Бесконечность Бога и бесконечный путь к Нему человека

To summarize the research we have undertaken, we will briefly describe the development of Gregory's ideas about God's and human infinity, in the form in which they are reconstructed on the basis of individual works, and we will mention several problems that seem unresolved. Epectasis of man and the incomprehensibility of God (“On Virginity”, “On the Beatitudes”) Already Gregory’s early work On Virginity quite clearly reveals the starting points of his idea of ​​infinity: on the one hand, this is a (neo)platonic ascent to beauty as an intelligible manifestation of good, a path from the sensory world through an indescribable ecstatic comprehension of “beauty around good”, which needs to be likened, towards a goal that ultimately eludes any achievement of it 1266. On the other hand, this is a “tourist metaphor” of traveling to a specific goal, requiring the traveler to move forward into the future, without being distracted by what is opening up to his gaze 1267. These two versions of the path have a common anthropological basis: the (Platonic) idea of ​​the human soul as a constant movement that must be turned in the right direction - forward or upward 1268. When it comes to the goal of movement, Gregory knows that it is devoid of shape, form and size 1269, that everything we find is always less than what we are looking for 1270. We can seek the goal only when we try to become “commensurate with what we are looking for” 1271, in constant excess of what we have already found. The idea of ​​epectasis has already been outlined in its infancy: awareness of the unattainability of the goal means skepticism regarding everything achieved and turns the invincible movement of the human soul into a constant overcoming of the lower in favor of the higher, the present in favor of the future. The motif of an ever-continuing path is also presented in great detail in Gregory's work On the Beatitudes, where anabasis is likened to climbing Jacob's ladder: each step that we have already reached becomes the starting point of the next step 1272. This extends to at least eight stages of ascent from bliss to bliss, meaning ever deeper likeness to the all-blessed God 1273. The movement of the human soul is described here as a run towards a goal 1274 or a courageous competition in the sense of a concentrated and decisive turn forward 1275. New Testament verse Phil. 3:12 and subsequent ones, which are given here verbatim 1276, have another meaning: Gregory refers to the incessant striving forward, which the Apostle speaks of, polemicizing with the idea of ​​saturation or satiety with virtues 1277. Each achievement on the path of virtue brings an increase in thirst, not its quenching. At the same time, efforts to achieve virtue are in no way similar to “pursuing one’s own shadow,” which can never be grasped 1278: hunger for virtue (for Gregory, this is the New Testament “hunger for righteousness,” see Matt. 5:6) can be satisfied, but this saturation always causes new hunger 1279. The dialectic of saturation and hunger, developed here by Gregory, is the next important element of his theory of epectasis. As in the treatise On Virginity, we are not yet talking about an explicit idea of ​​​​human infinity, but rather about the dynamics of constant advancement and overcoming. Therefore, God - the goal of the human path - is also called here not so much infinite as incomprehensible, invisible, without size, quantity, quality, type, space and time, and in this sense “exceeding any boundaries” 1280. Only “the impossibility of comprehending what we are looking for gives some idea of ​​His greatness,” says Gregory 1281. In the works On Virginity and On the Beatitudes, therefore, we see the first, embryonic phases of Gregory’s idea of ​​​​God’s and human infinity: awareness of God’s incomprehensibility and the idea of ​​the human soul as a constant movement forward and upward - towards the incomprehensible God. However, such a movement towards a constantly receding goal can bring one closer to it only under the condition of constantly overcoming everything achieved, i.e. epectasis - incessant greed and thirst for truth, allowing neither rest nor final saturation. Human life as a diastema and adiastematic Deity (“On the Inscription of the Psalms”, “Accurate Interpretation We find new important motives in Gregory’s treatise On the Inscription of Psalms. Like both previous treatises, this treatise is also devoted to the theme of spiritual anabasis 1282, the five parts of which, corresponding to the five parts of the biblical Psalter, reproduce the same structure of appeal from the actual present to aspiration and from aspiration to the eschatological future 1283. This future itself appears to Gregory as an interval, a diastema, the content of which is a continuous growth of bliss: in other words, it is also a kind of anabasis 1284. But in addition, from the treatise we learn that God “embraces” or “contains” the entire eternal interval, which gives the beginning and boundaries to everything that happens in time, embracing even human eternity, that “eternal extension”, the end of which is “infinity” 1285. Here we first encounter the idea of ​​human life as an extension without end, which corresponds to the idea of ​​the human soul as a constant movement. Human life as extension (diastema or paratasis) is also a key theme in Gregory’s conversations on the Book of Ecclesiastes. Everything that happens happens within a time frame; a person is also given a certain period of time 1286, but he tends to forget about this, plunging into the present. Only virtue takes us beyond this gap, directing us towards the future. The only alternative to wandering in circles is the straight path of virtue 1287. In Solomon's Accurate Interpretation of Ecclesiastes, Gregory does not specify whether the diastematic character of human life changes after death—and if so, how. It primarily speaks of man's search for and discovery of God. As in his earlier works, in his Accurate Interpretation of Ecclesiastes Gregory expresses the conviction that God can only be found in the constant overcoming of what is found, i.e. in further search: there is no other acquisition except the search itself 1288. In these conversations apophatic and even sigetic 1289 motifs are extremely expressively presented. The Divinity, which transcends every human thought and every concept, can best be known precisely as the unknowable and is best designated by silence 1290. However, unlike, for example, the sermons on the Beatitudes, Gregory here does not simply mention the epectatic path of constant self-overcoming, but introduces this motif in an expanded form. The diastematic character of the created mind does not allow it to be adequate to what is not contained in the interval. Everything that the created mind knows, it always knows diastematically: firstly, it is not able to renounce thinking in temporary categories; secondly, he comprehends everything as a limited interval 1291. However, no one can ever leave “all the time” behind; a part of it always remains ahead 1292. Therefore, we cannot avoid the diastematic way of cognition even in relation to individual limited phenomena 1293. Anyone who tries to do this will be like a climber who would look for support for his leg in the abyss 1294: he will fall out of his boundaries and sink into oblivion 1295. In addition to this thoughtful apophatic concept, thematizing human diastematicity and God's adiastematicity, in Gregory's Accurate Interpretation of Ecclesiastes we also find the motive of good, which cannot be satiated, since each new acquisition only deepens the thirst 1296. If in his treatise On the Beatitudes the saint rejected the idea of ​​being satiated with virtue, now Gregory speaks of a good that can never be satiated. Otherwise, Gregory develops the thoughts already expressed in the treatise On the Beatitudes, again describing the dialectic of saturation and thirst, which does not allow quenching. In this understanding of human infinity, Solomon's precise interpretation of Ecclesiastes comes close to the treatises On the Beatitudes and On the Inscription of Psalms, but differs from them in a much deeper understanding of the diastematic character of man as a justification for the unknowability of the adiastematic Deity. The adiastematic Deity appears unlimited, but is primarily conceptualized in a distinctly apophatic context: unlimitedness presupposes mainly unknowability. The initial pleroma of creation and its unfolding over time (“About the structure of man”, “About Shestodneva”) From a slightly different perspective, the motif of human life as a diastema is developed in the treatise On the Structure of Man. Here Gregory outlines the image of a certain primordial timeless equal-angelic pleroma called “man” (man as the image and likeness of God according to Genesis 1:26). In anticipation of the Fall, God additionally “creates” time (possibly) and the difference between the sexes as an “alternative” way of reproducing the human race (man as man and woman according to Gen. 1:27 and Gen. 2) 1297. In the creation of time (the extent of human history 1298), actualized as a result of the Fall (Gen. 3), Gregory sees a way out of the unfortunate situation, a “substitute” way of supplementing the initially conceived number of souls, an alternative way of actualizing in individual human beings the image of God, which has not yet been manifested in them at the embryonic phase of their existence 1299. When human history, set into motion by the cosmic disaster of the Fall, ends, time will again condense into timelessness 1300, and human essences will once again unite into a corporeal, but nevertheless sexless human pleroma. The question that remains unanswered is whether—and if so, how—this idea of ​​an eschatological return to the original pleroma is consistent with the idea of ​​an endless human diastema. Moreover, in his treatise on the structure of man, Gregory describes human life within the diastema of time as a constant movement. Moreover, this applies not so much to the constant changes and changes of bodily life 1301 as to the spiritual movement, which can be voluntarily turned either to good or to evil. If the movement towards good is constantly directed forward, since its goal is unlimited, then the movement towards evil gets bogged down in it more and more until it reaches the bottom, “the full measure of evil,” and then it will inevitably turn to good 1302. In this passage, for the first time, the idea is heard that limitlessness is a characteristic that belongs exclusively to good, as opposed to evil. In the treatise on the structure of man, it is also noteworthy that man is likened to God on the basis of the incomprehensibility of the human mind, which is incomprehensible even to itself, just as God is incomprehensible 1303. In addition to the apophatic moment already known to us, Gregory’s conviction about the self-transcendence of the human mind, which corresponds to the transcendence of God in relation to the universe, is evident here. In this text, Gregory rejects the “pagan fabrications” about man as a “microcosm” 1304 since this teaching in its Stoic version clearly does not embrace human transcendence as a simulacrum of the transcendence of God. Gregory's treatise On the Sixth Day introduces his anthropology into a broader cosmological context. Not only the bodily life of a person, but the entire material cosmos is a constant movement 1305, a continuous transition from one element to another based on the general qualities of lightness, cold and dryness for individual pairs of elements 1306. The visible world, according to Gregory, was created in the course of a two-level cosmogenesis, including (1) creation “in possibility” and (2) implementation in time 1307. This two-level cosmogenesis corresponds, at least structurally, to (1) the original human pleroma and (2) its unfolding in human history. Moreover, the description of this primordial creation “in possibility” oscillates between the idea of ​​an undifferentiated mixture of individual elements, which are gradually to be distinguished 1308, and the idea of ​​​​the creation of intelligible qualities, the confluence of which creates the material universe 1309. Gregory’s universe is limited by the “vault” of the heavens 1310, therefore, it is not unlimited in space (although the saint indicates, obviously hyperbolically, that the sphere of the fixed stars is “infinitely” removed from the earth 1311). Therefore, the endless movement in it can only be circular, whether we are talking about the circulation of fire and the celestial bodies that arose from it 1312, or about the endless cyclic transformation of elements, which Gregory contrasts with Vasily’s idea of ​​​​the final ekpirosis of the world 1313. In Gregory’s cosmology one can speak about the “eternity” of the world only in the sense of a time interval that includes the entire time of the created world 1314. Be that as it may, man, on the one hand, belongs to this cyclical movement, but on the other hand, he can, following the example of the Apostle Paul, strive “to the foreground” (see Phil. 3:136), thereby overcoming the boundaries of sensory nature towards speculative reality 1315. Unlimited movement of love Gregory's dialogue On the Soul and Resurrection is based on the idea of ​​the transcendence of the human mind in relation to the sensory world. An important role in this “Christian Phaedo” is played by the idea of ​​the constant movement inherent in the soul. The movement towards infinite good, which has no end, which we have already encountered in the treatise on the structure of man, is here divided into two parts. (1) In earthly life, human nature is directed towards good, which it constantly lacks. This is a movement of thirst (or hope). (2) In the eschatological movement of love, the soul becomes like the insatiable love of God and, thus, grows in the good to which it already participates. The movement of love, according to Gregory, has no limit, since, on the one hand, infinite good cannot be exhausted, on the other hand, the abilities of the soul constantly increase with increasing participation in infinite good, so that they can never be fully “fulfilled”, they will never know satiety and cooling 1316. In the dialogue On the Soul and Resurrection, God appears as an infinite good, not limited by opposition, and therefore “increasing to limitlessness” 1317. Moreover, God knows Himself and treats Himself as an infinite good with inexhaustible and insatiable love 1318. So, in Gregory’s concept of the eschatological movement of love, the idea of ​​the human soul as an endless movement was for the first time consistently associated with the motive of infinity in God, with the idea of ​​infinity as an unlimited good. In contrast to the previous, rather apophatic concept of an incomprehensible God, Whom must be approached along the path of constant self-overcoming, Gregory now proceeds from the unlimited good in God, as well as from God’s and human love, insatiably striving for this good. But to the extent that everything is present before God at once 1319, His love differs from human love, which is associated with movement and growth. Infinity as the absence of end In his most famous systematic work - a polemic with the neo-Arian Eunomius - Gregory reveals the question of infinity in the most detail. In particular, he combines two previously developed motives: on the one hand, human diastematicity and God's adiastematicity and, on the other hand, the doctrine of God as an infinite good and of human participation in it, which also has no restrictions. Eunomius’s assertion that the essence of God can be exhaustively and exclusively expressed by the concept “unborn/uncreated” 1320 provokes the protest of Gregory (who relies on Basil, who began and led the polemic before him) in particular on three points, which deny that: (1) any word of human speech can name God’s essence; (2) human words generally express the essence of things; (3) “unborn/uncreated” is the most adequate name of God. Moreover, further elaboration of these three points leads Gregory (1) to a consistent thinking through the incomprehensibility of God for human thinking and language; (2) to the development of the theory of human words and human language, in particular, the language about God; and, finally (3) to new reflections on the concept of God's infinity. God's nature, unlimited, devoid of any dimensions, cannot be comprehended by diastematic human thinking or described in words, as we already know from Solomon's precise interpretation of Ecclesiastes. Now Gregory is developing this teaching in more detail. Between the uncreated Deity and the created mind, in his opinion, there is a “huge and insurmountable mediastinum” 1321, an endless abyss of difference separating them. The presence of this “abyss of otherness” in no way limits or defines its Creator Himself, who is alien to any diastematicity. However, this same interval fundamentally determines the created world, being embedded in its very structure: all creation is initially associated with a diastema of otherness, difference from the uncreated Divinity. The fundamental diastematic character of the created world is also manifested in the fact that it as a whole and each individual creation in it represents a certain ontological diastema - something separated by boundaries from other things. In addition, diastematicity brings with it extension in time: the existence of the created world is not simultaneous. It's historical. In addition (although Gregory mentions this only in passing), the entire diastematic creation has a spatial character. But temporal and spatial diastematicity is just a consequence of the fundamental distance of otherness, which grounds identity and difference, i.e. mutual limitation of created things 1322. Diastematicity, inherent in all creation, according to Gregory, also characterizes the created mind, both human and angelic or demonic: after all, it has a beginning, although there is no end 1323. As we already know from Solomon’s Accurate Interpretation of Ecclesiastes, the human mind cannot renounce its diastematicity even in the freest cognitive activity: everything it comprehends is always cognized in a historical perspective, as temporal extension. Therefore, his knowledge of the adiastematic Deity, in which there is neither historicity, nor extension, nor perspective, can never be adequate 1324. Such a distinction, however, is not a reason for Gregory to develop a “technology” of apophatic theology, like his Arian colleagues, 1325 or to fall into pure sigetics [refusal of saying], denying the possibility of any judgment about God. Gregory, unlike Eunomius, does not believe that words are of divine origin and can express the essence of things 1326. However, the saint does not belittle the role of language - as a purely human attempt to comprehend the world around us 1327 - for human cognition and human culture 1328. The attempt to speak about God is of exceptional importance for a person; but such an attempt should not be too ambitious: it is impossible for man to comprehend the incomprehensible God in His essence. Any statement that serves this purpose describes, at best, only the human experience of God, in other words, God's actions 1329. Gregory tries to reconcile the contradiction between the inevitable diastematicity of human cognition, which is always forced to choose a certain perspective, and the simple adiastematicity of the Divine, in Whom the simultaneous completeness of everything is contained, and therefore there is no perspective, resorting to a multiplicity of perspectives and ways of speaking. To get closer to the inexplicable Divinity, it is necessary to correlate one statement with others, mutually complementing them 1330. Consequently, even Eunomius’s statement about God’s “ungeneracy/uncreatedness,” according to Gregory, cannot in any way express the essence of God, much less in any exceptional way, as the neo-Arians insist. Basil already noted that “unbornness/uncreatedness” presupposes only the absence of a beginning; this perspective, however, must be complemented by the absence of an end, “immortality” (lack of disappearance 1331) or “incompleteness” 1332. This “dividing eternity in two” clearly contains a certain anthropomorphism, as Eunomius reacts ironically 1333; but precisely this, by its diastematic nature, is the human view of the eternity of God, which man is unable to think about otherwise than in the sense of infinite temporal extension, infinite past and infinite future 1334. The infinity of God, for Gregory, is not a reason to welcome the multiplication of perspectives or theological discourses. However, in his polemic with Eunomius, the saint takes advantage of two unique advantages of this position: (a) on the one hand, this is a statement that applies equally to all three Divine Persons (as opposed to “unborn/uncreated”); (b) on the other hand, it is closest to man as a being, by nature oriented towards the future. (a) The expression “ungeneracy/uncreatedness” (in Greek before the Arian polemic) from the point of view of Nicene orthodoxy is ambiguous: it can and cannot be applied to the Divine Logos as the Second Hypostasis of the Divinity: He, on the one hand, is uncreated as uncreated, and on the other hand, he is born from the First Hypostasis 1335. Therefore, Gregory is not satisfied with this term as a definitive statement about the Divine. So, Gregory is looking for another concept that could be applied to all three Divine Hypostases equally, and finds it precisely in the concept of God’s infinity. His train of thought is roughly as follows: God transcends the realm of opposites. He is infinitely good and unchangeable: therefore His goodness is unlimited 1336. Since God is completely simple, He not only participates in goodness, but is also infinitely good in His essence 1337. Therefore, God is also unlimited in His essence 1338. These reflections (on the basis of contemporary orthodoxy to Gregory) can be applied to all three Divine Persons, each of which can be spoken of as infinite. The concept of infinity (at least according to Gregory) does not allow for differences in power: therefore, all three Hypostases are equal 1339. One may wonder why Gregory chose “infinity” as the key statement about the Divinity, and was not satisfied, for example, with “perfect goodness,” the attribution of which to all three Hypostases is a prerequisite for his thoughts. Obviously, there are several possible answers here. Firstly, “perfect goodness” does not necessarily exclude the distinction of levels: a thing can be completely good within its boundaries, and at the same time be less than another thing (remember the example given by Gregory with the maximum filled volume of the lungs, which, however, do not contain all the air 1340). Gregory's reflections should rather have proceeded from “omnibenevolence.” The apophatic statement - “unlimited goodness” - has the advantage that, on the one hand, it cannot be surpassed, on the other hand, of course, it can be expressed repeatedly. The transition from “unlimited goodness” to “infinity” is obviously possible due to the simplicity of God; in addition, it is consonant with Gregory’s conviction that only good can be unlimited, while evil, having reached its bottom, is forced to return back to good, as we know from the treatise on the structure of man. The apophatic connotations of statements about the infinity of God are not without meaning. Infinity or boundlessness, the absence of boundaries, is the true basis and cause of God's incomprehensibility, which Gregory energetically emphasized already in his earliest works and to which he pays special attention in his polemic with Eunomius. And in this polemic, Gregory’s argument is focused on the fact that the only possible knowledge of God is constant detachment from already acquired ideas and concepts 1341. However, Gregory notes that his choice of the concept “infinity” also implied something else. (b) “Infinity” in the sense of the absence of end has a special value in the eyes of a being directed to the future 1342. For diastematic human knowledge, directed to the future, God's beginningless and endless adiastematic eternity appears, first of all, as the absence of an end. Of course, God as unlimited good embraces all the time of the world in general, but the key point here is that He always exceeds every step forward that a living being can take towards Him. Therefore, He constantly eludes all the efforts of human thought, but always leaves the opportunity to move further “into the foreground,” without in any way limiting the desire of a diastematic being to know Him. In Gregory's polemic with Eunomius, one can discern a threefold understanding of unlimitedness/infinity: (1) the absence of limits, implying incomprehensibility; (2) the adiastematic eternity of God; (3) diastematic eternity, which has a historical character characteristic of the diastematic mind and everything that it knows - in the categories of such eternity, the created mind, due to its own limitations, is forced to think about God (for example, infinity in the sense of unlimited good or the absence of end). (“On the Life of Moses the Lawgiver”, "An Accurate Exposition of the Song of Solomon" Perhaps Gregory's most striking work, On the Life of Moses the Lawgiver, is dedicated to the specifics of Christian spirituality. Here the saint, on the one hand, relies on the apophatic and epectatic ideas of his early works, on the other hand, he clarifies the concept of infinity, which he developed in polemics with Eunomius. However, the saint addresses the anti-Arian arguments themselves here only to a small extent. The key concept of the entire work is “virtue”; Through the prism of this category, Gregory sets out here the concept of infinity that he developed. The perfection of virtue, unlike all other things, has not a limited, but an unlimited character: the boundaries of virtue are only the absence of boundaries 1343. In Gregory’s universe, as we already know, the characteristic of limitlessness belongs exclusively to the Supreme Good - God Himself. Gregory unequivocally states that perfect, unlimited virtue is the infinite God Himself 1344. Man, as a diastematic being, can approach this perfection only by constantly overcoming everything that he has already achieved, in other words, by epectasis. Gregory shows this in detail using the example of three theophanies that Moses was honored with: in the light of the burning bush, God appears to Moses as “true being” 1345; Sinai darkness means that God can only be seen in ignorance 1346; finally, the epiphany in the cleft of the rock implies that God can only be seen in the constant abandonment of what has been achieved, in a constant thirst that never reaches quenching 1347. A diastematic being can approach God’s adiastematic infinity only in non-stop movement. This line of thought apparently does not correspond to the conclusion of the treatise, where Gregory calls Moses “the household of God” 1348 or “the friend of God” 1349. However, perhaps the saint represents here perfect human virtue - this unceasing movement - as an endless, inexhaustible relationship between man and God, which can have neither end nor complete saturation, since the Divinity always remains different from humanity 1350. The diastema of difference, separating the created from the uncreated, at the same time creates an attraction between them, which will never be “saturated” with fusion. This motif is most clearly formulated where it is least expected - for example, in the erotic metaphors of the Exact Exposition of the Song of Solomon. However, here Gregory focuses not on the marital union of the Bridegroom-Logos with the Bride-Soul, but on the wanderings of the Bride, who finds the Bridegroom precisely because He constantly avoids her 1351. Gregory speaks of “gaining by faith”: to know that God exists is possible only by renouncing attempts to know what God is 1352. Like Gregory's early exegetical texts, the discourses on the Song of Songs are subordinated to a single script of spiritual anabasis, consisting of many separate steps, where the achievement of one means a transition to the next 1353. Metaphors of love 1354 and intoxication 1355 allow him to reproduce the dialectic of hunger and saturation 1356: the thirst of the soul only increases with each quenching 1357 as it gains the ability to contain more. Indeed, on its way to a good that constantly exceeds it, the soul seems to be “continually being created” 1358. She again and again encounters the diastema of the difference between created and uncreated: no matter how great her participation in the uncreated, it still never abolishes her diastematic character. This movement, according to Gregory, continues literally “forever and ever” 1359 - throughout the endless diastema of human life. In both of these unsurpassed works on the topic of Christian spirituality - On the Life of Moses the Lawgiver and An Accurate Exposition of the Song of Solomon - Gregory returns to discussions about epectasis, which fascinated him in his youth. The saint again examines spiritual anabasis, which implies the endless overcoming of everything achieved, again polemicizes with the idea of ​​satiety with virtue or saturation with good, which would make final satisfaction possible, and again emphasizes the unattainability of what is sought. The analysis of human diastematicity and God's adiastematic infinity, carried out in the Accurate Interpretation of Ecclesiastes of Solomon and in the Refutation of Eunomius, as well as the understanding of the human path as a movement of unlimited love for unlimited good, formulated in the dialogue On the Soul and Resurrection and developed in the Refutation of Eunomius, now gives this spiritual intuition the character of a deeply thought-out concept. In conclusion, I would like to touch on several topics that, it seems, are not fully explained by Gregory. According to researchers, they all have a direct or indirect relation to Gregory’s polemics with his great Alexandrian predecessor Origen, whose work should have been very familiar to him. This is (1) a polemic with the idea of ​​satiety of the soul, (2) the question of Self-reflection of the infinite God, (3) the human eschatological path without end. Controversy with the idea of satiety Polemics with the idea of satiety of the soul with virtue or goodness run like a red thread through the works of Gregory - from interpretations of the Beatitudes to an accurate explanation of the Song of Solomon. In the dialogue On the Soul and Resurrection, Gregory directly denies the possibility of satisfying intra-Trinitarian love in God Himself. The idea of ​​epectasis, which Gregory contrasts with the idea of ​​satiety of the soul, has one of its main sources in this polemic. The question remains unresolved as to what exactly was the motive for the controversy itself. E. von Ivanka is convinced that Gregory’s polemics are aimed against Origen and his teaching about the initial satiation of souls with contemplation, the consequence of which supposedly was the development and cyclical repetition of the cosmic process in 1360 (as we already know, the anti-Origen anathematisms of the 6th century actually quote Origen’s thought that the soul fell, “satiated with divine contemplation” 1361; translated Rufina mentions “satiation with good” 1362). The following can be pointed out against this: firstly, there is no complete certainty that Origen really put this meaning into the concept of “satiation” (see M. Harl 1363); secondly, Origen himself was familiar with the idea of ​​​​the endless path of the soul, similar to the epectasis of Gregory (cf. Ronald E. Heine 1364). Reading into the thought of Origen (as translated by Rufinus), we will see that Origen speaks of an initial gradual decline caused by “satiation” (satietas), or “neglect” (neglegentia 1365), not in connection with the repetition of the cosmic cycle, but to induce souls to an ever-growing, never ceasing, never satisfied thirst 1366 - in which case, he means that the same as Gregory! Even later anti-Origen anathematisms obviously condemn not so much the idea of ​​negligence of the soul as the cause of the fall, but the very idea of ​​the original incorporeal existence of souls (ψυχάς), which only because of their “cooling (ἀποψυγείσας) in the love of God” fell into bodies 1367. M. Arles suggests that the Neoplatonists gave the term “satiation” the meaning of a “technical term”, making it unacceptable to Gregory 1368. T. Boehm emphasizes the Neoplatonic use of this term, incompatible with Gregory's concept of unquenchable thirst 1369. Let us consider the idea of ​​“completeness” as it is presented by Plotinus, whose quite close acquaintance with the tests of Gregory is quite likely 1370. In Plato's dialogue Cratylus we find an allegorical etymologization of the three generations of the main male deities of Hesiod's theogony: Uranus, Kronos and Zeus. The name of Kronos, the god who devours and retains his own creations, is derived from κόρος (“satiety” and “purity” of the mind 1371). Plotinus interprets this myth in the light of the three hypostases of his universe: Kronos corresponds to the Mind (νοῦς), which comes from the One, and from Kronos, in turn, comes the World Soul 1372. In perfect inner completeness 1373 the Mind contains the universe of ideas 1374 . Such a “satiated” introspection of thinking represents, however, only one side of Plotinus’s Mind. The second moment is his love for the One (νοῦς ἐρῶν), in which the Mind, “intoxicated with nectar,” “is completely given over to this bliss to the point of satiety” (ἁπλωθεὶς εἰς εὐπάθειαν τῷ κόρῳ), loses prudence and becomes completely loving and contemplating the One (ἐκεῖνον βλέπειν), and therefore one (ἕν ἐστι) 1375. At the same time, Plotinus tries to personify the concept of “satiety” (or “intoxication”) as a filling that occurs from the outside, resorting to another image of Plato’s mythology from the dialogue Symposium - the image of Poros, who drank nectar at the celebration of the birth of Aphrodite and fell asleep in order to give birth to Eros with Singing (Poverty) 1376. Plotinus connects this motif with Plato’s, in the dialogue Phaedrus 1377, with the myth of the fall of souls and describes how some souls contemplating beauty cannot withstand the intoxication of this fullness and are turned away 1378. I am in no way going to claim that Gregory was familiar with all these places and that he deliberately polemicized with Plotinus. However, I think it is important to note what connotations the idea of ​​“satiation” carried in Gregory’s era. If we look at this teaching from the point of view of the ideas of Gregory, we will see that Gregory contrasts his epectasis not so much with the primary saturation of the soul, leading to the initial fall, but rather with the final satiety, which would mean the completion of the entire path - Plotinus’s “satiation” or “intoxication” of the mind, which goes beyond its boundaries and touches the One 1379. Then the “satiation” that Gregory’s epectasis opposes does not consist in a return to the beginning and a repeated fall (although Gregory polemicizes with Origen’s idea of ​​pre-existence and transmigration of souls, in this regard he says nothing about repeated satiation 1380); rather, it consists of "reunion" as the overcoming of the differences between the diastematic soul and the adiastematic Deity. The question remains unresolved in what sense Gregory, in his “Christian Phaedo,” denies complete saturation in God Himself 1381. Does he mean only that the Divine, the relationship within Whom is expressed as love, can never be disappointed in Itself? With this question we move on to the next topic. On the issue of Self-Knowledge of God, some researchers also contrast Gregory and Origen 1382. Origen (at least according to the anti-Origen anathematism of Emperor Justinian) claims that “if the power of God were infinite, it could not think of itself, since the infinite is incomprehensible in its nature” 1383. This idea, if Origen really expressed it, apparently so confused his translator Rufinus that he tried to soften it by talking about the necessary limitations of created things, which God could not otherwise control 1384. Indeed, already according to Aristotle, infinity cannot be actualized in thinking 1385; obviously, for the same reason, Aristotle’s God as pure thinking cannot be infinite (νόησις νοήσεως 1386). If Gregory claims the opposite, does he think that the infinite God does not comprehend Himself in thought? This would seem to be indicated by Gregory’s remark in his treatise On the Constitution of Man that the human mind is like God in that it cannot comprehend itself, just as God cannot be comprehended 1387. However, Gregory does not speak directly about the Self-reflection of God, but only about the comprehension of Him by the human mind. In the dialogue On the Soul and Resurrection, the saint asserts that God, the unlimited good, knows Himself by His unquenchable love 1388. Thus, the God of Gregory, at least according to the “Christian Phaedo,” knows Himself. However - and this scandalous fact is emphasized by Charalambos Apostolopoulos 1389 - He never fully comprehends Himself, but always exceeds Himself 1390, He eludes Himself, as well as from the human mind. Apparently, this is contradicted by Gregory’s statement in the same dialogue that God is “the fullness of good” and He does not need anything, and therefore in Him there is no movement of love or remembrance, in Him there is the simultaneous presence of everything 1391. Perhaps this partly unsatisfactory conclusion will become somewhat clearer in the light of Gregory's consideration of the diastematic method of human knowledge in the Accurate Interpretation of Ecclesiastes of Solomon and in the Refutation of Eunomius. Here Gregory explains that the human mind can never conceive of God's adiastematic unlimitedness except in an endless diastematic history - or as uncertainty in the apophatic sense. Obviously, it is here that Gregory gives us the key to his idea of ​​​​the Deity, which constantly exceeds Itself in the movement of unquenchable love: this description from his Phaedo represents only the diastematic attempt of the diastematic mind to express the adiastematic unlimitedness of the Deity. What do these reflections mean for our original question about Divine Self-Reflection? There are two possibilities: 1) the unlimited God fully knows Himself, in the sense of reflexive identity, but the created mind is able to imagine this only in the diastematic image of unquenched love; 2) the adiastematically unlimited God in the full sense of the word does not comprehend Himself, and only the diastematic mind in a simple perspective in some way tries to become like this idea of ​​Him. Obviously, the only way for the diastematic mind to conceive of adiastematic infinity is the combination of all infinite histories at the same time, or even the reflexive self-embracing of all infinite histories in their simultaneity. One thing is unclear: in this attempt, which is the last mental self-overcoming, how can the diastematic mind touch adiastematicity while maintaining its own diastematic character? Gregory really knows that if the diastematic mind left the soil of diastematicity, it would disappear into oblivion, in other words, it would abolish itself. Awareness of the “gap” between the created and the uncreated, which is “impossible to cross,” does not allow the saint to jump over this abyss. Perhaps this is why Gregory believes that the created mind cannot fully comprehend itself (and thus abolish its diastematicity). However, if the created mind cannot emerge from its diastematicity even in the act of self-transcending reflection, there is no need for any reason why reflective self-awareness is supposed to be in the adiastematic God. If the path of assimilation to the adiastematic Deity is not mental Self-knowledge, but a continuous path forward, then God Himself appears rather as a constant Self-transcendence without end, rather than an act of perfect reflection. The most that can be said about God, according to Gregory, is to describe the human experience of Him 1392. If this observation of ours is correct, then on the question of God’s Self-reflection Gregory differs significantly not only from Origen, but also from the traditions of Western theology, which, based on Augustine, presupposes in God perfect Self-awareness, multiplied by the Trinitarian perichoresis 1393 of the Divine Persons 1394. Of course, this is not a matter of deliberate polemics, as in the case of Gregory’s categorically rejected idea of ​​satiety, but rather of an unthematized premise of Gregory’s thinking. Eschatological infinity of man The last of the questions posed above concerns a certain inconsistency in Gregory’s statements about the eschatological destiny of man. In this study we came across two slightly different ideas: in particular, in the treatise On the Constitution of Man, Gregory speaks of an original timeless pleroma of equal angels, in which human history, once launched by ill-fated human choice, will eventually be abolished. However, in other works (in the dialogue On the Soul and Resurrection and in the Exact Explanation of the Song of Solomon), Gregory, on the contrary, shows that human life, even from an eschatological perspective, remains a movement and growth that occurs in a certain diastema, albeit one that extends to infinity. This inconsistency is very noticeable in the treatise On the Inscription of Psalms, where Gregory seems to express both theses simultaneously: human nature in the triumphant eschatological blow of the cymbals must again return to the angelic 1395, and yet the eschatological destiny of man is presented here as an endlessly continuing growth 1396. The idea of ​​that original pleroma, which unfolded in time as a result of ill-fated human choice and must return to its original state during the eschatological “renewal of everything” (apocatastasis), is reminiscent of the protology of 1397 and the eschatology of Origen of 1398. At the same time, Gregory resists not only the idea of ​​​​the pre-existence of souls, which “like some kind of society, according to special regulations, exist on their own” 1399, but also the idea of ​​metempsychosis 1400. Both theories appear in him as “Hellenic teachings” or even “Hellenic fornication” 1401, supported by Origen 1402. This suggests that the idea of ​​the endless eschatological growth of man, which we find in some of Gregory's writings, is used either as a form of anti-Origenian polemic 1403, or as an attempt to reinterpret Origenism on the basis of fourth-century Christian orthodoxy 1404. A detailed analysis of Gregory's polemics with Origen's eschatology shows that Gregory opposes Origen's teaching not so much to the idea of ​​epectasis, but rather to the doctrine of the unity of soul and body, which belongs to it from the very beginning of 1405 until the coming resurrection as a “spiritual body” (see 1 Cor. 15:44) 1406. Contrary to the theory of metempsychosis, Gregory also points out that the change of bodies can have an exclusively downward tendency, and therefore will never lead to an eschatological renewal of the entire creation: how can one imagine that an unreasonable animal or even a tree would again move through virtue to the original heavenly homeland of souls 1407? And even if this were possible - which would imply higher moral qualities in wood than in the immaterial soul - this would mean “a certain circle” of virtues and vices, where good and evil will eventually mix into an “indistinguishable mixture” 1408. If Gregory so decisively insists on the simultaneous origin of the soul and its body, then how does he imagine the original and eschatological human pleroma, in which all people dwell “as in one body” 1409, but at the same time “like angels” 1410? It is very likely that this is a fairly direct analogy to matter created “in possibility,” as Gregory describes it in his cosmogony. There is even a similar lack of clarity as to whether we are talking about a purely speculative, incorporeal pleroma, or about some kind of material, albeit undifferentiated completeness. The only difference is that in relation to the human pleroma, Gregory assumes a two-level creation: to the original “image of God” only at the second stage is added the distinction of the sexes and time in possibility - time condensed, not yet unfolded into history. But how does this pleroma relate to the endless eschatological path of a person who will never reach the goal and come to complete saturation with good? Gregory obviously did not ask this question, and therefore any attempt to find a consensus of both concepts, if possible at all, remains only a speculative hypothesis. The two descriptions of man's eschatological destiny obviously differ primarily in their perspectives. If the path without end or unquenchable love describes human immortality or infinity as unlimited history from the point of view of a diastematic being, then the image of the pleroma shows what the simultaneous full actualization of all the individual infinite histories participating in God's eternity would be. Probably, it would be a kind of Plotinian Mind, which is the timeless fullness of ideas. However, this pleroma differs from the adiastematic Deity Himself, being only His “image” 1411 (so the Plotinian Mind, as a set of ideas, differs from the One, whose image it is 1412). Through the simultaneous, timeless actualization of all endless stories, the adiastematic Deity is reflected in the human pleroma, and this pleroma develops in human history, on the basis of human choice, into separate endless stories of human lives. Thus, we find here a threefold infinity: (1) the adiastematic unlimitedness of the Divine Himself, (2) His image in the timeless, instantly actualized totality of all infinite histories, constituting a certain mediastinum of the diastematic and adiastematic 1413, as well as (3) the endless history of the human path, which, although it has a beginning, has no end. At the same time, the irresistible human diastematicity is due, as we already know, to the insurmountable diastematic difference between the created and the uncreated. From the perspective of this diastema, Gregory understands the eschatological likening of man to the infinite God exclusively as unquenchable love or a path without end. It is the endless path that makes man like the infinite God, although it never deprives him of his diastematic character. It is obvious that Gregory did not try to systematize his teaching about the irresistible human diastematicity in all details. It is also obvious, however, that his deep and radical understanding of man as a being of time and change, a being turned by his very dispensation to the future, is unique and practically unsurpassed by anyone in the history of all Christian thinking. See De virg. 10–11: GNO VIII/1, 289–296; see about this above, chap. About virginity, section Ascent to beauty. See De virg. 4: GNO VIII/1, 271 ff; see above, Ibid. See De virg. 6: GNO VIII/1, 280 ff; see above, Ibid. See De virg. 10: GNO VIII/1, 290, 25 – 291, 1; see above, Ibid. See De virg. 11: GNO VIII/1.294, 3 ff; see above, Ibid. De virg. 10: GNO VIII/1, 291, 7 ff; see above, Ibid. See Debeat. 5: GNO VII/2.123 ff; see about this above, chap. About the beatitudes, section Motive of Ascension. See De beat. 2: GNO VII/2, 89 ff; see above, Ibid. See Debeat. 8: GNO VII/2, 163 ff; see above, ch. About the bliss, section Running to the goal. See Debeat. 2: GNO VII/2.93; see above, Ibid. See Debeat. 2: GNO VII/2,93,15–19. See Debeat. 4: GNO VII/2.122.25–123.4; see above, ch. On the Beatitudes, section Thirst for Virtue. See De beat. 4: GNO VII/2.121, 9 ff; see above, Ibid. See De beat. 4: GNO VII/2,121; see above, Ibid. See Debeat. 3: GNO VII/2, 104, 15–19; see about this above, chap. On the Beatitudes, section Vision of God. See Debeat. 3: GNO VII/2.105.3 ff.; see above, Ibid. See Inscr. Ps. I,7: GNO V, 43, 14; 51, 21; see about this above, chap. On the inscription of the Psalms, section Construction of the Psalter. See Inscr. Ps. I, 5–8: GNO V, 38–65; see above, Ibid. See Inscr. Ps. I, 9: GNO V, 68, 20 ff; see about this above, chap. On the inscription of the Psalms, section Continuous Doxology. See Inscr. Ps. I, 7: GNO V, 46, 8–12; II, 13: GNO V, 136, 3 fF; pyc. lane – vol.2, p. 31. See above, ch. On the inscription of the Psalms, section Boundless Eternity. See In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 376, 23–377, 4; see above, ch. Interpretation of Ecclesiastes, section Time as an interval. See In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 378 ff; see above, Ibid. See In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 400, 21–401, 2; see above, ch. Interpretation of Ecclesiastes, section The meaning of the search is in the search itself. From gr. σιγή, "silence". – Approx. ed. See In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 411 a 414; see above, ch. Interpretation of Ecclesiastes, section What cannot be spoken about must be kept silent. See In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 412, 6–14; see above, Ibid. See In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 412,18–413, 5; see above, Ibid. Cm. In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 411 ff; see above, Ibid. Cm. In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 413; see above, Ibid. Cm. In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 411; see above, Ibid. Cm. In Eccl. hom. 2: GNO V, 313, 10–13; see above, ch. Interpretation of Ecclesiastes, section The meaning of the search is in the search itself. See De hom. opif. 16: PG 44, 181b; see about this above, chap. On the structure of man, ch. Man is the image of God and his present suffering. See De hom. opif. 22: PG 44, 205c; see above, Ibid. See De hom. opif. 29–30: PG 44, 236b-240b; 253–256; see above, ch. On the structure of man, section The full measure of evil and unlimited movement towards good. See De hom. opif. 23: PG 44, 209b. See De hom. opif. 13–14: PG 44, 165ab; 176b, supra, ch. About the structure of man, section The structure of man. See De hom. opif 21: PG 44, 201bc; see above, ch. On the structure of man, section The full measure of evil and unlimited movement towards good. See De hom. opif. 11: PG 44, 156b; see above, ch. About the structure of man, section The structure of man and the conclusion of the chapter. See De hom. opif. 16: PG 44, 177d; see above, ch. About the structure of man, section The structure of man. See In Nehaet.: PG 44, 108a; see above, ch. Interpretation on the Sixth Day, section of the Waters above the Firmament. See In Nohat.: PG 44,108d-109d; see above, Ibid. See In Nohat.: PG 44, 69d-72c; 120b; see above, ch. Interpretation on the Sixth Day, sections How did the incorporeal God create matter? and Creation of celestial bodies. See In Nehaet.: PG 44, 72s-76s; 120b; see above, ch. Interpretation on the Sixth Day, sections Isolation of fire and Creation of celestial bodies. See In Nohat.: PG 44, 69cd; 77d-80c; see above, ch. Interpretation on the Sixth Day, sections How did the incorporeal God create matter? and Unsettled Land. See In Nohat.: PG 44, 81c; 84d; see above, ch. Interpretation on the Sixth Day, section of the Waters above the Firmament. See In Nehat: PG 44, 117ab; see above, ch. Interpretation of the Sixth Day, section Creation of the celestial bodies and conclusion of the chapter. See In Nohat.: PG 44, 85bc; see above, ch. Interpretation of the Sixth Day, the section of Water over the Firmament and the conclusion of the chapter. See In Nohat.: PG 44, 89bc-112d; see above, ch. Interpretation on the Sixth Day, section of the Waters above the Firmament. See above, ch. Precise interpretation of Shestodnev, approx. 86 and conclusion of the chapter. See In Nehaet.: PG 44, 121a; see above, ch. Interpretation of the Sixth Day, section of the Third Heaven and conclusion of the chapter. See De an. et res.: PG 46, 89a-96a; 105a-c; see above, ch. About the soul and resurrection, section The endless movement of love and the conclusion of the chapter. See De an. et res.: PG 46.97a. See De an. et res.: PG 46.96c-97a; see above, ch. About the soul and resurrection, section The endless movement of love and the conclusion of the chapter. See De an. et res.: PG 46.92c-93b; see above, ch. About the soul and resurrection, section The endless movement of love. See Eunomius, Apol. 8 / Vaggione 42, 17 ff; 58, 16 ff; Gregory paraphrases in S. Eun. II, 21; II, 23; II, 62: GNO I, 232, 29 ff; 233, 11–17; 244.1 ff; see above, ch. Refutation of Eunomius, section The Teaching of Eunomius about the unbornness of God. See S. Eun. II, 69: GNO I, 246, 14 ff. See S. Eun. II, 69–70; I, 168: GNO I, 246; 77, 7–13; see above, ch. Refutation of Eunomius, sections Naming of God and the Infinity of God. See S. Eun. III, 6.73: GNO II, 211, 28 – 212, 1; see above, ch. Refutation of Eunomiau section The Infinity of God. See S. Eun. II, 458–459; II, 469; I, 364: GNO I, 360 ff; 363; 134; see above, Ibid. See S. Eun. II, 563; II, 580: GNO I,391.9 ff; 395.25 ff; see above, ch. Refutation of Eunomius, section on the Naming of God. See Eunomius, Apol. 12 / Vaggione 46.7 ff; Gregory paraphrases and develops in S. Eun. II, 196; 269: GNO I, 282, 5 ff; 305, 7; see above, ch. Refutation of Eunomius, section The Teaching of Eunomius about the unbornness of God. See S. Eun. II, 125; II, 237; II, 148; II, 402: GNO I, 262, 22 ff; 295, 23–27; 268.18ff; 343.25 – 344.3; see above, ch. Refutation of Eunomius, section Dispute on the nature of language. See S. Eun. II, 181–182: GNO I,277, 7–26; see above, Ibid. See S. Eun. II, 149: GNO I,268.27 ff; see above, ch. Refutation of Eunomius, section on the Naming of God. See S. Eun. II, 144–145; II, 475–476: GNO I, 267; 365; see above, ch. Refutation of Eunomius, Naming of God section and conclusion of the chapter. See Basil, S. Eun. I, 7: SC 299,192. Gregory quotes S. Eun. II, 446: GNO I, 356, 30 – 357, 7. See Vasily, Adv. Eun. I,16: SC 299, 228, 5. See S. Eun. II, 457: GNO I, 360, 3 ff. See S. Eun. II, 459: GNO I, 360 ff; see above, ch. Refutation of Eunomius, section The Infinity of God. See above, ch. Refutation of Eunomius, section The Teaching of Eunomius about the unbornness of God. See S. Eun. I, 167–170: GNO I, 77. See S. Eun. I, 233–235: GNO I,95. See S. Eun. III, 1,104: GNO I, 38, 24 ff. See S. Eun. I, 167–170; I, 236; III, 2, 20: GNO I, 77; 96, 2 ff; II, 58, 22 ff; Refut. 31: GNOII, 324,15–21. See also above, ch. Refutation of Eunomius, section The Infinity of God. See Debeat. 7: GNO VII/2, 150, 12–20 (see above, chapter On the Beatitudes, note 53). See S. Eun. II, 89–91: GNO I, 253; see above, ch. Refutation of Eunomius, section on the Naming of God. See S. Eun. I,673: GNO I,220; see above, ch. Refutation of Eunomius, section The Infinity of God. See Vita Moysis I: GNO VII/1, 3.12 ff; 4.17 ff; see above, ch. About the life of Moses, section The measure of virtue is infinity. See Vita Moysis I: GNO VII/1,4,11 ff. See Vita Moysis II: GNO VII/1, 38–41; see above, ch. About the life of Moses, section of the Haggadah about Moses and its allegorization. See Vita Moysis II: GNO VII/1, 86 ff; see above, ch. About the life of Moses, section Sinai Epiphany. See Vita Moysis I: GNO VII/1, 113–118; see above, ch. About the life of Moses, section of the Epiphany in a cleft of the rock. See Vita Moysis II: GNO VII/1,141,11. See Vita Moysis II: GNO VII/1,144, 7. See about this above, the conclusion of the chapter On the Life of Moses. See In Cant. 6: GNO VI, 181,13–16. See In Cant.. 6: GNO VI, 183.1 ff; see above, ch. Conversations on the Song of Songs, section Finding by Faith. See In Cant. 6: GNO VI, 177, 19–178.1; see above, ch. Conversations on the Song of Songs, section The Bride-Soul and Her Spiritual Path. See, for example, In Cant. 4: GNO VI, 120.16 ff. See In Cant. 5: GNO VI, 156, 18; In Cant. 10: GNO VI, 310.4. See about this above, chap. Discourses on the Song of Songs, section Fulfillment and insatiability of desire. See In Cant. 5: GNO VI, 159, 7 ff. See In Cant. 6: GNO VI, 174, 8–11; rus. lane – t.Z, p. 150. Cm. In Cant. 8: GNO VI, 246.1–5. See above, ch. Review of studies, approx. 34. See above, ch. Review of studies, approx. 35 and 36. See Deprinc. I, 3, 8: 252,164, 317. See above, ch. Review of studies, section Controversy with Origen? See above, ch. Review of studies, approx. 40; like M. Harl, see chap. Review of studies, approx. 39. Si autem aliquando satietas cepit aliquem ex his, qui in summo perfectoque constiterunt gradu, non arbitror quod ad subitum quis euacuetur ac decidat, sed paulatim et per partes defluere eum necesse est (ita ut fieri possit interdum, si breuis aliquis lapsus accident, ut cito respiscat atque in se reuertatur), non penitus ruere, sed reuocare pedem et redire ad statum suum ac rursum statuere posse id, quod per neglegentiamfuerat elapsum (De princ. I, 3, 8: SC 252, 164, 322–329). Origen speaks about “negligence” (ἀμέλεια) as the cause of the fall in other places (see De princ. III, 1.13: SC 268, 78, 367). Saturation with good, turning into evil, is also known to Philo, see Quis rer. div. her. 240; De poster. 145; De Abr. 134 ff. ... ita perdurare debemus, ut nulla umquam nos boni illius satietas capiat, sed quanto magis de illa beatitudine percipimus, tant o magis in nobis uel dilatetur eius desiderium uel augeatur; dum semper ardentius et capacius patrem etfilium ac spiritum sanctum uel capimur uel tenemus (De princ. I, 3, 8: SC 252,164, 316–321). See Justinian's edict against Origenism, 542, Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum, ed. E. Schwarz, III, Berlin 1940, p. 213.13–16. See above, ch. Review of research, subsection Controversy with Origen? See above, ch. About the life of Moses, approx. 101. See above, ch. Review of studies, approx. 30. See Plato, Crat. 396b. For another meaning mentioned, deriving from the Pythagorean mysticism of cosmic rhythms, see R. Boyancé, “La “doctrine d'Euthyphron” dans le “Cratyle”” // Revue des Études Grecques, 54, 1941, p. 141–175, esp. 156 ff. See Plotinus, Enn. V, 1 [10], 7, 27–48; III, 8 [30], 11, 38–42; V, 8 [31], 13,1–10. See Plotinus, Enn. III, 5 [50], 9.18; V, 9 [5], 8, 8 ff. See Plotinus, Enn. V, 1 [10], 4,10–13. See Plotinus, Enn. VI, 7 [38], 35, 19–30. On this see P. Hadot, introduction to Plotin, Traité 50 (III, 5), p. 78 ff. See Plato, Symp. 203bc. Plotinus gives an interpretation of Eros in Enn. III, 5 [50]. On Poros' intoxication, see III, 5 [50], 9; see on this P. Hadot, introduction to Plotin, Traité 50 (III, 5), p. 70–81. See Plato, Phaedr. 246d-248c. See Plotinus, Enn. V, 8 [31], 10, 7 ff; V, 8 [31], 10, 33. See Plotinus, Enn. VI, 7 [38], 35,19–30. See De hom. opif. 28: PG 44, 229bc, 232a-233c; Dean. et res.: PG 46, 109b-121a. Cm. Dean. et res.: PG 46.96c. See above, ch. Review of research, section The Infinity of God and the “epectasis” of man. SC 253, 211 ff. Quote above, ch. The concept of infinity in the interpretation of the predecessors of St. Gregory, approx. 24. De princ. II, 9, 1: SC 252, 352, 11–16. Quote above, ch. The concept of infinity in the interpretation of the predecessors of St. Gregory, approx. 26. Other passages in Rufinus’ translation sound in a similar sense: ... quia [deus] omnia conpraehendit, superest ut eo ipso quo conpraehendi possunt, et initium habere intellegantur et finem. Nam quod penitus sine ullo initio est, conpraehendi omnino non potest. In quantumcumque enim se intellectus extenderit, in tantum conpraehendi facultas sine fine subducitur etdiffertun ubi initium non habetur (De princ. III, 5,2: SC 268,222,52–58). ... nihil enim deo uel sine fine uel sine mensura est. Virtute enim sua omnia conpraehendit, et ipse nullius creaturae sensu conpraehensus est. Ilia enim natura soli sibi cognita est (Deprinc. IV, 4, 8: SC 268, 420, 306–309). See Aristotle, Phys. III, 6: 207a21–26. See Aristotle, Met. XII, 9:1074b34. Cm. De hom. opif. 11: PG 44.156b; see chap. About the structure of man, section The structure of man and the conclusion of the chapter. See De an. et res.: PG 46.96 p. See Ch. Apostolopoulos, Phaedo Christianus, p. 339. ... πανταχόθεν ... τῆς ἰδίας ὑπερεκπίπτουσα φύσεως (S. Eun. III, 6, 68: GNO II, 210.14 ff). See De an. et res.: PG 46.92c-93b. See C. Eun. II, 149: GNO I,268.27 ff; In Cant. 9: GNO VI, 264.18 – 265.1; see above, ch. Refutation of Eunomius, section on the Naming of God, and ch. Conversations on the Song of Songs, section Finding by Faith. Perichoresis (Greek περιχώρησις) – interpenetration. – Approx. ed. In another work, I tried to examine the key passages on this topic in Augustine’s work De trinitate (see “Lidská mysl jako model Trojice podle Augustinova spisu De Trinitate IX, X a XV” // L. Karfiková, Studie z patristiky a scholastiky, Oikúmené, Praha 1997). Cm. In inscr. Ps. I, 9: GNO V, 66; see above, ch. On the inscription of the Psalms, section Minor Theology of Music. See Inscr. Ps. I, 7; I, 9; II, 13: GNO V, 46, 8–12; 68, 20 ff; 136, 3 ff. see above, ch. On the inscription of the Psalms, sections Unceasing Doxology and Boundless Eternity. Protology is reasoning about the beginnings of being. – Approx. ed. This link is not in the original - Note. ed. ... προϋφεστάναι (De hom. opif. 28: PG 44, 229b). See podobně De an. et res.: PG 46, 112c. Metempsychosis (Greek μετεμψύχωσις, from μετα- - perei ἔμψυχος - animate, living, actually - trans-animation) is the doctrine of the transmigration of souls into other bodies. – Approx. ed. See De hom. opif. 28: PG 44, 232a; 233b. Gregory clearly alludes to Plato’s myth, in the dialogue Phaedrus, about the heavenly origin of souls (see Phaedr. 246 ff). Gregory recalls that this doctrine was developed by his predecessors, namely the author of the treatise Περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, see De hom. opif. 28: PG 44, 229b. Gregory's polemic with Origen is examined by E. Pietrella, “L'antiorigenismo di Gregorio di Nisa (de hom. op. 28, ed. Forbes, pp. 276–282)”, in: L'origenismo: Apologie e polemiche intorno a Origene (XIV Incontro di studiosi dell'antichità cristiana) // Augustinianum, 26, 1986, p. 143–176. The author points out that Gregory (as well as two other Cappadocian fathers) denies not only metempsychosis (which cannot be shown with certainty in Origen either), but also Origen’s idea of ​​the pre-existence of souls. See S. W. Gustafson, Gregory, p. 156–159. R. E. Heine, Perfection p. rightly insists on Gregory’s positive attitude towards Origen, which probably motivated the saint’s correction of Origenism. 7 and other places; see about this above, chap. Review of studies, section Controversy with Origen? See De hom. opif. 29: PG 44, 233d-237b. See De an. et res.: PG 46, 156ab; see above, ch. About the soul and resurrection, section Resurrection of the body. See De hom. opif. 28: PG 44, 233ab. Κύκλος γάρ τίς ἐστι... οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ ἀδιάκριτος κακῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν σύγχυσις (De an. et res.: PG 46,113b). See De hom. opif 16: PG 44, 185c. Cm. De hom. opif 17: PG 44, 188b-189d. The biblical statement about man as the image of God (Gen. 1:26) Gregory refers literally and primarily to the human pleroma, see De hom. opif. 16: PG 44, 185cd. See Plotinus, Enn. V, 1 [10], 7.1. Perhaps this is why Gregory points out in conversations on the Song of Songs that the original creation did not have the character of a diastema, since “the beginning completely coincided with the end”: συνανεφάνη τὸ πέρας (In Cant. 15: GNO VI, 458, 1 a 10 ff). On the supposed "contradiction" between this idea and Gregory's assertion that diastema is an essential property of creation, see T. P. Verghese, Διάστημα, p. 255 ff.