XVIII. Понятие тождества в схоластической философии (к стр. 79).

The concepts of numeric and generic identities discussed in the text were launched in modern philosophy, but differed in scholastic philosophy. Here is a summary of the definitions related here in the own words of the adherents of scholasticism. “Generic – Specifice – Numerice (Generice – Specifice – Numerice). Most often it is said that things are different. Generically, something differs that is not similar in any single-sense (univoco, - i.e., not ambiguous) predicate, such as substance and quantity. From here come the highest kinds - genera - of things, of which there are ten and which are called predicates. Specifically, that which is similar in some uniformly meaningful gender, but is contained under different genders, such as man, lion, stone, etc. Therefore, intermediate genders differ not generically, but specifically. – Finally, by number alone - solo numero differunt - individuals - individua - are distinguished, - contained under the same species, which, therefore, know neither generic nor specific difference, but only differ according to what is attached to the nature of the species - sed tantum distinguuntur secundum ea quae sunt naturae speciei adiuncta 843 - such as Socrates and Plato. We said “by number alone - solo numero”, because in general it is said that what differs by number - numero - is that which can be counted as different, in which sense also individuals of different species, such as Alexander and Bucephalus, differ by number - numero. The specific difference is also called formal, because it comes from the fact that - formally - appellatur etiam formalis, quia fit secundum id quod est formale 844, while the numerical difference is material - materialis, for matter is the beginning, from which there are many individuals of the same species" 845. Three types of differences correspond to three types of unities: “unitas generica – specifica – numerica. Since the one denotes an indivisible essence - ens individuum - there will be as many unities - unitates, as there are divisions. But things differ from each other or by genus - genere, such as a stone from a person 846; or – by appearance – specie, such as a lion from a horse; or by number - numero, such as Peter from Paul. So there are three unities; that of them that denies the division of the genus is called generic - generica; which denies the division of a species is called specific - specifica; which denies division of the numerical type is called numeric - numerica - or individual - individualis. Hence, one in kind - unum genere - that which is similar in the same generic concept - ratione. By appearance - something that is similar in the same definition. That which is one in genus and species is also called formally one - formaliter una, that is, inclusive of the essential concept - quoad essentialem conceptum. Finally, everything singular – singularia – or individuals – is one in number – numero. Individual unity alone - unitas individualis - is real unity; After all, in the nature of things there is only the singular – singularia. Generic and specific unity, if individual unity is not added to them, are not from the side of things - but parte rei - perfect unities, but only negations of diversity. So, for example, the nature of Peter and Paul is called one not because it posits the same essence, but only because it denies specific diversity. Therefore St. Thomas says: “That which is indivisible in relation to any genus or species is not simply called one - simpliciter unim, but one either in genus or in species; - and that which is simply indivisible is simply one, that is, one in number - unum numero" 847. Further, that which forms a numerical unity, or that by which in one and the same form one thing differs from another, is called the principle of separation - principium individuationis" 848. But, despite this sufficient clarity in distinguishing the concepts of different types of unity and difference, and scholastic philosophy, especially during its transition to the new philosophy, the desire to reduce numeric unity to generic unity and to identify the identity of individuals with the equality of their corresponding unit classes. This desire is expressed very openly by Francis Suarez or Suarius 849 (1548–1617). “Numerical unity,” he says, “is the state of real existence that nature has from the side of a thing existing in individuals - in singularibus, and is also called the state of contraction - status contractionis, as if through it nature, or the essential concept of a thing, was contracted to indivisibles and individuals, and from here comes the numerical unity that things have precisely as they exist from the side of a thing - vocatur existentiae realis quem habet natura a parte rei in singaluribus existens, et vocatur etiam status contractionis, quasi per illum natura, seu essentialis rei conceptus, ad individua et singularia contraheretur, et hinc exsurgit unitas numerica, quae rebus nimirum convenit, ut a parte rei existunt.” So, numerical unity is only a “state of contractionis”. This is not the primary fact of the self-position of the individual, but a product of a certain evolution (-even if logical!-) of the nature of a thing, which is impersonal from the beginning. It is not “nature” that is posited by the self-positing personality, but the personality by “nature.” This representation of numerical unity, as the “contraction” of a general essence into a single thing, clearly reveals the whole essence of thing philosophy, for which numerical identity is the equality of individual classes, and the individual is identified with his individual class. One has only, according to this view, to sufficiently narrow (“tighten”) the scope of the class in order to obtain a single class, i.e., the individual, which is nothing more than the status contractionis of the general concept. This is the Western, Catholic understanding of life. But we have already seen to what extent the Orthodox understanding of life is alien to this philosophy, in which the category of thingness lies in the hidden basis of all depths, and which is decisively alien to the idea of ​​personality, just as the recognition of personality with its demands is alien to the entire structure of Catholicism, which represents the practical side of this impersonal understanding of life. Thomas Aqu. , – Contra Gent., IV, 14. Thomas Aqu. , – Summa. I.q. XLVII, a. 2c; Contra Gent., 92; Qq. dispp., De Ver., q. XII, a. 13 ad 3. Nuntius Signoriello, – Lexicon peripateticum philosophico-theologicum in quo scholasticorum distinctiones et effata principua explicantur. Ed. novissima, locupletior atque emendatior. Neapoli, 1906, litt. GII, pp. 150–151. Quote [858, 859] – from the same place. There is nothing in the presentation here. contradiction: previously stated. the difference was recognized as specific. Thomas Aqu., – In lib. I Sep., Dist. XXIV q. I, a 1 sol. (Sign., litt. U VI, p. 371). Suar. , – Dispute. metaphys., sect. 9, num. 9. Quote. from: Cornoldi, – Thesaurus Philosophorum, 1891, U. v. ΙΙ70, p. 156.