitiveness regarding such a sublime subject, partly due to the darkness of this subject, partly due to lack of time. The constant absences exhausted his patience to such an extent that, in order to force me to answer him with greater care and thoroughness, he even challenged me with poems, and poems, mind you, good ones, for which you should love him all the more. These verses could not be read to you then, because you were very far from such activities; cannot be read even now, because his departure was so sudden and there was so much fuss with him that we could not even think of anything like that - and he intended to give them to me when I answer him. There are many other reasons why our competition should be sent to him. First of all, it is a duty. Then it will be quite decent in a similar way to demonstrate his favor towards us, what kind of life we ​​are leading at the present time. Finally, he is second to no one in the joy that hopes for you inspire. For even then, when he was here, out of friendship with your father, or, better to say, with the father of us all, he was very worried not so much that some spark of your spiritual abilities, which he diligently observed, would not be inflated by my efforts, but that it would not be extinguished by your neglect. And when he finds out that you also study poetry, he will be so pleased that, it seems to me, I can already see him jumping for joy. 8. “I am flattered by your words,” said Licentius. I don’t know whether you will laugh at my youthful frivolity and inconstancy, or whether this happened by some divine providence and order, but I don’t hesitate to tell you that I suddenly lost interest in poetry. Another, completely different something is now beginning to glow in my soul. Philosophy, I confess, is much more beautiful than Thisbe, than Pyramus, than Venus and Cupid themselves, than all these passionate feelings. At the same time, with a sigh, he offered thanks to Christ. Needless to say, I accepted it with pleasure; and why, in fact, not say? Let everyone else take it as he wants - I don’t care about that. A little later the day came, they got up, and I prayed to the Lord for a long time with tears. and now I hear Licentius cheerfully and sonorously singing the words from the psalm: “God of hosts, turn and illuminate your face, and we will be saved” (Ps 79.8). Having left the room the day before after dinner out of natural need, he sang this verse so loudly that our mother could not tolerate such beautiful words being sung in a certain place. He did not utter any other words, since he had only recently learned the tune, and, as often happens, he enjoyed the new melody. His mother, as you know, an extremely pious woman, began to reprimand him for choosing such an indecent place to sing the psalm. “As if,” he said jokingly, “if some enemy had imprisoned me in this place, the Lord God would not have heard my voice!” So, in the morning, returning to the room, Licensius came to my bed and asked: - Tell me the truth (for we must act as you want), what do you think of me? “What I think about you,” I said, taking his right hand, “is what you yourself feel, know and understand.” In my opinion, it was not for nothing that you sang for so long yesterday about how God of strength would show his face to those who turned to you. Remembering this, he remarked: “You said a lot and absolutely truthfully.” I myself am quite surprised by the fact that I, who showed so much annoyance when you distracted me yesterday with lusts, by which, through accepting and following the doctor’s somewhat harsh advice, returned to a healthy state and to the light. And so they live, unhappy, contented, as if with alms, in the name and foreboding of the highest God - yet they live. This most excellent and most beautiful bridegroom calls other people, or, more correctly, other souls, into his palace even when they are still wearing this body; and this is because they want not just to live, but to live a blissful life. So, go to your muses for now. But do you know what I would like from you? “Order what you want,” he answered. - In that place of your poem where you intend to sing how Pyramus killed himself, and on him, half-dead, and his beloved, you have in the very sorrow, which is appropriate for your verse to ignite with special force, a circumstance that is very beneficial for you. Burst with the curse of this vile lust and that poisonous flame, due to which such misfortunes happen, and then turn entirely to the praise of pure and immaculate love, by which souls, enriched with knowledge and virtue, are beautifully united with reason through philosophy, and not only avoid death, but also enjoy the most blessed life. Licencius was lost in thought, and then came out, shaking his head. Then I got up, and, having offered the usual prayers to God, we went to the baths. The baths, when due to cloudy weather we could not be in the field, were a convenient and usual place for our competitions. And just before the doors we saw roosters entering into an extremely hot fight. We wanted to see it. After all, wherever they stop, wherever the eyes of lovers wander, waiting for a sign to be given to them by the beauty of reason, which disposes and controls everything known and unknown, that beauty that attracts admirers who thirst for it, wherever and in whatever way it commands them to look for itself! So in these very roosters it was worth looking at the heads stretched forward, at the feathers spread out on their heads and necks, at the fierce blows, at the prudent evasions; and in general, how in every movement of these creatures devoid of reason there was nothing ugly, since everything was controlled by another mind, from above. it was then worth looking at the law of the winner, at his proud singing, and at all the members of the chicken family, gathered in a kind of circle, as if for demonstration; the sign of the vanquished was the feathers plucked from the neck; there was something ugly in the voice and in the movements, but at the same time, I don’t know how, in accordance with the laws of nature and therefore beautiful. Many questions came to our mind. Why does everyone do this? Why exactly - for the sake of power over the women they own? Or is it because the fight itself is fun? What is it about us that is given to us precisely by these feelings? We asked ourselves: where is there no law? Where is power not held by the best? Where is there no display of the unchanging order of things? Where is there no reflection of true beauty? Where is there no measure? But, remembering at the same time that there must be a limit to our spectacle, we went where we were going. Here, as far as possible, we very diligently set about collecting all the fragmentary records of the competition into this part of the book (for it was all still fresh in our memory). Concerned about my health, I did nothing else that day - only before dinner I listened, as is my custom, to half of Virgil's book - because in our studies we observe nothing so carefully as moderation. There is hardly anyone who would not approve of the measure, but feeling it, especially when you are doing something seriously, is a very difficult and rare thing. 9 . The next day, early in the morning, we gathered at our usual place. and when the eyes of those present turned to me, I said: “Stay here as long as you can, Licencius, and you too, Trigetius.” After all, we are talking about an important subject - we are talking about order. Why should I, however, praise order at length and flowerily to you, as if I belonged to that school, from which I rejoice at leaving on any occasion? Listen if you want, even do as you want, but no other praise for the order, neither more concise nor more true, in my opinion, can be said. Order is that if we adhere to it in our lives, we will come to God, and if we don’t, then we won’t come. But, if my feelings do not deceive me regarding you, this is already a foregone conclusion for us, and we hope that we will reach God. Therefore, we must consider and resolve the question of the first in the most careful manner. I wish that everyone else who usually takes part in such activities with us would also be there. I would also like, if it were possible, that not only they, but also all our friends, whose abilities I am always amazed at, were present here with the same attention as you - or, at least, only Zinovy, who constantly sought this, but whom, in view of the vastness of the subject, I never had the leisure to satisfy. But since my desire is not destined to come true, then let them read our notes, since we have already decided not to lose a single word from our reasoning and to enclose, as if in the shackles of writing, things that are slipping from memory with the aim of restoring them in memory again and again. This, perhaps, is required by the very order that has arranged the absence of many of our friends. For you, too, in such a great task, since you alone are entrusted with the responsibility of fulfilling it, will, without a doubt, use the greatest effort of spirit; and when they, who are the subject of our greatest concern, having read our notes, consider it necessary to object to something, then the real competition will give rise to new competitions, in which their instructive order will also be visible. But now, as far as circumstances permit, I will, as I promised Licentius, object to him, although he has almost completed his work, if only he can protect him with a solid and durable wall of defense. 10. After this, noticing from their silence, their facial expressions, their eyes, and the stillness and calmness of their limbs, that they were sufficiently excited by the sublimity of the subject and animated by the desire to listen, I said: “So, Licentius, if you want, gather all your strength, strain all your insight and determine what order is.” Hearing that he was being invited to make a determination, he shuddered, as if he had been doused with cold water, and, looking at me with a very embarrassed expression on his face and smiling (as often happens) from this confusion, said: -What does this mean? Who do you take me for? Do you really think that I am actually inspired by some mountain spirit? But, immediately recovering, he said: “Maybe you’re right, there’s really something going on with me.” Okay, I’ll try: order is that by which everything that God has decreed is accomplished. “Don’t you think,” I ask, “that God himself acts on the basis of order?” “Quite right,” he answered. “So,” objected Trigetius, “God is also governed by order?” – Do you deny the divinity of Christ, who came to us to fulfill the order, and who says about himself that he was sent from God the Father? if God sent Christ to us to fulfill order, and if we do not deny that Christ is God, then God not only governs everything in order, but is himself governed by order. “I don’t know,” Trigetius said hesitantly, - how can I accept this? In fact, the word “God” is associated more with God the father, while Christ is associated with the word “son of God.” “Excellent point,” exclaimed Licencius, - does this mean we must deny that the Son of God is God?! Although it seemed dangerous to Trigetius to answer this question, he nevertheless forced himself and said: – And He, of course, is God, but in the proper sense we call God the father. “Come to your senses,” I interrupted him, “after all, a son is not called God in a figurative sense.” Then Trigetius, moved by piety, wanted his last words not to be written down, but Licentius, either wanting to incriminate his opponent, or simply out of childish frivolity, began to insist that these words be written down without fail, as if the dispute between us was due to vanity. When I reproached this movement of his soul in very strict terms, he blushed with shame; Meanwhile, I noticed that this embarrassment made Trigetius laugh and amuse him. Then I told them both: - That's what you're doing! Doesn't it bother you that you pile on yourself such a mass of vices and cover yourself with such darkness of ignorance? Was this really your devotion to God and the truth, which I, foolish, rejoiced at? Oh, if you could see, even with such sick eyes as mine, what danger we are plunging into, what disease of madness this laughter means! Oh, if you only knew how soon and for how long this laughter will turn into crying for you. Unhappy people, you don’t understand where we are! To be mired, of course, is the common fate of the souls of stupid and uneducated people; but wisdom does not equally give its hand and help to all those who are mired. Believe me, there are those who are called upward by it, and there are those who are left to go into the abyss. Do not double, I beg you, my misfortune. My own wounds are enough for me, and although I pray to God every day to heal them, I often become convinced that I am not worthy enough to recover as quickly as I want. I ask you, if you owe me at least some feeling of love or friendship, if you understand how much I love you, how much I do for you, what worries it costs me to care about your morality, if I am worthy of not being neglected by you, if, finally, I am not lying, as God is my witness, that I do not desire anything more for myself than for you, I ask you, reward me with good for good. And if you sincerely call me your teacher, reward me: be kind. Here tears prevented me from continuing. Then Licentius, annoyed that all this was being written down, said: - Tell me, please, what have we done? “So,” I say, “you still don’t realize your sin?” You don’t know that I was usually very annoyed at school when children were carried away not by the benefits and beauty of science, but by the love of empty boasting to such an extent that some of them were not even ashamed to answer the lesson from other people’s words, and even (an evil worthy of regret) received applause from those whose words they thoughtlessly repeated. Although you, I believe, have never done anything like this, yet into the philosophical life that, to my pleasure, I finally have the opportunity to lead, you introduce and permeate the very last, but in its harm surpassing all others, the ulcer of corrupting envy and empty vanity. and perhaps because I turn you away from this vanity and this illness, you will become lazier in your pursuits of science and, removed from the poisonous smell of glory, you will freeze in an inactive stupor. I am unhappy if even now I have to endure the same people who cannot part with some of their vices without replacing them with others. “You will see in practice,” said Licentius, “how we will improve.” Only to everyone that you love, we beg you: forgive us and order us to cross it all out; but at the same time, save the rest on the signs. Because nothing of what we have been discussing for a long time has yet been rewritten into books. “No,” objected Trigetius, “let all this be left entirely to us as a punishment, so that the very vanity that carries us away with its own whip scares us away from loving him.” We will only try on our part to ensure that these books are known only to our friends and people close to us. 11. Meanwhile, my mother came in and asked how far we had come in solving our problem. When I ordered to write down, as usual, about her arrival and the question she asked, she asked: - Why are you doing this? Has it ever been heard of women being ever allowed to participate in this kind of competition? “I don’t pay attention,” I answered, “to the judgments of proud and ignorant people who act the same when reading books and when greeting people.” They think not about what these people are like in themselves, but about what clothes they wear and with what splendor of wealth and fortune they shine. But in books they pay little attention to where the question arises, how the reasoners try to reach its solution, and what is finally understood and resolved by them. Among them, of course, there are also those whose souls should not be despised, since they carry within themselves the rudiments of education and are easily introduced through the golden and ornate doors into the sanctuary of philosophy; but for such people enough was done by our ancestors, whose books, I believe, are well known to you. And at the present time, not to mention others, Theodore, both in talent, and in eloquence, and in the highest gifts of fortune, and, most importantly, in intelligence, a most excellent man, whom you yourself know very well, takes care that both now and later none of his descendants have the right to complain about the literature of our time. As for my books, if it happens that someone takes them in their hands and, after reading my name, does not ask “who is this” and does not push the book away, but out of curiosity penetrates into their very content, such a person will not be burdened by the fact that I am philosophizing with you, and, most likely, will not treat with contempt any of those with whom I talk in them. For my interlocutors are not only free people, which is already enough for any science, and especially for philosophy, but also belong to the most noble families. And, meanwhile, there are books of learned people who represent philosophizing even shoemakers and people of even lower status, who, however, shone with such a light of intelligence and virtues that under no circumstances would they want to exchange their goods with any aristocracy. There will be, believe me, a class of people who will like the fact that I am philosophizing with you much more than if they met something else here, playful or serious. For among the ancients women also philosophized, and I like your philosophy very much. And so that nothing remains unknown to you, mother, know that “philosophy” is a Greek word and means nothing more than the love of wisdom. Therefore, the divine Scriptures, to which you are ardently devoted, command you to avoid and ridicule not all philosophers, but the philosophers of this world. But that there is another world, inaccessible to our eyes, which only the minds of a few healthy people look at, this is shown by Christ himself, saying not “My kingdom is not of the world,” but “My kingdom is not of this world” (John 18.36). Therefore, anyone who thinks that all philosophy should flee, demands of us nothing less than that we should not love wisdom. I would, of course, neglect you in my writings if you did not love wisdom; but if you still love her at least a little, I will not neglect her with joy. And since I know that you not only love her, but have also achieved such success in her that you are no longer afraid not only of various vicissitudes of fate, but even of death (which even the most learned men rarely achieve and which, rightfully, is considered the height of perfection in philosophy), then I myself am willingly ready to become your student! When she kindly and modestly objected that I had never exaggerated so much before, and I myself saw that what we had said was more than enough for a whole book, I decided to postpone further consideration of the issue. and he decided to spare his stomach - our conversation clearly did not benefit him. But when we were about to leave, Licensius suddenly said: – Remember that much of what we should learn from you is given to us in a mysterious and divine order, often even without your knowledge! “I see,” I say, “and I never tire of thanking God for it.” And since you notice this, it means you will certainly become better than you are now. That was the end of the day. 1. After several days, Alypiy came to see us. The day turned out to be clear and calm, as pleasant as possible in winter in these parts. Having gathered together, we happily proceeded to the nearest meadow. Our mother was also with us. During our long life together, I had the opportunity to see how great her gifts were and how ardently her soul strives for divine objects. At one of our last debates, which took place on my birthday and touched on very serious issues, she showed so much prudence and common sense that I could not help but recognize her as fully capable of comprehending true philosophy (however, you already know all this from the first book of this work). That’s why I decided to arrange everything in such a way that she could take part in this conversation of ours. So, when we settled down as comfortably as possible, I turned to the young men: “Although I am a little angry with you because of your childish attitude towards great subjects, however, by the grace of God, not without the intervention of order, it happened that the speech with which I tried to distract you from this frivolity took so much time that the discussion of such an important subject was postponed until the arrival of Alypius. Therefore, since I have already acquainted him with the question and shown how far we have advanced in its solution, are you ready, Licencius, to defend the cause that you have taken upon yourself along with your definition? After all, as far as I remember, you said that order is that by which God controls everything. – Ready as far as I can. - How, then, does God control everything through order or, if you like, providence? so that through order he controls himself, or only everything else, with the exception of himself? “There,” answered Licentius, “where everything is good, there is no order.” There reigns supreme equality, which does not need order. “So,” I say, “you don’t deny that with God everything is good?” – It turns out that neither God nor anything with God is governed by order? - So, in your opinion, is everything good really nothing? “On the contrary, it is the very essence.” “In that case, let me remind you of your own words that everything that exists is governed by order and that absolutely nothing exists that is outside of order.” “But,” Licentius objected, “there is still evil, as a result of which it happened that order embraces good as well.” Because order is governed not only by good, but by good and evil together. When we say everything, then, of course, we mean not only good. From this it follows that everything collectively that God controls is governed by order. -What do you think, does what is controlled move or is it motionless? “What happens in this world,” he answered, “moves.” “And the rest,” I ask, “no?” – That which exists with God is motionless, but everything else, in my opinion, moves. – So, by assuming that what exists with God does not move, but the rest moves, you thereby want to make it clear that everything that is in motion does not exist with God? “Repeat,” said Licentius, “the same thing, but more clearly; he asked for this, as it seemed to me, not because he did not understand my question, but wanting to stall for time and find something to answer.” “You said,” I say, “that what exists with God does not move, but everything else moves.” Consequently, since in everything that is with God you deny motion, it turns out that what moves exists without God. You won't deny that not everything in this world is motionless, will you? - Of course. But I affirm that everything in this world exists with God. I, in fact, did not say that anything exists without God, but only said that, in my opinion, anything that moves does not exist with God. – This means that this sky exists without God, because no one disputes the fact of its movement. “No,” he answered, “it is not without God.” – It turns out that with God there is also something that moves. – It’s difficult for me to grasp your thought; Therefore, I ask you, without waiting for my answer, if possible, guess for yourself what I am trying to say. It seems to me that, on the one hand, nothing exists without God, and, on the other, that what exists with God remains motionless. nevertheless, I cannot say that heaven is without God. I cannot say this not only because nothing exists without God, but also because heaven, as it seems to me, has something motionless in itself; it is either God himself, or something existing with God; although, of course, the sky itself undoubtedly rotates and moves. 2. “Define,” I say, “if you like, what does it mean to be with God and not to be without God?” for if a dispute now arises between us over the meaning of words, then we can easily and quickly stop it. “I,” he answered, “hate definitions.” – What should we do then? “Define,” he says, “yourself.” It’s easier for me to see the shortcomings of someone else’s definition than to formulate my own well. - If you please. Does it seem to you to exist with God that which is controlled by Him? – When I spoke about the immobility of what is with God, I did not mean this at all. “Look,” I say, “will you like this definition: everything that understands God exists with God?” – Of course, it’s hard to disagree with this. - So what, the wise man does not seem to you to understand God? – But the wise can be on the move, anywhere and anytime. And if so, then, the question arises, how will the proposition be true that everything that exists with God is motionless? “It’s funny,” he exclaimed, “as if it follows from my words that everything that a wise man does exists with God!” with God - only what he knows. “But,” I objected, “doesn’t a wise man know his books, his robe, his tunic, his belongings, if he has them, and other things of the same kind that fools know?” – I believe that knowing the tunic and the mantle does not mean being with God. “So,” I said, “it follows from your words that not everything that the wise man knows exists with God; but whatever is wise with God, the wise man knows. – That’s right: with God there is not what the wise man knows with the help of his senses, but only what he comprehends with his spirit. Those who know only their sensations do not exist not only with God, but, perhaps, with themselves. Then I realized from the expression on Trigetius’s face that he wanted to say something, but did not dare to enter into an argument. Therefore, when Licentius fell silent, I invited him to express his opinion. “As for bodily feelings,” said Trigetius, “it is difficult to say anything for sure about them.” After all, it’s one thing to feel, and another thing to know. Therefore, if we know something, then this “something” is contained exclusively in our mind and is comprehended by it alone. hence, if that which a wise man knows with his mind exists with God, then everything that a wise man knows can all be with God. Licencius approved this opinion, adding, for his part, something else, which I could not help but pay attention to. “The wise man,” he said, “undoubtedly exists with God, for he also knows himself.” This follows equally from what I heard from you, namely: with God, that which realizes God, and from what we said earlier: what the wise perceive, that is with God. But, I confess, I do not understand by what means a wise man uses bodily senses (I believe that we are not obliged to take them into account when we talk about a wise man), and I absolutely do not guess what the nature of this is. “So,” I noted, “you deny not only that the wise man consists of body and soul, but also that he consists of a complete soul - although it would be madness to deny that the part of it that uses the senses belongs to the soul.” It is not the eyes or ears themselves that feel, but something else. and if these feelings are not attributed to the mind, still less can they be attributed to any other part of the soul. All that remains is to attribute them to the body: but, in my opinion, nothing more absurd than this can be imagined. “The soul of a sage,” Licentius objected, “purified by virtues and already united with God, is worthy of the name wise, but nothing else in it can be called wise; but at the same time, those, so to speak, dirty clothes, from which such a soul was cleansed and, as it were, withdrew into itself, still continue to serve it. If all this should be called the soul, then, of course, it is in the service and subordination of that part of the soul, which is the only decent thing to call wise. I believe that memory also resides in this subordinate part. Thus, the sage uses this part of the soul as if it were a slave, showing it and pointing out to it, as if subjugated and subordinate, its proper boundaries, so that it does not dare to exalt itself before the master, using those feelings that are necessary not for the wise man, but for herself. This lower part of the soul also includes what is transitory. And what is memory needed for, if not for what comes and, as it were, runs away? The wise man embraces God; he enjoys the one who always abides, who is not expected to be, and is not afraid that he will not be, but who is truly existing because he always abides. But being motionless and remaining within himself, the sage also takes care to some extent about the property of his slave, so that the vigilant slave properly uses this property as a fruit and carefully guards it. Reflecting on what I had heard, I suddenly remembered that I myself had once expressed something similar in the presence of Licencius. “Thank you, Licentius,” I said, smiling, “to this servant of yours: if he had not prepared something for you from his own supply, you would probably now have had a very hard time.” For, although memory belongs to that part of the soul that gives itself to the service of common sense, yet now, believe me, it was she who helped you express this. and I, before moving again to a discussion about order, ask you: don’t you think a wise man needs memory at least for such, that is, honorable and necessary scientific pursuits? – Why, when all the objects of his knowledge are in himself? After all, the senses themselves do not need the help of memory when something is before our eyes. Moreover, it is not needed by the sage, for whom everything is before the inner gaze of his mind, who constantly and unchangeably contemplates God himself. And if I need memory to retain what I heard from you, then it means that I am not yet the master of this slave, but for now I myself serve her, although I am struggling not to serve, and, as it were, trying to free myself from her. Sometimes I command her, and she obeys me, and then it seems to me that I have already defeated her, and sometimes she again raises her head so much that I, unfortunate one, throw myself at her feet. That’s why, when we talk about being wise, I don’t want you to think that I even consider myself to be such. “And I hold the same opinion about myself.” But, however, let's talk about something else. Answer me, can a wise man really abandon his friends and, while his body is still functioning, in which he contains this slave of his bound by the bonds of the law, cease to provide benefits to people, especially to teach wisdom itself, which is what is primarily expected of him? Wanting to be a good teacher, won’t he often prepare for his lessons in advance, so that he can then present everything consistently and coherently? And this, in turn, won’t require the participation of memory? Thus, you must either reject the debt of benevolence in the wise, or admit that he keeps something in his memory. And if he commands the memory to preserve something from his wealth, which is necessary not for himself, but for his friends, is it possible that she, a faithful and obedient slave to the master’s orders, would not preserve it, if not for the sake of bringing fools to wisdom, then at least because she was ordered to preserve it? “I believe that the sage entrusts absolutely nothing to memory, since he always remains firmly in God both when he is silent and when he speaks to people. But his memory, this already well-trained slave, diligently preserves what it could sometimes do to serve its master during his competitions and thereby fulfill its grateful duty towards the one under whose power it lives. and she does this not for any reason, but by virtue of a higher law and a higher order. “This time,” I noted, “I leave your reasoning without objections in order to quickly move on to the continuation of what I started.” But someday later we will talk about this subject in more detail (for this subject is important and cannot be exhausted by such a brief speech about it), if it is the will of God and a favorable opportunity. 3. So, we have defined what it means to be with God. And when I said that with God that which realizes God, you added something more, namely: with God, you said, that which the wise perceive. In this case, I was greatly struck by the way in which you unexpectedly connected stupidity with God. For if everything that a wise man understands exists with God, and a wise man cannot avoid stupidity except by understanding it, then in your opinion it turns out that this infection will also be with God, although it is a sin to say so. Everyone fell silent, shocked by this conclusion, but Trigetius said: – Let this be answered by the one whose arrival, which happened so opportunely, we, I hope, did not welcome in vain. “God have mercy,” Alypius answered. - Was I really destined to keep my silence, so dear to me, only until now? Yes, I see my peace is disturbed. But be that as it may, I will try to answer this question if I secure it for the future, and you promise me that you will not demand anything more from me than this answer. “It does not suit your goodwill and your generosity, Alypius,” I remarked, “to conceal from us your opinion, which we greatly value.” However, do what you suggested; the rest will happen as order dictates. “And it’s true, since you elected me to defend order, then I should expect the best from order.” If I am not mistaken, according to your conclusion, it turned out that they imagine stupidity united with God precisely because they said that everything that a wise person comprehends exists with God. To what extent the latter position should be accepted - I will not say now; I will only draw your attention to the conclusion itself. With God, you said, everything exists that a wise man understands, but a wise man cannot avoid stupidity without understanding it. But, of course, no one can be awarded the name of the wise before he avoids stupidity. It is further said that with God there is that which the wise understand. Therefore, if anyone commits stupidity in order to avoid it, then he is not yet wise. When he becomes wise, then stupidity should no longer be counted among what he understands. On this basis: since what the wise already understand is connected with God, it will be correct and logical if we eliminate stupidity from God! “You, Alypius,” I objected, “answered as witty as always, but answered as one usually answers when he finds himself in someone else’s predicament.” In such a situation, since I hope you will not refuse to be foolish with me for now, what would we do if we met such a sage who would willingly undertake to free us from this misfortune through teaching and competition? I think I, for my part, would ask him, first of all, to show me what stupidity is, why and what kind it happens. Because, I don’t know about you, but stupidity forces me to reflect on it until I realize it and overcome it. So, adhering to your opinion, this sage should have told us the following: “You should have approached me with such a question at a time when I was stupid; now only you yourself can be your own teachers, because I no longer understand nonsense.” Having received such an answer from him, I would not hesitate to ask him to join our society and together with us look for another teacher. For, although I do not fully understand stupidity, nevertheless, in my opinion, nothing can be more stupid than such an answer. But perhaps he will be ashamed to leave us without everything and follow us. In this case, he will enter into competition with us and will talk about the misfortunes of stupidity. And we, expecting to receive an intelligible answer, will listen carefully to a person who does not know what he is saying; or we will think that he knows what he does not understand; or, finally, that stupidity is connected with God, according to the opinion of those whom you undertake to defend. The first two propositions, in my opinion, cannot be defended in any way; It means the latter remains, although you don’t like it. “I,” said Alypius, “never considered you an evil person.” And now, remaining completely unshakable in your conclusion, you force me, as if I had taken some kind of reward for the protection of those whom, in your words, I accepted under this protection, to return to them what was taken back. In this case, let them be satisfied with the fact that, having entered into an argument with you, I gave them a lot of time to think; and if they wanted to follow their advice, without any guilt on his part as a defeated lawyer, let them give in to you this time, and be more careful in the future. “I would like to listen to Trigetius, who during your defense was constantly trying to say something, especially since you have only recently known him, and this debate of ours is the best opportunity for you to get to know each other better.” “You can laugh at my stupidity,” Trigetius began, “but it seems to me that what stupidity is perceived as, which is the only and most important cause of unreason, should not be called intelligence.” “Well,” I said, “that’s a reasonable opinion.” True, I am greatly puzzled by what Alypius said: how can anyone teach correctly about something that he does not understand, and what harm can be caused to the mind by something that no one sees with the mind; weighing this, he was careful not to say what you said, although this opinion was known to him from the books of very learned men. However, paying attention to the bodily feelings, and taking into account, on the one hand, that the soul uses these same feelings, and on the other, that the soul itself is the only thing that comes into some comparison with the mind, I come to the conclusion that no one can see darkness. hence, if for the mind to understand is the same as for the senses to see, and if no one can see darkness, even if his eyes were open, healthy and clean, then there is nothing absurd in saying that stupidity cannot be understood; for stupidity is darkness to the eye of reason. After this, I will no longer be confused by the question of how one can avoid stupidity without understanding it. For just as we avoid darkness with our eyes because we don’t want not to see, we also try to avoid stupidity, not so much trying to understand it as grieving that, due to stupidity, we do not understand what can be understood, and feeling the presence of stupidity in ourselves, not because we understand it itself, but because we understand little of something else. 4. But let us return to order, so that we can finally return to ourselves Licensius, who left us. I ask you: do you think that a fool acts in everything he does because of order? But pay attention to how this question can bind you. If you say that he acts by virtue of order, then where will your definition be that order is that through which God controls everything that exists, if even a fool acts in accordance with order in his actions? if, on the contrary, you say that there is no order in the actions of a fool, then it turns out that there is something that order does not control. You don't want either one. In this case, be careful that you don’t frighten everything possible by defending order itself. “Although,” said Trigetius (Licentius was still absent), “it is not so difficult to answer your question, for some reason I can’t think of a comparison with which, in my opinion, I should confirm and clarify my thought.” However, I will say what I think, and in this case you should do the same as you did before, because your mention of darkness shed a lot of light on what was dark in my words. The life of a fool, although it does not receive the most definite direction and is not ordered from him, is nevertheless, by the action of divine providence, all included in the necessary order of things and, as it were, the very locality, located according to an unchangeable and eternal law, does not allow it to be where it should not be. Therefore, one who focuses his attention exclusively on stupidity alone experiences disgust, as if struck by great uncleanness. But if he distracts himself from it and begins to survey the entire universe as a whole, he will not find anything disordered, but on the contrary, everything seems to be distributed and located in its place. - Oh, how much and how beautifully God and this very (so that I believe in him more and more) some hidden order of things answers me through you! for what you express seems to me to be so true and sublime that I cannot even comprehend how you can say so, nor how you were able to acquire this information. But when expressing your opinion, you expressed a desire to confirm it with at least one example. I know countless examples of this and they make me completely agree with your opinion. Who, for example, could be more vile than an executioner? What is rougher and tougher than his soul? however, the laws recognize the role of the executioner as necessary and part of the order of well-ordered social life. and the executioner, being criminal at heart, serves to punish other criminals. What is more vile, what is more insignificant than beauty and more shameless than obscene women, procurers and similar people? Meanwhile, eliminate libertines from human society, and debauchery will bring its disorder everywhere. But on the other hand, put them in the place of matrons, and you will dishonor everything with shame and ugliness. To such an extent this kind of people is evil in life in its rights and despicable in its position! In the bodies of animals you see some members and cannot see others; although the order of nature did not want them not to exist, since they are necessary, it did not allow them to be exposed, since they are ugly. And they, having taken their place, gave up the best place to the best members. What was more pleasant to us and what in the village and at the dacha reminded us most of all of the theater, if not that cockfight, which was often mentioned in the previous book? At the same time, have we seen anything uglier than a defeated rooster? And yet, from this ugliness the beauty of the battle became even more perfect. That’s how it is, I think, and everything else – you just need to look closely. Poets, for example, fell in love with the so-called solecisms and barbarisms, and decided, changing the names, to call them schemes and metaplasmas and not avoid such obvious shortcomings. Throw them out of poetry, however, and you will immediately feel the lack of the best seasonings. But, on the other hand, collect a lot of all this in one place - and you will immediately get tired of all this rude, nasty, disgusting. Put all this into prose or judicial speech, and everyone will advise you to go to a booth with all this. The order that governs and balances all this does not tolerate what is superfluous in poetic speech, and what is alien to it in any other speech. A certain simplicity, even a kind of coarseness of speech, as its opposite, presents in a special light its lively turns of phrase and beautiful passages. If there were only simplicity and rudeness in it, you would discard it as base; but, on the other hand, if it were not for this simplicity and roughness in it, all those beautiful places would not stand out in it, would not dominate, so to speak, within their boundaries and possessions, but would interfere with themselves with their own brilliance and, in general, would produce disorder. 5. And in this case, beauty depends on order. Who is not afraid of deceptive conclusions that creep into consciousness little by little, either by weakening the falsehood or by evoking agreement with it? however, even in conscientious competitions, when expressed opportunely, they often have such power that, I don’t know how, but thanks to them the deception itself becomes sweet. Shouldn't we praise the order for this too? Finally, in music, in geometry, in the movements of the heavenly bodies, in the immutable laws of numbers, order dominates to such an extent that if anyone wanted to see its source, so to speak, and the most secret secrets, he would find them in these sciences or with their help he would be unmistakably led to it. For the study of these sciences, if only one indulges in them moderately (however, one should not be afraid of anything here except excess), cultivates in a person such a fighter and even a leader of philosophy that he himself ascends and raises many others to that highest level, beyond which one cannot and should no longer look for absolutely anything. From this height, focusing on human affairs, he covers them so widely with his gaze and distinguishes everything so much that he is no longer bothered by questions like the following: why does one person want to have children and does not have them, while another is burdened by the fertility of his wife; why does the one who is ready to give it generously need money, while the withered and lousy moneylender sleeps on buried treasures; why the family's inheritances are squandered and squandered by luxury, and the beggar, shedding tears all day, barely begs for one small coin; why some unworthy person rises in power and honor, while people with the purest morality remain unnoticed in the crowd. These and similar phenomena of human life often lead people to impiously think that we are not governed by any order of divine providence. Others, pious, virtuous and gifted with a bright mind, although they cannot come to terms with the idea that we have been abandoned by the Almighty God, however, confused by the kind of darkness and ugliness of such phenomena, do not see any order in them, and wanting the most hidden reasons to be explained to them, they often complain about their errors even in poetry... As for me, as far as I can advise my friends at all, to the best of my understanding, I believe that they should study all the sciences mentioned. Only in this way can we understand all this more clearly than daylight. If they are lazy, or devoted to other pursuits, or are no longer capable of science, let them turn to faith, by the bonds of which He draws them to Himself and frees them from these sorrowful and gloomy evils, Who does not allow the death of a single one who sincerely believes in Him, as religion prescribes. For there are two paths that we can follow when we are tormented by the darkness of surrounding phenomena: this is either the path of reason or the path of authority. Philosophy gives us reason, but, alas, it frees very few from darkness. However, it encourages them not only not to neglect the mysteries of faith, but, on the contrary, to understand them as they should be understood. This true and, so to speak, genuine philosophy has as its task nothing other than to teach what serves as the beginningless Beginning of all things, what kind of intelligence abides in Him and what comes from Him, in addition to any damage, for our salvation. The revered religion, which liberates nations by the power of pure and unshakable faith, teaches about this one God: father, son and holy spirit - not vaguely, as some say about it, and not unworthy of the Divine, as others say. As for the fact that the Most High God was pleased to accept and wear our human body, the more base it seems, the more it is filled with mercy and the less it has in common with human arrogance. And where does the soul originate, why does it live in this world, how much does it depend on God, what is its own and what it contributes to this or that nature, to what extent it is subject to death and how its immortality is justified - don’t all these questions deserve to be studied? Without a doubt - yes! But we will talk about this a little later, but for now I ask you to take note of the following: if anyone dares to seek knowledge of these subjects thoughtlessly and in violation of the required order of scientific studies, he will exchange his curiosity for criminal curiosity, scholarship for gullibility, doubt for unbelief. That is why, having just heard your such good and practical answers, I was surprised where you got this from, although, at the same time, I cannot disagree with them. Let's see, however, how long you can hold out. Now let them read to us the words of Licentius, who, I don’t know what he’s doing, has withdrawn from our conversation so long ago that he, it seems to me, will have to read what we said in his absence, like those of our friends who are not present with us now. Come here, Licencius, and try not to leave in the future. Listen, you approved of my definition of what it means to be with God, and wanted, as far as I could understand, to prove that the mind of the wise remains motionless with God. The following consideration greatly complicates me: how can it be that the mind of this sage remains motionless when his body (for he, too, has a body while he lives among people) moves back and forth. In the same way you could say that when a ship sails, the people on it do not move; although, of course, we will not dispute the fact that they own and manage the ship. Yes, if they controlled it and forced it to go wherever they wanted with just one thought, then even then, while on it, they could not help but move, as long as the ship itself moved. “The spirit,” said Licentius, “does not live in the body in such a way that the body commands the spirit.” “I’m not saying that either,” I answered. – But the rider does not sit on the horse in such a way that the horse controls him; however, although he forces the horse to go where he wants, along with the movement of the horse he himself also moves. – The rider himself can sit still. “You force us to define what it means to be in motion—do it, I ask you, if you can.” “Continue,” Licentius begged, “to provide me with your protection: do not ask again whether it is advisable for me to give definitions - I myself will hasten to present them to you as soon as I am able to do so.” When he said this, the boy who was entrusted with this kind of duty came running to us from the house and announced that it was time for dinner. “This boy,” I noted, “makes you not only define, but also clearly demonstrate what it means to move.” Let’s go and move from this place to another, because, if I’m not mistaken, this means making a movement. Everyone laughed and headed towards the table. 6. Having refreshed ourselves, we, since the sky was overcast with clouds, sat down in our usual place in the bathhouse. “So Licencius,” I said, “do you agree that movement is nothing more than the process of moving from one place to another?” “But do you agree that no one can find themselves in a place they have never been to before and remain motionless?” “I don’t understand you,” he answered. - If something was first in one place, and now in another, would you agree that for this movement it was necessary to make a movement? “But can,” I say, “the living body of a sage be here with us so that his soul will be far from here?” “Even,” I was surprised, “if he were talking to us and teaching us?” “If,” answered Licentius, “he taught us wisdom itself, I would then say that he is not with us, but with himself.” - So he is not in the body? “But a body that is devoid of spirit, is it not dead?” But I meant a living body! “I don’t know how,” he answered, “to explain it.” On the one hand, I admit that a person’s body cannot be alive if there is no spirit in it; on the other hand, I cannot say that the spirit of a wise man would not be with God, wherever his body is. - I'll try to help you. Since God is everywhere, then, perhaps, wherever the wise man goes, he will find God everywhere, with whom he can be. hence we have the opportunity not to deny that the wise man moves from place to place, and this means being in motion, and that he is with God. “I agree,” he said, “that the body makes such a transition from place to place, but I deny this in relation to the mind, to which, in fact, the name wise is applicable.” 7. “For now I will yield to you,” I said, “so that this mysterious subject, which requires a longer and more careful discussion, does not distract us from the main topic.” But let’s focus on this: since we have defined what it means to be with God, can’t we also know what it means to be without God; although this, I think, is already clear in itself. For, I believe that those who are not with God, in your opinion, are without God. “If,” Licentius noted, “I had not lacked words, then I might have been able to say in such a way that you would have liked my answer.” But please forgive me my inexperience, and, as befits you as a teacher, predict with your quick mind what I would like to express. In my opinion, although such people are not with God, God does not abandon them. Therefore, I cannot say that those whom God does not abandon are without God. But, on the other hand, I will not say that they are with God, since they do not have God. To have God, as we decided during the previous competition, which we conducted with such pleasure on your birthday, means nothing other than enjoying God. But, I admit, this contradiction scares me: how can one be neither without God nor with God. “Don’t worry about it,” I said. – Who will pay attention to words when the deed itself is indisputable? But let us return once again to the definition of order you gave. Order, you said, is how God controls everything. and in my opinion, there is nothing that is not controlled by God: after all, from this you drew the conclusion that absolutely nothing can be found outside of order. “I remain unconvinced,” he answered, “but I already see what you want to say: does God also control what, in our opinion, is bad?” - Great, you completely penetrated my thoughts. But if you guessed what I wanted to ask, then guess what should be answered to my question. “I can’t gather my thoughts,” answered Licentius, shaking his head and spreading his arms. At that moment, my mother unexpectedly came to us. Licencius, after a short silence, asked me to ask him the same thing again (he did not know that Trigetius had already answered this question). “What,” I said, “or why should I repeat it?” What has been done, they say, don’t do it. Therefore, I would rather advise you to read what was said before, if you could not hear it. I, however, was not angry at your avoidance of our conversation and endured it long enough, on the one hand, so as not to interfere with what you were thinking about, having gone deep into yourself and moving away from us, and on the other, because the continuation of my speech with the help of this style could not be lost on you. now I am asking about something that we have not yet tried to examine carefully. for, after how, I don’t know by what order, the question of order arose among us, I remember you said that God’s justice distinguishes between the good and the evil and rewards each according to his deserts. It is impossible, as far as I understand, to define justice more clearly. But tell me, do you think that God was once unjust? “And if,” I say, “God has always been just, then it means that good and evil have always existed.” “In my opinion,” said the mother, “there cannot be any other consequence.” In fact, when there was no evil, then there was no judgment of God; and if at some time God did not reward the good and the evil according to their deserts, then he could not be just. “So,” Licentius remarked, “in your opinion, we should think that evil has always existed?” “That,” she answered, “I don’t dare say.” - What will we say? – I asked. – If God is just because he judges the good and the evil, then he was not just when there was no evil. At the same time, while they were silent, I noticed that Trigetius wanted to intervene in the conversation, and I gave him a sign. “God,” he said, “is generally just.” He can distinguish between good and evil, even if they did not exist, simply by virtue of the fact that he is just. In fact, when we say that Cicero investigated the conspiracy of Catiline prudently, showed moderation, without tainting himself with any selfishness in order to spare the evil ones, with all justice he handed them over to the highest punishment of the Senate, courageously endured all the arrows of the enemies and, as he himself puts it, a huge amount of envy - is it really possible that he would not have had all these virtues in him, if Catalina had not prepared for such a great republic? dangers? virtue in a person should be considered in itself, and not according to any matter of this kind, and even more so it should be considered in God, if, however, given the limitations of concepts and words, it is permissible in this regard to compare them with each other in one way or another. To understand this, let's put it this way. since God was always just, when evil appeared, which had to be separated from good, he immediately began to reward everyone according to their deserts; for in this case he did not need to learn justice, but only to apply to the case what he always possessed. When Licencius and his mother approved of this opinion, I asked: - Well, Licencius, what do you say now? Is your judgment justified that “there is nothing apart from order,” a judgment that you so persistently defended? for the action that brought evil into existence is not an action in the divine order. “I,” he said, “are surprised and feel some embarrassment that I have so unexpectedly lost my business.” So, now I decisively affirm that order began from the moment from which evil began. – So, the appearance of evil did not occur due to order, if order began after evil occurred. But with God order always existed; and whether this nothingness, which is called evil, has always been, or whether it began someday - since order is either good itself, or from good - without order there has never been anything and never will be. There is some stronger objection, but, as usual, it has escaped memory, which, in my opinion, is also in the order of things - according to merit, or condition, or order of life. “I don’t know,” he answered, “how I so thoughtlessly expressed this judgment, which I now myself reject: for I should have said not that order began after evil appeared, but that both justice, about which Trigetius reasoned, and order existed with God, but they received their use after evil appeared. “And again,” I said, “you stumble on the same thing: for what you want least of all remains irrefutable.” In fact, whether there was order with God, or whether it began from the time when evil appeared, in any case it turns out that evil occurred apart from order. If you agree with this, you will have to admit that something could have happened outside of order, and this undermines and shatters the opinion you defend. If you do not agree, then evil will appear to have originated from the divine order, and you will have to recognize God as the author of evil; and, in my opinion, there can be nothing more vile than such blasphemy. He either didn’t understand this, or pretended that he didn’t understand: and when I explained my thought to him, changing and turning it around in different ways, he couldn’t find what to say and fell silent. “I,” the mother said then, “don’t think that there could be nothing outside the divine order; for the evil that came into being could by no means come into being by divine order: but divine justice would not have it remain disordered, and converted and brought it into the order it deserved. Seeing that they all sought God very diligently and each to the best of his ability, but at the same time no one possessed the order that constitutes the subject of our discussion, under the condition of which it is possible to achieve an understanding of the inexplicable greatness of God, I said: – If, as I see, you love order so much, then let’s not allow ourselves to be perverse and disorderly. For, although the innermost reason promises to prove to us that nothing happens outside of the divine order, however, if we heard some school teacher trying to teach a child to read by letters, whom no one had previously taught the letters, then, I believe, we would consider him worthy not only of ridicule as an unreasonable teacher, but also of tying him up as a demoniac, since he does not observe order in teaching. No one will argue that simple people do many things that are condemned and ridiculed by scientists, and crazy things that are condemned even by fools. However, even all this, which seems perverted to us, some sublime science, the existence of which the crowd does not even suspect, promises to prove to the souls devoted to it and who love God that it does not take place outside the divine order, and to prove with such clarity that the very sums of numbers when added cannot be truer for us. 8. This science is the divine law itself, which, eternally remaining motionless and immutable with God, is, as it were, reproduced in the souls of the wise, so that they can know that they live the better and more exalted the more perfectly they contemplate this law in thought and the more diligently they fulfill it in life. Thus, this science commands those who wish to know it to follow at the same time a twofold order, one side of which concerns life, the other - the pursuit of science. Young men devoted to her must live, abstaining from love affairs, from the lures of the belly and throat, from immodest decoration and adornment of the body, from empty games, from sleep and laziness, from vanity, envy and hatred, from ambition and lust for power. Let the love of money be considered the surest poison of all hope. Let them not do anything sluggishly, but do nothing zealously. Let them not harbor any anger towards the mistakes of their neighbors, or let them curb it so that it seems as if it does not exist. Let them not hate anyone. Let no vice be left unattended. When they punish, let them be careful not to be too strict; when they forgive, let them be too soft. Let them not punish anything that cannot be better; let them not excuse anything that is being made worse. Let them consider as their relatives all those over whom they will be given power. Let them serve in such a way that it would be a shame to dominate them, let them dominate in such a way that it is pleasant to serve them. Let them not be harsh towards the mistakes of others. Let them avoid enmity in the most careful manner, endure enmity toward themselves indifferently, and make peace as quickly as possible. In relationships and dealing with people, it is enough to keep this one popular saying: let no one do anything that they do not wish for themselves. Let no one seek to govern the republic except the perfect. But let them try to become perfect at senatorial age, or, more precisely, in their youth. But even the one who turns to this late should not think that there are no rules for him; at a mature age he will retain them more easily in all respects. All their lives, in every place, at every time, let them have or try to have friends. Let worthy people be served, even if they did not expect it. Let them pay little attention to the proud and let them not be proud themselves. Let them live decently and decently. Let them honor God, meditate on Him, seek Him, strengthened by faith, hope and love. Let them wish you peace and firm order, a sound mind and a peaceful life. 9 . Now I should talk about how those young men devoted to science who intend to live as described above should study. There are two paths that lead us to the study of science: authority and reason. In relation to time, authority takes precedence, and in relation to the essence of the matter, reason. For the first is preferred when it is necessary to dispose, while the other is most valued when achieved. So, although the authority of good people seems more useful for the ignorant crowd, and reason more decent for the learned, however, since every person becomes educated from the uneducated, and every uneducated person cannot know how he should appear before his teachers and through what life he can become capable of learning, then for everyone who wants to learn the great and hidden, only authority serves as the door to this. He who enters this door follows without any hesitation the rules of the best life; having become, thanks to them, capable of learning, he will then learn how reasonable everything that he followed before the discovery of reason is; and what is this reason itself, which he now follows, emerging from the cradle of authority strong and mature; and what is the mind in which everything is, or, better said, which itself is everything; and which, being outside of everything, serves as the beginning of everything. Few are capable of knowing this, and moreover, even after real life, no one can comprehend it. As for those who, content with mere authority, are constantly concerned only with good rights and pious objects, either despising or not being able to study the free and sublime sciences, then I do not know how to call them blessed while they still live among people; however, I am unshakably confident that as soon as they leave their body, they are freed from their ignorance - easier or more difficult, depending on whether they lived more or less well. Authority is partly divine, partly human; but the true, lasting and highest authority is that which is called divine. In relation to him, however, one must be afraid of the amazing deceit of those airy beings who, with the help of some predictions about things related to the bodily senses, and some manifestations of their power, are accustomed to very easily deceive souls eager to penetrate the secrets of transitory happiness, or seeking illusory power, or timid before empty miracles. So, the divine authority should be called the one who not only in sensory signs exceeds all human ability, but, controlling a person, shows him to what extent he himself has lowered himself for his sake; commands him not to succumb to feelings for which the above-mentioned predictions seem worthy of surprise, but to rise to the level of intelligence; and at the same time makes clear how strong the said falsity is here, why it does it and how little it deserves attention. For this authority must show its power by its deeds, teach mercy by its humiliation, and teach the laws of nature by its instructions; and all this is taught in a more mysterious and faithful manner in the religion into which we are initiated, and in which the life of the virtuous is very easily purified, not by ambiguous contests, but by the authority of the sacraments. Human authority is mostly deceptive; however, it seems to be rightly attributed to those who, as far as the senses of ignorant people can perceive, know how to teach perfectly and themselves live as they instruct others to live. If they also receive some gifts of fortune, thanks to which they seem even greater, and, despising such, even more worthy, then in this case the one who would trust the rules of life given by them would, perhaps, be right. 10. “A majestic way of life,” said Alypius, “is both fully and briefly outlined by you before our eyes; although we constantly strive for it, guided by your daily lessons, today you have made us desire it even more and seek it more ardently. If it were possible to achieve and adhere to it not only for us, but for all people, I would like it all to be as easy to imitate as it was amazing to hear. For I don’t know how (oh, if only we ourselves were far from this), but the human spirit, while it hears something like this, proclaims it to be heavenly, divine and completely true, but when it achieves this, it behaves, alas, completely differently. So, in my opinion, either divine people can live this way, or not without divine help. “These rules of life,” I noted, “which you, Alypius, liked, although expressed in my words, were not invented by me, which, however, you know very well.” The books of great and almost divine people are filled with them; I considered it necessary to express them not for your sake, but for the sake of these young men and with the sole purpose that they would not have the right to neglect them. For I want to be believed only as one who teaches and presents evidence; I believe that you also inserted your word to further excite them in view of the greatness of the subject. Indeed, it should not be difficult for you to follow what you grabbed with such greed and rushed towards with such swiftness of your amazing nature that I became a teacher of words for you, and you became a teacher of deeds for me. Now there is not the slightest reason, or at least a reason, to lie: I believe that as a result of my false praise you will not become more devoted to science, but our boys know both of us, and the one to whom this book is sent knows all of us. But the number of people who are virtuous and devoted to the best morals, in my opinion, if you think what you say, you imagine to be much smaller than it seems to me; but many of them are completely hiding from you. And among the famous, many hide what is amazing in them; because all this is in the soul, which is inaccessible to the senses; and very often, wanting to adapt to the conversations of vicious people, a person says what he approves or desires only for show. He does a lot even against his own desire, in order to avoid either human hatred or absurd gossip. This is why it happens that we consider many people not to be what they really are and what their friends know them to be. You can be convinced of this by some of the great spiritual gifts of our friends, which only we know about. This misconception occurs mainly due to the fact that many do not suddenly turn to a virtuous life; and until they become famous for any brilliant deeds, they are considered to be what they were. Not to go far for an example: who of those who knew these young men before would immediately believe that they sought great things with such zeal and unexpectedly at such an early age showed such hostility to pleasure? Let us banish this opinion from our souls: for that divine help, which you piously mentioned at the end of your speech, lavishes its mercy on all nations much more widely than some think about it. But let us return again to the order of our competition, and since enough has been said about authority, let us see what significance reason has. 11. Reason is the movement of thought which has the power to distinguish and explain that which is to be studied. However, the human race can extremely rarely use his guidance to know God, as well as the very soul existing in him or anywhere else. and this is because anyone who has entered the realm of these feelings finds it difficult to return to himself. Therefore, although people in these deceptive conditions try to do everything in accordance with reason, they do not know, with the exception of a very few, what reason itself is and what its properties are. It seems strange, but it is true. In this case, this reservation is enough, because if I now decided to explain to you how to understand this important subject, I would be just as absurd as I would be insolent and arrogant if I declared that at least I myself already understood it. However, as far as the mind pleases to manifest itself in things that seem to you known, we will, if we are only able, trace it to the extent necessary for the subject of our goal. First, let us consider those cases in which this word - reason - is usually used. In particular, of course, we must pay attention to the fact that the ancient sages defined man himself as follows: man is a rational and mortal animal. After indicating the genus called the word - animal, we find here two specific differences, which, in my opinion, should remind a person where he should return and from where he should run away. For just as the exit of the soul is a fall into the realm of the mortal, so its return must be into the realm of reason. With one of these words, namely the name - rational, the soul is separated from dumb animals, by another name - mortal, from the divine. So, if she does not keep the first one behind her, she will be a dumb animal, and if she does not move away from the last one, she will not be divine. But the most learned men are in the habit of distinguishing with wit and subtlety between the subjectively rational (rationale) and the objectively rational (rationabile). This distinction should in no way be lost sight of for our purpose. They called subjectively rational that which uses or can use reason; and objectively reasonable is what is done or said reasonably. For example, we can call these baths and our speech objectively reasonable; subjectively reasonable either the one who built these baths, or us who are speaking here. So, from the subjectively rational soul, reason passes into the objectively rational, that is, into what is done or said. So, I see two types of objects in which the power and strength of the mind can be observed by the senses: these are human deeds, subject to sight, and words, subject to hearing. In relation to both, the soul, according to the necessary conditions of bodily life, uses two messengers: one of them is the eyes, the other is the ears. Therefore, when we see something formed from mutually proportional parts, we say, not without reason, that it appears reasonable. in the same way, when we hear some harmonious singing, we have no doubt that it sounds reasonable. But we would ridicule anyone who said: it smells smart, or tastes smart, or feels smart - unless he used such an expression in relation to something specially prepared by people so that it smelled like that, or tasted like that, or warmed like that, or evoked another sensation. Thus, it would not be funny if someone said about a place from which snakes are driven out with the help of substances that emit a strong odor, taking into account the reason why this was done: it smells like that; or would call a drink prepared by a doctor reasonably bitter or reasonably sweet; or in the case where the doctor would order the patient to moderate the temperature of the bath, would say that it is hot or lukewarm reasonably. But no one, entering the garden and bringing a rose to his nose, will dare to say: how intelligently it smells, even if he smelled it as prescribed by a doctor. For in this case, only the doctor’s instructions can be reasonable, but not the smell itself. and this is not at all because the smell of roses is natural, for although we can call the food prepared by the cook intelligently prepared, it is not customary to say that it has an intelligent effect on the taste if there is no special reason for it, and the food simply satisfies an immediate need. After all, if they ask someone for whom a doctor has prepared a drink why it should taste so sweet, then a special reason is given why it is so, namely, the type of illness; and this reason no longer lies in the feeling of sweetness itself, but separately from it, in the body. If you ask a gourmet with an excited appetite why a certain dish is pleasant, he will answer that he simply likes it or gives him pleasure. No one would call his delicacy reasonably sweet, unless the pleasure it gives is necessary for something else, and what he is waiting for is prepared just that way. Let us dwell, as far as we can, on some of the traces of reason in the senses, and, with regard to sight and hearing, on the pleasure they themselves provide. In relation to other feelings, as was said above, the rational usually manifests itself not in the pleasure it provides, but in something else, that is, in the fact that it is caused by a living rational being for some known purpose. As for vision, everything in which a reasonable proportionality of parts is noticed is usually called beautiful. As for hearing, when we find the word reasonable and measured singing harmonious, the pleasure received from this is called by its proper name. But neither in beautiful things do we have the habit of calling the color we like reasonable, nor in the pleasures of hearing do we call the clearest and purest sound so. So, in the pleasures delivered by these feelings, we recognize as belonging to the mind that in which a certain harmony and proportionality is manifested. Thus, in this very building, carefully examining the details, we cannot help but be unpleasantly surprised by the fact that we see one of the doors placed on the side, and the other almost in the middle, and, however, not in the very middle. This is because in all structures, the incorrect measurement of parts, unless it is caused by any special need, seems to cause some kind of insult to vision itself. And how attractive these three external windows seem to us, one in the middle and two on the sides! This goes without saying. Therefore, the architects themselves call it rational (ratio) in their technical language, and when the parts are arranged discordantly, they say that this is irrational. The same provision applies to almost all types of art and human affairs. and in verses, in which we also find reason related to the pleasure of hearing, who does not feel that all this pleasantness is brought about by proportionality? But when a histrion dances, although the harmonious movements of its members also give pleasure to the eyes due to their proportionality, however, if all his gestures appear to attentive spectators as signs of certain objects, his dance is called reasonable because it signifies or shows something well, but with the exception of the pleasure of the senses. It is also true that if someone depicts Venus with wings, and Cupid in a cape, then at least in the picture they were given an amazingly beautiful movement and position, this image will offend not the eyes, but through the eyes - the soul; because it would be an insult to the eyes if there were no beauty in the movements. The latter would refer to the feeling in which the soul receives pleasure by being mixed with the body. So, feeling is one thing, and another thing is that through feeling: beautiful movement gives pleasure to the feeling, but through feeling, the soul receives only beautiful meaning in movement. This is seen even more clearly in regard to hearing: for what sounds pleasant gives pleasure and pleasure to the ear itself, but the meaning that is expressed by this sound, although transmitted by the ear, relates exclusively to the soul. Thus, when we hear the famous verses of Virgil: Why are the winter luminaries in such a hurry? Into the depths of the waters? and why are the nights so long? We praise their sound for one thing, and their meaning for something completely different; and we do not say in the same sense: it sounds reasonable and it is said reasonably. 12. So, there are three types of objects in which this objectively rational is revealed. Firstly, in actions aimed at any goal, secondly, in words, thirdly, in pleasures. The first encourages us not to do anything rashly; second, to properly convey thought through words; the latter is blissful to contemplate. The first is expressed in rights, the last two - in knowledge, which is what we are talking about. For that subjective-rational that exists in us, that is, that which is endowed with reason and, in turn, produces or follows the rational-objective, is connected by certain social bonds with those with which it has a common reason. But since a person could not establish strong communication with a person if they did not talk to each other and, thus, did not communicate their feelings and thoughts to each other, this subjective-reason found it necessary to designate objects with words, that is, with some sound symbols, so that people who are not able to directly feel their souls would use, as it were, an interpreter to establish mutual relations between them. But no one could hear what the absent people were saying. Therefore, the mind invented writing, designating and distinguishing all the sounds of the larynx and tongue. But he could not have done any of this if the multitude of things appeared infinite in the mind, without certain definite boundaries. Of necessity, attention was also paid to the benefits of notation. When these two discoveries were made, the profession of scribes and accountants appeared - like a kind of childhood of grammar - which Varro calls literacy, but I don’t remember what it’s called in Greek. Continuing to move forward, the mind noticed that of the same sounds with which we speak and which it has already designated in writing, some are formed in the variously opened larynx evenly and cleanly, without any collisions, others, from various compressions of the lips, retain only a certain sound, while others, finally, cannot clearly come out of the mouth without attaching the first or second to themselves. Therefore, he named the letters in the order in which they were presented: vowels, semi-vowels and silent ones. Then he noted the syllables; further, the words were divided into eight genders, their changes, correctness, and combinations were noted in a skillful and subtle way. Then, without losing sight of numbers and measurement, he paid attention to the pronunciation of words and syllables, slowed down in various ways, and discovered the double and simple longitude with which long and short syllables were pronounced. And he noted this and brought it under precise rules. The grammar might already be complete; but since by its very name it proclaims that it promises written stories, which is why it is called literature in Latin, everything that was transmitted in writing as worthy of memory was necessarily attributed to it. So, history has been added to this science, although under one name, but a boundless, polysyllabic subject, causing more trouble than pleasure or truth, and giving not so much trouble to the historians themselves as to the grammarians. for who can say that he saw such an ignorant person who did not hear that Daedalus flew? But would the one who invented this seem a liar, the one who believed it a fool, and the one asking about it an insolent person? or, if our friends (in such cases I usually heartily regret them) had not answered what Euryale’s mother was called, would they not have been accused of ignorance; even if they had the right to call the questioners themselves empty and absurd rather than inquisitive? 13. So, this mind, having completed and arranged the grammar, came to the idea of ​​finding and exploring the very force that gave birth to art. For by defining, dividing and bringing it to consciousness, he not only ordered it and gave it a certain harmony, but also protected it from all impurity and lies. And how would he have begun to create another if he had not first distinguished, designated and put in order these tools and instruments of his and had not produced that very science of sciences, which is called dialectics? she teaches to teach, but she also teaches to learn; the mind reveals itself in it and shows what it is, what it wants, what it can do. She knows to know; she alone not only wants, but can also make people knowledgeable. But since there are a lot of stupid people who, being persuaded to do something only on condition of obvious benefit and benefit to them, do not follow the truth in its pure form, which a rare mind understands, but their own feelings and habits, then such people had to be not only and not so much taught (to the extent that they could be taught anything at all), but often and strongly aroused. That part of itself that would do this, filling its bosom with amusements to scatter them to the people - the part whose content was more forced by circumstances than its pure content - she called rhetoric. That side of the mind which is called objectively rational has advanced so much in free pursuits and sciences. 14. After this, the mind wished to rush towards the most blissful contemplation of the divine things themselves. But in order not to fall from a height, he took care to find support and make his way through his own possessions and in a certain sequence. He was looking for beauty that he could contemplate alone and on his own, but his feelings got in the way. So, he entered into a struggle partly with the feelings themselves, which, proclaiming that they were the truth, with their annoying chatter distracted him, who was in a hurry to go to something else. He began, firstly, with hearing, which declared as its property the very words from which reason had already compiled grammar, dialectics, and rhetoric. Very powerful in discernment, he immediately saw the difference between the sound and that of which it serves as a sign. he realized that nothing but sound is subject to the judgment of hearing, and this sound comes in three types: one he found in the voice of animate beings, the other is produced by blowing into special instruments, and the third is formed by impact. The first category includes tragedies, comedies, all kinds of choruses and in general everything that is sung and pronounced in one’s own voice. Flutes and similar instruments are intended for the second type. The third is given zithers, lyres, cymbals and everything that produces a harmonic sound when struck. But he found such material most despicable if the sounds were formed without an exact measure of time and without a certain variety of sharpness and density. In this he recognized the very elements that in grammar, when he studied syllables carefully, he called stops and stresses. and since it was easy to notice that the shortness and length of syllables in words are scattered throughout the speech in almost equal quantities, he tried to arrange and combine the indicated feet in certain rows and, following first of all the meaning itself, isolated small parts, which he called ceses and members. And so that the rows of feet would not lengthen to such an extent that they could tire his attention, he set a limit for them, from which they would return, and for this reason he called them poems. And for what there was no definitive end established, but which was nevertheless expressed by a reasonable sequence of feet, he designated the name rhythm, which can be translated into Latin by the word numerus (number). Thus he produced poets. When I saw the great importance of their works not only from the side of sounds, but also from the side of language and content, I accorded them great honor and gave them power over any reasonable inventions they wished. But he allowed the grammarians to be judges over them, since they traced their origins to the same science. So, having taken this fourth step, he noticed that here, both in the rhythms and in the very measure of speech, numbers reign and make everything. He looked very carefully at what kind they were, and found them divine and eternal, especially because with their help he developed everything that was most sublime. And it was already becoming painful for him to endure that their brilliance and clarity were obscured by the corporeal matter of sounds. And since what is contemplated by the mind is always present and is recognized as immortal, and numbers are such, and sound passes into the past and is imprinted in memory, then it was invented by reasonable poetic invention that the muses are the daughters of Jupiter and Memoria (Memory). And therefore this science, which takes part of itself from feeling, part from the mind, received the name music. 15. From here the mind moved into the realm of vision and, examining the earth and sky, felt that it liked nothing other than beauty, and in beauty - images, in images - dimensions, in dimensions - numbers. and he asked himself questions: is the line like this, is the roundness like this, are all the other forms and images that exist in his concept like this. he found them much worse - he found that everything that the eyes see cannot in any way be compared with what the mind sees. Having distinguished everything and ordered it, he elevated it to a science and called it geometry. The movement of the sky made a strong impression on him, thereby forcing him to take a closer look at it and explore it. and there, in the constant alternation of times, in the precise and determined courses of the stars, in known spaces and distances, he saw the dominance of the same dimension and the same numbers. Reducing this in a similar way, through definition and distinction, to order, he produced astrology - a subject of utmost importance for the superstitious and torture for the curious. So, in all these sciences, he encountered everything subordinate to numbers, but in such a way, however, that these numbers appeared more clearly in those dimensions that he, reflecting and weighing to himself, saw as the truest, and these, which are subject to the senses, rather reminded him of only the shadows and traces of those. This gave him courage and great determination: he dared to prove the immortality of the soul. He examined everything carefully; I fully understood that he could do a lot, and that he could – he could do it through numbers. He was awakened by a certain miracle and he began to suspect that maybe he himself was a number, the very number by which everything is calculated, and if he was not a number, then in the number there was the One Whom he was striving to achieve. He grabbed hold of Him with all his strength, which - the future index of universal truth, the same one that Alypius mentioned when we discussed the Academicians - was already in his hands, like Proteus. For false images of those things that we count, deviating from that most mysterious thing with the help of which we count, distract the thought and often allow it to escape, already caught. 16. If someone does not succumb to them and everything that is expounded at length and in detail in so many sciences can lead to some simple unity, true and accurate, then he, most worthy of the name of a scientist, does not in vain seek the divine, not only for faith, but also for contemplation, for understanding and for knowledge. And the one who is still a slave to lusts and passionately seeks things that are perishing, or, although he runs away from them and lives purely, does not know what nothing is, what formless matter is, what soulless formation is, what is body, what is space, what is time; what exists in space, what in time; what is movement in space, what is movement not in space, what is continuous movement, what is eternity; what does it mean to not be in space and nowhere, and what does it mean to be outside of time and always; and that - to be nowhere and not to be anywhere, and never to be, and never to be - so whoever, not knowing all this, would decide to ask questions and reason, not talking about the Highest God, who is better known by ignorance, but about his very soul, he will sin as much as he can sin; but it is much easier for one who has understood numbers that are simple and comprehensible to the mind to understand this much more easily. Not to mention that the very numbers are comprehended by those who sufficiently study the mentioned series of sciences, having certain mental talents for this, taking advantage of leisure due to their age or some fortunate circumstances, and having a particularly ardent zeal for their studies. For, although all these liberal arts are studied partly for everyday use, partly for the knowledge and contemplation of things, it is very difficult to acquire experience in them, except for one who, being gifted with excellent abilities, devotes himself to continuous and constant study of them from childhood. 17. And which of these sciences is needed for our question, then don’t let it scare you, mother, that this is some kind of immeasurable forest of objects. For out of all, very few will be chosen, but they will be significant, and although difficult for many to understand, for you, mother (for your mind is opening up to me every day from new and new sides, and your soul, either due to age or amazing abstinence, alien to all little things, is deeply concentrated in itself), the easier they are, the more difficult they are for those of little ability and leading a miserable life. Of course, I would be grossly lying if I said that you would easily master speech that is free from errors in pronunciation and language. For I myself, who was very necessary to study this, are still reproached by the Italians for the pronunciation of many words: although, in turn, they are also reproached by me regarding the pronunciation itself. For it is one thing to know a language by study, another thing to know it, so to speak, by inheritance. As for the so-called solecisms, it is quite possible that some scientist, with careful observation, will discover them in my speech; there was a man who with great knowledge proved to me that Cicero himself made some errors of this kind. Barbarisms are so widespread in our time that even the speech that has been preserved in Rome seems barbaric. But you, neglecting these things as childish and not concerning you, have studied the almost divine power and nature of grammar so much that it seems as if you kept its soul with yourself and left its body to others. About other sciences of this kind I will say the following. If you despise them in the depths of your soul, then as much as a son, I dare and as much as you allow, I ask you, firmly and carefully preserve that faith that you received from the venerable sacraments, and then remain firm and vigilant in this life and morality. But at the same time, judge carefully about dark, and at the same time divine, objects, for example: how God does not create anything evil, and, moreover, is omnipotent; where does so much evil come from? in the name of what good God created the world, for which he had no need; whether evil always existed or began in time, and if it always existed, then did it exist by God’s decree, and if it existed, then did this world always exist in which this evil dominates according to the divine order; if the world began to exist at some time, then how, before it began to exist, God’s power controlled evil; and what was the need to create the world in order to imprison in it, as a punishment for souls, the evil that was already restrained by the power of God; and if there was a time when there was no evil under the power of God, then why did something suddenly happen that had not happened in previous eternal times. For to claim that God has come up with a new decision is not impious, but it is extremely absurd. If we say that evil was inconvenient and, as it were, terrible for God, as some people think, then no scientist will be able to refrain from laughing, and every unlearned person will get angry. For what harm could this unknown nature of evil do to God? If they say that she could not have caused it, there will be no reason for the creation of the world, and if they say that she could, it will be an unforgivable crime to believe that God can be subject to corruption in such a way that at least he does not protect his own being from damage by his power. After all, they recognize that the soul under such conditions is subject to punishment, and at the same time they do not want to see absolutely any difference between its essence and the essence of God. So, about all these and other subjects of the same kind, one must either conduct research in the above order of scientific studies, or not do any research at all. 18. And lest anyone think that our requirements are too strict, I will say the following more clearly and briefly: no one should seek knowledge of the above-mentioned subjects without this, as it were, double knowledge: the ability to reason correctly and knowledge of the power of numbers. If anyone considers this too much, let him better study numbers alone or dialectics alone. And if this too seems immeasurable to him, let him know only perfectly what a unit in numbers is and what meaning it has, not in relation to the highest law and the highest order of all things, but in relation to our everyday thoughts and actions. For this kind of knowledge is already the subject of philosophy itself; and philosophy also seeks in it unity, but more sublime and more divine. Two questions form the subject of her study: one about the soul, the other about God. The first leads us to knowledge of ourselves, the other - to the knowledge of our origin. This one is more pleasant to us, this one is more expensive, this one makes us worthy of a blessed life, and this one makes us blessed. The first is a subject of research for students, the last is for scientists. This is the order of exercises in wisdom, through which everyone becomes capable of understanding the order of things, that is, of knowing the two worlds and the very father of the universe, of whom the soul has no other knowledge than the knowledge in which it does not know him. So, adhering to order, the soul, already devoted to philosophy, first of all studies itself; and when this study convinces her that reason is her property, or that she herself is reason, and in reason there is nothing better and more powerful than numbers, or reason itself is nothing other than number, she will then say to herself the following: “By some inner and secret movement of mine, I can distinguish and unite what is subject to study, and this power of mine is called reason. But what else can be subject to distinction, if not that which is considered one, but is not one, or in reality is not as individual as it is believed? on the other hand, why combine anything if not so that it can be as single as possible? So, both in differentiation and in unification, I desire unity and love unity. But when I differentiate, my goal is to purify, when I unite, to return to its original form. In the first case, what is alien is eliminated, in the latter, what is familiar is united. For a stone to be a stone, all its parts and its entire nature are united into one. But won’t a tree cease to be a tree if it is not one? and the members and entrails of any animal and everything of which they are composed? - after all, if their unity is subject to division, the animal will cease to be an animal. and what are friends but people who strive to be one? – and the more they are one, the more friends they are. The people constitute one state, for which differences of opinion are extremely dangerous. and what is diversity of opinion if not the absence of unanimity? An army is made up of many warriors, and isn’t every army the more formidable the more it is united into one? hence the very unity into one is called cuneus, as it were - couneus (connection). What is love if not the desire to be one with the one you love? and passion itself gives pleasure because bodies that love each other are united into one. Where does grief come from? from the fact that what was one is dissolved. That is why it is harmful and dangerous to be united with something that can separate. 19. From many objects, previously chaotically scattered, but then collected together according to one drawing, I build a house. I myself am better than him, because I make him come into being; I am better insofar as I do; undoubtedly that is why I am better at home. But therefore I am still no better than a swallow or a bee; for the former skillfully builds nests, and the latter builds honeycombs; but I am better than them because I am an animal gifted with reason. But if intelligence is manifested in correctly carried out measurements, then is what birds build proportionately less skillful and less accurate? There are probably even more calculations there. So, I am not the better for doing things that require calculations, but for knowing the numbers. Therefore, even without knowing the numbers, they can do things that require calculations? They totally can. Where do they learn this from? and from the same place where we, with a certain proportionality, apply our tongue to our teeth and palate so that letters and words fly out of our mouths, and when we speak, we do not think about through what movement of the mouth we should do this. Then, what good singer, even if he is ignorant of music, does not follow the rhythm and accepted melody when singing from memory, guided by natural feeling? What may require large calculations? The unscientist does not know this, and yet he does it, because nature does it for him. When does he become the best, when does he become higher than the beasts? When he knows what he's doing. What elevates me above cattle is that I am a rational animal. But why is the mind immortal, and why do I define myself as something at the same time both rational and mortal? or is the mind not immortal? But the relation of one to two or two to four is a relation in the highest degree true. And it was no more true yesterday than it is today, and no more will it be true tomorrow or in a year; Yes, even if this whole world perished, this relationship would not cease to exist. For it is always the same; but this world did not have yesterday, nor will it have tomorrow, what it has today; and even today, in the interval of even one hour, it does not have the sun in the same place, so that there is nothing in it that remains unchanged, it does not have anything in the same form even for a short time. So, if the mind is immortal, and I, who distinguishes and unites all this, am the mind, then it is not mine that is why I am called mortal. Or, if the soul is not the same as the mind, but I nevertheless use reason and thanks to it I rise above all mortals, then one should strive from the worst to the best, from the mortal to the immortal.” A well-educated soul speaks to itself and reflects on this and many other things (which I do not want to list, so that, wanting to teach you order, you will not overstep the bounds, which is the mother of order). Since she carefully observes the strength and power of numbers, it will seem extremely unworthy and extremely sad to her if her knowledge is harmonious, like a beautiful verse, and euphonious, like a zither, and her life and she herself, the soul, will follow the false path, and, surrendering to the power of lust, divide herself with the vile creak of vices. When she puts herself in proper form and order and becomes slender and beautiful, then she will receive boldness to see God, to see the very source from which all truth flows, to see the very father of truth. Great God, what kind of eyes these will be, how healthy they will be, how beautiful, how sharp-sighted, how firm, how bright, how blessed! and what will they see? What, I ask? How will we imagine this, how will we evaluate it, how will we express it? Everyday words roll around on the tongue, and all of them are contaminated by the most insignificant objects. I will say one thing: they promise us such a spectacle of beauty, by imitation of which everything else is beautiful, but in comparison with which everything else is ugly. Whoever sees this beauty (and he who lives well, prays well, does science well) will ever be shaken by the fact that one, wanting to have children, does not have them, and another throws them away because he has too many; one hates those who are yet to be born, and another loves those who are born? Will he not in every possible way reject the idea that anything could happen that would not happen before the face of God in the necessary order established by Him for everything, which does not, however, exclude the reality of prayers to God? And when will any hardships, any gifts and offerings of fortune make a righteous man waver? For in this sensible world it is necessary to take into constant consideration time and place: when anything gives pleasure in a part of a place or a time, the whole of which it is a part must be represented as much better; and again, if something seems incongruous in a part, it will be clear to a scientist that it seems so because the whole with which this part agrees in an amazing way is not visible. In the same intelligible world, every part, like the whole, is beautiful and perfect. All this will be said in more detail if your academic studies, as I advise and hope, will proceed in the order I mentioned above or, perhaps, in another, shorter and more convenient, but in any case correct order, and will proceed strictly and constantly. 20. In order for this to be possible for us, we must take special care of good morality. For otherwise our God cannot hear us. He listens to those who live well very easily. So, let us not pray for wealth, nor for honors, nor for other similar flowing things, with any resistance from anyone passing us by, but let us pray for what will make us good and blessed. and in order for these vows to be fulfilled in the most holy way, we involve in this matter especially you, mother, through whose prayers, as I undoubtedly believe and affirm, God gave me such a spiritual disposition that I prefer absolutely nothing to the study of the truth, I don’t desire anything else, I don’t think about anything, I don’t love anything. And I will not cease to believe that this great good, which we wished for through your merits, will receive through your Prayers for it. Why would I encourage or exhort you, Alypius? if you are not overly devoted to the work, then perhaps because any love for such objects can, perhaps, be called small, but in fairness it can never be called excessive. To this he said: “With your daily reasoning and the surprise that you have aroused in us towards you at the present time, you have truly made the legends about the most learned and great men, which once seemed incredible, judging by the huge number of discoveries in the field of knowledge attributed to them, now seem to us not only beyond doubt, but also such, the authenticity of which, if necessary, we could confirm with an oath. For what else have you now revealed before our eyes, if not the venerable and almost divine, as it was rightfully considered and turned out to be, the teaching of Pythagoras? and the rules of life, and not so much the paths, but the very fields and open plains of knowledge, and what this man especially highly revered - the very sanctuary of truth - where it was located, what it was, what kind of worshipers it required - you explained all this briefly and so completely that although we guess and think that you know something more secret, we would consider it shameless on our part if we decided to extort anything more from you. “It’s good to hear that,” I answered. “What consoles and encourages me, however, is not so much your words, for they are incorrect, but rather your sincere feeling.” By the way, we suggested sending this essay to someone who tends to think better of us than we really are. However, if others read it, I don’t think they would be angry with you. For who will not, with full grace, excuse errors of judgment on the part of a loving person? As for your mention of Pythagoras, I think that it came to your mind due to the same unknown divine order. For I completely lost sight of the most important thing that surprises me about this man (if you believe what is written; although who would not believe Varro) and which, as you know, I extol every day, namely: that he taught the doctrine of governing the republic to his listeners in the very last place, when they were already learned, already perfect, already wise, already blessed. In this control, he saw so many waves that he did not want to plunge anyone into these waves except his husband, who, by controlling in an almost divine way, could avoid the rocks, and if everything failed him, he would survive in those waves, like a rock. For one can rightly say about a wise man in the words of Virgil: “He stands like an immovable rock in the sea,” as well as everything else that is said on the same topic in beautiful verses. At this point the competition ended, and we, joyful and excited, left the place of our meeting already by the light of the night lamp. You might be interested in: