Schelling's speech

Schelling is not giving lectures this winter. But at the Berlin Academy of Sciences, on the occasion of the celebration of the birthday of Frederick the Great (January 30), he read a speech: on the significance of the Roman Janus. This work, as the journals say, will soon be published, and if this is true, then we hope that it will tell us a lot of important and new things about Schelling’s philosophy, which is still little known to us. In his speech about Janus, Schelling is said to express his view not only of mythology, but also of the most fundamental principles of his philosophy in general; for the philosophy of mythology is known to be of high importance in his new system. In mythology he sees not the work of invention of this or that inventor, not the poetic expression of the unconscious instinct of individual peoples; but he understands in it a great, universal, completed process of inner life in the consciousness of all humanity, which, precisely because it could not belong to one people, but was distributed among various peoples, in various degrees of its development, until its individual branches, having reached maturity, in the era of a turning point, finally united in the Roman-Greek world into one common system of belief. To understand the importance of such a view of mythology in relation to the whole system of philosophy, it is necessary to know Schelling’s concept of the philosophy of religion in general. Religion, in his opinion, is not simple knowledge about God, nor an abstract, ideal relationship of a person to God, but actual being in God, an essential, real relationship to God. From here comes a completely special view of the philosophy of religion, and, among other things, a new division of religion occurs. Religion is usually divided into revealed (positive) and natural (derived by reason from its concepts); both views of religion usually oppose one another. By natural we mean that which comes from pure reason, in contrast to that which is directly given to a person from the outside, communicated by revelation. But if we are content with this division, says Schelling, then we will not find a special religious principle in either member of the division. For my knowledge about revealed religion is not acquired in a special way, exclusively characteristic of it, but in the same way in which I receive my information about other things, for example, about historical events, etc., therefore, there is no talk here about any special way of knowledge belonging to one religion. The same can be said about natural religion: for the science of religion, based on the conclusions of reason, does not have a special way of cognition that belongs to one religion; many other branches of business are acquired in the same way. Therefore, if we stop at this division of religion, we admit that in man there is no special principle to which the generation of religious knowledge exclusively belongs, there is no specifically religious meaning. On the one hand, religion, which attributes its origin to revelation, is in relation to reason the same as history; on the other hand, natural religion is the same as philosophy. In order to truly derive a specifically religious principle, it is necessary to find a religious foundation, independent of any knowledge through which man is in living dependence on the Divine - a foundation that represents not only the ideal, but also the real relationship of man to God, a principle that not only mentally, rationally posits God in the knowledge of man, but together and truly, essentially. Now the question is: is it possible to find in man such an essentially God-founding principle? The answer is that man’s previous religious existence, his previous beliefs, that is, mythology, can neither be understood nor explained except through such an essential principle of God. A person who comes out of an essential, real relationship with God must through a necessary process be returned to God. Mythology can only come from this process. But in this case, mythology will no longer be anything other than natural religion, therefore, revealed religion is opposed not only to religion generated scientifically, but also to natural religion, which is mythology. Through this third term the system gains a lot. For without the assumption of this third it is impossible to understand revelation. There is absolutely no transition from rational religion to frank religion; for the rational one knows only about the ideal relationship of man to God, while the frank one presupposes a real relationship. The theory of revelation cannot come from an ideal relationship to God, but from a real one. It must posit this real relationship of man to God in a pre-rational, factual, essential, everyday, historical way. This is the only basis possible for the theory of revelation. But such an essential relation of man to God, which is posited before all knowledge, cannot be anything other than religion, which would be generated from itself; and this naturally self-generating religion is nothing more than mythology, or a religion contained in mythology. Thus, it is clear that the real basis for the theory of revelation must be sought in the philosophy of mythology. Therefore, for its own purpose, the theory of revelation is disgusted to take a purely opposite, merely exclusionary position against paganism. Christianity frees man not from the power of this real relationship, but only from the power of dark paganism. Therefore, the reality of Christianity cannot be destroyed by the concept of the reality of paganism. The expression: pagan darkness means precisely a dark, blind, naturally self-generating religion. Therefore, in the concept of self-generating religion, not only the fact of revelation is opposed to rationalism, but also the fact of mythology. Mythology and revelation, according to Schelling, relate to each other as the natural to the supernatural, But the natural is contained to the supernatural, as the previous is to the subsequent. Therefore, the supernatural is nothing other than the victory of the natural. Therefore, the supernatural can only be known in its relation to the natural. Thus, instead of the previous division of religion into revealed and natural, Schelling accepts: 1) natural religion - mythology; 2) supernatural religion - revelation; 3) the product of philosophy and speculation - rational religion. But this division should not be understood in such a way as if these three concepts of religion should be heterogeneous and disparate; especially the first two are in such a close connection, that is, the supernatural is in such a close relationship to the natural that it can only appear at the moment of its victory over natural beliefs, over the religions of antiquity. As a result of this, the relationship, mythology and revelation are not so far apart from each other as is usually thought; false religion is only a distortion of the true one. Revelation is preceded by darkness; Revealed religion necessarily presupposes a beginning that is more concealing than revealing God. Therefore, it is revelation, as a matter of victory, that must necessarily appear within the boundaries of a certain time, for it consists solely in the moment of a glimpse (while natural religion is constantly generated from a self-developing principle). From this we can see what a necessary connection there is between the philosophy of mythology and the philosophy of religion. Philosophical doctrine, says Schelling, can only arise from the reconciliation of natural religion with revealed religion, and necessarily presupposes both of them. Mythology, or natural religion, as natural, is at the same time necessary, blind, unfree, a religion of torpor, superstition. Only from the fact that truth is freed from blindness and unfreedom by revealed religion does the actual possibility of free knowledge arise. And so, the relationship is the following: religion of torpor - liberation in revelation - spiritual religion. With such a relationship between a freely spiritual religion and a necessarily supposed natural and revealed one, philosophical doctrine would be devoid of any content if these two points did not serve as its basis. The philosophy of mythology and revelation has the same close relationship to the philosophy of history. Not only because prehistoric time can only be understood through mythology, but also because the relation of the new world to the old can only be understood from the latter; for through revelation the new world finds itself liberated from the power that necessarily acted in the old by the force of necessity and which is the beginning that gave birth to mythology. This view is no less closely connected with the philosophy of art. If already the philosophy of art cannot help but touch upon mythology, then a new view of the relationship of mythology to revelation explains for the first time the true content of ancient art to the new, and in this way many riddles about the artistic relationship of mythology to revelation can be resolved. For example, how did religious feeling not prevent the artists of the Middle Ages from merging pagan objects with Christian objects into one thought or into one image? But with philosophy in general the philosophy of revelation and mythology is in necessary contact. Of course, at first glance, there is nothing more heterogeneous than philosophy and mythology; mythology, apparently, is the kingdom of unbridled unreason, while in philosophy the kingdom of reason itself must be created. But this very opposition forces us to undertake a scientific-like investigation: is there reason in the visible unreason? Is it not possible to discover and present meaning in external nonsense? – This requires an objective representation of meaning (meaning manifested not in the internal understanding, but in external being), which naturally cannot be achieved without a significant expansion of the field of philosophy in general. Just as any philosophy draws its first content from immediate facts, which in human consciousness require understanding and reflection, so no positive, complete and complete system of philosophy can arise without recognizing and explaining all the facts that have a decisive influence on humanity. Consequently, that system of philosophy that did not take into account such a fact as mythology can therefore not be called either complete or complete. Consequently, just as before, about forty years ago, the whole philosophy was re-formed, and the main point of departure was completely changed, only for the reason that in addition to its previous development, the philosophy of nature was also added, so now the search for the pure, undistorted fact of mythology and revelation (which remains unexplained for philosophy as it has developed until now) - this search, I say, must not only expand the limits of philosophy, but change it in such a way that it will appear completely different from the current one. Such a presentation of an improved philosophical system can be called indirect, indirect, reflected, because it proceeds from a given fact, and not from an unconditional first principle. And here the question arises: isn’t it generally better to start with this kind of facts, and only build a system as research increases, than, starting from a higher beginning, to reach the fact after the development of the system? Isn't it better to get straight to the point than to remain so long in the preface? In this practical way, Socrates and Plato once taught to philosophize, not in such a way that they first made inquiries about thinking itself; but in such a way that they forced their students to think, moving away from randomly encountered objects and ascending to higher questions, through the sublime aspiration of the mind. Therefore, it is very important to ask: is the current way of teaching philosophy the best, or should the system not be communicated precisely in an indirect way? We take mythology, says Schelling, where and how we find it, and exactly as it appeared in the world. The system to which an indirect presentation should be presented in this way is a positive system, a system of science freed from all subjectivity, a system of directly objective being and deeds, which alone can be desired as an essential need of reason, which alone true thinkers sought, and for which all those artificial systems served only as a substitute, a surrogate, which were built not due to their essential, internal truth, but only because reason could not receive, could not achieve that exactly what he wanted, just as an insufficient owner sometimes drinks stomach coffee because he is unable to have the real thing. Therefore, there is no need to refute artificial systems; for, existing only in the absence of a positive system, they themselves must be destroyed at the mere emergence of the positive. They also interfere little with positive systems, just as the opinion of a blind person interferes with the vision of a sighted person. Schelling, analyzing the current concept of mythology, interprets Herodotus' position that Homer and Hesiod compiled a treatise on mythology in such a way that mythology was kept chaotically in the consciousness of the Greek people, and in Hesiod and Homer it only expressed itself definitely and clearly in all its aspects. Myths cannot be invented; for then the question arises: who invented them? Someone alone could not have invented them, for mythology is so fused with the people that to consider it invented is the same as deducing the language of the people from someone else’s composition. And how could an inventor convey his concepts to the people and make them believe that his inventions are real gods? It is even easier to assume that mythology is the invention of an entire people; but such a poetic state is difficult to explain historically. However, this assumption would be even more reasonable if it did not encounter a contradiction in the very concept of the people. For what is a people, and what makes an assembly of people a people? It is not the common existence of many individual people that makes up a people, but a community of consciousness, expressed outwardly in language, and internally in the community of one view on the order of things and the world, unanimity, from which morals and customs arise. This commonality of view on the order and original order of things is nothing more than religion, which among ancient peoples appears in the form of mythology. Therefore, it is incongruous to think that mythology would later join a people that already exists, when a people cannot arise without a common view of the original structure of the world, without mythology. And so, if mythology cannot arise in an already existing people, then it must necessarily arise together with the people themselves, and therefore, it is nothing more than that part of the universal consciousness with which the people emerged from the primitive unity of humanity in order to exist as some kind of specific and separate people. The mythology of a people is the inheritance that it receives from its previous unity, and with which it is separated from the community of humanity. The fate of every people lies in its mythology; and she is precisely his destiny. The emergence of various mythologies is therefore contemporary with the emergence of various peoples. This emergence of differences itself already presupposes the primitive unity in which they were contained. This unity cannot again be a people, but only humanity itself in its primitive integrity and indivisibility. Meanwhile, primitive inseparability can no longer be external, but is possible only as an internal unity of consciousness. From this Schelling concludes that the primitive unity of humanity lies in monotheism, from which later, through separation, peoples with polytheistic religions arose. It is obvious, he says, that just as primitive humanity could be united only by the idea of ​​the One God, so decisively fragmented it could not be anything other than polytheism. You can give physical reasons for separation, such as earthquakes, volcanoes, ruptures of the earth, etc. However, every nation, right from the moment of its formation, already has a decided character. Physical revolutions could not impart a decided character to individual parts. The physical is determined by the internal; The physical disintegration of the people already presupposes spiritual disintegration. And so, when we reach the last beginning of bifurcation, we certainly find an internal bifurcation; for the internal fracture necessarily precedes the external. The concept of the division of peoples through such a turning point is preserved in the most ancient legends. The Bible depicts it as a confusion of tongues among a people hitherto agreed upon. Language, however, is only the expression of inner consciousness, and therefore, the difference between languages ​​is explained only by the difference in inner consciousness. But it is precisely in the disintegration of the community of language that the community of consciousness is destroyed. The disintegration of the community of language is only an external sign of the disintegration of common consciousness. And so, this confusion of languages ​​was a turning point, a crisis produced by the emerging polytheism. But from the time this confusion began and how many gods arose, man no longer lost the fear that stems from the consciousness that he had been inherited by a special deity, and it was this fear that constituted the strength of their individual consciousness. She united people into a people, and she also separated them from all those with whom they had nothing in common. Thus fear became the basis of both external religious and civil institutions. Fear sought a means against complete fragmentation. We find such means in the division of castes, in the establishment of a strict hierarchy, in the gigantic architecture of India, Nubia, Egypt, Greece, Italy, in the gigantic walls and towers, which in ancient legends are attributed to a giant family that has already disappeared from the face of the earth. With these colossal monuments, one cannot help but think about the significance of the Pillar of Babylon, whose construction was conveyed to us as a desire to unite, not to get confused, to come together. What is the significance of this pre-mythological monotheism? The opinion that polytheism is a distortion of monotheism belongs to the most ancient. Now the question is asked about the property and image of this first monotheism; for what can be divided into parts must contain diversity, multiplicity, articulation. We are of necessity forced to presuppose a whole unified doctrine, and such as we currently call pantheism. From this we should express ourselves in such a way that polytheism is disintegrated monotheism. However, what reason can be assumed for such a disintegration? How can we imagine the possibility of this kind of consciousness being resolved in polytheism? relaxation of the spirit would not explain to us precisely the force with which polytheism arose; just as monotheism, if we had assumed it only as a doctrine, would not have explained to us the force with which unity sought to be restored in consciousness. Therefore, it is necessary to assume: 1st, a cause that acts independently of the will and knowledge of man and tends to generate polytheism; 2nd, resistance to this generation. Therefore, a person had to be captured by the movement of an involuntary event. Monotheism, which precedes polytheism, cannot be understood as a scientific system, but it is necessary to presuppose in human consciousness existence in Divine unity; for knowledge of unity is ideal; being in unity: the real relationship of man to God. Obviously, man is placed at the center of things. Its rationality seems to be based only on the fact that the same forces that appear separately in nature are again collected in it into unity, from which they emerged only in order to give birth to nature. Therefore, man is at the center of Divine unity and in a state of pantheistic insight towards God. As long as he remains here, all things appear to him as organs of the Divine; but as soon as he is expelled from the center, the circle becomes confused for him. But he does not want to leave the previous state, because it was a state of bliss. From this contradiction between the desire to see things in God and the position outside the center of things, mixed pantheism and polytheism arose from this struggle, and arose in an involuntary, fatal way. But just as the feeling of being outside of God was natural, so the emergence of polytheism from monotheism is necessary; and this view is the only possible one, which in mythology itself shows the real relationship of man to God and represents the disintegration of primitive monotheism into polytheism as a necessary event based on the universal consciousness of the human race. The phenomenon of a polytheistic concept is so fatal and blind that we cannot in any way allow it to arise from thinking alone. This fatal character requires an attitude that is much more significant; it presupposes not simple knowledge of God, but being in the midst of Divine things. This existence of man in Divine unity can, on the one hand, be understood only as the primitive state of people in general and, therefore, as the past. It is at least indisputable that pantheistic insight had to be disrupted along with the first exodus of man from the primitive state. The Bible calls Paradise the place of bliss from which man was expelled. But as soon as the Divine unity of forces is broken, it becomes subordinate to everything to which other things are subordinate; meanwhile, an unsuppressed feeling tells him that he is not like other things, that he is above them. This disorder of insight begins from there. Meanwhile, on the other hand, we have now assumed that until the very immediate pre-historical time, unity-consciousness continues in humanity, which was broken not before, as with the fragmentation of humanity into nations. In his discussion of the Roman Janus, Schelling could very easily connect with the figure of the two-faced god the beginning and end of the entire mythological process, as he understands it. For, based on philosophical conclusions and on the testimony of the ancients, Schelling sees in Janus the idea of ​​chaos: by this chaos should not be understood the disorderly mixing of heterogeneous substances, as some understand; Chaos for Schelling is the primary unity of the universe, the concept of which precedes in human consciousness the concept of individual gods; the first unity in which theogonic and cosmogonic forces still rest in indifference. In support of this view, Schelling cites a long series of evidence from Herodotus to Seneca. In the two turned away heads of Janus, between which stands a crescent moon, Schelling sees the second moment of unity of forces, when they are, although still united, but already identified in their difference. Schellishg also refutes the opinion that sees in Janus the only deity of the border, gate, or transition; as well as the opinion that presupposes in it the expression of the idea of ​​​​the necessary change of times, of the opposition of the past and the future. Historical explanations of mythology are sometimes more plausible than these colorless interpretations; but in this case they were also unsuccessful. It was not difficult for Schelling to show the unreasonableness of Ovid's explanation that the gates of the church were dissolved during the war in order to give shelter to the army in case of escape; This opinion is equally contrary to the virtues and morals of the Romans. The opinion of Niebuhr, who sees in the gates with Janus heads a symbol of the armed union between the Sabine and Latin tribes, which preserved the civil independence of each tribe, is also refuted by Schelling, who sees in the stories about the first principles of Riemann a history reshaped by folk songs, but mythological concepts transferred to historical soil, reshaped according to historical standards. For him, the gates with Janus heads do not represent the war of the Sabines with the Latins, but the struggle of the original creative forces: they remind him of mythological legends π ό λεμος ἁπ ά ντων πατ ή ρ. But for those to whom this significance of Janus seems exaggerated, or disagrees with the ancient concept of him, Schelling cites passages from Macrovius, Cicero and others who call him deorum deus, and say that in all the most important undertakings, Janus was called upon before other gods. Schelling cites the words of Ovid in which Janus himself testifies to his identity with Chaos. The importance of this place was partially noticed by others, and therefore they tried by various means to resolve the difficulty of how to understand Janus together with Jupiter, the main god of the Roman people. Buttman, with the name Janus, thought about Ζᾶν (Zeus); but Schelling cites the strongest etymological evidence from one passage of Festus, still viewed by everyone, where Janus is derived from Hios, hiare (to gape). Thus Janus, Hianus and chaos are unambiguous in both sound and meaning. This article is compiled from various journal excerpts and notes from Schelling's lectures given in Munich and Berlin. You might be interested in: