«О девстве»

Although the chronology of Gregory’s work is not completely established, almost all researchers agree on one thing - the primacy (or at least the early date of creation 184) of the voluminous ascetic treatise On Virginity. This work, which Gregory probably wrote after his marriage, 185 was an expression of his devotion to his elder brother Basil, the founder of Cappadocian monasticism. However, even in this ascetic theme, the originality of Gregory’s thinking was revealed, for whom the idea of ​​virginity is key in the cosmic vision of human fall and a possible return to the original nature, to man’s original likeness to God. The cosmic meaning of virginity Man, created by God as a “reasonable and thinking animal” (τὸ λογικὸν καὶ διανοητικὸν ζῷον 186), deprived of suffering and death, according to Gregory’s interpretation, with his beauty showed the likeness of the Prototype, work and likeness Which he was. As the image and likeness (εἰκὼν καὶ ὁμοίωμα 187) of the royal power that rules over everything, he had power over himself, and thereby over the entire material world, and the freedom to make decisions 188 without any coercion from the outside. However, as the Book of Genesis narrates, man used his abilities to “invent evil” 189, which stems from freedom, but not from nature, and thus became the cause of “the misfortune (συμφορά) that humanity now suffers” 190. “From a small beginning (ἐκ μικρᾶς ἀφορμῆς) flowed immense (ἐις ἄπειρον) evil in man” 191, hiding his original nature - Gregory compares this “misfortune” with rust, eating iron. Thus, man ceased to be the image of the “immortal God” and put on “the corruptible and earthy image” 192, i.e. damaged body. However, according to Gregory, we are talking only about a kind of tragic “reveiling”, which does not destroy at all the original image of God in man, but hides it with “the dirt (...) of carnal impurity” 193. To remove these inappropriate clothes, these “dead skins” (see Gen. 3:21) 194, it is necessary to experience all the “misfortunes” in reverse order 195. What, according to Gregory, actually happened during this “misfortune” described in the 3rd chapter of Genesis, and in what order (ἀκολουθία 196)? The pleasure (ἡδονή 197) of the forbidden fruit, which man was seduced by, ceasing to rejoice in God, was quickly replaced by shame, fear, and the desire to hide. Therefore, the man received a covering of “robes of leather” 198 and was sent into exile, where he was given marriage as a consolation for mortals 199 . Now this path must be taken in reverse order, i.e. first of all, it is necessary to renounce marriage, then get rid of worries and efforts about earthly things 200, put aside these ill-fated “leather vestments”, i.e. “carnal wisdom” (τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός 201), as the apostle encourages this (see Rom. 8:6). Then - stop hiding under the shadow of the “fig tree” (see Gen. 3:7-11), appear before the eyes of the Creator and listen not to the advice of the “poisonous serpent” tempting with deceptive pleasure, but to the commandments of God Himself; return to the knowledge of pure good, and not “good” mixed with evil 202. So, according to Gregory, a person can now get rid of the disasters of this world and return to the bliss of paradise, as the Apostle Paul managed (see 2 Cor. 12:2 and below 203). Instead of physical reproduction, the original destiny of which is death, another birth from the Spirit is necessary (see John 3:5 and below), a washing into a life devoid of defilement 204 . If marriage is a symbol and implementation of the first 205, then it is virginity, Gregory believes, that is a step towards the implementation of the second 206, because it does not produce what is subject to physical death and even puts a certain limit on it (ὅρος) 207, abolishes and destroys its power 208. This is roughly the basic outline of Gregory's argument in favor of virginity. Let us pay attention to several of its points, to which, presenting them in a new light and deepening them, the saint will return in subsequent works. First of all, this is the motive of man as the image and likeness of God. Gregory, unlike other Greek fathers (e.g., Irenaeus), does not make any special distinction between “image” and “likeness,” but uses both words interchangeably, 209 which corresponds to the figure of parallelism used in the biblical text itself (see Gen. 1:26). Gregory sees this similarity in the free power of man over the entire material world, reflecting the omnipotence of the Creator. Unlike his prototype, man is subject to temptation, and therefore to change. However, Gregory does not particularly explain this noteworthy circumstance here; he will have occasion to return to it. The fatal “misfortune”, the cause of which was human free will, interests Gregory primarily as an explanation of current human suffering, i.e. in its etiological function. Here an interesting question arises, which Gregory will answer differently in his different works - the problem of human corporeality. In the treatise On Virginity, it seems that we are talking about another re-veiling, about “leather vestments”, which it is desirable to take off as soon as possible in order to return to the original nakedness of the spirit. It is important that the distinction between the sexes existed even before the “misfortune” that resulted from a series of events. Whether such a difference existed among the disembodied, Gregory does not indicate 210. He only mentions that man was given a “helper” (βοηθός) 211 in his direct, undefiled and exclusive relationship with God, a certain spiritual being, whose gender Gregory does not indicate at all. Perhaps he means human reciprocity in general as the support of human relations with the Creator. For our work, it is important what behavior is recommended for a person in “his present disasters.” Here Gregory apparently gives an ascetic interpretation to the term Irenaeus ἀνακεφαλαίωσις (see Eph. 1:10). According to him, each person is called to go through in reverse order all the key moments of the history of the Fall, as, according to the teachings of Irenaeus, Christ had already done, in order to unite everything “under a new head” 212 (Irenaeus even uses the metaphor of a tangled thread, all the knots of which must be untangled, to go through again in the reverse order: Christ-Adam, Mary-Eve, etc.) 213. What is important here is not the identity of the stages, but the very motive of returning to the original and lost correct teaching, to the proper state of human nature, i.e. to godlikeness. For the motive of the endless path, of which there is not a single mention here yet, it will be important that a person must return to a state when he did not know “good and evil,” but knew only “pure and unmixed with evil” good. Here it is necessary to consider what exactly this return looks like. Discussing the return to the lost good, Gregory first of all emphasizes that the restoration of godlikeness is not a purely human matter, it is possible only thanks to the original generous gift of God (μεγαλοδωρεά 214), which is the very creation of human nature. And yet this return to the image of God remains, for Gregory, a matter of human care (ἀνθρωπίνη σπουδή 215). At the same time, Gregory relies on the assurance of Jesus himself: “The Kingdom of God is within you” (Luke 17:21, ἐντὸς ὑμῶν 216), i.e., as Gregory believes, “the good of God is inseparable from our nature” 217 and is not far from those who seek it, but is present in each of us, although not easily recognizable. It is only necessary to realize it, “turn the mind to it” 218, to concentrate the movement of the human mind towards this goal. Gregory sees a description of such an effort in the Gospel parable of the lost coin (Luke 15:8–10). The only missing drachma is the lost likeness to God (Gregory calls it “the image of the king,” ἡ εἰκών τοῦ βασιλέως 219), without which all other drachma-virtues have no value, and therefore the soul is called a “widow” 220. At the same time, Gregory interprets every detail of the gospel narrative allegorically: first it is about lighting a candle, which obviously means reason (λόγος 221), then about searching in one’s own house, i.e. in yourself. The lost drachma, bearing the “image of the king,” is not lost at all, it is only covered with “dust” (κόπρος 222), i.e. hidden under “carnal filth” 223, as Gregory literally says. In order for the drachma to shine with full light again, it must be cleansed, proper care devoted to it - Gregory, in connection with the Gospel usage 224, specially analyzes the term ἐπιμέλεια (τοῦ βίου) [“care, diligence” 225], which has Platonic parallels 226. And then the happy owner of the drachma will again be able to share joy with neighbors and household members 227, meaning the powers of the soul (“abilities - thinking, desiring - the disposition of the soul towards sadness and anger, and all other forces that are seen in it” 228), will be able to concentrate on the beauty of the acquired image and contemplate only “the beautiful and the good” 229. We see that in this allegorical reading of the Gospel parable, as a story about the cleansing of the desecrated image of the king, Gregory in many ways comes close to Plotinus’s “processing of his own statue” 230; at least the basic scheme is very close to Platonism. Gregory also wants to cleanse the royal image of the soul from “carnal impurity” in order to completely turn the soul to the contemplation of good and beauty. In other places in this early work of Gregory, the closeness to the ideas of Plotinus is even more obvious. As for Plotinus, for Gregory human life is defined by the tension between “addiction to one’s body” and detachment from “carnal life,” which means “living only with the soul” (τὸ μόνῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ζῆν 231), in contemplation of the incorruptible source, “adorning one’s image in the likeness of pristine beauty" 232. Inspired by the idea of ​​striving for beauty, expressed in Plato’s dialogue Symposium (210–211), as well as Plotinus’ ascent to beauty in Enneads I, 6 [1], Gregory calls for looking behind the sensual beauty that attracts us for true, intelligible beauty, in which all that is beautiful participates. Whoever has a pure eye of the soul and who can contemplate such objects, he, having ceased to admire the substance subordinate to the idea of beauty (ἡ τοῦ καλοῦ ἰδέα), uses the visible as a step (ὑποβάθρά, lit., stand) to the contemplation of rational beauty (πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ θεωρίαν κάλλους), according to the commonality with which everything else is and is called beautiful 233. Many, Gregory sadly states, turn away from the “striving for true good” (τῆς περὶ τὸ ὄντως ἀγαθὸν σπουδῆς 234), being carried away by concerns about other things, be it wealth, honors, power and glory, art, knowledge, right down to pleasing the belly. The natural mobility (τὸ ἀεικίνητον 235) of our soul must be protected from such dispersion into empty things and focused on ascending upward. Gregory explains this with a clear example: water directed through a water pipe and encountering an obstacle will rush upward due to strong pressure. Likewise, our mind (νοῦς 236), preserved by abstinence from dissipation, unhinderedly ascends to the heavenly 237. Gregory says the same about human lust (ἡ ἐπιθυμητικὴ ἡμῶν δύναμις 238): one should neither turn it to the transient and base beauty of things, nor keep it within oneself in inactivity and immobility 239. It must be cleansed from the inclination to the low and raised to the high - but not only to the beauty of the heavens or the radiance of the stars: the contemplation of all this only tunes the soul to search for true beauty, exceeding its pale image - the heavens (cf. Ps. 18:2 and below, Ps. 8:2 240). In this ascent, Gregory notes, the soul rejects everything that it recognizes as inferior to what it is looking for 241. However, the soul - and here Gregory partly Christianizes the Neoplatonic motif - has no other chariot for ascension (ὄχημα 242) along this path, except for the wings of the Spirit, likened in Scripture to a dove (this bird, in Gregory’s view, is devoid of gall and abhors the stench 243). Only on the wings of this dove can the human soul ascend and approach beauty in itself, become beautiful and be illuminated by the light of beauty, and even become light itself, i.e. to become involved in that true light, which is Christ 244. Only in this way, Gregory believes, can the human soul unite with the incorruptible God (συναφθῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ θεῷ 245), i.e. purified by chastity, “so that like may receive like” 246. “Like a mirror for the purity of God” 247, the soul itself is likened to original beauty by its participation in it, as its reflection (κατὰ μετοχὴν καὶ ἐμφάνειαν 248). This beauty, contemplated “in a blissful ecstasy” 249, is indescribable by human speech, which is why the psalmist says that “every man is a lie” (if he wants to describe it; see Ps. 116:2). We can convey the sensual beauty that surrounds us in words to another, “as if in a painting” 250, but how can we express in words what “the primitive beauty of which is inaccessible” 251? That which is completely formless, has no image, is alien to any quantity 252, can neither be known nor comprehended in the same way as sensible things are comprehended. In this place, Gregory, although between the lines, describes beauty itself as devoid of not only matter, but also appearance (τὸ ἀειδές 253). As if realizing this difficulty, in the next maxim he will talk more about the good and participation in it than about beauty (τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετουσίας 254). Elsewhere, Gregory, like Plotinus, specifies that beauty is “contemplated around the primary good” (περὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθόν ... θεωρεῖται) and adds that this beauty is at the same time “above all good” (τὸ ἐπέκεινα παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ 255). This statement allows us to conclude (although not indisputably) that Gregory may have distinguished beauty in itself, transcendental in relation to all the good things of this world, from the “primary good” around which beauty extends as its speculative appearance 256. In the ascent from visible beauty to beauty in itself, as a speculative manifestation of good, described in this early work, we are primarily interested in two motives: on the one hand, the idea of ​​the human soul as a constant movement, on the other hand, the very moment of ascent to a goal that eludes achievement. We have already drawn attention to the fact that Gregory understands the constant mobility of the human soul as its integral property. We can only influence the direction of this movement, and this direction itself deserves our care. The (neo)platonic tone of the saint’s early work contributes to the context of the theme being developed – about upward movement, about ascension. We find here the motive of the path further forward to the designated goal 257. Gregory describes how a person who turns to the “truth of things” 258, and not to the changing circumstances and situations of human life, like a traveler, “rushing further and further, pays little attention to the objects that appear [to his gaze] 259.” This desire forward and into the future, towards the goal of the journey, gives the traveler firmness of step even in dangerous moments of his journey. Such a comparison (Gregory’s favorite lines - Phil. 3:13 are not yet quoted, although they would fit well here) for Gregory does not in any way refute the fact that the goal of life’s path is “mountain” 260, and its visual metaphor is heaven 261. Unfortunately, Gregory tells us nothing here about whether this goal can ever be achieved. However, the saint points out that virtue is not limited to any “human limit,” 262 but this passing mention does not yet develop into a theory of a path without end. The question of the possible achievement of the heavenly goal also arises at the top of Gregory's ascent to the contemplation of beauty. Gregory, like his Neoplatonic colleagues, seems to suggest a certain possibility of achieving the goal of ascension, if only for a moment. He describes this moment as contemplation of beauty, assimilation to beauty, transformation into light 263. We are obviously talking about an experience that is both terrifying and joyful. Whoever saw it [this beauty], by some divine gift and inspiration, keeps inexplicable amazement (τὴν ἔκληξιν) in the secret of consciousness (ἐν τῷ ἀπορρήτῳ τῇς συνειδήσεως 264 ). At the same time, Gregory quite clearly indicates that the path to this goal means constant detachment from what has already been achieved, since it is “inferior to what is sought” 265. Does this also apply to the contemplation of beauty? Should it be left? Obviously not. On the one hand, because it itself leaves us, on the other, because it is no longer possible to rise above the speculative manifestation of the good itself, its very source. In beauty (and, apparently, only in it) one can see the primary, supreme good, in which all good things participate, but it itself is incomprehensible. Does pure good, visible in beauty, remain fundamentally unattainable? Or is the contemplation of beauty at the same time the contemplation of the good itself as beauty? This nuance is important for our study; Meanwhile, Gregory himself does not answer this question. But the saint tells us something no less remarkable, namely, that one can partake of the good only by ascending to its height, only with some correlation with its magnitude: We should not refuse the desire for this good on the basis that it is above our understanding (κατάληψις): on the contrary, the higher the sought-after object appears to us, the more we should rise in mind and be exalted along with the greatness of the sought-after (συνεπαίρεσθαι τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ ζητουμένου), so as not to be excluded from participation in this good. For there is a great danger (κίνδυνος γὰρ οὐ μικρός) due to the exceptional height and ineffability of the subject, of completely losing the idea of ​​it, if in our comprehension we do not rely on anything available to us 266 . It is precisely because of this that the “great danger” that Gregory warns about and to which he simultaneously calls his reader will actually be the topic of our next consideration: can – and if so, how – can the constantly moving human mind rise to the “magnitude of what is sought”, can – and if so, how – touch the goal that is constantly moving away from it. See above, ch. Life and works of Gregory, approx. 23. See above, ch. Life and works of Gregory, approx. 9. On the development of the topic of virginity in the first Christian centuries and the great passion for it in the Christian East and West, see P. Th. Camelot, “Les traités “De virginitate” au IVe siècle” // Études Carmelitaines, 31, 1952, p. 273–292. For the elements of diatribe in this treatise and its connection with other works of this genre, see G. Ch. Hansen, “Molestiae nuptiarum” // Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Universität Rostock, 12, 1963, p. 215–219. De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1,297, 24. De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1,298,10. ... έν τῷ αὐτεξουσίῳ τῆς προαιρέσεως (De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1,298, 12 and below). ... τῆς κακίας εὑρετὴς γενόμενος (De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1,298,18). See De virg. 12.2: GNO VIII/1, 298.16 and below. De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1,299.17 and below. ... τὴν φθαρτὴν καὶ πηλίνην εἰκόνα (De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1,300,1). ... τῆς θείας εἰκόνος... τῆς νῦν ἐν τῷ τῆς σαρκὸς ῥύπῳ κεκαλυμμένης (De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1, 302, 6 and below). ... τῶν νεκρῶν δερμάτων έπιβολή (De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1, 302, 9 and below). ... διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔξεστιν ἡμῖν παλινδρομήσασιν ἐπανελθεῖν (De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1,302.18 and below). De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1,302,20. De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1, 302, 20. On the understanding of the flesh as those “robes of skin” which, according to Gen. 3:21, covered the primordial nakedness - as a corruptible body - see already in Philo, Quaest. in Gen. 1.53; and also in Origen, Nota. in Lev. VI, 2: GCS, Origen VI, 362,14–19. However, Gregory - at least in his later works - understands by “leather vestments” not physicality in general, but only its “animal” component, including passions and mortality; see about this J. Daniélou, Platonisme, p. 60–65; aka, L’être, p. 154–164. ... ὁ γάμος παραμυθία τοῦ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐπενοήθη (De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1, 302.27). ... τῆς περὶ τὴν γῆν ταλαιπωρίας ἀναχωρῆσαι (De virg. 13: GNO VIII/1,303,12 and below). De virg. 13.1: GNO VIII/1, 303.15 and below. ... καθαρὸν δὲ καὶ ἀμιγὲς καὶ ἀμέτοχον τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν (De virg. 13.1: GNO VIII/1, 304, 5 and below); Gregory adopts this idea of ​​​​man’s return to original naturalness from Philo, see M. Harl, “Adam et les deux arbres du Paradis chez Philon d’Alexandrie” // Recherches de science religieuse, 50, 1962, p. 321–388. Cm. De virg. 13: GNO VIII/1, 304.12 and below. See De virg. 13: GNO VIII/1, 304, 15 – 305.9. Gregory’s understanding of marriage, even in the treatise On Virginity, is not as negative as one might expect: marriage, no matter how full of passions it may be, is still a “public service” (λειτουργία, De virg. 7: GNO VIII/1,284,8), see about this M. D. Hart, “Reconciliation of Body and Soul: Gregory of Nyssas Deeper Theology of Marriage” // Theological Studies, 51, 1990, p. 450–479. Cm. De virg. 13: GNO VIII/1, 305,10–22. Cm. De virg. 14: GNO VIII/1, 306, 19. Cm. De virg. 14: GNO VIII/1, 305.26 – 306, 21. This is what most interpreters think, see, for example, N. Urs von Balthasar, Présence, p. 88 and below; J. Daniélou, Platonisme, p. 52; N. Merki, Όμοίωσις θεῷ. Von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa, Freiburg i.d. Schweiz 1952, c. 138–164. The Alexandrian predecessors of Gregory had a slightly different idea of ​​​​the division of the sexes: for Philo, the difference between the sexes, together with physicality, refers only to the “aesthetic” (“sensory-perceptible”), and not the “noetic” (“speculative”) person (see De opif. mundi 134). Origen understands the difference between the sexes in man, created “in the image” of God (in Gen. 1:27), and not “molded from the dust of the ground” (in Gen. 2), as an anticipation of the future, or interprets it allegorically - as spirit and soul (see Notes in Gen. I, 13–15: GCS, Origen VI, 15–19). For both authors, see below, chap. About the structure of man, approx. 128. In this later work, On the Constitution of Man, Gregory interprets in more detail the emergence of the difference between the sexes: he distinguishes two human creations - as “the image of God” and “as male and female” (see Gen. 1:27). Both creations precede the fall and both, obviously, are already associated with corporeality, albeit spiritual corporeality, see about this F. Floeri, “Le sens de la “division des sexes chez Grégoire de Nysse”” // Revue des sciences religieuses, 27, 1953, p. 105–111; and below, chap. About the structure of man, section Man - the image of God and his current suffering, and ch. About the soul and resurrection, section Resurrection of the body. See De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1, 302.13. See Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. haer. III, 16.6: SC 211,313,210 – 315, 221. “... because the bound could not be broken in any other way than through the destruction of the connecting bonds, so that the first bonds are broken through the second, and the second in turn free the first. And it turned out that the first connection was resolved from the second connection, and the second served to resolve the first.” (Adv. haer. III, 22, 4: SC 211, 441, 72 – 443, 78). See entire passage III, 22, 3–4: SC 211,439–445. See De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1,300,10. See De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1,300,13. Cm. De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1,300.19. Cm. De virg. 12.3: GNO VIII/1,300.20. .... 300.24 and below). De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1,301.8. The Gospel text (Luke 15) does not mention a “widow,” but simply a “woman.” The source of Gregory's interpretation could be the interpretation of this parable by Methodius of Olympus, Symp. IX, 4, 248: SC 95,274,7–13; see about this M. Aubineau, Gréroire de Nysse, Traité de la virginité, p. 413, approx. 6. De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1, 301, 5. De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1, 301.10. De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1, 301.10 and below. See Luke 15:8: ζητεῖ ἐπιμελῶς (“seeks diligently”). De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1, 301.12. On “care of the soul” (ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλεια, resp. ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) see Plato, Apol. Socr. 29e-30b; in the spiritualized sense, see, for example, Philo, Contempl. 36; Ebr. 33. ... αἱ δὲ ... σύνοικοι τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις (De virg. 12: GNO VIII/1, 301.23). ... ἐγγινομένη διάθεσις, καὶ εἴ τινες ἄλλαι δυνάμεις εἰσὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν θεωρούμεναι (De virg. 12.3: GNO VIII/1,301, 24 – 302.1). ... πρὸς τὸ καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν βλέπωσι (De virg. 12.3: GNO VIII/1, 301.3). See Plotinus, Enn. I, 6 [1], 9, 7–15. De virg. 4.8: GNO VIII/1,276.15 and below. This image is also used by Philo, see Quis rer. div. her. 82; VitaMos. 1.29. ... τῆς ἐνδεχομένης μιμήσεως (De virg. 4.8: GNO VIII/1, 276.19 and below). De virg. 11.1: GNO VIII/1, 292, 10–15. De virg. 11: GNO VIII/1,292.24 and below. De virg. 6: GNO VIII/1, 281, 11. The soul is presented as “eternally mobile” (ἀεικίνητος) or “self-moving” (αὐτοκίνητος), in particular in Plato’s dialogue Phaedrus, see 245c5 (on this ambiguity in the manuscripts dialogue see L. Brisson, Platon, Phèdre, suivi de La pharmacie de Platon de J. Derrida, Paris 1989, pp. 208 and below, p. De virg. 6: GNO VIII/1,280, 19. De virg. 6.2: GNO VIII/1, 280, 9–281.15. De virg. 11: GNO VIII/1,293,17. ... μήτε μὴν ἀργὴν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κατακλείσαντας ἔχειν (De virg. 11: GNO VIII/1,293,17 and below). See De virg. 11: GNO VIII/1,293,20 – 294, 3. ... καταλιμπάνουσα (De virg. 11: GNO VIII/1,294, 3 and below). De virg. 11: GNO VIII/1, 294.12. De virg. 11: GNO VIII/1, 294, 17 et below. On the dove motif, see J. Daniélou, “La colombe et la ténèbre dans la mystique byzantine ancienne” // Eranos-Jahrbuch, 23,1954, p. 389–418, in particular p. 397 and below. See De virg. 11: GNO VIII/1, 294,19–26; 295.21. De virg. 11: GNO VIII/1,296, 3 and below. ... ὡς ἂν διὰ τοῦ ὁμοίου καταλάβοι τὸ ὅμοιον (De virg. 11.5: GNO VIII/1,296, 5 and below). De virg. 11.5: GNO VIII/1,296, 6 and below. De virg. 11: GNO VIII/1, 296, 7 and below. … ἐν τῇ μακαρίᾳ ἐκείνῃ ἐκστάσει (De virg. 10: GNO VIII/1,290, 5). De virg. 10.2: GNO VIII/1,290.19 and below. De virg. 10: GNO VIII/1, 290, 21. ... τὸ ... ἀειδὲς πάντη καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον καὶ πηλικότητος πάσης ἀλλότριον (De virg. 10: GNO VIII/1, 290.25–291.1). De virg. 10: GNO VIII/1, 290, 25. The context of this passage does not exclude the possibility that Gregory only means an aesthetic appearance. De virg. 10: GNO VIII/1, 291, 9. De virg. 10: GNO VIII/1, 289, 25 and below. Gregory’s addition that this is beauty “beyond all good” can be understood as the transcendence of beauty itself in relation to all good things, and not to the first good. Plotinus speaks very similarly about the good that is clothed with beauty (... πρὸ αὐτῆς ἔχουσαν), however, he does not indicate that beauty was outside the good, but on the contrary, that the good is “outside (ἐπέκεινα) beauty” or is identical to it (see Εnn. I, 6 [1], 9, 41 and below). A different opinion is shared by A. Meredith, according to which Gregory identifies beauty and good (see The Good). … ὀρθῶς ὁδεύσει τὴν πορείαν (De virg. 4: GNO VIII/1, 271, 26 – 272, 1). ... τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀλήθειαν (De virg. 4: GNO VIII/1,272,4 and below). De virg. 4: GNO VIII/1, 272.4 and below. … πρὸς τὸν ἄνω σκοπὸν (De virg. 4: GNO VIII/1, 272.14). See De virg. 4: GNO VIII/1,272.12 and below. ... τὴν ἀρετὴν ... οὐδεὶς ὅρος ἀνθρώπινος περιγράφει (De virg. 4: GNO VIII/1,268, 10 and below). De virg. 10.1: GNO VIII/1, 289, 13. Plotinus, Εnn, also speaks of “amazement” from the vision of beauty. 1.6 [1], 4.17; I, 6[1], 7, 14.17. See De virg. 11: GNO VIII/1, 294, 3 et below, cited above, note. 58. De virg. 10.2: GNO VIII/1,291.4–12.