The hypothesis of the plurality of worlds in Origen's treatise "On Elements"

Contents Preface Chapter 1. Problems of interpretation of the RA text 1.1. Genre features of the treatise 1.2. Features of the Rufino translation RA 1.3. Anti-Origenist sources and RA 1.4. Greek works of Origen and RA Chapter 2. Various interpretations of Origen's hypothesis of the plurality of worlds 2.1. Endless cyclism 2.2. Apokatastasis at the end of the sequence of centuries 2.3. Cyclism of the second degree? 2.4. Intermediate falls and recoveries? 2.5. Summary: four possible understandings of the plurality of worlds according to Origen Chapter 3. The hypothesis of the plurality of worlds in the context of “systematic” and “hypothetical” approaches to the study of Origen 3.1. Problems of a “systematic” approach to the study of Origen 3.2. Problems of the “hypothetical” approach to the study of Origen 3.3. Crusel's version of the cosmic process according to Origen Chapter 4. Origen's hypothetical method and text 4.1. Distinguishing between doctrine and hypothetical research 4.2. Alternative hypotheses with the reader's choice 4.3. Submitting a hypothesis from a third party 4.3.1. On behalf of real opponents 4.3.2. On behalf of the fictitious interlocutor 4.3.3. Possibility of Rufin's intervention 4.3.4. Conclusion: presentation of the hypothesis from a third person and the author’s position 4.4. Discussion of the hypothesis with which Origen does not agree (using the example of the doctrine of metempsychosis) 4.5. Result: the hypothetical method and the author's position of Origen Chapter 5. Formulation of the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds in the text 2, 3, 1–5 5.1. RA 2, 3, 1 – statement of question 5.2. Discussion of the hypothesis of the periodic existence of matter in 2, 3, 2–3 5.3. Criticism of the theory of identity of worlds or “eternal return” in 2, 3, 4 5.4. Transition to the formulation of Origen’s own hypothesis of the plurality of worlds (2, 3, 4–5): literal interpretation of the plural αἰῶνες 5.5. 2, 3, 5, 196–210: plurality of worlds and apocatastasis 5.6. Results of the analysis of RA 2, 3, 1–5 Chapter 6. Protological aspect of the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds in RA 3, 5, 3 6.1. The hypothesis of the plurality of worlds and the problem of the eternity of creation 6.2. Various interpretations of the eternity of creation according to Origen 6.3. Dzamalikos theory: RA 3, 5, 3 – Rufin interpolation 6.4. The problem of the relationship between RA 3, 5, 3 and RA 1, 4, 3–5 6.5. Criticism of authenticity RA 1, 4, 4–5 6.6. Results of the previous analysis Chapter 7. Selected mentions of the multiplicity of worlds in ra 7.1. Plural saecula in RA and the hypothesis of apocatastasis 7.2. The transition from one “age” to another: a new general fall or an individual redistribution of intelligent creatures according to the ranks of the spiritual hierarchy? Chapter 8. The hypothesis of the plurality of worlds in the Greek works of Origen 8.1. “The Future Age” and “Coming Ages” in the Greek Works of Origen 8.2. Origen's eschatological terminology 8.3. Eschatological terminology of the Rufinus translation of the RA (consummatio, restitutio, finis) Conclusion Accepted abbreviations I. Editions of texts and reference literature II. Works of Origen III. Works by other authors Bibliography Origen of Alexandria (185–254 AD) is one of the most significant and controversial thinkers in the history of the early Christian church. His treatise “On the Principles,” which has come down to us mainly in the Latin translation of the 4th century, contains a number of metaphysical and cosmological hypotheses of an unorthodox nature. This study examines in detail one of these hypotheses, which suggests the existence of many worlds before and after the current world. To analyze the philosophical content of this hypothesis, as well as to resolve the issue of the degree of its authenticity, the texts of Origen, preserved in the Greek original, are used. The reader who opens any standard textbook on the history of early Christian thought in order to obtain general information about the teachings of Origen of Alexandria (185-254 AD), as a rule, learns that this great theologian was a supporter of a number of concepts subsequently rejected by the Christian tradition, among which the eternity of the created world, the preexistence of souls, universal salvation extending to demons and even the devil himself, and several others are usually mentioned. Among such concepts, the plurality of successive worlds or “eons” traditionally appears. But it is worth turning to more specialized research, and such an idea of ​​Origen’s views turns out to be significantly shaken. The point is not only that all of the listed concepts receive alternative and sometimes contradictory interpretations in the works of various scientists. In fact, among these theories there is not a single one, the very presence of which in Origen’s thought would not be denied by one or another researcher. However, the emergence of directly opposite interpretations of Origen’s teaching dates back to the heyday of Christian patristics. Already in that era, Origen managed to earn a reputation as both one of the founders of theological thought (at least for Greek-speaking Christianity) and a heretic. This specific situation is well illustrated by the words of V.V. Bolotov, spoken by him in one private letter. Explaining to his addressee who Origen is, he says the following: “This is a star of the first magnitude among the catechetes (professors of theology) of the Alexandrian Catechetical School (in the 1/2 of the 2nd century of the first Christian Academy) and perhaps the most glorious name in the Christian world of his time, a man whose works constitute an era in the history of theological thought, “diamond” and “copper from within,” as he was called, a 70-year-old confessor and, perhaps, only due to the refined prudence of the tormentors, he is not a martyr for Christ († 254). He was highly valued by St. Athanasius the Great; “three great Cappadocians” (St. Basil the Great, Gregory the Theologian and Gregory of Nyssa) were ardent admirers and - in essence - students of Origen. But the Arians also ascribed to themselves the honor of being his followers, and St. Epiphanius of Cyprus considered him the source of all heresies of the 4th century; and the excitement raised over Origen finally turned into a storm, ending in the exile of St. John Chrysostom almost to our Caucasus. About 1 1/2 centuries passed and the Council of Constantinople in 543 proclaimed not eternal memory, but anathema to Origen. From this you, of course, did not know who (quis, qualis) Origen was, but perhaps you felt how great (quantus) he was and how knotty (to put it this way) his teaching was, if the holy universal teachers revered him and cursed his councils.” Among the reasons why Origen turned out to be such a controversial figure, an important place is occupied by the fact that his activity fell on that historical period when Christian dogmatics had not yet taken shape, but at the same time, the need for a qualified philosophical understanding of numerous theoretical problems associated with the Christian faith was already ripe. By the time of Origen there was already a highly developed tradition of apologetic and polemical literature; Nevertheless, the task of a serious intellectual reaction to the surrounding cultural environment remained more than relevant for Christians, which should have been especially acutely felt in Alexandria, the center of both pagan education and Gnosticism, where at the same time a Christian theological school had already developed, represented by the names of Panten and Clement of Alexandria. Origen was quite clearly aware of the task of competent polemics with the ideological opponents of Christianity, so that as a result he became a major expert in ancient philosophy, also recognized in pagan circles, and in his teaching activities, according to the testimony of his student Gregory the Wonderworker, he always considered it necessary to acquaint listeners with the doctrines of a variety of philosophical schools (except perhaps atheistic concepts). Such a strong involvement in the ancient philosophical tradition, which could also be associated with his probable apprenticeship with Ammonius Saccas, the future mentor of Plotinus, could not but affect Origen’s thoughts. Porfiry, who was his younger contemporary, gave him a famous description depicting him more as a not entirely consistent adherent of Platonic and Stoic authors than as a Christian thinker: “He lived like a Christian, breaking the laws. He thought about the material world and about God as a Hellenic, but he introduced Hellenic philosophy into fables that were alien to it. He always lived with Plato, read Numenius, Cronius, Apollophanes, Longinus, Moderates, Nicomachus and writers known in Pythagorean circles. He used the books of Chaeremon the Stoic and Cornutus; having learned from them an allegorical interpretation of the Hellenic mysteries, he applied it to the Jewish scriptures.” In the light of such ideas, one could try to find the reason for the later radical revaluation of Origen by the Christian Church precisely in his excessive exposure to ancient influences, which allegedly determined the content of his thought in all those points where it reveals a deviation from orthodoxy. But although it cannot be denied that ancient philosophy had a significant influence on Origen as a thinker and simply an educated person belonging to his time and inevitably thinking within the framework of the cultural paradigm given by him (in this case it can be defined as Platonic-Stoic), it must still be noted that he does not have the desire, so characteristic of some Christian intellectuals of that era, to assimilate the heritage of ancient philosophical thought as much as possible, considering it as a kind of preliminary form of revelation, given to the pagans, and to the pagan philosophers as “Christians before Christ.” And if Origen did not belong to such ardent opponents of ancient philosophy as, for example, Tertullian, then the degree of his dependence on it is clearly not so unprecedented as to fully explain why, of all the ante-Nicene theologians, he was the only one who faced such a bizarre and contradictory posthumous fate. Another reason that is associated with Origen’s controversial reputation in the Christian tradition is that many of his ideas, which were sometimes tentative moves of a system of thought that had not yet formed into a dogmatic system, were not only interpreted as elements of just such a system, but were also significantly developed, thought out, distorted both by his opponents and by those who considered themselves his followers, and the responsibility for all this fell on him. For example, the largest anti-Origenists (Theophilus of Alexandria, Jerome of Stridon, Epiphanius of Cyprus, etc.) often presented Origen’s teachings in such a distorted form that they could attribute to him views that were the constant object of his own criticism. However, it is impossible to completely attribute the problematic nature of Origen’s teaching to later distortions, just as it is impossible to hope that, having cleared Origen’s thought from false and tendentious interpretations, we will end up with an author who is completely invulnerable from the point of view of Christian orthodoxy. Despite all the obvious distortions, in many cases anti-Origenist criticism had objective prerequisites in Origen’s theories themselves. To one degree or another, this applies to all of Origen’s most significant hypotheses, such as the preexistence of souls, the eternity of creation, universal apocatastasis or the plurality of worlds. In this case, we can only talk about the fact that the anti-Origenists gave these theories a more categorical character or did not quite adequately interpret their content, but in principle they started from certain ideas that were actually present in Origen’s texts. So, ultimately, the reason why Origen became such a problematic figure in the Christian tradition is quite natural to look for in the thought of Origen himself, in its, as Bolotov aptly put it, “knottedness,” which cannot always be decomposed into elements of tradition - church-Christian or philosophical, but should be perceived in its uniqueness and little comparable originality (among Christian theologians). This work is devoted to a detailed analysis of precisely one of those Origenian concepts that turned out to be unacceptable for orthodox Christianity, namely, the theory according to which the existing material cosmos is not unique, but is built into a long and perhaps even endless sequence of successive worlds or “eons.” This hypothesis is deeply connected with the totality of Origen’s metaphysical and cosmological views, therefore, the study of the texts devoted to it can make his entire worldview as a whole clearer. There is no doubt that in the treatise “On the Principles” (περἱ ἀρχῶν; De principiis - hereinafter PA) Origen formulated such a hypothesis. But its interpretation and even attribution raises many questions, to which modern researchers sometimes give mutually exclusive answers. How exactly did Origen imagine the content of this hypothesis? Why did he even bother discussing it? How did he manage to combine it with Christianity? Finally, did he really share it or was he just expounding it? To answer these questions, we must first of all be aware of the specific features of RA as the main source on Origen’s cosmology and metaphysics. Chapter 1 of this study is devoted to this. It is also necessary to take into account the points of view already existing in the scientific literature on the very content of the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds. The most typical positions of various researchers on this issue are critically discussed in Chapter 2. In addition, the study of any problem related to Origen’s worldview is complicated by the fact that in the tradition of the scientific study of his thought in the 20th century, two opposing approaches were presented - “systematic” and “hypothetical” - which proceeded from different methodological premises and, as a result, based on the same material of Origen’s texts, created interpretations of his views that are incompatible with each other. Therefore, Chapter 3 examines the question of how the application of these approaches affects our understanding of the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds, and Chapter 4 examines what place Origen’s so-called “hypothetical” method occupies in RA and in what sense the unorthodox theories discussed by him can be considered hypotheses, and not categorically affirmed teachings. After this, we can proceed to a direct analysis of those places in the RA where the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds is formulated. The most detailed discussion of this theory is contained in RA 2, 3, 1–5 and is discussed in Chapter 5 of this work. Chapter 6 analyzes another important place in the RA, where the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds is placed in a certain relationship with the idea of ​​​​the eternity of creation, namely RA 3, 5, 3. Chapter 7 is devoted to the interpretation of other places in the RA, where this hypothesis is also mentioned, but still is not the subject of special and detailed consideration. Finally, Chapter 8 presents those data from the surviving Greek texts of Origen that can shed light both on the content of the plurality of worlds hypothesis and on the degree of its authenticity. Chapter 1. Problems of interpretation of the RA text 1.1. Genre features of the treatise The treatise “On Principles,” written in the twenties of the 3rd century AD, is of key importance for the study of Origen’s metaphysics and cosmology. and relating to the early period of Origen's writing. It is generally accepted that work on the RA was completed even before Origen was forced to leave Alexandria in the early thirties due to unsettled relations with the Alexandrian bishop Dionysius. After this dramatic episode, Origen settled in Caesarea Palestine, and there his writing activity continued until the very end of the 40s, when the persecution under Decius began, but, although over the years he created many works, nothing similar to RA came out of his pen. The fact is that RA is a very diverse work, for which it is difficult to find exact analogies not only in the work of Origen himself, but also in general in the tradition of theological or philosophical literature of that era. On the one hand, it absorbed many elements of the genres of Christian writing that already existed by that time, i.e. first of all – polemical and exegetical works. On the other hand, it integrates into the perspective of a special speculative consideration the widest possible range of different topics of Christian teaching about God, the world and man (from the problems of Trinitarian dogmatics and cosmology to the principles of interpretation of Scripture), and not just any one of them, and not only for apologetic or polemical purposes. This kind of multifaceted speculative treatises were more typical of the Platonic and, subsequently, Neoplatonic traditions; in Christian literature, by the time of Origen, there were, at best, examples of the presentation of Christian tradition, but not a large-scale theological analysis of the latter using professional philosophical technology. It was Origen who for the first time managed to create a universal work, aimed at Christian intellectuals of his time and aimed at solving at once a whole complex of tasks facing them - from polemics with infidels and heretics to the analysis of doctrinal problems that were already of a purely internal nature. At the same time, he laid the foundation for the tradition that would later lead to the creation of treatises on systematic theology, such as John of Damascus’s “An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith,” so that if Origen was often called the first taxonomist in the history of Christian theology, then he owes this exclusively to the writing of RA. And finally, in the same work, Origen had the opportunity to thoroughly expound all his controversial ideas, including the concept of the multiplicity of successive worlds or eons, which made this treatise a source of unabated controversy for centuries. Thanks to such a non-standard author's approach, RA became a landmark phenomenon in the history of early Christian literature, both in terms of genre and content. However, in one aspect the RA differs very significantly from future treatises on systematic theology. Unlike the same Damascene, in RA we are not dealing with the final results of dogmatic development (which would be historically impossible) and not even with the categorically affirmed totality of individual views of Origen himself. In this treatise, Origen, based on a limited number of data from the Christian tradition that is undoubted for him, makes only an attempt to study the issues that remain not fully clarified in this tradition. In the course of such research, he expresses various, often incompatible hypotheses, and does not always make a final choice in favor of one or another of them, sometimes inviting the reader to make an independent decision. This essentially investigative, heuristic character of Origen’s thought sharply distinguishes RA from later dogmatic treatises and allows us to speak of the theology of Origen himself as “theology in search,” théologie en recherche. But this same circumstance creates a lot of problems for understanding what Origen actually wanted to say. No matter how much detail he expounds on this or that concept, there is always the possibility of doubting whether he is actually doing this on his own behalf or whether he is considering it only, so to speak, for the sake of completeness of the picture, but at the same time does not at all share it himself. And since many of the hypotheses discussed by Origen are clearly not of an orthodox nature and, being perceived not as hypotheses, but as categorical statements, form an undoubted corpus delicti for accusations of heresy, the mentioned opportunity to doubt is readily used by apologetically minded researchers seeking to bring Origen’s thought and orthodox dogmatics as close as possible. This, in particular, leads to mutually exclusive interpretations of Origen’s texts. From my point of view, the problem is rooted in the fact that generally accepted methodological principles for assessing the degree of authenticity of a particular hypothesis have not been developed, so each researcher here has very great freedom to follow his own methodological and value preferences. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the formal features of the RA text do not at all contribute to solving the problems associated with its interpretation. The compositional structure of the RA is characterized by a lack of formal rigor and produces a rather chaotic impression. The division of the RA into four books, which is still accepted today, most likely goes back to Origen himself, but does not in any way reflect the meaningful division of the text and has a purely technical meaning, associated, as is usually assumed, with the volume of papyrus scrolls used by the author. As for the division of the text into chapters, which often resemble small independent treatises that are not integrated into a single compositional plan, it may not reflect the original state of the text. Finally, the currently accepted division of chapters into paragraphs generally has a later origin and dates back to the edition of Delarue in 1733. The text of the RA itself is characterized by numerous repetitions, during which the author sometimes quite unexpectedly returns to the discussion of problems that seem to have already been considered by him. Even within the same chapter, there are often seemingly spontaneous deviations from the main topic. Sometimes the author may state a certain topic, but in practice it is not addressed. Trying to discover some organizing factor in this apparently chaotic structure of the text, modern researchers are predominantly inclined to the hypothesis of a tripartite division of the treatise. This hypothesis was first expressed by Steidle, who suggested that the composition of the RA would look more logical if the text was divided into three blocks (1, 1–2, 3; 2, 4–4, 3; 4, 4), each of which contained a sequential consideration of three main subjects - God, rational creatures and the world. Steidle himself associated a similar composition with the three cycles of training at the Alexandrian catechetical school, where Origen taught. Other researchers, having generally accepted the idea of ​​dividing the RA into three parts, motivated this division by purely literary factors, for example, the different functional purposes of these parts in the general plan of the treatise or the genre features of philosophical literature contemporary to Origen. In addition, to explain the numerous formal oddities in the text of the RA, the Spanish researcher of Origen Rius-Camps put forward the hypothesis of multiple authorial editing of this treatise. According to this hypothesis, the text of the RA, which formed the basis of the Latin version of Rufinus known to us, was not initially conceived by the author as something holistic, but was gradually formed over the course of four successive editions. At the same time, Rius-Kamps, who also starts from the idea of ​​a three-part division of the treatise, believes that the first edition basically coincided with the so-called second part, i.e. in its original form, the treatise began with RA 2, 4 (except for the preface that had already been partially written at that time) and was mainly a polemical work directed against Marcion. It was only in the second edition that the so-called first part was added, after which during the third edition Origen made several insertions throughout the text of the treatise, which included entire chapters (for example, devoted to the eschatological issues of RA 1, 6 and 3, 6), and then during the fourth edition he supplemented the text with a final recapitulatio or the so-called third part. It must be admitted that, as a result of a very thorough analysis of the treatise, Rius-Camps as a whole manages to show at least the theoretical possibility of perceiving this text as consisting of numerous editorial layers. However, as Dorival rightly noted in this regard, here in any case we are not dealing with a whole tradition of editing (as, for example, in the case of many biblical books), but with changes made to the text by the author himself. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that ultimately the author’s intention is fully reflected precisely in the final edition of the treatise, and the task of analyzing its structure is by no means removed by the assumption that this edition arose in stages. We must also not forget that we are dealing not with the original, but with a translation, and some compositional glitches in the RA could have arisen due to the editorial intervention of the translator. 1.2. Features of the Rufino translation of RA The main difficulty in interpreting the RA is caused by the fact that the Greek original of the treatise has not survived and, as something integral, this work has reached our time only in a Latin translation, which was made in 398 AD. a major translator of Greek theological literature into Latin, Rufinus of Aquileia. Rufinus was an ardent admirer of Origen's thought and, in particular, spent a total of about eight years in Alexandria studying with the famous theologian Didymus the Blind, who wrote the unsurvived scholia to the RA text. The translation of RA made by Rufinus appeared already in the context of Origenist disputes and had a very clear apologetic tendency, which consisted in the desire to give Origen’s ideas the most orthodox content possible. How adequate this translation is can be judged to some extent by comparing it with two extensive fragments from the Greek original of the third and fourth books of the RA (3, 1 and 4, 1–3), included in the anthology from the texts of Origen (Philokalia, Filokal...a), compiled by Rufinus’ contemporaries Basil the Great and Gregory the Theologian. Traditionally, later, anti-Origenist texts, which include selections of “dangerous” passages from this work, are also used as sources in the study of RA. Firstly, this includes a letter dated around 409 from Jerome of Stridon to the Spanish priest Avitus (Ep. 124), which quotes (in Latin translation) about 30 places from this treatise that seemed heretical to the author of the letter. The second important anti-Origenist source is the letter of Emperor Justinian to Patriarch Mina, compiled by anti-Origenist monks in connection with the local council of Constantinople in 543, which condemned Origen. It includes 25 Greek quotations from the RA containing doctrines that are questionable from an orthodox point of view. Some information about the text of the RA can also be gleaned from other Greek-speaking authors (Marcellus of Ancyra, Theophilus of Alexandria, Epiphanius of Cyprus, Antipater of Bostria, etc.), and most of this evidence is anti-Origenist in nature (the exception is, for example, quotes from the RA by Athanasius the Great, De decr. 27). Thus, we practically do not have direct access to the text written by Origen himself, and we are forced to make judgments about the ideas presented in the RA, constantly asking ourselves the question of whether existing sources, which also have the opposite direction, really adequately reflect them. Even if the Latin text in Rufinus were a literal translation of the original Greek RA, corresponding to modern standards of scientific translation, the very fact that we are not dealing with the original would inevitably complicate the study. But the problem is that the very principles of translation in that era, even with the translator’s honest desire to accurately convey the author’s thoughts, did not imply an indispensable literalist following of his text. In the case of the Rufino translation of RA, one must also take into account its apologetic tendency. The resulting discrepancies with the original, which can be judged by the surviving fragments of the Greek text and the statements of Rufinus himself, for the purpose of analysis are conveniently divided into two types: 1) changes motivated by the translation technique and made by the translator without a conscious intention to somehow distort the meaning of the text; 2) changes associated with the translator’s conscious attempt to present the doctrinal content of the original in the light he needs. As for the first type of changes, their occurrence in the text is associated primarily with Rufin’s translation style, which constantly strays into paraphrase, which generally follows the main ideas of the original, but does not aim to convey its syntactic structure or lexical composition as accurately as possible. A similar translation technique was characteristic of Rufinus not only while working on the RA text, but also in the case of many other works of Origen or other Greek-speaking authors, which he translated into Latin. In addition, Rufinus sought to adapt the text of the treatise for contemporary Latin-speaking readers and very often introduced some clarifications into it or supplemented some thesis developed by Origen with his own example. Sometimes inaccuracies arose due to the fact that Rufinus himself, who did not have as developed a philosophical culture as Origen, did not fully understand all the semantic implications of the special philosophical terms used in the original. On the other hand, there are quite a few cases where he gives the original term in Greek, accompanying it either with his own version of the translation, or with some remarks descriptively conveying its meaning. The so-called “reduplication” is also very characteristic of the style of Rufino’s translation, i.e. rendering one Greek word by two Latin ones. Finally, thanks to Rufinus, some stylistic features associated with the Latin cultural tradition appeared in the RA text, such as Virgilian allusions or legal terminology, found even where the original did not give rise to this. This kind of discrepancy between the Rufinus translation and the original calls into question mainly the details and nuances of the surviving RA text, but can still be consistent with a significant degree of confidence in the transmission of the basic ideas of the original. Discrepancies of the second type, which arose due to the fact that the translator deliberately changed the meaning of the text, can cast doubt on the overall reliability of the translation as such. Rufinus himself did not at all hide his apologetic intentions. In the preface to his translation of the RA, he directly states that he views the text of the treatise as distorted in places by heretical falsifications. On the same topic, he specially wrote an essay “On the Forgery of Origen’s Books.” However, speaking about heretical interpolations in RA, Rufinus does not refer to any real facts known to him, but simply to the internal contradictions he himself perceived in Origen’s text. These contradictions, which consisted in the fact that in one place the translator encountered statements that seemed completely orthodox to him, and in another that seemed heretical to him, he was inclined to explain, allowing for the distortion of the text on the part of heretics: “So, if anywhere in his books we found something contradictory to what he himself had piously defined about the Trinity in other places, then we [the place], as distorted and inauthentic (adulteratum hoc et alienum), was either omitted (praetermisimus), or stated in accordance with the rule that was often found affirmed by himself (secundum eam regulam protulimus, quam ab ipso frequenter invenimus adfirmatam)” (PA Praef. Ruf. 3, 54-59). Thus, the deliberate changes made by Rufinus to the text of the RA were primarily the elimination of the most sensitive passages from it. Moreover, if Rufinus mentions the contradictions he discovered in the treatise solely in connection with Trinitarian issues, then this is most likely not accidental and may mean that the cuts he made in the text of the RA were related specifically to the Trinitarian dogmatics that had already fully formed in his era, and not to cosmological or anthropological problems, many of which were still not perceived as affecting the essence of Christian doctrine and therefore could seem to the translator to deserve less attention. In addition to cuts and omissions, Rufinus himself mentions another technique he used - the presentation of doctrinally questionable passages “in accordance with the rule” (secundum eam regulam), which was often affirmed by Origen himself, i.e., apparently, the rule of faith. Since, along with this, Rufinus categorically denies that he made any interpolations on his own behalf, in this case it may not be the introduction of any significant insertions into the text, but only its editing, i.e. relatively minor corrections aimed at giving the text a more orthodox sound. As for more extensive interpolations, some statements by Rufinus himself seem to indicate that in his translation he used passages from other works of Origen. Thus, in the preface to the treatise, he writes: “If anywhere, as if addressing already experienced and knowledgeable readers [of the essence of the matter], he (i.e. Origen. - A.S.) expresses himself rather darkly, since he strives for brevity, we, in order to make [such] a place clearer, added what we read on the same subject in a clearer form in his other books (nos, ut manifestius fieret locus, ea quae de ipsa re in allis eius libris apertius legeramus adiecimus), taking care [thus] to explain [the meaning of the text]" (PA Praef. Ruf. 3, 59–63). Meanwhile, no direct borrowings or quotations from other works of Origen can be found in the Rufino translation of RA. Jerome already demanded that Rufinus indicate them, but received no answer. In my opinion, the wording “we ... added what we read on the same subject in a clearer form in his other books” does not necessarily indicate quotations. Rufinus did not consider even a literal translation of the RA itself necessary, so one cannot expect him to accurately quote other works of Origen either. In practice, this statement may well mean only that, while presenting some provisions of the RA in somewhat more detail than was done in the original, Rufinus simply took into account the general context of Origen’s views, known to him not only from the RA, but also from reading other works of Origen. Of course, this kind of accounting could be very subjective. However, it is worth noting that Rufinus himself motivates his appeal to other works of Origen not by apologetic purposes, but by the desire to make the text clearer for the Latin reader, so that ultimately such changes may not be much different from the already mentioned tendency of Rufinus to clarify the paraphrase of the original, which does not have as its goal a deliberate change in its meaning. In general, the cuts or corrections made by Rufinus cannot completely undermine the credibility of the RA text, since their general apologetic orientation guarantees, at least, that all the less than orthodox ideas, despite everything being present in abundance in his translation, go back to the Greek original. It would be strange to believe that we owe them to Rufinus, who wanted, if possible, to exclude the reasons for attacks on Origen that existed in the RA. Most likely, Rufinus did not eliminate or correct the cosmological theories found in the original, but since they were presented there mainly as hypotheses and were often accompanied by more acceptable alternatives from a Christian point of view, he can, in principle, be suspected of deliberately emphasizing precisely these alternatives, although not hiding from us the content of the ideas presented in the original, but still presenting them in the light of a certain evaluative tendency. For example, Rufinus could have put a more vulnerable hypothesis into the mouths of others, presenting it as the opinion of “some” or “others,” whereas in the original it could well have been expressed on behalf of the author himself. From all that has been said, it becomes clear that the main suspicion in Rufinus’ version of RA falls on those passages that emphasize the orthodoxy of the author’s views. The presence of unorthodox concepts in RA and the general course of argumentation in their presentation can hardly be attributed to Rufinus. Only the evaluative tendency of their presentation (due to the apologetic orientation of the translation) and minor formal details from a number of those that may appear or disappear in the text due to the non-literal nature of the translation (for example, the terminology used by Rufinus) can raise doubts. In any case, it is advisable to use any available opportunity to control the data of the Rufino version of RA. This can be done by turning, firstly, to alternative sources from the text of the RA, and secondly, to the works of Origen that have come down to us in the original Greek, although both of these methods do not completely solve all the existing problems and are themselves associated with a number of difficulties. 1.3. Anti-Origenist sources and RA The use of selected passages from the RA text as rendered by Jerome or Justinian, as well as the use of most Greek-language evidence, is problematic primarily because they are all anti-Origenist in tendency, and from this point of view have no special advantage over the version of Rufinus. Of course, if Rufinus’s translation in some way coincides with the version of Jerome or Justinian, then such agreement between sources of opposite tendencies in this particular case sharply increases the authenticity of our information about the content of the RA. But if Rufinus' version diverges from the anti-Origenist versions, the question arises as to which side follows the original more closely. The discrepancies between Rufinus's translation and other sources concern either the very presence of certain ideas in the RA text, or their function in this text. In the latter case, anti-Origenist sources tend to underestimate the hypothetical status of the theories expressed by Origen, presenting them as categorically affirmed doctrines and omitting all sorts of nuances and clarifications contained in the Rufinian version. In addition, it is important to take into account that even where Jerome or Justinian not only retell the contents of the RA in their own way, but actually quote it, we are still talking not about a coherent translation of the entire text, as in Rufinus, but about fragments taken out of context, and in the case of Jerome one also has to make allowances for the Latin translation. Throughout the 20th century, attitudes towards anti-Origenist sources in scientific circles changed significantly. Ketchau, who published the RA in the GCS, used the maximum number of anti-Origenist sources to reconstruct the supposedly authentic text of the treatise, considering them as more reliable. In later editions, some of the fragments used by Ketchau were rejected, and Crusel and Simonetti, who published RA in the SC series, abandoned the very habit of embedding anti-Origenist fragments into the text of Rufinus, relegating them entirely to the commentary. This formal change was accompanied by a general reassessment of the substantive significance of anti-Origenist sources. In the first half of the 20th century, Origen studies were dominated by the so-called “systematic” approach, many of whose representatives, like de Fay, usually appealed to the fact that the versions of Origen’s teachings by Jerome and Justinian often coincide with each other, despite the difference in languages ​​and eras, but at the same time differ from the version of Rufinus. If we take into account that Rufinus’s version, as a rule, is more compatible with orthodoxy, then for the “systematists”, who saw in Origen a Platonist philosopher who mistakenly considered himself a Christian, the choice in favor of anti-Origenist sources seemed almost inevitable. However, in the second half of the 20th century, the so-called “hypothetical” approach prevailed in Origenology. Its main representative, Henri Crouzel, in particular denies that the mere coincidence of the versions of Jerome and Justinian, contrary to Rufinus, is a guarantee of the authenticity of their content. The fact is that since the time of de Fay, an important methodological breakthrough has occurred on this issue. The texts of Jerome and Justinian are no longer seen as self-evidently independent sources. On the contrary, it is considered possible to talk about the influence of Jerome’s texts on Justinian’s. Thus, instead of unilateral control of the Rufinian text by means of fragments of Jerome and Justinian, it is now more a matter of mutual comparison of the versions of Rufinus and the anti-Origenists, which seem at least equal. 1.4. Greek works of Origen and RA The Greek originals of Origen's works, which have come down to us in whole or in part, should also be used to evaluate the data of the Latin text of the RA. Since in this case we are not talking about other options for transmitting the same text, but about independent works, the analogies or, on the contrary, discrepancies found between them and the RA have only relative significance for judgments about this treatise. If, for example, in some Greek text there is a certain parallel to the ideas developed in the Latin version of the RA, then this increases the likelihood that the latter could actually take place in the original RA. But if in the Greek works of Origen we do not find any analogies to the data of the Rufinian version, then this in itself does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the latter is unreliable. Thus, some ideas that play a very significant role in the text of the RA available to us, such as the hypothesis of eschatological incorporeality or the concept of the eternity of creation, are not found in the surviving Greek texts of Origen. However, this could be considered as a reason to deny their authenticity only by assuming that any of the basic ideas of RA would certainly have to be reflected in other works of Origen, and such an assumption is clearly arbitrary. Finally, even a direct discrepancy between the Latin translation of the RA and the Greek texts could theoretically be explained not only by the distortions made by Rufinus, but also by the fact that Origen himself did not adhere to the same position on this issue in different works. Thus, it can be said that on the basis of Origen's Greek texts it is sometimes possible to somewhat confirm Rufinus' version, but it is much more difficult to refute it. This will become even clearer if we take into account the characteristics of Origen's Greek writings themselves. First, Origen appears to have been a fantastically prolific writer. The number of books he wrote, according to some accounts, numbered 6 thousand, or at least almost 2 thousand. This is probably an exaggeration, but to a certain extent it reflects the legendary performance of Origen, nicknamed Adamantium (i.e. “Steel” or “Diamond”) for it. Combined with the use of stenographers provided to him by his regular patron of the arts, Ambrose, this could indeed lead to the creation of a huge corpus of writings. Of all this abundance, we know only a smaller part, so it is difficult to judge with confidence how representative the Greek texts that have come down to us are in any particular respect. However, the fact that for some of the central ideas of the RA it is not possible to find sufficiently convincing parallels in them is not particularly surprising against this background and does not at all exclude the possibility that such parallels could still have taken place in the lost texts. Secondly, one should take into account the genre specificity of most of Origen’s Greek texts. Leaving aside the treatise itself, Origen's works can be divided into the following main types: 1) theological treatises devoted to individual topics related to the Christian worldview (On the Resurrection, of which only minor fragments have survived, or On Prayer); 2) apologetic treatise “Against Celsus”; 3) moral and didactic essay “Exhortation to Martyrdom”; 4) the “Stromata” that have not reached us, probably representing an eclectic collection of reflections on various philosophical and theological topics, illustrated with fragments from ancient authors (like the work of the same name by Clement of Alexandria); 5) an epistolary heritage that has almost never reached us, from which, for example, a letter to Julius Africanus has been preserved; 6) exegetical works, including a) detailed commentaries (τὸμοι) (for example, “Commentary on the Gospel of John” and “Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew”); b) homilies (δμιλίαι), more popular in nature, which are a shorthand recording of Origen’s sermons; c) brief explanatory scholia (σχ ό λια), which were preserved mainly among later compilations of Origen’s interpretations of one or another biblical book in catenis, which also included fragments of commentaries and homilies (and often all this was mixed with fragments from Eusebius of Caesarea, Evagrius of Pontus and other authors). If the first four types of works were represented in Origen’s work by one or, at most, two titles, then the exegetical works numbered in the dozens and were often distinguished by a larger volume. Origen's largest work not related to exegesis, i.e. the treatise “Against Celsus” consists of 8 books, and, for example, the “Commentary on the Psalms”, which has come down to us only in fragments, probably consisted of 46 books, and the largely preserved “Commentary on the Gospel of John” - 32 books. From this it is clear that RA represents a genre experiment that is completely unique in the context of the rest of Origen’s work, and since the overwhelming majority of Origen’s works were devoted primarily to the exegesis of the biblical text, he did not necessarily have to turn in them to a discussion of metaphysical and cosmological ideas that were important to him. Even when he does this, these ideas often appear to be “encrypted” with the help of metaphors and phraseology borrowed from the interpreted biblical text, which creates additional difficulties in their analysis. Sometimes, in order to decipher some not entirely intelligible hint at a certain metaphysical or cosmological hypothesis, one has to remember what it, in fact, could consist of, appealing for this purpose precisely to RA as still the main special source on the metaphysics and cosmology of Origen. Thirdly, the appeal to the surviving Greek works of Origen is associated with the theoretical assumption of the unity of the author’s position on various speculative issues both in these works and in the RA. Representatives of the “systematic” approach to the study of Origen usually proceeded from this assumption, believing that he had a certain unified system of metaphysical and cosmological views, which he constantly adhered to in all his writings, although not quite adequately expressing it. For “hypothetical” Origen studies, which denies the systematic nature of Origen’s thought as such, the supposed unity of the author’s position in various works is not at all something self-evident. Cruzel, for example, often admits that Origen could have treated the same problem from alternative positions. We will return to discuss this problem later. But the same question about the unity of the author’s position can be posed in a chronological aspect. Origen's intensive writing activity continued from the early 20s to the end of the 40s. 3rd century Was this thirty year associated with any significant change in Origen's views? At one time, Cadiou expressed the point of view according to which a certain revolution in his worldview dates back to the time of Origen’s departure from Alexandria, so that all specific Origen hypotheses should be associated primarily with the early period of his work (20s). However, such a connection is natural due to the fact that it was then that the only work of Origen was written, in which these hypotheses could be most clearly formulated. In my opinion, it is impossible to say that Origen's texts themselves contain striking evidence of any dramatic intellectual evolution of their author. At the same time, there are undeniable specific similarities between the RA and Greek writings that can increase our confidence in the text of the RA. Thus, the question of whether Origen proceeded from the same views in both the RA and the Greek writings, by and large, makes sense only in those cases where there are contradictions between these writings and the RA and, to a lesser extent, when there are simply no analogies between them on any particular issue. CHAPTER 2. DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF ORIGENIAN HYPOTHESIS OF PULTURITY OF WORLDS Having said all this, it is not surprising that, like other Origenian concepts, the idea of ​​a plurality of worlds gives rise to the most controversial interpretations in the scientific literature. The most traditional interpretation presents Origen's chain of eons as a very close analogy to the ancient concepts of cosmic cyclism. First of all, one remembers the Stoic idea of ​​eternal recurrence. True, Origen repeatedly polemicizes with it, for example, in the late apologetic treatise “Against Celsus” (Contra Celsum - hereinafter SS), 4, 68; 5, 20, but the direct object of his criticism is only the identity of cosmic cycles, and not the multiplicity of worlds as such. Although the change of eons according to Origen is not associated with any form of naturalistic determinism, caused, for example, by the movement of heavenly bodies or the theory of elements (elements) in the Stoic spirit, there is still a typological similarity with ancient cyclic theories in this version of the understanding of Origen’s hypothesis. In both cases, the cosmic process is considered as an endless succession of structurally similar cycles, which in itself presupposes eternity or, more precisely, the temporal limitlessness of the existence of the universe. Origen sees the specificity of such a change of cycles in the fact that the emergence of successive material worlds is causally determined by the free “fall” of intelligent spiritual beings from the state of initial equality and perfection. This fall, as a result of which spiritual beings are distributed into three main hierarchical classes (angels, people and demons), is sooner or later followed by the return of all “minds” or “souls” to the original perfect state (ἀποκατάστασις πάντων), after which the material world ceases to exist, only to resume it again after a new fall. The main motive that prompted Origen to formulate such a concept was a polemic against the idea attributed to him by the Gnostics that some people by nature are predestined to destruction, and others to salvation, and this explains the diversity of their earthly fate. Origen, on the contrary, sought to show that this diversity, as well as the differences between the fate of angels, people and demons in general, are determined by the free will of each individual, and not by the play of blind chance and, of course, not by natural predestination to one destiny rather than another. By affirming free will, he thereby removes responsibility for evil from God and places it entirely on the most rational individual. Of course, this can be considered as another variation on the theme of the famous Platonic thesis “he who chooses guilt, God is innocent” (Resp. X 617ë αἰτία ἑλομένου · Θεὸς ἀναίτιος), but this kind of dependence on Plato still fits well within the framework of the normative "Platonism of the Fathers". Another thing is those specific metaphysical concepts that Origen developed in his desire to defend free will. First of all, so that God could not be accused of some kind of original injustice towards rational beings, Origen considered it necessary to admit a world of pre-existence in which all rational spiritual beings were created absolutely equal; It was in this ideal pre-existence that each of them made a free decision, which determined their present varied and not at all ideal state and is the only cause of existing evil. But by admitting the world of pre-existence, Origen took a step leading to the considered version of the hypothesis of cosmic cyclism. The goal of cosmic development in this case is considered to be the reproduction of the original perfect state of created beings in accordance with the thesis repeatedly expressed by Origen that the end is always similar to the beginning. But precisely because, in the interests of theodicy, Origen considered it fundamentally important to associate with the perfect state the idea of ​​an inherent and radical freedom that led to the fall, the reproduction of the same state at the end of the world cannot exclude the possibility of a new fall. And this can continue indefinitely. As a result, according to this version, it turns out that for the sake of theodicy, Origen sacrificed the meaning of history. General apokatastasis is conceived in this case not as the absolute finale of world development, but only as its phase, repeated at the end of each world. 2.2. Apokatastasis at the end of the sequence of centuries This understanding of apokatastasis encounters significant difficulties from the point of view of compliance with Origen's texts. The fact is that Origen often depicts apokatastasis as gradually being prepared over many aeons and occurring only at the end of their chain. This obviously contradicts the assumption that it occurs at the end of each eon. The gradual return of created intelligent beings to their original perfect state is another generally recognized motive that prompted Origen to formulate the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds. This gradualism is fundamentally connected with his fundamental idea of ​​​​divine pedagogy, which strives throughout cosmic history through re-education to incline all fallen beings to reunite with God. However, for the universal appeal of spiritual individuals to God, it turns out that, for example, one human life is clearly insufficient, and, on the other hand, Origen denies the possibility of the repeated infusion of an individual soul into a material body during the existence of the same cosmos. This makes it necessary to admit more and more new worlds, which would provide created freedom with more and more chances for conversion, until finally, thanks to educational measures, the success of which can be hoped mainly because they are undertaken by God himself, each of the spiritual individuals will make an independent decision to return to the state of original perfection. It is impossible not to notice that this entire speculative construction makes sense only to the extent that total apocatastasis is conceived as the only possible and desirable ending of the world process. In standard Christian eschatology, divine long-suffering is not at all inclined to wait for each individual sinner who hesitates on the path to perfection, and provide him with more and more chances to correct himself until he actually does it. It is clear that taking into account the pedagogical motivation of the plurality of worlds, the picture of Origen's cosmology undergoes significant changes. If until now we were talking about the general restoration that takes place at the end of each eon, now it becomes possible to place it at the end of a whole series of eons. In this version, cosmic history according to Origen seems more compatible with the traditional Christian view of it. Even though it unfolds not over the course of one single world, but apparently covers a very significant number of worlds, nevertheless it has an end, and the very transition from one world to another is apparently connected not so much with cyclism as such, i.e. with a periodic return to structurally and meaningfully similar phases of the world process, as well as with gradual progressive development towards one final goal, i.e., in fact, with linear development. 2.3. Cyclism of the second degree? However, this version is not an unconditional alternative to the idea of ​​​​infinite cyclism. On the contrary, it may give rise to the formulation of an even more complex version of the cyclical concept. Now, in relation to apocatastasis at the end of the chain of eons, the question can be raised whether a new fall will occur after it. If we answer this question positively, then Origen is talking about what I will allow myself to call cyclism of the second degree, implying, firstly, a change of eons as such, continuing until apokatastasis and, secondly, a change of successive periods, each of which consists of a sequence of numerous eons and ends with a general restoration. Thus, even if we recognize the plurality of worlds as a self-evident element of Origen's doctrine, it is possible to talk about these worlds in significantly different senses. Either by them we should mean individual eons, or entire chains of individual eons, continuing from the fall to apocatastasis. This creates fertile ground for all kinds of misunderstandings, so that it is not always possible to understand in what sense exactly this or that researcher uses the word “world” when speaking about the plurality of worlds in Origen. For example, the Norwegian patrolologist Einar Molland, on page 145 of his work The conception of the Gospel in the Alexandrian theology, first himself terminologically leveled into “worlds” and “eons” (αἰῶνες, saecula), speaks of the multiplicity of “ages,” clearly referring to the eons preceding apocatastasis. But on page 161 of the same work, “worlds,” apparently, no longer refer to these eons, but to worlds that begin after apocatastasis as a result of a new fall. Molland probably means something like cyclism of the second degree. However, the terminological ambiguity with the concept of "peace" in his own text makes it unclear how much of his position is actually the result of a critical and thoughtful approach. It should also be emphasized that Molland speaks only about the possibility of a new fall after apocatastasis, and not about the fact that it will certainly happen. Such careful formulation is quite justified. Since the fall of intelligent spiritual beings is based precisely on their freedom, here in any case we can only assume that they are never immune from the fall, but in no case that they are doomed to it. Nevertheless, the general tendency of his reasoning tends to be that, according to Origen, a new fall will actually occur and, apparently, more than once. In general, it should be noted that, even if one is skeptical about the idea of ​​cyclism of the second degree, it still makes sense to discuss the multiplicity of worlds in Origen, implying the multiplicity of individual eons. 2.4. Intermediate falls and recoveries? However, this seemingly overly complicated hypothesis of double cyclism does not yet reach the maximum degree of complexity possible in this matter. Another problem arises in connection with the attempt to determine the precise relation in which the plurality of worlds stands to the world of pre-existence. Theoretically, there are two possible solutions to this problem. Either the world of pre-existence precedes each specific material cosmos or eon, because it is in pre-existence that the fall takes place, giving rise to this cosmos: then it turns out that between the eons, when intelligent spiritual beings are in a perfect state, each time there is another world of pre-existence, i.e. the interval from apocatastasis to a new fall, considered by some researchers of Origen's thought as absolutely immaterial. Or the world of pre-existence with the fall occurring in it is placed at the beginning of a whole chain of eons by analogy with apocatastasis, which in this case is placed at its end. The first version explains the mechanism of changing eons very logically. In each specific case, the end of an eon is associated with a general restoration, and the beginning of a new eon is considered as a consequence of a new fall. But this version does not correspond to those texts that localize apokatastasis at the end of the whole sequence of eons. From this point of view, the advantage is on the side of the second version, since if we consider that restoration can occur only at the end of the chain of eons, then the fall in the world of pre-existence would be logical to attribute to its beginning. However, in this case, the mechanism of changing individual eons turns out to be much more vague. This difficulty can be resolved through a peculiar combination of these two versions, which, on the one hand, preserves the idea of ​​​​immaterial intervals between individual eons, and on the other, considers apokatastasis as the finale of a whole chain of eons. This kind of view of Origen’s cosmology was perhaps formulated more clearly than others by Heinrich Karpp: “The final “restoration” of the original state does not take place with the end of one world period. Instead of allowing the repeated incarnation of the soul in the existing world, Origen teaches precisely about the death and re-emergence of the entire world. According to the testimony of Jerome and Justinian, he in any case believed that after a certain interval a new corporeal world would be formed. But God himself establishes pedagogical unity between different worlds, for example, making the worst creature the devil in the next world. Apparently, Origen meant that only this cycle of worlds ultimately leads to the complete unity of all spiritual creations and to the real end.” From this it becomes obvious that Karpp localizes apokatastasis not at the end of one world, but at the end of a series of worlds. However, between these individual worlds preceding the general restoration, Karpp places certain disembodied intervals (sich nach einer Zwischenzeit wieder eine neue körperliche Welt bildet), in which, obviously, the fall must take place, giving rise to each new world. Thus, Karpp seems to take into account that apocatastasis occurs at the end of a whole series of worlds, and at the same time explains how each individual world begins - through the fall of intelligent beings. However, this advantage of Karpp's position is only apparent. Firstly, it is clear that the fall as an action performed by rational beings who are in the same and incorporeal state can only occur if it was already preceded by the restoration of this state after the period of their inequality and being clothed in various (ethereal or grossly material) bodies, which is called the “world”. But such preliminary restoration is in no way qualitatively different from apokatastasis as such, regardless of whether this term itself is applied to it or not. Therefore, it is impossible to explain why apokatastasis, as opposed to intermediate restorations, should be final. It is not surprising that Karpp himself ends up questioning whether such a final restoration will ever be achieved, and thus leans toward a version of Origen's cosmology that assumes endless cyclism. However, one could assume that the finality of apokatastasis is somehow connected with the pedagogical essence of cosmic history, i.e. that rational creatures return to God not simultaneously, but gradually, so that the final restoration will take place only when absolutely all of them freely submit to this influence. However, such an interpretation is consistent only with that version of Origen's cosmology, according to which the fall and restoration are placed at the beginning and end of the whole chain of worlds. If, following Karpp, we assume that each of the worlds preceding apocatastasis already ends with a general restoration, followed again by a general fall, then this essentially means that the pedagogical process each time first reaches its goal, and then it must be started from scratch. With this approach, any continuity of the pedagogical process between separate worlds turns out to be absolutely unthinkable. In other words, the pedagogical motivation for changing eons and the assumption of general restorations and falls between them are simply logically incompatible. The second circumstance that does not allow us to accept Karpp’s hypothesis is that in Origen’s texts the end of the present world is often described in a seemingly traditionally Christian spirit, i.e. like the Last Judgment and the division of spiritual individuals into righteous and sinners, and not at all the final salvation of all rational creatures. There may not be an absolute contradiction with the totality of apokatastasis, just if we take into account the hypothesis of the multiplicity of worlds. Then it is possible to attribute total apokatastasis to the end of their sequence, and the division into righteous and sinners to the end of each specific cosmos, when the goal of divine education has not yet been achieved. Thus, these texts testify against the version of Origen's cosmology in which apokatastasis takes place at the end of each individual world. But Karpp’s hypothesis, although it localizes the final restoration at the end of the chain of world cycles, contradicts these texts to the extent that it presupposes a series of, albeit preliminary, but still total restorations at the end of each world. 2.5. Summary: four possible understandings of the plurality of worlds according to Origen Summarizing all that has been said, we have to state that, even if we admit that Origen was inclined to the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds, it is still necessary to make a choice between the numerous versions of this hypothesis that exist in the scientific literature and differ significantly from each other. I will list once again the possibilities that, from my point of view, exist in this rather confusing issue: 1) The first possible version assumes an endless succession of eons, at the beginning and end of each of which there is, respectively, a fall and restoration of spiritual individuals; 2) The second version introduces the idea of ​​the final change of eons, and the fall and restoration are placed at the beginning and end of their entire sequence; 3) The third version, like the second, implies that the fall and restoration occur at the beginning and end of a finite series of eons, but at the same time, regarding this series itself, the possibility of its infinite repetition is allowed; 4) The fourth version again practically coincides with the second in that it localizes the first fall and final restoration at the beginning and end of the final sequence of eons, but at the same time assumes intermediate falls and restorations between individual eons and in this coincides with the first version. Of all the listed versions, the second and fourth, to the extent that they assume the singularity and finitude of the cosmic process, are closer to the traditional Christian view of cosmic history than the first and third versions, which actually contain the possibility of a typological rapprochement with ancient cyclic theories. But all these versions make it possible to attribute to Origen the theory of the plurality of worlds, at least in the sense of a finite sequence of individual eons. CHAPTER 3. THE MULTIPLE WORLDS HYPOTHESIS IN THE CONTEXT OF “SYSTEMATIC” AND “HYPOTHETICAL” APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF ORIGEN In comparison with the interpretations already outlined, the position of Henri Cruzel seems to be the most radical point of view on the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds in Origen. For for Cruzel, the question is not so much what exactly was the essence of Origen’s theory of cosmic cyclism, but rather whether he had this theory at all. Methodologically, Kruzel's doubts are based on his thesis, already mentioned above, about Origen's theology as “theology in search.” According to this thesis, Origen was not a systematic thinker, always proceeding from a set of fully thought-out and devoid of contradictions views, but rather constantly operated in his thinking with alternative and sometimes mutually exclusive hypotheses, without at all insisting on their absolute truth. So in his texts a situation is possible when the author’s point of view does not necessarily completely coincide with one or another theory he formulates. From Kruzel’s point of view, this is approximately the same situation in the case of the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds. Of course, Crusel cannot deny that Origen's texts from time to time discuss this hypothesis in detail or touch upon it in passing. But to what extent can it be said that in these cases Origen not only mentions it, but actually shares it himself? 3.1. Problems of a “systematic” approach to the study of Origen Cruzel's radical doubt is especially valuable from a methodological point of view, for it puts the specific question of the plurality of worlds in the context of the general and main methodological problem of Origenology: was Origen a taxonomist and is it even legitimate to use the concept of system in application to his thought? There cannot be much doubt that Origen is not a systematic thinker in a formal sense. Any external signs of the system, for example, the systematic nature of its presentation, the internal consistency and consistency of its individual moments, making it as inaccessible to immanent criticism as possible, as well as the categorical nature of its statement - all this is absent even in the text of RA, not to mention other works of Origen. However, as Franz Kettler once formulated, “naturally, the presentation of the system does not have to be systematic.” Thus, even the absence of a formally adequate expression of the system does not exclude the possibility of the existence of the system itself. This, on the other hand, suggests that the researcher who recognizes in Origen the systematicity of thought, despite the unsystematicity of its expression, is forced precisely by virtue of this dualism of form and content to first reconstruct the supposed “logic of the system”, and then analyze it in itself. It was from such methodological premises that, for example, V.V. Bolotov proceeded in relation to Origen’s dogmatics when he wrote: “Of course, Origen’s dogmatic view was presented to his thoughts as a harmonious whole, but it did not find a formally satisfactory expression in his writings: here his system constitutes only what is sought, and does not appear as given.” It should be noted that the mere assumption of the logic of the system in the indicated sense does not at all exclude the hypothetical nature of Origen’s thought. After all, one can, on the one hand, try, from the standpoint of a single logic, to harmonize with each other the various theories discussed in Origen’s texts (the preexistence of souls, the plurality of worlds, total apokatastasis), but at the same time, on the other hand, pay tribute to the heuristic pathos of his thought and recognize the fact that all these theories do not represent completely categorical beliefs. And vice versa: the fact that Origen’s theology, metaphysics and cosmology were fundamentally in the nature of research does not in the least negate, but rather even presupposes the fact that in his research Origen came to certain results, even without absoluteizing their meaning. But here a significant difficulty arises due to the fact that it is not so easy to create a completely convincing combination of all Origen’s hypotheses, which would also take into account all the data from Origen’s texts. The main versions of how exactly Origen imagined the plurality of worlds listed above are a good example of such a hermeneutical difficulty. It is these kinds of difficulties that give Cruzel a reason for radically denying the very concept of a system, even if by the latter we simply mean a certain consistent set of theories implied in Origen’s texts. The “hypothetical” approach in this case means not only an indication that Origen formulated this body of theories hypothetically, and not dogmatically, but a fundamental denial that he formulated it at all as a kind of “harmonious whole.” The wrongness of the “systematic” approach, from this point of view, also lies in the fact that, trying to discover some kind of consistent logic in Origen’s thought, for the first time he himself generates those contradictions, which he then reproaches Origen, and generates precisely due to the fact that he tries to reconcile with each other separate theories that for Origen himself either looked like alternatives or were not directly related to each other at all. This kind of denial of systematicity, even in the sense of admitting a logical relationship between individual hypotheses, is, in any case, understandable as a reaction to the futility of all attempts by a “systematic” approach to discover in Origen a systematicity that is completely invulnerable to criticism. The main drawback of the “systematic” interpretation of Origen’s heritage is that, wanting to find in it a certain system as a “harmonious whole,” in practice it always creates such a reconstruction of Origen’s worldview, which is simply replete with internal contradictions. In addition, the abuse of the concept of “system logic” often led to the fact that conclusions could be attributed to Origen that he himself did not make, but which at the same time seemed to one or another researcher to be completely natural and inevitable consequences of a certain logic that he saw in Origen’s texts. Considering all these shortcomings, it seems quite natural to ask whether their reason lies in the flawed methodology of the “systematists” itself. 3.2. Problems of the “hypothetical” approach to the study of Origen On the other hand, it is also difficult to agree unconditionally with the extreme conclusions from the “hypothetical” approach. Firstly, it does not seem very plausible to assume that a thinker with such speculative talent as Origen, expressing certain hypotheses relating to the same subjects, did not really think at all about how these hypotheses relate to each other. Secondly, in any case, the basic cosmological theories of Origen, i.e. the pre-existence of souls, the eternity of creation, total apokatastasis and the plurality of worlds are, in fact, already correlated with each other in his own texts, and the only problem is that this correlation cannot be described as completely logical. Sometimes Origen actually happens to contrast several hypotheses as alternatives to each other, without making a clear choice in favor of any of them. These kinds of cases can be interpreted in different ways. At one time, Franz Kettler put forward a theory according to which the appearance of seemingly equal alternatives in the text of the RA is associated with the esoteric attitude of Origen. In other words, it is possible that Origen simply hid his own value preferences in favor of one or another of the hypotheses he presented as equal, hoping that the knowledgeable reader himself would guess which of the alternatives was actually true, while the simpler believer, not yet prepared to perceive esoteric truth, would not be particularly discouraged if it was presented to him only as a hypothesis, which, moreover, has a more familiar alternative. From Kettler's point of view, it is possible to find out which alternative seemed correct to Origen himself, based precisely on the logic of the system. In my opinion, one cannot agree with Kettler, even admitting that Origen actually had certain esoteric sentiments. The hypothetical nature of Origen's thought does not at all boil down to the fact that from time to time Origen contrasts various hypotheses with each other. Origen’s research attitude itself is much broader and is manifested in the general non-categorical, heuristic tone of his discourse, including even purely stylistically. Against this background, there is no need to interpret the presence of alternative hypotheses as a tactical ploy by the esotericist (“just a skillful maneuver,” in Kettler’s words). The lack of explicit authorial agreement with one of the alternative possibilities of reasoning may well reflect Origen's genuine difficulty in making a final choice. Much more importantly, even such a difficulty may well be compatible with Origen’s own pros and cons on the very issue where he does not make a final decision. There is no need to think that, having indicated several alternative options for reasoning on a particular problem and not making a final choice between them, Origen, in fact, every time found himself in a situation of absolute intellectual impasse and was not even inclined in any way to any of the options he listed. But if the “hypothetical” approach is indeed justified in relation to the alternatives opposed in the text itself, this does not mean that there are grounds for describing all the contradictions in Origen’s texts as alternative hypotheses. For example, Kruzel considers it possible to consider total apocatastasis not as Origen’s conviction, but only as a generally non-binding “great hope”, citing the fact that many texts testify against the possibility of salvation for the devil and demons, although others are inclined to admit such a possibility. In my opinion, a simple statement of this kind of contradiction can be perceived as an argument against one of the members of this contradiction itself only in the context of an apologetic research strategy. By and large, it is not clear why this is, if Origen contains texts both for total apokatastasis and for the fact that the devil and demons will not be saved, then this relativizes the significance of the first texts, and not the second. But here a more significant question arises. Is it obvious that when an external contradiction includes Origen’s statements, which are not only not opposed in the text by himself, but are either in different places of the same work, or in different works altogether, we must obviously proceed from the fact that in this case we are dealing with theories alternative to Origen himself? All this, however, is far from exhausting the problems associated with the “hypothetical” approach. Crusel's most radical methodological stance, related to the implicit nature of the very concept of hypothesis within his research, suggests that the theory formulated by Origen as a hypothesis may not reflect his views at all. In this case, to call this or that Origenian concept a hypothesis is for Crusel to effectively claim that Origen himself did not in fact think so. In this regard, a very revealing quotation can be cited from one of Cruzel's articles, where he discusses the possibility of a second fall of souls after restoration in connection with the question of whether the state achieved by restoration is incorporeal: “It is only since the idea that those who have achieved beatitude can sin again is a problem raised by the advocate of the complete destruction of bodies, Origen does not want to leave it without consideration, but it does not reflect his thought ... In fact, Origen believes in a final apocatastasis, and not in a series of preliminary apocatastasis, and the idea of ​​multiple worlds... is also nothing more than a hypothesis.” Here it is clearly seen that, according to Cruzel, Origen discusses the admissibility of a new fall not because it represents the possibility of his own thought, but only because, in order to maximize the completeness of the study, he is simply reacting to the consequences of other people's theories. However, neither these theories themselves (in this case, the complete destruction of bodily nature), nor their consequences (i.e., the possibility of a new fall of spiritual beings who have achieved bliss and a plurality of worlds) should be attributed to Origen himself and considered relevant specifically for his worldview. The non-accidentality of this interpretation of the concept of hypothesis will become clear if we take into account the apologetic tendency of the “hypothetical” approach. The fact is that the problematic nature of applying the concept of a system to Origen’s thought lay not only and not so much in the fact that the logic of the system, read from Origen’s texts, could not be completely logical, but also in the fact that it could not be completely Christian. In other words, the inconsistency of the logic of the system seen in Origen was not limited only to the internal contradictions of this logic as such, but also consisted of its external contradictions with the fundamental premises of Christian tradition, which, however, were also somehow reflected in the texts of the same Origen. In this context, the main question of Origenology: “Was Origen a taxonomist?” took on a different meaning: “Was Origen a Christian?” It is clear that the “systematic” approach, as a rule, leads to the recognition of the very significant degree of heterogeneity of Origen in the Christian tradition and to emphasizing the dominant role of the Hellenic, primarily Platonic, component in his thought. Here it is either assumed that Origen set himself the task of synthesizing biblical revelation and ancient philosophy, and then he looks like one of the most radical “Hellenizers” of Christianity. Or it is still recognized that Origen had a much more restrained attitude towards ancient philosophy than, for example, Justin or Clement, did not strive for any synthesis and generally only wanted to be a Christian, but at the same time it is argued that ultimately he did not succeed. This is Koch's famous thesis about the discrepancy between intention and result in Origen's thought. In the latter case, Origen's Christianity is recognized as an unconditional fact, but at the same time - a fact that rather characterizes his subjective self-awareness. As for his objective position in the cultural tradition, from this point of view, he looks more like an average Platonist than a Christian. Against this kind of interpretation, the tradition of “hypothetical” research has developed, one might say, several “degrees of defense.” Firstly, she views Origen primarily as an exegete, mystic and “man of the church” and only secondarily as a religious thinker who developed dogmatic and metaphysical questions through the application of methods of philosophical speculation to them. This point of view was partly a completely fair reaction to the one-sidedness of the “systematic” approach, which focused the entire problematic of the study of Origen, if not on the text of the RA itself, then, in any case, on those dogmatic and metaphysical questions that arose precisely in connection with this text, but at the same time ignored, for example, the theme of mysticism in Origen to such an extent that Harnack at one time could even quite calmly write: “Origen is not mystic." However, the in itself undoubtedly correct emphasizing the importance of mysticism, exegesis and traditional church identity in Origen’s thought, even if on its basis we also recognize the secondary status of philosophical speculation in it, still does not eliminate the existing inconsistency as such. Therefore, the second technique that the apologetic interpretation of Origen resorts to is to emphasize the hypothetical status of his philosophical concepts. In itself, this only means that Origen in no way ascribes final truth to them, as, nevertheless, he still does in relation to the main points of church tradition. However, there is still the possibility of thinking that Origen puts forward these hypotheses on his own behalf, and, therefore, certain tendencies leading not at all in the same direction as the main line of development of Christian dogma and metaphysics were nevertheless present in his very thought. This is where Krusel’s transition from “hypothesis” to “just a hypothesis” turned out to be especially appropriate and downright saving. For it means: where Origen expresses this or that hypothesis, we are dealing not so much with a non-categorical formulation of a thought, to which he himself is more or less inclined, but with the mention and discussion of a thought that he in fact, perhaps, does not share at all. And, of course, this makes it possible to present Origen’s views as close to orthodoxy as possible. But if such a conclusion seems non-random within the framework of a certain research perspective, this does not mean that its methodological premises are so obvious. Absolutization of this technique of Kruzel will lead to complete absurdity. If the fact that Origen expresses certain concepts as hypotheses also means that he himself does not share these concepts, then precisely against the background of recognizing the general character of all Origen's thought as hypothetical, and his theology as a “theology in search,” one has to conclude that Origen apparently does not share all the original ideas, which nevertheless occur in abundance in his texts, because all of them, as was recognized, are in the nature of hypotheses. How did Origen really think? Apparently, it remains only to assume that his individual beliefs were strictly limited to a few undoubted truths of Christian tradition listed in the preface to the RA. It is not surprising that in practice Kruzel does not apply this technique universally, but rather selectively. On the one hand, he argues that some of the hypotheses expressed by Origen do not reflect this theologian’s own position. On the other hand, Cruzel himself constantly calls, for example, the theory of pre-existence as Origen’s “favorite hypothesis.” Thus, it is clear that, from the point of view of Cruzel, all the main original ideas found in Origen’s texts and going beyond the framework of several absolutely true provisions of the tradition, firstly, by definition, are hypothetical in nature, and, secondly, some of them do not reflect the views of Origen himself, while others do, although here we are not talking about final beliefs. In itself, this approach to Origen’s texts seems correct to me, but only as a general principle. In specific cases, a whole series of difficulties inevitably arise related to determining which hypothesis is “favorite” and which is not. It cannot be said that Kruzel had complete methodological clarity on this issue. Let me first point out just one example. We have seen that, according to Cruzel, Origen discusses the hypothesis of a new fall not because it represents his own thought, but only in order not to leave it out of consideration within the framework of his study. On what basis did Kruzel come to this conclusion? In the note he made, he explains that “Origen says this about another problem, methensomatosis” - and provides the corresponding references to the sources. Thus, Kruzel believes that if in relation to one hypothesis (metensomatosis) Origen explicitly formulated a certain motive that prompted him to introduce its discussion in his text, then the same motivation can be “by default” transferred to another hypothesis (the possibility of a new fall) discussed by Origen in a completely different place. However, such a technique can be considered methodologically flawless only under one condition - if it is obviously assumed that the concept of hypothesis has exactly the same and uniform meaning when applied to all hypotheses found in Origen’s texts. However, we have already seen that, according to Kruzel, hypotheses are heterogeneous and are divided into “favorite” and “just” hypotheses. It is clear that the motivation for introducing the hypothesis of metensomatosis, which is discussed in this case, implies that Origen himself most likely did not share such a hypothesis (as was in fact the case). Therefore, the possibility of an uncritical transfer of this motivation to the hypothesis of a new fall is far from self-evident, because the latter may also belong to the category of “favorites.” Thus, the main flaw in Kruzel's methodology is that, as this example shows, it tends implicitly to assume a general concept of hypothesis, which should apply to all theories that have a hypothetical status, and implies their alienness to the position of the author; but at the same time he is inconsistent, since in practice he himself admits that at least one of these theories (pre-existence) reflects the views of Origen himself. In my opinion, we should completely abandon this approach to Origen’s hypotheticalism. The task of the study should be to analyze the individual specifics of each specific hypothesis, rather than to subsume it under a certain general concept of a hypothesis, which is obviously regarded as self-evident. In addition, there is no escaping the fact that an important role in such research is often played by certain value preferences associated, roughly speaking, with the “anti-Origenist” or, on the contrary, apologetic attitude of the researcher. Moreover, in the latter case, the task is seen not only in recognizing the numerous evidence of the very significant heterogeneity of Origen in the Christian tradition, but still trying to soften and relativize them by pointing out their hypothetical nature and the presence in Origen’s texts themselves of important alternatives capable of presenting his doctrine in a more orthodox spirit. Rather, due to the initially recognized predominance of hypothetical discourse in Origen, it is considered necessary to prove that even the hypotheses that appear obviously in his texts are in fact significant for his thought. This is recognized only when there is nothing else left. This is exactly what Cruzel is forced to do with the theory of pre-existence. And it is not difficult to notice that it is precisely the significance of such hypotheses that have to be proven that lead away from the Christian tradition. Once you look at the same hypotheses from a different perspective, however, the situation changes dramatically. After all, the simple fact that Origen generally mentions and discusses certain concepts that are poorly consistent with the fundamental ideas of Christian tradition and does not always clearly reject them testifies to a certain significance and relevance of these concepts for his thought. Let Origen live in a period when the process of formation of Christian dogma was just beginning. But not every Christian thinker of the third century felt forced to deal at all with hypotheses, one way or another present in Origen’s texts, and at the same time treat them at least as alternatives, in principle deserving of discussion and not unequivocal rejection. From this point of view, it seems to me that there is still a certain correctness in von Ivanka’s judgment about the “Platonic-Gnostic features” of Origen’s thought: “although he, of course, often ignores and disavows them in his exegetical-theological thinking, he still did not overcome them as a thinker, and this is essential in this case for the problem of the meeting of Christianity and Platonism.” Therefore, in the future in this work I will adhere to the following attitude: one cannot knowingly assume that Origen does not share the hypothesis he formulates, only on the grounds that it is a hypothesis, and assume that the opposite still needs to be proven. If we talk about specific methodological criteria that would allow us to assess the degree of significance of a particular hypothesis for Origen himself, then there are at least three points that, from my point of view, should be paid attention to first of all. Firstly, it is obvious that Origen does not share the hypotheses with which he himself polemicizes and against which he directly speaks out in his writings. These are, for example, the concepts of metempsychosis (RA 1, 8, 4) or eternal recurrence (RA 2, 3, 4). Such a negative reaction in itself distinguishes hypotheses of this type from all those theories to which Origen does not formulate a clear attitude, or presents them as possible alternatives in the discussion. If we take into account that sometimes he himself speaks out against certain hypotheses, then those cases when he still does not do this acquire a completely different status and in relation to them it can no longer be assumed that they simply, due to their hypothetical nature, do not reflect the position of Origen himself: we have reason to think that if this were so, he would have stated this more definitely, as he does in other cases. Secondly, it is more likely that Origen does not subscribe to a particular hypothesis if an external source can be identified from which he could have drawn it. For example, in the case of metempsychosis, this is Pythagoreanism; in the case of eternal recurrence, this is Stoicism or, again, the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition. If it is not so easy to discover the source of the hypothesis analyzed by Origen, this in itself does not exclude the admissibility of the existence of such a source, but at the same time raises the possibility that this hypothesis as such was generated by the actual needs of Origen’s thought itself. Finally, the examination of each specific hypothesis from the point of view of how it relates to the fundamental tendencies of Origen's thought, which are difficult to deny, even despite its hypothetical nature (free will, divine pedagogy, correspondence of the beginning and the end, etc.), represents the third criterion necessary, from my point of view, in this matter. This criterion presupposes the assumption, albeit not of a rigid logic of the system, but, in any case, of a significant relationship between the main tendencies of Origen’s thought. With absolute certainty, any hypothesis can be recognized as not representing the position of Origen himself, therefore, only if it is 1) subjected to criticism by him; 2) borrowed from an external source; 3) contradicts the principles of his thought. At the same time, the opposite assumption, i.e. that a certain hypothesis actually reflects Origen’s point of view does not mean that he expressed it as an absolute truth or, even if only his own, but final conviction. This only means that such a hypothesis represents a relevant, although not exclusive, possibility of his own thought, which he came to, most likely, not by chance - and then the way opens for analyzing the motives that prompted him to do this. 3.3. Crusel's version of the cosmic process according to Origen Kruzel's point about the plurality of worlds is not simply one of emphasizing the hypothetical status of the theory. In addition, Cruzel offers his own interpretation of Origen’s cosmology, according to which it assumes the existence of only one material cosmos, which, naturally, is in perfect agreement with the data of Christian tradition. Apocatastasis, correlated by Cruzel with the end of the current world, according to this version does not necessarily have to be thought of as total, since, on the one hand, in Origen’s texts there are actually places where we are talking about the general restoration of rational creatures, on the other hand, there are also places where the eschatological division into sinners and righteous people is affirmed, as well as the salvation of the devil and demons is denied. Against this background, it becomes possible to see in the idea of ​​total apocatastasis nothing more than “hope.” In addition, Kruzel also questions the idea of ​​​​the non-finality of apokatastasis, based on the assumption of the possibility of a new fall. We have already seen that, according to Crusel, the hypothesis of a new fall does not represent the thought of Origen himself. The inalienability of the freedom of rational beings seems to support a new fall. However, even here Crusel points to the alternative understanding of freedom that, in his opinion, exists in Origen’s texts - as the final unity with good, excluding a new fall. Thus, all the problematic nature of the idea of ​​apokatastasis in Origen is actually eliminated, because it was reduced mainly to two points - totality and non-finality, and Crusel presents everything in such a way that apokatastasis may turn out to be non-total, but at the same time it will be final. This interpretation makes it possible to practically eliminate the multiplicity of worlds, since in this perspective a new material cosmos following the current one can only take place if we assume that the restoration that will occur at the end of this world will be followed by a new fall. If Origen sometimes speaks of a plurality of worlds, then, according to Crusel, by this it is not at all necessary to mean a numerically indefinite or even infinite sequence of cosmic structures, although not identical, but generally of the same type to the current material cosmos. Origen may be referring to the world of archetypes or ideas of creation in the Logos, the world of pre-existence, the present material cosmos and the future world of bliss. If Origen's picture of cosmic history is indeed this, then the only thing that significantly distinguishes it from the orthodox one is the assumption of a world of pre-existence. If we compare this understanding of Origen's cosmology with the above versions of the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds, it becomes obvious that Crusel takes into account only those of them, from the point of view of which the change of eons or worlds is possible only by allowing for restoration and fall in the intervals between individual worlds. But we have seen that such an assumption does not fit well with Origen's concept of divine pedagogy. In the light of the latter, the finale of the world process, which consists in the universal conversion of rational creatures to good, becomes possible only through the spread of God’s educational activity beyond the boundaries of one world and the introduction of numerous new worlds, which are a kind of “schools for souls.” However, this would mean that the worlds already precede apokatastasis, whereas, according to Crusel’s logic, Origen, as a last resort, only allowed that they could follow it, and even then under certain conditions that are hypothetical in nature. In this regard, it should be noted that the assumption of precisely this, and not another, relationship between the plurality of worlds and apokatastasis is far from being absolutely inevitable when interpreting Origen’s thought, especially if we take into account that those places in which Origen talks about the eschatological polarization of the righteous and sinners can be correlated with the end of the current eon, and the final unification of rational beings with good can be attributed to the general restoration at the end of the entire chain of eons. It is precisely this interpretation, in my opinion, that can compete with Krusel’s understanding of the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds. CHAPTER 4. ORIGEN'S HYPOTHETICAL METHOD AND THE TEXT OF RA 4.1. Distinguishing between doctrine and hypothetical research From the previous chapter it became clear that, while sharing the idea of ​​​​the hypothetical status of the concept of the plurality of worlds, I find it impossible, on this basis alone, to consider it as not reflecting Origen’s own views. But in order to come to a reasonable conclusion about how significant this hypothesis can be for understanding Origen’s worldview, one must first understand how exactly the hypothetical method is used in the text of the RA and what types of author’s position in relation to specific hypotheses are generally possible in this treatise. In the study of RA, it has become commonplace to point out the fundamental role of the distinction made by Origen in the preface to this treatise between the undoubted truths of church tradition (ecclesiastica praedicatio) and questions that remain unexplained within its framework, and therefore allow for free theological research. This distinction is formulated as follows: “... the holy apostles, preaching the faith of Christ, about certain [subjects] which they considered necessary (de quibusdam... quaecumque necessaria crediderunt), left to all believers, including those who seemed not particularly inclined to investigate divine wisdom, an extremely clear tradition (manifestissime tradiderunt), leaving the reasons for their assertions to be examined (rationem... assertionis eorum) to those who have acquired outstanding spiritual gifts and especially received from the Holy Spirit himself the grace of words, wisdom and knowledge. As for other [subjects] (de aliis vero), they, having mentioned their existence (quia sint), kept silent about how and why they exist (quomodo autem aut unde sint), [having done so] of course, so that the more inquisitive and wisdom-loving of their followers (studiosiores quique ex posteris suis, qui amatores essent sapientiae), namely, those who make themselves worthy and capable of receiving wisdom, have received [the opportunity] for an exercise in which the fruits of their mind would be manifested (exercitium habere possent, in quo ingenii sui fructum ostenderent).” Thus, here, first of all, the existence of necessary provisions (necessaria), which are extremely clearly and clearly (manifestissime) recorded in the apostolic tradition, is affirmed, and then two objects of possible research are highlighted. Firstly, these are the foundations of the very truths of the apostolic tradition (ratio assertionis eorum), and, secondly, other objects (alia), only mentioned in the tradition, but left without detailed explanation. It is to this kind of alia that the concept exercitium, “exercise,” is applied here. Most likely, this really means that the results of research, which is thought of as exercitium, should be assigned only a hypothetical status. But from this text as such it is impossible to conclude that exercitium here is equivalent to gumnas...a in the Athanasian sense, i.e. “exercise”, the entire function of which is to discuss other people’s opinions that are not shared by the author himself. Let us see, however, how this distinction between the truths of church tradition and controversial issues subject to hypothetical investigation correlates with those formulations in the text of the RA that are most often referred to when speaking of Origen’s “theology in search,” i.e. with a contrast between dogma and disputatio, as well as with a statement of alternative hypotheses without choosing between them, but with providing this choice to the reader. The clearest application of the distinction between church tradition and hypothetical research, dating back to the preface, can be found in RA 1, 6, 1, 12-19. Here the hypothetical nature of the reasoning is declared in connection with the consideration of eschatological problems (finis et consummatio rerum): “We speak about this with great fear and caution, discussing and exploring rather than establishing precise and definite [positions] (discutientibus magis et pertractantibus quam pro certo ac definito statuentibus). For above we indicated how the [area] of a certain doctrine should be limited (quae sint de quibus manifesto dogmate terminandum sit); which I think we did to the best of our ability when we spoke of the Trinity. In these [questions], as far as we can, we practice discussion rather than determination (de his vero disputandi specie magis quam definiendi, prout possumus, exercemur).” In this case, the selection of items that require a clear definition (de quibus manifesto dogmate terminandum sit) is associated with what was said on this issue “above” (in superioribus), and this is most logical to perceive as a direct reference to the preface. Therefore, if in this place the opposition of the dogmatic and hypothetical approaches is repeated twice (discutientibus magis et pertractantibus quam pro certo ac definito statuentibus; disputandi specie magis quam definiendi), then there is every possibility of assuming that the formulations pro certo ac definito statuentibus and (specie) definiendi, as well as manifesto dogmate mean the undoubted the truths of church tradition and the correct type of attitude towards them. In short, the term dogma in this case can be considered as an analogue of the term ecclesiastica praedicatio. This becomes even more clear from another similar passage, which is already at the beginning of the next chapter (RA 1, 7, 1), but in meaning rather sums up the eschatological theme of RA 1, 6. Here, first, the difference is once again stated between what can be “considered and discussed, guided by logical consistency” (pertractata atque discussa per consequentiae intellectum), and what should be spoken of as “a certain teaching” (definito dogmate) - expressions containing an unambiguous analogy to the corresponding formulations in RA 1, 6, 1; after which we are faced with an explicit identification of the concepts dogma and ecclesiae fides: “Now let us consider what it is appropriate to discuss further in accordance with our teaching, that is, the church faith” (RA 1, 7, 1, 7–9: Nunc ergo videamus quae sint, de quibus disserere in consequentibus convenit secundum dogma nostrum, id est secundum ecclesiae fidem). Meanwhile, such an identification cannot at all be extended to all of Origen’s word usage. As Kettler showed, the term dogma (δ ό γμα) both in the Greek works of Origen and in Rufinus’s translation of RA predominantly designates simply a certain categorically affirmed doctrine or position, and not at all a dogma of faith in the later understanding, or at least an unquestioned point of church tradition, as Origen himself understood it. If we turn directly to RA, here, in addition to the places already given, we can find several more examples in which the meaning of the word dogma, in any case, may be close to what is designated in other places as praedicatiö, for example, RA 2, 1, 5, 160, where in the words de hoc dogmate we mean the doctrine of the creation of the world by God, i.e. the truth of the tradition according to RA Praef. 4; RA 3, 2, 6, 397, which says that demonic forces act on us “to induce us to deviate from the truth of dogma” (ut transferri cogamur a veritate dogmatum). Along with this, the term dogma in the RA text is used to designate heretical and false teachings. A particularly striking example here is RA 1, 8, 4, 176, where the formulation “refutating and discarding this perverse teaching” (confutato hoc perverso dogmate atque depulso) refers to the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul into the body of an animal. Let us now turn to one more place where the hypothetical nature of the provisions under discussion is formulated in relation to the concept of dogma. In RA 2, 8, 4, 186-190, the following is said about the famous Origenian idea that the “soul” is the result of the “cooling” of the pre-existing “mind”: “Let the reader himself carefully discuss and consider (discutiat apud se qui legit diligentius et pertractet) what we have said about the transformation of the mind into the soul... And let this be perceived not as the doctrines we put forward (dogmata), but as something what we discuss by research and inquiry (tractandi more ac requirendi discussa).” In this case, by dogmata we do not mean the truths of tradition, as in RA 1, 6, 1 and 1, 7, 1. The meaning of this place is rather that the general concept of “teaching” (not necessarily church teaching) is contrasted here with everything that is discussed tractandi more ac requirendi, i.e. hypothetically. Thus, the obvious meaning of the term dogma, which is quite sufficient for the interpretation of this context, can be rendered as “categorically affirmed doctrine.” This, it seems, may be the meaning of another formulation of the hypothetical method in RA 3, 4, 5, 255-257: “We have, as far as we can, presented for consideration on behalf of individuals what can be said in discussing each of these doctrines (Et nos quidem, prout potuimus, ex singulorum personis quae dici possent disputationis modo de singulis dogmatibus in medium protulimus)". And in this case, by dogmata we do not mean the provisions included in the ecclesiastica praedicatio, but simply different points of view on the problem of the unity of the soul, presented on behalf of their supporters. This indicates that, in general, Origen’s hypotheticalism, as it is presented in the text of the RA, is based not so much on the distinction between necessaria and alia formulated in the preface, i.e. truths of church tradition and other questions regarding which research is possible (exercitium), as much as on a broader distinction between dogma and disputatio, i.e. between the general concept of a categorically affirmed doctrine and a study that is hypothetical in nature. And if some contexts allow the meaning of the term dogma to be reduced to the “truth of church tradition,” as clearly happens in RA 1, 7, 1, then this can be considered simply as the application of this term to one of the specific doctrines falling within its scope along with others. In any case, all the cited passages in which doctrine and hypothetical research are contrasted do not in themselves provide any obvious grounds for disparaging the latter as obviously and by definition not reflecting the point of view of the author. 4.2. Alternative hypotheses with reader choice When a contrast between alternative theories concerning the same subject is found in the RA text, their hypothetical status is simply due to the fact that, being mutually exclusive, they cannot be true at the same time. And then, if the author himself does not make a clear choice in favor of one of them, but calls on the reader to make his own decision, this inevitably relativizes the meaning of all the alternatives he gives. In RA 1, 6, 3, 122–131, precisely this approach is applied to the question of the possibility of salvation for the devil and demons: “But will some of these ranks, acting under the command of the devil and obeying his vice, ever in future centuries be able to turn to good, since they have the ability of free choice, or will a constant and inveterate vice, as a result of habit, turn into a kind of nature? You yourself, reader, consider (etiam tu qui legis probato) whether this part [of rational beings], neither in the visible temporal ages, nor in the invisible and eternal ones, will not be completely separated from this final unity and agreement.” In RA 2, 3, 7, 324-328, three possible points of view on the eschatological finale of the world process are similarly contrasted: “After we have outlined these three opinions (His igitur tribus opinionibus ... adumbratis) about the end of all things and the highest beatitude, to the best of our ability, let each reader himself more carefully and closely judge whether any of them can be approved or chosen (unusquisque legentium apud semet ipsum diligentius et scrupulosius iudicet, si potest aliqua harum probari vel eligi).” Of the three opinions mentioned, the first assumes the complete incorporeality of the state achieved by the creature as a result of apocatastasis; the second, on the contrary, allows for the preservation of bodily nature, albeit subjected to significant spiritualization; As for the third of the hypotheses mentioned here, it represents the end of the world process in a completely different aspect: finis omnium is thought of here as the achievement by intelligent creatures of another heaven and another earth, which are “above the sphere of the fixed stars” (341: supra illam, quae ἀπλανής dicitur, sphaeram). At the same time, the external neutrality of the alternative formulated in RA 2, 3, 7 is combined with some skepticism of the author in relation to the first of the listed hypotheses. Within this chapter (2, 3) this manifests itself in the fact that in RA 2, 3, 3, where the hypothesis of incorporeality is put into the mouths of certain nameless supporters (100: “those who think” - hi, qui putant...), we find a polemic with it, which is presented as if on behalf of the author himself: “But let’s see what the objections are to those who think so” (130: Sed videamus quid eis occurrat, qui haec ita asserunt), etc. The same problem - the materiality or immateriality of the perfect state of creatures at the end of the world - is discussed in RA 3, 6. As in RA 2, 3, 7, the discussion of this alternative ends with an appeal to the reader: “Having discussed the problem of the corporeal nature or the spiritual body, we leave it to the discretion of the reader to choose from both [possibilities] the one that he considers better.” At the same time, in this chapter (3, 6) Origen, in any case, is not at all inclined towards the theory of eschatological incorporeality. In RA 3, 6, 1, the question of the possibility of an absolutely incorporeal state, as in RA 2, 3, 3, is posed on behalf of “some” (41: requiritur a nonnullis), and then the doctrine of the “spiritual body” is stated in detail and rather as a statement rather than an assumption (3, 6, 4–9). If the chapter did not end with another call to the reader to choose between the proposed options, it would be difficult to find any reason to consider the doctrine of the “spiritual body” as a hypothesis. In other places of the RA, the author’s own rather negative attitude towards the hypothesis of eschatological incorporeality is already quite clearly expressed. In RA 2, 2, 1, 13–17, this is manifested in the very formulation of the question: “We should consider whether it is possible for rational beings, having reached the highest degree of holiness and bliss, to remain completely incorporeal, which personally seems to me difficult and hardly possible (quod mihi quidem difficillimum et paene inpossibile videtur).” A similar position on this matter is expressed in RA 4, 4, 8 (35), 333–334: “How difficult, if not impossible, this is from our point of view, we have already shown above in a detailed discussion” (Quod quam difficile sit vel paene inpossibile intellectui nostro, in superioribus singula disserentes ostendimus). In the tradition of "systematic" Origen studies, all evidence of the author's disagreement with the theory of eschatological incorporeality has traditionally been viewed as the result of Rufinus' editorial intervention. But, it seems to me, it is rather worth emphasizing the fact that even if in this case we consider Rufino’s version to be completely adequate to the meaning of the original, the signs of a certain author’s assessment contained in it are still not equivalent to a categorical denial. Origen, even according to this version, does not pass a final verdict on this hypothesis, but continues to discuss it and mainly ends the discussion with a simple statement of existing alternatives. This situation differs, for example, from the absolutely categorical denial of eternal return in RA 2, 3, 4 or the transmigration of the soul into the body of animals in RA 1, 8, 4. On the other hand, this example makes clear the possibility of combining in the RA text an outwardly neutral statement of equal alternatives with one or another form of authorial preference in favor of or, accordingly, against any of them. An even more clear example of such a combination can be found in RA 3, 4. In the first paragraph of this chapter, three opinions (tres opiniones) concerning the causes of human temptations are contrasted. According to one of them, this reason lies in the existence of two souls in every person, divine and inferior, of which the latter inclines a person to evil. The second opinion presupposes the unity of the human soul, while the principle that induces evil is seen in the body with which the soul is united. Finally, the third opinion reproduces the Platonic concept of the trichotomy of the soul. Moreover, the first two hypotheses are again presented on behalf of certain nameless supporters, “some,” while the authorship of the third is attributed to “Greek philosophers.” This third point of view is immediately unequivocally rejected, since, according to Origen, no confirmation can be found for it in Scripture (RA 3, 4, 1, 32–33), and further discussion concerns only the first two hypotheses. In RA 3, 4, 5, 249–254 it is shown that from the theory of two souls approximately the same conclusion inevitably follows as from the Gnostic teaching about the original predestination of some souls to salvation and others to destruction: “If we accept this, then how will it differ from [the opinion of] those who say that souls are by nature created different and are by nature destined either for salvation or for destruction (ab his, qui diversas naturas esse animarum dicunt creatas, quae naturaliter vel salvandae sunt vel periturae)? Only heretics (Quod utique solis haereticis placet) think this way, who, being unable to substantiate divine justice by pious reflection, invent such impious fabrications (impietatis figmenta).” It would seem that such an equation of one of the theories under discussion with the teaching of heretics, which is also a constant object of harsh criticism from Origen throughout the treatise, should lead to an unambiguous denial of the hypothesis of two souls. However, in this case, the text allows us to talk only about a certain degree of indirectly manifested author’s assessment, and not about the final choice, because immediately after the above quotation there follows another formulation of a hypothetical approach, providing this choice to the reader: “We, as far as we could, have presented for consideration [as if] on behalf of individual [people] what can be said in a discussion about each of these teachings; let the reader choose from this which point of view is preferable.” This passage shows that, within the framework of Origen’s method, it is possible to both unequivocally reject the hypothesis under discussion and retain its significance, despite its general hypothetical status and even a significant degree of the author’s aversion to it. 4.3. Submitting a hypothesis from a third party Of particular importance for understanding Origen’s research methodology is his habit of introducing into the text some of the hypotheses he considered as if from a third person, using constructions like “some say” or “someone, perhaps, will say.” Obviously, it is precisely in such cases that there may be a significant reason to assume that Origen is simply discussing the views of others, but does not at all share them himself. The use of such a technique in itself was quite traditional by the time of Origen. In ancient philosophical literature, it was not customary to necessarily name the exact source of one or another theory being presented; it was enough to simply use some phrase like “as some claim,” etc. In addition, such phrases may not at all refer to the views actually expressed by someone, but represent just a convention through which a hypothetical question is introduced into the text, formally put into the mouth of a fictitious opponent, but in fact being the author’s anticipation of a possible objection or even simply a formulation of a problem perceived by the author himself. For example, Aristotle constantly used the construction ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις for such purposes, i.e. “someone will probably experience difficulty” or “will express bewilderment.” It is well known how important the use of a fictitious opponent, often introduced into the text using the pronoun τις, acquired in the Hellenistic genre of diatribe. Thus, Origen, putting the theories he discusses into the mouths of “some” or “someone,” reproduces the standard technique of ancient philosophical literature. However, such attribution of controversial opinions to their nameless supporters in the case of RA can be interpreted in different ways. 4.3.1. On behalf of real opponents Firstly, there are often cases when the mysterious “some” on whose behalf a certain concept is formulated actually mean real representatives of a particular philosophical school or heretical teaching, who can be quite easily identified. This is the case, for example, whenever Origen polemicizes with Gnostic teachings about the natural predestination of people to salvation or destruction or about the evil demiurge. “In RA, where Origen so often takes up arms against heretics, he actually does not cite a single specific name,” Dorival notes in this regard. The only exception is the mention of Marcion and Valentinus in RA 2, 7, 1, 27 and Marcion, Valentinus and Basilides in RA 2, 9, 5, 135–136. In other, much more numerous cases, Origen’s opponents are defined either as “heretics” in general (for example: PA 1, 7, 2, 53; 2, 4, 1, 52; 2, 4, 3, 115, etc.), or just as nameless “some”, “those who”, etc. (PA 1, 8, 2, 27–31: “fables of those who... invents” – ...fabulas eorum, qui... fingunt; 2, 4, 1, 5: “those who think” – eos, qui putant, etc.). A similar situation occurs in the polemic with the concept of eternal recurrence, where Origen’s opponents, designated as qui and isti (2, 3, 4, 143 and 159), are either Stoics or representatives of the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition (cf. SS 4, 67–68; 5, 20–21). In all these examples, just as in the case of the anonymous adherents of the doctrine of transmigration of the soul (PA 1, 8, 4, 162: a quibusdam), it is quite clear both that Origen himself was not the author of the doctrine in question, and that he quite categorically rejects it as completely and completely erroneous. I think it is worth once again emphasizing this ability that Origen constantly demonstrates to unequivocally deny those theories with which he actually disagrees. The hypothetical attitude makes him cautious in formulating a positive doctrine, but it does not at all exclude the possibility for him to radically categorically refute a doctrine that seems to him false - if only it really seems to him to be so. 4.3.2. On behalf of the fictitious interlocutor However, it is not always possible to identify the “some” mentioned by Origen with any representatives of a particular philosophical or religious tradition. This in itself does not exclude that Origen had in mind some real persons, perhaps even personally familiar to him, whose activities remained unknown to us either entirely or in this aspect. But, on the other hand, there is a possibility that in such cases we are dealing with a literary device through which the author personifies alternative possibilities of his own thought or, if we assume that the authorship of such a hypothesis does not belong to him personally, possibilities, in any case, that have become relevant to his own thought. This kind of assumption can be made, for example, regarding the already discussed discussion in RA 3, 4, related to the theory of two souls and ending with the following formulation: “We, as far as we could, have presented for consideration (in medium protulimus) [as if] on behalf of individual [people] (ex singulorum personis) what can be said in a discussion about each of these teachings” (3, 4, 5, 255-257). The expression ex singulorum personis may well indicate just this kind of literary convention. It is quite possible that in this case Origen is actually discussing someone else's doctrine, which has real supporters. But there is no absolute contradiction between the assumption that the hypothesis under discussion has a real source, and the use in its presentation of a formal device that puts it in the mouth of a fictitious interlocutor. And if you just take a closer look at the text of the discussion developed in RA 3, 4, it will become obvious that in places Origen actually resorts to this technique. For example, in the second paragraph of this chapter (RA 3, 4, 2), the theory of two souls is first presented on behalf of “some” (36–37: “what some usually prove” - quid adstruere solent quidam), then a possible objection that “anyone” could make to them is given (65: “if anyone objects to them” - Si quis obiciat eis...), and after that a possible answer from them is offered parties (72–73: “they will try to resolve and dispute this [objection]” – haec illi resolvere atque inpugnare conabuntur). The expression si quis obiciat can hardly be understood as an indication of a real opponent. It is almost no different in meaning from the impersonal phrase “if they object to this” and suggests that this quis simply personifies one of the arguments that seems possible to Origen himself during such a dispute, if it had taken place. Accordingly, the counterargument given below most likely does not go back to any real source, but simply reflects the opinion of the author himself about what could be objected to. On the other hand, if we turn to the alternative theory, which asserts that “there is in us one movement and one life of the same soul, whose salvation or destruction is attributed to itself in accordance with its actions,” it becomes clear that in this position, emphasizing the free will inherent in the soul in choosing between death and salvation, there is essentially nothing that is not asserted in other places of the treatise by the author in his own person. And if here this position is introduced on behalf of “those who” (3, 4, 4, 172: ab his, qui) adhere to it, is it not possible to simply assume a literary convention here? Whatever the case may be at this point, in Origen's Greek texts it is not uncommon for one or another of the alternative points of view to be introduced by reference to τὶς or τινές, but this in itself does not mean at all that by “someone” or “some” any real opponents of the author are always meant. Of course, often we are talking about a point of view that is presented as a possible objection to the author and with which he argues. But, on the other hand, there are no less frequent examples in which one can really talk about nothing more than a formal device that personifies potentially conceivable positions on a particular issue, perceived by the author himself. For example, if Origen finds that a certain place in the Holy Scripture allows for two different interpretations, then to introduce them into the text he can use some kind of phrase like εἴποι δ ᾽ ἄν τις ἄλλος δ ῝, presenting each of these interpretations as if from a third person. This technique, typical of Origen’s style, is partly connected precisely with the hypothetical nature of the reasoning: it seems to emphasize that for the author the final truth of these interpretations remains in question. However, no matter how preliminary the alternative hypotheses formulated in this way may seem to the author, it is clear that in many cases they belong to him and are not simply borrowed theories of others that he only mentions. Quite typical in this regard is the formal structure of Origen’s exegesis on John 1, 6 (“There was a man sent from God; his name was John”) in CJ 2, 29, 175–30, 180. First, through τις, the very formulation of the question is asked: “Someone ( τις ) think more carefully about the word “sent” - for after all, sent [usually] sent from somewhere somewhere - will ask where John was sent from and to.” One of the possible answers, according to which John was sent to this world from heaven or from paradise, is also given in the third person (CJ 2, 29, 175, 11: “Having examined this saying further, he may express the opinion that,” etc.), as well as the following objection to it (CJ 2, 29, 178, 1-2: “He who objects to this understanding that looks deeper will say..."). Finally, CJ 2, 29, 179–30, 180 demonstrates the compatibility of both proposed interpretations. In all this lengthy reasoning, the hypothetical opponents, in whose mouths two options for understanding John 1, 6 are put, are simply personifications of the interpretative possibilities seen by Origen himself. But even in those cases where the point of view introduced through such a technique is considered by the author as an objection to his own position and causes controversy on his part, this in itself does not guarantee that he has some real opponents in mind. This could also be a purely hypothetical debate. In other words, it all can come down to the fact that Origen himself thinks about what objections may be made to him, what questions may arise regarding certain aspects of his reasoning, and tries to anticipate them. It is clear, however, that these potential difficulties, although formally presented on behalf of “some” or “someone,” are generated precisely by the thought of Origen himself, thanks to which the course of his thoughts appears before the reader in all its ambiguity and incompleteness. Thus, it can be said that a characteristic feature of Origen's style is a tendency to formally personify both the alternative possibilities of his own thought and the potential objections to it that he himself perceived. This feature, often found in his Greek writings, represents one of the essential elements of Origen’s hypothetical setting and may well stand behind those places in the Latin text of the RA where the hypothesis discussed by the author is presented in the third person. 4.3.3. Possibility of Rufinus intervention A third possibility for interpreting the references to “some” or “others” in the RA text is that they may represent distortions introduced into the treatise by Rufinus. This means that this or that theory, which in the original was expressed on behalf of Origen himself, in the translation could be presented as the point of view of someone else, only discussed by the author, and often in a polemical manner. This is exactly how representatives of the “systematic” approach usually regarded, for example, the fact that in RA 2, 2, 1; 2, 3, 3 and 3, 6, 1, the hypothesis of eschatological incorporeality is presented as the opinion of some nameless opponents of Origen. The suspicious attitude towards Rufinus's version in this case was based not so much on criticism of the text, but on the fact that the hypothesis of incorporeality fit better into the desired logic of Origen's system. Even if this approach is considered outdated and tendentious, there is still reason for doubt. Rist, who analyzed the Greek and Latin versions of the discussion about the problem of free will in the first chapter of the third book of the RA, gave a specific example of how the opinion put in the mouth of “some” in the Latin text is expressed in the first person in the Greek text. Where in the Latin version we read that “in some dumb animals, for example, in dogs with a keen sense of smell or in war horses, a certain greater order of movement is found than in other animals, so that to some it seems (ita ut videantur aliquibus) that they are moved as if by some rational feeling” (3, 1, 3, 61-64), the original Greek says: “an action performed hunting dogs or war horses, I would say (ἵ ν ᾽ ο ὕ τως εἴπω), somewhat close to reasonable” (3, 1, 3, 45–47). This discrepancy may not seem very significant, since Origen’s expression ἵ ν ᾽ ο ὕ τως εἴπω, of course, does not mean that Origen here literally ascribes rationality to animals, but, on the contrary, indicates that the concept of rationality can be applied to them only in the approximate sense of the word. But even in such a passage, which is very innocent in meaning, and by no means entails any particularly “dangerous” consequences of a doctrinal nature, Rufinus for some reason considered it necessary to attribute the statement of Origen himself to an unnamed aliquibus. After this, don’t we have a legitimate reason to assume that he could have done this all the more in those cases when we were actually talking about theories that were questionable from a dogmatic point of view, which Origen formulated on his own behalf? 4.3.4. Conclusion: presenting a hypothesis from a third person and the author’s position From all that has been said, we can conclude that even if the hypothesis in the RA text is formally presented in the third person, it does not follow that it does not belong to Origen himself. From this point of view, it looks especially indicative how the already mentioned alternative of eschatological incorporeality and the spiritual body is presented in RA 1, 6, 4. Formally, the hypothesis of incorporeality is presented here as an alien theory, which the author himself seems unlikely: “If anyone (si qui) thinks that at this end the material, that is, corporeal, nature will completely perish, then I absolutely cannot understand (nullo omnino genere intellectui meo occurrere potest), how are there so many similar ones [i.e. intelligent] substances could lead life and exist without bodies” (1, 6, 4, 175–179). But also the opposite hypothesis, i.e. the doctrine of the spiritual body, also expressed on behalf of the “other”: “Another, perhaps, will say (Alius fortasse dicet) that at that end every corporeal substance will be so pure and purified that it can be imagined like ether, possessing a certain heavenly purity and transparency” (1, 6, 4, 182-185). It is clearly seen that this opposition si qui - alius is similar to standard Greek constructions of the type εἴποι δ ᾽ ἄν τις ἄλλος δ ῝, the characteristic nature of which for Origen’s style was already mentioned above. If we remember that the line of reasoning in RA 3, 6 and 4, 4, 8 (35) allows us to see in the hypothesis of the spiritual body exactly the point of view towards which Origen himself is inclined, then one of two things turns out: either alius in this case is simply a personification of his own, albeit inconclusive, position, or - if we still take this expression in the literal sense and consider that Origen is really simply discussing someone else’s theory - we we get a clear example of how this circumstance in itself does not at all exclude his own sympathy in relation to precisely such a theory. In any case, it follows absolutely clearly that Origen can put into the mouth of “another” or “some” a hypothesis that is close to himself. This means that if a hypothesis is presented in an RA text from a third person, this cannot obviously be taken as a sign that this opinion is not shared by the author himself and he is thus distancing himself from it. 4.4. Discussion of the hypothesis with which Origen does not agree (using the example of the doctrine of metempsychosis) It’s another matter if the clearly expressed motivation for introducing a hypothesis boils down to the author’s indication that he is discussing it simply so that it does not seem as if he is unfamiliar with one of the discussion possibilities. Such a statement, firstly, in itself means that the theory in question does not initially belong to the author himself, and, secondly, to a certain extent, it inclines us to think that he does not share it. The fact that he discusses it at all seems more like a reluctance to shy away from polemics with it: otherwise the reader might get the impression that since the author ignores a certain point of view, then he has nothing to argue with it. Approximately the same logic can be assumed in RA 3, 4, 3, 164–167, where the inclusion in the text of a lengthy discussion of the two-soul hypothesis is justified as follows: “We have considered this, wishing to discuss the opinions [associated] with individual statements, and in doing so we have stepped aside more than we intended, so that it would not seem that we do not know the [doubt] that is usually raised by those who ask (uti ne latere nos putarentur ea, quae moveri solent ab his, qui quaerunt, utrum etc.)”, etc. (the question follows whether a person has two souls). But a particularly striking example of the use of such motivation when introducing a certain hypothesis into the text of the RA is found not in Rufinus’ translation of the treatise, but in Jerome’s letter to Avitus (Ep. 124, 4; PL 22, 1063) and in that part of Pamphilus’ “Apology” (Apol., 9; PG 17, 608A), which was preserved again in Rufinus’ translation. There is no doubt that both Jerome and Pamphilus quote the same passage from the RA in different versions, since in both cases we are talking about metempsychosis, and the texts themselves contain a sufficient number of convincing parallels. These texts are: “And in the end, in order not to be mistaken for an adherent of the Pythagorean doctrine, which affirms metempsychosis, after such an impious reasoning that wounded the soul of the reader, he says: “According to our opinion, let this not be [accepted as] a doctrine, but only be examined and posed as a problem, so that it does not seem completely unexamined.” Et ad extremum, ne teneretur Pythagorici dogmatis reus, qui asserit metemyÚcwsin, post tam nefandam disputationem, qua lectoris animam vulneravit, Haec, inquit, juxta nostram sententiam non sint dogmata, sed quaesita tantum atque proiecta, ne penitus intractata viderentur. “Finally, that he said this for the sake of discussion, and not for confirmation, he himself showed by those [words] which he added after analyzing the subject itself, saying the following: “As for us, let this not be [perceived] as a doctrine, but as what we said for the sake of discussion, and let it be rejected. After all, this was said only so that the issue raised would not seem undiscussed.” Denique quod discutiendi haec et non confirmandi dixerit causa, ipse per ea quae post tractatum rei ipsius adiecit, ostendit hoc modo dicens: Sed haec, quantum ad nos pertinet, non sint dogmata, sed discutionis gratia dicta sint, et abiiciantur. Pro eo autem solo dicta sunt, ne videretur quaestio mota, non esse discussa. The following parallels can be established between these two quotes: Haec haec; juxta nostram sententiam quantum ad nos pertinet; non sint dogmata non sint dogmata; sed quaesita tantum sed discutionis gratia dicta sint; atque proiecta et abiiciantur; ne penitus intractata viderentur ne videretur... non esse discussa. However, despite the general similarity, the versions of Jerome and Pamphilus are not completely identical in meaning. First of all, this concerns the parallel proiecta abiiciantur. The verb abiiciantur indicates that, according to Origen, the theory of metempsychosis should not only be discussed within the framework of his hypothetical approach, but also unequivocally rejected, while proiecta is a form that, in principle, can also have a similar meaning, i.e. indicate rejection – Kettler considered as a possible transfer of the Greek προβληθέντα and, accordingly, translated it as “proposed as a problem”, als Probleme vorgelegt, extending the same meaning to abiiciantur: “Proiecta or, accordingly, et abiiciantur... already in view of the next target sentence (ne pro eo), depending on them, in the original could not express any rejection, but just have a certain meaning parallel to the expressions quaesita or, accordingly, discussionis gratia dicta... No rejection is expressed here, but only a distinction is made between an open question and a completed teaching.” Cruzel, polemicizing with Kettler, proceeds precisely from the fact that the negation expressed through abiiciantur should also be seen in proiecta. Kettler's assumption that abiiciantur, and not just proiecta, can be translated in the sense of als probleme vorgelegt seems to me an obvious stretch. His argument, which appeals to the syntactic structure of the phrase, can indeed be applied to Jerome's version of the text. In this case, the subordinate clause ne penitus intractata viderentur directly depends on the form of the proiecta, so that the translation “let this be... posed as a problem so that it does not seem completely unconsidered” seems more logical than “let it be... rejected so that it does not seem completely unexamined.” But this argument cannot be applied to the text of Pamphilus, since the form abiiciantur here closes the phrase and the next sentence, starting with pro eo, does not depend on it in any way. In this respect, Kruzel's interpretation of this passage seems more successful than Kettler's interpretation. But this does not mean that it is the only possible one. If taken in isolation, Jerome's version of the text can easily be interpreted in the sense proposed by Kettler. In itself, it really looks like a simple statement of the hypothetical nature of the reasoning, and not as an expression of the author’s negative reaction to the theory under discussion. Therefore, in my opinion, there is no need to necessarily adjust one option to another. It can be assumed that here too we are faced with the manifestation of opposite tendencies in the interpretation of Origen’s text by Jerome and Pamphilus themselves (or already by Rufinus, who translated Pamphilus). Which of these two versions can be considered as more consistent with the meaning of the lost original? Both of these quotations are usually correlated with RA 1, 8, 4, where the theory of metempsychosis is presented on behalf of “some” (162: a quibusdam), which we find neither in Pamphilus nor in Jerome, and then harshly and - in comparison even with Pamphilus’s version, which is very laconic in this regard (abiiciantur) - is verbosely rejected: “We not only do not accept these [evidence], but all their statements that go against our faith are not acceptable and we reject.” Perhaps Rufinus was more accurate when he translated an isolated quotation from the RA text in Pamphilus' Apology than when he created his own version of the translation of the entire RA. This doesn't change things essentially. In the Greek texts of Origen's other works one can find enough passages confirming his clearly negative attitude towards the Pythagorean theory of metempsychosis. So Pamfilov’s version of the quotation, in any case, does not contain anything that could not in principle be present in the lost original. On the other hand, even if we accept Jerome's version as more correct, this passage simply once again establishes the general difference between the dogmatic and hypothetical approach. It is clear that the latter fully admits the author’s reluctance to the hypothesis under discussion. 4.5. Result: hypothetical method and author's position of Origen A specific analysis of those passages in Rufinus’s translation of the RA that can be used to characterize Origen’s “theology in search” showed how diverse the gradations of Origen’s hypothetical method are. From all that has been said, it is clear, firstly, that Origen proceeded from the basic distinction between categorically affirmed teaching and hypothetical research, and if terminologically such a word as dogma could be used by him to designate both Christian teaching and the teachings of heretics or ancient philosophical schools, then in essence only the provisions of church tradition listed in the preface to RA were considered by him as true teachings. The rest was left to the hypothetical study. And in the course of such a study, Origen could, on the one hand, discuss other people’s theories, on the other, put forward his own, so that both of them initially had for him the status of equal hypotheses, regarding the truth or untruth of which nothing had yet been decided. As for other people's theories, as a result of the discussion, he could, firstly, radically and unequivocally reject a theory that seemed to him completely and completely false (for example, the theory of metempsychosis in RA 1, 8, 4), and secondly, show a certain degree of aversion to such a hypothesis on his part, but still leave the final choice to the reader and thereby preserve its overall significance as a probable hypothesis (as in the case of the theory of two souls in RA 3, 4, 5). Finally, the very fact that a formally discussed hypothesis is often presented in a third person does not in the least exclude its possible ownership by the author himself or at least the author’s possible sympathy for it (as the discussion of the hypothesis of the spiritual body in RA 1, 6, 4 and other places in the treatise shows). If Origen simply expounds a theory on his own behalf and does not even use the typical techniques indicating its hypothetical status (contrasting disputatio and dogma, mutually exclusive alternatives with an appeal to the reader, putting a hypothesis in the mouth of “some” or “another”), then it, of course, should also be considered as a hypothesis simply because it is not among the categorically affirmed truths of tradition listed in the preface, but at the same time it can no longer be said about it that it “does not represent the thought” of Origen himself. The incompleteness of agreement shown by him in this case, which is quite natural for a researcher formulating a certain hypothesis and precisely as a hypothesis, would be absurd to regard as evidence of disagreement. Therefore, the approach that, based simply on the very hypothetical nature of this or that concept considered by Origen, tries to level out the significance of the latter for his thought, in my opinion, presents the matter in a very wrong way. Evaluating “hypothetical” and “systematic” Origen studies from this point of view, one can draw a somewhat paradoxical conclusion: despite all the differences in their methodology and the opposition of conclusions, in a certain respect they coincide in the interpretation of the very concept of a hypothesis. Kettler, as we have seen, believed that all hypothetical formulations in RA are simply tactical ploys that disguise the author’s agreement with whichever alternative hypothesis fits better into the “logic of the system.” On the other hand, Crusel always seemed to insist on the authenticity of Origen's hypotheticalism and sought to take Origen's research attitude completely seriously. But in those cases when a simple indication of the hypothetical nature of a certain doctrine is used by him to assume that Origen does not share this doctrine, does this not border on the interpretation of the hypothetical approach as a purely formal device, which in fact hides a very definite choice? In fact, we are faced here with the same dualism of form and content: on the one hand, the text declares the general hypothetical status of a certain theory, which in itself does not indicate either denial or categorical agreement, but still gives it a certain degree of probability; on the other hand, it is assumed that behind such explicit declarations there is hidden a very definite position, a deliberate disposition “for” the hypothesis, because in fact it is only presented to the reader, and is not perceived by the author himself as a hypothesis (Kettler), or “against” the hypothesis, because it is “just” a hypothesis and, therefore, it may very well be that in fact it means a point of view not shared by the author (Kruzel). So in this sense, not only “systematic” but also “hypothetical” Origen studies does not take the research attitude of Origen’s thought seriously. A serious attitude would presuppose, first of all, the awareness that giving any theory the status of a hypothesis means, of course, not considering it as the ultimate truth, but, on the other hand, still undoubtedly seeing in it a potential truth, a probability of truth, and if then the discussion of the hypothesis even leads to its rejection, then this is only one of the various reactions possible on the part of the author. Now we need to see how everything that has been said relates to the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds, i.e. what were the specific motives that prompted Origen to introduce its discussion into the RA text at all, and under which of the above types of author’s attitude to the hypotheses under discussion does it fall? CHAPTER 5. FORMULATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS OF PULTURITY OF WORLDS IN THE TEXT RA 2, 3, 1–5 5.1. RA 2, 3, 1 – asking a question The uncertainty of the protological and eschatological aspects of cosmic existence, which is stated in the preface to the RA, creates a theoretical opportunity to pose the question of whether there was before this world and whether there will be another world or worlds after it. In RA 2, 3, 1, this question is posed in such detail that it occupies this entire paragraph: “It remains that after this we consider whether there was not another world before this world that exists now, and if there was one, then whether it was the same as the one that exists now, or a little different, or worse; or there was no world at all, but there was something such as, in our opinion, that [coming] end after all will be, when the kingdom will be handed over to God and the Father: which [end] was nevertheless the end of another world, that, therefore, after which this world began, God was prompted to create this diverse and varied world by the diverse fall of rational natures. But, I think, it is worth considering in a similar way whether after this world there will be any treatment and correction, although more severe and full of suffering for those who did not want to submit to the Word of God, yet [accomplished] by education and reasonable instruction, whereby those who have already in this present life devoted themselves to these studies and, having become purer in mind, already here become receptive to divine wisdom, could grow to a fuller understanding of the truth, and will not follow Is this immediately the end of everything? or for the sake of correction and improvement of those who need it, there will again be another world, either similar to the one that exists now, or better than it, or even much worse; and whatever the world [that follows] may be after this, how long it will [exist], or whether it will exist at all; and whether there will ever be [such a time] when there will be no more peace, or whether there has ever been [such a time] when there was no world at all; whether numerous [worlds] existed or will [still] exist; Does it ever happen that one [world] comes out equal and similar to another in everything and indistinguishable? This abundance of alternatives may seem confusing at first glance, but can generally be boiled down to a few basic options. First, the question is posed in a protological aspect. The first possibility that Origen sees here is that before this world there was another, which could be the same as the current one, different or worse. It would be logical to expect that the next general alternative to the existence of another world should simply be to deny its existence. And at first the formulation of this alternative seems to justify such an expectation: “or there was no world at all, but there was something that, in our opinion, will be the end after all, when the kingdom is handed over to God and the Father.” Reference to 1 Cor. 15, 24 (“when the kingdom is handed over to God and the Father”) is a typical sign for Origen’s texts, indicating that we are talking about finis in the sense of apokatastasis. Thus, it is assumed here that the existence of this world was preceded by a state of created existence similar to that which should be achieved during apocatastasis. But the continuation of the phrase indicates that this state is thought of here exclusively as the end of another world that preceded it: “which [end] was nevertheless the end of another world, the one, therefore, after which this world began.” Thus, from the very beginning, in the very formulation of the question “what was before this world,” Origen is not at all dealing with a choice between the assumption of the existence of a previous world and the absolute denial of its existence. The alternative “or there was no world at all” in fact here only assumes that there could be some gap between the previous and the present world, and in it “the varied fall of rational natures prompted God to create this varied and varied world.” If we think of such an interval as incorporeal, it turns out that the question being raised here is precisely that version of the hypothesis of cosmic cyclism, which presupposes incorporeal intervals between individual material worlds or eons. And this option must be distinguished from the other, according to which the change of worlds occurs without mediation by incorporeal intervals. That such a possibility exists for Origen also follows from the very formulation of the question in this place. Then comes the turn of eschatological issues. The alternative formulated here is less clear-cut. Both options for what will happen “after this world” are associated with the idea of ​​​​divine pedagogy: the first involves “a certain treatment and correction” (curatio aliqua et emendatio), and the second - “correction and improvement” (correctio et emendatio) of rational beings. The whole difference is that, apparently, only in the second case will divine pedagogy be connected with the emergence of a new cosmos; in the first case, it remains essentially absolutely unclear where and how it will be implemented. It is only clear that this will take place after the end of the given world and before the apokatastasis, which, nevertheless, will come immediately after this emendatio, so that the present world is not separated from it by another world or a series of other worlds (post haec statim finis omnium consequetur). Probably, this possibility can be correlated with the question that is missing in a number of manuscripts and posed further about the future world: will it exist at all (si omnino erit)? Taking into account the entire previous context of the paragraph, this question can be interpreted as a hypothetical assumption that the current world will be the last in the sequence of eons. Further, both in the eschatological and protological aspects, the question is raised about the possibility of such a state of being in which the world does not exist at all: “and will there ever be [such a time] when there will no longer be any world, or whether there has ever been [such a time] when there was no world at all.” Such a possibility is here referred to as a certain indefinite eschatological or, accordingly, protological perspective (aliquando), and this is most naturally understood in the sense that we are not talking about a state of being that immediately precedes or follows a given world. Moreover, all questions about what will happen immediately before or after this world have already been raised in this paragraph. The fact that this distant protological or eschatological perspective is associated with the absolute non-existence of the world suggests that there may be talk here about the possibility of an absolute beginning and end of all cosmic history, i.e., in other words, the question is whether the sequence of world cycles had an absolute beginning, before which there was not a single world as a cosmic cycle at all, and, on the other hand, whether this sequence will have an absolute end, after which the chain of world cycles will forever breaks off. Only after considering these particular possibilities, Origen moves on to a more general formulation of the question, which already explicitly introduces the idea of ​​​​numerous worlds that existed before this cosmos or following it: “whether numerous [worlds] existed or [still] will exist.” He then elaborates on this question in relation to the concept of eternal recurrence: “does it ever happen that one [world] comes out equal and similar to another in everything and indistinguishable.” Thus, on the basis of this paragraph we can conclude that when considering the question of what was before this world and what will be after it, for Origen the following hypothetical alternatives initially exist: 1) this world is immediately preceded by another world; 2) another world precedes this world, but is separated from it by a gap in which the restoration and new fall of spiritual beings takes place; 3) after this world there will no longer be a new world, but after an indefinite period of correction of spiritual beings, the universal end will immediately come - finis omnium; 4) after this world there will be a new world necessary for the implementation of divine pedagogy; 5) the sequence of worlds has an absolute beginning and an absolute end; 6) both before and after this world there are many worlds; 7) successive worlds are different, in particular - worse or better than the current world; 8) worlds following each other are identical. 5.2. Discussion of the hypothesis of the periodic existence of matter in 2, 3, 2–3 Although in the further text of this chapter (RA 2, 3) it is impossible to find a consistent consideration of all the questions posed in the first paragraph, this text still allows us to trace in general terms exactly how Origen answers them. From the beginning of the second paragraph, a discussion of two alternative hypotheses begins - absolute incorporeality, achieved through apocatastasis, and the spiritualization of the body (RA 2, 3, 2–3). The hypothesis of incorporeality in RA 2, 3, 2 is introduced as follows: “So, in order to make it clearer whether corporeal matter exists at intervals (utrum materia corporalis per intervalla subsistat) and whether it will cease to exist, just as it did not exist before its origin, let us first consider whether it can happen that someone lives without a body” (2, 3, 2, 29-32). It is important to note that this hypothesis is not yet being put into the mouths of “others” or “some”. Moreover, the mention that corporeal matter, according to this point of view, exists per intervalla implies that periodic apocatastasis is being discussed here. Thus, this formulation of the question can be correlated with the second hypothesis listed in the first paragraph (another world precedes this world, but is separated from it by an interval in which the restoration and new fall of spiritual beings takes place). Subsequently, Origen returns again to the hypothesis of incorporeality only at the very beginning of the third paragraph, and here it is presented as someone else’s point of view: “However, those who think (hi, qui putant) that rational creatures are ever capable of leading a life outside of bodies, can at this point say something like the following (possunt in hoc loco talia quaedam movere)” (2, 3, 3, 100–102). The hypothetical objection that proponents of incorporeality make in response to the spiritual body hypothesis is that they regard the spiritualization of corporeal nature as an intermediate stage on the road to its complete disappearance. In this case, it remains to draw a conclusion, which Origen no longer puts directly into the mouths of others, but presents, one might say, impersonally: “If this seems consistent, it remains to be thought that an incorporeal state will someday be inherent in us” (2, 3, 3, 120–122: Si ergo haec habere consequentiam videntur, reliquum est ut status nobis aliquando incorporeus futurus esse credatur). As we see, alternative hypotheses are included in the context of a hypothetical discussion that could be conducted between their supporters. In this regard, is it possible to think that the reference to hi, qui putant is of a completely formal nature? Until now, everything looks as if both discussed alternatives were presented by the author as equally valid, and even the fact that the incorporeality hypothesis is attributed to others does not in itself change anything in this regard. But then the phrase: Sed videamus quid eis occurrat, qui haec ita asserunt (130), introduces the following passage, which may already indicate that Origen himself is entering into polemics with the hypothesis of incorporeality: “For if corporeal nature is [totally] eliminated, it will seem necessary that it should be restored again and created a second time; for it seems possible that rational beings, from whom the faculty of free will is never taken away, may again succumb to certain disturbances, with divine permission, so that they, always maintaining [the same] unchangeable state, do not accidentally fall into ignorance that [only] by the grace of God, and not because of their virtue, they were in [a state of] final bliss; these same disturbances will undoubtedly be followed again by the difference and diversity of bodies, from which the world is always constructed, [after all] the world can never exist if it does not consist of difference and diversity; and it in no way can arise outside of corporeal matter” (RA 2, 3, 3, 130–142). It was this passage that Crusel had in mind when he argued that the possibility of a second fall was considered by Origen only because it follows from the point of view of the supporters of final incorporeality. Meanwhile, such an understanding of this passage depends entirely on the interpretation of the introductory phrase: Sed videamus quid eis occurrat, qui haec ita asserunt. It is the verb occurrat that can be interpreted as indicating that we are talking about an objection. Then the literal translation of the phrase would be: “But let us see what is the objection to those who say so.” If we are really dealing here with the author’s polemical attack against the hypothesis of incorporeality, then it is natural to assume that the entire argumentation that explicates the formulation of quid eis occurrat belongs precisely to Origen, and does not reproduce the logic of thought of the hypothetical adherents of this theory themselves. But this would mean that it was Origen who saw in the hypothesis of incorporeality a reason for drawing a conclusion from it in the spirit of the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds. Meanwhile, it is not at all obvious that the phrase: Sed videamus quid eis occurrat, qui haec ita asserunt, actually introduces some kind of objection. It all depends on how to understand the verb occurrat. There is no stretch, for example, in the following translation of this phrase: “But let’s see what comes to mind for those who say this.” The verb occurrere is repeatedly used in the text of the RA in precisely this sense. With this translation, the entire subsequent passage, in which the hypothesis of incorporeality is considered as a prerequisite for allowing a new fall, is only a continuing neutral presentation of this hypothesis of incorporeality itself and its consequences, and is by no means an objection to it. Of course, in this case, the letter of the text indicates that this is someone else’s hypothesis, which Origen is only expounding. But we must remember that the formal attribution of the hypothesis discussed in RA to someone else does not exclude the author’s sympathy for it. In addition, the entire argument that follows this controversial phrase represents a set of provisions that are expressed elsewhere in the RA on behalf of the author himself. This concerns the central thesis for the entire treatise about the radical freedom of rational beings, and the idea that rational creatures can remain in a state of perfection only “by the grace of God, and not because of their virtue” (dei gratia et non sua virtute), and the stable linking of the concept of mundus with the concept of diversitas/varietas, and an indication of the necessity of matter for the existence of diversity. If this passage has a polemical meaning, this is further proof that Origen himself, on the basis of his own cosmological views, derived from the hypothesis of incorporeality the possibility of a new fall. But if we do not attribute a polemical meaning to this place, then we have here a decisive argument in favor of the fact that the reference to others in this case is only a formality and in fact Origen is formulating his own hypothesis. 5.3. Criticism of the theory of identity of worlds or “eternal return” in 2, 3, 4 From the beginning of the fourth paragraph, a discussion begins of that version of the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds, which was the last mentioned in the first paragraph and assumed the complete identity of worlds: “Those who claim that from time to time worlds indistinguishable from each other and identical in everything arise, I don’t know what evidence could confirm this.” Here, putting a hypothesis into the mouths of others does not arouse any suspicion, firstly, because the doctrine of “eternal recurrence” is repeatedly attested in the ancient philosophical tradition, and secondly, since Origen’s Greek texts also contain polemics with this doctrine (CC 4, 67–68; 5, 20–21), from which it becomes clear that in this case he could have had in mind either the Stoics (CC 4, 68; 5, 20), or Platonists and Pythagoreans (5, 21). Usually RA 2, 3, 4 are considered as primarily a presentation of the Stoic position. But the text makes no specific mention of any particular school of philosophy. An appeal to the indicated passages from the CC shows that, when criticizing the “eternal return,” Origen could not necessarily have had Stoicism in mind. Moreover, none of the details of the Stoic doctrine given by Origen in the SS are mentioned in RA 2, 3, 4. Here Origen formulates his objection to the concept of “eternal recurrence” as follows: “For souls are not governed in their actions and desires by some movement, which after many centuries returns to normal, but wherever the freedom of their own mind directs them, there they direct the course of their actions.” “A certain movement, after many centuries returning to normal” or - literally - “to the same circles” is a rather vague expression, directly indicating only the cyclical nature of world development as a whole. Perhaps what is meant here is something more concrete, namely the astrological determinism of earthly events: the fact that “souls are guided” or “controlled” (animae aguntur) by a certain circular movement then means not simply that they are somehow included in the cyclicity of the cosmic process, but that their actions or desires (vel agant vel cupiant) are causally determined by the cyclic movement of the heavenly bodies. However, in CC 5, 21 Origen connects astrological determinism only with the Platonic and Pythagorean tradition, and precisely in the context of comparing the Platonists and Pythagoreans on the one hand and the Stoics (CC 5, 20) on the other. From this point of view, the criticism of the “eternal recurrence” in PA 2, 3, 4 may be meant not so much by the Stoics as by the Platonists and Pythagoreans. In any case, RA 2, 3, 4 can be taken into account when considering Origen’s polemic with Stoicism, not because it refers specifically to Stoic ideas in the strict sense, but because in the most general way it describes a certain type of cosmological concept, under which, along with Platonic-Pythagorean cosmology, Stoicism also fits. As for the essence of Origen’s criticism of the theory of “eternal return,” its main motive is the incompatibility of cyclic determinism with free will. In PA 2, 3, 4, having shown that the concept of "eternal recurrence" implies the periodic repetition of the events of biblical history, Origen says: "I do not think that this can be in any reasonable way, if souls are governed by free will and undergo both improvement and fall according to the power of their will." At the same time, Origen does not provide any substantive arguments in favor of free will. He does not consider it necessary to prove the objective truth of human freedom as such. Rather, free will appears in his role as a deliberately accepted premise, the simple inconsistency of which means in his eyes the self-evident falsity of any deterministic concept. The motives that force Origen to polemicize with Platonic-Pythagorean or Stoic cosmological determinism are not so much in the nature of objective philosophical arguments as of value preferences. Only free will makes possible an adequate moral assessment, both positive (ἔπαινοι) and negative (ψ ό γοι), otherwise there would be no reasonable basis for it. In general, RA 2, 3, 4, as well as similar passages from the SS, show that Origen turned to the consideration of ancient cyclic theories primarily for polemical purposes. Thus, if these theories had any significance for the formation of Origen’s own cosmology, then I would define it as purely negative: they were what he distanced himself from, what he argued with, but not at all what he imitated. 5.4. Transition to the formulation of Origen’s own hypothesis of the plurality of worlds (2, 3, 4–5): literal interpretation of the plural αἰῶνες Having criticized the ancient theory of “eternal recurrence,” Origen offers his own alternative: “Thus, it seems to me impossible that the world could be restored a second time in the same order and with the same positions of beings born, dying and doing anything; but different worlds can exist with very significant changes, so that, for some known reasons, the state of one world is better [than another], for other [reasons] it is worse, for [some other] other [reasons there is] some kind of average state. What is the number or mode (modus) [of the existence of these worlds], I confess, I do not know. If someone could show [this] to me, I would willingly learn” (RA 2, 3, 4, 168–176). If we compare this passage with the hypothetical alternatives formulated in the first paragraph (RA 2, 3, 1), it is difficult to draw any other conclusion, except that Origen clearly rejects the hypothesis, which on page 84 was numbered 8 (worlds following each other are identical), but at the same time speaks in favor of hypotheses numbered 6 and 7 ([6] both before and after this world there are many worlds; [7] successive worlds worlds are different, in particular - worse or better than the current world). The next paragraph (RA 2, 3, 5) confirms this conclusion: “However, about this world, which itself is called an age, it is said that it is the end of many centuries. The Holy Apostle teaches that Christ did not suffer either in the previous century or in the one that came before him, and I do not know if I can list how many previous centuries there were in which he did not suffer. I will say on the basis of what statements of Paul I came to the possibility of such a conclusion. After all, he says: “Now once at [the time of] the end of the ages he appeared to destroy sin by his sacrifice” (Heb. 9:26). So, once, says [the apostle], he became a sacrifice and appeared at [the time of] the end of the ages to destroy sin. And the fact that after this age, which, as [here] is said, existed for the end of other ages, there will be other coming ages, we clearly learn from the same Paul, who says: “That in the coming ages he might show the exceeding riches of his grace in his kindness to us” (Eph. 2:7). He did not say “in the age to come,” nor “in two centuries,” but “in the centuries to come,” from which, I believe, [it follows] that the evidence of this statement presupposes numerous centuries. If there is something greater than centuries, so that centuries [let] be thought of [only] in relation to creations, [then] in relation to other [beings] that surpass and surpass visible creations - which will probably happen with the restoration of everything, when everything collectively (universa) comes to a perfect end - one should think that this is probably something more than an age in which there will be an end of everything. What prompts me to this [understanding] is the authority of the Holy Scriptures, which says: “For ever and ever” (Ex. 15:18). For the fact that it says “yet” certainly implies something more than a century. And, think about it, is this not what the Savior is talking about, since [the sayings] “I want them to be with Me where I am” (John 17:24) and “just as I and You are one, so that they also may be one in Us” (cf. John 17:21), seem to hint at something more than a century or centuries, maybe even more than centuries of centuries, that is, apparently, that [state] when everything will no longer be in the world, but God will be everything and in everything.” The first paragraph of this paragraph (177–195) is a consistent concretization of the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds in the protological and eschatological aspect, involving those places of Holy Scripture that, in the author’s opinion, can confirm this hypothesis. In the first phrase we encounter the expression hic mundus, qui et ipse saeculum dicitur (“this world, which itself is called the century”), allowing us to conclude that the terms mundus and saeculum in the text of the RA can be used as virtually equivalent - and such a conclusion is based not simply on the similarity of the meanings of the obvious Greek equivalents of these Latin terms (κ ό σμος; αἰών), going back to New Testament word usage, but precisely on the specific textual fixation of the convergence of these meanings in Origen. From here it is natural to conclude that when the term saeculum is used further in the text of this paragraph, what is meant is not just a certain chronological segment within one world, but a separate and closed cosmic structure that represents a certain analogy to the current world. As for the protological aspect, here the plurality of worlds, from Origen’s point of view, is assumed by the plural saeculorum / τῶν αἰώνων from Heb. 9, 26. In the eschatological aspect, a similar conclusion is drawn from the expression in saeculis supervenientibus "ἐν τοῖς αἰῶσιν τοῖς ὲπερχομένοις in Eph. 2:7. The obvious parallel to this place in RA is RE 27, 15, 1–15 where the plurality of worlds is discussed in connection with these same two New Testament verses: “I have often wondered, when I compared two apostolic sayings, how the end of the ages [is possible] (συντέλεια αἰώνων), in [the time of] which Jesus appeared once for the destruction of sins, if after this [age] there must be centuries to come (αἰῶνες μετὰ τοῦτον ἐπερχ ό μενοι). In the Epistle to the Hebrews [it is said]: “But one day he appeared to the end of the ages to destroy sin.” His sacrifice,” and in the Epistle to the Ephesians: “That He might show in the ages to come the exceeding riches of His grace in kindness to us.” Having reflected on such great [subjects], I believe that, just as the end of the year is the last month, after which comes the beginning of another month, so perhaps the end of numerous centuries, constituting, as it were, a year of centuries, is the present age (πλει ό νων αἰώνων οἱονεὶ ἐνιαυτὸν αἰώνων συμπληρούντων , συντέλειά ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεστ ὼ ς αἰών ), after it certain future centuries will come, the beginning of which is the coming [century after this] ( μέλλων), and in these coming [centuries] (ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς μέλλουσιν) God will reveal the riches of His grace in goodness.” The same idea is expressed in SM 15, 31, 79–92: “I think that, just as at the end of the year, they say, something [special] must happen, so at the end of numerous centuries (ἐπὶ πλει ό νων αἰώνων συντελεί ᾳ), forming either a certain year or something else [similar], our Jesus appeared to destroy sin, so that after the end of the ages (μετὰ τὴν ... ἐν τοῖς αἰῶσι τοῖς ἐπερχομένοις) the exceeding riches of His grace to those to whom it is fitting to show [it] and whom [only] He Himself knows.” In my opinion, all these passages clearly show that the main role in Origen’s formation of the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds was played not by the assimilation of ancient philosophical theories, but by the original reading of the New Testament text. We are talking about a very specific situation in which Origen found himself as an exegete professing the principle of “accuracy of Scripture,” i.e. knowingly proceeding from the conviction that any nuances of the biblical text, down to the grammatical form of the word (in this case, it is plural, not singular), cannot be accidental, but, on the contrary, are used intentionally and endowed with a deep and specific meaning. In the context of this approach, Origen very often uses a hermeneutic technique, a clear example of which is the concluding phrase of the first paragraph of the analyzed paragraph RA (193–195): “He did not say “in the age to come,” nor “in two centuries,” but “in the centuries to come,” from which, I believe, [it follows] that the evidence of this statement presupposes numerous centuries.” The essence of this technique is that Origen first formulates certain theoretically conceivable alternatives to what is actually said in the text (in this case: “in the coming age” and “in two centuries”), and then, in contrast to them, establishes what exactly is the exact meaning of the expression actually used in the text. The results achieved as a result of such a hermeneutic procedure may remain hypothetical, but their rootedness in the thought of Origen himself is quite obvious. In this case, the typicality of such a technique for Origen in general is an additional argument in favor of the authenticity of the passage in question in the Latin translation of the RA. 5.5. 2, 3, 5, 196–210: plurality of worlds and apokatastasis Let us now turn to the second paragraph of the RA paragraph in question (2, 3, 5, 196–210). It is especially important because the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds is linked in it to the hypothesis of apocatastasis. The first sentence of this paragraph represents perhaps one of the most obscure passages in the text of the RA: “If there is something greater than centuries, so that centuries [let them] be thought [only] in relation to creations, [then] in relation to other [beings] that surpass and exceed visible creations - which will probably happen in the restoration of everything, when everything collectively (universa) comes to a perfect end - one should think that this is probably there is something more than an age in which there will be an end to everything (id fortasse plus aliquid esse quam saeculum intellegendum est, in quo erit omnium consummatio).” In the old Russian translation of the Kazan Theological Academy, this passage is translated as follows: “If there is something greater than centuries, then in this way centuries should be thought only in application to creatures, and in application to that which surpasses and exceeds visible creatures, which will, of course, be the case with the restoration of everything, when the universe reaches its perfect end, perhaps one should think of something greater than age, which will (consist) in the completion of everything.” The discrepancy that is important for me in this case is that the phrase in quo, introducing the last subordinate clause, is understood here as relating to plus aliquid... quam saeculum (“something more than a century”) and revealing its meaning: “something more... in which the accomplishment of everything will consist.” In the translation I proposed above, in quo, on the contrary, is referred to as saeculum. In principle, I do not find any formal grounds in the text that would make such an option impossible from a purely grammatical point of view. The word order itself makes it more likely that in quo defines the nearest of those words to which it can generally be attributed, i.e. just saeculum. The semantic criterion remains, i.e. it is necessary to evaluate what exactly the subordinate clause in quo erit omnium consummatio contributes to the general meaning of the phrase. The term consummatio used in it has already been found in the text of this paragraph in a slightly different combination - in consummatione saeculorum (184–185, 187, 189). Then this was understood as the current “age” or the world, completing the sequence of “ages” preceding it. After it, according to Origen, other “ages” will have to follow. Thus, consummatio saeculorum is not the absolute finale of the world process. Let us assume that omnium consummatio in the phrase we are interested in has the same meaning as consummatio saeculorum. It is very likely that within a limited passage of text, the term consummatio could not radically change its meaning - in such a way that the change from saeculorum to omnium would lead to the introduction of some fundamentally new concept into the text and this would not be specifically stated in any way. Then the omnium consummatio occurring in this “age” cannot be equivalent to the restitutio omnium, cum ad perfectum finem universa pervenient, since it is precisely the latter that is asserted that it completely goes beyond the centuries (aliquid saeculis maius; plus aliquid esse quam saeculum), and the omnium consummatio (consummatio saeculorum) is itself a “century”, and is built into the chain of “centuries” preceding it and following it, as became clear from the first paragraph of this section. In this case, the meaning of this phrase is that restitutio omnium is something more than omnium consummatio, namely: restitutio omnium generally goes beyond the sequence of centuries, and omnium consummatio is only an intermediate finale, closing one of the segments of this sequence. This meaning was reflected in the translation version I proposed, in which the subordinate clause introduced in quo is classified as saeculum, and not as plus aliquid, quam saeculum. The traditional translation, on the contrary, assumes the actual equivalence of restitutio omnium and omnium consummatio. In principle, both translation options allow us to fundamentally differentiate apokatastasis (restitutio omnium) and the present world as the end of the sequence of previous eons (consummatio saeculorum from the first paragraph). But the version of translation I have proposed extends this differentiation also to the omnium consummatio and, thereby, makes it more consistent. In any case, this passage testifies in favor of the fact that apokatastasis occurs not at the end of a given world, but at the end of a sequence of coming eons or centuries. 5.6. Results of the analysis of RA 2, 3, 1–5 If we summarize everything that has been said about this chapter of the RA (2, 3), then we can say that the research program set out in 2, 3, 1 (cf. p. 84) is implemented in it as follows: firstly, the discussion about eschatological incorporeality (2, 3, 2–2, 3, 3) includes a discussion of the second of the hypotheses mentioned in 2, 3, 1 ([2] another world precedes this world, but is separated from it by an interval in which the restoration and new fall of spiritual beings occurs), and the textual data indicating that the author disputes incorporeality and the version of cyclic cosmology that follows from it is very ambiguous and can be interpreted in a less negative sense; secondly, in 2, 3, 4 a conclusion is made that testifies in favor of the sixth and seventh hypotheses from 2, 3, 1 ([6] both before and after this world there are many worlds; [7] successive worlds are different, in particular - worse or better than the current world), and it is clear that the first of them includes the first ([1] this world is immediately preceded by another world) and the fourth hypothesis ([4] after this world there will be a new world necessary for the implementation of divine pedagogy) from 2, 3, 1; thirdly, here, in 2, 3, 4, the last, eighth hypothesis listed in 2, 3, 1 is unambiguously and categorically rejected ([8] worlds following each other are identical); fourthly, in 2, 3, 5, in a completely obvious way and on behalf of Origen himself, the same sixth hypothesis from 2, 3, 1 is concretized in the protological and eschatological aspect ([6] both before and after this world there are many worlds); fifthly, the third hypothesis from 2, 3, 1 remains virtually undiscussed in the text of this chapter ([3] after this world there will be no new world, but after an indefinite period of correction of spiritual beings the finis omnium will immediately begin); sixthly, what is said about apokatastasis in 2, 3, 5 can to some extent be correlated with the fifth hypothesis from 2, 3, 1, which assumes the absolute end of the sequence of centuries ([5] the sequence of worlds has an absolute beginning and an absolute end), but this hypothesis itself in the existing version of the text turns out to be undiscussed, especially in the protological aspect. CHAPTER 6. PROTOLOGICAL ASPECT OF THE MULTIPLE WORLDS HYPOTHESIS IN RA 3, 5, 3 6.1. The hypothesis of the plurality of worlds and the problem of the eternity of creation Another place in the treatise where the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds is discussed in detail is RA 3, 5, 3: “But [some] usually object to us, saying: if the world began at a certain time, what did God do before the world began? For to say that the nature of God [was] idle and motionless is at the same time impious and absurd, just as it is to believe that goodness did not once create good and omnipotence once did not exercise dominion. This is what [they] usually object to when we say that this world began at a certain time, and even count the years of its existence, according to the reliable testimony of Scripture. I do not think that any of the heretics, based on the meaning of their teaching, could easily answer these provisions. We will answer appropriately, observing the rule of piety and saying that God first began to create not when he created this visible world, but [that] just as after the destruction of this [world] there will be another world, so, we think, before this [world] existed, there were other [worlds]. Both will be confirmed by the authority of divine Scripture. That after this [world] there will be another world, Isaiah teaches, saying: “There will be a new heaven and a new earth, which I will create (faciam permanere) before Me, says the Lord” (Is. 66:22). And that before this world there were also others, Ecclesiastes shows, saying: “What is [that] that has come [to be]? The same thing that will happen. And what is [that] that was created? The same thing that will [yet] be created; and there is absolutely nothing new under the sun. If someone speaks and says: Behold, this is new, [then] this already happened in the centuries that were before us” (Eccl. 1: 9-10). These testimonies prove both [positions] - both that there were centuries before and that there will be centuries later. One should not, however, think that numerous worlds exist simultaneously, but that after this [world] there will be another. There is now no need to talk about these [things] in detail again, since we have already done this above.” At the beginning of the paragraph, Origen formulates a problem that was relevant not only for Christian theology, but also for the contemporary philosophical tradition: how to reconcile the immutability of God with the fact that the world was created “from a certain time” (cf. RA 3, 5, 1, 4 and 19: ex certo tempore)? In Platonism, a similar question could be posed in connection with the doctrine formulated in the Timaeus that this ordered cosmos was created by the demiurge (29d-30a). In the era of Origen, Platonists usually interpreted the creation of the world in the Timaeus not as a denial of the eternity of its existence, but as an indication of the lack of self-sufficiency of eternal cosmic existence and its dependence on an external cause, i.e. God. If some Platonic-minded authors admitted that the world began to exist from a certain point in time, then in their mouths this meant that before this world there existed disordered matter - a point of view that Origen clearly rejected from standard Christian positions. Along with this, the polemics of Tertullian with Hermogenes or later of Augustine with the Manichaeans show that the argument given by Origen in RA 3, 5, 3 was sometimes used by representatives of heretical movements. Whoever Origen had in mind in RA 3, 5, 3, he does not challenge the very motives of the argumentation of his hypothetical opponents. He himself agrees that goodness should always do good deeds, and omnipotence should dominate. In PA 1, 2, 10, 307–328, he puts forward similar arguments in favor of the eternity of creation, already on his own behalf: “Just as one cannot be a father without a son, nor a master without property or a slave, so God cannot be called omnipotent if there are not those [beings] over whom he would exercise power; and therefore for the manifestation of divine omnipotence it is necessary that everything should exist. If there is anyone who believes that there were certain ages or periods, or [something similar], no matter what he calls it, when what was created had not yet been created, undoubtedly, by this he will show that God was not omnipotent in these either centuries or periods and became omnipotent [only] later, since he began to possess those [beings] in relation to which He manifests [his] power: and thanks to this it will seem that He perceived some improvement and moved from worse to better, unless, of course, one questions that it is better for Him to be omnipotent than not to be. And how does it not seem absurd that God, not having anything that was fitting for Him to have, subsequently achieved the possession of it through some improvement? Since there is no time when He was not omnipotent, there must also exist that by which He is called omnipotent, and He always had that over which He exercised power and ruled as king and ruler; We will discuss this in more detail in the appropriate places where we will have to talk about his creations.” Thus, Origen, based on the idea of ​​​​divine immutability, comes to the conviction of the eternity of creation. But at the same time, he himself considers the doctrine of the creation of the world from a certain time as the unconditional truth of church tradition (RA Praef. 7; 3, 5, 1). As a result, he is faced with the task of reconciling the co-eternity of the created world with God and its limited time frame. To do this, in RA 3, 5, 3, he distinguishes between the current cosmos, to which the doctrine of the creation of the world should be attributed, and created being in general, consisting of a sequence of worlds that existed before creation. Nothing is directly said here that this sequence has no beginning, but otherwise Origen’s argument would have no meaning, since then the question of his opponents could be posed anew in relation to this beginning. Therefore, the general meaning of RA 3, 5, 3 seems to imply the assumption of the eternity of creation precisely in the sense of the actual existence of many successive worlds. Such an interpretation gives the impression that Origen’s concept of eternity does not yet imply a strict distinction between temporal permanence and timeless eternity, perpetuitas and aeternitas in the Boethius sense (De cons. phil. 5, 6) or in the sense of Proclus (In Tim., 1, 239, 1), which may have influenced Boethius. From the point of view of later Christian thought, the solution to this problem proposed by Origen still looks unsatisfactory, since it does not take into account what was quite clearly formulated by Augustine when discussing the same issue: “time cannot be coeternal with unchangeable eternity, since it flows in variability.” If in RA 3, 5, 3 we do not find any traces of Origen’s reaction to such difficulties, then this may indicate that he did not have the idea of ​​​​eternity in the sense that was given to it by the later Christian tradition. The RA text seems to confirm this conclusion, since the concept of eternity is defined in it as follows: “Eternal or eternal in the proper sense is called that which has no beginning of being, and cannot cease to be what it is.” This definition looks quite traditional from the point of view of the understanding of eternity, characteristic of Platonism, as the opposite of becoming (Tim. 27d), the essential features of which are the presence of the beginning and end of being in the becoming being. Origin and destruction, γένεσις and φθορὰ in this perspective are interconnected in such a way that the first necessarily entails the second, while when applied to the eternally existing, the same logic forces one to deny both the beginning and the end of being. But such a concept of eternity does not in itself exclude temporal sequence or duration in the existence of “eternally” existing things. From this point of view, it is quite clear that in RA 3, 5, 3 Origen could be satisfied with the interpretation of the co-eternity of creation to God as the temporal infinity of successive worlds. 6.2. Various interpretations of the eternity of creation according to Origen In modern science, as far as I know, one can find at least four different approaches to the interpretation of Origen's idea of ​​the eternity of creation. Firstly, the eternity of creation according to Origen is understood as RA 3, 5, 3 allows us to understand it, i.e. as the temporary incessancy of successive eons. Secondly, the eternity of creation can be interpreted as the eternity of the world of pre-existence. In this case, it is believed that Origen related the idea of ​​co-eternity not to the sequence of successive eons, but to the totality of intelligent spiritual beings, whose free self-determination in turn determines the succession of eons. This understanding of the eternity of creation in Origen was dominant for a long time, although it is difficult to find an obvious basis for it in those RA texts where this eternity is, in fact, discussed (i.e. in RA 1, 2, 10; 1, 4, 3–5 and 3, 5, 3). Moreover, Kruzel points out that, according to the text of the RA, the existence of “minds” had a beginning. The third version of the interpretation of the eternity of creation belongs to Crusel himself and, unlike the second, is based on very serious textual evidence. RA 1, 4, 3–5 allows us to think that by the eternity of creation, Origen did not mean the endless existence of the actual creation (whether spiritual or material), but the eternity of the archetypes of creation in the Logos (providential creation). This option is most compatible with orthodoxy, since the doctrine of the ideas of creation in the Logos is very widespread in patristics. Finally, the Greek researcher P. Zamalikos generally denies that Origen expressed the idea of ​​​​the eternity of creation in any sense. To the extent that Dzamalikos's views call into question the authenticity of RA 3, 5, 3, they should be considered in this paper. 6.3. Dzamalikos theory: RA 3, 5, 3 – Rufin interpolation Dzamalikos approaches the RA text with truly unprecedented hypercriticism. In particular, he believes that RA can only be used as an auxiliary source. In practice, this is manifested in the fact that when any of those places in the RA, which do not have meaningful parallels in Greek texts, contradicts the highly controversial reconstruction of Origen's doctrine carried out by Dzamalikos himself, he considers it possible to deny the authenticity of this place, without bothering himself with its philological analysis at all. Of course, the RA text is unreliable and, as far as possible, should be controlled by reference to Greek writings. But this does not mean that one can simply ignore his data whenever they contradict the researcher’s own constructions. This general methodological attitude of Dzamalikos is also evident in his approach to the problem of the eternity of creation. Regarding the question posed in RA 3, 5, 3, why God did not begin to create earlier, he considers it possible to draw the following categorical conclusion: “All the writings preserved in Greek clearly show that Origen had no need to address this imaginary question.” This is a strange argument, because even if this issue did not play any role in the theology of Origen himself, this could not at all prevent the latter from discussing it in the RA, where he constantly considers many theological problems that are not necessarily rooted in his own teaching. But Dzamalikos, based on similar reasoning, states: “We believe that those passages in the RA that seem to be implicitly affected by the so-called “why not sooner” argument are just a disastrous interpolation of Rufinus.” As examples, Dzamalikos immediately cites RA 1, 1, 6; 1, 2, 10; 1, 4, 3–5; 3, 5, 2–3. Thus, it turns out that numerous and very lengthy passages (from one to three paragraphs) of the text of the RA belong entirely to Rufinus. According to this logic, he not only inaccurately retold Origen’s text, not just introduced some interpolations into it, which at least would have had a starting point in the original itself, but on his own initiative inserted a lengthy discussion into the RA, for which, from the point of view of Dzamalikos, there was no reason at all. At the same time, Rufin was not satisfied with a single interpolation, but repeated this procedure several times. Rufinus here no longer appears as a translator, albeit an unreliable one, but as an independent thinker, persistently introducing into the RA a discussion of problems that concern him exclusively, and not Origen at all. This whole hypothesis, in my opinion, does not stand up to criticism. The RA translation is far from literal, but there is essentially no basis to assume that Rufinus’ interpolations could have been not isolated inclusions of individual words or sentences, but longer sections of text, except for Jerome’s statements that Rufinus used the scholia of Didymus the Blind in the translation. But, firstly, Zamalikos does not mention the scholia of Didymus, attributing the interpolations to Rufinus himself. Secondly, if Rufinus had actually used the scholia of Didymus in this case, some reason for discussing the eternity of creation in these scholia themselves should have been present already in the original RA. However, Dzamalikos's hypothesis suggests that in the original Greek RA there was no reason at all to address the question of the eternity of creation. In addition, in RA 1, 4, 3–5 the eternity of creation is spoken of as applied to ideas localized in the Logos, and in RA 3, 5, 3 the eternity of successive worlds is meant, and these two interpretations of the eternity of creation, as we will see, are absolutely incompatible. If we accept Dzamalikos’s hypothesis, it turns out that Rufinus, who deliberately interpolated these passages into the RA text, was somehow too inconsistent in his interpretation of such an important concept for him. Finally, why would Rufinus need such an interpolation, which the RA text itself did not provoke at all? Dzamalikos gives the following answer to this: “Rufinus obviously feared that this theology (i.e. Origen’s - A.S.) would not be able to answer a specific question like “what did God do before creation?” or “why didn’t He create before?” Therefore, he inserted a completely unnecessary and yet confusing argument into the RA text... He adopted the pseudo-question “why not earlier?” for a real problem; therefore he believed that he must protect his author in this respect and protect him from possible charges of heresy.” It is not clear how the introduction of the idea of ​​the eternity of creation into the RA text could protect Origen from potential charges of heresy, if it was this idea that later brought them upon him (among other things), whereas its supposed absence in the RA text would not in itself create any problems from the point of view of orthodoxy. It turns out that Rufinus himself created a problem completely alien to Origen, which he then tried to resolve, defending Origen from the accusations of heresy that became possible as a result of this, but he also failed. But the most obvious argument against Zamalikos's hypothesis is that the idea of ​​the eternity of the world is attributed to Origen by some Greek sources independent of the Rufinian translation. First of all, these are fragments from the RA appended to Justinian's letter to Patriarch Mena (ACO III, p. 210, 26–27). Did the authors of this collection of texts really discover the idea of ​​the eternity of creation in Rufinus’s translation of the RA, where, according to Dzamalikos, it first appeared, and only then expound it in Greek? But the same idea was attributed to Origen by his constant critic Methodius of Olympus at the turn of the 3rd-4th centuries, i.e. long before the appearance of the Rufinus translation of RA. The corresponding text of Methodius is quoted at length by Photius in his Library (Cod. 235). Thus, in order for Dzamalikos’s hypothesis to become at least probable, it is necessary to first admit the inauthenticity of Photius’s quotations from Methodius. All this means that Dzamalikos's hypothesis is erroneous and the idea of ​​​​the eternity of creation was present in the original RA. 6.4. The problem of the relationship between RA 3, 5, 3 and RA 1, 4, 3–5 However, difficulties associated with conflicting interpretations of this idea remain. The topic of this study does not include their comprehensive consideration, so I will focus only on the already mentioned problem of the relationship between RA 3, 5, 3 and 1, 4, 3–5, since it is directly related to the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds. The text of RA 1, 4, 3–5 is as follows: "1. 4. 3. So, this blessed and ἀρχικ ή ν, that is, ruling over all [things], δύναμιν > we call the Trinity. This is a good God and a benevolent father of everything, at the same time εὐεργετικὴ δύναμις, and δημιουργική, that is, a beneficent, creative and providential ability. It is both absurd and impious to think that these faculties of God were ever idle for a moment. For it is not permissible to assume even in the slightest degree that these abilities, which [allow] first of all to think about God in a proper way, ever did not perform deeds worthy of Him and remained motionless. After all, they, who are in God, or even rather are God, cannot be thought that they encountered an external obstacle, just as, on the other hand, it cannot be assumed that they were either lazy or neglected to do and produce what was worthy of them. And, therefore, it is impossible to imagine absolutely a single moment in which this beneficent ability would not do good. Whence it follows that there always existed those [beings] to whom she did good, therefore - her creatures or creations, and, while doing good, [she] distributed her benefits in order and according to merit through providence. And thus, it seems to follow that God has always been the creator, the source of good, and the provider. 1. 4. 4. But, on the other hand, the human mind turns out to be weak and limited in the following [question]: how can one think that there have always been creations, since God exists, and that these [creations], which should be represented as beyond any doubt created and produced by God, existed, so to speak, without beginning. So, since there is this struggle between human thoughts and ideas, - because on both sides the strongest and contradictory arguments come to mind, inclining the mind of the reflector to its side, - to the extent of our limited and insignificant ability of understanding, it occurs to us what can be affirmed without any danger to piety: God, in any case, has always been the Father, has always had an only-begotten Son, who, according to what we have stated above, is at the same time called Wisdom. This is the same Wisdom with which God always rejoiced when he created the world (Proverbs 8:30), so that thanks to this it becomes clear that God is always blessed. In this, therefore, Wisdom, which was always with the Father, creation was always outlined and represented, and there never was [a time] when Wisdom did not have a predestination of what would be. 1. 4. 5. And, perhaps, in this way, to the best of our weak strength, we will observe a pious way of thinking about God, not asserting either that creatures are without beginning and co-eternal with God, or, on the other hand, that God, although before he did not do anything good, [only later] turned to do; After all, what is written [in Scripture] is true: “You created everything in Wisdom” (Ps. 103:24). And if everything was created in Wisdom, and Wisdom always existed, [then], according to predestination and transformation, there was always in Wisdom that which was subsequently also substantially created. And I think this is what Solomon means or implies in Ecclesiastes when he says, “What is [that] that has come [to be]? The same thing that will happen. And what is [that] that was created? The same thing that will [yet] be created; and there is nothing new under the sun. If someone speaks and says: Behold, this is new, [then] this already happened in the centuries that were before us” (Eccl. 1: 9-10). If, therefore, the individual [beings] that exist under the sun already existed in those centuries that were before us, since there is nothing new under the sun, without a doubt all the genera or species [of beings] have always existed, and perhaps [beings have always existed] even individually. In any case, it is still true what [here] is proved: that God did not one day begin to be a creator after not having been one before.” How can one explain that in RA 3, 5, 3, speaking about the eternity of creation, Origen refers to the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds, and in RA 1, 4, 3–5 for the same purpose he uses the concept of the ideas of creation in the Logos? First of all, one can imagine these texts as two alternative solutions to the same problem, or try to interpret one of them in the sense of the other. The first approach is sometimes found in the historical and philosophical study of Origen's doctrine, which does not specifically consider the philological aspects of the controversial texts. For example, one modern researcher presents the matter as if Origen saw a contradiction between the infinite chain of worlds in RA 3, 5, 3 and the thesis about the finite number of creations in RA 3, 5, 2 and, as a result, in RA 2, 3, 5 he spoke out for a finite chain of worlds, as a result of which he could no longer refer to the plurality of worlds in connection with the eternity of creation. It was then that he interpreted the eternity of creation as the eternity of ideas in the Logos in RA 1, 4, 3–5. This reconstruction eliminates the contradictions between individual theses found in different places in the RA, presenting them as moments in the diachronic development of Origen’s thoughts, but it is purely theoretical, since no specific textual data can be cited in its favor. In the text of the RA itself, both interpretations of the eternity of creation are presented completely independently of each other, and there is no sign that the author himself considers them as alternatives and is generally aware of the contradictions that exist between them. The second approach is presented in Cruzel's commentary on RA, where the French researcher offers an alternative interpretation of RA 3, 5, 3, in which this place does not contradict RA 1, 4, 3–5. To do this, he first of all seeks to show that the mention of “worlds” or “ages” in RA 3, 5, 3, both preceding this world and following it, has no relation to the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds discussed by Origen in RA 2, 3, 1–5. As for future worlds, here Cruzel emphasizes that, according to Rufinus’ text, we are talking about only one world. True, Jerome, in his famous letter to Avitus, containing more than 30 quotations from RA (in a Latin translation), gives another version of the same passage, and although it generally coincides with Rufinus’s, yet, drawing a conclusion from what has been said, Jerome no longer speaks about the future world, but about future worlds: “This evidence confirms that worlds not only were, but will also be: and they do not arise simultaneously and all together, but one after the other.” On this occasion, Krusel writes: “Future worlds in the plural are Jerome’s interpretation. According to him, as well as according to Rufinus, Origen speaks of past worlds in the plural, but of one future world, which is confirmed by a quotation from Isaiah (Is. 66, 22 - A.S.).” In my opinion, this argument by Kruzel is not true. Although in the passages he cited from RA 3, 5, 3, the future world is spoken of in the singular, further we find a formulation that is a clear parallel to Jerome’s phrase criticized by Crusel: “Both [positions] are proved by these evidences - both that there were centuries before and that there will be later. One should not, however, think that numerous worlds exist simultaneously, but that after this [world] there will be another.” Here it is already clearly indicated that there will be many future centuries (futura sint postmodum), and when the next phrase says that after this world there will be another, then this can be considered as a special case of a change in the numerous worlds mentioned before (plures mundos). From this point of view, there is no contradiction between Rufinus's translation and Jerome's version. True, Crusel correlates the mention of plures mundos in the above phrase with RA 2, 3, 6, where the question is discussed whether the other world from which the Savior appeared is an independent world along with this one or only a structural part of the latter: “But is that world... separated from this world and significantly removed from it in place, quality or glory, or is it, although distinguished by glory and quality, still contained within the boundaries of this world, which and it seems to me more probable - it is still unclear and, as I believe, is still inaccessible to the knowledge and thoughts of people.” But here we are not talking about denying the simultaneous existence of two separate worlds, as in RA 3, 5, 3, but about denying their very separation. Thus, there is no need to draw a parallel between RA 3, 5, 3 and RA 2, 3, 6, but it is quite possible to assume that in RA 3, 5, 3 Origen has in mind the same hypothesis of the plurality of future worlds that he discussed in RA 2, 3, 1–5. This is even more obvious with regard to the protological aspect of this hypothesis. The plurality of worlds preceding this world is mentioned three times in RA 3, 5, 3. Moreover, to prove this, a reference is made to Eccl. 1, 9–10, which speaks of “ages” in the plural (dat. plur. τοῖς αἰῶσιν), i.e. the same technique is used as in RA 2, 3, 5 in connection with Heb. 9, 26 and Eph. 2, 7. Finally, RA 3, 5, 3 ends with a reference to another place in the RA: “There is no need now to talk about these [things] in detail again, since we have already done so above” (86–88). In my opinion, this link points to the discussion about the plurality of worlds in RA 2, 3, 1–5. Cruzel, however, gives this discussion of previous worlds an alternative interpretation: “According to Origen, before this world there were indeed two other worlds: the intelligible world of ideas, causes and mysteries, contained in the Son-Wisdom and created by God (RA 1, 4, 3-5); the world of pre-existing minds, which had a beginning and ended with the fall, as a result of which God created this world; after this last one the world of resurrection will take place. To what extent is the interpretation of Jerome acceptable, who apparently relates this passage with the hypothesis put forward in RA 2, 3, 1 of many successive worlds arising as a result of new falls of free will? But there it was just one of the alternatives discussed.” As a result of this approach, in particular, the discrepancy between RA 3, 5, 3 and 1, 4, 3–5 is eliminated, for in this case the mention of previous worlds in the first of these places implies, in particular, the world of ideas in the Logos, which is discussed in the second of them. Accordingly, Kruzel regards the final reference to the previous context from RAs 3, 5, 3 as an indication of RAs 1, 4, 3–5 and 2, 3, 6. In my opinion, this interpretation is artificial. In the text of RA 3, 5, 3, the terms mundi and saecula, denoting multiple worlds or ages, are not explained. Thus, Cruzel's interpretation is based on the assumption that they could have an implicit and at the same time extremely differentiated conceptual meaning, denoting four fundamentally different concepts of Origen's cosmology. In any case, such an assumption would have to be justified, which Kruzel does not do. In my opinion, Origen's usage does not support Cruzel's interpretation. Of course, in various places in Origen's writings, for example, ideas in the Logos or pre-existing souls may be separately mentioned, but the term κ ό σμος is not usually attached to them, and the term αἰών is not attached at all. Therefore, there is no basis to assert that precisely where it comes to saecula or αἰῶνες in the plural, Origen may have in mind the ideas of creation, the hypothesis of pre-existence, the material cosmos and the “coming eon” in a sense close to the New Testament. In addition, in the text of RA 3, 5, 3, no evidence can be found that the number of “ages” mentioned here can be limited to four worlds. Kruzel’s doubts about whether it is worth relating RA 3, 5, 3 with RA 2, 3, 1–5, where the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds was, in his words, “just one of the alternatives under discussion,” are puzzling, since in RA 2, 3, 1–5 there is not a single alternative that would not assume a plurality of worlds, much less exclude it entirely (for example, it does not consider at all the possibility that that the existing material world is unique). From all that has been said, we can conclude that Kruzel’s attempt to interpret RA 3, 5, 3 so that this place is not related to RA 2, 3, 1–5 and thereby does not contradict RA 1, 4, 3–5, does not lead to satisfactory results. It remains to take a closer look at the text of RA 1, 4, 3–5 in order to understand what in it can be consistent with the data of RA 3, 5, 3, and what cannot, and for what reasons. 6.5. Criticism of authenticity RA 1, 4, 4–5 The totality of data from RA 1, 4, 3–5 requires, in my opinion, a very differentiated approach. On the one hand, the contradiction between this text and RA 3, 5, 3 is completely insurmountable, since the interpretations of the eternity of creation in these two places are not just alternative, but mutually exclusive. In RA 3, 5, 3 the question is only what God did before the creation of the world, and to answer it the concept of the eternity of the actual creation is allowed. RA 1, 4, 3–5 also recognizes that, based on the immutability of God, one must somehow recognize the eternity of creation; however, at the same time it is realized here that it is impious to consider actual creatures co-eternal with God, due to which it is necessary to interpret the eternal creation as providential, and not actual. Thus, the concept of providential creation put forward in RA 1, 4, 3–5 makes the understanding of the eternity of creation in the spirit of RA 3, 5, 3 not just unnecessary, but fundamentally unacceptable. That is, in RA 3, 5, 3, what has already been overcome in RA 1, 4, 3–5 has clearly not yet been fully thought out. On the other hand, not all of the data in these three paragraphs are truly incompatible with RA 3, 5, 3. The first of them (1, 4, 3) does not create any problems at all, since there is no mention of the ideas of creation in the Logos, but simply formulates the concept of the eternity of the world in the most general way, and sometimes in expressions very close to some formulations from 3, 5, 3. Moreover, some points in RA 1, 4, 3, seem to indicate the eternity of actual creation rather than providential creation. Thus, having mentioned that the “beneficent faculty” of God exists eternally, Origen draws the following conclusion: “... there always existed those [beings] to whom she did good, therefore - her creatures or creations, and, doing good, [she] distributed her benefits in order and according to merit through providence (et bene faciens ordine et merito in his sua beneficia virtute providentiae dispensaret)". The distribution of benefits in order and according to merit through providence can hardly relate to the ideas of creation in the Logos, but is quite conceivable in relation to actually existing intelligent creatures, distributed throughout cosmic history to various levels of the spiritual hierarchy. If we accept this interpretation, then it turns out that the contradiction exists not so much between RA 3, 5, 3 and 1, 4, 3–5 as a whole, but between RA 3, 5, 3 and 1, 4, 3 on the one hand and RA 1, 4, 4–5 on the other, i.e. all the problems are related precisely to the last two paragraphs. Meanwhile, there is a serious argument in favor of the authenticity of these paragraphs, relating primarily to the ending of RA 1, 4, 5: “without a doubt, all genera or species [of beings] have always been, and perhaps [beings have always been] even individually. In any case, it is still true what [here] is proved: that God did not one day begin to be a creator after not having been one before.” This ending has a very close parallel in one of the Greek fragments from the text of the RA, appended to Justinian’s message to Patriarch Mina: “All the genera and species [of beings] have always been, but someone else will say that [beings have always been] and separately. In any case, it is clearly shown that God did not begin to create while first being inactive.” Considering this almost literal coincidence of two sources, one of which has a pro-Origenist tendency, and the other an anti-Origenist one, the authenticity of this passage does not raise much doubt. In my opinion, an additional argument in favor of the fact that the ideas expressed in it really belong to Origen is the fact that the Greek version uses a very typical for Origen style presentation of one of the versions of the theory he discusses in the third person (ἄλλος δέ τις ἐπεῖ). Crusel understands the terms “genera and species” (τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴση; vel genera vel species) used in this fragment as designating those prototypes of creation in the Logos, which were discussed in the previous text RA 1, 4, 4–5 (1, 4, 4, 84: “predestination of what will be” – eorum, quae futura erant, praefiguratio; 1, 4, 5, 92–93: “according to predestination and transformation” – secundum praefigurationem et praeformationem). With this interpretation, the entire text of RA 1, 4, 4–5, with its detailed concept of providential creation, must be considered as, on the whole, adequately conveying Origen’s original ideas. It cannot be said that such an interpretation of this passage was impossible in principle, since Origen actually sometimes uses the terms τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴση in a similar sense. However, these same terms can have other meanings for him, including designating intelligent beings distributed across various levels of the spiritual hierarchy. In any case, in the very final phrases of RA 1, 4, 5 there is no direct mention of divine Wisdom, and, therefore, no explicit indication that by τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴση we must certainly understand the ideas of creation in the Logos. But if we assume that the “genera and species” in the finale of RA 1, 4, 5 indicate intelligent spiritual creatures, then this ending is completely consistent with the implicit meaning of RA 1, 4, 3, which has already been discussed above, and at the same time contradicts the entire part of the text of RA 1, 4, 4–5, which speaks in detail about providential creation in Wisdom. In addition, the formulation of ἄλλος δέ τις ἐπεῖ in the finale of RA 1, 4, 5 also raises suspicions that the rest of the text of RA 1, 4, 4–5 was not conveyed by Rufinus quite accurately, since it indicates that Origen in this place discussed not one, but at least two interpretations of the eternity of creation, contrasting them as alternative theories, one of which was presented to them from a third person. It is difficult to say what exactly the specific meaning of this opposition might be. It is significant, however, that in the entire preceding text of these two paragraphs no trace of such an alternative can be found, and the entire discussion focuses exclusively on the concept of providential creation. Therefore, it can be assumed that Rufinus made some notes in this text. If we compare the very content of RA 1, 4, 4–5 (excluding the undoubtedly authentic ending), with other places in RA, which also speak of the eternity of creation (1, 2, 10; 3, 5, 3), including the preliminary general formulation of this problem in 1, 4, 3, then the correctness of De Fay will become clear, who found here a “significant softening” (une forte atténuation) of the usual idea about the eternity of created existence. De Fay already on this basis concluded that such an interpretation of the eternity of creation cannot go back to Origen himself. One may not agree with De Fay’s last conclusion, but one thing is clear: if in the text of the RA, on the one hand, the eternity of creation is spoken of twice in the most general way (1, 2, 10 and 1, 4, 3), and, in addition, in one case this creation is understood as the actual existence of successive eons (3, 5, 3), in the other - as the ideas of creation in the Logos (1, 4, 4–5), then it is difficult to describe these mutually exclusive interpretations as belonging to the same edition of the text. It remains to assume that we are dealing with successive stages of development and clarification of this concept, and it is unlikely that a more sophisticated interpretation (1, 4, 4–5), moreover, making its alternative (3, 5, 3) obviously unacceptable, could have arisen from the very beginning. On the contrary, the reverse sequence of development of this concept seems quite natural: first, the only problem is the question of what God did before the creation of this world, because of which we have to assume the general idea of ​​​​the eternity of creation, and in such a way that even a reference to the hypothesis of the plurality of actually existing worlds is suitable to support the latter; and only later, when it is realized that recognizing the eternity of the actual creation is no less unacceptable than the inactivity or changeability of God, there is a reason for a clarifying explanation: in fact, by eternal creation one should mean exclusively the ideas of creation in the Logos. If such a scheme for the development of this concept seems most plausible, then at what stage of the existence of the RA text could this “softening” in the understanding of the eternity of creation occur? Is it the result of a later author's revision of the text or interpolation? As for the later author's edition, for example, according to the hypothesis of four editorial layers of RA developed by Rius-Kamps, RA 3, 5, 3 belongs to the first editorial layer, and RA 1, 4, 3–5 to the second. But for Rius-Kamps, such a conclusion is not associated with a specific analysis of the relationship between these two passages, but with the fact that, from his point of view, in general, the entire first half of the treatise (RA 1, 1–2, 3) refers only to the second edition. In my opinion, in the case of the problem of the eternity of creation, the assumption of the later author’s edition explains little, since it suggests that Origen himself, perhaps reacting to some criticism addressed to him, revised his views in the spirit of RA 1, 4, 4–5, but for some reason retained the earlier interpretation of the eternity of creation in RA 3, 5, 3. The interpolation hypothesis seems more logical, since it is much more likely that the person who ignored the incompatibility of the text he inserted with another place in the RA was not the author of this treatise. However, there are no obvious grounds for attributing this kind of interpolation to Rufinus, who was not an independent thinker, but only a translator, even if he did not strive for literal transmission of the original. It remains either to assume that interpolation already existed in the Greek edition of the text that Rufinus translated, or to explain the originality of the interpretation of the eternity of creation in RA 1, 4, 4–5 as a possible sign that Rufinus in this case supplemented the text of RA with the scholium of Didymus. According to the testimony of Jerome and Socrates Scholasticus, Didymus's commentary sought to show that Origen's controversial ideas in orthodox circles were misunderstood and could in fact be interpreted in a better sense. If we compare these evidences with the interpretation of the eternity of creation in RA 1, 4, 4–5, which represents precisely a softening of this idea in comparison with RA 1, 2, 10 and 1, 4, 3, and especially in comparison with RA 3, 5, 3, then, in any case, the correspondence of the general nature of this interpretation with the main trend of Didymus’s comments is quite obvious. Of course, this is nothing more than an assumption, but in general the possibility that between RA 1, 4, 3 and the end of RA 1, 4, 5 at one or another stage in the existence of the text, significant additions were made, in my opinion, is quite significant. 6.6. Results of the previous analysis Overall, the previous analysis demonstrates two things. Firstly, those key passages in the Latin translation of the RA where the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds is expounded in detail, i.e. RA 2, 3, 1–5 and 3, 5, 3 do not raise any radical doubts about their authenticity and, apparently, quite accurately convey the ideas contained in the Greek original of the treatise. Dzamalikos' point of view, according to which RA 3, 5, 3 is an interpolation of Rufinus, does not find confirmation upon closer examination of the text, as well as Kruzel's attempt to interpret this passage so that it is not related to the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds. The second conclusion that can be drawn here almost did not have to be proven during the direct analysis of the texts under consideration, and this just demonstrates the degree of its obviousness. Nowhere is the presentation of the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds accompanied by typical manifestations of Origen’s hypothetical position, known to us from Chapter 4. Speaking about the plurality of worlds, Origen does not feel the need to emphasize that we are talking about disputatio, and not about dogma, does not put this theory itself into the mouth of “some” or “other”; finally, it does not present it in the context of contrast with what would be a completely natural alternative for it, i.e. with a clear assumption of the uniqueness of this world, so as to once again turn to the reader: “You, reader, check” (tu, qui legis, probato). Even if all these standard features of Origen's hypotheticalism were present in this case, this in itself would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the plurality of worlds hypothesis “does not represent the thought of Origen himself.” But the fact of the matter is that there is nothing of the kind in the reviewed RA texts. The concept of the plurality of worlds nevertheless remains a hypothesis simply because it is not among the unquestioned provisions of church tradition listed in the preface to the RA, and, accordingly, cannot be considered as a doctrine that is ultimately reliable in its truth. But this does not mean at all that Origen in this case is only discussing a theory that he himself does not actually share. In practice, he always proceeds from the assumption of a plurality of worlds and nowhere does he seriously assume the absolute uniqueness of this world. This hypothesis seems to him to follow obviously from those places in the Holy Scriptures where “ages” or “eons” are spoken of in the plural. What seems unclear to him is rather the particulars and details, for example, the number of worlds or a specific variant of the distribution of intelligent creatures in each of them. But Origen has no particular doubt that numerous worlds have existed and will exist, although he cannot affirm this as the ultimate truth. It remains to be seen whether these conclusions will be confirmed by other contexts, both in this treatise and in Origen's Greek writings, which use key cosmological terms relevant to the plurality of worlds hypothesis. CHAPTER 7. SPECIFIC MENTIONS OF THE PULTURALITY OF WORLDS IN RA 7.1. Plural saecula in RA and the apocatastasis hypothesis There are several other places in the RA text where the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds is mentioned, and in such a way that it can be connected with the hypothesis of apocatastasis. These include the following contexts: 1) 1, 6, 2, 90-95: “Of these, as far as I can judge, consists this race of people, which in the future age or in the centuries to come (in futuro saeculo vel in supervenientibus saeculis), when, according to Isaiah, there will be a new heaven and a new earth, will be restored to that unity (restituetur in illam unitatem) which the Lord Jesus promises when he speaks to God the Father about his disciples” and etc. (follows John 17, 22ff.) In the above quotation, Origen indicates that the restoration of the human race to a state of original perfection will take place in the next century or in future centuries. The wording in supervenientibus saeculis implies “the ages to come” from Eph. 2, 7, i.e. the passage to which Origen refers as the main argument in favor of many future worlds in RA 2, 3, 5, RE 27, 15, SM 15, 31. In the light of the latter passages, the alternative “in a future age or in future centuries” can hardly be taken as a doubt about the very existence of multiple ages in the future. It only emphasizes the gradual nature of the recovery, which will most likely take not only one future century, but also a whole series of world periods following it. Thus, this context links the hypothesis of the multiplicity of worlds with the hypothesis of apokatastasis, indicating that a certain sequence of eons is necessary for universal restoration, and, therefore, it does not occur at the end of each of them. 2) 1, 6, 3, 122–139: “But will some of these ranks, acting under the command of the devil and obeying his vice, ever in future centuries (in futuris saeculis) be able to turn to good, since they have the ability of free choice, or will a constant and inveterate vice, due to habit, turn into a kind of nature? You yourself, reader, consider whether this part [of rational beings], neither in the visible temporal ages, nor in the invisible and eternal ones (neque in his quae videntur temporalibus saeculis neque in his quae non videntur et aeterna sunt) will not be completely separated from this final unity and agreement (ab illa etiam finali unitate ac convenientia). For all this, both in the visible temporal ages and in the invisible eternal ones (tam in his quae videntur et temporalibus saeculis quam in illis quae non videntur et aeterna sunt), all [creatures] are still distributed in accordance with the order and [due] basis, as well as the measure and merits of [their] merits, so that some earlier, others later, some in the very last times and through more significant and difficult ones, and also prolonged punishments, endured, so to speak, for many centuries (multis, ut ita dicam, saeculis), [will be] corrected by [these] more severe corrective measures and restored (reparati et restituti) first with the help of angelic instructions, then also by the forces of the higher ranks ... ". Here Origen raises the question of whether restoration is possible for demons. He does not give any final solution to this question, but already in its very formulation the existence of numerous future saecula is assumed as that segment of cosmic history during which this restoration could generally take place. Particularly interesting is the distinction twice reproduced in this context between “visible and temporal ages” (his quae videntur temporalibus saeculis) and “invisible and eternal” (his quae non videntur et aeterna sunt). Kettler interprets this distinction in the spirit of the idea traditional for “systematic” Origen studies about the existence of incorporeal intervals between the general restoration at the end of each eon and the general fall at the beginning of the next. However, the text itself says nothing either that “visible and temporal ages” are periodically interspersed with “invisible and eternal” ones, or that the latter represent periods during which corporeal nature does not exist at all. The very formulation quae non videntur et aeterna sunt, which is a reference to 2 Cor. 4, 18 (τὰ δ ῝ μὴ Βλεπ ό μενα αἰ ώ νια), does not at all imply that this “invisible and eternal” is identical to the incorporeal. This becomes clear from an analysis of the following context: 3) 1, 6, 4, 150-158: “Since Paul says that there is something visible and temporary (visibilia... et temporalia) and, besides this, something invisible and eternal (invisibilia et aeterna), we ask in what sense the visible (haec quae videntur) is temporal: is it that it will not exist at all after this [age?] (post hoc) in all those future periods and centuries (in omnibus illis futuris spatiis ac saeculis), during which this dispersion and division of the one principle will again be brought to to the same end and likeness (quibus dispersio illa unius principii atque divisio ad unum et eundem finem ac similitudinem reparatur), or in the fact that, although the image of what is visible passes away, its substance is still not completely destroyed.” From further discussion it is clear that Origen is inclined to the second of the alternatives proposed here. The transition from this age to the coming centuries is conceived by him (based on 1 Cor. 7:31, Ps. 101:27 and Isa. 65:17) not as “the destruction or destruction of a material substance” (165–166: exterminatio vel perditio materialis substantiae), but as “a certain change in [its] quality and transformation of the “image” (cf.: 1 Cor. 7:31)" (166–167: inmutatio quaedam... qualitatis atque habitus transformatio). Thus, the definition quae non videntur et aeterna sunt, appearing with saecula in the previous context, may well mean only that in future ages or worlds the corporeal nature will be in a different state than in this world. Another argument against Kettler’s interpretation can be considered that saecula, quae non videntur et aeterna sunt are presented in RA 1, 6, 3, 122–139 as segments of cosmic history, during which a different distribution of spiritual beings according to the ranks of the spiritual hierarchy is preserved. We are therefore not talking about periodic general returns to the state of original unity and equality, which would then be followed by new declines. Thus, this passage should in no way be taken as an argument in favor of the periodicity of apocatastasis. On the contrary, like context 3), it suggests that the restoration of the original unity can only occur at the end of the sequence of centuries. 4) 3, 1, 23, 1023-1027: “And therefore we believe that since the soul, as we have often said, is immortal and eternal, it is possible that in numerous and endless periods (in multis et sine fine spatiis), throughout immeasurable and varied centuries (per immensa et diversa saecula) it either descends from the highest good to the worst evil (a summo bono ad infima mala), or returned from extreme evil to the highest good (ab ultimis malis ad summa bona).” Here we are talking about the possibility of the “soul” transitioning from one rank of the spiritual hierarchy to another, while “centuries” represent those segments of cosmic history during which this transition can take place. In this case, the change of centuries does not correspond to the hypothesis of apokatastasis. It may even seem that the formulations in multis et sine fine spatiis and per immensa et diversa saecula imply the infinity of cosmic history. However, epithets indicating the infinity and unlimitedness of centuries can simply mean an indefinite and at the same time, of course, very significant extent of the future, but do not at all exclude the possibility that after “endless and immeasurable centuries” an apocatastasis will come, according to RA 2, 3, 5, going beyond the centuries. The following context demonstrates this most clearly: 5) 3, 6, 6, 164–173: “We must think that all our bodily substance will be brought to this state when everything is restored to be one, and when God is all in all (cum omnia restituentur, ut unum sint, et cum deus fuerit omnia in omnibus). But this, one must believe, will not happen suddenly, but little by little and in parts (non ad subitum ... sed paulatim et per partes), over endless and immeasurable centuries (infinitis et immensis labentibus saeculis), during which improvement and correction will be carried out gradually and separately, since some will run ahead and rush faster to the highest [goal] (ad summa), others will follow them, lagging behind only a little, and, finally, the third [will follow] far behind.” Here the centuries, as in the previous context, are defined as “endless and immeasurable,” but, unlike the previous context, they are characterized as segments of cosmic history during which apokatastasis is gradually being prepared. 7.2. The transition from one “age” to another: a new general fall or an individual redistribution of intelligent creatures according to the ranks of the spiritual hierarchy? All of the above contexts more or less clearly connect the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds with the idea of ​​gradual preparation of apocatastasis, with the exception of context 4) (RA 3, 1, 23, 1023–1027). However, the fact that in this last case Origen envisages the possibility not only of gradual improvement, but also of regression, does not necessarily mean that by the transition from good to evil (a summo bono ad infima mala) a new fall after apocatastasis is meant here, as Crusel seems to think in his commentary on this passage. In my opinion, the “centuries” mentioned in this place by RA, during which various oscillations of the “soul” between good and evil occur, should be attributed to the period of cosmic history before apokatastasis, and apocatastasis itself should be placed only at the end of the chain of “centuries”, as evidenced by 1–3) and 5) from the above contexts. Thus, we are not talking here at all about the periodic change of collective appeals to God and collective falling away from him. What is meant here is rather what one scholar has aptly called “trans-epochal self-determination,” in which “rational souls in each era of their lives are distributed according to how they used their freedom in the previous era.” Such self-determination is individual in nature, so that when changing eons, simultaneous movements are possible both from the lower ranks of the spiritual hierarchy to the higher ones, and vice versa. This will become more obvious if we consider that in the same chapter of the RA, which contains the context of 4), it is preceded by the following reasoning, preserved in the original Greek: “It is possible that he who is now (νῦν) due to some previous worthy deeds (ἐκ προτέρων τινῶν κατορθωμάτων) became a “vessel of honor” (cf. Rom. 9:21), but does not do what corresponds and befits a “vessel of honor”; in another century (εἰς ἕ τερον αἰῶνα) became a “low vessel” (cf.: Rome 9, 21); how, on the other hand, is it possible that someone who has become here (ἐνθάδε) a “low vessel” due to [reasons] preceding this life (διὰ πρεσβύτερα τούτου τοῦ β ί ου αἴτια >), having corrected himself, became would be in the “new creation” (ἐν τ ῇ καιν ῇ κτ ί σει; cf.: 2 Cor. 5:17; Gal. 6:15) “a vessel of honor, sanctified and useful to the Master, fit for every good work” (2 Tim. 2:21 ... so that, according to this, thanks to their own choice, some improve, [moving] from worse to better (ἐκ χειρ ό νων εἰς κρε ί ττονα), while others fall away from better to worse (ἀπὸ κρειττ ό νων εἰς χε ί ρονα), and [besides], some remain in good (ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς τηρεῖσθαι) or ascend from good to even better ( ἀπὸ καλῶν εἰς κρειττ ό να), others, on the contrary, remain in evil (τοῖς κακοῖς παραμένειν) or, if evil increases, they become even more evil the worst (ἀπὸ κακῶν, χεομένης τῆς κακ ί ας, χε ί ρονας γ ί νεσθαι)" (RA 3, 1, 23, 750–768). The fact that the transition from one rank of the spiritual hierarchy to another with the change of eons occurs without the mediation of general restorations and falls is also evidenced by RA 2, 1, 3, 82–91: “Since the course of the previous reasoning showed that the various movements [of the will] and the various decisions of rational creatures became the cause of diversity for this world (causam dedisse... diversitatis mundo huic), it is necessary to see whether this is not appropriate for this world also the end is like the beginning (ne forte similis initio exitus quoque huic mundo conveniat). For there is no doubt that its end will take place with still significant diversity and difference (finis ipsius in multa adhuc diversitate ac varietate reperiendus sit), and this difference, caught at the end of this world (varietas in huius mundi fine depraehensa), will again provide reasons and reasons for the differences of another world that will come after this (diversitatum alterius mundi post hunc futuri), thanks to which the end of this world will be the beginning of another (huius mundi finis initium sit futuri).” The correspondence of the end to the beginning, which is repeatedly mentioned in the PA, is usually correlated with the hypothesis of apokatastasis and implies a return to unitas or original unity (PA 1, 6, 2, 42–51.74; 2, 1, 1, 20; 3, 6, 3, 78; 3, 6, 8, 245). But this context, as M. Arles rightly noted, is an exception. Here Origen asks whether the scheme of initium finis also applies to the beginning and end of a given world, and the similarity of the beginning and end in this case lies in the fact that they are equally characterized by diversity (diversitas). From this we can conclude that the end of this world, from Origen’s point of view, does not imply the possibility of at least a preliminary return to the original unity (unitas), i.e. an intermediate apocatastasis, followed by a new fall. The idea that the future world can only begin as a result of a new general fall of intelligent creatures did not, of course, arise out of nowhere. We have seen that in RA 2, 2, 1–2 and 2, 3, 2–3 Origen, in a hypothetical manner, discusses the theory of the existence of matter per intervalla, which actually assumes the emergence of a new material cosmos as a result of the next fall of intelligent spiritual beings. The same version of the plurality of worlds hypothesis is presented in detail by anti-Origenist sources in the text of RA. First of all, this includes a fragment cited by Jerome of Stridon in a letter to Avitus (Ep. 124, 10): “Again discussing the differences of the worlds (de mundorum varietatibus) and declaring that in the future either angels can become demons, or demons - angels or people, and vice versa - people demons, and all [types of spiritual beings] all [others], he (i.e. Origen. - A.S.) confirms his opinion with the following conclusion: “There is no doubt (Nec dubium est) that after certain intervals of time (post quaedam intervalla temporum) matter begins to exist again, bodies arise and the diversity of the world is formed due to the various wills of rational creatures, which, after [previously achieved] perfect bliss, [continued] until the end of all things (usque ad finem omnium rerum), gradually sinking into a lower [state], they acquire such malice that they turn into [something] the opposite, because they do not want to preserve the original state (principium) and enjoy lasting bliss. You should also know that many rational creatures retain their original state (principium) right up to the second, third, and even fourth world (usque ad secundum et tertium et quartum mundum) and do not allow room for change in themselves, while others will lose so little from their previous state that they will seem to have lost almost nothing, and some, due to a great fall, will be cast into the deepest abyss ... " The first phrase of the above text is not a quotation from RA, but the formulation of Jerome himself. It introduces the already familiar theme of the transition of intelligent beings from one rank of the spiritual hierarchy to another. Further, in the quote given by Jerome, we talk about the periodic emergence and disappearance of matter, depending on the will of the same intelligent beings. As a result, one may get the impression that their redistribution according to the ranks of the spiritual hierarchy, according to this quote, is possible only thanks to a general restoration, in which matter is destroyed, and the subsequent general fall, as a result of which matter arises again. This, however, is far from the case. Of course, this speaks of a new fall after the end of all things has been achieved (finis omnium rerum), i.e. apokatastasis. However, this same text clearly demonstrates that after a new fall, “many intelligent creatures retain their original state right up to the second, third, or even fourth world.” This can only mean one thing: after a new fall, a whole chain of separate worlds begins, the mechanism of change of which in itself does not imply intermediate restorations and falls of a total nature. Jerome's quotation presents the theory of a new fall and periodic emergence of matter as a completely categorical belief of Origen (Nec dubium est). However, the categorical nature of Origen's statements in this case can be explained simply by the loss of the context in which they were made. The expression Nec dubium est in the source text could be preceded by a conditional sentence like “If someone proves that intelligent creatures can exist without bodies” or some similar construction that embeds the thesis about the periodic existence of matter in the context of a hypothetical discussion. This assumption is supported by another quotation given by the same Jerome and touching on the same topic (Ep. 124, 14): “If anyone can prove (Si quis autem potuerit ostendere) that the incorporeal and rational nature, purified from the body, can live on its own and that it is in a worse state when clothed in bodies, and in a better state when sheds them, [then] there will be no doubt for anyone (nulli dubium est) that bodies do not exist originally (non principaliter subsistere), but due to the various movements of rational creatures through intervals (per intervalla), they sometimes arise to be clothed [in them] by those who need them, then they are again resolved into nothingness, when [fallen creatures] from this depravity and fall turn to the better, and these alternations always follow each other (et haec semper successione variari).” In this fragment, the theory of the periodic existence of matter is also accompanied by an expression formally indicating its certainty (nulli dubium est), however, from the context it becomes obvious that we are talking about the purely logical certainty of the conclusion that must be drawn upon the assumption of a certain premise, while this premise itself is of a hypothetical nature (Si quis autem potuerit ostendere). Let us imagine what this text would look like if Jerome had omitted its first part, containing the conditional sentence (as he may have done in the case of the quotation given in Ep. 124:10). Then nothing would prevent us from seeing here direct evidence of Origen’s unambiguous commitment to the hypothesis of the periodic existence of matter. By the way, it is in this version that this passage is quoted by Justinian (Just. ACO III, p. 212, 15–19): “It is necessary [to recognize] (῟ Ανάγκη) that the nature of bodies is not original (προηγουμένην), but arises through intervals (ἐκ διαλειμμάτων) due to the falls that occur with rational [beings] who need [for this reason] bodies, and [then] when perfect correction occurs (τῆς ἐπανορθ ώ σεως τελε ί ως γινομένης), these [bodies] are again resolved into non-existence, so that this always happens (τοῦτο ἀεὶ γ ίv εσθαι).” All this once again demonstrates the biased attitude of anti-Origenists towards the text of the RA. The general conclusion that the fragments of RA given by Jerome and Justinian allow us to draw is that in the Greek original of the treatise the hypothesis of a new fall after apokatastasis, entailing the periodic emergence of matter and endless cyclism, was stated in much more detail than in the Rufinus translation, where it, however, is also found in RA 2, 2, 1–2 and 2, 3, 2–3. Apparently, Origen also considered it in RA 3, 6, 3 (Hier. Ep. 124, 10 is correlated with this place) and RA 4, 4, 9 (36) (Hier. Ep. 124, 14 and Just. ACO III, p. 212, 15–19 are usually embedded here). At the same time, it did not have the categorical character that is attributed to it in some fragments by Jerome and Justinian. In addition, allowing for an endless cyclism and periodic restoration and fall of all rational beings, this hypothesis still does not at all contradict the fact that the mechanism of changing individual eons in Origen should be imagined as an individual redistribution of rational creatures according to the ranks of the spiritual hierarchy, and not a general restoration at the end and a general fall at the beginning of each eon. Nothing prevents us from placing the new fall, mentioned by Jerome and Justinian, after the apokatastasis, which will occur only at the end of a long chain of separate aeons. Thus, we are talking here rather about what was proposed above to be designated as “cyclism of the second degree.” The end of the present world in the same Jerome is depicted not at all as a general restoration, but precisely as a new distribution of rational creatures into various ranks of the spiritual hierarchy. This is clear from the quotation he gives in Ep. 124, 4: “At the end and consummation of the world (in fine etconsummatione mundi), when souls and rational creatures are released by the Lord, as if from some kind of gates and prisons, some of them will begin their journey (incedere) more slowly due to laziness, others will quickly fly [forward] due to [their] zeal. Since everyone has free will and can spontaneously acquire either virtues or vices, some will be in a much worse position than now, others will achieve a better state, for different movements and various expressions of will both in one direction and the other give rise to a different state, that is, angels become people or demons and, conversely, these [the latter] become people or angels.” CHAPTER 8. THE HYPOTHESIS OF PULTURAL WORLDS IN THE GREEK WORKS OF ORIGEN 8.1. "The Future Age" and "Coming Ages" in the Greek Works of Origen Let us now turn to the Greek works of Origen. In them one can find a completely standard eschatological concept of the “future age”, contrasted with the present “age”. As already in the New Testament itself, we are talking not just about the change of two chronological periods, but about the change of two worlds. The current eon is conceived by Origen as an ethically negative concept. This is a world lying in evil, in which the righteous are tested. This explains Origen’s comparison of this eon with night. He presents the future eon as a time of realization of eschatological promises, with which is associated the possibility of a more perfect knowledge of God. This is a world in which the resurrection of the dead will take place, and the righteous, of course, will have a better fate, while the sinners will be punished. If Origen's eschatology were limited only to this doctrine of the future aeon, then it would not stand out in any way from the background of traditional Christian eschatology. Nevertheless, this doctrine of the future age can, if necessary, be built into the context of the plurality of worlds hypothesis without much difficulty. In this case, the future century should no longer be understood as the final state of the universe, which will never be changed, but as only one of the preliminary stages of the pedagogical process that prepares the general restoration at the end of the entire chain of centuries. The Greek texts in which Origen formulates the hypothesis of the plurality of aeons are quite capable of confirming this interpretation of his eschatology. As has already been shown, in RE 27, 15 and SM 15, 31 he proceeds from a literal interpretation of the plural τοῖς αἰῶσιν τοῖς ἐπερχομένοις from Eph. 2, 7, which, from his point of view, indicates that after this century there should be many more centuries. At the same time, he thinks of the “future century” as the “beginning” of these “coming centuries,” and not as an alternative to them. The same conclusion follows from Origen's polemic with the interpretation of the “two days” (δύο ἡμέρας) from John. 4, 40, proposed by the Gnostic Heracleon (CJ 13, 52, 351). According to Heracleon, these “two days” may refer to the present and future ages. In this regard, Origen finds it necessary to specifically emphasize that Heracleon “did not pay attention to the coming centuries after the future [century] (τούς ἐπερχομένους αἰῶνας μετὰ τὸν μέλλοντα), about which the apostle says: “In order to reveal it in the coming ages”....” This is a clear distinction between the “future age” and the “future ages” that will come only after it (μετὰ), and accompanied by another reference to Eph. 2, 7, shows that ὁ μέλλων αἰ ώ ν may well be built by Origen into the chronological sequence of future eons. In Greek writings one can also find evidence in favor of the fact that, according to Origen, in the “coming ages” it is still possible for spiritual beings to turn to good, even if in the “future age” they are under the power of sin and subject to punishment. In SM 15, 31, 41–48 this idea is connected with the literal interpretation of the expression εἰς τούς αἰῶνας from Ps. 76, 8: “has the Lord really rejected it forever?” Origen sees in this verse a hint of many future centuries and draws the following conclusion: “And perhaps,” I would venture to say, “the Lord will not reject “for centuries” (εἰς τούς αἰῶνας) (after all, when the Lord rejects for one century (εἰς ἕ να αἰῶνα), then this too much), but will reject, perhaps, for the second century (εἰς δεύτερον αἰῶνα), since such a significant sin is not forgiven “neither in this century, nor in the next” (ο ὔ τε ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι ο ὔ τε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι; cp.: Matthew 12, 32)". Thus, if God rejects the sinner in the present and future ages, then after these two ages things can still change. A mention in a similar context of sin against the Holy Spirit, which, according to Matthew 12:32, is not absolved either in this age or in the future, is found in Origen back in RE 27:15: “... just as the end of the year is the last month, after which comes the beginning of another month, so, perhaps, the end of numerous centuries, constituting, as it were, a year of centuries, is the present age, after which certain future centuries will come, the beginning of which is the future [century after this], and in these coming [centuries] God will reveal the riches of His grace in goodness, [moreover] even to the greatest sinner (τοῦ ἁ μαρτωλοτάτου), who blasphemed the Holy Spirit and are under the power of sin both in the entire present age, and from beginning to end in the future [age] ( ἐν ὁλ ῳ τῷ ἐνεστῶτι αἰῶνι καὶ ἀρχῆθεν μέχρι τέλους τῷ μέλλοντι), after this [period God] I don’t know how [exactly, but] will order [for his good] (μετὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ο ῝ δ ὅ πως οἰκονομησομένου)". All these examples point to the possibility of forgiveness of the sinner in the “coming centuries” and allow us to conclude that in the Greek writings of Origen, the hypothesis of the plurality of aeons is associated with the idea of ​​​​divine pedagogy, gradually preparing a universal apokatastasis. The same relationship is visible in Fr. in Ps. 9, 37–38 (Sel. Ps. PG 12, 1196B). Ps. 9, 37 (“The Lord is king forever, forever”; Greek τοῦ αἰῶνος), is interpreted here as follows: “The Lord must reign throughout the ages (διὰ τῶν αἰ ώ νων)... until he puts all enemies under his feet. For His kingdom is the contemplation of all past and future centuries ( Through this contemplation even enemies become friends.” Ps. 9, 37 is put here in connection with 1 Cor. 15, 25 (“For He must reign until He has put all enemies under His feet”), and this last place, like the verses immediately surrounding it (15, 24–28), is constantly used in Origen’s writings as the main textual evidence in favor of the hypothesis of total apokatastasis, and the subjugation of enemies to Christ, which is discussed in it, according to Origen implies “the salvation of the conquered” (RA 1, 6, 1, 39–40: salutem subiectorum). In the context in question, this "salvation" is indicated by the phrase "enemies become friends" (οἱ ἐχθροὶ φ ί λοι γ ί νονται). 8.2. Origen's eschatological terminology The point of view according to which the division of sinners and righteous in the “future age” and the hypothesis of total apokatastasis correlate in Origen with two fundamentally different stages of cosmic history can be confirmed by an analysis of eschatological terminology in Origen’s Greek writings. In order to somehow indicate the end of this world, Origen can use such a New Testament expression as συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος, or simply συντέλεια, as well as synonymous terms like συντέλεια τοῦ κ ό σμου and τοῦ κ ό σμου φθορά. All of them are either directly associated with traditional eschatological ideas, or, in any case, do not appear in those places where Origen formulates the hypothesis of a universal apocatastasis or at least hints at it. Moreover, Origen specifically stipulates that by the time of συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος there will be many sinners in the world who have not yet turned to good. In SM 13, 1, he writes that Scripture “knows about the multitude of sinners during the destruction of the world ( τῆς τοῦ κ ό σμου φθορ ᾶ σ ), which [becomes] clear if we compare the words: “But the Son of Man, when he comes, will he find faith on earth?” (Luke 18:8) - with what we find in Matthew, where it is said: “But as it was in the days of Noah, so it will be at the coming of the Son of Man: for as in the days before the flood,” etc. (Matt. 24, 37–38)” (CM 13, 1, 99–112). At times, Origen not only mentions that at the end of this world there will be many sinners, but even directly challenges the point of view that assumes the opposite. In SM 10, 13, commenting on that picture of the eschatological division of the righteous and sinners, which is in Matt. 13, 47–50 is connected with the interpretation of the parable of the net, he specifically emphasizes: “If this is what is written about the net and those in it, the one who would like until the “end of the age” (πρὸ τῆς συντελε ί ας τοῦ αἰῶνος) and before “the angels go out and separate the wicked from among the righteous,” there were no longer any evil “of every kind” in the net, it seems that he did not understand the Scriptures and wants the impossible ( ἀδυνάτων ἐπιθυμεῖν ). Therefore, let us not be surprised if, before the angels sent for this purpose “separate the wicked from among the righteous,” we see that our assemblies are full of evil πονηρῶν ). On the contrary, how could those who were “thrown into the fiery furnace” not turn out to be more numerous than the righteous! (῟ Αλλ ῾ εἴθε μὴ πλε ί ους ο ὗ τοι τυγχάνοιε v ὄντες τῶν δικα ί ων οἱ Βληθησ ό μενοι εἰς τὴν κάμινον τοῦ πυρ ό ς )” (SM 10, 13, 13–23). Some texts also suggest that, according to Origen, there is some kind of cause-and-effect relationship between the increase of evil and the end of this world. In CJ 6, 59, 304 Origen gives the following commentary on Matt. 5, 13 (“You are the salt of the earth”): “It is possible that by “earth” we mean the rest of the people, whose “salt” is those who believe, who are the reason for the preservation of the world for the sake of their faith ( διὰ τοῦ πιστεύειν τυγχάνοντες ). The “end” (συντέλεια) will come when “the salt loses its strength” (Matthew 5:13) and there will no longer be that which makes the “earth” salty and preserves it. For it is clear that if lawlessness increases and love grows cold (cf. Matt. 24:12) “on earth,” as the Savior himself said, as if hesitating about what would [happen] during his coming: “But the Son of Man, when he comes, will he find faith on earth?” (Luke 18:8) - then the end of what precedes the [future] age will come ( This entire body of evidence, in my opinion, very clearly demonstrates that Origen not only did not associate any “hope” for the universal salvation of spiritual beings with the end of this world, but directly spoke out even against the idea that at this stage of the eschatological process even all members of the Christian church, not to mention the entire human race, would find salvation. It is worth paying special attention to the fact that in SM 10, 13, as well as in SM 13, 1, the thesis about the presence of a large number of sinners by the time of συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος is presented to the reader not simply as Origen’s personal opinion, but as a teaching contained in Scripture. It would be strange if he found it possible to contrast Scripture itself with some alternative hypothesis, presupposing a universal voluntary conversion to the good. If, despite all this, he nevertheless repeatedly formulates such a hypothesis and often talks about the complete destruction of sin at the end of the cosmic process, then this, in my opinion, becomes possible only because he initially correlates such ideas with another stage of cosmic history - not with the end of this “age,” but with the end of the entire sequence of “future ages.” Thus, judging by Origen's Greek texts, terms such as συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος, συντέλεια τοῦ κ ό σμου, τοῦ κ ό σμου φθορά, or, finally, simply συντέλεια, in principle have no relation to the hypothesis of general restoration. Theoretically, one would expect that if συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος denotes the end of one age, namely the current one, then another New Testament expression, συντέλεια τῶν αἰώνων from Heb. 9, 26, could well be suitable for the role of a term denoting the end of the entire sequence of centuries or apocatastasis. This point of view was once expressed by Kettler. But upon closer examination it turns out to be wrong. It would be more correct to say, following Cécile Blanc, that συντέλεια τῶν αἰώνων is a term that implies for Origen “the moment of the historical existence of Jesus,” more precisely, the entire current age as the final stage in the series of centuries preceding it, which has earned this special status precisely because the appearance of Christ took place in it. Thus, based on the Greek texts, there is no way to connect the term συντέλεια with the hypothesis of apokatastasis. It follows from this that in order to somehow designate that stage of the eschatological process at which the universal conversion of rational beings to God could occur, Origen had to use some other terms. It would be natural to expect that for these purposes he would first of all use the term ἀποκατάστασις, which is so strongly associated with his name, and exclusively in the sense suggesting universal salvation. In fact, the use of this word by Origen is far from being as definite and stable as in the case of the term συντέλεια. First of all, the term ἀποκατάστασις is not used very often in Origen’s texts, and those contexts in which it is directly related to the eschatological finale of the world process are generally isolated. Some passages show that, in using this term, Origen relies on New Testament usage. As you know, in the New Testament there is only one context where the word ἀποκατάστασις appears - this is Acts. 3, 21: “... until the time of the completion of all things (ἀποκατάστασεως πάντων), which God has spoken by the mouth of all His holy prophets since the world began.” Origen quotes this verse twice, speaking of the time when the state of direct contemplation of God will be achieved, and once refers to it in a very characteristic context, demonstrating that, in his opinion, the term usually implies a return to the former state. However, there is no hint of the idea of ​​universal salvation in these contexts. The only clear context that still allows us to say that Origen himself actually used the term ἀποκατάστασις in the sense that later tradition firmly associated with his name is CJ 1, 16, 91. Here Origen, developing the metaphor of the “beginning of the path” from Proverbs. 16, 5: “The beginning of a good path is to do the truth” (Ἀρχὴ ὀδοῦ ἀγαθῆς τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ δ ί καια), - also mentions “its end during the so-called apocatastasis” ( "). Immediately following this, he states that the “end of the good road” and the “so-called apokatastasis” will take place “due to the fact that there will no longer be a single “enemy” (διὰ τὸ μηδένα καταλε ί πεσθαι τ ό τε ἐχθρ ό ν), unless [the saying] is true: “For He must reign until He has put all enemies under His feet. The last enemy will be destroyed - death"" (CJ 1, 16, 91, 7-11), - that is, he puts the term ἀποκατάστασις in direct connection with 1 Cor. 15, 25–26, and this place in Scripture, as has already been shown, is constantly considered by him as a direct indication of the gradual process of subordinating sinners to good, ending with the complete destruction of sin. Much more often, Origen associates the term τέλος with the hypothesis of universal salvation, to which the very use of this word in 1 Cor. 15, 24 (“And then the end”; Greek ε ῝ τα τὸ τέλος). In one of those contexts where Origen quotes Acts 3:21, τέλος appears precisely as an eschatological term designating the final stage of the cosmic process. The connection of the term τέλος with the hypothesis of general restoration is also evident in several places in CJ, where expressions such as διὰ τὸ τέλος, διὰ τὸν περὶ τέλους λ ό γον, are used. διὰ τὰ περὶ τέλους ἡμῖν ὑπονοούμενα, as a rule, hinting at the possibility of gradual salvation of sinners in some eschatological perspective. A similar logic is visible, for example, in CJ 28, 18, 154–156, where Origen discusses the meaning of the words of Caiaphas from John. 11, 50: “... it is better for us (συμφέρει ἡμῖν) that one man should die for the people, than that the whole people should perish.” Although, on the one hand, Origen points out that “it is absurd to claim that Caiaphas and the opponents of Jesus in the Sanhedrin are saved and achieve the best (σ ώ ζεσφαι καὶ τοῦ συμθέροντος τετευχέναι) thanks to death Jesus,” he immediately admits that such an assumption may make sense διὰ τὸν περὶ τέλους λ ό γον, especially if we compare John. 11, 50 s Eur. 2, 9 (“that He, by the grace of God, might taste death for all (ὑπ ῝ ρ παντὸς)”) and 1 Tim. 4, 10 (“Who is the Savior of all men (πάντων ἀνθρ ώ πων), and especially of the faithful”) - that is, those places in Scripture where, if desired, one can see a hint of the universality of salvation. Moreover, Origen adds to this series of quotations a reference to John that at first glance does not prove anything. 1, 29: “Behold the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world,” in order to emphasize that we are talking about “the sin of the world, and not a part of it” ( μέρους αὐτοῦ ). Another context in which the term τέλος is very clearly associated with the theme of the universal conversion of rational beings to good and the complete destruction of moral evil is found in CC 8, 72: “The supporters of the Stoa believe that when the most powerful of all elements prevails [over the rest], there will be a general conflagration and everything will turn into fire. We say that one day the Word will prevail over all rational nature (τῆς λογικῆς φύσε ώ σ ... ὅ λης) and will lead every soul (π ᾶ σαν ψυχὴν) to its own perfection, when everyone, taking advantage of by free will alone (ἕ καστος ψιλ ῇ χρησάμενος τ ῇ ἑξουσ ίᾳ), he will choose what [the Word] desires, and will end up in the [state] that he chose. And we say that it is unlikely that it would be impossible for God and the rational [principle that rules] over everyone to heal any vice in souls, just as in the case of bodily illnesses and wounds, something is stronger than any medical art. For the Word is stronger than all evil in the soul and the cure that [is] in Him is given to everyone by the will of God, and the end of [all] things [consists] in the destruction of vice ( τὴν κακ ί αν)". Sel can also be compared with this. Ps. 12, 1660D (Fr. in Ps. 138, 5–6), which states that “vice... was not in the beginning and will not be in the end” (τὴν κακ ί αν … ο ὔ τε ἐν τ ῇ ἀρχ ῇ, ο ὔ τε ἐν τῷ τέλει ὑπάρχουσαν ). What has been said, of course, does not mean that the word τέλος is used by Origen exclusively in relation to the hypothesis of apocatastasis. On the one hand, there are cases when it denotes not so much the “end” of a period of time, but rather a “goal” or “perfect state” to which one should strive. On the other hand, it is clear that in the meaning of “chronological finale” this word may well be applied not only to the end of the entire cosmic process, but also to the end of any of its preliminary stages. So, in Fr. C. Eph. 9, 168sq., speaking about “the structure of this world from beginning to end (μεχρὶ τέλους),” Origen means precisely the end of the present world or “age,” to which he contrasts “the age of a better world, where the saints are striving.” Obviously, this should also include SS 4, 9, 9, which speaks of “the end of the world and a fair trial for everyone after [this] end” ( περὶ πάντων κρ ί σις ). In addition, once Origen correlates with the “end of the age” and the picture of the eschatological separation of the righteous and sinners the expression τέλος τῶν πραγμάτων, which in some other cases can be used in connection with the hypothesis of apocatastasis. Finally, the context in which τέλος clearly designates the end of the next century has already been given above (RE 27, 15, 17: μέχρι τέλους). To summarize, we can say that if the term συντέλεια, used alone or with various words dependent on it, in Origen’s Greek texts correlates exclusively with the end of the present world and traditional eschatological ideas, then, turning to the formulation of the hypothesis of universal salvation, Origen uses such terms as ἀποκατάστασις, τέλος and τέλος τῶν πραγμάτων, but in the latter case its word usage is much less unambiguous, due to which the same expressions τέλος or τέλος τῶν πραγμάτων can also mean in his texts the end of the present world. 8.3. Eschatological terminology of the Rufinus translation of the RA (consummatio, restitutio, finis) Observations made on the use of eschatological terms in Origen's Greek writings lead to some criticism of their Latin equivalents used in the RA text. In the Rufinian translation one can find such terms as consummatio, restitutio and finis, and, if we start only from the lexical meaning of these words themselves, then they, of course, would have to be considered as an obvious rendering of the Greek terms συντέλεια, ἀποκατάστασις and τέλος. However, contextual analysis shows that the use of the term consummatio in RA very often does not correspond to the meaning of συντέλεια, which was established above based on Greek sources. On the one hand, like συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος or συντέλεια τοῦ κ ό σμου in Greek texts, consummatio saeculi or consummatio mundi in Rufinus In translation, it primarily means the end of the present material cosmos, and consummatio saeculorum - the present “age” as the moment of the coming of Christ. On the other hand, there is one context in which the term consummatio saeculi seems to be used in relation to the hypothesis of apocatastasis. In RA 3, 5, 6, 171-183, Origen, if we are to believe Rufinus, writes the following: “Since, as we have said, [Christ] appeared in order to restore not only the order (disciplinam) of government or reign, but also of obedience, having first carried out in Himself what He desired from others, He not only became obedient to the Father even to the point of death on the cross, but it is also said of Him, that at the end of the age (in consummatione saeculi), having embraced in Himself all whom He submits to the Father and who with His help comes to salvation (omnes, quos subicit patri et qui per eum veniunt ad salutem), He is with them and in them subject to the Father, for all things exist in Him, and He is the head of all, and in Him is the fullness of those who have achieved salvation (salutem consequentium plenitudo). This is what the apostle says about Him: “When all things are put under Him, then the Son Himself will be subject to Him who put all things under Him, so that God may be all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28).” The fact that this passage reproduces motifs and even quotes from 1 Cor. 15, 24–28, as well as the understanding of the “conquering” of enemies as their salvation visible here, of course, testifies to the fact that we are talking about the hypothesis of general restoration. Thus, this context conflicts both with numerous Greek sources, in which συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος is usually associated only with traditional eschatological concepts, and with those places in the RA itself where the general apokatastasis is attributed to the end of the sequence of centuries, and the end of this world is thought of as the time when “diversity” (diversitas) will reign and the Last Judgment will take place. In my opinion, the accuracy of Rufinus' translation in this case should be questioned. The fact is that even without the gen dependent on it. saeculi, the term consummatio is constantly found in the Latin text of the RA in relation to the hypothesis of apokatastasis, and this cannot receive any confirmation in the light of the data of the Greek texts and leads to the conclusion that Rufinus’s transmission of Origen’s eschatological terminology is, in principle, very inadequate. The most illustrative case is RA 3, 6, 6, 266, where the wording in consummatione ac restitutione omnium is found. If we follow the letter of Rufinus' translation, we have to assume that in the original Greek RA the terms συντέλεια and ἀποκατάστασις were used as synonyms. We have seen, however, that in the surviving Greek texts these terms not only never occur within the same context, and even as homogeneous members of a sentence, connected by the conjunction “and,” but are generally associated with significantly different eschatological concepts. On the other hand, Rufinus' tendency to render one Greek word by two Latin ones is well known. In my opinion, in the latter case it is not only possible, but also necessary to assume this kind of reduplication. If this assumption is correct, then it follows that Rufinus, when translating, did not make a clear distinction between the terms restitutio and consummatio, and therefore could use the latter to denote apocatastasis. This is what happens almost every time another duplicate formulation is used in the RA text: finis et consummatio. Of course, in Greek texts the terms συντέλεια and τέλος are occasionally found within the same context, but in these cases there is no need to think that τέλος implies a general restoration. In Rufinus’ text, finis et consummatio is a kind of standard designation of precisely that stage of the eschatological process at which the complete destruction of evil will take place and “God will be all in all.” In the light of all that has been said, it is difficult to admit that in the Greek original the term συντέλεια was actually used in these cases. Probably, in Origen himself, only one term corresponded to these formulations: τέλος. On the other hand, the translation of the Greek ἕ ως συντελε ί ας in RA 4, 1, 5, 126 as usque ad finem allows us to assert that in those cases when in the Latin text of RA the word finis is used out of connection with the hypothesis of apocatastasis, but is nevertheless an eschatological term, it is possible to assume that in the Greek text there could have been not only the term τέλος, but also συντέλεια. Thus, Rufinus’s rendering of Origen’s eschatological terminology in the text of the RA should be recognized as very free and in many respects directly contradicting the idea of ​​​​the difference between the end of the present age and the general apokatastasis at the end of numerous future centuries, which can be found not only in Greek writings, but - if we leave aside the terminological aspect of the issue - including in the text of the RA itself. The main results of this work are as follows: 1) The theory of the plurality of worlds, discussed by Origen in RA, has the status of a hypothesis for him, i.e. is not a doctrine categorically affirmed by him; 2) Origen’s hypothetical methodology, manifested in the text of the RA in a number of formal features discussed in Chapter 4, is quite compatible with various gradations of the author’s position in relation to the hypotheses he considers. Therefore, it is unlawful to conclude that the author disagrees with the theory he presents simply on the basis that it has the status of a hypothesis. In particular, the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds, contrary to what Crusel writes about this, reflects precisely Origen’s own ideas about cosmic history; 3) Analysis of those places in RA where the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds is stated in most detail, i.e. RA 2, 3, 1–5 and 3, 5, 3, showed that from a philological point of view their authenticity is beyond doubt and is confirmed by data from the Greek works of Origen. At the same time, special attention was paid to the contradiction that exists between RA 3, 5, 3 and 1, 4, 3–5, which, in my opinion, allows us to consider the doubt expressed by De Fay about the authenticity of the latter place to be quite justified (contrary to Nemeshegi and Kruzel); 4) Both in the Latin text of RA and in the Greek writings, the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds can be said to be generated by the course of Origen’s exegetical reflections. Starting from the synonymy αἰ ώ ν – κ ό σμος, which was already characteristic of the New Testament texts themselves, combined in them with the doctrine of two eons, present and future, Origen, who always showed extremely picky and meticulous attention to what he called “the accuracy of Scripture” (ἀκρ ί βεια τῆς γραφῆς ), could not ignore the fact that Scripture often uses the plural form αἰῶνες (accordingly, saecula in the Latin translation) and interpreted it with the greatest possible degree of literalness - as an indication of numerous worlds. Thus, the formal prerequisite for the emergence of Origen’s hypothesis of the plurality of worlds was the New Testament tradition of using the term αἰῶνες in the meaning of “world,” specifically refracted in the light of the original principles of Origen’s exegesis; 5) The worldview reasons that led Origen to the formulation of this hypothesis boil down to its use to substantiate other key hypotheses for him (primarily, the eternity of creation and apocatastasis). The protological aspect of the plurality of worlds hypothesis, which the surviving sources allow us to imagine only approximately, is that Origen used the idea of ​​​​an infinite succession of worlds in the past to formulate the hypothesis of eternal creation; 6) The eschatological aspect of the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds puts it in close connection with the hypothesis of total apocatastasis. Analysis of those contexts where Origen uses such phrases as “future age” (ὁ μέλλων αἰ ώ ν) and “coming ages” ( οἱ ἐπερχ ό μενοι αἰῶνες), allows us to conclude that, thanks to the hypothesis of plurality worlds, he was given the opportunity, on the one hand, to maintain adherence to the traditional concept of the separation of righteous and sinners at the end of the present world, and on the other, to allow the possibility of a universal salvation of spiritual beings, attributing it to the end of a long sequence of coming eons; 7) The thesis about the need to distinguish between these two stages of cosmic history is confirmed in the analysis of the Greek eschatological terminology of Origen, since the terms denoting the end of the present world (συντέλεια, συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος, συντέλεια τοῦ κ ό σμου, τοῦ κ ό σμου φθορά), are never found in those texts where the hypothesis of apocatastasis is formulated, but are often used in connection with traditional eschatological concepts. When formulating the hypothesis of apokatastasis, Origen usually operates with such terms as τέλος, τέλος τῶν πραγμάτων and very rarely - ἀποκατάστασις. However, Rufinus in his translation can connect the Latin equivalents of all the terms mentioned (consummatio, restitutio, finis) with the idea of ​​​​universal salvation, which makes his rendering of Origen's eschatological terminology very inadequate; 8) The mechanism of changing individual eons should be imagined not as periodically repeating general restorations and falls, but as an individual redistribution of intelligent beings across various levels of the spiritual hierarchy as a result of God's judgment at the end of each world. In this case, Origen's hypothesis of the plurality of worlds can be considered simply as a linear sequence of aeons, continuing until apokatastasis; 9) Sometimes Origen hypothetically discusses the possibility of a new fall of spiritual beings after apocatastasis, as well as the periodicity of such falls and restorations. However, it cannot be concluded from this that he unambiguously adhered to this version of the plurality of worlds hypothesis; 10) Analysis of those texts in which Origen refers to the concept of “eternal return” allows us to critically evaluate the thesis often found in scientific literature, according to which Origen’s hypothesis of the plurality of worlds arose under the direct influence of ancient theories of cosmic cyclism, and shows that the significance that these theories had for the formation of Origen’s cosmology can be defined as purely negative: they were what he argued with, but not at all what he imitated; 11) The true role of the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds in Origen’s thought can be understood not in the perspective of a clear choice between “Origen the Christian” and “Origen the Platonist” (or “Origen the Stoic”), but only as a result of focusing on the originality of Origen himself, who, based on the data of the biblical text and certain elements of early Christian tradition, presented his own, completely original version cosmic history, of course, deviating from the norms of Christian orthodoxy, but not at all due to slavish imitation of ancient cosmological theories. I. Editions of texts and reference books ACO – Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum. DThC – Dictionnaire de théologie catholique. GCS – Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller. PR – Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. SC – Sources chretiennes. SVF – Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. Adn. Gen. – Adnotations in Genesim. CJ – Commentarii in evangelium Joannis. SM – Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei. CR – Commentaria in epistolam Pauli ad Romanos (lat.). CR (in Rom.3, 5–5, 7) – Commentarii in epistolam Pauli ad Romanos III. 5-V. 7. CR (I.1-XII. 21) – Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos (I.1-XII. 21) (in catenis). De eng. – De engastrimytho Homilia in 1 Reg. [1 Sam.] 28. 3–25. De res. – De resurrectione libri II fragmenta. DH – Dialogus cum Heraclide. Enarr. Job – Enarrationes in Job. Exc. Ps. – Excerpta in Psalmos. Exp. Prov. – Expositio in Proverbia. Fr. C 1Cor. – Fragmenta ex commentariis in epistulam i ad Corinthios (in catenis). Fr. C. Eph. – Fragmenta ex commentariis in epistulam ad Ephesios (in catenis). Fr. J – Fragmenta in evangelium Joannis (in catenis). Fr. Jr. – Fragmenta in Jeremiam (in catenis). Fr. L – Fragmenta in Lucam (in catenis). Fr. Lam. – Fragmenta in Lamentationes (in catenis). Fr. in Ps. – Fragmenta in Psalmos 1–150. HJ – In Jeremiam homiliae. HL – Homiliae in Lucam. H.Ex. – Homiliae in Exodum. H. Jes. Nav. – In Jesu Nave homiliae. H. Lev. - Homiliae in Leviticum. RA – Περὶ ἀρχῶν; De principiis. RE – Περὶ εὐχῆς; De oratione. Phil. – Philocalia sive Ecloga de operibus Origenis a Basilio et Gregorio Nazianzeno facta. Sch. Ap. – Scholia in Apocalypsem. Sch. Cant. – Scholia in Canticum canticorum. Sch. L. – Scholia in Lucam. Sch. M. - Scholia in Matthaeum. Sel. Ex. – Selecta in Exodum. Sel. Ez. – Selecta in Ezechielem. Sel. Gen. – Selecta in Genesim. Sel. Job – Selecta in Job. Sel. Lev. - Selecta in Leviticum. Sel. Ps. – Selecta in Psalmos. III. Works by other authors Epit. – Epitome doctrinae Platonicae Сontra Prisc. et Orig. – Ad Orosium contra Priscillianistas et Origenistas De Gen.contra Man. – De Genesi contra Manichaeos Aristotle De cael. – De caelo Met. – Metaphysics De cons. phil. – De consolidation philosophiae Basil the Great (Bas.Caes.) Hom. Hex. – Homiliae in hexaemeron Gregory of Nazianzen (Greg. Naz.) Adv. Eun. –Adversus Eunomium Gregory of Nyssa (Greg. Nyss.) De hom. opif. – De opificio hominis Gregory the Wonderworker (Greg. Thaum.) Pan. Or. – In Origenes oratio panegyrica Eusebius of Caesarea (Eus.) Hist. Eccl. – Historia Ecclesiastica. Praep. Ev. – Praeparatio Evangelica Diogenes Laertius (Diog. Laert.) Hieronymus of Stridon (Hier.). Ep.124 – Epistola 124. Ad Avitum Apol. contra Ruf. – Apologia contra Rufinum John of Damascus (Jo. Dam.) Exp. fid. – Expositio fidei Irenaeus of Lyon (Iren.) Adv. Haer. – Adversus haereses Clement of Alexandria (Clem. Alex.) Exc. Theod. – Excerpta ex Theodoto Maximus the Confessor (Max. Conf.) Quest. ad Thal. – Quaestiones ad Thallasium Apol. – Apologia pro Origene Plato Resp. –Respublica Vita Plot. – Vita Plotini In Tim. – In Platonis Timaeum commentaria Socrates Scholasticus (Socr.) Hist. Eccl. – Historia ecclesiastica Adv.Herm. – Adversus Hermogenem Photius (Phot.) Bibl. – Bibliotheca Bolotov V. IN . Lectures on the history of the ancient church. M., 1994. T. 2. Bolotov V. IN . Origen's teaching on the Holy Trinity // Collection of church historical works. T. 1. M., 1999. Karsavin L. P. Holy fathers and teachers of the church. M., 1994. Mayorov G. G . Formation of medieval philosophy. M., 1979. Nakhov I. M. Cinematic literature. M., 1981. Prot. G . Florovsky. Contradictions of Origenism // Dogma and History. M., 1998. Alexandre M. Le statut des questions concernant la matière dans le Peri // Origeniana primä Premier colloque international des études origèniennes. Bari, 1975. Altaner B. Patrologie. 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