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Having said in the previous book that the cult of demons should be rejected, since they themselves give many reasons to consider them evil spirits, bl. Augustine in this book opposes those who introduce a distinction between demons, presenting some of them as good, others as evil. Having refuted this distinction, he proves that the position of intercessor for people, in order to bring them bliss, can only befit Jesus Christ alone, and not at all any demon. Chapter I. Where the previous discussion stopped, and what remains to be considered in this matter Some thought that there were both good and evil gods; some, having a better opinion of the gods, spoke of them with such respect and praise that they did not dare to consider any of them evil. Those, according to whom some of the gods are good and others are evil, also called demons by the name of gods; although gods, however, were much less often called demons; so they find a place in Homer where he calls Jupiter himself, considered the king and head of the gods, a demon. Those who are reputed to be good people, in whose opinion all gods are good and are far superior to people in their kindness, become justly embarrassed, seeing such actions of demons, which they cannot deny, and believing that these actions in no case can be performed by gods, who, in their opinion, are all good, are forced to recognize the difference between gods and demons: so that everything that is in evil deeds or mental dispositions in which invisible spirits reveal their power is fair to them don’t like it, they consider all this to be the work of demons, not gods. But since they represent these same demons as intermediaries between gods and people (not a single god, they say, enters into direct communication with humans), conveying to the gods the desires of people, and to people the will of the gods; and since this opinion belongs to the first and most famous of the philosophers, the Platonists, with whom, as with the best, we decided together to seek an answer to the question whether the veneration of many gods is useful in acquiring the blessed life that comes after death; then in the previous book we asked: how are demons who delight in such things as are disgusted and condemned by good and prudent people, that is, blasphemous, shameful, criminal inventions of poets, and not about any people, but about the gods themselves, and villainous sorcery punishable by law - how can these demons, supposedly in friendly and close relations with God, mediate between virtuous people and good gods? It turned out that this was in no way possible. This book, as we promised at the end of the previous one, will be devoted to a discussion not about the difference (if they admit such) between the gods, whom they call good, and not about the difference between gods and demons, of which they place the former too far from people, and give the latter a place between gods and people, but about the difference between the demons themselves; which actually relates to the question posed. For many people are in the habit of calling some demons good and others evil. Whether this opinion belongs to the Platonists, or to whomever else this opinion belongs, it should in no case be left without consideration: lest anyone, imagining that he must follow supposedly good demons, at the time when he tries and achieves with the help of them as intermediaries, to unite with the gods, whom he considers all good, in order to be with them after death, entangled and deceived by the deceitfulness of evil spirits, does not deviate far from the true God, in Whom alone, with Whom alone, and from Whom alone, the rational and thinking human soul is blessed. Chapter III. What Apuleius attributed to demons, for whom, without taking away their reason, he did not recognize any virtue What is the difference between gods and evil demons? The Platonist Apuleius, speaking about them and talking a lot about their airy bodies, did not say anything about their spiritual virtues, which they would be gifted with if they were good. Thus, he kept silent about what serves as the cause of bliss, but could not remain silent about what serves as a sign of unhappiness, recognizing that their mind, according to which he considers them to be rational beings, not watered and not strengthened by virtue, not only does not show any resistance to unreasonable spiritual passions, but is itself subject to a kind of violent excitement, as is characteristic of foolish minds. Here are his actual words: “For the most part, from this crowd of demons,” he says, “poets, and not without reason, tend to bring out in their writings gods both burning with hatred and friendly towards some people; These they make happy and elevate, and those they oppress and humiliate. They have mercy, and are indignant, and are sad, and rejoice, and, experiencing all sorts of states of the human spirit, with a similar movement of the heart and hesitation of the mind, they experience passionate emotions associated with their thoughts. All these anxieties and storms are completely alien to the gods of heaven” 94. Do these words leave even the slightest doubt that it is not some lower mental faculties, but the very minds of demons, thanks to which they are rational beings, that, according to Apuleius, are agitated by a whirlwind of passions, like a stormy sea? They cannot be compared even with wise people, who, although under the conditions of real life they endure this kind of spiritual unrest, since human infirmity cannot be free from them, nevertheless resist them with their calm mind, not agreeing under their influence to approve or do anything that would deviate from the path of wisdom and the law of truth. They can be compared with stupid and unjust people (not to say that they are even worse than them, since they are older and more incorrigible due to the punishment that weighs on them), to whom they are similar not in bodies, but in morals; being subject, as Apuleius puts it, to the disturbances of their mind, they do not establish any aspect of their spirit in truth and virtue, with the help of which they could resist the rebellious and perverse excitement of the spirit. Chapter IV. How do the Peripatetics and Stoics think about the emotions experienced by the soul? There are two opinions of philosophers about those mental movements that the Greeks call πάθη, and from ours - some, for example Cicero, are excitement, others are excitement or affects, some - as if more accurately translating from Greek - passions. These disturbances, or excitements, or passions, according to some philosophers, are also experienced by the sage, but they are curbed and subordinated to reason, so that the power of the mind imposes on them a kind of laws that indicate the proper measure for them. Those who hold this opinion are Platonists or Aristotelians, since Aristotle, who founded the Peripatetic school, was a student of Plato. Others, for example the Stoics, resolutely do not allow the sage to experience any passions. But Cicero, in his books on the ultimate goal of good and evil, proves that the latter, i.e. Stoics, who argue with Platonists or Peripatetics rather over words than over the essence of the matter; The Stoics, for example, do not want to call bodily and external goods goods, but call them conveniences: because for a person there is no other good than virtue, the art of a good life, which exists only in the soul. And those (i.e., Platonists and Aristotelians) call these goods the simple and commonly used word “good,” but only in comparison with virtue, as the norm of right life, consider them small and insignificant goods. From this it is clear that no matter what term they and others use—whether goods or benefits—they mean the same thing by these terms, and the Stoics in this matter flaunt only the novelty of words. Thus, in my opinion, and regarding the question of whether a wise man experiences spiritual passions or is completely alien to them, the Stoics argue rather over words than over the essence of the matter. For, as far as the essence of the subject is concerned, and not the sound of words, they adhere to the same ideas as the Platonists and Peripatetics. For the sake of brevity, omitting anything else that I could use to confirm this, I will only point out the following, the most obvious. Agellius, a man of the most graceful eloquence and extensive and multifaceted learning, writes in books entitled “Attic Nights” 95 that he once sailed on a ship with a certain famous Stoic philosopher. This philosopher (Agellius talks about this in great detail, but I will tell you briefly), when a terrible storm arose in the air and on the sea, the ship began to be tossed from side to side and dangerously tilted on board, he turned pale with fear. This was noticed by those present, who, despite the proximity of death, watched with extreme curiosity whether the philosopher would retain his presence of mind. And so, when the storm subsided and the confidence in safety gave rise to conversations and even jokes, one of the passengers, a rich and wasteful Asian, pestered the philosopher, laughing at the fact that he had become cowardly and turned pale, while he supposedly remained calm. But the philosopher cited the answer of the Socratic Aristippus, who, under similar circumstances, having heard exactly the same speech from exactly the same person, said: “You, of course, should not have worried about the soul of a wicked slacker; but I had to fear for the soul of Aristippus.” When this answer forced the rich man to leave, Agellius, not with the intention of pricking, but out of love for knowledge, asked the philosopher what was the reason for his fear. Wanting to teach a person inspired by a sincere desire for knowledge, the philosopher immediately took out from his travel bag a book by the Stoic Epictetus, the contents of which were in agreement with the main provisions of Zeno and Chrysippus, known to us as the main representatives of the Stoic school. From this book, says Agellius, he read that, according to the teachings of the Stoics, when mental images, which they call fantasies, the occurrence and time of their appearance in our mind does not depend on our will, come from terrible and terrible objects, then they inevitably excite the mind of the wise; so that for a short time he turns pale with fear and is subject to sorrow, as passions that precede the activity of the mind and understanding. But from this, it does not follow that a bad disposition, approval or sympathy for evil will form in his mind. They represent the latter as being in his power, and the difference between the soul of a wise man and the soul of a fool, from their point of view, is that the soul of a fool succumbs to passions and subordinates his mind to them; while the soul of the wise, although it undergoes them out of necessity, unshakably, however, retains in its mind a true and unchangeable idea of ​​​​what should be reasonably desired or avoided. This is what Agellius recalls from what he read in the book of Epictetus, what Epictetus said and thought from the point of view of the Stoics. I have stated this as best I could - although not as well as Agellius, but at least more briefly and, I think, more clearly than him. If this is so, then there is no or almost no difference between the opinions of the Stoics and other philosophers about the passions and emotions of the spirit: both equally do not allow their dominance over the mind of the wise. And the Stoics say that a wise man is not subject to passions and emotions, perhaps because these passions and emotions do not cloud his wisdom with any error and do not endanger his wisdom, thanks to which he is wise. But they also arise in the soul of the wise, although without disturbing the clarity of his wisdom - they arise under the impression of what the Stoics call benefits or disadvantages and what they do not want to give the name of good or evil. In fact, if the aforementioned philosopher had not attached the slightest value to what the shipwreck threatened him with the loss of, that is, health and life itself, the danger would not have frightened him to such an extent that it made him turn pale and thus give himself away. Meanwhile, at the same time he could experience confusion and firmly retain in his mind the idea that life and bodily health, the loss of which a terrible storm threatened him with, do not constitute such a good as would make those who possessed it good, as justice makes them so. And when the Stoics say that these benefits should be called benefits rather than goods, this is a dispute over words, and not an investigation of the essence of the matter. What, in fact, is the importance of whether these things are more accurately called goods, when the Stoic turns pale and is afraid no less than the Peripatetic, because of the danger of losing what he does not call the same with the latter, but values ​​the same with him? For both of them, if the danger threatening these goods or benefits forced them to a dishonorable or villainous act, so that otherwise they could not preserve them, both of them, of course, would say that they would rather lose what serves to maintain the nature of the body intact and intact, than to commit what would be a violation of justice. Thus, the mind, in which such a concept is firmly held, does not allow any disturbances, even if they arise in the lower parts of the soul, to have a predominant force over itself contrary to reason; on the contrary, he himself dominates over them and, by his lack of sympathy, and even more so by resistance to them, establishes the kingdom of virtue. This is how Virgil describes Aeneas when he says: Tears flow in vain, but the mind remains calm 96. Chapter V. That the passions that agitate the souls of Christians do not lead to vice, but serve to exercise virtue In this case, there is no need to show in detail how the Divine Scripture, which contains Christian teaching, teaches about these passions. It subjects the mind to the control and guidance of God, and the passions to the limitation and curbing of the mind, so that they are turned to the benefit of justice. In addition, we pose the question not about whether a pious mind is angry, sad, or afraid, but about what arouses its anger, what causes its sadness, what it fears. I do not know whether anyone, after sound reflection, will blame him for being angry with a sinner in order to correct him, grieving for the unfortunate in order to help him, fearing for someone in danger so that he does not perish? After all, the Stoics often condemn mercy; but it would be many times more honorable if the above-mentioned Stoic were touched by mercy towards a person in need of help, rather than succumb to the fear of shipwreck. Much better, more humane and much more in keeping with pious feelings, Cicero speaks in praise of Caesar when he says: “Of all your virtues, there is not one that is more amazing and attractive than your mercy.”97 And what is mercy if not a kind of compassion in our hearts for someone else’s misfortune - compassion that forces us to provide all possible help? A similar (heartfelt) movement is subject to reason when mercy is shown while preserving justice: when either help is given to someone in need, or forgiveness is given to someone who repents. Cicero, that excellent orator, without any hesitation calls it a virtue, while the Stoics are not ashamed to consider it a vice: although (as is known from the book of the famous Stoic Epictetus, written in the spirit of Zeno and Chrysippus, the most famous representatives of the Stoic school) they also allow this kind of passion in the soul of the wise, whom they try to present as free from all vices. It follows from this that the Stoics do not consider them vices when they arise in the wise, without disposing him towards anything contrary to mental prowess and reason, and that both the Peripatetics or Platonists and the Stoics have the same opinion; but as Tullius notes 98, the desire for verbal debate has long made the Greeks passionate lovers of controversy rather than truth. However, this still does not resolve the question of whether it is part of the imperfection of real life that we, even in all our good actions, experience this kind of mental movements? Holy angels do not experience, for example, anger when they punish those who are subject to punishment on their part by virtue of the eternal divine law, nor compassion when they come to the aid of the unfortunate, nor fear when they save those in danger whom they love. People, unable to express it otherwise, apply the names of these passions to them; but they are used for the sake of some similarity in actions, and not with the aim of pointing out the imperfection of their mental movements. Likewise, God himself, although he is angry according to Scripture, is not subject to any passion. For by His anger we mean punitive actions, and not an indignant state of mind. Chapter VI. What passions, according to Apuleius, are agitated by demons, which, as he claims, serve as intercessors for people before the gods? Putting aside for now this question about the holy angels, let us see how demons, who, according to the Platonists, are mediators between gods and people, are agitated by a storm of passions. If demons were subjected to movements of this kind in such a way that their mind remained free from them and dominated over them, Apuleius would not have said that they, “with a similar movement of the heart and fluctuation of the mind, experience passionate disturbances associated with their thoughts.” This means that their mind itself, that is, the highest part of the soul, thanks to which they are rational beings and in which virtue and wisdom would dominate over the rebellious passions of the lower parts of the soul, moderating and curbing them, if they had them - I say, their mind itself is agitated, as the mentioned Platonist admits, by a storm of passions. Thus, the mind of demons is subject to passions of lust, fear, anger and other things of the same kind. What part of their nature, one may ask, is free and possesses wisdom, thanks to which they would be pleasing to the gods and serve as an example of good morals for people, if their mind, subject to the vices of passions and suppressed by them, leads everything that is rational by nature to lies and deception, the more strongly the more it is mastered by the desire to harm? Chapter VII. That, according to the Platonists, the poets dishonored the gods by attributing to them the struggle of opposing inclinations, whereas this is the lot of demons, not gods Someone might object that it is not from among all demons in general, but only from among the evil demons that poets, without deviating too much from the truth, invent gods who love or hate certain people; This is what Apuleius says about them, that in the fluctuations of their minds they experience all the passionate disturbances associated with their thoughts. But how can we accept such an interpretation when, saying this, he described the mediating role between gods and people not of individual demons, but of all in general, thanks to their aerial bodies? After all, according to him, the fiction of the poets is that they make gods from among these demons, give them the names of gods and, out of unbridled poetic self-will, assign them to whomever they want, as friends and enemies; while the gods are represented as alien to such demonic morals both by their place of residence - the sky, and by the fullness of bliss. This means that the invention of the poets is that they call those who are not gods gods, and represent them, under the names of gods, arguing among themselves over people to whom they are partial, loving them or hating them. However, he says that the fabrication is not far from the truth; because by calling non-gods by the names of gods, they describe demons as they really are. Among these, he said, was the famous Homeric Minerva, who took part in the mediation meetings of the Greeks to keep Achilles. That it was Minerva, this, in his opinion, was a poetic invention; because he considers Minerva a goddess and assigns her a place among the gods (who, in his opinion, are all good and blessed) in the region of the highest ether, far from mortals. But that one of the demons patronized the Greeks and harmed the Trojans, and the other, mentioned by the poet under the name of Venus or Mars (who did nothing of the kind and were placed by Apuleius in the heavenly abodes), assisted the Trojans against the Greeks, and that these demons entered into a struggle among themselves for those they love, against those they hate - this, according to him, is said by the poets close to the truth. For they spoke similar things about those who, as he expresses it, with a similar human movement of the heart and fluctuation of the mind, experience all the passionate emotions associated with their thoughts, so that they can love and hate not out of justice, but out of partiality, just as popular parties similar to them at spectacles love and hate fighters with animals and charioteers. Obviously, the Platonist philosopher was trying to ensure that no one would think that such things, when they are sung by poets, are created not by intermediary demons, but by the gods themselves, whose names the poets use fictitiously. Chapter VIII. Platonist Apuleius's definition of heavenly gods, air demons and earthly people However, it is enough to pay attention to the very definition that he gives to demons (and in defining, he covers them, of course, all of them), when he says that demons are animal by genus, subject to passions by soul, reasonable by mind, ethereal by body, and eternal by time. Among these five signs, he did not indicate a single one that could be recognized as common among demons only with good people, but which evil people did not have. When he describes people in somewhat more detail (he speaks of them in his place as lower and earthly creatures, after he has spoken about the gods of heaven, so that, having described these two extreme classes, the highest and the lowest, in the third place he can speak about the middle creatures, about demons), he says: “So, the earth is inhabited by people gifted with reason, possessing the gift of speech, immortal in soul, but with mortal members, with a light mind and restless, with rough and corruptible bodies, with different morals, with the same delusions, with stubborn courage, with stubborn hope, with useless labor, with changeable happiness; mortals alone, they constantly remain in their entire family, successively changing in new and new generations; their age is fleeting, their wisdom is dull, their death is quick, their life excites regret.” Having said here many things that apply to the majority of people, did he remain silent about what, as he knew, belongs to a few: stupid wisdom? If he had kept silent about this, he would not have outlined the human race with such remarkable thoroughness in this description. And when he depicted the superiority of the gods, he argued that the highest thing in them is bliss, which people hope to achieve through wisdom. Thus, if Apuleius wanted to present some demons as good, when describing them, he would have put forward something that would make one think that they either have a certain amount of bliss in common with the gods, or some kind of wisdom in common with people. Meanwhile, he did not mention anything good about them, how the good differ from the evil. Although he refrained from a more bold description of their malice, for fear of offending not so much themselves as their admirers, he nevertheless made it clear to sensible people how they should think about demons: because the gods, whom he considered all good and blessed, he presented as decisively alien to their passions; He compared them with the gods only in terms of the eternity of their bodies, and in their souls he very clearly showed them to be similar not to gods, but to people - similar, moreover, not in the blessing of wisdom, which people can also be possessors, but in the excitement of passions that dominate the stupid and evil, but which are curbed by the wise and good so that they would rather not have passions at all than to conquer them. For, if he wanted to show that demons, along with gods, belong to eternity not in the body, but in the soul, he would not, of course, separate people from their participation in this, because the souls of people are eternal, as our Platonist undoubtedly believed. On this basis, of course, when describing people, he said that people are immortal in soul, but with mortal members. Thus, if people do not have eternity in common with the gods because they are mortal in body, then demons have it only because they are immortal in body. Chapter IX. Can the mediation of demons win a person the favor of the heavenly gods? So, what kind of intermediaries are these between gods and people - intermediaries with the help of which people should seek the favor of the gods - when they, together with people, have the worst thing that is the best in animals, i.e. the soul, and together with the gods the best thing is what is the worst in animals, i.e. the body? After all, if an animal, that is, an animate being, consists of a body and a soul, and of these two the soul is better than the body; if the soul, even vicious and weak, is better than the healthiest and strongest body, because the most excellent nature of the soul does not become inferior to the body from the dirt of vices, just as soiled gold is valued more than the purest silver or lead; then these intermediaries between gods and people, with the help of which the human is united with the divine, turn out to share an eternal body with the gods, and a vicious soul with people; as if religion, which, according to their ideas, should unite people with gods through the mediation of demons, lies in the body, and is not a matter of the soul! Yes, finally, as a result of what obscenity or as a punishment for what, these lying and deceitful intermediaries hang, so to speak, with their heads down, so that the lower part of the animal, i.e., the body, is shared with the higher ones, and the higher part, i.e., the soul, with the lower ones - with the heavenly gods, they are united with the slave part, and the ruling part shares the misfortunes with earthly people? For the body is a slave, as Sallust says: “What commands in us is the soul, and what obeys is the body” 99 . Sallust adds to this: “We have one thing in common with the gods, and another with dumb animals”; but he adds because he speaks of people who, like dumb animals, have a body. The demons, whom philosophers have placed as intermediaries between people and gods, although they can say about the soul and body: “We have one thing in common with the gods, and another with people,” but, being, as I said, as if turned upside down and suspended with their heads down, they share a enslaving body with the blessed gods, and a dominant spirit with unfortunate people; in the lower part they are exalted, and in the higher part they are humiliated. Thus, even if someone thought that they share eternity with the gods, because no death separates their souls from their bodies, their body, in any case, should be looked at not as an eternal chariot of those crowned with power and honor, but as an eternal prison of the condemned. Chapter X. That, according to Plotinus, people are less unhappy in a mortal body than demons in an immortal body Plotinus enjoys well-deserved fame as the person who understood Plato better than anyone else (at least to date). Speaking about human souls, he says: “The merciful Father created mortal bonds for them.” Thus, in the fact that people are mortal in body, Plotinus sees the mercy of God the Father, who did not want people to remain forever in the disastrous conditions of real life. The wickedness of demons is not awarded such mercy: with the misfortune of having a soul subject to passions, they received not a mortal body, like people, but an eternal one. They would be happier than people if they shared a mortal body with people, and a blessed spirit with the gods. They could have been the same as people if, on an equal basis with them, they had been honored to have, along with the ill-fated soul, a mortal body; but only on the condition that they had some capacity for piety, so that at least in death they could find peace from disasters. In their present state, compared to people, they are not only no happier, having an ill-fated soul, but also much more unhappy, for they are imprisoned in the eternal shackles of the body. Apuleius did not allow any progress in piety and wisdom that could turn demons into gods, since he very clearly called them eternal demons. Chapter XI. About the opinion of Platonists that the souls of people after the death of their bodies become demons Apuleius says, however, that the souls of people are demons; that people become Lares if they lived virtuously; lemurs, or larvas, if they lived viciously; gods are called manas, those about whom it is not known with certainty whether they were virtuous or vicious. But who, if he is a person even a little thinking, will not understand what an abyss opens up in this opinion for moral corruption? In fact, no matter how obscene people are, thinking that after death they will become larvas, or at least gods-mans, they become even worse, the more desires they have to harm; since they are instilled with the idea that after death they will be treated even with some sacrifices in the form of a cult, so that they cause harm. For, according to him, the larvas are harmful demons that originated from people. However, this is another question. But from here, according to him, the good in Greek are called εὐδαίμονες, - good souls, that is, good demons. This confirms the opinion that the souls of people are demons. Chapter XII. About the three opposites by which, according to Platonists, the nature of demons and people differs But in this case we are talking about those demons who, as occupying a middle position between gods and people, Apuleius defines in their actual nature, saying that they are animal by genus, rational by mind, subject to passions by soul, aerial by body, eternal by time. Having previously shown the difference in place and dignity of nature between the gods occupying the highest heaven and the people inhabiting the lower earth, he concludes by saying: “Thus, we have two kinds of living beings, clearly distinguishing gods from people by the height of place, the continuous continuation of life, the perfection of nature and not allowing any rapprochement between them: for the highest dwellings from the lowest are separated by an enormous distance, and life there is eternal and continuous, but here - fleeting and short, and spiritual abilities there are elevated to bliss, but here they are humiliated to a pitiful state” 100. In these words I find three opposites that distinguish the two extreme regions of nature, the highest and the lowest. For he then repeats the initially indicated three majestic characteristics of the gods, albeit in different words, in order to contrast them with the other three opposite traits inherent in people. The three features related to the gods are the following: the sublimity of the place, the continuous continuation of life, the perfection of nature. When repeating them in other words, he contrasts them with their three opposites, characteristic of the human condition. He says: “And the higher dwellings from the lower ones are separated by an enormous distance (because he spoke about the height of the place), and life there is eternal and continuous, but here it is fleeting and short (since he spoke about the continuous continuation of life), and the spiritual forces there are elevated to bliss, and here they are humiliated to misfortune (for he spoke about the perfection of nature).” So, he indicated three features associated with the gods: the elevation of the place, the continuous continuation of life, bliss; and their three opposites related to people: lowness of place, mortality, misfortune. Chapter XIII. If demons are not blessed with gods, and not ill-fated with people, then how can they occupy the middle between gods and people, not having communication with both? Of these three characteristics that characterize gods and men, there can be no objection as to their place in application to demons, since Apuleius represents them as occupying the middle. Between the highest and the lowest, a middle place is quite naturally assumed. The other two require more attention, regarding which it is necessary to show how they can either be alien to the demons, or belong to them, but belong to such an extent that the average position of the demons does not seem to be violated. They cannot be alien to demons. If demons are rational animals, then we cannot say about them, as they usually say about the average, that it is neither higher nor lower, that they are neither happy nor unhappy, like trees or animals devoid of reason. Beings whose minds have reason must necessarily be either happy or unhappy. We also cannot say with certainty that demons are neither mortal nor immortal. Everything that lives either lives forever or ends its life in death. Apuleius himself called demons “eternal in time.” It remains to be assumed that these average beings have one trait from the two higher ones and one trait from the two lower ones. For if they have both lower or both higher, they will not be average, but will either join the higher beings or fall into the category of the lower. Indeed, if both of these features, as shown, cannot be alien to demons, then demons will remain average creatures only if they have one each from the higher and lower sides. But since from the lower side they cannot have eternity, which is not here, then they have this feature from the higher side; and for their position to be truly average, the other characteristic that they must have from the lower side is nothing other than ill-fated. So, according to the Platonists, either blessed eternity or eternal bliss belongs to the highest beings, the gods; to the lower ones, people, either ill-fated mortality, or mortal misfortune; average, demons, or ill-fated eternity, or eternal ill-fated. The same five signs with which Apuleius defines demons do not represent them, as he promised, as average creatures: three of these signs, he says, belong to them on a par with us, namely, that demons are creatures by the genus animals, by the mind rational, by the soul - subject to passions; one belongs to them on a par with the gods, that they are eternal in time; and one of their own, namely, that they are airy in body. How is it that they are average creatures, when they share one characteristic with the higher ones, and three with the lower ones? Who does not see how, leaving the middle position, they approach and descend to the lower ones? It is possible, however, even with these characteristics to represent them as average creatures as follows: of the five characteristics indicated by Apuleius, one, i.e. the air body belongs to them as their distinctive feature (just as the higher beings, gods, and the lower ones, people, in turn, each have one distinctive feature: the gods have an ethereal body, people have an earthly body); They have two things in common with the rest, namely, that they are animals by genus and rational by mind. For Apuleius himself, speaking about gods and people, remarks: “You thus have two kinds of animals.” They usually imagine gods as nothing other than rational beings. The remaining two signs: that demons are beings in their souls subject to passions, and in time - eternal, of which they share one with lower beings, and the other with higher ones, give them a middle position, balancing it so that it does not rise to the highest and does not fall to the lower. And this is ill-fated eternity or the eternal ill-fate of demons. For whoever says that demons are creatures “subject to passions at heart” is essentially saying that they are “ill-fated” creatures. On the other hand, since (as they themselves admit) the world is governed by the providence of the supreme God, and not by blind chance, the misfortune of the demons would never be eternal if their malice were not great. So, if the blessed are correctly called εὐδαίμονες, then the demons whom they place between people and gods are not εὐδαίμονες. What place belongs to good demons, who, being higher than people and lower than gods, would help the first and serve the last? After all, if they are good and eternal, they, of course, are blessed. And eternal bliss raises them above average beings, because it equates them too much with the gods and separates them too much from people. Hence, if good demons are immortal and blissful, then their attempts to prove that they can be creatures average between immortal and blessed gods and mortals and unfortunate people are in vain. For if they share both, that is, bliss and immortality, with the gods, and nothing of the kind with mortals and unfortunate people, then don’t they rather move away from people and draw closer to the gods, rather than remain in between the two? They would be average creatures if they had, as their own, two such signs, which would not both be either signs of gods or people, but one would be a sign of gods, the other would be a sign of people, just as man is an average (being) between animals and angels; since an animal is an unreasonable and mortal being, and an angel is a rational and immortal being, then man is a middle being, lower in comparison with angels and higher in comparison with animals, sharing mortality with animals, and reason with angels, i.e., representing a rational-mortal being. So, if we are looking for a being in between the immortally blessed and the mortally ill-fated, then we must look for one who would be either mortally blessed or immortally ill-fated. Chapter XIV. Can people, as mortal beings, be truly blessed? But whether a person can be both blessed and mortal is a moot point. Some look at their present situation with humiliation and do not allow that a person can be capable of bliss while living in the conditions of mortal life. Others, on the contrary, exalt themselves and dare to assert that mortals, possessing wisdom, can be blessed. If this were so, then why aren’t they the beings who mediate between the ill-fated mortals and the blessed immortals, since they share bliss with the immortal blessed ones, and mortality with the ill-fated mortals? After all, if they are blessed, then, of course, they do not envy anyone (for what is more unfortunate than envy?) and, as much as they can, assist unfortunate mortals in acquiring bliss, so that after death the latter can become immortal and unite with the immortal and blessed angels. Chapter XV. About the mediator between God and people, the man Christ Jesus If people, while they are mortal, are necessarily ill-fated, which is much more plausible, then one must look for a Mediator who would be not only a man, but also God, so that the blessed mortality of this Mediator could raise people from mortal misfortune to blessed immortality. He had to become mortal, and at the same time remain non-mortal. And He became mortal, not because the divinity of the Word lost its power, but because He took upon Himself the weakness of the flesh; but even in the flesh He did not remain mortal, but raised her from the dead: because His mediation brought precisely those fruits that the mortals themselves, for the sake of whose liberation He became the Mediator, did not remain in constant death, although clothed in flesh. For this purpose, the Mediator between us and God had to have transitory mortality and abiding bliss, so that through the transitory he could become like those subject to death, and through the abiding he would be raised from the dead. Therefore, good angels cannot be creatures occupying the middle between unfortunate mortals and blessed immortals, for they themselves are both blessed and immortal; but evil angels can be like that, since they are immortal with the blessed and ill-fated with mortals. The opposite of them is the good Mediator, Who, in contrast to their immortality and misfortune, deigned to be mortal for a while and at the same time remain eternally blessed, and thus, by the humiliation of His death and the goodness of His bliss, overthrew these immortally proud and ill-fated harmful spirits, so that they would not be tempted by the vanity of immortality to misfortune, - overthrew in those whose hearts He freed from their most unclean dominion, purifying them with faith in Himself. So, what should a mortal and ill-fated person, placed far from the immortals and blessed ones, choose in order to achieve immortality and bliss? What could attract him in the immortality of demons is disastrous, and what could offend him in the mortality of Christ no longer exists. There the subject of fear is eternal misfortune; here death does not inspire fear, because it could not remain eternal, but makes one love oneself with eternal bliss. The immortal and ill-fated mediator is a mediator in order to block access to blissful immortality, since what prevents this, that is, ill-fated, remains constantly; The mortal and blessed mediator offered himself for this purpose, so that, having shared death, he could make immortals out of the dead (which He showed himself by His resurrection) and blessed ones out of the ill-fated (for he never ceased to be blessed). Thus, one mediator is an evil mediator, dividing friends; the other is a good Mediator who reconciles enemies. Therefore, there are many intermediary-dividers, for the blessed multitude is blessed through communion with the one God, but deprived of this communication and as a result the ill-fated multitude of evil demons, which rather hinders than helps with their mediation in the achievement of bliss, by themselves, so to speak, with their multitude, they block their way to the achievement of the one and happiness-giving good. To achieve this good, we needed one Mediator, and not many, and it was He through communication with Whom we are blessed, that is, the uncreated Word, by Whom all things were created. However, He is the Mediator not because He is the Word: for the immortal and blessed Word is infinitely removed from unfortunate mortals, but because He is a man. By this, He showed that in order to achieve not only the blessed, but also the blessing that makes blessed, we should not look for other intermediaries that could ease our path to it; for the blessed and bestowing God, having become involved in our human race, showed us the shortest way to join His divinity. Freeing us from mortality and misfortune, He leads us not to the immortal and blessed angels, so that through communication with them we too would be blessed and immortal, but to the Trinity itself, through communication with Which the angels themselves are blessed. Thus, deigning to take the form of a servant (Philip. II, 7), diminished in comparison with the angels, (Ps. 8:6 Heb. II, 7) He in the form of God remained above the angels and became the way of life in the underworld, being life for heaven. Chapter XVI. Is it rightly said by the Platonists that the heavenly gods, removing themselves from the earthly infection, do not enter into communication with people who gain the favor of the gods with the help of demons? So, it is not true that, according to Apuleius, Plato said that “no god enters into communication with man” 101. This, he says, is where their greatness mainly manifests itself, that they are not defiled by any contact with people. This means that he admits that demons are defiled; consequently, they cannot cleanse those from whom they are defiled; and therefore everyone is equally unclean: demons from contact with people, and people from the veneration of demons. Or if demons can come into contact and intercourse with people and at the same time not become defiled, then they are better than gods: because the latter, if they enter into intercourse with people, become defiled. But this, he says, is the advantage of the gods, that no contact with people can defile them, as they are placed too high from people. But Apuleius himself asserts that, according to Plato’s depiction, the highest God, the Creator of everything, Whom we call the true God, is that “one who is not encompassed by the poor human word, no matter how eloquent it may be, even in part; the concept of this God barely glimmers, and then only occasionally, for wise men, when by the power of spirit, as far as possible, they are distracted from the body, it glimmers like a ray of light flashing for a moment in the deepest darkness.” If the highest God, who is truly above all, even if only occasionally, even if only like a ray of light flashing for a moment in the deepest darkness, but shows some of His presence in the minds of the wise when they are, as far as possible, distracted from the body, and at the same time can not be defiled, then how come those gods were removed to a more elevated place, supposedly for the sole purpose that contact with people would not defile them? As if those ethereal bodies, with the light of which the earth is illuminated as much as necessary, are something that cannot be looked at! If the heavenly bodies, which (by Apuleius) are called visible gods, are not defiled when they look at them, then the demons are not defiled, even if they look at them close. But perhaps, without being defiled by human gaze, the gods are defiled by the sound of a human voice; and as a result of this they have demons as intermediaries, who, placed far from people, make these sounds known to them, so that they themselves remain alien to all defilement? What about other feelings? Just as demons cannot be defiled by the sense of smell when they are present during the evaporation of living human bodies, so the gods themselves could not be defiled if they were present, as long as they are not defiled by the corpse fumes of sacrificial animals. They have no need for the sense of taste, being free from the necessity to which mortality, which needs reinforcement, is subject, so that hunger will not force them to demand food from people. The sense of touch, let us say, depends on good will. But although the mentioned contact most of all relates to precisely this feeling, however, if the gods wanted to enter into intercourse with people, they could only enter so far as to see and be seen, hear and be heard. Why must it be through touch? And people would not dare to wish for this if they enjoyed contemplation and conversation with gods or good demons. But even if they were so curious that they wanted to touch, then how could anyone touch a god or a demon against his will, when a sparrow can only be touched if it is caught? So, the gods could enter into intercourse with people in a bodily way, seeing them and, in turn, making themselves visible to them, talking to them and listening to them. But if, as I said, demons enter into intercourse with people in this way and are not defiled, and gods, if they enter, are defiled, then they represent the demons as not subject to desecration, and the gods as subject to desecration. If demons are also defiled, then what good can they do for the posthumous blissful life of people, whom, being defiled themselves, they are not able to cleanse, so that, as pure ones, they can unite with gods alien to filth, between whom and people they are intermediaries? And if they are not able to provide people with this benefit, then what benefit do people have in their friendly mediation? If only we assume that after death people do not pass over to the gods with the help of demons, but live with demons together, remaining equally defiled and, as a result, equally deprived of bliss? Or, perhaps, someone will say that demons cleanse their friends like a sponge or something like that, so that they themselves become dirtier the cleaner people become, as if from their friction? If so, then the gods, avoiding proximity and contact with people, so as not to become defiled, enter into intercourse with even more defiled demons. Or can the gods cleanse demons defiled by people and not be defiled, but cannot cleanse people in the same way and not be defiled by them? But only someone who himself has fallen into the net of the most deceitful demons can think this way. Then, if to be visible and to see means to be subject to desecration, then why do people see those gods whom Apuleius calls visible, that is, the brightest planets of the world and other luminaries; and the demons, whom people cannot see unless they themselves want to, remain safer from this desecration by people? If the defilement is not in being visible, but in seeing, then those who consider the brightest planets of the world to be gods must assert that these luminaries do not see people, although they extend their rays to the very earth. But in any case, their rays, no matter what unclean environment they pass through, are not defiled, and the gods, if they entered into intercourse with people, would be defiled, even if contact were necessary to provide help! The earth comes into contact with the rays of the sun and moon, and does not defile their light. Chapter XVII. To acquire a blessed life, consisting in communion with the highest good, a person needs not such an intermediary as a demon, but one such as Christ alone I am surprised, however, how such learned people, in whose opinion everything corporeal and sensory should be placed lower than the incorporeal and ideal, talk about bodily contacts when they talk about a blissful life. How can this be reconciled with the famous words of Plotinus: “We must flee to our most beloved fatherland, where is the Father and where is everything?” “What kind of ship,” he adds, “what kind of cart should we go there? You need to become like God" 102. So, if everyone becomes closer to God the more they become like Him, then moving away from Him is nothing other than dissimilarity with Him. The more unlike the incorporeal, eternal and blissful the human soul becomes, the more it adheres to temporary and transitory things. To heal from this we need a mediator; because the immortal purity inherent in the highest cannot be matched by the mortal and impure inherent in the lowest. But the mediator needed is not one who, even if he had an immortal body and close to higher beings, but would have a sick spirit, similar to lower beings - this sickness would prompt him to envy our healing rather than help our recovery. We need a Mediator who, having joined us with the mortality of the body, through the immortal righteousness of the Spirit, which eliminates the importance of the distance of places in relation to the highest and gives importance only to the superiority of likeness, would give you truly divine help for purification and liberation. As the unchangeable God, He had in any case nothing to fear from being desecrated by the man in whom He clothed Himself, or by the people among whom He dealt as a man. At the same time, it is of considerable importance that by His incarnation He gave saving proof that, on the one hand, the true Divinity cannot be defiled by the flesh, and on the other, that demons should not be considered better than us because they do not have flesh. We are talking about the One about whom the Holy Scripture preaches, saying that there is one “mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus” (1 Tim. II, 5). But it is untimely to speak about His divinity, in which He is always equal to the Father, and about His human nature, in which He became like us. Chapter XVIII. That, offering their mediation as the path to God, lying demons only try to turn people away from the path of truth The same false and deceitful intermediaries - demons, who, due to spiritual impurity, manifest their pitiful state and malice through their many actions, but who at the same time, thanks to the distances of bodily places and the lightness of airy bodies, try to turn us away and deviate us from spiritual improvement - those intermediaries do not show us the path to God, but, on the contrary, prevent us from entering this path. On the very path (they propose) - a path that is extremely false and full of error, which justice does not recognize as the (true) path: because we ascend to God not through bodily elevation, but through the spiritual, that is, through incorporeal likeness to Him - on this very bodily path, which the friends of demons pave through the elemental spheres, placing demons as mediators between the ethereal gods and earthly people, the gods appear having the peculiarity that they are not defiled by contact with people only due to spatial distance. Thus, it turns out that it is more likely that demons are defiled by people than people are purified by demons, and that people could defile the gods themselves if the height of the place did not protect them! Who will be so unhappy that he will expect purification for himself on such a path where people are represented as defiling, demons as defiled, gods as capable of desecration, and will not choose a path where defiling demons would not be encountered and where people would be cleansed from defilement by a God who is not subject to defilement in order to enter into the society of non-defiled angels? Chapter XIX. About the fact that the name of demons, even among their most admirers, is not accepted in the sense of something good Since some of these, so to speak, demon-worshippers, among whom Labeo belonged, claim that others call those whom they call demons angels, so that it does not seem that we are arguing over words, I find it necessary to say something about good angels, whom they do not deny, but prefer to call good demons rather than angels. We, following the Scripture, in accordance with which we become Christians, recognize both good and evil angels, but we do not recognize good demons at all. Wherever in these books we find the name of demons, it means only evil spirits. And this meaning of the word is so widespread among peoples that even among those who are called pagans and honor many gods and demons, hardly anyone, no matter how educated and learned, would allow himself to say in praise even to a servant: “You have a demon”; anyone to whom he wanted to say this would perceive his words as nothing other than abuse. It is this reason that forces us, after insulting so many, even almost everyone, who are accustomed to understand this word only in the worst sense, to enter into consideration of the designated subject, because by adding the name of angels, we can make up for the insult that could be caused by the name of demons. Chapter XX. About the properties of knowledge that makes demons proud However, the origin of this name, if we turn to the divine books, is something very worthy of study. They are called δαίμονες, a Greek word, and are so named from knowledge. Enlightened by the Holy Spirit, the apostle says: “Knowledge puffs up, but love edifies” (I Cor. VIII, 1). These words must be understood in the sense that knowledge is useful only when there is love; without love it puffs up, that is, it leads to immensely pompous pride. Thus, demons have knowledge without love, and that is why they are so arrogant, that is, proud, that they tried to appropriate to themselves divine honors and religious service, which, as they themselves know, are only fitting for the true God, and they still do this, as far as they can and where they can. What power does divine humility, which appeared in the form of a slave, have over the pride of demons, who rightfully owned the human race? The souls of people, arrogant with the impurity of exaltation, do not know this, but are similar to demons only in pride, but not in knowledge. Chapter XXI. To what extent did the Lord deign to allow himself to be recognized by demons? The demons themselves know this so well that they said to the Lord, clothed with the weakness of the flesh: “What have you to do with us, Jesus of Nazareth? You have come to destroy us!” (Mk. I, 24; Matt. VIII, 29). These words clearly show that the demons had great knowledge, but there was no love. They were afraid of the punishment that threatened them from Him, but they did not love the truth in Him. He allowed himself to be known to them, however, as much as he wished; but he wished as much as was necessary. He allowed himself to be known differently from the holy angels, who, by virtue of the fact that He is the Word of God, participate in His blessed eternity; but he allowed himself to be known as he should have been known, in order to terrify those from whose tyrannical power He wanted to free those destined for His kingdom, to ever-true and truly eternal glory. So, He made Himself known to the demons, not by the fact that He is eternal life and immutable light, enlightening the pious and purifying the hearts with the faith inherent in Him, but He made Himself known by some temporary manifestations of His power and signs of His most mysterious presence, which could be clearer to the angelic feelings of even evil spirits than to human weakness. Moreover, when He found it necessary to suspend the aforementioned manifestations of His power and hide Himself a little more, the prince of demons doubted Him and approached Him with temptation, finding out whether He was Christ - to the extent, however, that He allowed Himself to be tempted in order to give us an example to follow in the man whom He represented as Himself. After this temptation, when, as it is written, angels served Him - angels, of course, good and holy, and therefore terrible and terrible for unclean spirits - He allowed Himself to be recognized more and more by the demons by His greatness, so that not one of them dared to resist His commands, although the weakness of the flesh in Him could, apparently, arouse contempt. For good angels, all knowledge of bodily and temporal things, which demons boast of, is of no importance; this is not because they do not know these things, but because the love of God by which they are sanctified is dear to them. Before the incorporeal, immutable and inexpressible beauty of God, with holy love for Whom they burn, they consider of little importance everything that is lower than it and that is not it, including even themselves; so that they, because they are good, enjoy only that good which makes them good. But therefore they know better that this is temporary and changeable; for in the Word of God, by whom all things were created, they contemplate those fundamental reasons why one thing is approved, another rejected, and everything is ordered. Demons do not contemplate in the Wisdom of God these eternal and, so to speak, fundamental causes, although, according to some signs that elude us, they foresee the future with much greater skill than people. Sometimes they foreshadow their own actions. At the same time, demons often make mistakes, but angels never do. For it is one thing to make guesses about the temporary and changeable on the basis of the temporary and changeable, and with this to adapt your temporary and changeable will and the ability to carry out your assumptions - which, under certain conditions, is allowed to demons; and it is quite another thing to foresee the changes of times in the eternal and unchangeable laws of God, which lie in the Wisdom of God, and to know, through the communication of the Spirit of God, the will of God, which is as immutable as it is most powerful, which is rightly inherent in angels. Thus, the latter are not only eternal, but also blessed. The good by which they are blessed is God. by which they were created. In communication with Him and in contemplation of Him they find constant pleasure. If Platonists prefer to call these angels gods rather than demons, and to include among them those gods who, as their author and teacher Plato writes, were created by the Supreme God, let them call them; We will not argue with them over words. For if they call them immortal in the sense that they were created by the Supreme God, and represent them as blessed not through themselves, but through communication with Him by whom they were created, then they say the same thing as we, no matter what names they use. That this is the opinion of all, or at least the best, Platonists, can be seen from their writings. And regarding the very name of God, which they call this kind of immortal and blessed creatures, there is no particular disagreement between them and us. And in our sacred books we read: “The God of gods, the Lord has spoken” (Ps. 49:1). And in another place: “Praise the God of gods” (Ps. 135:2). And where it is said: “He is more terrible than all gods” (Ps. 95:4), it is further indicated why it is said: “For all the gods of the nations are idols, but the Lord created the heavens” (Ps. 96:5); that is, we mean those whom the pagans consider gods. Under the influence of this fear, the demons said to the Lord: “You have come to destroy us!” (Luke 4:34; Mark 1:25). In the words: “God of gods,” one cannot, of course, mean the God of demons. The same Scripture also calls people from among the people of God gods. Therefore, by the One about whom it is said “God of gods” one can understand the God of precisely such gods. But we may be asked: if people are called gods because they are from the people of God, to whom God spoke through angels or people; then are not those immortals all the more worthy of this name who enjoy the bliss that people desire to achieve by worshiping God? To this we can answer that it is no accident that Holy Scripture calls people gods with greater clarity than these immortal and blessed ones, with whom we are promised to be compared only after the resurrection. The reason is so that the weakness of faith does not dare to consider any of them, in view of their superiority, as a god for us. In relation to a person, it is not difficult to avoid this. For this reason, with greater certainty, people from the people of God should have been called gods, so that they would know and firmly believe that their God is the One about whom it is said: “God of gods”; because although those immortal and blessed ones who are in heaven are called gods, they are not called gods of gods, that is, gods of people living among the people of God. Therefore, the apostle says: “For although there are so-called gods, either in heaven or on earth, for there are many gods and many lords, yet we have one God the Father, from whom are all things, and we are for Him, and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we through Him” (I Cor. VIII, 5-6). So, there is no point in arguing about the name when the matter itself is so clear that it does not arouse the slightest doubt; but with one caveat. Those from among these blessed immortals who were sent to proclaim the will of God to people we call angels; They don’t allow this. They believe that this service is performed not by those whom they call gods, that is, immortal and blessed, but by demons, whom they decide to call only immortal, but not blessed, or if immortal and blessed, then only good demons, and not gods, who are placed high and removed from contact with people. Although in this case the dispute also seems to be a dispute over a name, the name of demons is so disgusting that we must in every possible way remove it from the holy angels. Let us finish this book with the fact that immortal and blessed beings, no matter what name they bear, but if they are created and created beings, are not intermediaries for unfortunate mortals in the matter of raising them to immortal bliss; because the difference in both separates them. Those intermediaries who share immortality with higher beings and misfortune with lower beings, since they are ill-fated as a punishment for malice, can rather envy us the bliss that they themselves do not have than communicate it to us. The friends of demons cannot provide any serious proof why we should honor as helpers those whom we should rather avoid as deceivers! About those whom they consider good and not only immortal, but also blessed, worthy, under the name of gods, to be worshiped with sacrifices and sacrifices for the sake of obtaining a blessed afterlife - about those who they may be and whatever name they are worthy of, we will show in the next book, with the help of God, that they themselves wish that with such religious service only the one God, by whom they were created and through communication with Whom, would be revered blessed. Sallust. De Catilina_e conjuratione. Apuleus, de Deo Socratis. “Our Fatherland is where we came from, and our Father is there. So what is the way, what is the escape? It is not necessary to do it with our feet, for our feet carry us everywhere only from one land to another, and there is no need to prepare a cart with horses or a ship, but we should leave all this and, as if closing our eyes, replace bodily vision and awaken spiritual vision, which everyone has, but which few use.” Plotinus. 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