About the quantity of the soul

The treatise “On the Quantity of the Soul” (36 chapters) was written by Bl. Aurelius Augustine in Rome in 387-388 and belongs to a group of works in which the influence of Neoplatonism is noticeable. The author talks about spirituality, immortality, sublimity, the origin and abilities of the soul. The work is composed in the form of a dialogue with Euodius (born in Tagaste, friend of St. Augustine). Much of this conversation is devoted to the denial of the corporeality of the soul and the definition of what bodily sensation is. Blzh. Augustine asks the questions: why the soul is united with the body, and what is its quality when it is united with the body and when it is separated from it. In the final part of the treatise, Bl. Augustine touches on the topic of free will. *The title of the work in Latin is De quantitate animae. See also: Augustine’s teaching on the levels of the individual soul (according to the treatise “On the Quantity of the Soul”) by F.V. Petrov Chapter I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX XX XXI XXII XXIII XXIV XXV XXVI XXVII XXVIII XXIX XXX XXXI XXXII XXXIII XXXIV XXXV XXXVI Evodiy. Since I see that you have a lot of leisure, I ask you to answer me questions that, as it seems to me, occupy me quite opportunely and appropriately. Agree that quite often, when I asked you about something important, you stopped me with some Greek saying, warning me to seek out what is above us. But I don’t think we are above ourselves. And if I ask about the soul, then I don’t deserve the answer: “What do we care about what is above us?”, for I only want to know what we are. Augustine. Briefly list what you want to hear about the soul. Evodiy. Please: I have prepared this with much thought. I ask: where does the soul come from, what is it like, how great is it, why is it given to the body, what does it become when it enters the body, and what kind does it become when it leaves it? Augustine. I am forced to understand your question about where the soul comes from in a double sense. After all, we can ask: where is this person from? both when we want to know where his homeland is, and then when we ask what he consists of, from what elements and things. Which of these do you want to know when you ask the same about the soul? Evodiy. Both, but what you should know first - I prefer to leave at your discretion. Augustine. The homeland of the soul, I believe, is God himself who created it. But I cannot name the substance of the soul. I do not think that it was one of those ordinary and well-known elements that fall under our bodily senses: the soul does not consist of earth, water, air, fire, or any combination of them. If you asked me what a tree is made of, I would tell you these four well-known elements, from which, one must assume, everything like this consists, but if you continued to ask: what the earth itself, or water, or air, or fire, is made of, I would no longer have found what to answer. Likewise, if they ask: what is a person made of, I will answer: from soul and body, and if they also ask about the body, I will refer to the indicated four elements. But when asked about the soul, which has its own special substance, I find myself in the same difficulty as if asked: what is the earth made of? Evodiy. Why do you say that it has its own substance when you said that it was created by God? I don't understand this. Augustine. But I do not deny that God created the earth, but at the same time I cannot say what the earth consists of. For the earth is a simple body precisely because it is earth, and for this reason it is called the element of all those bodies that consist of four elements. therefore, the idea we expressed that the soul was created by God and has a certain nature of its own does not contain a contradiction. After all, this special, its own nature was created by God himself, just as he created the nature of fire, air, water and earth, from which everything else is composed. Evodiy. But we produce mortal things, but God created the soul, as it seems to me, immortal. Or do you think differently? Augustine. So, would you like people to create the same things that God created? Evodiy. I didn't say that. But just as he, being immortal, created something immortal in his own likeness, so what we create in our own likeness, created immortal by God, should have been immortal. Augustine. You would be right if you painted a picture in the image of what you consider immortal in yourself, but in this case you depict on it the likeness of a body that is completely mortal. Evodiy. How can I be like God if I cannot create anything immortal, as he does? Augustine. Just as the image of your body cannot have the same power that your body itself has, so one should not be surprised if the soul does not have as much power as the one in whose image it was created. Evodiy. With where the soul comes from, i.e. that it is from God, I will agree for now, I will think about it carefully and, if I encounter any confusion, I will ask later. Now please explain to me what it is. Augustine. It seems to me that she is like God. After all, if I’m not mistaken, you are asking about the human soul. Evodiy. This is precisely what I wanted, for you to explain to me how the soul is like God, when about God we believe that he was not created by anyone, but the human soul, as you yourself said above, was created by God. Augustine. How do you think it was difficult for God to create something like himself? Don’t you see that even we can do this, and in a wide variety of forms? Evodiy. For now, this is enough. Now tell me how big the soul is. Augustine. In what sense are you asking how big it is? I do not understand whether you are asking about its latitude, longitude, thickness, or all these together, or whether you want to know what strength it has. We have, for example, the habit of asking how great Hercules was, i.e. how many feet did his height reach, and how big was this man, i.e. how great was his strength and valor. Evodiy. I want to know both about the soul. Augustine. But the first cannot not only be explained, but even thinkable about the soul. For the soul cannot in any way be assumed to be long, or wide, or, as it were, massive: all this is corporeal, and we imagine the soul in this way only by analogy with bodies. Therefore, in the sacraments it is prudently commanded that he who wishes to appear as he was created by God should despise everything corporeal and renounce this world (which, as we see, is the physical world). similar to God, since for the soul there is no other salvation, no other renewal, no other reconciliation with its creator. Therefore, how big the soul is - if you examine it in the indicated direction - I cannot say, but I can say that it is not long, not wide, does not have mass and does not have anything that is usually determined when measuring bodies. Why do I think this? - I am ready to present to you, if you like, all the reasons. Evodiy. This pleases me, and I strongly desire this: because it seems to me that the soul is, as it were, nothing if there is nothing in it that is said. Augustine. But perhaps first I will show you that there are many things about which you cannot say that they are nothing, and in which, however, there are not those dimensions that you are looking for in the soul, so that you will see that the soul not only is not nothing due to the fact that it has neither longitude, nor latitude, etc., but, on the contrary, it is all the more valuable and all the more significant because it has none of this, and then we will consider whether it really has none of this. Evodiy. Use whatever order and method you want - I am ready to listen and learn. Augustine. Great intention. But I would like you to answer my questions, because it may happen that you already know what I will try to teach you. I suppose you have no doubt that this tree is not complete nothingness? Evodiy. Who would doubt this? Augustine. Well, do you doubt that justice is much better than wood? Evodiy. It would be truly funny: what comparison could there be! Augustine. you are right, but pay attention to the following: if you agree that a tree is so much worse than justice that, in your opinion, there is no place for any comparison, and yet you admitted that this tree is not nothing, then do you think that we will consider justice itself to be nothing? Evodiy. What madman would consider it nothing? Augustine. Quite fair. But maybe that’s why a tree seems like something to you because it has length, width, and mass, and if you took all this away from it, it would become nothing? Evodiy. Perhaps so. Augustine. So, then, justice, about which you said that it is not only not nothing, but even something far more divine and more excellent than a tree, seems long to you? Evodiy. In no way: it is obvious that it has neither length, nor width, nor anything else of the same kind. Augustine. But if justice is not something of this kind and, however, is not nothing, then why does the soul seem to you to be nothing if it does not have any length? Evodiy. Let’s say it doesn’t seem to me that the soul is nothing because it’s not long, wide, or massive, but you yourself understand very well that you haven’t proven anything yet that this is really the case. It is quite possible that much of what does not possess the indicated properties is truly great and beautiful, but it does not at all follow from this that I must necessarily consider the soul to be such. Augustine. I know that I have to explain all this, but since this subject is very subtle and requires completely different views than those that people are accustomed to have in everyday life, I ask you not to be burdened by following the path in which I consider it necessary to lead you, not to get tired of some roundabout reasoning and not to be annoyed that what you want will not be achieved immediately and not suddenly. First of all, I ask, do you believe that there is any body that would not have a certain length, width and height, according to its appearance? Evodiy. I don't understand what you mean by height. Augustine. I call height the dimension by which the internal content of the body, thought or felt, is determined, if the body is transparent, like glass, for if you take this away from bodies, then they, at least this is my opinion, can neither be felt nor generally recognized as bodies. So tell me what you think on this subject. Evodiy. I have no doubt that all bodies have height. Augustine. Well, what do you think, these three dimensions exist only in bodies? Evodiy. I don't understand how they could exist in anything else. Augustine. So you think that the soul is nothing other than the body? Evodiy. If we recognize the wind as a body, then I cannot deny that, in my opinion, the soul is a body: I ​​imagine it to be something like that. Augustine. I agree, perhaps, that the wind is a body in the same sense as a wave, if you asked about it. for we feel that the wind is air set in motion; in a calm place protected from all winds, this can be proven with a small fan, with which we, even driving away flies, vibrate the air and feel the breeze. When this happens due to the more secret movement of celestial or terrestrial bodies over a large expanse of the world, it is called wind, which bears different names in different countries of the sky. Or does it seem different to you? Evodiy. Nothing seems to me, and what you say I find probable; but I said that the soul is not the wind itself, but something like that. Augustine. You tell me first, do you think that the wind you mentioned has any length, width and height? Then we will see whether the soul is something of the same kind, so that we can examine its magnitude in the same way. Evodiy. What can be found greater in length, width and height than this air, which, as you convinced me, if set in motion, becomes the wind? Augustine. You speak beautifully, but don’t you believe that your soul exists only in your body? Evodiy. I think so. Augustine. But what do you think, does it exist only inside, filling the body like fur, or only outside, in the form of a blanket, or both outside and inside? Evodiy. I think as you said at the end. For if it were not inside, there would be nothing vital in our insides, and if it were not outside, you could not feel even a slight prick on the skin. Augustine. So why should you ask how great the soul is, if you yourself see that it is what the volume of the body allows it to be? Evodiy. If reason teaches this, I ask nothing more. Augustine. You are doing well if you do not seek more than what reason teaches. But do you think this conclusion is strong enough? Evodiy. It seems like I can't find another one. But in my place I will ask you a question that is very interesting to me: will she retain this figure when she leaves the body? I remember I put it at the end of the issues to be considered. And since, in my opinion, the question of the number of souls also relates to the quantity of souls, I think that this too should not be ignored in its place. Augustine. The thought is appropriate, but first let’s talk, if you like, about its scope, which still continues to occupy me, so that I myself can learn something, if you are already satisfied. Evodiy. Ask what you want: because this feigned doubt of yours makes me in the most real way doubt what I assumed had already been proven. Augustine. Tell me, please: doesn’t what is called memory seem like an empty name to you? Evodiy. Who can think so? Augustine. Do you consider it to belong to the soul or the body? Evodiy. And it’s ridiculous to doubt this. Is it possible to believe or be convinced that a soulless body remembers anything? Augustine. Do you remember the city of Mediolan? Augustine. Since we have now remembered him, you remember, of course, how great he is and what he is like? Evodiy. Of course I remember. Augustine. Therefore, while you are not currently seeing him with your eyes, you see him with your soul? Evodiy. Absolutely right. Augustine. I also assume that you remember how large a space of regions it is currently separated from us? Augustine. So, you see with your soul the distance itself. Augustine. But if your soul is located here where the body is, and does not extend beyond its volume, as was proven by the above conclusion, then how does it happen that it sees all this? Evodiy. I believe that this is done with the help of memory, because the soul itself is not present in those places. Augustine. Therefore, the memory contains images of those places? Evodiy. I think so: because I don’t know what is currently happening there, but I would certainly know this if my soul extended even to those places and felt what was happening there at the present time. Augustine. You, in my opinion, speak the truth, but are these images really images of bodies? Evodiy. It is necessary this way: because cities and regions are nothing more than bodies. Augustine. Have you ever looked into a small mirror, or have you ever seen your face in the pupil of someone else's eye? Evodiy. And even very often. Augustine. Why does it appear there to be much smaller than it actually is? Evodiy. Would you like the reflection to appear larger than the mirror itself? Augustine. Consequently, images of bodies must necessarily appear small if the bodies in which they are represented are small. Augustine. But if the soul is as small in volume as its body, then how can such great images be imprinted on it that it can imagine cities, vast regions, and all sorts of other communities in its imagination? I would like you to think a little more carefully about how much greatness and how much our memory contains, which, in turn, is contained in the soul. What basis, therefore, does it have, what depth, what immeasurability, if it can accept all this, while the above conclusion shows that it is the same in volume as the body? Evodiy. I don’t find anything to answer you, and I’m not able to express to what extent this confused me; Now I laugh at myself for determining the size of the soul by the measure of the body. Augustine. So she no longer seems to you like the wind? Evodiy. In no way, because if the air, the flow of which is believed to be produced by the wind, can fill this entire world, then the soul can imagine in its imagination such countless and such great worlds that I am not able to even think about the space that could contain these images. Augustine. In this case, think whether it would not be better to believe that it, as I said above, is neither long, nor wide, nor high, just as you agreed with me regarding justice. Evodiy. I would willingly agree with this if I were not confused by the following question: how is it, having neither longitude, latitude, nor height, that it can accept countless images of such large volumes? Augustine. Perhaps we will discover this too if we first carefully analyze what these three are: longitude, latitude and altitude. So, try to mentally imagine a longitude that has not yet assumed any latitude. Evodiy. I can't imagine anything like this. If I draw in my mind a thread of a web, thinner than which we usually see nothing, I will find in it, in addition to longitude, a kind of latitude and height; no matter how small they may be, I, however, cannot deny their existence. Augustine. Your answer is quite good, but when you see these three dimensions in the threads of the web, you distinguish them and know how they differ from each other? Evodiy. How can you not know that they are different? Otherwise, how could I see that they are in this thread? Augustine. In this case, with the same mind with which you distinguished them, you can separate them by imagining one longitude, but only without imagining any body, because whatever the body is, it will certainly have them all. That which I now wish to imagine in you is incorporeal, because longitude alone can be represented only by the mind, but cannot be found in the body. Evodiy. Now I understand. Augustine. So, if you wanted to mentally dissect this longitude longitudinally, you would find that this is impossible, because otherwise it would also have latitude. Augustine. In this case, we will call this pure and simple longitude, if you like, a line: by this name scientists usually call it. Evodiy. Call it what you want. I don't care about names as long as the subject itself is clear. Augustine. And you are doing great: I not only approve, but also convince you to always care more about things than words. so if you stretch this line, which you already well imagine, in one or both directions, as far as you can stretch it in length, you will see that it has no end. or is your thought unable to reach such a concept? Augustine. In this case you also see that no figure can come out if you do nothing but draw out the line. Evodiy. I don’t yet understand what you call a figure. Augustine. In this case, I mean a figure when a certain space is enclosed in a line or lines, as, for example, if you draw a circle or connect four lines with ends, so that no end of either of them remains unconnected with the end of the other. Evodiy. What you call a figure, I seem to already see in front of me, but I can’t imagine what you’re driving at and what you intend to make of it in order to give me the required knowledge about the soul. Augustine. I warned you from the very beginning and asked you to be patient with some of the circumstance in our reasoning. I ask the same thing now. The subject being studied is important and not easy to understand, but we want to know it and master it completely. After all, it’s a different matter when we trust authority, and another when we trust reason. Faith in authority greatly shortens the search and does not require much effort. If you like it, you can read a lot of things that great and divine men wrote about these subjects, as if out of condescension, finding it necessary for benefit, and in which they demanded faith in themselves on the part of those for whose souls, more dull-witted or more occupied with worldly affairs, there could be no other means of salvation. Such people, who are always the majority in society, if they wish to comprehend the truth with reason, are very easily fooled by the semblance of reasonable conclusions and fall into such a vague and harmful way of thinking that they either can never sober up and free themselves from it, or they can, but only in the most disastrous way for themselves. It is most beneficial for such people to believe in the most excellent authority and lead their lives according to it. If you think it’s safer, I not only don’t object to it, but even highly approve. But if you cannot curb within yourself that passionate desire, under the influence of which you decided to reach the truth through reason, you must patiently endure many and long detours so that you can be led by that reason that alone can be called reason, i.e. true mind; and not only true, but also accurate, and alien to any semblance of falsity (if it is possible for a person to achieve this in any way), so that you cannot be distracted from it by any reasoning, false or true. Evodiy. I don't want to rush anymore. Let the mind do its thing and lead as it wants, as long as it leads. Augustine. This will be arranged by God, to whom one should pray either for such things only, or for them primarily. But let's return to the matter at hand. You already know what a line is and what a figure is. Therefore, I will ask you to answer me this question: do you think that any figure can be formed if you continue the line on one side or the other to infinity? Evodiy. I believe that this is impossible. Augustine. What should you do to form a figure? Evodiy. To do this, the line should not be endless, but should be closed in a circle, touching itself with the other side. Otherwise, I don’t see how to enclose any space in one line, and if this does not happen, then according to your description there will not be a figure. Augustine. Well, if I wanted to form a figure from straight lines, is it possible to form it from one line or not? Evodiy. I think it's possible. Augustine. You, therefore, perfectly understood and learned that if you need to form a figure from straight lines, then it cannot be formed from less than three lines. But if you were presented with an argument contrary to this, would it force you to abandon this opinion? Evodiy. If someone were to prove to me that this is false, then there would be absolutely nothing left of which I could say that I know it. Augustine. Now answer me this: how did you make a figure of three lines? Evodiy. Connecting them at the ends. Augustine. Don't you think that where they connect, an angle is formed? Augustine. How many angles does this figure consist of? Evodiy. There are as many of them as there are lines. Augustine. Well, did you draw the lines themselves equal or unequal? Augustine. Are the angles all the same, or is one more compressed and the other open? Evodiy. And I also consider them equal. Augustine. But in a figure that is formed from three equal straight lines, can the angles be unequal, or cannot they? Augustine. Well, if a figure consists of three straight lines, but not equal to each other, can the angles in it also be equal, or do you think about it differently? Evodiy. They absolutely cannot. Augustine. What you say is true. But please tell me which figure seems better and more beautiful to you: the one that consists of equal lines, or the one that consists of unequal lines? Evodiy. Better is the one in which equality reigns. Augustine. So, do you prefer equality to inequality? Evodiy. I don't know anyone who wouldn't prefer it. Augustine. Now notice that in this figure, which is given perfection by three equal angles, the opposite angle, i.e. lies on the opposite side - line or angle? Augustine. Well, if an angle were opposite an angle, and a line was opposite a line, wouldn’t you find even greater equality in such a figure? Evodiy. I agree with this, but I absolutely don’t understand how this can work out with three lines. Augustine. Can this happen with four lines? Augustine. So a figure consisting of four straight lines is better than one made of three? Evodiy. I think so, if equality prevails in it. Augustine. Well, do you think that a figure consisting of four straight equal lines can be formed in such a way that not all the angles in it are equal to each other, or don’t you? Evodiy. I think it can. Evodiy. If two corners are more compressed, and two are more open. Augustine. But do you notice that both the two more compressed and the two more open angles are mutually opposite to each other? Evodiy. Absolutely true and clear. Augustine. Consequently, here too you observe that equality, as far as it could be preserved, was preserved, for you see: since a figure is formed from four equal lines, then it is no longer possible that either all of them, or two and two angles, are not equal to each other, and, moreover, those that are equal are mutually opposite to each other. Evodiy. I see and am very firmly convinced of this. Augustine. But doesn’t such a constant kind of justice even in these things strike you? Evodiy. How is this possible? Augustine. But, I believe, we call justice nothing other than equality, and equality, apparently, received its name from the well-known equality. But what constitutes equality in this virtue, if not that everyone should have their due? It is impossible to give each one his own without some discrimination. Or do you think differently? Evodiy. This is absolutely clear and I completely agree with it. Augustine. Well, in your opinion, is there any distinction, if everything is equal to each other and does not differ in anything decisively from each other? Augustine. So, justice is preserved only if in the things in which it is preserved there is some, so to speak, inequality and dissimilarity. Augustine. Therefore, if we admit that these figures of which we speak are dissimilar to each other: one consists of three, and the other of four angles, although both are formed from equal lines, do you not find that a kind of justice is maintained in that the first, which cannot have equality of opposite parts, always preserves the equality of angles, and in the last, in which there is such a proportionality of opposite sides, this law of angles allows for some inequality? Struck by this, I found it necessary to ask you how much you were attracted to this truth, this uniformity, this equality? Evodiy. Now I understand what you are talking about and I am quite surprised. Augustine. And now, since you rightly prefer equality to inequality, and since, I believe, everyone who is gifted with human understanding holds the same opinion, let us look, if you wish, for a figure in which the highest equality could be found. the one that turns out to be so will without any doubt be preferred to the others. Evodiy. Of course, you want, and I really want to know what kind of figure this is. Augustine. But first answer me: don’t you think that of those figures about which we have already spoken enough, the one that consists of four equal lines and as many equal angles is superior, because in it, as you see, there is equality of lines and equality of angles, and there is equality of opposite parts, since a line lies against a line and an angle against an angle, which we did not find in the figure that is outlined by three equal lines. Evodiy. Everything is as you say. Augustine. Does it have the highest equality, or do you think otherwise? for if she has it, then we decided in vain to look for another, and if she does not, then I would like you to prove it to me. Evodiy. In my opinion, it does: because where the angles are equal and the lines are equal, I do not find it possible to find inequalities. Augustine. I think differently. A straight line, as long as it goes to the corners, has the highest equality, but as soon as another line is connected to it on the opposite side and an angle is formed, then don’t you already consider this itself inequality? or do you find that that part of the figure which ends in a line corresponds in equality and similarity to that which ends in an angle? Evodiy. No, it doesn’t seem like it, and I’m ashamed of my thoughtlessness. I was carried away by the fact that I saw in it both the angles and the sides as equal to each other, but who would not see how great the difference between these sides and the angles is? Augustine. Pay attention to another clear proof of inequality. you see that both in this triangular figure, consisting of equal lines, and in that square figure there is a certain middle. Augustine. Now, if from this very middle we drew lines to all parts of the figure, would you find these lines equal or unequal? Evodiy. They are decidedly unequal: because those will certainly be longer, which we will draw into the corners. Augustine. How many of these are there in a square figure and how many in a triangular one? Evodiy. Four in the first and three in the second. Augustine. Which of them are smaller, and how many of them are there in one and the other figure? Evodiy. There are the same number of them, and these are those that go to the middle of the sides. Augustine. What you say, in my opinion, is absolutely correct, and there is no need to dwell on this further. For our purpose, this is enough, since you see that although great equality is preserved here, it is not yet perfect in all respects. Evodiy. I see undoubtedly, and I strongly desire to know what kind of figure it is that has the highest equality. Augustine. But what if not the one whose outskirts are uniform from everywhere, without interference from equality from any angle, and from the middle of which equal lines can be drawn to all parts of the outskirts? Evodiy. I think I already understand. It seems to me that you mean a figure bordered by a circular line. Augustine. You got it right. Now pay attention to the following. From the preceding discussion we have learned that by a line one longitude is meant and no latitude is given to it; that is why it cannot be divisible along its length. Do you think it is possible to imagine any figure without latitude? Augustine. Well, can latitude itself not have longitude, can latitude alone exist, just as we talked above about longitude without latitude, or can it not? Evodiy. In my opinion, it cannot. Augustine. If I'm not mistaken, you also understand that latitude can be divisible on each side, whereas a line cannot be divided longitudinally. Augustine. What do you think should be ranked higher: that which can be divisible, or that which cannot? Evodiy. Of course it can't. Augustine. Therefore, do you prefer line to latitude? After all, if we must prefer what cannot be divisible, then we must certainly prefer what is less divisible. Latitude is divisible on all sides, and longitude only across, since it does not allow longitudinal division; therefore it is superior to latitude. Or do you disagree with this? Evodiy. The mind forces you to agree with what you say. Augustine. Now, if you like, let's look for something of this kind that cannot be divisible at all. After all, this will be superior even to the line itself: because the line, as you see, can be cut into countless parts. However, I leave it to you to find it yourself. Evodiy. In my opinion, what we called in the figure the middle, from which lines are drawn to the outskirts, cannot be divisible. If it were divisible, it could not but have longitude or latitude. If it had one longitude, it would no longer be possible to draw the indicated lines from it, since it itself would be a line. If it also has latitude, it will require another middle for itself, from which lines will be drawn to the outskirts of the latitude. Both are rejected by reason. Therefore, it is that which cannot be divided. Augustine. You are right. But doesn’t it seem something like that to you where the line begins, even if the figure itself, the middle of which we are talking about, did not yet exist? I mean the beginning of the line from where longitude begins, which you must imagine without any longitude. Because when you imagine longitude, you in no way imagine where the longitude itself begins. Evodiy. It seems quite like that. Augustine. And this, which you, in my opinion, have already understood, is the most powerful of all that we talked about. It is something that does not admit of any division and is called a point (punctum) if it is in the middle of the figure; and if it represents the beginning of a line or lines, or even the end of them, or generally designates something that should be represented as having no parts, and at the same time does not occupy the middle of the figure, it is called a sign (signum). Consequently, a sign is a mark without relation to anything; and the point is a mark indicating the middle of the figure. I would like to immediately agree on these names, so as not to specify all this in the process of reasoning. Many people, however, call the midpoint not of any figure, but only of a circle or ball; but we will not now delve into the intricacies of various definitions. Augustine. In fact, look at the power it has. The line begins with it and ends with it; we have seen that no figure can be formed from straight lines unless it ends at an angle. Then, if the line can be cut at any place, it is cut by it; and every line is connected to a line only through it. Finally, reason showed that of all flat figures (for we have not yet said anything about height) one should be preferred that is outlined by a circular line, due to its highest equality; and this equality itself is established by nothing other than the point lying in the middle of it. A lot could be said about its power, but I will be moderate and let you figure out the rest for yourself. Evodiy. So be it; I won't miss exploring darker things either; and now, it seems to me, I sufficiently see the great power of this sign. Augustine. Now pay attention to the following. You learned what a sign is, what longitude is and what latitude is. Which of these three, in your opinion, needs the other, what exactly, and does it need it so much that it cannot exist without the other? Evodiy. I think that latitude needs longitude, without which it cannot be imagined at all. Then I find that longitude, although it does not need latitude for its existence, cannot exist without the mentioned sign (point). The sign, obviously, exists on its own and does not need anything else. Augustine. That's true. But consider more carefully whether the latitude can really be cut from all sides, or whether there is a side from which it does not allow a cut, although it allows it more than a line. Evodiy. I really don't understand why she couldn't. Augustine. I think you forgot, because there’s no way you wouldn’t know this. I’ll give you an idea this way: you, of course, imagine breadth without mentally giving it any height? Augustine. Consequently, height can also be added to latitude; and now tell me: can anything else be added that could be even more dissected from all sides? Evodiy. You gave me a great idea. Now I see that height can take a section not only from above or below, but also from the sides, and there is generally no direction along which it cannot be divided. From this it is clear that latitude cannot take sections from those sides from which height arises. Augustine. And since you, if I’m not mistaken, have understood both longitude, latitude, and height, then tell me, can there not be the first two where there is height? Evodiy. Without longitude, in my opinion, there cannot be height; but without breadth - maybe. Augustine. In this case, return to the idea of ​​latitude, and if you imagined it in your imagination as if lying, then let it rise to some side as you would like to lead it through this narrow crevice that is seen between the closed doors. Do you understand what I want to say? Evodiy. What you say, I understand; but what you want to say, perhaps I still don’t understand. Augustine. I want you to tell me whether it seems to you that the latitude raised in this way has turned into height and has already lost the name and properties of latitude, or does it remain latitude, although it has been brought to this position? Evodiy. I think she has become tall. Augustine. Do you remember, pray tell, how we determined the height? Evodiy. I remember and am ashamed that I answered this way. Latitude, even as it is raised, does not allow a longitudinal section from top to bottom: nothing contained within it can be imagined, although it is possible to imagine the middle and the outskirts. According to the definition of height, which, as I recalled, you made above, there is absolutely no height where it is impossible to imagine anything inside. Augustine. You're right, and that's what I wanted you to remember. So now tell me, do you prefer the true to the false? Evodiy. To doubt this is incredible madness. Augustine. In this case, tell me whether the true line is the one that can be cut longitudinally; or a true sign (point) is one that can be cut in any way; or true latitude such that, if raised in this form, as we said, would allow a longitudinal section from top to bottom? Augustine. Have you ever seen with these bodily eyes such a point, or such a line, or such a width? Evodiy. Never, because they are incorporeal. Augustine. In this case, if the corporeal is contemplated with bodily eyes, then the soul with which we perceive this incorporeal must, of necessity, not be corporeal or a body. Or do you think otherwise? Evodiy. So be it so, I agree that the soul is not a body or anything corporeal; but tell me finally, what is she? Augustine. Yes, in this case, pay attention to whether it follows from what has been said that the soul does not at all have the size that we are now talking about; To my surprise, you forgot that the question of what the soul is has already been discussed by us. After all, you remember that you first asked where she was from; I remember answering this question in two ways: first as if it was about her homeland, and then as if she were from earth, or from fire, or from any other of these elements, or from all, or from several of them. At the same time, it became clear to us that we should not ask about this, just like about where the earth or any of the other elements, taken separately, come from. For although God created the soul, it should be represented in such a way that it is neither from earth, nor from fire, nor from air, nor from water, but has its own special substance; unless we assume that God, who gave the substance to the earth so that it could be nothing other than earth, did not give the soul so that it could be nothing other than a soul. If you want me to define your soul, and therefore ask what the soul is, then I can easily answer you. The soul, in my opinion, is a certain substance involved in the mind, adapted to control the body. So, it is better to pay attention to where the doubt arises, whether the soul does not have quantity and, so to speak, spatial volume. Since the soul is not a body - because otherwise it could not contemplate anything incorporeal - then it does not have the space by which bodies are measured; and therefore it is wrong to believe, or think, or imagine such a quantity in it. Are you confused by the fact that, although it itself has no size, it contains in memory such spaces of sky, earth and sea? But it is some amazing power, which you, as far as the light is inherent in your mind, could notice from what we have already revealed. After all, reason has shown that there is no body that does not have length, breadth and height, and that not one of these properties can be in the body without the other two, and meanwhile, regarding the soul, we recognized that with some inner eye, i.e. with her mind, she can contemplate even one line; I believe that we have recognized by this both that the soul is not a body and that it is better than the body. Having admitted this, we should, I think, have no doubt that it is better than the line. For if all these three are in the body, since it is a body, then it would be ridiculous if the one who is better than the body were not better than all these three. But the line itself, over which the superiority of the soul is undoubtedly proven, exceeds breadth and height insofar as less than these two can be cut. Further, these two are subject to a greater section than the line, since more of it extends outward; the line has no other extension except longitude, after which, when taken away, there will be no space left at all. Therefore, what is better than a line inevitably has no extension, and cannot be divisible or dissected at all. Consequently, it is in vain, in my opinion, that we try to find the magnitude of the soul, which it does not have, since we have agreed that it is better than the line. And if of all flat figures the best is the one outlined by a circular line, and in this figure, according to the teachings of reason, there is nothing better and more powerful than a point, which, as no one doubts, has no parts, then what is surprising is that the soul is incorporeal and unextended, although it is so strong that the control of all members of the body depends on it and it represents, as it were, the focus of all bodily movements? But just as the middle of the eye, which is called the pupil, is nothing more than a certain point of the eye, in which, however, there is such a force that from some elevated place it can see and embrace half of the sky, the space of which is infinite, so it does not contradict the truth that the soul does not have any bodily size determined by the three indicated dimensions, although it can imagine in its imagination any vast bodies of bodies. But not many are given the ability to contemplate the soul through the soul itself, i.e. for the soul to see itself; she sees through the mind. He alone is left to see that among things there is nothing more powerful and majestic than those natures that seem to exist, so to speak, without swelling. After all, it is not without meaning that the size of the body is called distension, which, if it had a greater value, then elephants would undoubtedly be more intelligent than us. And if someone were to argue that elephants are wise (I have met, although to my surprise, I have often met people who argued about this too), such, in my opinion, would at least agree that a bee is wiser than a donkey; and to equate them in size would mean to be a bigger donkey than the donkey himself. But we were talking about the eye. Who doesn’t know that an eagle’s eye is much smaller than ours? Meanwhile, soaring at such a height that in daylight we can hardly distinguish him, he clearly sees a bunny hiding under a bush and a fish under the waves. If in the senses themselves, which are given to feel only the bodily, it does not matter for the matter, i.e. for the strength of feelings, the size of the body, then pray tell, should we fear for the human soul, whose most excellent and almost only gaze is the mind itself, striving to comprehend it itself - to fear that it is nothing, if the same mind, i.e. will she herself prove that she has no quantity occupying space? Believe me, one should think about the soul as something great, but great without any idea of ​​the mass. This is easier for someone who, being well educated, begins this not out of a desire for empty glory, but inflamed with divine love for the truth; or one who practices research of this kind, and although he began it insufficiently prepared by science for research, he patiently devotes himself to the teaching of the good and refuses, as far as possible in real life, all bodily attachments. Divine providence cannot allow that pious souls do not have the opportunity to find themselves and their God, i.e. The truth, if one seeks it piously, diligently and with a pure heart. If I managed to resolve all your doubts, then let’s put an end to this question, if you like, and move on to another. And the fact that we talked about famous figures at more length than you would like, then later you will see how important this will be for someone else. After all, this kind of knowledge, on the one hand, exercises the soul, preparing it for the contemplation of more sublime objects, so that, struck by their light and not being able to bear it, it does not run back into the darkness from which it was trying to escape; and on the other hand, it provides evidence, if I’m not mistaken, the most accurate; and when with their help something is found and proven, then, to the extent that it is given to a person to investigate, doubt becomes shameless. For I doubt these things less than those that we see with these eyes, forever waging war with mucus. What could be more intolerable and unpleasant to the ear than when they claim that we are superior to animals in intelligence, and yet the things that we see with our bodily eyes and which other animals see much better than ours, are recognized as something existing, the same thing that we contemplate with our minds, they try to present as non-existent? But if someone were to assert that the latter is the same as what we see with our eyes, then even in this case his assertion should be considered unworthy. Evodiy. I willingly accept what was said and completely agree with you. But although the conclusion that the soul has no corporeal size is so clear to me that I absolutely do not know how to refute this evidence, the following confuses me. Why, first of all, as much as the body grows over the years, does the soul grow or seem to grow? Who will deny that boys in early childhood are inferior in their abilities even to some animals? Who can also doubt that with age their intelligence in some way grows? Then, if the soul spreads throughout the space of its body, then why does it have no size? And if it did not spread, then how would it feel the injection, no matter where it was given? Augustine. You are asking the very questions that I have often thought about. Therefore, I am just as ready to answer you as I usually answer myself. Whether the answer is satisfactory - let the mind that guides you judge that. Whatever it may be, I cannot give anything more precise, unless with God’s help something better comes to mind during the reasoning itself. But let us, if you wish, conduct our speech in such a way that you, under the guidance of reason, answer yourself; and first of all, let us consider whether the fact that a person becomes more capable with age and acquires more and more experience serves as a true proof of the growth of the soul along with the body. Evodiy. Do as you please. I, for my part, highly approve of this way of teaching and learning. I don’t know how this happens, but when I myself answer what I ignorantly asked, the discovery itself becomes more pleasant, not only in the essence of the matter, but also in its unexpectedness, which leads to surprise. Augustine. So, tell me, do you think that the words “more” and “better” mean two different things, or do these two names mean the same thing? Evodiy. I believe that this is not the same thing. Augustine. Which of these two, in your opinion, refers to magnitude? Evodiy. Of course, “more”. Augustine. Well, when we admit that of two figures the circle is better than the square, does the magnitude prompt us to do so, or is it something else? Evodiy. Not at all a size; the reason for this superiority is the equality we spoke of above. Augustine. In this case, pay attention to the following. Do you find that spiritual valor is a certain equality of life, consistent in all respects with reason? After all, if in life one thing goes against the other, then, if I’m not mistaken, this offends us more than if any part of the circle is at a greater or lesser distance from the center than the other. Or does it seem different to you? Evodiy. On the contrary, I agree with you and accept your definition of mental valor. For only true reason should be called and recognized as reason; and the one whose life is in all respects consistent with the truth, only he lives well and honestly; and only such a person should be considered to have virtue and live by it. Augustine. You speak well; but I suppose it has not escaped your notice that the circle has more similarities with spiritual valor than any other flat figure. Hence Horace has that verse, extolled by all, in which he says, when speaking about the wise: Strong, all rolled up and rounded into himself. And that's true. For just as in the number of good spiritual qualities you will not find anything that in all respects corresponds to itself more than virtue, so in the number of flat figures - more than a circle. Therefore, if the circle surpasses the other figures not in area, but in a certain harmony of the image, then one should think all the more about spiritual valor, since it surpasses other spiritual dispositions not by occupying more space, but by some divine proportionality and harmony in the course of action. And when a youth improves in a commendable way, what is this improvement primarily understood as, if not in spiritual valor? Or do you think this is not the case? Augustine. If so, then you should not think that the soul improves like the body through growth. Improving itself, it achieves valor, the beauty and perfection of which, as we recognized, does not depend on spatial magnitude, but on the great power of constancy; and if, as you have already agreed with, “more” is one thing, and “better” is something completely different, then the improvement of the soul with age, in my opinion, does not mean that it becomes bigger, but better. After all, if this were due to the increase in the body, then the one who is longer or thicker would be more prudent. But I believe you will not deny that in life we ​​do not observe such a connection. Evodiy. Who would dispute this? However, since you also admit that the soul improves with age, I am surprised how it happens that the soul, alien to any magnitude, receives something, if not from the volume of bodily members, then, it turns out, from the space of time. Augustine. Stop being surprised, because I will answer you with a similar argument. Just as there is no evidence that the size of the body gives anything to the soul, because many who have weak and small members turn out to be much wiser than those who have a large and fat body, in the same way we see that some young men are much more active and enterprising than other mature men. Therefore, I see no reason to think that time in the sense of human age gives an increase to both bodies and souls. Indeed, between the bodies themselves, which grow over time and occupy larger spaces, the older ones often have a smaller volume; and these are not only old people, who shrink and shrink over time, but even the bodies of children; among the latter we meet those who are smaller in stature compared to those who are older in years. So, if the length of time does not cause the increase of the bodies themselves, but all the power in this regard lies in the seed and in some secret and difficult to understand natural measure, then all the less should one think that from the duration of time the soul receives greater longitude. She studies a lot, as we know, with experience and perseverance. You may be confused by the fact that we usually translate the Greek word μακροθυμία with the word “longevity” (longanimitatem). But it should be noted that many words are transferred from the body to the soul, as well as from the soul to the body. If Virgil calls the mountain unscrupulous and the earth fair - names, as you see, transferred from the soul to the body, then what is surprising if in the opposite sense we use the word “long-spirited” (longanimitatem), although only bodies can be long (longa)? And that of the virtues, which is called greatness of the soul, is correctly understood to relate not to space, but to a certain force, namely, spiritual power and authority; and this virtue deserves the higher price, the more it despises. But we will talk about it later, when we consider the question of how great the soul is, in the sense in which they usually ask how great Hercules was, not in weight and height, but in the superiority of his exploits. For this is, as far as I remember, the order we established. In the present case, you should remember what we said about the point, and, in my opinion, it was said enough. Reason taught us that it is the most powerful and predominantly dominant in the figures. Power and dominance - don’t they indicate some kind of greatness? Meanwhile, at the point we did not open any space. Therefore, when we hear or say about the soul that it is great or lofty, we should imagine not how much space it takes up, but what power it has. So, if your first argument, related to the fact that, as it seemed to you, with age the soul grows along with the body, has already been discussed enough, then let’s move on to another. Evodiy. Whether we have discussed everything that usually causes me bewilderment, I don’t know. It may happen that something has slipped out of memory. But let us explain what has occurred to me at the present time, namely, that in infancy a child cannot speak, but as he grows up he begins to speak. Augustine. It's not difficult. You know, I suppose, that every child speaks the language spoken by the people among whom he was born and raised. Augustine. Imagine that someone was born and raised in a place where people do not speak at all, but convey their thoughts to each other through facial expressions and gestures. Don't you think that he will do the same, and that he who does not hear speech will not speak? Evodiy. Don't ask me about things that can't happen. Is it possible to imagine such a strange society? Augustine. Didn’t you see in Mediolan a young man of excellent physique and extremely worthy, who, however, was mute and deaf, and understood others only by the movements of his body, and himself expressed his thoughts in the same way? This made him especially famous. I knew one peasant who spoke beautifully and from his wife, who also spoke, gave birth to all his children, four or more (I don’t remember exactly now) boys and girls, dumb and deaf. They were mute because they could not speak; and since they noticed the signs given to them only with their eyes, they were considered deaf. Evodiy. I know the first one well, but regarding the others, whom I don’t know, I believe you. But what follows from this? Augustine. But you said that you couldn’t imagine anyone being born among such people. Evodiy. I say the same thing now; because I think you will agree that these people were born among those who spoke. Augustine. I don't deny this; but since we know that such people exist, then please imagine that a deaf man and woman got married, and then, thrown by fate into the desert, where they could nevertheless live, gave birth to a son with normal hearing. How would he talk to his parents? Evodiy. And not otherwise, of course, than by giving signs with body movements, which his parents would have given him. But a very small child could not do even this. Therefore my argument still stands. Whether the soul gains the ability to speak or make signs with movements with age is an insignificant difference; because both of them relate equally to the soul, which we do not want to recognize as growing. Augustine. After these words, it may seem that in your opinion those who walk on a tightrope have a larger soul than those who cannot do this. Evodiy. This is a completely different matter; here everyone will see art. Augustine. Why art? Is it because he studied it? Augustine. So why don't you consider the study of anything else an art? Evodiy. On the contrary, I do not deny that everything that can be studied belongs to art. Augustine. So our hero didn’t learn from his parents to give signs using body movements? Augustine. In this case, you must agree that this too is a matter of a kind of imitative art, and not of an increase in the soul due to age. Evodiy. I cannot agree with this. Augustine. In this case, not everything that is studied is related to art, even though you just agreed with it. Evodiy. Definitely towards art. Augustine. This means that he did not learn to give signs with body movements, which you also agreed with. Evodiy. He learned; but this does not apply to art. Augustine. But just before this you said that what is being studied relates to art. Evodiy. Perhaps I am ready to admit that the ability to speak and make signs with the help of gestures is an art, since we learn it. But only those arts that we learn by observing others are one thing, and those that are put into us by teachers are completely different. Augustine. Which of these arts do you think the soul acquires as more is done? Isn't that all? Evodiy. I think not all, but only the first. Augustine. Isn’t this the kind of art that, in your opinion, would be the art of walking on a tightrope? In my opinion, this art is also acquired by observing those who do it. Evodiy. I think so; but, however, not everyone who sees this and peers with great diligence is able to master this art, but only the one who goes to study with an expert in this matter. Augustine. You speak very well. I will give you a similar answer regarding speech. Many Greeks hear us speaking a different language much more often than they watch us walk on a tightrope; however, in order to learn our language, often, as we do, wanting to learn their language, we turn to teachers. If this is so, then it seems surprising to me why you attribute to the growth of the soul what people say, and do not want to attribute to this the fact that they walk on a tightrope. Evodiy. I don't understand how you mix it up. After all, the one who takes a teacher to study our language already knows his native language, which, in my opinion, he learned due to the age of his soul; when he then studies someone else’s, then I attribute this no longer to an increase in the soul, but to art. Augustine. Well, what if that person who was born and raised among the dumb, having found himself among other people, learned to speak late and when he was already a youth; Do you think his soul would have grown while he was learning to speak? Evodiy. I will never dare to say this; I am already beginning to believe your conclusions and no longer consider the ability to speak as proof of the growth of the soul. Otherwise I would be forced to admit that the soul acquires all other arts through growth. And having said this, I would have to admit in conclusion the absurdity that the soul decreases in stature as soon as it forgets something. Augustine. You understood the essence of the matter perfectly, and so truly that I can tell you: it is correctly said about the soul that it seems to grow when it learns, and, on the contrary, decreases when it forgets; but this is said in a figurative sense, as we showed above. At the same time, you need to be careful not to imagine when using the word “grows” that it occupies more space; one must imagine that, becoming more knowledgeable, she acquires greater power for her activities than she had before. At the same time, the properties of what it studies and what it seems to be in some way incremented with are also important. After all, in the body we see three kinds of increments. One is necessary, which gives the members natural harmony. Another is superfluous, when something, growing abnormally, stands out for its disproportion. This happens, by the way, when people are born with six fingers; These are also many other anomalies, which, when they take on extraordinary proportions beyond the usual, seem simply monstrous. The third is harmful, which, if it occurs, is called a tumor. And in the latter case the members are said to have grown, and in fact they actually occupy more space; but this is associated with the loss of a healthy state. Likewise, there are certain natural increases in the soul when they say about it that it increases with respectable sciences that have applications to an honest and blessed life. When we study something that excites surprise more than it is beneficial, then, although in some respects it may be beneficial, it must be considered unnecessary and classified as of the second type mentioned. From the fact that the famous flute player, as Varro says, gave such pleasure to the people that he became king, it does not follow that we should be concerned about increasing our souls with this skill; just as we would not want to have teeth larger than human ones if we heard that someone who had such teeth tore an enemy to pieces with them. A harmful type of art is one that harms the healthy state of the soul. The ability, for example, to distinguish foods by smell and taste with amazing skill; the ability to tell in which lake a fish was caught or how many years a wine has been aged is all knowledge that deserves regret. If any soul, which, having neglected the mind, is mired in feelings, seems to have grown in such arts, then it should be said about it that it was only swollen, or even that it was exhausted. Evodiy. I couldn't agree with you more; and yet I lament that our soul is in all respects as ignorant and bestial as we see it in a newborn baby. Why does it not bring with it any knowledge, since it is eternal? Augustine. You raise a great question, and one on which our opinions contradict each other to such an extent that it seems to you that the soul did not bring with it any knowledge, but it seems to me, on the contrary, that it brought everything, and that the so-called teaching is nothing more than the recollection and representation of the past in the present. But don't you think that it is somewhat inappropriate to deal with this issue now? After all, we try as best we can to explain that the soul is called small or great not by the volume of space it occupies; We will talk about its eternity when we begin to consider the fourth of the questions you posed, namely: why was it given to the body? For the question of its magnitude, it does not matter whether it has always or not always been and will be, or that at certain times it is ignorant and at another knowledgeable, as long as we have proven above that the length of time does not even cause the increase of bodies, and as long as it is known that the acquisition of knowledge may not be combined with growth, but is often combined with old age. We have said many other things, in my opinion, sufficient to prove that with the increase in the body, which occurs with age, the soul does not become larger. Let us therefore consider, if you please, your other argument, namely, that the soul, to which we do not wish to attribute any spatial magnitude, feels touch throughout the entire space of the body. Evodiy. I would agree to move on to this question if I did not find it necessary to say something regarding forces. What does it mean that bodies that grow larger with age give the soul greater strength, if at the same time the soul does not become larger? Although the soul is usually credited with valor and strength with the body, I will never allow myself to alienate them from the soul, as soon as I see that they do not exist in soulless bodies. True, and this cannot be denied, the soul uses powers, as well as feelings, through the body; nevertheless, if the body performs this service because it lives, no one will doubt to attribute this primarily to the soul. So, if in growing children we encounter powers greater than in infants, and if then youths and young men increase in their strength day by day, which then decreases as the body ages, then, in my opinion, this serves as an important indication that the soul grows with the body and ages with the body. Augustine. What you say is not absurd in every way. But I usually adhere to the opinion that strength depends not so much on the volume of the body and age, but on a certain exercise and the harmonious formation of the limbs. To prove this, I ask: Do you agree that if one person can take longer walks and be less tired than another, then this means that he has more strength? Augustine. Why did I, as a boy, when I practiced bird-catching, tirelessly walk incomparably greater distances than when I became a youth, when I moved on to other activities that forced me to sit still more, if the increase in strength should be attributed to increasing age and with it the growth of the soul? Then, in the bodies of wrestlers, teachers of their art pay attention not to mass or size, but to certain ligaments of muscles, to individual muscles and to the entire figure of the body, how proportional it is, and in this they primarily look for proof of strength. However, all this has little meaning if art and exercise are not added to it. We often see that people of enormous stature are superior to short and thin ones both in movement and in carrying heavy loads, and even in the fight itself. Who doesn't know that any winner of the Olympic Games is more likely to get tired on the road than an ordinary market trader whom he could crush with one finger? So, if we call forces great not irrespectively and not all at once, but only some that are most suitable for this or that task; if the proportions of bodies are much more important than sizes; if the exercises give so much strength that, as is confirmed by numerous examples, a person, lifting a small calf every day, achieved the point that he could lift and hold it, which had become a bull, without feeling much weight, which was added little by little; then the forces that appear at an older age do not at all show the growth of the soul. If the comparatively large bodies of animals are endowed with somewhat greater strength precisely because they are large, then the reason for this is that, according to the law of nature, the smaller ones are inferior to the larger ones. This law manifests itself not only in those cases when bodies themselves strive to take their place, such as, for example, liquid and earthen bodies - in the very center of the world, which is below, and airy and fiery bodies - on the contrary, above; but also in those cases when, by some throwing weapon, push or reflection, they are forced, under the influence of a force alien to them, to go to a place other than where they would have aimed on their own. If you throw two stones of different sizes from a height, albeit simultaneously, the larger one will fall to the ground faster; but if the smaller one falls under it and is so captured by it that it does not slip out from under it, it will completely succumb to it and fall to the ground with it. And in the same way, if the larger one is thrown from above downwards, and the smaller one is thrown from below upwards, then where they meet, the reflection and reverse movement of the smaller one will necessarily follow. And lest you think that this happens because the smaller one is given, contrary to nature, a violent movement in height, while the other is directed with greater desire to its place, make sure that the larger one is thrown up and meets the smaller one falling to the ground; You will see that in this case, too, the smaller one, being reflected, will receive a movement towards the sky, and when it then falls down, it will fall not in the direction in which it was directed, but in the other. If two stones, not by virtue of natural movement, but because they were thrown against each other by two, for example, fighting in a war, collide with each other in the middle of the distance they fly, then who can doubt that the smaller one will yield to the larger one and both will fly in the direction from which the first one flew and where the last one was thrown? However, although this really happens, i.e. although smaller weights, as mentioned above, are inferior to larger ones, what is of great importance is the speed with which they move towards each other. If a smaller one, thrown with greater force and speed by means of some strong throwing weapon, collides with a larger one, thrown with less force or already weakened in flight, then although it will rebound from the latter, it will slow down its movement, or even give it the opposite movement, depending on their speeds and weight. Now I ask you to delve into the following: whether the so-called animal forces also fit into this rule. Who would deny that the bodies of all animals have their own weight? This weight, moved in a certain direction by the desire of the soul, has considerable force due to its own magnitude. But the spiritual desire uses tendons as a kind of throwing weapons to move the weight of the body; and the tendons are given greater vitality and mobility by dryness and moderate warmth; damp cold, on the contrary, relaxes and weakens them. Therefore, in sleep, which doctors call cold and wet, confirming this view of it with evidence, the limbs become relaxed, and the very tension of strength in those who wake up is particularly weak; that is why there are no weaker and more powerless lethargs. But some crazy people who suffer from insomnia and acute attacks of fever, i.e. everything that causes heat and produces extreme tension and stiffness of the veins, on the contrary, as is known, they resist with greater strength than in a healthy state, and show considerable strength in general, although their body is usually thin due to illness. So, what is called forces is composed of the desire of the soul, of a certain mechanism of tendons and of the heaviness of the body. Desire is generated by will; it is more rapid in the presence of hope or courage, and is weakened by fear, and even more so by despair, since with fear, which still leaves room for hope, the strength usually turns out to be greater. The mechanism is given by the corresponding formation of the body; the state of health modifies it, and exercise strengthens it. Heaviness is imparted by the massiveness of the members, acquired by age and nutrition, and is restored by nutrition alone. Anyone who receives all this equally significant development arouses surprise with his own strength, and the more likely one person will be weaker than another, the more he lacks the indicated. But it often happens that a person with a lighter body, due to greater desire and a better mechanism, defeats another with a larger mass. Conversely, the massiveness is sometimes so great that with the slightest effort it suppresses a small enemy, despite the much greater efforts he makes. But when it is not the weight of the body or the location and condition of the tendons that gives way, but the desire itself, i.e. the soul itself, so that it is not the strongest in all respects who wins, but the weakest in all respects, and the more courageous over the cowardly - then I don’t know whether this should be attributed to its strength; unless someone would argue that the soul also has its own powers, thanks to which the winner received greater courage and self-confidence. In this case, since one has them and the other does not, this makes it clear how much the soul surpasses the body even in what is accomplished through the body. So, since a child undoubtedly has only one desire to attract or push something away, but his tendons, due to their recent and still imperfect formation, are clumsy, due to the humidity that abounds at this age, they are sluggish, and due to the lack of any exercise, they are weak, and the weight is so small that it cannot impart a strong push even when thrown by another, then who, seeing that all this, which was not there before, has been brought in over the years, and Having learned that strength is also given by the years, will he consider it correct and reasonable to think that the soul has grown, which in fact only uses what is increasing from day to day? Such a one, if he had first seen how the reeds fly close and quickly fall, shot with all their might from the weak bow of young men, hidden from him by a curtain, and then seen how high the arrows fly to the sky, already weighed down with iron, feathered, fired by a tightly stretched bowstring - then, having received the assurance that both were made by a man with equal effort, he might perhaps have thought that this man was so for a short time he grew up and increased in his powers. What can you think of that is more ridiculous than this? Further, pay attention to the extent to which it is ignorant, if the soul grows, to make its increments dependent on bodily forces, and not consider their source to be an increase in knowledge, while on its part it imparts only desire to the former, and inseparably owns the latter? Then, if we think that the soul grows when strength is given to it, then we must also think that it decreases when strength decreases. But strength diminishes in old age, and is also lost during scientific pursuits. Meanwhile, it is precisely at this time that knowledge is acquired and increased. But something cannot increase and decrease at the same time. Consequently, the fact that at an older age the forces are greater does not serve as proof of the growth of the soul. Much more could be said, but if you are already satisfied, I will finish with this subject and we will move on to another. Evodiy. I am fully convinced that the increase in strength is not directly related to the growth of the soul. I believe that even a madman, whose strength, as is known, becomes greater than is usually the case with a healthy person, even a madman would not say that the soul grows through insanity and illness, although the body itself decreases. From now on, I will adhere to the opinion that the tendons contain everything that we are so surprised at when we see extraordinary strength in someone. Therefore, I ask you to proceed to what my whole thought is now directed to, namely: why does the soul, if it does not have the spatial magnitude that the body has, feel it everywhere, wherever it is touched? Augustine. Well, let's get started, but this time you will have to be especially careful. Therefore, concentrate and answer, what kind of feeling is this, in your opinion, that the soul uses through the body (after all, it is, in fact, called feeling)? Evodiy. I heard that there are five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch; I don’t know what to say beyond this. Augustine. This division is very ancient and is often used in speeches addressed to the people. But I would like you to define what this feeling itself is - define it in such a way that your definition simultaneously includes all the above feelings and does not imply anything that is not a feeling. If this is not possible, I do not insist. It will be quite enough for the matter if you are able to refute or confirm my definition. Evodiy. The last one is probably best. Augustine. So listen. Feeling, in my opinion, is that by virtue of which what is experienced by the body is not hidden from the soul. Evodiy. I wholeheartedly approve of this definition. Augustine. In that case, take it as your own and defend it while I refute it little by little. Evodiy. I will probably protect you if you help; and if not, then I immediately refuse it, because, I think, it was not in vain that you found it necessary to refute it. Augustine. Do not obey authority so blindly, especially mine, which is almost non-existent. “Dare to understand,” as Horace says: let reason, not fear, conquer you. Evodiy. No matter how things are conducted, I am absolutely not afraid of anything. You, of course, will not allow me to be mistaken. But start quickly, so that the delays don’t tire me more than the objections themselves. Augustine. So tell me what does your body feel when you see me? Evodiy. Of course, he experiences something, because the eyes, if I’m not mistaken, are parts of my body; if they did not experience anything, then how would I see you? Augustine. But your assurance that your eyes experience something is not enough for me; explain what exactly they are experiencing. Evodiy. Of course, nothing more than the vision itself, since they see. After all, if you asked what the patient was experiencing, I would answer that it was an illness; the one who desires experiences desire, the one who fears experiences fear, the one who rejoices experiences joy. This means that the seer experiences precisely vision. Augustine. But he who rejoices feels joy, doesn't he? Evodiy. I guess so. Augustine. And could I say the same about other emotional disturbances? Augustine. Therefore, as long as the eyes feel something, then this is what they see. Evodiy. I just can’t agree with this: no one sees the disease, although the eyes often feel it. Augustine. It is clear that your attention is drawn to your eyes; You are following the progress of our discussions quite well. So, look closely, does the one who sees, when seeing, feel the vision, just as the one who rejoices, when he rejoices, feels joy? Evodiy. Could it really be any other way? Augustine. But everything that the seer, seeing, feels, he certainly sees. Evodiy. Not necessarily; and if, seeing, he feels love: does he really see love too? Augustine. Disclaimer; I'm glad you're hard to catch. But now pay attention to the following. Since it has been decided between us that not everything that the eyes feel, and not everything that we feel when we see, we certainly see: then don’t you consider it true at least that everything that we see is certainly felt? Evodiy. If I did not agree with this, then how could what we see be called a feeling? Augustine. Well, don’t we experience everything that we feel? Augustine. So, if everything we see we feel, and everything we feel we experience, then that means we experience everything we see. Augustine. So, when we see each other, you test me, and I test you? Evodiy. I think so, and my mind persistently forces me to admit it. Augustine. Look what follows from this. I believe that it would seem to you the greatest absurdity and stupidity if someone were to claim that you are experiencing some body where there is no body that you are experiencing. Evodiy. The absurdity is clear, and I believe that everything is as you say. Augustine. Well, isn’t it obvious to you that my body is in one place, and yours is in another? Augustine. However, your eyes feel my body; if they feel, then they certainly experience; but they cannot experience where what they experience is not there; and yet they are not where my body is; therefore, they experience where they do not exist. Evodiy. Although I agreed with everything that seemed absurd to me to disagree with, this last conclusion is absurd to such an extent that I would rather admit that I made some imprudent concession in the previous one than accept the conclusion itself as true. After all, even in a dream I would not dare to say that my eyes feel where they are not. Augustine. In this case, remember where you took a nap: would anything have slipped away as a result of your carelessness if you had been as attentive as you were shortly before? Evodiy. I'm really trying to remember and think again about everything we talked about; but I don’t see with sufficient clarity what concession I should repent of, except perhaps what our eyes feel when we see. Feels, perhaps, vision itself. Augustine. So be it. Vision really extends outward, and thanks to the eyes it penetrates so far that it can examine everywhere what we see. From this it happens that it sees rather where what it sees is located, but not where it comes from in order to see. In that case, when you see me, is it not you who actually sees? Evodiy. What madman would say this? In any case, I see; but I see with vision emanating outward through the eyes. Augustine. If you see, then you feel; if you feel, then you experience; you cannot experience anything where you are not; where you see me, there I am; therefore, you test me where I am. But if you are not where I am, then I absolutely do not understand how you decide to claim that it is you who sees me. Evodiy. I say that I see you where you are, extending my vision to the place in which you are; but I admit that I am not there. If I, for example, touched you with a stick, I would undoubtedly touch you and feel it; however, I would not be where I touched you. In the same sense I say that I see with sight. Although I am not there, this, however, does not force me to admit that it is not I who sees. Augustine. So, you have not made any rash concession, because you can defend your eyes, for which vision, as you say, is like a kind of stick, and the conclusion that your eyes see where there are none does not seem absurd. Evodiy. That's how it is; Moreover, the thought now occurred to me that if the eyes saw where they are, they would see themselves. Augustine. It would be more correct to say not “and ourselves,” but “if only they could see themselves.” After all, where they are, i.e. in the place that they occupy, they alone exist; for there is neither a nose nor anything else adjacent to them. Otherwise, you, perhaps, would be where I am, because we are both next to each other. If this is so, and if the eyes saw only where they are, they would see nothing but themselves. If they do not see themselves, then we must agree that they not only see where they are not, but even there they can only see where they are not. Evodiy. After this I have no doubts. Augustine. Therefore, you have no doubt that the eyes experience where they do not exist. For where they see, there they feel; After all, seeing means feeling, feeling means experiencing; therefore, where they feel, there they experience. But they see not in the place where they are; therefore, they experience where they do not exist. Evodiy. It's interesting how I accept all this as truth! Augustine. You're probably right. But tell me, do we see everything that we learn through vision? Augustine. And do you also think that everything that we learn by seeing, we learn through sight? Augustine. In this case, why do we, seeing only a large smoke, recognize that there is a fire hidden under it that we do not see? Evodiy. You speak the truth, and I no longer think that we see everything that we recognize through sight: because we can, as you proved, by seeing one thing, recognize another, which we cannot achieve with sight. Augustine. Well, can we not see what we feel with our eyes? Augustine. Therefore, it is one thing to feel, and another to know. Evodiy. Absolutely right: because the smoke that we see, we feel, and that underneath there is fire, which we do not see, we know. Augustine. You reason beautifully. But you notice, of course, that when this happens, our body, i.e. eyes, is not affected by fire, but is affected by smoke, which is all he sees. After all, we agreed above that seeing means feeling, and feeling means experiencing. Evodiy. This is true and I agree with it. Augustine. So, when, as a result of an impression experienced by the body, something is not hidden from the soul, it is not always notified by one of the five senses mentioned, but only when the impression itself is not hidden; because we do not see that fire, we do not hear, we do not smell, we do not taste, we do not feel, and it does not hide from our soul because smoke is visible. That, as a result of which it is not covered, is not called feeling, because our body does not experience anything from fire, but is called knowledge through feeling, because it is derived and obtained from the impression experienced by the body, albeit different, i.e. from the discretion of another thing. Evodiy. I understand and see that this answers and favors your definition, which you left me to defend as my own. After all, I remember, you defined feeling in such a way that what the body experiences is not hidden from the soul. Thus, what smoke allows us to see we call feeling, because, seeing it, our eyes, which are parts of the body, experience a certain impression; but we do not call the fact that we recognize fire, from which the body experiences nothing, a feeling. Augustine. I approve of your memory and consistency in judgment; but this fence protecting the definition is about to fall. Augustine. I think you can't deny that our bodies experience something when we grow or age; It is also obvious that we do not feel this with any of our senses; however, this is not hidden from the heart. Consequently, something that the body experiences is not hidden from it, but this cannot in any way be called a feeling. Seeing as larger what we once saw as smaller, and seeing as old those who are known to have been youths and children, we conclude that our bodies experience some change of the same nature even at the present time, when we are talking. And in this, I believe, we are not deceived. I am sooner ready to admit deception in what I see than in the thought that my hair is currently growing or that my body is constantly changing. If this change is a state experienced by the body - which no one denies - and is not felt by us at the present time, and yet is not hidden from the soul, because it is not hidden from us, then the body, as I said, experiences something that is not hidden from the soul, and yet it is not a feeling. Therefore, the definition, which should not contain anything that is not a feeling, turns out to be incorrect in fact, because it contains such a thing. Evodiy. I see that all I can do is ask you to either give a different definition, or correct it, if you can, since I cannot deny its fallacy due to what you said, which I fully approve of. Augustine. The fix is ​​easy. I would like you to decide on this. Believe me that you can do this, if only you understand well what is wrong with it. Evodiy. But what else, if not the fact that it embraces someone else’s? Augustine. But how? Evodiy. And such that the body ages; therefore it cannot be denied that it experiences something; and if we know this, then something that the body experiences is not hidden from the soul, and yet this cannot be perceived by any sense, since at this time I do not see that I am getting old, I do not feel it either by hearing, or smell, or taste, or touch. Augustine. How do you know this? Evodiy. I conclude this with my mind. Augustine. On what foundations does your mind rest? Evodiy. The fact that I see others as old people, knowing at the same time that they were once as young as I am now. Augustine. Isn’t the fact that you see them a feeling? Evodiy. Who denies this? But from the fact that I see them, I assume that I too am getting old, although I don’t see it. Augustine. So, what words, in your opinion, need to be added to that definition in order to correct it, if a feeling is nothing more than a state experienced by the body, not hidden from the soul, and yet experienced in such a way that the soul knows about it not through any other impression it experiences or the like? Evodiy. Please tell me this a little more clearly. Augustine. I will say it with great pleasure. But focus: what I say will matter for everything that follows. The definition should contain no more and no less than what is needed to clarify the matter; otherwise it is incorrect. Whether it really does not have these shortcomings is clarified by rearrangement. You will see this more clearly from the following examples. Suppose you asked me: what is a person? and I would define it as follows: man is a mortal animal. From the fact that what I said is true, it does not follow that you must accept the definition as true. Having added the word “everyone” to it, you must rearrange it and see if it remains true after the rearrangement, i.e. Just as it is true that every man is a mortal animal, will it also be true that every mortal animal is a man? Having seen that the latter is false, you must reject the definition due to the shortcoming that it embraces someone else’s: because not only man is a mortal animal, but every dumb animal is mortal. This definition of man is usually corrected by adding “rational” to “mortal,” because man is a mortal and rational animal, and just as every person is a rational and mortal animal, so every rational and mortal animal is a person. Consequently, the former definition is incorrect due to the fact that it embraces the superfluous, but the latter is correct because it contains every person and does not contain anything else except a person. But it can be unduly narrowed by adding the word “literate.” For although every rational, mortal and literate animal is a person, yet very many people who are illiterate will not fall under this definition. So, this definition in its original form will be false, but if you make a rearrangement in it, it will be true. For it is false that every person is a rational, mortal and literate animal; but it is true that every rational, mortal and literate animal is a person. But the definition will be much more incorrect than both of those given if it says a lie both in the original sentence and in the rearrangement. These are the following two: man is a white animal; man is a four-legged animal. Whether you say that every person is a white or four-legged animal, or say the opposite, you will equally say a lie. But the difference will be that the first definition extends to some people, for there are many white people; but the latter does not extend to anyone, because there is no four-legged man at all. Learn this just in case to check the definitions in order to judge their correctness, putting them in the form of a sentence and making a rearrangement in them. There is a lot of other, verbose and very obscure things taught on this subject; I will try to introduce you to this little by little when it comes in handy. Now pay attention to the definition we have given and, having examined it as a more knowledgeable person, correct it. We found that, being the definition of a feeling, it embraces something that is not a feeling, and therefore, if a rearrangement is made in it, it will not be true. So it is true, perhaps, that every feeling is a state experienced by the body, not hidden from the soul, just as it is true that every person is a mortal animal; but just as it is false that every mortal animal is a person, because even a dumb animal is mortal, so it is also false that every state experienced by the body, which is not hidden from the soul, is a feeling, because our nails are currently growing and this is not hidden from the soul, we know this, but we do not feel it, but learn through inference. To correct the first definition of man, we added to it the word “reasonable”; thanks to this addition, the dumb animals that were contained in it are excluded from it, and the definition in this form no longer embraces anything except man, but man embraces everything. Don't you think that in the same way something should be added to our definition of feeling, in order to thereby exclude from it what is foreign in it, and so that nothing is understood in it except feeling, and feeling means everything? Evodiy. I think you are absolutely right, but I don’t know what should be added. Augustine. A feeling is undoubtedly any state experienced by the body that is not hidden from the soul; but this expression does not allow for rearrangement due to the known state experienced by the body, when it increases or decreases without our knowledge, i.e. so that it is not hidden from the heart. Augustine. Well, isn’t this experienced state hidden from the soul in itself, or through something else? Evodiy. Obviously, through something else: because it is one thing to see your nails large, and quite another to know that they are growing. Augustine. Consequently, if growth itself is an experienced state, and this quantity that we feel came from this experienced state, but is not itself this state, then it is obvious that we know about this state not through it, but through something else. We would rather feel this state than conclude about it, if it were not hidden from the soul by itself, and not through another. Augustine. In that case, why are you thinking about what should be added to this definition? Evodiy. Now I know that it should be defined this way: a feeling is a state experienced by the body, which in itself does not hide from the soul. Augustine. If this is so, I am ready to accept the definition as correct. But let us check, if you like, whether it does not suffer from that other shortcoming that the definition of a person, to which the word “literate” is added, does. After all, I suppose you remember what was said about man. He is a rational animal, mortal and literate; and that this definition is incorrect because it is true by rearrangement, but in the original presentation it is false. For it is false that every man is a rational, mortal and literate animal, although it is true that every rational, mortal and literate animal is a man. This definition is incorrect because although it does not contain anything other than man, it does not contain everyone. Perhaps this is also the definition of feeling, which seems to us so far quite correct. For although every state experienced by the body, which in itself is not hidden from the soul, is a feeling, not every feeling is precisely this. You can explain this to yourself this way. Dumb animals feel and almost all possess the mentioned five senses to the extent that this is given to them by nature; or do you deny it? Augustine. Wouldn't you agree that knowledge is acquired only when an object is perceived and reproduced by a sound mind? Augustine. But a dumb animal does not use its mind. Evodiy. I agree with this too. Augustine. Consequently, the concept of “knowledge” does not apply to a dumb animal; but as soon as something is not hidden, it is known; Therefore, dumb animals do not feel, unless every feeling is a state experienced by the body, which in itself is not hidden from the soul. And yet they feel. After this, what reasons can keep us from rejecting a definition that turns out to be unable to embrace every feeling, because it does not include the feeling of dumb animals? Evodiy. I confess that I was mistaken in agreeing with you that knowledge is obtained only when something is perceived by a sound mind. When you asked about this, I only took people into account. As for dumb animals, although I cannot say that they use reason, I cannot deny that they have knowledge. I think that the dog knew its master if it recognized him, as it is said (in the Odyssey), twenty years later; I’ll keep silent about countless other examples. Augustine. Tell me, please, when two things are presented to you, one that needs to be comprehended and the other through which you can comprehend, which one do you attach greater importance and which one do you prefer to the other? Evodiy. Without any doubt, I prefer the one that needs to be comprehended. Augustine. Of these two things, knowledge and reason, do we comprehend reason by knowledge or knowledge by reason? Evodiy. As far as it seems to me, both things are so closely related to each other that through one and the other one can comprehend each. After all, we would not have comprehended reason itself if we did not know that it was necessary to comprehend it. Therefore, knowledge comes first, since through it we comprehend the mind. Augustine. Well, and the knowledge itself, which, according to you, stands in front, is comprehended without the help of reason? Evodiy. I didn’t say that - that would be the greatest recklessness. Augustine. Therefore, it is comprehended by reason? Augustine. Is it really recklessness? Evodiy. Why is this suddenly? Augustine. So what, finally? Evodiy. Nothing, because knowledge is innate to us. Augustine. You seem to have forgotten what we agreed on above when I asked if you think that knowledge is formed when any object is perceived by a sound mind. I remember you answered that human knowledge seems to you exactly like this; Now you claim that a person can have some knowledge even when he perceives an object without any understanding. Isn't it obvious that these two positions contradict each other? Therefore, I would like to know which of these two positions you choose; for both can in no way be true at the same time. Evodiy. I choose the one I just expressed; because I agreed with the previous one, I admit, thoughtlessly. After all, when we search for the truth with our reason, and this is achieved through questions and answers, how could reason reach the final conclusion if it had not first accepted something as true? And how could he accept anything as true if we did not recognize this something? Consequently: if this reason had not found something known in me, relying on which it would lead me to the unknown, I would have learned absolutely nothing through it, and I would not have called it reason. In view of this, you are in vain in disagreeing with me that there certainly exists in us some knowledge before reason, from which reason itself originates. Augustine. I will do what pleases you and allow you to correct mistakes in all those cases when you are dissatisfied with your agreement with something. But please don't take advantage of this or be careless with my questions. Otherwise, too often, the careless consent you give to something will cause you to doubt what you agreed to correctly. Evodiy. Continue what you started. Although I will concentrate my attention as much as I can, because I am ashamed to deviate from my opinion so many times, I will never be afraid to resist this shame and correct my mistake, especially with your assistance. Stubbornness should not be tolerated because it is permanently desirable. Augustine. Let this constancy be established in you as soon as possible - the thought you expressed is so pleasant to me! But for now, be as attentive as possible to what I have to say. I ask: what do you think is the difference between reason and inference? Evodiy. I am not strong enough to point out this distinction. Augustine. In this case, tell me, do you believe that a person - a young man or a husband, perhaps even (let's say without any extravagance) like a wise person, if only his mind is healthy, reason is inherent immediately and constantly, like a healthy state, for example, is a body if it does not suffer from ulcers and wounds; or, on the contrary, how the ability, for example: to walk, sit, talk, can sometimes manifest itself, sometimes not manifest itself? Evodiy. I believe that a sound mind always has reason. Augustine. Well, what about the fact that we, whether by asking another, or comparing one thing with another, with which we have already agreed before or which is obvious in itself, reach the knowledge of any thing, is this always done by us or with the help of an outside sage? Evodiy. Not always. For every man, and a wise man, as I believe, does not always, either by himself or with someone else, seek for anything through reasoning: because the one who seeks has not yet found; therefore, if he had always searched, he would never have found it. But the wise man has already found at least (not to mention anything else) wisdom itself, which, while still a fool, he perhaps sought through reasoning, or in some other way. Augustine. What you say is true. So please understand for yourself that it is not reason itself when, through something that we have agreed with or that we know, we reach something previously unknown; because this, as we now agree with you, is not always inherent in a sound mind; and reason is always present. Evodiy. I understand, but what is this for? Augustine. And to the fact that shortly before this you said (and I, in your opinion, certainly had to agree with this) that we have knowledge before reason, on the basis that reason, leading us to the unknown, relies on something already known; whereas at present we have found that this, when done, should not be called reason; because a sound mind does not always do this, although reason always has it; and this, perhaps, is correctly called inference, since reason is a kind of glance of the mind, and inference is a rational investigation, i.e. the movement of this gaze over everything that is to be viewed. The latter is needed in order to find, and the mind is needed to see. So, when this gaze of the mind, which we call reason, being cast on any object, sees it, this is called knowledge; and if the mind does not see, although it strains its gaze, this is called ignorance or lack of knowledge. After all, even with these bodily eyes, not everyone who looks sees; we easily notice this in the dark. From this, I think, it is clear that looking is one thing, and seeing is quite another; in the mind we call these two things intelligence and knowledge. But perhaps you want to object to something or do you find this distinction not clear enough? Evodiy. I am pleased with this distinction and readily agree with it. Augustine. In this case, tell me, in your opinion, do we look in order to see, or do we see in order to look? Evodiy. Not a single blind person, of course, will doubt that the gaze exists in order to see, and not vice versa. Augustine. Therefore, we must admit that seeing has a much greater value than having sight. Augustine. Consequently, knowledge has a greater value than reason. Evodiy. I find this conclusion consistent. Augustine. Do you think that dumb animals are better and happier than people? Evodiy. May God protect from such madness. Augustine. You were quite rightly horrified; but the position you expressed leads us to this. You said that they have knowledge, but they have no understanding. Man has a mind, through which he achieves knowledge with difficulty. But let him reach and easily; What is so special about reason that we consider ourselves superior to dumb animals if they have knowledge, and knowledge, as it turns out, should be valued higher than reason? Evodiy. I am forced either not to allow knowledge in dumb animals, or to recognize without objection their actual superiority over me. But please explain to me the quality of what I mentioned about Ulysses’ dog: after all, the surprise it caused prompted me to bark into the wind. Augustine. Do you really think that this is knowledge, and not just a certain power of feeling? Many dumb people are superior in feeling to us (it is now inappropriate to look for the reason for this); but in mind, intellect, and knowledge, God has placed us above them. The said sense, in conjunction with habit, which is of great force, can discern what gives pleasure to similar souls, and can discern all the more easily because the soul of animals is more attached to the body to which these feelings belong and which it uses for life and the pleasure it receives from the same body. The human soul, through reason and knowledge, which we are talking about and which are incomparably superior to the senses, rises as far as it can above the body, and more willingly enjoys the pleasure that is within it; and the more he goes into feelings, the more he makes a person look like cattle. Because of this, it happens that crying children, the more alien to reason they are, the more easily they sense even the touch or approach of nurses, and cannot stand the smell of other women to whom they are not accustomed. Therefore, even if I interrupted one another, I would gladly engage in a conversation of such a nature that would convince the soul not to plunge into feelings more than necessity requires, but, distracted from them, to concentrate more in itself and become infantile in relation to God. The latter means, having put off the old man, to become a new man. To begin with this is a direct necessity because of the neglect of the law of God, and nothing is set forth in the divine Scriptures with such truth and mystery. I would like to talk about this more, so that, under the pretext of advising you, I can convince myself to only care about giving myself back to myself, to whom I am especially indebted; and through this, to become for God, as Horace says, a servant - a friend to the Master. And the latter is absolutely impossible if we do not transform ourselves in His image, which He gave for preservation, as something most precious and dear, when He gave us ourselves such that nothing can be considered higher than us except Himself. In my opinion, there is no task more difficult and no task more similar to the cessation of activity: the soul cannot undertake or complete it without the help of the one to whom it gives itself back. Therefore, man must transform himself through the mercy of Him by Whose goodness and power he was formed. But we must return to the subject of our conversation. Do you now find it proven for yourself that dumb animals do not have knowledge and that everything that we marvel at in them, as having some semblance of knowledge, is the power of feeling? Evodiy. This has indeed been proven; and if there are some questions remaining on this subject that should be resolved, I will use another time for that; and now I would like to know what conclusion you will draw from this? Augustine. And what else, in your opinion, is it not that the above definition of feeling, which at first contained something more than feeling, now turns out to suffer from the opposite deficiency, because it cannot embrace every feeling? For dumb animals have feeling and do not have knowledge; and meanwhile, what is not hidden is known; and everything that is known, without a doubt, belongs to knowledge. You and I have already agreed on all this. Consequently, it is either false that feeling is a state experienced by the body, not hidden from the soul, or dumb animals do not have it, since they do not have knowledge. But we recognized the feeling in dumb animals. Therefore, the definition is incorrect. Evodiy. I admit, I have nothing to object to this. Augustine. Pay attention to one more circumstance that should make us even more ashamed of this definition. You remember, of course, that the third of the deficiencies of the definition pointed out to you, the ugliest of which nothing can be, is that the definition is false in all respects. This is the well-known definition of man: man is a four-legged animal. Whoever says and proves that every person is a four-legged animal, or that every four-legged animal is a person, is undoubtedly crazy if he is not joking. Evodiy. You are telling the truth. Augustine. Well, if it turns out that our definition of feeling suffers from the same defect, don’t you think it should be eliminated and thrown out of our minds with more decisiveness than anything else? Evodiy. Who will deny this? But I would not want, if possible, for you to keep me on this subject for a long time and torment me with your questions. Augustine. Don't be afraid - the matter is already coming to an end. Or, since we are talking about the difference between dumb animals and people, are you perhaps not yet convinced that it is one thing to feel and another to know? Augustine. So, it’s one thing to feel, another thing to know? Augustine. But we do not feel with our minds, but with our sight, hearing, smell, taste or touch. Augustine. Yet everything that we know, we know with reason; therefore no feeling is knowledge. And what is not hidden belongs to knowledge; therefore, the fact that a thing is not covered does not exactly apply to any sense, any more than the naming of a quadruped cannot properly apply to any person. Therefore, our definition, accepted by you, as it turned out, not only enters into someone else’s area and omits some of our own, but it doesn’t even have our own at all, but contains everything that’s alien. Evodiy. What are we going to do now? Will you really allow it to leave your court with this? Although I defended him as best I could, you composed the very formula of the trial that deceived us. Even if I could not win the case, I at least conducted it in good faith: that is enough for me. But you, who, on the one hand, prompted him to boldly enter into litigation, and on the other, with your denials forced him to abandon it with shame, what will you do if you are accused of abuse of power of attorney? Augustine. Is there really any judge whom I should fear because of this? I, as a privately invited lawyer, wanted to refute you only so that you would stock up on the necessary information, and when the case came to court, I would come prepared for it. Evodiy. So, then, there is something that you can say in favor of this definition, which, of necessity, you entrusted to me, the weak, for protection and preservation? Augustine. Of course there is. Evodiy. What is this, pray tell? Augustine. Here's what. Although feeling is one thing, and knowledge is quite another, their property, by which something is not hidden from the soul, is common to both of them; how the property of an animal is common to man and dumb animals, although they are very different from each other. For that which appears to the soul either through the bodily organization or through the mental lumen is not hidden; The first is the property of feeling, the latter is knowledge. Evodiy. Therefore, that definition remains intact and true? Augustine. Without a doubt, it remains. Evodiy. So what was my mistake? Augustine. The mistake was that you, without properly thinking the matter through, answered in the affirmative when I asked you: is everything that is not covered up known? Evodiy. How do you think I should respond? Augustine. If something is not hidden, it is not always knowledge, but only when it is not hidden by reason; and if it is not covered by the body, then it is called a feeling, since the state experienced by the body is not covered by itself. Don't you know that some philosophers and very witty men believed that even what is understood by the mind does not fit the name of knowledge, unless the understanding is so firm that no argument can shake it in the mind? Evodiy. Very grateful for this clarification. But since it has already been shown with all, in my opinion, subtlety, what a feeling is, let us return, perhaps, to the question for the sake of which we entered into this explanation. To prove that the soul has the same volume as its body, I advanced the argument that, from the head to the last toe, it feels the touch wherever you make it; This was the reason that we moved on to the definition of feeling, which delayed us for so long, although perhaps this was necessary for the matter. So now show the benefit of this work, if, of course, there is any. Augustine. There is undoubtedly, and a very big one: everything we sought has been done. In order to understand as firmly as possible, we discussed for longer than you wished that feeling is a state experienced by the body that is not hidden from the soul; Do you remember our discovery that the eyes feel or better experience a certain state where they do not exist? Augustine. If I’m not mistaken, you also agreed, or at least you have no doubt, that you should also agree that the soul is much better and more powerful than any body? Evodiy. I consider it criminal to doubt this. Augustine. In this case, if the body, due to some kind of union with the soul, can experience a certain state where it does not exist, which, as it turned out, happens with the eyes during vision, then do we really recognize the soul, thanks to which the eyes themselves exhibit such power, to be so crude and clumsy that the state experienced by the body would be hidden from it, even if it is not located where this experienced state itself occurs? Evodiy. This conclusion hits me so hard that I feel backed into a corner and not only don’t know what to answer, but also where I am. Indeed, what could I object to? What is not a feeling when the state experienced by the body in itself is not hidden from the soul? But what will it be if not this? Or that the eyes experience nothing when we see? But this is ridiculous. Or do they experience where they are? But they do not see themselves, and where they are, there is nothing but themselves. Or that the soul is not more powerful than the eyes, although it is the basis of their power? But there is nothing more meaningless than this. Shouldn't it be said that it is a higher degree of power to experience where something is located than where it is not? But if this were true, vision would not be superior to the other senses. Augustine. And what does it mean that when the eyes, for example, experience some kind of blow, cut or change in humidity - they experience it where they are - and when this is not hidden from the soul, then this is not called vision, but sensation; and, moreover, the eye can experience everything similar in a soulless body, even if there is no soul from which the experienced state would not be hidden; and that which the eye cannot experience otherwise than on the condition that a soul is inherent in it, i.e. What he experiences in vision, is he experiencing only one thing where he himself is not? Isn’t it clear to everyone from this that the soul is not contained in any place, since the eye, which is the body, only experiences out of its place that which it never experiences without the soul. Evodiy. Tell me, please, what should I do after this? After all, on these grounds we can conclude that our souls are not in bodies? And if this is so, then I know where I am, right? Who will force me to admit that I am not the soul itself? Augustine. Don't be embarrassed, be very optimistic about it. This reasoning turns us to ourselves, and, as far as possible, turns us away from the body. Although your conclusion that the soul is not in the body of a living and animate being seems absurd, there were, and I believe there still are, very learned men who thought exactly this way. You understand for yourself that this is a very subtle subject and requires a fairly purified mental gaze for its consideration. In this case, think better about what other basis you can imagine to prove that the soul is long or wide, or something of the same kind: because you yourself see that your argument about the sensation of touch does not touch the truth and does not at all prove that the soul is spread throughout the body, like blood, for example. But if you have nothing to add, let's move on to consider what remains. Evodiy. Perhaps I would not have had anything to add if I had not remembered how much we, as youths, were amazed at how the tails of lizards twitched, separated from the rest of the body; I in no way can imagine that such a movement is accomplished without a soul, and I do not understand how the soul has no extension if it can be dissected along with the body. Augustine. In response to this, I could point you to air and fire: these two elements are held in the earthly and moist body by the presence of the soul, so that a mixture of all four is formed; and when the soul leaves the body, they rush upward, and when freed, these bodies move the faster, the more unexpectedly they burst into the freshly made wound; and then the movement weakens and finally stops, as soon as what escapes becomes smaller and smaller and evaporates completely. But what stops me is that I observed with these very eyes - I observed, perhaps, later than one might believe, but in fact not later than I should have observed. Recently, when we were in Liguria, our young men, who were with me at that time for the sake of their scientific studies, lying on the ground in a shady place, noticed a multi-legged reptile animal, i.e. some kind of long worm. This animal is known to everyone, but what I want to say, I have never observed in it. One of the youths, turning the style that he happened to be holding in his hands, cut the animal in half: then both parts of the body moved in opposite directions with such speed and with such unrelenting tension of movement, as if they were two animals of the same kind. Struck by this marvel and curious to know the reason, the young men immediately brought these two living pieces to us, to the place where we were sitting with Alypius. We also watched with considerable surprise how they could run along the board in different directions and how one of them, touched by the style, turned towards the sore spot, while the other did not feel anything and continued his own movements in another place. But what more? We carried out experiments while it was possible, and the worm, even worms, were already dissected into many parts: they all moved in such a way that, if this had not been done by us and fresh wounds had not been visible, we would have decided that the same number of them were born separately and that each of them lived on its own. But what I said to these young men at that time, when they turned to me with intense attention, I am afraid to tell you now. We have already advanced so much that if I did not answer you otherwise, in a way that would serve in favor of the opinion I defend, our essential position, supported by such a long reasoning, would turn out to collapse, having been undermined by one worm. I ordered them that in their scientific studies they, as they began, should continue to adhere to a certain order; that in due time they would be more comfortable to begin to explore and study it, if it should prove necessary. But if I wanted to present what, after they had been removed, I discussed with Alypius, when each of us from his own point of view recalled what he saw, expressed assumptions, asked questions, then we would have to say much more than we spoke to you from the very beginning with all the digressions and roundabouts. However, I will not hide from you what I think. If at that time I had not already known a lot about the body, the form inherent in the body, place, time, movement, which is discussed very subtly and darkly on this same issue, I would have been inclined to admit victory to those who say that the soul is the body. Therefore, as far as I can, I still and again convince you, do not recklessly indulge in books or reasonings of people who are too talkative and who trust these bodily feelings to the extreme, until you correct and establish the paths that lead the soul to God himself; so that scientific studies and works, even easier than inaction and idleness, do not turn you away from this most mysterious and calm refuge of the mind, from which it currently wanders at a distance while it lives here. Now, in contrast to what I feel leads you to extreme bewilderment, listen from many, not what is heavier, but what is shorter; I couldn’t choose what was more likely for me than the rest, but I could choose what was more suitable for you. Evodiy. Please speak as soon as possible. Augustine. First of all, I will say the following. If the reason from which this happens when some bodies are cut is unknown to us, because of this alone we should not be confused to such an extent as to consider false many things that before seemed clearer than light. After all, it may happen that the reason for this is unknown to us because it is hidden from human nature itself; or perhaps it is known to some person, but he cannot be asked by us, or even if asked, he could not satisfy us, since we do not possess the mental abilities necessary for this. Is it really because of this that we should be deprived of what we have studied most thoroughly and what we recognize as the truest? If everything that is true and undoubted that you answered to my questions remains inviolable, then we have nothing to be childishly afraid of the mentioned worm, even if we are not able to imagine the reason for its vitality and multiplicity. After all, if you had a firm and undoubted conviction about someone that he was a good man, and you caught him at a feast with the robbers whom he was pursuing, and by some chance he died before he could be questioned by you, you, although this would forever remain a mystery to you, would rather come up with any reason for his association and feast with the villains than villainy and complicity in villainy. So why, in this case, when by the multitude of the above evidence, which you yourself discussed most thoroughly, it became clear to you that the soul is not contained in a certain place and therefore does not have any such quantity as we see in the body, why don’t you, in order to explain why some animal, being dissected, lives in all parts, not suggest some other reason, but not that the soul could be dissected along with the body? If we cannot discover this reason, then should we not rather seek the true than believe the false? Then I will ask you: do you think that in our words the sound is one thing, and what is denoted by the sound is completely different? Evodiy. In my opinion, this is the same thing. Augustine. In that case, tell me, where does the sound itself come from when you speak? Evodiy. Who can doubt that he comes from me? Augustine. So, the sun also comes from you when you call the sun? Evodiy. You asked me about the sound, not the object itself. Augustine. Consequently, sound is one thing, and an object is another, denoted by sound; and you said that both are one and the same. Evodiy. I agree, I was wrong. Augustine. In this case, tell me, can you, knowing the Latin language, use the name sol (sun) so that the sound is not preceded by the idea of ​​the sun? Augustine. Well, what if, before this name comes out of your mouth, you, wanting to express it, spend some time in silence; won't your thought contain something that someone else will then hear? Augustine. But the sun is enormous; So is it not possible to represent the concept of it, which you contain in your thoughts before uttering the word, as long, wide, etc.? Augustine. Now tell me: when the name itself comes out of your mouth, and I, hearing it, imagine the sun, which you imagined before and during the utterance of the word, and now, perhaps, we both imagine—doesn’t it seem to you as if the name itself received from you the meaning that was conveyed to me through the ears? Augustine. Therefore, if the name itself consists of sound and meaning, and the sound refers to the ears, and the meaning to the mind, then do you not think that in the name, as in some animate being, the sound represents the body, and the meaning the soul of the sound? Evodiy. In my opinion, this sounds convincing. Augustine. Now pay attention to whether the sound of a name can be divided into letters, while its soul, i.e. its meaning, maybe? After all, a little earlier you said that in our thoughts it does not seem to you either long or wide. Evodiy. I completely agree with this. Augustine. Well, when this sound is divided into letters, do you think it retains its meaning? Evodiy. How can individual letters have the meaning that the name made up of them has? Augustine. Well, when the meaning is lost by dividing the sound into letters, don’t you think that something similar happens to what happens when the soul comes out of a torn body, and that a kind of death happens with the name? Evodiy. I agree with this, and moreover, as willingly as with anything in this speech. Augustine. So, if from this comparison you have sufficiently understood how the soul, with the dismemberment of the body, can not be dissected, then delve into how the pieces of the body themselves can live, even if the soul is not dissected. You have already agreed, and agreed, in my opinion, fairly, that the meaning that constitutes, as it were, the soul of the sound when the name of an object is pronounced, in itself cannot in any way be divisible, while the sound, which is, as it were, its body, can. But in the name sol the sound is divided in such a way that no part of it holds any meaning. Therefore, upon the decomposition of the body of the name, we will look at its letters as members that have lost their soul, i.e. lost their meaning. But if we find a name that, being divided, can have some meaning in individual parts, then you will have to agree that the dissection in the latter case does not necessarily produce something like death, because the members considered separately will seem to you to have some meaning and, as it were, to breathe. Evodiy. Of course I agree, and I look forward to hearing you say such a name. Augustine. Please. Next to the sun, whose name we discussed above, I remember lucifer (Venus); if we cut this word between the second and third syllables, in its first part, when we say luci, it will have some meaning, and therefore it will live on this larger half of the body. The last part also has a soul, because when you are told to fetch something, you hear this part. How could you obey when someone tells you: Percodicem, if the word fer meant nothing? When this word is added to luci, it is pronounced lucifer, and indicates a star; and when it is cut off from it, it still means something, and therefore, as it were, it holds life. But since everything that is subject to the senses is in a certain place and time, or more precisely, occupies a certain place and time, then what is sensed by the eyes is divided according to place, and by the ears - according to time. As the above-mentioned worm, being whole, takes up more space than its part; so when the word lucifer is pronounced, a longer time is required than if only luci were spoken. Therefore, if the last part of the word lives in meaning with the decrease in time that is made by the well-known division of sound, although the meaning itself remains inseparable (because it is not the sound that has the extension in time), then it should also be precisely assumed that after the dissection of the body of the worm, although part of it, precisely because it was a part, lived in a smaller place, the soul was by no means dissected and did not become smaller in a smaller place, although when the animal was intact it owned all of them at once. members extending over a large area. For she did not control space, but the body that she set in motion; just like the well-known meaning of the word, although it has no extension in time, it seemed to animate and fill all the letters of the name, each having its own measure and extension. With this likeness, which I feel you like, be content for now. For more subtle reasoning, which would require not similarities, which for the most part deceive, but the matter itself, do not wait at the moment, because, on the one hand, it is time to end the already protracted conversation, and on the other, in order to penetrate into objects of this kind and comprehend them, your soul must first assimilate many other things that you lack; only then will you be able to clearly understand whether it really is so in reality, as some of the most learned men say, i.e. the soul itself cannot be divisible, but through the body it can. Now, if you want, listen, or better yet, find out what the soul is like, not in terms of space and time, but in terms of strength and power, for these, if you remember, are our initial assumptions and order. As for the number of souls, although this also relates to the same question, I don’t know what to tell you. I would rather say that this should not be asked at all, or that you should wait with this question, than to say that number and multitude do not refer to quantity, or that in relation to such a dark question I cannot currently help you in any way. After all, if I said that the soul is one, you would make a noise that in one way it is blessed, in another it is unhappy, and that the same thing cannot be both blessed and unhappy at the same time. And if I said that she is one and at the same time there are many, you would laugh; and I wouldn’t have anything on hand that could hold back your laughter in time. And if I only said that there are many of them, I would laugh at myself and would rather endure your displeasure than my own displeasure. Therefore hear from me what I think you can profitably hear; and what is so heavy for both or one of us that it can suppress, do not want to lift or impose. Evodiy. I agree and hope that, to the extent that it is within the power of my soul, you will outline what can be discussed with me with benefit for me. Augustine. Oh, if we could both ask about this some most learned, and moreover, the most eloquent and in all respects the wisest and most perfect person! How beautifully in his speech and reasoning he would have explained what power the soul has in the body, what power it has in itself, what it has with God, to Whom it, being pure, is very close, and in Whom it has for itself the highest and every good! Now, when I lack such a person, I am forced to offer you only my services. The benefit here is that while I, an unscientist, will explain what power the soul has, I will without fear try what power I myself have. First of all, however, I will curtail your too broad and limitless expectations: do not think that I will talk about every soul, but only about the human soul, which alone we must take care of if we are obliged to take care of ourselves. So, firstly, she, as is easy for anyone to see, gives life to this earthly and mortal body with her presence; collects it into one and contains it in unity, not allowing it to disintegrate and become exhausted; distributes nutrition evenly among the members, giving each of them its own; preserves its harmony and proportionality not only with regard to beauty, but also with regard to growth and birth. All this, however, may seem to be common to man and trees, since we also say about the latter that they live, and we see and affirm that each of them in its own way preserves itself, nourishes, grows, gives birth. Therefore, ascend to another level and see what power the soul has in the feelings, where life manifests itself more obviously and clearly. For we should not pay attention to that wickedness, quite coarse and more wooden than the trees themselves, which it takes under its protection - the wickedness that believes that the vine feels pain when the cluster is plucked from it, and that trees not only feel, but also see and hear when they are cut down; for the analysis of this sacrilegious error another place would be appropriate. Now, as I suggested, pay attention to what power the soul reveals in the feelings and in the very movement of a being more visually animated - in feelings and in movement, in which we have nothing in common with those who are attached to a place by roots. The soul extends into sensation and in it feels and distinguishes warm and cold, rough and smooth, hard and soft, light and heavy. Then, tasting, smelling, listening, seeing, she discerns countless features of tastes, smells, sounds, forms. And in all this, what corresponds to the nature of her body, she accepts and strives for, and what is opposite to this nature, she rejects and runs away from it. At a certain period of time, she is distracted from these feelings and restores their sensitivity, as if through a kind of holiday, she goes through whole rows and in different manners of the images of the things that she received through them; all this constitutes sleep and dreams. Making various body movements and wandering here and there, she often finds pleasure in the very ease of movement and without difficulty brings the limbs into harmony; to unite the sexes, he does what he can, and through communication and love turns the dual nature into one; inclines not only to the birth, but also to the affection, protection and feeding of children. By force of habit, it becomes attached to things through which the body is carried and supported by the body, and is torn away from them, as if from members, with pain; this force of habit, not broken by the very separation from things and the interval of time, is called memory. But, as everyone agrees, the soul manifests all this power in dumb animals. So, rise to the third level, which is already the property of a person, and imagine this memory of countless things, not grown by force of habit, but taken for preservation and retained by observation and with the help of conventional signs; these different kinds of arts, the cultivation of fields, the construction of cities, the many different miracles of various structures and great enterprises, the invention of so many signs in letters, in words, in body movements, in all kinds of sounds, in painting and sculpture; there are so many languages ​​among peoples, so many institutions, sometimes new, sometimes restored; such a mass of books and all kinds of monuments to preserve memory and such care for posterity; these ranks of positions, authorities, honors and dignity in everyday life, whether in family life, or in state internal and military service, in secular or sacred cult; this power of thought and invention, streams of eloquence, a variety of poetic works, thousands of types of imitation for fun and jokes, the art of music, the accuracy of measurements, the science of calculations, the solution to the past and the future based on the present. All this is great and quite human. But all this wealth is still common, on the one hand, to the learned and unlearned souls, on the other, to the good and the evil. Now raise your gaze higher and jump to the fourth step, from which kindness and everything that truly deserves praise begins. Starting from this stage, the soul dares to prefer itself not only to its body, although it forms a certain part of the world’s body, but also to the world’s body itself, and not to consider its benefits as its own, but in comparison with its own power and beauty, to separate and despise them; and then, the more he loves himself, the more he moves away from impurities, cleanses himself of all bodily dirt and strives in every possible way for his possible beauty and decoration; fights against everything that gets in her way to divert her from her assumptions and intentions; highly values ​​human society and does not wish anything for others that he does not want for himself; obeys the authority and commandments of the wise, and believes that God speaks to her through them. This bright aspiration of the soul is also characterized by labor and a great and painful collision with the sorrows and delights of this world. For with the very work of purification is connected the fear of death, often small, but often very strong. It is small when one believes in the simplicity of the heart (for only a completely purified soul can see whether it is really so) that everything is governed by divine providence and truth in such a way that death cannot befall anyone unjustly, even if it was inflicted by an unjust person. But the fear of death becomes strong even at this stage, when the work of purification seems less durable the more carefully one tries to take care of it, and it seems less because, due to fear, the calmness that is extremely necessary for the study of mysterious things decreases. Then, the more the soul, by virtue of its very success, feels how great the difference is between its pure self and its defiled self, the more it fears that when it lays down this body, its God may tolerate the defiled one even less than it itself tolerates. And there is nothing more difficult than to fear death, and at the same time to abstain from the delights of this world, as the dangers themselves require. But such is the strength of the soul that it can succeed in this too with the help of the truth of the highest and true God, by which this entire world is supported and governed, which makes it possible that not only everything exists, but also exists in such a way that it absolutely cannot exist better. With great piety and firm hope, she entrusts herself to this truth in such a difficult task of her purification, so that it will help her and perfect it. When this is accomplished, i.e. when the soul is free from all corruption and washed from defilements, then, finally, it will feel filled with the greatest joy, not at all afraid for itself, not experiencing any anxiety for its position. This constitutes the fifth stage. For it is one thing to achieve purity, and quite another to have it; and it is absolutely one thing to cleanse oneself when one has been defiled, and another thing to not allow oneself to be defiled again. At this stage the soul feels its strength in all respects; and when he feels this, then with great and incredible confidence he rushes to God, i.e. to the very contemplation of truth, and this constitutes the highest and most mysterious reward, for which so much labor has been expended. But this action, i.e. the soul's desire to understand what exists in a true and highest way represents the highest contemplative state of the soul. There is nothing more perfect, better and more normal for the soul. This is the sixth stage. For it is one thing to cleanse the very eye of the soul, so that it does not look in vain and aimlessly and does not see wrongly; another is to preserve and strengthen his health; and it is quite another to turn a clear and direct gaze to what is to be considered. Those who want to do the latter before they are cleansed and receive healing are so painfully affected by this light of truth that they not only do not find anything good in it, but even, on the contrary, find a lot of bad in it, deny it the name of truth and with some voluptuousness and pathetic pleasure, cursing healing, plunge back into their darkness, which their illness can only endure. That is why, by divine inspiration, the prophet says quite correctly: “Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me” (Ps. 50:12). The right spirit, in my opinion, does what the soul, in the search for truth, cannot deviate from the straight path and be mistaken. But such a spirit will not be renewed in her until the heart is pure, i.e. before the thought itself is removed and purified from all desire and all impurity of mortal things. And what will I tell you about this joy, about the enjoyment of the highest and true good, about the quiet flickering of light and eternity inherent in this vision and contemplation of truth, which constitutes the seventh and last stage of the soul - not even a stage, but some kind of constant presence, into which all previous stages ascend? This was said, as far as it was necessary to say, by some great and incomparable souls, of whom we think that they have seen and see it. For my part, I will tell you one thing with complete confidence: if we consistently adhere to the direction that God prescribes to us and which we have decided to adhere to, then we will achieve, with the help of the power and wisdom of the divine, that highest cause, or the highest cause of existence, or the highest principle of all things, or in another way, more appropriately called a thing, having comprehended which, we will truly see that everything under the sun is the vanity of things that exist. Vanity is a lie, and vanity means either those who are deceived, or those who deceive, or both. But at the same time we will be able to recognize what the difference is between this and what truly exists and how all this was created by God the Creator, and how it, being insignificant in comparison, considered in itself seems amazing and beautiful. Then we will know how true that which we are commanded to believe is; how beautifully and supremely saving we were raised by our mother church; how great was the benefit of that milk, about which the Apostle Paul said that he gave it to babies to drink (1 Cor. 3:2). Taking this food while one is being fed by the mother is extremely beneficial; but it’s a shame to accept it when you’ve already grown up; to reject it when it is needed is regrettable; to blame her at any time or to hate her is villainy and misfortune; and preparing and properly distributing it is a highly praiseworthy and loving deed. And in this bodily nature, as long as it obeys the divine laws, we will see such changes and alternations that the very resurrection of the flesh, which is partly believed with great difficulty, and partly not believed at all, we recognize as undoubted to such an extent that for us the sunrise after sunset will not be more certain. Finally, those who laugh at man, who was taken from the most powerful, eternal and unchangeable Son of God into the image and firstfruits of salvation and born of the Virgin, and at other miracles of this story, and we will despise such children as those children who, seeing a painter painting from the pictures lying in front of him, at which he looked, think that a person cannot paint otherwise than by looking at another picture. Moreover, in the contemplation of truth, as far as everyone is able to contemplate it, there is such pleasure, such purity, such genuineness, such undoubted certainty that everyone believes that he never knew anything other than this, although he seemed to himself to know; and since the soul does not encounter obstacles to surrendering completely to the truth, then death, which it previously feared, i.e. complete escape and detachment from this body will turn into an object of desire, as the highest gift. You have heard how great the strength and power of the soul is. To put it briefly: if it must be admitted that the human soul is not what God is, then it must also be precisely concluded that of all created things there is nothing closer to God. Therefore, in the Catholic Church there is a divine and excellent tradition: “No created thing should be honored for the soul” (with special pleasure I speak in the same words with which this was instilled in me), but only the Creator himself of all existing things should be honored, in whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things, i.e. unchanging beginning, unchanging wisdom, unchanging love; the one, true and perfect God, who always was, always will be, never was otherwise than he is, will never be otherwise; Of which there is nothing more mysterious and nothing inherent; Who is difficult to find where He is, and even more difficult to find where He is not; with whom all cannot be, and without whom no one can be (and so on, if we humans can say anything more incredible about Him, but nevertheless more suitable and more decent). So, the soul must honor this one God, without giving Him definite outlines and without vague ideas about Him. For it is necessary that what the soul honors as God it should represent as better than itself. And the best of the soul should not be considered neither nature, nor the earth, nor the seas, nor the stars, nor the moon, nor the sun, nor anything in general that can be touched or that can be seen with the eyes, nor, finally, that which we cannot see. All this is even far worse than any soul, as reason convinces us of this, if only lovers of truth decide with all possible constancy and care to follow him along a somewhat unusual and therefore difficult path. If there is anything in the nature of things other than what is known by the senses, and in general other than what occupies any specific place, over which we have recognized the superiority of the soul to all; So, if there is anything else created by God, one of these is worse than the soul, the other is equal to it. Worse, for example, is the soul of a dumb animal; equal, for example, angels; but there is nothing better than her. And if any of these are better than her, it depends on her sin, but not on nature. But sin does not make it so worse that the soul of a dumb animal should be placed above it or equalized with it. So, she must honor only God, who alone is her creator. A person, any other person, even the wisest and most perfect, and in general any soul that is involved in reason and most blessed, she should only love, imitate her and give her what is due according to her merits and rank. For “Fear the Lord your God, and serve Him alone” (Deut. 6:13). To kindred souls who are erring and falling, we are obliged, as far as possible and commanded, to give help, presenting the matter in such a way that even this, when done well, is done through us by God. We should not consider anything ours, carried away by the thirst for empty glory: this evil alone is enough to cast us down from the heights to the underworld. And we should hate not those suppressed by vices, but the vices themselves, and not those who sin, but the sins themselves. For we must be willing to provide help to everyone, even those who have offended us, those who insult us, or those who generally want to insult us. This is the true, this is the only religion. To be reconciled with God through it refers to the greatness of the soul, which we are talking about and which makes it worthy of freedom; for He frees from everything, serving Whom is extremely beneficial for everyone, and in serving Whom, completely pleasing, lies the only freedom. But I see that I have already crossed the boundaries of my initial assumption and have told you a lot without any questions on your part. However, I don't regret it. Since this is scattered throughout many church scriptures, we by the way brought it all into one; it is impossible to understand this completely, however, unless someone, courageously struggling on the fourth of the indicated seven steps, maintaining piety and acquiring health and strength to perceive this, examines everything in detail and with special care and insight: for all the indicated steps have their own distinctive and special beauty. More correctly we call them actions. The question is about the power of the soul, and it may happen that it does all this at the same time, but it seems to it that it does only what it does with difficulty, or at least with fear; for she does this with more attention than the rest. So, if again ascending from below upward, the first action, or teaching, is called animating; the second - by feeling; third - art; fourth - valor; fifth - peace; sixth – introduction; seventh – by contemplation. They can also be called: from the body; through the body; near the body; to yourself; in itself; to God; from God. It can be like this: beautiful from something else; the beautiful through the other; beauty near another; beautiful to beautiful; beauty in beauty; beautiful to beauty; beautiful before beauty. About all this, if you feel that something needs to be explained in more detail, you will ask later. At the present time, I wanted to designate this with so many names so that you would not be at a loss when others call the same thing by other names and even use a different division, and so that because of this you would not reject this or that. One and the same thing can be called and divided in countless ways quite correctly and with full justification; and with such an abundance of methods, everyone uses the one he finds more suitable for himself. So, the highest and true God, by the indestructible and unchangeable law by which He governs all created things, subordinated the body to the soul, the soul to Himself, and through this, everything to Himself; and does not leave the soul in any action, either by punishment or reward. He recognized that the most beautiful thing is that everything that is exists, and exists as it is, and is distributed among the degrees of nature in such an order that no ugliness on any side offends the eyes examining the whole, and every punishment and every reward to the soul, by its proportionality, always imparts something to the correct beauty and the order destined for everything. The soul is given free will. Those who try to refute this with their empty arguments are blind to such an extent that they do not understand that at least these empty and sacrilegious things they say of their own free will. But free will is not given to the soul in such a way that, by undertaking something, it will overthrow in any part the divine order and law. For it was given by the wisest and most invincible Lord of every creature. But few are given the opportunity to see this; and only true religion makes everyone capable of this. This true religion is that which, through reconciliation, reunites the soul with the one God, from whom it was, as it were, torn off due to sin. She takes possession of the soul and begins to lead it in the mentioned third action; in the fourth - waiting; in the fifth - transforms; in the sixth - introduces; in the seventh - he grazes. All this is done in one case more quickly, in another - more slowly, according to the degree of love and merit of a particular soul; and God does all this in the highest degree justly, correctly and beautifully, no matter how those in relation to whom He does this decide to dispose of themselves. As for the question of how beneficial the sanctification of infants is, this question is very dark; however, one must believe that it does bring some benefit. The mind will find this when this kind of research is useful (although I preferred to postpone for the future for my research many other things, as necessary for knowledge). And this will be most beneficial if the research is carried out under the guidance of piety. If this is so, then who has the right to be annoyed that the soul is given to the body to set it in motion and control it, since such and such a divine order of things could not be arranged in a better way? Or will he consider himself right to ask questions about what she is like in this mortal and frail body, when she was justly subjected to death for sin, and can become high in her valor in the body itself? Or what will it be like after death, when the punishment of death must of necessity remain if sin remains, and virtue and piety will be rewarded by God himself, i.e. the truth itself? Therefore, let us finally stop, if you like, our too long speech, and make vigilant and reverent efforts to observe the divine commandments. We have no other refuge from so many evils. If I said something darker than you expected, then try to remember it and ask about it at another, more convenient time. He who is the teacher of all from above will not refuse us help if we ask Him. Evodiy. I was so delighted by this speech that I considered it blasphemous to interrupt it; but if you find that it is time to stop talking, and if you considered it necessary to touch upon those three remaining questions only briefly at this time, I will rely on your judgment in this; In the future, when studying such great subjects, I will not only adapt to the times, in view of your many activities, but also take care to be more prepared myself. You might be interested in: