About the immortality of the soul

The treatise “On the Immortality of the Soul” (16 chapters) was written by Bl. Aurelius Augustine at the beginning of 387 in Mediolan (present-day Milan in Italy). Belongs to a group of works in which the influence of Neoplatonism, characteristic of the early Blj, is noticeable. Augustine. The author comes to the conclusion that the soul is immortal, since it was created for God. The soul is understood as the form of the body to which it gives life. The soul is life itself. The form is connected to the body in such a way that it cannot be separated from it, even to become something corporeal. The treatise was not completed and therefore remained unclear in content. *The title of the work in Latin is De immortalitate animae. 1. If science exists in something (and it can only exist in something that is endowed with life), and if it always exists (and, if so, then its container must also be eternal), then, consequently, that in which science exists lives forever. We come to this conclusion, i.e. our soul, and since it is impossible to make correct conclusions without science, and without science only that soul can exist that is deprived of it by virtue of its nature, it means that science exists in the human soul. So, since science exists, it certainly exists somewhere (after all, it cannot exist in “nowhere”). In the same way, it cannot exist in something that is devoid of life, for the dead does not know and does not cognize anything; in the same thing that does not know and does not cognize, science cannot exist. Likewise, science always exists, since what exists and exists unchangeably necessarily always exists. And no one denies that science exists. And whoever recognizes it as impossible that a line drawn through the center of a circle should not be the largest of all lines that are not drawn through the center, and recognizes this as a truth known to science, does not deny the existence of an unchangeable science. Further, everything in which something always exists cannot but always exist. For nothing that always exists will ever allow itself to be deprived of that in which it always exists. Then, when we make conclusions, it is a matter of the soul. For this is a matter only of what thinks; the body does not think; and the soul thinks without the help of the body, because when it thinks, it is distracted from the body. Moreover, what is thought must (at least at the moment of comprehension) be assumed to be unchangeable, while the corporeal is constantly in the process of becoming. Therefore, the body cannot help the soul in its quest for understanding; it’s good if it doesn’t interfere. Then, without science, no one can conclude correctly. For correct inference consists in the effort of thought to reach from the known to the unknown, and in the soul, which knows nothing, there is nothing known to it. However, everything that the soul knows, it has within itself, and everything that is embraced by knowledge belongs to some kind of science. For science is the knowledge of any kind of thing. Consequently, the human soul always lives. 2. Reason, undoubtedly, is either the soul itself, or it resides in the soul. But our mind is better than our body, and our body is a certain substance. Being a substance is better than being nothing. Therefore, the mind is not nothing. Then, if any harmony exists in the body, it necessarily exists as a subject, precisely in the body, inseparable from it; and nothing in this harmony is assumed that would not equally necessarily exist in the body as a subject with which harmony itself is inseparable. But the human body is subject to change, but the mind is unchanged. For everything is changeable that does not always exist in the same way. But two, and four, and six always exist equally and unchanged - they always remain the same as they are: four contains two and two, but two does not contain so much - two do not equal four. This basic position is unchanged - therefore, it is reason. But when the subject changes, that which exists in the subject inseparably from it cannot but change. So, the soul is not the harmony of the body. On the other hand, death cannot be inherent in things that are not subject to change. Consequently, the soul always lives, regardless of whether it is the mind itself, or the mind exists in it, but exists inseparably. 3. There is a certain virtue of consistency. Not every constancy is immutable, but every valor can accomplish something, and, having accomplished something, remains, at the same time, valor. Further, every action is expressed by movement or produces movement. Therefore, not everything that moves is subject to change. But everything that receives movement from the outside, from another, and does not itself set anything in motion, is mortal; and nothing mortal is immutable. From here a direct consequence is drawn, without any exception: not everything that moves is subject to change. But there is no movement without substance, and every substance either lives or does not live; everything that does not live is soulless; and soulless action does not exist. Therefore, that which sets in motion such that it does not itself change can only be a living substance. Every substance of this kind sets the body in motion with some gradualness. Therefore, not everything that moves the body is subject to change. A body is set in motion only with a certain sequence of time: it can move, for example, slower or faster; therefore there is something that moves with the succession of time, and yet does not change. Everything that moves a body in time, although it strives for one goal, cannot, however, accomplish everything at once and not perform multiple actions. For that which can be divided into parts cannot be completely individual, unified, no matter how much force it is set in motion; equally there is no body without parts, and no time without intervals; and it is impossible to pronounce the shortest syllable so that you do not hear the end of it when you no longer hear the beginning. Further, when something is done in this way, there is an expectation that it can be done, and a memory that, if possible, would retain it all. Expectation refers to future things, memory - to past things. On the other hand, the tension of action refers to the present tense; through it the future passes into the past; Moreover, waiting for the end of a body’s movement to begin is impossible without memory. For how could we expect the cessation of what has begun, if we have already forgotten either about its beginning, or even that it was set in motion at all? Again, the tension of action related to the present is impossible without waiting for its end: there is nothing that either has not yet happened or has not already happened. Therefore, there may be something in action that relates to something that does not yet exist. In the agent there can be many things at the same time, although the many things that are put into action could not be at the same time. Therefore, it can be in the mover, even if it could not be in the mover. But that which cannot exist at the same time, and, however, passes from the future to the past, naturally refers to the changeable. From this we conclude that there may be something which, while it sets in motion what is changed, itself remains unchanged. For, since the tension of the mover does not change, but, due to the movement it imparts, the body moved by it changes every minute, as, for example, constant tension sets in motion both the artist’s hands and the wood and stone under his control, then who can doubt the logical consistency of what has been said? So, if under the influence of the soul some change in the body occurs and this is included in the intention of the soul, it does not necessarily follow that it itself changes; and from this one should not conclude that she, too, is dying. For with this tension, she can have both a memory of the past and an expectation of the future - and all this is impossible without life. Although no death occurs without change, and change does not occur without movement, not every change produces death and not every movement produces change. About our body itself we can say that by some action it is brought into strong motion and has changed, perhaps due to age; it is impossible, however, to say that it died, i.e. lost his life. It is therefore permissible to think that our soul would not necessarily lose life even if it happened, due to movement, to undergo some change. 4. If there is something unchangeable in the soul that cannot exist without life, then there must be eternal life in the soul. The situation is precisely this: if the first exists, the second will also exist. But the first one is there. For, without mentioning anything else, who would dare to assert that the bases of numbers are changeable; or that any art does not owe its existence to reason; or that art does not exist in the artist, even if he does not use it; or that it can exist outside his soul, or where there is no life; or that the unchangeable may someday not be; or that science is one thing and reason is something completely different? Although we say about this or that science that it is, as it were, a certain set of reasonable propositions, we can, with good reason, call and represent science as the same reason. But one way or another, from this, in any case, it follows that science is unchanged. Science, obviously, not only exists in the soul of those who know it, but also does not exist anywhere, if not in the soul, and, moreover, inseparably with it. After all, if science were separated from the soul or existed outside the soul, it would either exist in “nowhere” or would pass successively from soul to soul. But just as there is no place for science outside of life, so there is no life connected with reason anywhere except in the soul. Further, it is impossible that what exists should not exist anywhere, or that what is unchangeable should ever not exist. And if science passed from soul to soul, ceasing to be in one to establish its residence in another, then everyone teaching science would invariably lose it, and every student would comprehend it only through oblivion or death of the teacher. If this, as it really is, is extremely absurd and false, then the human soul is immortal. But if science sometimes exists in the soul, and sometimes does not, which usually manifests itself in the form of oblivion or ignorance, then the above proof of the immortality of the soul may lose its force, unless, of course, what has just been said is properly refuted. So, either there is something in the soul that does not occur to it at a given moment, or in the educated soul there is no knowledge of music at the moment when its thought is occupied exclusively with geometry. But the latter is false, therefore the former is true. The soul feels itself to have only what comes to its mind. Consequently, there may be something in the soul, the presence of which the soul itself does not feel. How long this happens is not important for the matter. For if the soul is occupied with something else for so long that it is difficult for it to return to what its thought was previously working on, this is called oblivion or ignorance. But if what we have discovered regarding any free sciences, reasoning with ourselves or prompted by other people’s questions, we have discovered not somewhere else, but precisely in our soul (and to open does not mean the same thing as to create or give birth; for otherwise the soul would give birth to the eternal by temporary discoveries, since it often reveals precisely the eternal, for what can be so eternal as the theory of the circle; or what else is there in this kind of sciences about which it could be said that has it ever not been or will not be?), then it is obvious that the human soul is immortal, and that all true rational propositions exist in its recesses, although due to ignorance or oblivion it seems that it does not have them or has lost them. 5. Now let us consider to what extent a change of soul can be allowed. If the soul is a subject in relation to the science that exists in it, and if the subject cannot change without what is in it also changing, then how can we have an unchanging science and an unchanging reason if the soul in which they exist is changeable? There is no greater change than change into its opposite; and who will deny that the soul (to omit the rest) in one case is stupid, and in another wise? So, let us first consider how many ways of so-called changing the soul are allowed. In my opinion, there are two types of these changes, the most obvious and clearest (there are many more types). For the soul seems to change under the influence of passions - either bodily or its own. Under the influence of bodily passions, changes occur due to age, illness, suffering, labor, failure, and sensual pleasures. Due to its own passions, the soul suffers changes from desires, from joy, from fear, from annoyance, from love for science, in the process of studying science. All these changes, taken separately, should not inspire any fear, unless they serve as undoubted evidence of the death of the soul. But let's see if they do not contradict our basic position, according to which, with a change in the subject, everything that is in the subject necessarily changes. No, they don't contradict. For this situation occurs with such a change in the subject, after which he is forced to completely change his name. But if for some reason the wax turns black instead of white, if instead of a square it takes on a round shape, from soft it becomes hard and from hot it becomes cold - all this will be in the subject itself and the wax will remain the subject. Wax will remain wax, although the indicated changes will occur to it. Consequently, what exists in the subject can be subject to change, while the subject itself, in what constitutes its peculiarity, will not change. But if such a change had occurred with what is in the subject that what was understood by its name could no longer be understood by it: as, for example, if wax from the fire turned into steam and underwent such a change that it ceased to be wax, then, in this case, it would in no way be possible to imagine that in the subject one way or another there remained anything of what existed in it insofar as it was this and not another subject. Therefore, if the soul turns out to be such a subject in which, as we said above, the mind exists inseparably and necessarily determines the existence of the subject itself; If a soul can only be a living soul, and reason cannot exist in it without life, and reason is immortal, then the soul is also immortal. For reason can in no way continue to exist if its subject ceases to exist. And this would happen if such a change happened to the soul that would make it not a soul, i.e. would make her die. But none of the above changes, whether they are produced by the body or by the soul itself (although the question of whether some of them are produced by the soul itself, that is, whether it itself serves as their cause, is a very controversial question), does not lead to the fact that the soul is no longer a soul. Consequently, these changes are not only safe in themselves, but do not undermine our conclusions. 6. So, I find it necessary to direct all speculative forces to find out what reason is and what definitions can be given to it, in order to clarify in every possible way the question of the immortality of the soul. Reason is the gaze of the soul, with which it independently, without the mediation of the body, contemplates the true; either he is the very contemplation of the true without the mediation of the body, or he is the very truth that is contemplated... That the former exists in the soul, no one doubts; the second and third may be questionable. However, the second is also impossible without a soul. But regarding the third, there is disagreement: the true thing that the soul can contemplate without the body, as an instrument, does it exist by itself, and not in the soul, and can it exist without the soul? Moreover, no matter how it exists, the soul could not contemplate it by itself without some connection with it. For everything that we contemplate, we grasp with thought or feeling and understanding. But what we grasp by feeling, we feel existing in us and enclosed in a space from which it cannot be removed. And what appears to the mind appears to be not somewhere, but in the very mind that comprehends it. Therefore, the connection between the contemplating soul and the contemplated true is either such that either the soul serves as the subject, and this true exists in the subject, or, on the contrary, the true serves as the subject, and the soul exists in the subject, or both are independent substances. If the first of these three takes place, then the soul is immortal, as is the mind, according to the previous reasoning; since reason can only be inherent in a living soul. The same consequence necessarily follows from the second. For if the true is what we call reason, then, as is obvious, there is nothing in it that is subject to change; nothing existing in him, as in a subject, can change. So, the whole dispute concerns the third. For if the soul is a substance, and the mind with which it is connected is also a substance, then it will not seem absurd to anyone to suppose that the former can cease to exist while the latter continues to exist. But it is obvious that as long as the soul is not separate from the mind and is closely united with it, it must inevitably remain alive. But what force can separate her? Is it not bodily, which is weaker in power, lower in origin, and very different in its properties? No way. Therefore, animate? But even this - how? Is it possible that some other, more powerful spirit can contemplate the mind in no other way than by removing the other spirit from it? But, on the one hand, reason cannot be denied to either of the contemplators, if they both contemplate, and, on the other hand, if there is nothing more powerful than reason itself, for there is nothing more immutable, then a spirit that has not yet been united with reason can in no way be more powerful than that which is united. It remains for either the mind itself to separate from the soul, or for the soul to separate from it of its own free will. But in the nature of the mind there is no envy that would force it to refuse the soul to use itself. Further, and more importantly, to everything that is connected with reason, reason thereby imparts existence: and this is the opposite of annihilation. It would be sheer absurdity if anyone were to say that the soul can separate from the mind of its own free will (if any mutual separation is possible at all between things that are not in a certain place). This can only be said in spite of everything that has been said above, to which we have presented other refutations. So what? Should we not conclude that the soul is immortal? But maybe it cannot separate, but can fade away? If, however, the power of reason, through its unity with the soul, influences the latter - and it cannot help but influence - then, without any doubt, it influences in the sense that it gives it the opportunity to Continue existing. Reason is reason because it assumes the highest immutability. Therefore, on whom it acts in a certain way, it seems to force him to continue existing. So, the soul cannot fade away unless it is separated from the mind. But, as we proved above, it cannot separate. Therefore, she cannot die. 7. The soul’s aversion from reason, the consequence of which is stupidity, cannot but be accompanied by a loss for it. If turning to reason and attachment to it gives it a certain superiority, since it is ranked among the unchangeable things, which is, in particular, truth, which represents the highest and most original, then aversion from it reduces all this for the soul, which constitutes a loss. Any loss leads to nothingness, and by death, in the literal sense of the word, we should understand that something that was something becomes nothing. To incline toward nothingness is to incline towards death. If the soul is not subject to such a decline, then it is difficult to say who, in fact, is subject to it; and with all this the rest is connected. One should not, however, think that those who are inclined towards insignificance will certainly die, i.e. reaches the final stage of insignificance. Thus, every body is a part of the sensory world, and therefore the larger it is and the more space it occupies, the closer it is to the whole (the world), and as much as this makes it larger, the larger it is. For the whole is greater than the part. Therefore, as it decreases, it naturally becomes smaller. Consequently, by decreasing, it is subject to decline. It decreases first of all when something is cut off from it. It seems to follow from this that such cutting leads to destruction of the body. But no cutting off leads to insignificance. For every remaining part continues to be a body, and every body occupies some place in space. And this would be impossible if it did not have parts, each of which, in turn, could not be cut off. Consequently, through an infinite section it can decrease to infinity, undergo a decline through this and tend to destruction, although it can never reach insignificance. The same can be said regarding space itself and any distance. Having identified them and subtracted from them, for example, half, and then from the remaining one by successively removing half at a time, we will reduce the size and go to the end, which, however, we will in no way reach. Why should we be afraid of this regarding our soul? In any case, it is better and more durable than the body, which receives its life from it. 8. But what if what makes a body a body is not its mass, but its shape? And such a thought has an irrefutable basis - for the body is more preferable the more beautiful and beautiful it is, and the more insignificant the more disgusting and ugly it is. Such a decline does not depend on the cutting off of mass, about which enough has been said, but on the loss of species. It is necessary to think and reason about this subject, so that someone does not begin to assert that the soul dies as a result of such a loss, namely: since, being stupid, it loses, in some way, its appearance, form, then it is permissible to think that such a loss can reach such an extent that the soul will completely lose all appearance, and because of this it will reach complete insignificance and will be forced to die. Therefore, if we were able to prove that such a thing cannot happen to a body so that it loses that form that, in fact, makes it a body, then perhaps we would have the right to consider it proven that even more so one cannot take away from the soul that which makes it a soul. For anyone who carefully examines himself recognizes that the soul, whatever it may be, is still higher than the body. So, as an introduction to our reasoning, let the proposition serve that no thing creates or gives birth to itself; for otherwise it would have existed before it received its existence. If the latter is false, then the former is true. Likewise, that which is not created and not born, and yet exists, must of necessity be eternal. Whoever ascribes such a nature and superiority to any body is extremely mistaken. But why should we refute it? Indeed, in this case, we will all the more have to attribute this to the soul. Indeed, if there is at least some eternal body, then there is no non-eternal soul. For any soul is preferable to any body, just as, in essence, everything eternal is preferable to something that is not eternal. But if, as they rightly assert, the body was created, then it was created by something that created, and, moreover, not inferior to the body. For it would not have been able to give to what it created everything that is in what it created, if the qualities of the latter were superior to the qualities of the first. In order to create, the creator needs to have something better than what he creates. This means that the world body was created by some force and nature, more powerful and better, but in no case – not corporeal. After all, if the body were created by the body, it would not be worldly. The position we expressed at the beginning of this discussion, that no thing can receive existence from itself, is completely true. This same force and incorporeal nature, the creator of the world body, holds the world with its inherent power. For, having created, she did not withdraw and did not abandon what she had created. It is a substance that is not a body, and which, so to speak, has no movement relative to a place that could separate it from the substance that occupies the place; and this creative force cannot remain inactive, not protect what it has created and allow it to lose its form, no matter how diverse it may be. For whatever does not exist through itself will certainly cease to exist if it is abandoned by that through which it exists; and we cannot say that the body that was created received something that could already support itself, even if it was abandoned by the Creator. But the soul, whose superiority over the body is obvious, has all this to the highest degree. And if she can continue to exist through herself, then this serves as proof of her closeness to immortality. For everything like this is incorruptible and cannot die because it will not abandon itself. The variability of the body is obvious. This sufficiently shows the general motion of the world body itself. Those who look closely at this movement, so far as such a nature can be observed, discover that the order in which changes occur serves as an imitation of that which is unchangeable. But that which exists through itself has no need for any movement, since everything vital for it is in itself. For every movement is a movement towards another, of which that which moves has a need. So, the universal body has an inherent form due to the support and protection of that better nature that created it; whereby the said variability does not deprive the body of the possibility of being a body, but causes it, through the most orderly movement, to pass from form to form. For not a single part of it is brought to complete destruction. The creative force embraces everything with its power, which does not tire and does not cease its activity, and allows everything that exists from it and through it to continue to exist. Therefore, no one should reach such stupidity as to consider the body better than the soul, or, recognizing the opposite, to think that although the body does not cease to be a body, the soul can become not a soul. And if this does not happen, and the soul cannot continue its existence if it does not live, then it is certain that the soul will never die. 9. If anyone says that the soul should fear not that death, as a result of which a former something turns into nothing, but that which deprives the living of life, let him pay attention to the fact that no thing is deprived of itself. The soul is a certain kind of life; therefore, everything that is animate lives, and everything inanimate that could be animate is considered dead, i.e. deprived of life. Therefore, the soul cannot die. For if she could lose her life, she would not be a soul, but simply something animate. If this is absurd, then the soul should be much less afraid of this kind of death, which should not be at all terrible for life. After all, if the soul were to die when this life left it, then the soul itself should be recognized as the life that is leaving it at that moment. So the soul will not be something that is left behind by life, but life itself, leaving what is dying, but, of course, not leaving itself. Therefore, the soul does not die. 10. But perhaps we should consider that the soul is only a certain organization of the body, as others thought? But such an idea would never have occurred to them if with the same soul, detached and purified from bodily habits, they were able to contemplate what truly exists and remains unchanged. For who, looking closely at himself, has not experienced that he understands anything more sensibly, the more he is able to distract and free mental attention from bodily feelings? This could never have happened if the soul were a bodily organization. For such a thing, which would not have its own nature and would not be a substance, but would be inherent in the subject - the body, like its color and form, would in no way be strengthened by moving away from this very body for the perception of what is comprehended only by the mind, and as much as the body could, it could also see, and through such contemplation it would become better and more excellent. For the form, or color, or even the very organization of the body, which represents a certain mixture of the known four elements of which the body itself consists, cannot in any way be removed from that in which it exists, as in the subject, inseparably. Moreover, what the soul understands when it is distracted from the body is by no means bodily; nevertheless it exists, and exists predominantly because it always exists in the same way. Nothing could be more absurd than the assertion that what we see with our eyes exists, but what we perceive with our mind does not exist, when only a madman would doubt that the mind is incomparably superior to the eye. By contemplating that which always seems to exist in the same way, the soul shows that it is united with this in some amazing and incorporeal way, i.e. out of place. All this either exists in her, or she herself exists in it. And at the same time, one of two things: either it exists in another, as in a subject, or both are substances. If the first is the case, then the soul does not exist in the body as a subject, like color and form, because it either itself is a substance, or is inherent, as a subject, in another substance that is not a body. If the second is true, then the soul does not exist in the body as a subject, in the form of color, because it itself is a substance. The organization of the body exists in the subject-body, like color. So, the soul is not the organization of the body, but the soul is life; no thing leaves itself, but what dies is left behind by life. Therefore, the soul cannot die. 11. So, if you should still be afraid of something, then only so that the soul does not die from decline, i.e., so that it does not lose the very form of its existence. Although it seems to me that enough has been said about this subject and it is impossible to show with sufficient accuracy how this could happen, it should be added that for fear of this kind there is no other reason than the fact that in a foolish soul we must recognize a certain loss, and in a wise soul a greater presence and fullness of essence. But if, as no one doubts, the soul is wisest when it contemplates the unchanging truth and remains motionless in it, united with it by divine love, and if everything that exists in any way receives being from that essence that exists in the highest and most excellent way, then the soul, insofar as it exists, either receives being from it, or through itself. But if it exists through itself, then since it itself serves as the cause of its existence and never abandons itself, it never dies, as we discussed above. If it receives its existence from the truth, then we must carefully examine what could be so contrary to the truth that it would deprive the soul of its existence as a soul provided to it by the truth. What is this? Isn't this a lie, since it is the truth? But how much a lie can harm the soul is obvious and before everyone’s eyes. After all, she can’t do more than deceive. And only those who live are deceived. Therefore, a lie cannot kill the soul. If that which is contrary to the truth cannot rob the soul of its existence as a soul, which the truth has given it (for truth is so invincible!), then what else can be found that would rob the soul of what it is a soul? Of course, nothing: for there is nothing that would be stronger than its opposite to destroy that which produces its opposite. 12. If we begin to look for something contrary to the truth, not because it is the truth, but because it exists in the highest and most dominant way (although it exists insofar as it is truth; because we call truth by virtue of which everything that exists in any form is true, and it exists insofar as it is true), then I will not shy away from this either, because this will testify even more clearly in my favor. For no essence, so far as it is an essence, has anything contrary to itself; nevertheless, that first essence can have its opposite to itself, insofar as it is the essence that is called truth. Every entity is an entity precisely because it exists. The only opposite of existence is non-existence. Therefore, the opposite of essence is nothing. So, there is no thing at all that could be opposite to that substance that exists primarily and primarily. If the soul has from it that very thing that it is (and if it does not have it from itself, then it cannot have it from anywhere except from that thing that thereby surpasses the soul), then there is no thing that would take it away, because there is no thing opposite to the one from which it has it; and therefore it will not cease to exist. But the wisdom that the soul has as a result of its turning to that from which it receives its being, it can only lose due to its aversion from it. For the opposite of conversion is disgust. What it has from something to which there is nothing opposite, it cannot lose from anything. So she can't die. 13. In this case, another question may arise: since the soul is not destroyed, does it not change into some worse essence? After all, it may seem to someone, and not without reason, that from our reasoning it follows that the soul cannot reach insignificance, but that it can, perhaps, turn into a body. If what was previously a soul becomes a body, it will by no means cease to exist altogether. But this cannot happen except if she herself wishes it or is forced to do so by others. However, whether the soul itself would have wished it, or been forced to it, it does not follow from this that it could become a body. Now, if this happened, then, of course, it would follow that either she wants it or is forced to do it. But how is this even possible? Yes, she will never want this. For all her desires regarding the body are to possess it, or to animate it, or to act in some way, or to take care of it in some way. But all this cannot happen if she does not have a better body. And if it becomes a body, then, of course, there will be no better body. Therefore, she will not want to be a body. However, let the soul ask itself about this. In this way she will easily discover that she has no other desire than the desire to do anything, or to know, or to feel, or only to live, so far as she has her own power. If she is forced to become a body, then who forces? Of course, someone more powerful. After all, the body itself cannot force it. For no body is more powerful than any soul. A more powerful soul forces only those subordinate to its power to do anything. But the soul submits to the power of another soul only through its wishes. So, the more powerful soul forces only as much as the own wishes of the one it forces allow. But it is said that the soul cannot have the desire to be a body. Moreover, it is obvious that the soul will not achieve the fulfillment of its desire if it loses all desire; and she, of course, will lose it as soon as she becomes a body. So, it cannot be forced to become a body by one who has the right to force only through wishes subject to his power. Then, every soul that has another soul in its power will naturally want to have power over it rather than the body, and either, out of its kindness, will want to help it, or, if it is evil, give evil commands. Therefore she will not want her to be the body. Finally, this compelling soul is either embodied in something corporeal, or does not have a body. But if it does not have a body, then it does not exist in this sensory world. And if this is so, then she is an extremely good soul, and cannot wish such a vile change on another. If she is an animal, then the one she forces is either also an animal or not. If she is not an animal, then she cannot be forced by another soul to do anything. For the one who stands on the highest level does not have the most powerful self. If she exists in the body, then whatever she is forced to do, which also exists in the body, is forced through the body. And who can doubt that such a change in the soul cannot in any way be accomplished through the body? It would be accomplished if the body were more powerful than her; meanwhile, everything that she is forced to do by the body is, in the essence of the matter, forced not by the body, but by her own wishes, about which enough has been said. Everyone agrees that God is better than the rational soul. But God, undoubtedly, cares about the soul, and therefore, of course, it is not Him who can force the soul to turn into a body. 14. So, if the soul is not subjected to this either by its own will or by someone else’s compulsion, then what else could subject it to this? Is it really because we are often involuntarily overcome by sleep that we should be afraid that through some similar darkening our soul will turn into a body? But is it because sleep relaxes our limbs that our soul becomes in some respect more powerless? It does not feel only what is subject to feelings, since what the dream produces arises from the body and acts in the body. Sleep leads to an insensitive state and, in some way, obscures the bodily senses. The soul, however, yields to this change with pleasure, because this change, which renews bodily strength after labor, occurs according to the law of nature. However, even in sleep, the soul does not lose the ability to feel or understand. For even then she has before her eyes images of sensory objects, and often they cannot even be distinguished from those objects of which they are images; and if the soul at the same time comprehends something, then it is equally true for both the sleeping and the waking one. For example, if someone in a dream sees himself reasoning and asserts something on the basis of true propositions in a competition, then these propositions will remain just as true upon awakening, although everything else turns out to be false, for example, the place where, as he dreamed, he conducted his reasoning, the person with whom he conducted his reasoning, and the like, which, however, often passes without a trace and is forgotten even by those who are awake, and in no way resembles an eternal presence true principles. This leads us to the conclusion that such a bodily change as sleep represents can deprive the soul of the use of the body, but not of its own life. 15. Finally, if the soul is not connected with a body occupying a certain place by place, then those higher and eternal causes that remain unchanged and are not contained in any specific place act before the soul than on the body, and not only before, but also predominantly. They act as much earlier as it is closer to them, and as preferentially as it is better than the body. This proximity is understood not by place, but by the order of nature. It is understood that by virtue of this order the supreme essence gives the body, by means of the soul, the form in which it exists, so far as it exists. So, the body exists through the soul, and by virtue of that very thing that is animated, whether in a general way, like the world, or in a particular way, like every animal in the world. From here it directly follows that the soul could become a body only through the soul, and there is no other way. But since this does not happen, since while the soul remains in that which it serves as the soul, the body itself exists, then the soul cannot change into the body. For if she did not give the body the form that she received from the highest Good, the body would not exist through her, and in this case either it would not exist at all, or it would also receive its form in the closest way, it would be the same as the soul. This is where the difference lies: the soul is better because it receives everything in the closest way. But the body would also receive in the most immediate way, if it did not receive through the soul. For in the absence of any means, it would certainly receive in the same close way. Apart from the quickening soul, there is nothing that stands between the highest life, which is wisdom and unchangeable truth, and that which is quickened, as the last in order, i.e. body. Therefore, if the soul gives the body a form so that it is a body, then in no way will it, by giving the form, take it away. And she would take away, becoming a body. So, the soul does not become a body through itself, because the body exists only under the condition of the presence of the soul and through the soul, nor through another soul, because the body exists only through the soul, receiving form from it, and the soul would turn into the body, if only it were turned, through the taking away of the form. 16. The same can be said regarding the soul or irrational life, i.e. that the soul is rational and does not turn into it. For even the irrational soul is subordinate to the rational soul due to its lower order, and in order to be such, it receives its form from it. By virtue of the natural order, the appearance taken from the highest beauty is given to the weakest by the strongest. By transferring, they in no case take away. And the weakest exist insofar as they are given the appearance of being the strongest. The strongest are also the best. Such is the peculiarity of these natures that their qualitative advantage is associated not with greater mass, but, regardless of any spatial volume, with a better appearance or form. In this sense, the soul is better and more powerful than the body. That is why, if, as has been said, the body exists through it, then it itself cannot in any way turn into a body. For the body exists only because it receives its form through the soul. The soul, in order to become a body, must not accept, but lose its appearance, which is impossible unless the soul is confined in a certain place and is not connected with the body in a local way. In the latter case, perhaps, a large mass would be able to turn the best form into its worst, like a mass of air to a small light. But this is not the case. For every mass that occupies a place receives its integrity from all its parts, and the whole does not exist in each separate part. One part of it is in one place, the other in another. The soul is inherent not only in the entire mass of its body, but also in each individual particle of it at the same time entirely. She fully feels the suffering of a part of the body, and feels it, however, not in the whole body. When something hurts on your leg, the eye notices it, the tongue speaks about it, the hand reaches out to it. This would not happen if the soul, as far as it is present in these parts, did not feel in the leg, and it could not feel what was happening there if it were absent. For it is incredible that this was done through the medium of any messenger who does not feel what he is announcing; because suffering does not run through the continuous continuation of the bodily mass, so as not to allow it to hide from the remaining parts of the soul located in other places, but the entire soul feels entirely what is happening in the particle of the leg, and feels only where it is happening. Consequently, it is entirely present at the same time in each of the individual parts - because everything simultaneously feels in each of them. And the whole thing is not present in the same way, however, just as, say, whiteness is completely inherent in one or another part of the body. For the change in whiteness which a body suffers in one part may have no relation to its whiteness in another. This serves as proof that, according to the mutual distance between the parts of the body mass, it itself is located at known distances from itself. And that there is nothing like that in the soul is proven by the feeling that has already been mentioned. You might be interested in: