Слово 10. О том, что единосущен Отцу Сын

It is not reasonable (οὐκ εὐλόγως) that Christ-fighters, when discussing what concerns the Divinity of the Son, and examining the relationship that He by nature has with His Father, use the humanly spoken words that the Lord said when He took on our flesh. For it is not that He, as a man, speaks economically that is characterized by an incorporeal essence, but one should know and believe that the Word, being God and in everything consubstantial with the Father, put on human nature and became man, so that even as a man he could sometimes speak, because of [His, carried out] with the help of the flesh of the economy. He also speaks as God that which is higher than man, as being such by nature, and when the moment demands it. But if someone wanted to bring what was said rather humanly and economically, as I already said, in relation to His Divinity, and, conversely, to relate what was divinely spoken to the time in which He became a man, then such a person would sin against the nature of things and abolish the economy. After all, sometimes He, as God, says: “Amen, I say to you, before even Abraham was not, I am” 221. And again: “Down from heaven” 222. If anyone wanted Him to retain only divine dignity, then such a person would in every way deny that He became a man in recent times. For according to humanity He was not, before even Abraham was not, and not as a man descended from heaven. And again, if anyone wants to apply the words and deeds of [His] humanity to the naked God Word before His incarnation, then this will be extremely wicked. For what will he do when Christ says: “Now my soul is troubled 223 and sorrowful 224”? Would he agree to believe that sadness and confusion arose in the realm of God’s nature, and that she was dominated by the fear of death? What, then, when he sees Him crucified, will he also agree that in this way the Divinity of the Son suffers like a man? Or will he [still] reject the blasphemy? So, for every time and matter, let the things that are appropriate [for him] be observed, and let the meaning of theology be examined (τῆς θεολογίας ὁ λόγος), [based] on everything, not from those [sayings] which He obviously pronounces as a man, but from those from which [it is clear that] He is [born] from the Father, as the Son and God. And in relation to the economy [carried out] with the help of the flesh (τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ τῇ μετὰ σαρκὸς), let it be admitted that He sometimes says things that do not befit the naked and self-existent Divinity 225 . So, when, as a man, He says that He is not as good as the Father, then this should rather be attributed to the economy with the flesh and not connected with the essence of the Son and God. A convincing answer to the questioner: “What good do you say?” 226, and the interpretation of [this] saying It is fitting that we fully examine the meaning of the above, and then we will clearly understand what Christ wanted to teach when he said [the following when] a lawyer approached [him] (for so it is written) 227 seeking to learn how to be saved. Then he offers, having previously called Him “teacher” and “good,” [the question]: “What have I done, will I inherit eternal life? "228 To this Christ says: "Why do you say good things to me? No one is good, only one God 229. Go, sell what you have and give to the poor, and have treasure in heaven" 230. But, not bearing the burden of the commandment and weakening in virtue, [the lawyer] does not find the strength in himself to fulfill the command. “Otis,” says [Scripture], “grieving” 231. Was this the right moment for theology? After all, for the one who asked “what did he do...”, He Himself will be among those saved. After all, he asked that having done, he himself would be numbered among those being saved. What is the reason to first reveal to him not what he sought to know, but to say something other than what he passionately desired? How was it possible for someone who was unable to bear the burden of one Gospel commandment to teach a sacrament that surpasses all, when he was so weakened in [his] striving for good that he could not contain it in words? For he was saddened, as it is written. So, since, seeing a man, the lawyer approaches [Christ] as a man and asks as a simple man, testing [Him] as illiterate, especially since he cared to give the impression of wisdom, appearing to know the law, [by no means] shames him, saying: “God alone is truly good. Therefore, why do you, having approached [Me] as a person, attribute to Me that which is inherent in God alone by nature, calling [Me] good? For there is [only] one who is good by nature, and this, of course, is God. “If you,” He says, “knew Me as God and therefore good, then why did you approach me as a simple person?” And if you do not believe that I am God, but consider Me a simple man, then why do you attach to man the dignity due only to God?” So what has been said is a denunciation of ignorance, and not a theological axiom. OTHER. If, simply because it is said that God alone is good by nature, the Son is excluded from similarity in this and likeness in relation to the Father, and will be less good, and therefore not consubstantial, then let one of those accustomed to fight against Christ tell us what he will do when we offer them [something] similar. For nowhere does one of the saints say about God and the Father that “God is light” 232; He also says about the Son that “he is the true light” 233. Behold, look, the light is the Father, the light and the Son. And to the one Son the “true” is also added. This means that the Father will be deprived of being truly light, since John refers this word to the Son alone. But no one, I think, will reach such madness as to agree with this wickedness. So, if, despite the fact that only the Son truly appears and is called light, the Father truly is also light, then despite the fact that the Father is good by nature, and “one” is attached to Him, the Son will also be good by nature, [as well as] the Father. And where there is identity of nature, there will undoubtedly be consubstantial ones. OTHER. If the fact that the Son differs in some way from His Father does not allow Him to have the same nature [as the Father], but makes Him foreign (ἑτερογενῆ) and, as it were, alien (ἔκφυλον), then the fact that He does not differ in anything shows Him to be consubstantial. So, when the divine Scripture says of the Father that He is “light,” and again calls the Son light, so that there is nothing here that would break the likeness (for the expression “true light” is applied to both), what prevents the Son from being consubstantial with the Father? OTHER. If the Son is of another substance in relation to the Father, then how does the Father appear in Him, and He in the Father? After all, He says: “Whoever sees Me, sees the Father” 234. After all, we will not see the image of a person in a horse; and vice versa - no one will see her image in human form. For like appears in like, but things that are different (ἑτεροειδῆ) and separated from each other’s natural likeness will never appear one in the other. And the Son appears in the Father, and the Father in the Son. Therefore, He is not of another essence, [as it will be], in your opinion, but of one essence, like the mark and image of the Father. About the fact that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, with the addition of the saying: “I ascend to My Father and your Father, and My God and your God” 235 The objection seems to be from among the Eunomievs. And how, says [the Christ-fighter], can the Son be consubstantial with the Father, having Him as God? After all, these are His words, it seems: “I will ascend to My Father and your Father, and My God and your God” 236; and also: “My God, my God, have you forsaken me?” “237 If [the Father] is His God, then how is He consubstantial? After all, those who belong to the same essence cannot be one in relation to another God by nature, just as [for example] neither a soul can become a god for another soul, nor an angel for an angel. Rebuttal to this. Again the opponent of Christ does not notice the creature, and not the Son, offering as Lord, a slave instead of the Master, and a servant (λάτριν) instead of God. For if he imagines that by nature the Father is God of the Son, and does not see the economy [performed] in others, then [the Son for him] will be neither consubstantial, nor Master, nor God. After all, he insists on this very much. Let him then clearly deprive the Son of Divinity and Lordship and number Him among the creatures, so that their blasphemy, becoming obvious, will prompt everyone to say: “You are delusional, not knowing the Scriptures.”239 For it is appropriate to investigate the hidden meaning of the word (τὴν κεκρυμμένην τοῦ λόγου 240 δύναμιν). They imprudently blaspheme, no longer considering the Son to be God, but the church of God, as each of the saints was, about whom [God] says: “I will dwell in them and walk around” 241. So, according to their madness, He will also be one of those who, by grace, are called sons and gods, to whom it is said: “I am God, you are God, and all are the sons of the Most High” 242. Christ clearly teaches in the Gospel that He is completely different from them and immeasurably superior in nature to them, saying: “You are of the lower ones. “I am from the highest” 243, calling “lower” the bestowed (βασιλευομένην) and subordinate nature, and “higher” the reigning and superior (ἐποχουμένην) Deity. So, while Christ truly said that He is from above, this [i.e. e. Eunomian] claims that He is from below, obviously slandering the essence of the Son. That the Son is consubstantial with the Father The objection seems to be from among the Eunomievs. And how, he says, will the Son be consubstantial with the Father, having Him as the author of [His] existence, which is not inherent in the Father? For [the Father has existence] not from any cause, which, I think, everyone recognizes as the truth. Rebuttal to this. Anyone who dares to say this can rightly be accused of great ignorance. For, speaking about the Son, they call Him not consubstantial, probably not realizing what kind of madness they are falling into. After all, if He is the Son, as He truly is, then everything will be the same in essence as the One who gave birth. If, in your opinion, He is not the Son, then openly show your blasphemy, and say [directly] that He is a creature, and may not be consubstantial. And then you will show yourself to be opposed to all the divine Scriptures, for they call Him Son, and not a creature. OTHER. You say that the Father became the author of the existence of the Son - and how, O Christ-fighters? If you are the Creator, then you imagine some kind of creature, and not the Son, and you are definitely fighting with the Father, who speaks of his own generation: “From the womb before the star gave birth to Thee.” 244 If you really confess the Son and believe that He is such, then it is in every possible way necessary to say that not as the Creator the Father became the author of existence for the Son, but as a Parent by nature. And nothing prevents—indeed, it is absolutely necessary—that by nature what has come from something is essentially similar to it, even if it has it as the author of [its] existence. OTHER. If everything that arises because of something will certainly be in relation to this and not consubstantial, then how was Abel, born because of Adam, similar to him in essence? Consequently, it is necessary that every generally fertile nature has something similar to itself that is [born] from it, even if that which gives birth is the cause [of being] for what is born of it. OTHER. If the Son will not be essentially similar to the Father, nor consubstantial, due to the fact that the Father does not exist because of anyone, but the Son has Him as the cause [of His existence], then what prevents us from saying that Cain was not consubstantial with [his] father? After all, Adam was not born from anyone, since he was the first man. And Cain was his cause, for he came from him. If everyone who says this is a liar (for Cain is consubstantial with Adam), then everyone will be consubstantial with the Father, the Son, even if He had Him as the author of [His] existence, having come from Him timelessly and ever remaining with Him. The objection seems to be from among the Eunomievs. And how will it be, he says, that the unborn is consubstantial with the born? After all, there is a big difference between them. Rebuttal to this. [This] wise questioning of the Christ-fighters will not refute [the fact] that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, since the Father is unborn, and the Son is begotten. For if difference in some way necessarily produces in beings a different nature and cuts off those who are related from mutual communication and natural similarity, then let them distinguish, for example, Paul from Peter according to the logos of essence, since they have a certain partial and individual difference from one to the other, according to which one is Peter, and the other is Paul. But we see that often in some other way entities that are very distant from similarity in relation to each other have communication in the logos. For a black person, perhaps, has a great difference in relation to a white person, but this does not cut into their essence. So, if in ourselves, difference in some way does not destroy belonging to the same essence, to which those from whom we differ also belong, then what prevents the Son from being consubstantial with the Father, when they are different in that the Father is not begotten, but the Son is begotten? For in Them there is one Divinity, from the unbegotten Father naturally passing on to Generation. OTHER. The objection seems to be from among the Eunomievs. It cannot be perfect, he says, if it has not completely emerged from a certain beginning. Therefore, if the Father stopped begetting the Son, and stopping [doing something] means the end [of the process], then it means that [the Son] has a beginning of existence. How can such a one be consubstantial with the Father who exists not from any beginning? Rebuttal to this. If, in your opinion, oh, Christ-fighters, the Father stopped begetting the Son, and [the Son] began from a certain beginning (for this contains a question), then it means that He came to the Father. And what has arrived and has the beginning of being will certainly and necessarily be new (πρόσφατον). How then do you consider the Son to be God, when the divine Scripture does not allow this, if this is the case, as you say? For it says: “There will be no new god for you” 245. But divine Scripture knows Him both as Son and as God. Therefore, He is not new and has not begun to be born, as you assert, but begotten, and at the same time co-existent, as the Son who is in the Father. And if being new does not allow the Son to be of the same essence with the Father, then the fact that He is not new is proved by consubstantiality. OTHER. If, by nature alone, God is deserving of worship from us and the angels, and to no one else, and regarding us it is proclaimed: “Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God and serve Him alone,” 246, and the Spirit commands the angels to worship the Son, according to what is said: “When He brings the First-born into the universe, he says: And let all the angels of God worship Him.” 247 , then the worshiped Son is God. How can there be one Godhead if [the Son] is not consubstantial with the Father? After all, if He has a certain discrepancy, that is, a difference, according to the logos of essence, then the Son will be different from God, and different from the Father, and, according to this, it is necessary to talk about two Gods, which is impious [not only to say, but] even to hear - and that is unacceptable. But there is one Deity, and this is how the divine Scriptures proclaim: so that the Son is consubstantial with the Father. For in this way the unity of the Divine will be maintained. OTHER. If the Father began to give birth to the Son and stopped, according to the madness of the Christ-fighters, then a certain change and transformation took place in Him. For what He was not before He was born, He became after He gave birth. If the Divinity (τὸ θεῖον) is above such [things] and does not allow change and change, then [the Father] did not begin to give birth and did not cease, as they say, but the Creator of ages and times, the Son, was timeless in the Father. And since He is co-essential, then therefore He is consubstantial. OTHER. If the Father began to give birth to the Son, then this [property] was added to His essence, and what He did not have at the beginning, He received later. And allowing some addition will be imperfect, not perfect. But this is absurd, for the essence of the Father is perfect. This means that [property| to give birth, but it had not begun in her. If [the Divine Essence] did not begin to give birth, then it means that the Son born from Him is co-essential with the Father. And just as, if He received the beginning of being, He would not be consubstantial, so, since He did not receive a beginning in time, then everything will be consubstantial. OTHER, in narrative form. Just as those who fight against the truth, who attribute a beginning and an end to the birth of the Son, tear Him away from likeness in relation to the One who gave birth, so we, who do not admit either a beginning or an end in relation to the birth of the Son, introduce Him into immutable likeness in relation to the Father. And in everything it is similar and consubstantial. The situation seems to be from among the Aetievs. And how, he says, could the identity of essence be preserved between the Father and the Son, if the Father is unbegotten and the Son begotten? For [then] it is in every possible way necessary to say that the unborn is in no way different in relation to the born. If so, then nothing prevents us from calling the Father begotten and the Son unbegotten, and everything would be confused. Rebuttal to this. He who ignorantly proposes these [arguments] will hear in response from us: and how could the identity of essence between the Father and the Son not be preserved, if the image of the Father is the Son and shows the Father in Himself? For it is self-evident and recognized by everyone that no one will see another in one nature, and no one could, seeing a horse, say that he saw one of the people. After all, [it is] in those of the same nature [that there is] a demonstration of similar ones, and not in those that are separated from each other according to the logos of qualified being (κατὰ τὸν τοῦ πῶς εἶναι λόγον) 248 . So, if to Philip, who is seeking to see the Father, Christ points to Himself, saying: “Whoever sees Me, sees the Father” 249, then it is absolutely necessary to say that the Son is of one essence with the Father, as an unchanging image and outline of His hypostasis 250. OTHER. The Lord is seen everywhere teaching that He is consubstantial with the Father, although He is born, for how does He say about Himself that He is the Son? To this, the opponents of Christ, [as a counterargument] citing weakness [borrowed] from their own thoughts, say that He cannot, since He is born, be of the same essence with the unborn Father. Therefore, when Christ says one thing about Himself, and those who oppose Christ say another, who will reach such a degree of madness as to think that it is proper to believe in man more than in God, and not repeat that beautiful saying of the apostles, saying to the wicked (ἀνοσίους) heretics: “It is fitting to obey God rather than man” 251 ? For if they are weak in comprehending the truth, this will not cancel their inherent recklessness. OTHER. You yourselves undoubtedly confess that the Son was born from the Father; after all, not as one of the creations He will be outside the essence of the One who gave birth. And how can He not be entirely consubstantial with the One who gave birth (τεκόντι), if he really is a generation, being, as it were, some natural fruit of the One who gave birth (γεννήσαντος)? If you allow [Him] to have this tropos [of existence], then He will be in every way and consubstantial; if, down to the service word (διακόνου φωνῆς) and the name devoid of content (προσηγορίας ψιλῆς), then let Him then be called by you “creature”, so that your blasphemy may be more clearly manifested. The objection seems to be from among the Aetievs. If God, he says, is indivisible in essence, then what was born was not born by dividing the essence, but existed according to the power 252 [of God to create His own children] 253 . And how could the nature that came into being be of the same essence as the nature that came into being? Rebuttal to this. Why does this great and deep sophistry, as [allegedly] seems, - that the essence of God is not divided - not allow that for those who are accustomed to correctly examine things, the Son should be of the same essence with the Father? Let these menacing and picky [people] tell us. After all, it is not because God is indivisible in essence that He will, in your opinion, be deprived of reproductive power. If they think to honor God, preserving for Him [the property] of not sharing in any way, but depriving Him of the ability to beget, so that He therefore existed the Son by power [to create], then let them hear that the grace of natural action is much greater and better than the radiance of power. OTHER. If by power, as you say, the Father existed the Son, then in vain He is called the Son. For what has not come from the essence of the Father, how can it be called the Son? And what comes from someone by nature has the name of generation certifying [this natural origin]. So, the Son was born, and is consubstantial with the Father. And those who are born have one nature in relation to those who give birth. OTHER. If, as you think, deceiving and being seduced 255, the Son did not come from the essence of the Father, but existed autocratically (ἐξουσιαστικῶς), and He [at the same time] is the wisdom and power of the Father, then the Father is neither wise by nature nor strong. If, according to your most ignorant assumption, He externally existed the Son, who is His wisdom and power, but [nevertheless] is by nature wise and strong, then it is in every possible way necessary to say about the Son that He is from the essence of the Father, and if so, then He is consubstantial. OTHER. It is necessary to ask those who say that the Son came into existence through the power of the Father [to create], and was not born from Himself, what, in your ignorant opinion, prompted the Father to bring the Son into existence? So, was He forced to do this, or having wanted to give the Son what He also brings into being (εἰς ὑπόστασιν), like us? If forced (ἀναγκαίως), then you will agree that God is subject to necessity (ἀνάγκῃ 256); if not so, then with the fact that, having wished to bestow [existence] on the Son, he turns out to be giving to Himself that He might be the Creator and strong and wise, since all this is in the Son. For the Scripture says: “Everything came into being, and without Him there was nothing” 257. And again: “Christ is God’s power and God’s wisdom” 258. However, we do not say that God and the Father granted this to Himself, but that He is by nature good and strong. This means that He did not independently (ἐξουσιαστικῶς) exist the Son, as you say, but has Him as the fruit of His own nature; and if so, then He [i.e. e. Son] and consubstantial. For by nature what comes from God is not alien to Him. That the Son is consubstantial with God and the Father If, because of the image that He took in the image of God 259, He is consubstantial with us, since He [took flesh] from us, and the Son is the image of God, then it means that He is consubstantial with Him whose image He is. OTHER. If the light we are familiar with is consubstantial with its radiance, and the Son is the radiance of the ever-essential Light, then He is also consubstantial with the Light of Whose radiance, since for the sake of comparison examples of a partially related nature are given. OTHER. If equality in intelligible [things] is not measured by quantity, and thus the equal will of necessity be both equal and consubstantial, and the Son is equal and coequal with the Father, according to the Divine Sayings, then He will of necessity also be consubstantial, since equality is not observed in respect of quantity in incorporeal nature, but rather in the identity of essence. OTHER. If it is recognized that it is true, and not by adoption (θέσει), those who are born are consubstantial with those who truly give birth to them, and the Son belongs to the number of those who are truly begotten, and not by adoption, then it means that He is truly, and not by adoption, consubstantial with God who gave birth to Him. OTHER. If the essentially (οὐσιωδῶς) begotten inherits the essence of the one who gave birth, having it in himself, and the Son has everything that belongs to the Father 260, then, therefore, He is essentially begotten. OTHER. If nothing that comes after the Son realizes (ὑφίστησιν) essence from non-existents, but the Son does, then it means that He will not be akin to what comes after Him, but will be consubstantial with the One who realizes from non-existent. For those who have one action are recognized as belonging to one essence. OTHER. If those who indistinguishably have the same action are recognized as belonging to the same essence, and if the Son is of the same action with the Father, creating in a similar [Fatherly] manner everything that the [Father] creates, then, by general recognition, [He] will be of the same essence [with Him], because he has the same action. OTHER. If the Father is God by nature, and not by sacrament, then the Son is God by nature. If He really surpasses those who [are gods] by communion, then it means that He will be of the same nature with the Father, and not with those who are by communion. OTHER. If the Son is God by communion, and not by nature, and there are many gods by participation, then He is in no way superfluous in comparison with many to the superiority of [His] essence. But if [He is not god] by communion, since He is the Creator of those who [are gods] by communion, then He will be of the same essence with the Father, and not with those who are by communion. OTHER. If every rational entity creates, not only desiring, but also acting and suffering, and only one uncreated 261 entity - desiring and not suffering, and the Son creates, desiring and not suffering, then He belongs to the creating essence only by desire, and not to the one acting with suffering (ἐνεργούσης κατὰ πάθος). OTHER. If every [creature] that gave birth to a person who was not a bastard gave birth to a consubstantial [offspring], and God gave birth to the Only Begotten, who was not a bastard, then, therefore, He gave birth to a consubstantial one to Himself. If He gives birth, then the one who gave birth to a bastard did not give birth. OTHER. If God and the Father, who gave birth to the Only Begotten, gave birth better than us, and we, when giving birth, pre-exist in relation to those born [by us], then God, therefore, when giving birth, does not pre-exist. If He gave birth like us (after all, no one will say which is worse), and we give birth from our essence, then God, therefore, gave birth from His essence. And therefore it is imperative and necessary that [what is born] from Him be considered consubstantial with Him. OTHER. If the whole world of created [entities] is, as it were, a certain genus, and the particular in relation to the genus is a species, and the Son is created, then, therefore. He is a species [being part of] the genus, that is, the world. If He is not a species of the world, because He preexists it, whereas it is impossible for a species to exist before the genus, then He is not from the world at all. If so, then He will necessarily be consubstantial with the Creator of the world (τοῦ κοσμοποιοῦ), and not with the world. OTHER. If of those that exist one is God, and the other is the world, then the Son, by necessity or for the world, will be his own (ἴδιος) by origin (γένεσιν) 262; or for God - in essence. Since He is not his own to the world, because his own (τὸ ἴδιον) in no way allows to be created from his own (ὑπὸ ἰδίου) 263, then, therefore, He is consubstantial with the Creator of the world, God. Here, the distinction traditional for Greek patristic thought between the concepts “θεολογία” and “οἰκονομία” is made, when the first denotes the doctrine of the inner life of the Divine, essence, hypostases, etc., and the second - relating to the incarnation of Christ and His work of saving man. According to some researchers, the absence of such a distinction in the West led to the transposition of the “economic” order of the appearance of the divine Hypostases into Their intra-Trinitarian relationships, which found expression in the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit “and from the Son.” There is probably a typo in the text, and instead of “ἀναπείσῃς” you should read “ἀναπείσῃ”. The original says “Λόγου”, but we believe the capital letter is an error here. “As-being” (τὸ πῶς εἶναι) – being in one way or another, i.e. “like a man”, “like a horse”, etc. Compare: Athanasius the Great. De sancta Trinitate (dialogues 2 and 4). [Sp J: Volume M28, race 1177, line 32–34/Ed. C. Bizer//Studien zu pseudathanasianischen Dialogen der Orthodoxos und Aetios [Diss. Bonn (1970)]. In the Latin translation, placed in the Patrology of Min, “κατ’ ἐξουσίαν” is given as “ex voluntate,” that is, “by will, desire,” but in the “Dialogues on the Trinity” of St. Athanasius this phrase, which St. Cyril borrowed it from there, slightly modifying it, putting it in the context of the Gospel words: “He gave them the realm (ἐξουσίαν) to be children of God” (John 1:12). Therefore, we considered it best to retain the meaning of “power,” which required explanatory words. We believe that this not entirely clear expression was used for the sake of a play on words “οὐσία – ἐξουσία”, based, perhaps, on one of the meanings of the prefix “ἐκ–”: “separation”, “removal”; that is, it was not the essence, according to the opinion of his opponents cited by the saint, that was divided between two subjects, but the Son produced “according to power” became outside the essence of the Father. We suggest reading here “αὐτὴν” instead of “αυτόν” in the text, which also corresponds to the Latin translation. Ananke (ἀνάγκη) is a philosophical term introduced by Democritus. He used it to describe the theory of the structure of the world, according to which the world consists of atoms and emptiness. There is no chance in the world, there is only the eternal Ananke - a program that sets the course of all events, the movement of every atom. In mythology, she is the goddess of necessity, inevitability, the personification of rock, fate and predestination from above, to whom not only people, but even gods obey. The Greek text says "ἀγέννητος" - "unborn", but the general meaning of the phrase requires "ἀγένητος". That is, it will be created, like the world. That is, from the same origin. You might be interested in: