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1. To wish to do good to everyone and to wish for every person in the whole world, no matter who he is, to squander his mercy indiscriminately, as well as to spend a supply of many medicines on the incurably sick, it seems to me, is an impossible task and not free from condemnation by many; because, despite the useful goal, it does not deliver anything worthy of careful effort: neither benefit to those who receive the benefit, nor praise to those who distribute it generously. On the contrary, such things often become a reason for the worse, for just as the sick and those close to death are easily brought into final disorder by powerful medicines, so the bestial and unreasonable, being favored, from not saving the beads, as the Gospel says (Matthew 7:6), become worse. Therefore, it seems to me that when distributing gifts, as God’s word foretold, it is good to distinguish what is priceless from what is precious, so that the generous lover is not saddened by trampling the beads and by insensitivity to the beautiful by desecrating the good deed. 2. It occurred to me to say this when I imagined generously communicating his own kindnesses to everyone, I mean the man of God, these lips of piety - Basil, who, from the abundance of spiritual treasures, indiscriminately poured out the grace of wisdom into evil souls, even into Eunomius, who was ungrateful to those who tried to do him any good. For the latter, due to the excessiveness of his mental illness, from which he was exhausted in the matter of faith, seemed pathetic to everyone belonging to the Church. And who is so compassionate as not to take pity on the perishing? The only thing that inspired Vasily to take on healing was that he alone, in an abundance of philanthropy, dared to heal the seriously ill. And so, in grief over the death of his husband, out of his natural compassion for the needy, as a kind of antidote to harmful poisons, he composed a word to refute the heresy, with the goal of making the person healthy again and returning it to the Church. 3. And he, as if struck by madness of mind, resists the healer, declares war on him, fights and considers those who are trying to remove him from the abyss of wickedness to be an enemy. And it is not simply, not by chance, not at times, that he falls into such madness, that he erects a written monument to his bilious state. And for as long a time as he wanted, having found time for himself, he gave birth to a book throughout its entire continuation, running around with it longer than tall and heavy animals with their fruit; and was fraught with threats, still growing its fetus in secret, and it was already too late and with difficulty it brought into the world a certain premature baby and a miscarriage, which all those participating in the same dissent are fattening with milk. And we, according to the prophetic blessing, which says: “Blessed is he who has and will dash your babies against the stone” (Ps. 136:9), laid down this infant verbal work, like one of the children of Babylon, when it came to our hands, take it and strike it against the stone (“the stone is Christ” (1 Cor. 10:4), that is, the word of truth), if only it would descend and power is upon us, strengthening what is weak through prayer in the weakness of a body that has perfected its strength. If even now, with fleshly eyes, that god-like and holy soul was looking at human life, and its lofty lips, according to the grace initially given to them, were uttering that irresistible voice, then would anyone reach such self-confidence as to dare and say something about this same subject, when that divine trumpet is louder than every word and every voice? Because he ascended completely to this God, and before, as a small and shadow-like remnant of a body, he touched the earth, and for the most part soared to God, but now he has laid aside this shadow of his body and left it to this world. Meanwhile, the bumblebees buzz around the word honeycomb and spoil the honey; then let no one accuse me of courage, having risen to defend silent lips. For, not as having realized in myself a certain power of the word more than others, I took upon myself this work, but no less than anyone else, knowing exactly that in the church there are many thousands adorned with the gift of wisdom. However, since, I say this, the property of the deceased, both according to the written and natural laws, belongs to me more than to any other, therefore, in addition to other things, I appropriate to myself the inheritance of the word, although I am numbered among the last of those who make up the Church of God, I am not inferior in strength to the one who broke away from the Church and went over to the side of the opposition, because in a healthy body even the smallest member, in agreement with the whole, is stronger member damaged and cut off, although the latter will be larger and the former smaller. 4. But because of these words, let no one think of me as if I were speaking in vain, boasting of greater power than I have. For it is not contrary to decency, out of some kind of childish curiosity, that I enter into business with this person to compete in words or to demonstrate my good speech. That having more in quantity is useless and serves no purpose, we readily concede to those who want victory. And that Eunomius practiced a lot in words, I guess, among other things, looking at this very study of dogma, especially at how much he worked on the composition of this work, concluding both from the fact that a considerable part of the writer’s life was spent on this work, and also from the fact that his lovers admire this work with all excess. And there is nothing incredible in the fact that someone who worked so hard at the Olympiads produced something more than those who scribbled something hastily. And such assiduous processing of words is shown more by petty care about the external structure of the composition, some kind of excess and vanity in caring about the like. For from a ready-made stock, taken from some books, having collected a pile of words, few of which are thoroughly understood, putting them in some immeasurable heap of sayings, he produced a laborious creation, which is praised and received with surprise by the disciples of deception, perhaps due to blindness, which prevents them from seeing what is useful, deprived of the ability to distinguish everything that is beautiful from what is not like it; those whose heart's vision is not clouded by the filth of unbelief are ridiculed and treated as nothing. For who has no right to laugh when he sees that, according to the promise, the truth of dogmas should be the object of diligence, while the same diligence, without any success, is turned to finding indecent sayings and embellishments? And whether, as he thinks, some strange invention of embellishment in the word, having the appearance of news and peculiarities of word composition, exquisite offensiveness of speech, will help in any way to further expose what was said and to confirm the truth of what was sought. And again, offensive sophistication, not caused by some previous competition to work? For no one can find which of those who have acquired fame, having before his eyes in literature, could he himself set out on this, like some spectacular miracle worker, with corresponding, equal-syllabic, similar-sounding, end-like speeches, as if rattling, acting out the speech in measured expressions. Such, in addition to many other things, are in Eunomius’s preface these luxurious flows of sounds, gentle refrains, which, in my opinion, he pronounces, perhaps not with a calm appearance, but on the contrary, he pronounces, stamping his foot, and pleasantly clicking his fingers together in harmony, and says that in this case there is no need for anything else, neither in other words, nor in new works. So, having conceded to him the advantage in this and the like and the right to hope in victory, I will voluntarily put aside all efforts about this, as becoming one who has ambition in mind, if only to enjoy such writings in general satisfies any ambition, because the true servant of the word Paul, adorning himself with the truth alone, just as he himself considered it shameful to embellish the word with such variegations, and He taught us to keep in mind only the truth, perfectly and properly legitimizing this. And whoever is adorned with the beauty of truth, what need does he need for sophistication of embellishment to complete the beauty of a counterfeit and cunning one? For those who do not have truth, it may be useful for them to highlight lies with the pleasantness of speech, instead of some kind of color, using such sophistication in the style of the composition. In this case, deception will become probable and worthy of approval for those listening, colored and unrecognizable under such embellishments of the word. When someone seeks pure truth without the admixture of any deceptive veil, then beauty itself shines through the words. But, starting to study what Eunomius said, I am at a loss, apparently, like another farmer in a windless situation, not having a way to separate the fruit from the chaff. In this heap of words there is so much that is superfluous and looks like chaff that you are not far from thinking that in everything said by Eunomius, you will not recognize a single solid deed or concept. For I consider going through everything he wrote in order to be an empty task, and at the same time difficult and inconsistent with our goal. We don’t have so much leisure that we have the right to do empty things; and it is fitting, I think, for a skilled worker to spend his strength not on empty things, but on things on which labor has undoubted fruit. Therefore, I am silent about how Eunomius, right in the introduction, calling himself a defender of the truth, attacks his opponents with reproach for unbelief, saying that some kind of constant and ineradicable hatred is lodged in them, and how proud he is of the very thing for which he was recently condemned (although he does not seem to make any accusations, but says that they had some kind of trial about something dubious, and that some kind of legal right to those who are daring are not rightfully forced to behave chastely, but he expresses this in his own words, in the Lydian style, exactly this way: “those who are daring are not rightfully forced to become chaste by legal right,” which Eunomius called the “prohibition” of the rebels, I don’t know what he means by this prohibition). All this and the like are passed over in words as an empty pile of words leading to nothing useful. If anything is done in defense of heretical wisdom, then I consider it appropriate to pay the greatest attention to this. This is what the interpreter of divine dogmas did in his work. When much could serve to spread his word, adhering to the laws of necessity, he cuts off most of the content, choosing from everything said in the book of wickedness what was most important in the blasphemy. If anyone demands that ours be conducted consistently, according to the order of Eunomius’s work, then let him say the benefits of this. What more will the listeners gain if I resolve the secret meaning of the inscription, this riddle, which, like the sphinx in tragedy, Eunomius suddenly offers us in the very introduction, and for this I will analyze this unprecedented apology of the apology and the many empty rumors about this, and a long story about sleepy dreams. For, I think, the readers of the Eunomius book alone will be sufficiently annoyed by the preserved subtlety and emptiness of the news in the inscription of the work, and at the same time by the burdensomeness of the stories about their affairs. For what kind of labors and exploits does he not describe, sweeping across all land and sea, and proclaimed throughout the entire universe? And if we write about this again and, as naturally, with the addition of denunciations of lies, from which the essay will increase, then will anyone be as hard and strong as adamant so as not to feel disgust at the inappropriateness of the work? Even if I literally rewrite this enthusiastic story, who was under the Euxine Pontus, who first saddened him with the similarity of his name, what his life was like, what activities, how, due to the similarity in character, he diverged from this Armenian, on which they later agreed and made peace with each other, so that Eunomius came into agreement with his irresistible and notorious (for this is how he honors him with praise) teacher Aetius; then what was the trick and what intrigues against him, according to which this man was brought to court, accusing him of being praised and superior to others. If I retell all this, then, like those who incur eye disease by long-term treatment of the sick, before them, won’t I myself seem to have fallen into the disease of diligence about empty things, following in the footsteps of vanity and examining in detail what kind of slaves Eunomius speaks of, who were set free, about what kind of union initiated into secrets, about what kind of militia of slaves, what those included in mean? the speech of Montius, Gall, Dometian, false witnesses, an angry king and some of those sent into exile? For what would be more empty than these stories for those who intend not just to tell a story, but to expose those who challenge the dogma of heresy? Much more, historical explanations for this will be much more useless. For I think that the author himself will not read them without dozing off, although the fathers have a certain natural tenderness for those who came from them, for there, of course, deeds are explained, suffering is highly extolled in words, and history is remade into a pompous tragedy. 5. But so that by the refusal itself, continued more than appropriate, I do not waste time on useless things, and like one who drives a horse through the mud, he himself gets into trouble, so I, having conducted the word in the order of what is recalled from the Eunomius writings, do not pollute my work, I consider it decent to leave all such rubbish in the Eunomius writings, as much as possible, behind me, making a high and rapid leap with the word. For sufficient benefit is the speedy elimination of troubles; then the word will rush to the end of history, and the bitterness of their speeches will not be communicated to my book. For let it only be fitting for Eunomius’ lips to call the priests of God by similar names: “shield-bearers, staff-bearers, spear-bearers, who frighten those who are interrogating, and do not allow the one hiding to hide.” And Eunomius is not ashamed to write anything else about the gray hairs of the priests. Just as in the schools of secular literature, in order to exercise the looseness of the tongue and mind, the youths are offered content for which to attack some unnamed person, so exactly this writer speaks out against the mentioned priests, and gives freedom to the slanderous tongue to attack them, and, keeping silent about bad deeds, prepares for them with indignation a vomited mixture of insults, inventing all sorts of reproaches from himself and putting them together in his slander. incompatible names: “a lentil-eating warrior, a disgusting saint, pale from fasting, but with cruelty breathing murder,” and many similar ridicule. Just as someone gets excited at pagan celebrations and, in an excess of shamelessness, indulges in a riot without disguise, so Eunomius, without covering his bitterness with any veil, speaks in a clear and shameless voice, as if from a chariot. Then he admits that he irritates him: they, he says, made an effort so that few would fall into our deception, and he is indignant that the Eunomians do not have the right to live wherever they would like, but, by order of the ruler at that time, Phrygia became their place of residence, so that not many would suffer harm from bad society. And about this, angry at this, he writes: “the severity of the exploits was great, the sorrows unbearable, the endurance of suffering required courage when Phrygia replaced their homeland for them.” Truly so! For what happened did not serve as a reproach to the native of Oltisirium, did not entail a decline in his father’s honor, and did not offend the dignity of the family. So this eminent and notorious Priscus, the father of this father Eunomius, would hardly have himself chosen what Eunomius is now indignant about. From his father he has glorious and wonderful stories about the family: a mill, leather clothes, servants' salary, and other heritage of Canaan. And at the same time it was necessary to condemn those who contributed to their resettlement! I also agree with this that truly worthy of their reproaches are those who became the culprits for them, if only there are (or were) any culprits, because the information about the former life, darkened by this, detracts from the memory of respectable people and does not allow one to be curious about what is older than the present, in what dignity both of them first entered into the matter, what rule for life they accepted from their fathers, what was decent for free people to a greater or lesser extent realized in themselves, they came then to such fame and eminence that even kings know them, as Eunomius now boasts in his work, and all the highest authorities for their sake began to move, and rumors about them spread throughout most of the universe. 6. Has this really caused a very great offense either to this writer himself, or to his defender and mentor in such a life, Aetius, with whom, as it seems to me, Eunomius competed, meaning not so much the fascination of dogmas, but much more the contentment and benefits of life? I say this, not concluding from any conjecture, but having heard with my own ears from those who knew exactly: for about Aetia I heard the stories of Athanasius, the bishop of Galatia, such a man who would prefer nothing to the truth, and as evidence of most of what he reported, I showed the letter of George of Laodicea. He said that Aetius did not indulge in dogmatic absurdities from a young age, but over time he turned this innovation into a life craft. For, having already left the cultivation of the vineyard in which he served (and how, I don’t consider it necessary to say so as not to seem as if I am telling the story with malicious intent), he first becomes a blacksmith, works with fire in this inseparable blacksmith’s handicraft, sits with a short hammer at a small anvil in a hair hut among the sewage and with this work with difficulty obtains the necessities of life. For could there be any significant payment for someone who repairs broken things, plugs up wells, breaks tin with blows, or casts boiler trays from lead? But from this craft, a certain misfortune that befell him becomes the cause of a change in life. At one time, having taken some kind of gold thing from a warrior’s wife, which served as an adornment to the neck or arm, in order to correct the damage done to it by a blow, he deliberately deceived this woman: he took the gold thing for himself, and gave her a copper one, the same size as the gold and similar in appearance due to the same color on the surface, because the copper was covered with gold. And the woman was deceived by appearances, because Aetius was strong in his work and, with the cunning of his craft, could deceive those who used his work. But over time, when the gilding on the copper came off, it revealed the substitution of gold. Then the thief was brought to court, several warriors by kinship and tribe became angry. Aetius, for this daring act, endured everything that was fair for a deceiver and a thief to endure, with an oath he refused to continue his craft, as if it was not by choice, but by his occupation that the desire for a thief was produced in him. After this, he enters into partnership with some deceiving doctor, so as not to remain without the necessary food and, under the pretext of healing, visit dark houses and some outcast people. Then, after a while, the invented remedy served Aetius as a profit, and some Armenian, who, as a barbarian, was easy to deceive, was convinced to obey him as a doctor and often gave him money. Aetius considered it low to work for others in the field of art, but he wished to be and be called a doctor himself. From that time on, he took part in meetings of doctors, and, meeting with those competing in word debates, he became one of the loudmouths. And having earned respect with the swiftness of his words, he became the subject of considerable search for those who hire shameless tongues for their competitions. This made his piece tastier, however, Aetius did not admit that he should remain in this kind of life; on the contrary, little by little, after blacksmithing, he began to throw medicine. When the god-fighter Arius began to sow the evil seeds of tares, the fruit of which was the dogmas of the Anomeans, then the medical schools made noise about this issue. Therefore, having engaged in such research and having noticed a certain method of inference from Aristotle’s lessons, Aetius became eminent, surpassing the father of the heresy Arius in the news of inventions, or better yet, as having understood the connection of the Aryan propositions, he was revered as a man of subtle mind, revealing the hidden, because he argued that what was created and came from nothing is not like the Creator and came from nothing. Therefore, as soon as he tickled the news-loving ears of those suffering from the same disease with such speeches, he learned about this innovation of Theophilus Blemmides and how he had previously had some kind of connection with Gallus, then Aetius was brought into the palace by him. And just as at that time Gallus dared to commit evil intent against the eparch Dometian and Montius, all the accomplices in the nasty deed justly participated in the fall of Gallus. But Aetius avoids punishment, and is not even recognized as worthy of suffering anything bad with the co-authors of evil intent. Moreover, since Athanasius the Great was removed from the Alexandrian church by royal power and George Tarvastinite tormented these people, Aetius is again an Alexandrian, not inferior to any of those whom this Cappadocian fed and supplied with bread, because Aetius did not disdain flattery, and George was glad of this, having long been captivated by the perversion of dogma, and is willing to serve a godsend for Aetius. Therefore, this is not hidden from the true Aetian competitor, from this Eunomius, who from his father by nature, a wonderful man in everything else, in addition to the fact that he became the father of such a father, learned to live a well-intentioned and lawful life, but painful due to poverty and filled with a thousand labors (the father of Eunomius was some kind of farmer, hunched over a plow, putting a lot of work on a small plot land, in the winter, when there was freedom from excavation work, he skillfully drew letters and warehouses for children, and in payment for this he obtained for himself what he needed for life). Why, seeing such a position of his father, does he part with the plow, with the hoe and with all his father’s working tools, so that he himself does not suffer from such labors and first becomes a student of Prunik’s wisdom. Having learned cursive writing, at first he lived, as I believe, with one of his relatives, receiving food in payment for the written service. Then, while teaching the children who provided him with food, he gradually began to feel within himself the desire to become a rhetorician. I am silent about what immediately followed, about his life in his homeland, about what activities and with whom he was found in Constantinople. After this, as they say, he was engaged in preparing woolen cloaks and belts. Since Eunomius saw that all this was of little importance and that what was acquired through diligence was not worth even a desire, then, abandoning other crafts, he preferred only Aetius to everything, not without reason, as I think, but in accordance with his goal, choosing this path in life. For from the time he became a participant in this unspeakable wisdom, everything grows for him without sowing and without cultivation, because he is knowledgeable in what he strives for and has acquired knowledge of how he can especially attract more passionate people to his side. Since humanity, for the most part, is most likely caught up in voluptuousness, and the inclination of nature is great towards this passion, which readily falls into the bliss of voluptuousness from harsh occupations, in order to expose as many of his accomplices as possible to the same disease as himself in the reasoning of dogmas, for this purpose he becomes a saint to those who are secretly taught by him, putting aside the inconveniences and difficulties of virtue as little convincing to accept the secret. And what is taught in secrecy, what is proclaimed openly and brought to clarity by those who have received this defilement through deception, this ineffable secret teaching, and what is learned from the venerable sacred interpreter of the sacraments, about the method of baptisms, about the excusability of nature and all the like. If anyone has the leisure to find out this exactly, let them ask those for whom it is not a crime to utter anything indecent with their lips. But we will remain silent about this, because it is not permissible even for accusers to mention such things, if they have learned to honor purity in words, and not to denigrate their writings with the most accurate stories, even when the truth is expressed in them. But why did I recall what was said? Because just as Aetius’s source of wickedness was Aristotle’s art of perverting the truth, so his perfected student was given the same opportunity, along with the teacher, to live richly in the simplicity of the deceived. Why did Basil from the Euxine Pontus or Eustathius from Armenia, about whom he has a long insert of a historical story, offend him so much? What prevented him from achieving his life's goal? Didn't they support their new glory at a greater height? For where did they get their fame and such great eminence? Is it not from these men, if only the accuser speaks the truth about them? For the very fact that those who acquired fame, as the writer testifies, recognized those who had no fame at all as worthy opponents, naturally served as a reason to think highly of themselves when they entered into a fight with men, preferably over others who had an advantage. And from this it happened that the baseness and obscurity of the former life are left in the shadows. And from that time on, they become famous for something that those who have the opposite mind should run away from. For no one who is well-minded would want to be considered great for a bad deed, but for people like this this seems to be the most extreme limit of well-being. This is how they tell about one of the ignominious and insignificant inhabitants of Asia, who wanted to become famous among the Ephesians. Any great and glorious deed did not come to his mind, and could not have come, but it becomes more remarkable than those who became famous for the greatest deeds, having invented to cause the Ephesians the greatest loss. They had one public building, which attracted attention with its splendor of every kind and great value. This same man, having destroyed this great work by fire, and was put on trial for insolence, confessed to his spiritual passion, namely, that, recognizing the importance of being known among many, he came up with this so that, due to the greatness of the evil, the name of the one who dared to commit an evil deed would be remembered with him. Eunomius and Aetius have the same means of gaining fame, except that there is a difference in the greatness of evil, for they cause harm not to inanimate buildings, but to the living building of the church itself, introducing, as if by some kind of fire, a perversion of dogma. But I will postpone the word about dogma until my time. 7. Now let us consider what kind of justice is driven by Eunomius, who in the preface complains that the reason for the hatred of the infidels is his justice; for, perhaps, it is not inappropriate to learn from what has been said about a dogma that does not relate to how he adheres to the truth, to use this indication when considering what is said about dogmas. It is said: “He who is faithful in a little is also faithful in a lot: and the unrighteous in a little is also unrighteous in a lot” (Luke 16:10). Intending to write an apology, an essay unprecedented and extraordinary in writing and content, he says that the reason for such strangeness came not from anything else, but from someone who objected to his previous essay, because, although the name of that essay was “apology,” but having received a remark from our teacher that an apology is appropriate for only those accused, and if someone writes on his own voluntarily, then the essay is something other than an apology, he does not contradict that, obviously inconsistency should not constitute an apology if it is not preceded by an accusation, but he says that, as accused of a very important thing, he began to justify himself from the condemnation brought against him. But how much of a lie there is in this, I think, will become clear from what we say. Eunomius complains that he suffered many unbearable evils from those who condemned him; and this can be found out from the very thing that was written by him. Therefore, how did he suffer this if he was justified in his guilt? For if apology was used to avoid accusations, then, without a doubt, this deplorable position is false and invented in vain. If he suffered what he said, then, of course, he suffered without justifying himself; for the purpose of any apology is to prevent those in power in the verdict from being deceived by slander. Does he intend to say that he presented an apology in court, but could not win over those who participated in the court, and was defeated by his opponents? On the contrary, he didn’t say anything like that in court, and couldn’t say it. Why? He himself admits in the essay that he did not want to deal with hostile and hostile judges. “We admit,” he says, “that we were condemned when we were silent, and evil and crafty people were allowed to take the place of judges.” Here, in strong, as I think, excitement, and having something else in mind, I did not notice, instead of embellishment, the solecism introduced into the speech, very boldly imitating the Attic style, in the speech “admitted” (εισφρησαντων), since the use of it is different among those who have succeeded in the word, known to those familiar with rhetorical rules, and another was invented by the new Attic wit. However, this does not suit our goal at all. But, going a little further, he adds the following: “if, because I did not take advantage of the prosecutorial judges, he thinks to destroy this name “apology,” then he is extremely deceived due to his simplicity.” When and to whom did this witty husband justify himself, having rejected the judges because of enmity, and at the trial, as he himself confirms, remained silent? Look at this strong champion of the truth, how, after some time changing, he is transferred to the side of lies and, while honoring the truth in words, opposes it in deeds. But what is pleasant is that one is exhausted in one’s strength even in the very defense of lies. For how was it that one and the same person was justly justified in the accusation raised and prudently also remained silent, because the trial was carried out by enemies? And from the very work that he called an apology, it clearly turns out that no trial was drawn up against him at all. The preface of the work is addressed not to specific judges, but to some unspecified people who were at that time and will be in the future, before whom (in which I myself agree) he needs a great apology, but not similar to the one now written and requiring another apology in defense of himself, but some general and reasonable one that could convince the listeners; because this was written by the one who assembled a judgment seat for himself from people who were not present, and perhaps were not born, and justified himself before those who do not exist and begged those who were not born, so that the whole multitude would not distinguish lies from truth, when for the most part they would be attached to the best. For indeed, it is proper for such people, who are still judges in the loins of their fathers, to be treated with such an apology, and to think that he is telling the truth, because one decided to go against the opinion of everyone, and considers the erroneous idea of ​​his soul to be the most reliable in the whole universe of those who glorify the name of Christ. Let him, if you like, write a new apology for this second apology, too, because the current one is not a correction of an error, but rather the preparation of new accusations. Who does not know that every correct apology means a refutation of the accusation raised? For example, someone accused of theft, or murder, or some other crime, either denies the act altogether, or places the blame for the bad deed on someone else, or, if he cannot do either one, asks for the leniency and mercy of the authorities in the verdict. And here in the essay there is neither denial of guilt nor blame on others; Eunomius does not resort to mercy, promising to behave better in the future, but on the contrary, with carefully collected arguments he strengthens the very guilt for which he is condemned. For what is brought against him, as he says, is an accusation of wickedness, not charging indefinite guilt, but showing the very type of wickedness; The apology, not denying guilt, but confirming the accusation, proves that one must be wicked. While the dogmas of piety were not yet made known, perhaps it would be less dangerous to venture into innovation. But when the theologian’s teaching is firmly established in all pious souls, then the one who proclaims the opposite of what is generally accepted by everyone is justified in what he is accused of, or, moreover, incurs the wrath of his listeners and becomes the worst accuser of himself? I say the latter. Therefore, if, according to the author, there are either listeners of his justification, or accusers of his daring attacks on piety, let him say for himself, either how his accusers will revile him, or what sentence the judges will pronounce on him when his apology confirms his sinfulness. 8. But I don’t know how I moved away from the connection of speech due to lax adherence to consistency. For what is now subject to investigation is not how one should have been justified, but whether Eunomius was justified at all. Let us return to what was assumed, namely, that he is clearly caught in his own words as follows: in indignation he speaks a lie, that he was judged and had lawless judges, that, dragged along land and sea, he suffered from the heat of the sun and from dust. Then, again covering up this lie, according to the proverb, he knocks out a nail with a nail, covering the previous one with another lie. For then, while everyone with him is sure that he did not utter a single word at the judgment seat, he says that he evaded the judgment seat of his enemies and was condemned silently. Who could more than expose himself to contradiction both to the truth and to himself? When he is accused of writing an essay, it becomes necessary to justify himself before the court. When accused that nothing was said before the judges, he denies that there was a trial and does not recognize the judges. Look at this strong champion of truth, how firmly does he stand against lies? And then, being such himself, he dares to call the great Vasily evil, malicious, a liar; and even more than that - impudent, ignorant, impostor, not initiated into the knowledge of the divine; he adds to the list of slander insanity, madness and thousands of similar curses, mixing them in different places throughout his entire work, as if thinking that his bile will be enough to overcome the testimony of all people who marvel at the name of the great as one of the ancient saints. And Eunomius thinks that someone who is invulnerable can be harmed by ridicule only through slander. The sun is not so low that those who throw stones or anything else at it can reach it. The thrown object returns to the thrower again, and the target remains above the thrown object. If someone begins to slander the sun that it is not bright, then the light of the rays will not be darkened by ridicule. The sun and the one ridiculed will remain the sun, but the one who maligns its rays, which are not bright, will expose the blindness of the sense of sight. And if, like this apology, he wishes to convince all his listeners and readers of this most of all, so that they do not agree with the general ones and, giving preference to the majority, do not prefer what has been proven by the experience of many to their own assumption, then it will be in vain to talk fuss before those who see the matter. Therefore, whoever is well-disposed towards Eunomius, let him convince him to put a bridle on his mouth, not to indulge in disorderly speech, not to “go against the grain” (Acts 9:5), not to speak impudently of the venerable name, but, and only by bringing to mind the great Basil, to be filled with reverence and fear in the soul. For what will he gain from this immeasurable self-praise, when Vasily is revered by everyone as his life, word and general testimony about him to the universe return? Anyone who begins to speak badly about him shows his character, and precisely that, as the Gospel says nowhere, he is not able to “speak well, being evil, but he speaks out of the abundance of his heart and wears out the treasures of the evil one” (Matthew 12: 34-35). And that what Eunomius said is unfounded slander, not consistent with the truth of the matter, this is exposed by the very thing he wrote. 9. Eunomius mentioned a certain place in which, according to him, a dispute about dogmas took place, but he did not name the place or indicate it with any familiar sign, so that the listener was forced to mistakenly guess about the unknown. In this place, says Eunomius, a meeting was formed of persons convened from everywhere; and how a young man blossoms in words, presenting to his eyes the very course of affairs. Then, he says that some judges (without naming them either) were facing a decisive conclusion to the case, and our mentor and father, who was in the presence, also gave his voice. But since superiority at the trial was given to the opponents, he fled from there, leaving his place, chasing some kind of smoke from the fatherland. And Eunomius mercilessly denigrates Basil in depicting timidity, as anyone can find out from the book itself; for I don’t have the leisure time to bring everything that his leisure has vomited into my essay. And why I mentioned what was said, I’ll move on to that. What is this nameless place in which the study of dogmatic teaching is carried out? What occasion calls the valiant to a contest? What kind of people are these who urged themselves both by land and sea to hasten to communicate in labor? What kind of world does he speak of, preoccupied with the consequences and awaiting a judicial verdict? Or who is the manager of these competitions? Or let him, although he allows himself to keep silent about this, so that, according to the custom adopted among children in schools, he manages to give the word some weight and greatness in such inventions, let him nevertheless say one thing: who is this invincible fighter with whom, according to him, our teacher was afraid to enter into a competition? For if this is also invented, then let him again be recognized as a winner and gain the upper hand in vanity; we'll shut up. In a fruitless struggle with a shadow, true victory is to voluntarily give up such a victory. If Eunomius speaks about what happened in Constantinople, means this gathering, is inflamed in his words by the deplorable events there and calls himself a great and invincible fighter, then we will accept the accusation, namely, that, being present there during the competition, we did not enter into a fight with the competitors. Therefore, let him who reproaches Vasily for timidity show whether he himself went out into the middle? Did you say any word in defense of your piety? Did you prolong your speech with courage? Did you fight your opponents well? But there is nothing to say to him unless he clearly contradicts himself. For he admitted that he had silently accepted the sentence pronounced by the judges. Therefore, if it was necessary to speak during competitions (he now legitimizes this in his essay, then why is he condemned then, being in silence? If he did well, preferring calmness in front of the judges, then by what lot should he - the silent one - be praised, and for us to turn our calmness into condemnation? Can anyone think of anything more unfair than this incongruity, if, when two people wrote an essay after the competition, one of them says about himself that he defended himself on time, although and he has wasted a lot of time, and the one who wrote an objection to his defense essay will be blamed as being late, because a lot of time has passed since the competition? Or perhaps the objection should have meant the word that would be spoken later? For this seems to be lacking in the accusation. Why, knowing in advance what he would write, did he not expose him during that trial? For that he did not compose this apology at the trial is clear from his own confession; I will remember again the very words: “We admit,” he says, “that, silently, we are condemned,” and adds the reason: “because, as it is said further, wicked people received the right to judge,” or better said, as he himself puts it, “they were admitted to the place of judges.” And what else confirms the writing of the apology at the appropriate time is clear from other words spoken by him; literally it reads like this: “but that, not having invented it on my own, but being forced by intermediaries, I was brought at the appropriate time and in the right way,” he says, “to write an apology, this became clear both from the deeds themselves and from his words.” Therefore, what will someone who easily distorts speech in all directions say? Is it not that one should not be silent during competitions? So, why was Eunomius silent during the competitions themselves? But is his apology timely even after the competition? Why is Basil’s struggle with what Eunomius said timeless? But most of all, it seems, the word of the monk is true, that under the guise of an apology, Eunomius brought his dogmas into whatever coherence he desired. And the true competitor of Phinehas, who destroys with the sword the words of everyone who has committed astray by departing from the Lord, pulled out a soul-healing knife, destructive of wickedness - I mean the refutation of blasphemy. If, however, Eunomius persists and does not accept healing, having killed his soul by apostasy, then the guilt is on the one who chose evil; This is confirmed by the word of the external sages. This is what Eunomius is like before the truth and before us! According to the ancient law, which allows one to take revenge on one’s equals for an insult, it would indeed be possible for us to mercilessly cover him up with reproaches and with great convenience generously lavish slander on the offender, because if he was so abundant in insulting and slandering someone who did not even present any opportunity for reproach, then naturally there would be many similar speeches from those who wanted to ridicule his honest life. But since we were taught from the beginning to study the Gospel as disciples of the truth, we do not demand in return an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, knowing that a bad deed is usually destroyed by an opposite deed, and that anything evil said or done will not reach the extreme if something useful, penetrating into the environment, cuts through a continuous series of evils. And therefore, a series of slander and insults in their further continuation is stopped by long-suffering. If someone takes revenge with insult for insult, slander for slander, then, of course, he will increase the incongruity by feeding it with the like. 10. Therefore, leaving everything said in the middle of the book as insult, ridicule, slander, causticism, I will hasten in words to examine the dogma. If anyone says that I shy away from slander because I lack the skill to repay such people, then let him look at himself - what an inclination he has for the worse, which, without any effort, naturally leads to sin. For becoming thin depends on will alone, and often wanting is enough to commit a sin. It is much more convenient to commit sins of the tongue, because other sins require time, practice, and external assistance to commit; and the handiness of the word provides every opportunity to sin. The proof of this is the very work of Eunomius, which we have in our hands. Anyone who examines it superficially will find a tendency to sin in words, which, of course, is very easy to imitate, even if one does not care at all about the art of blasphemy. For what is the point of laboring in composing offensive words? You can use his own words against the offender, because in this part of the work full of reproach, Eunomius collected all the lies and blasphemies compiled according to the examples he had, and there is no such absurdity that would not be written, for example: “a dangerous, contentious man, an enemy of truth, a sophist, a deceiver, contradicting the opinions and information of many, not ashamed of exposure by deeds, not respecting either the fear inspired by laws or reproaches from people, unable to distinguish truth from tricks.” To this Eunomius adds “shamelessness and readiness for slander”; then he calls it “negligent, full of competing assumptions, combining incompatible things in speech, struggling with his own words and uttering contradictions.” Then, wanting to say a lot of bad things about Vasily, and being unable to pour out his spiritual bitterness in new offensive words, since there is nothing more to say, he often returns to the same thing and, having said it once, also makes another turn for the third and fourth time, or even more, as if in some field, giving the word back and forth, in the same insulting expressions, with the same idle talk the slanderer turns back and forth, repeating the same thing. And therefore we are no longer indignant at the shamelessness of his insults; When one is fed up with what has been said, the irritation stops. Another will feel disgust rather than become angry; these ridicule are so low, devoid of any pleasantness and vulgar, not at all different from the jokes of some drunken old woman who mutters through her teeth. So what? Should we go through everything one by one and with all care justify ourselves in everything offensively expressed, proving that the person about whom this was written is not like that? But in this case, we too will find ourselves insulting this one, like the luminary that shone upon our family, zealously proving in word that he did no evil and did not deserve condemnation. On the contrary, I remember this divine voice, how prophetically it spoke about Eunomius that place from the prophecy where the Prophet likens him to shameless wives who lay down their own shame on the chaste (Jer. 3:3). For whom do Eunomius’ words proclaim to be the enemy of truth? Who is portrayed as contrary to the opinions of many? Who can ask those reading his work not to look at the multitude of witnesses, not to pay attention to antiquity, not to rush to agree on the authenticity of what is recognized as perfect? Is it really possible for one and the same person to write this and to affirm what was said before, to try to get his listeners to follow his innovations, and to again blaspheme others for going against general concepts? And this - “not to be ashamed of exposure by deeds and human reproach,” and what else similar to this Eunomius lists, I leave it to the listeners to consider about whom it is fair to say, whether about the one who makes chastity, decency and all mental and physical purity into the law with the strictest abstinence, or about the one who commands not to interfere with nature, to achieve what is pleasing to him fulfillment of bodily desires, do not resist pleasures, do not judge strictly such everyday zeal, because no harm is done to the soul from such a way of life, and for a person to achieve perfection, only heretical faith is enough. If Eunomius denies that this is what they teach, then I, and each of the right-thinking people, would like there to be truth in such denials. But his true disciples do not allow themselves to find a place for such a denial, or his most important position will fall, and the tabernacle will be ruined for the sake of this, especially those who have established themselves in his dogma. And whoever is shameless and does not respect human reproach, would you like to see this from the deeds of your youth or from the deeds of the life that follows? In both cases, you will find that the reproach of shamelessness will fall on him; for both youth and the life that follows it do not testify to the same thing about each of them. Let this writer bring to mind how he lived in his homeland during his youth and in Constantinople, and let him hear from those who know what they know about the one he is slandering. If anyone wants to review the subsequent activities, then let him say who is worthy of the name shameless? Is it the one who, before becoming a priest, generously squandered his father's property on the poor, and especially during the famine, when he became rector of the church, while still serving in the rank of presbyter, and after this did not spare the remnants, so that he could boast with the Apostle: “below the flesh of the bread is poison” (2 Thess. 3:8)? Or is the one who turned the defense of dogma into a pretext for income, self-proclaimedly invades houses, does not cover up a disgusting illness with his behavior, does not count on the fact that healthy people naturally have an aversion to such people, and that according to the ancient law, due to the proximity in the meaning of illnesses, he would be expelled from the camp of the living? Vasily is also called a reckless offender and, in any case, a liar by the one who generously and meekly teaches his opponents, for in his writing he delights in speeches about himself, who did not leave a single opportunity to pour out all the excess of bitterness wherever he could do it. So, what and what actions does Vasily accuse of offense and rashness? “Because,” he says, “he called me a Cappadocian Galatian, and then having a residence on the border of our own countries, in some nameless region of Corniaspina.” If he called not a native of Oltisyria, but a Galatian (but will he only prove that this name was added, for this appendix is ​​not in our lists; however, let us assume without dispute that this is also said), is it really for this alone that Vasily is called rash, an offender, and all reproachful names? Doesn’t the wise man understand that an accusation from a slanderer about something unimportant provides the accused with great protection and evidence of innocence? For the one who attempted to accuse would not spare the most important and exercise his anger at the unimportant, about which he actually speaks a lot, exalting and exaggerating the untruth, solemnly philosophizing about lies, recognizing it as equal absurdity, whether the matter is about an important or an unimportant one. For, like the fathers of his heresy, I mean the scribes and Pharisees, he knows how to carefully filter out the “mosquitoes” and mercilessly devour the hunchbacked Velbud (Matthew 23:24), laden with the heavy burden of wickedness. And, perhaps, it would not be inappropriate to tell him to spare those living in our civil society from such a law and not to give orders to regard as nothing the distinction of being condemned for lying based on the smallness and significance of deeds. For Paul did not sin equally, allowing lies and purifying himself in the Jewish way in good time for the benefit of those led into deception, and Judas, during the betrayal, taking on the guise of a friend and protector. Joseph also lied, humanely joking with his brothers, and swearing by Pharaoh's health (Gen. 42:16); His brothers also lied against him, out of envy planning his death first and then slavery. There are many other similar examples that can be said. Sarah lies, ashamed of her laughter; The serpent also lies, instilling the idea that man will pass into the nature of God through disobedience. There is great difference in lies according to what they concern; It is impossible to say what it is like, whether you judge by ancient stories or by present life. Therefore, according to the general verdict about people, which the Holy Spirit spoke through the mouth of the Prophet, namely: “every man is a lie” (Ps. 115:2), we agree that the man of God was involved in a lie, accidentally using the name of a neighboring country, either due to ignorance of the local name, or due to failure to pay attention to it. But Eunomius also lied, and what kind of lie is that? Perversion of truth itself; he says that there was once no Eternal Being; asserts that he who is truly called Son is called so falsely; about the Creator of the universe it is expressed that He is a creature and a creature; He calls the Lord of all things a slave; by nature he is considered by a superior to be a slave by nature. Is this difference in lies small? Is it such a thing that it would be considered nothing for someone to lie, apparently, one way or another? 11. But look at the care he takes for the truth in proof, reproaching others even for a sophistical way of speaking. Our teacher in his word to Eunomius said that during a revolution in affairs, he acquired Cyzicus as a reward for his wickedness. Therefore, what does one who denounces the sophists do? He immediately attaches himself to the word “reward” and says that, according to our confession, “he defended himself, gained the upper hand with an apology and acquired a victorious reward through competitions,” and draws up a conclusion, deriving a consequence, in his opinion, from unquestioned provisions. Let us retell literally what he actually wrote: “if a reward,” he says, “is a sign and the end of victory, and judicial proceedings indicate victory, and judicial proceedings along with it, of course, introduce the thought of accusation, then he who admits the reward must necessarily admit that there was also an apology.” What can we say to this? Let us not argue that he competed, that this crafty competition of wickedness was very strong and stubborn, and in no small measure with his efforts against the truth he surpassed and exceeded those like him; but he did not win over his opponents; in comparison with those who, out of wickedness, along with him sought to lead into error, he was ahead of everyone with an abundance of lies, and thus received Cyzicus as a reward for the excess of evil. As being superior to all who, like him, entered into the struggle with the truth, during the victory won by blasphemy, he was awarded a loud and famous proclamation, and as a reward for the absurd teaching, those who laid down the law thus chose Cyzicus for him during the competition. And that in this sense we have recognized this is proved by our work, in which it is said that Cyzicus became for him a reward of wickedness, and not some successful consequence of an apology. Therefore, what does what we said have in common with this childish tangle of sophisms, as if for this a judicial investigation took place against him, and an apology was prepared for him? This is as if someone, who at a feast drank more undiluted wine than others and was given some honor by those who drank with him, turned this victory at the feast into proof that he was tried at the trial and won the upper hand in court. Because one can, imitating him, draw a conclusion: if a reward is a sign and the end of victory, and the proceeding of a trial indicates victory, and the proceeding of a trial introduces with it, of course, the thought of accusation, then I won the victory over the trial, because, being drunk, I was crowned in a competition in who can drink the most. But to the one who boasts in this way, of course, someone will tell him that there is a different way of contesting at the court and a different way of arguing at feasts; and the one who wins the cups, as a result of such a victory, has no advantage over his opponents in the courts, although he flaunts himself with flower wreaths. Therefore, whoever surpasses his fellows by the word of wickedness, in the reward acquired for wickedness, does not yet provide evidence that he has won in court. Therefore, what benefit does the unspoken defense receive from our testimony that he prevails in wickedness? For if, having justified himself before the judges and defeated his opponents, he had then accepted the honor bestowed at Cyzicus, then what we said would have been timely turned against us. If it is constantly testified in words that, avoiding the hostility of those in power to pronounce a sentence, he silently accepts the punishment assigned to him, not agreeing to leave the trial of his heroism to his enemies, then why does he deceive himself, and use the word “reward” as evidence that he was justified? This wonderful man did not understand the meaning of the word “reward,” namely, that Cyzicus was given to him as a kind of distinction and recognition of valor for superiority in wickedness. But since he accepts the reward at will and as a gift of victory, then let him also accept what is connected with this concept, namely, that by his victory he acquired superiority in wickedness. For if our weapons are strengthened against us, then justice requires the use of either one or the other, or neither one nor the other. 12. Such is he in our affairs; But won’t it turn out that, at least to some extent, he adheres to the truth in other things, what is said by him that is offensive? In this description of Basil as timid, timid, shying away from more persistent works, in his depiction of all similar features, when Eunomius carefully collects signs of timidity: a secret hut, a securely locked door, confusion from fear caused by those entering, and a voice, and a look, and facial features, and everything like that, which expresses the disease of timidity. But even if Eunomius had not been exposed as having lied about anything else, then this alone would have been enough to expose his manner of action. For who does not know how, at the very time when King Valens was rebelling against the Church of the Lord, this great ascetic, with magnanimous determination, overcame such a difficult state of affairs, became higher than the intimidating one, exalting himself in thought above everything that was arranged to intimidate him? Which of the inhabitants of the east, which of those inhabiting the very edges of our universe did not know his struggle for truth with those prevailing? Who hasn’t been horrified when looking at an opponent? This was not any ordinary person, it was not through counterfeit intricacies that he acquired the power to win, and to gain the upper hand over him was not glorious, and to be defeated by him was not harmless; but, although he then had the entire Roman empire under his rule, nevertheless, proud of such a great kingdom, he listened to the slander against our teachings of Eudoxius, the bishop of Germanicia, who attracted him to himself by deception. And as supporters in his desire, he had all the high-ranking people, all those serving with him and in charge of affairs, some of whom were inclined to do this voluntarily, due to similarity of thoughts, and many, out of fear of the sovereign power, readily did what it pleased, and by cruelty to those who held the faith, they proved their zeal for him, when flights, inventory of estates, exile, threats, penalties, dangers, detention, prisons, scourging and what is even worse than this - everything was brought into action against those who disagreed with the wishes of the king; when it was harder for those who found themselves in the house of God to be pious than for those convicted of the most criminal guilt. But a detailed description of all this would require some larger work, a lot of time and a special kind of labor. On the other hand, since the disasters of that time are known to everyone, nothing will be added to the present word by an exact presentation of these misfortunes in writing. There is another disadvantage in the story about them; whoever sets out in order the history of these sad events must make some mention of what was done on our part. For if in these struggles for piety we have done something that, when narrated, can arouse competition, then wisdom commands us to leave this to our neighbors, according to what has been said: “Let the sincere praise you, and not your mouth” (Proverbs 27:2). Not realizing this, he took up more and more of his work with grandeur about himself. Therefore, putting all this aside, I will accurately describe the cases of our teacher’s timidity. The king himself opposed him as an opponent; and the one in charge of him throughout the entire kingdom served the king’s aspirations, and everyone around the king served as contributors to such a desire. For the most accurate test and proof of an ascetic’s unshakable conviction, add to this the time. What time was it then? The king set off from Constantinople to the east, mentally exalting himself with his recent successes over the barbarians and not supposing that anything would oppose his wishes. The eparch preceded him on this journey, instead of any other necessary thing, making such an order for the authorities that no one holding the faith would be allowed to remain in his place, but all such were expelled from everywhere, and in their place some other impostors were brought in, to offend the divine economy. Therefore, when with such a decision, like some menacing cloud, the sovereign power moved from the Propontis against the churches, and suddenly Bithynia was deserted, and Galatia was carried away with great convenience, and everyone along the way yielded to them in their way of thinking, and in order our country was already subjected to this disaster; What does the great Basil do then, this one, as Eunomius says, fearful, not courageous, timid of the terrible, entrusting his salvation to a hidden hut? Are you horrified by the disaster that has befallen you? Does he first accept the suffering of those he has suffered as an adviser for his own safety? Does he agree with the one who advises to yield for a while to the swiftness of evil, and not to plunge oneself into obvious danger by intercourse with people accustomed to bloodshed? Or will every superiority of words, every height of thoughts and speech expose itself to the fact that it is lower than reality? How can anyone describe in words such great contempt for insurance? How can anyone imagine this new struggle, about which others can rightly say that it is not waged by people and not with people, but that the virtue and boldness of a Christian opposes the murderous dominion in it. Anticipating the arrival of the king, the eparch summoned Vasily, a commanding authority already terrible in its greatness, making it even more terrible by the cruelty of punishments, after those deplorable experiences that he committed in Bithynia. When the Galatians were conquered with usual ease and without difficulty, the eparch thought that among us he would find a willingness to do whatever he wanted. The precursor to severity in business was speech mixed together from threats and promises. The eparch said that Vasily, if he was subdued, would continue to enjoy honor from the tsar and the authorities in the church, and if he resisted, he would endure everything that the irritated soul wanted, adding power to power. These were their actions. And ours was so far from being in any horror from what was seen or said that, like some doctor or good adviser called upon to correct mistakes, he ordered them to repent of what they had dared to do and henceforth to stop killing the servants of the Lord; because for those who care about the kingdom of God and the immortal power, they can do no more than just imagine something; but unable to do evil, unable to invent anything that, if said or done, would sadden a Christian. The inventory of property, he said, will not affect one who places all his acquisitions in one faith; exile will not frighten one who, with the same disposition, goes around the whole earth and looks at every country due to the short duration of its residence, as if it were alien, and because all creation is of service, - at every city as if it were his own. To be subjected to blows or labor, or death, when necessary, for the sake of the truth, will not arouse fear in women, but for all Christians there is the highest limit of bliss in the hope of enduring something unbearable. The only sad thing, he added, is that there is only death in nature, and he does not find any way to strive for the truth through many deaths. Since Vasily in this case put himself above these threats and despised all the arrogance of this government as if it were nothing, how at a spectacle with a change of faces, instead of some, others suddenly appear, so here the bitterness of the threats was transformed into endearment, the previously formidable and terrifying eparch with his pride, changing his speech to a modest and condescending one, says: “Don’t consider it unimportant that the great king is entering into environment of your people, on the contrary, agree to be called their teacher, and do not resist his will. It is pleasing to him that this should follow after the exclusion of one small thing from the written statement of faith - the saying “consubstantial.” But the teacher answers again: for a king to become a member of the church - this is very important, for, he says, a great thing is the salvation of the soul, not because he is a king, but because in general he is a man. But in order to make an exception or addition in the presentation of faith, he is so far from this that he cannot even change the order of what is written. This is what this timid, cowardly man, who was horrified at the creaking of the door, said so much in word to a high rank and confirmed what he said with deeds! Thus, he stopped and turned away, as if some kind of stream was spreading over the domain, the overthrow of churches, having alone gained sufficient strength against the blow of evil, and like some great and unshakable rock in the sea, instead of many years of huge waves, crushing the increase of disasters. But his struggle did not end there. On the contrary, the king himself is still undertaking an experiment, indignant that the first attack did not end to his satisfaction. Therefore, just as the Assyrian king in Jerusalem once ordered the destruction of the Israeli church to be carried out by the cook Nebuzaradan, so this one Dimosthenes, assigned to the preparation of dishes, and the chief cook, as the most shameless of others, entrusted this service, thought that he would prevail in any enterprise. Therefore, since he makes a mixture out of everything, and some god-fighter from Illyricum, with a message in his hands, gathers all the nobles for this, and Modest again flares up with anger with the strongest swiftness before; then everyone was moved by the king’s anger, indignant along with the upset king, and pleasing the irritation of the authorities, and everyone was amazed by the threat of what was expected. For again this eparch; again the strongest uprisings of insurance, the addition of threats, the most sensitive irritation, the deplorable spectacle of the trial, heralds, speakers, staff-bearers, fences, curtains, everything that easily horrifies the thoughts of the most prepared. And again the ascetic of God in the second struggle surpasses the glory acquired in the previous one. If you demand proof, then look at the facts themselves. Was there any place in the churches that was not destroyed by the then coup? Is there any tribe left that has not experienced a heretical uprising? Who among those respected in the churches has not been drawn away from his labors? What people escaped such violence? Let us take the whole of Syria, a region even to the barbarian limits: Phenicia, Palestine, Arabia, Egypt and the Libyan tribes to the very end of the universe known to us - and all those who live there: the Pontians, Cilicians, Lycians, Lidians, Pisidians, Pamphylians, Carians, inhabitants of the Hellespont, islanders as far as the Propontis, and all those inhabiting Thrace, where only Thrace and the surrounding tribes extended all the way to Istra; What of all this remained in its form, except perhaps the one thing that was previously possessed by such evil? But of all the nations, the Cappadocian alone did not feel the general disaster of the churches; our great protector saved him from temptation. Such are the consequences of our teacher's timidity! Such are the deeds of one who was horrified by more difficult labors! He did not gain fame from pitiful old women, he did not try to deceive women who were easily susceptible to any deception, he did not consider it a great thing to arouse surprise in reprehensible and depraved people; but by deeds he proved his spiritual strength, constancy, courage and nobility in his way of thinking. His merits are the salvation of the entire fatherland, the peace of our church, a model of all that is good for those who live virtuously, the overthrow of opponents, the defense of the faith, the protection of the weak, the support of the zealous - everything that is recognized as the best among us. With these stories alone, both hearing and sight are brought into harmony by deeds. For here it is the same thing - to narrate in words what is beautiful, and to show in practice what is testified in words, and in both cases, making one thing reliable, the memory visible, and the deeds narrated. 13. But I don’t know how the word moved so far from what was supposed, turning to every blasphemy expressed by the slanderer. However, Eunomius benefits greatly from slowing down his speech on such subjects; denunciation of human untruths prevents the word from reaching the most essential. Just as it is useless to prosecute a person convicted of murder for rashness in words, because the conviction of murder is enough to pronounce the death sentence, although the murderer is not at the same time convicted of any rashness of words, so, it seems to me, it would be good in denouncing Eunomius to present only his wickedness, and to put aside the slander against us. For it is clear that with the discovery of evil-mindedness in the most important and essential, everything else is also exposed as possible for it, although we will not exactly talk about everything in detail. So, the main thing that he strives for both in his previous word and in the one that we are analyzing now is blasphemy against the dogma of piety; nevertheless, efforts are made to completely distort, expel, and destroy pious concepts about the only begotten God and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, so that his speculations about the dogmas of truth turn out to be the most false and untenable, I will first present literally what Eunomius said about them, and then, returning again to what was said, I will examine each saying separately. “Our entire dogmatic teaching is limited to the highest and in the most proper sense so-called essence, that which exists from it, after which it takes precedence over all others, and finally, the third, which is not on the same level with any of those named, but is subordinate to one as a cause, and the other as an effect by which it came into being; without a doubt, to complete the entire teaching, the actions that follow the essences and the names akin to them are taken together. Moreover, since each of these essences, taken separately, is simple and in its own dignity and is, and is conceptualized completely alone, and actions are determined by deeds, and deeds are measured by the actions of those acting, then, by all necessity, for each of the essences, subsequent actions are some less, others more, some are in the first, others in the second row, and generally speaking, they reach such a difference as the deeds can reach; because it is not permissible to call the same action by which he created the angels, or the stars, or the sky, or man; but just as some deeds are more excellent and more honorable than others, so is an action superior to another action, as some pious reasoner will say; since the same actions produce identity in deeds, and different deeds indicate a difference in action. Since this is really so, and the mutual relationship of one to the other maintains an indispensable connection, then those who conduct research in an order akin to things should not mix everything together, trying to merge it; and if a dispute is raised about the essence, then from the first and directly belonging to the essences of the action, produce certification of what is being proven and the resolution of the controversial; and when resolving doubts about the actions of the essences, it is most decent and useful for everyone to consider the flow from the first to the second.” 14. So, here is the intricacy of blasphemy! May our true God, the Son of the true God, guide the word to the truth through the guidance of the Holy Spirit. We will again repeat what has been said in order. Eunomius says that “his dogmatic teaching is limited to the highest and in the most proper sense so-called essence, still that which exists from it, after which it takes precedence over all others, and finally, the third, which is not on the same level with any of those named, but is subordinate to one as a cause, and the other as an effect.” So, the first trick in the book is the following: Eunomius, promising to present us with a mysterious dogma, as if correcting the Gospel sayings, does not use those names in which the Lord gave us this sacrament in the mystery of faith, on the contrary, having kept silent the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, instead of the Father he names some higher and in the most proper sense essence, so called, instead of the Son - an essence that exists from the first, but after it takes precedence over others, and instead of the Holy Spirit - an essence that is not on the same level with any of those named. But if it were more consistent with the matter to express it this way; then Truth, without a doubt, would not have difficulty in inventing these words; It would not have been difficult, of course, for those who later took upon themselves the preaching of the sacrament, and “at first the witnesses and servants of the former Word” (Luke 1:2), and after them filled the whole universe with gospel dogmas, and again after this, from time to time, perplexities about the dogma arose, dismantled at a general council, the written traditions of which are always preserved in the churches. If they had to express themselves this way, then they would not have even mentioned the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. If it is completely pious or safe to replace the sayings of faith with this newness, does it mean that the ignorant, who were not announced in the sacraments, who had not heard the names, as Eunomius puts it, akin, were those who neither knew how nor did they want to make their own concepts preferable to the names given to us in the Divine Word? 15. But I think the reason for this compilation of new names is clear to everyone. For every person, having heard the name of the Father and the Son, immediately recognizes from the names themselves their characteristic and natural relationship to each other; because from these names the affinity of nature is itself explained. Therefore, so that this is not understood about the Father and the only begotten Son, through this it conceals from the listeners that concept of mutual property, which with names automatically enters into thought; and, putting aside divinely inspired sayings, in the presentation of dogma he uses sayings invented to the detriment of the truth. But Eunomius says the following beautifully: this is the dogmatic teaching not of the universal church, but of our church. Anyone who has intelligence can easily understand the wickedness of what was said. But perhaps it would not be untimely to examine in detail in the word with what intention Eunomius ascribes to the one essence of the Father that it is superior and in the very proper sense so called, not allowing either the Son or the Holy Spirit to be the highest and actually so-called essence. For I think that in this one can see an attempt to completely deny the essence of the Only Begotten and the Spirit, and Eunomius, with such a clever composition of words, inconspicuously leads to this very thing, that They exist only in appearance and in name; the true confession of Their hypostasis is rejected by such a construction of speech; and that this is a turn of phrase will be easily noticed by those who dwell briefly on Eunomius’s word. He who recognizes that the Only Begotten and the Holy Spirit truly exist according to His own hypostasis does not tend to talk much about recognizing the names with which, he thinks, the God who exists above all should be honored; for extreme would mean simplicity in agreeing in deeds and obsessively arguing about words. And now, having testified about one essence of the Father that it is the highest and in the most proper sense so called, by keeping silent about the others, it leads to the conclusion that they do not exist in the proper sense. For how can we say what truly exists, what is not attested to, what exists in the proper sense? What is not recognized as being named in the proper sense must be given the opposite name; and what is not in the proper sense is, without a doubt, not really so. Therefore, what is asserted about something that does not exist in the proper sense is made proof of complete non-existence; It is probably with this in mind that Eunomius introduces these new names in his dogma. For no one, of course, will say that Eunomius, through a misunderstanding, fell into a rash assumption and defines the highest place as being above, and, as it were, separates some kind of high guard from the Father, and places the Son in low places. For there is not a child of such intelligence that in the discussion of spiritual and incorporeal nature he can imagine the difference in place; because bodies tend to remain in place; and the spiritual and immaterial by nature are recognized as being far from the concept of place. Therefore, what is the reason for the essence of the Father alone to be called superior? For it is not easy for anyone to imagine that, due to some kind of ignorance, one was involved in these thoughts, who in many ways, by which he shows himself, takes on the appearance of a wise man, and, as the Divine Scripture expresses it, becomes wise “too much” (Eccl. 7:16). But he will not say that the name “higher” essentially shows the superiority of strength or goodness, or something else like that; for everyone (we are not talking about those who boast of the superiority of wisdom) also knows that the Hypostasis of the Only Begotten and Holy Spirit does not lack perfect goodness and power and everything like that; because every good, as long as it does not allow the opposite, has no limit to goodness, but is usually limited to only opposites, as can be seen in individual examples: strength ends as soon as weakness takes its place; life is limited by death; the limit of light is darkness; and to put it briefly, every single good ends with its opposite. Therefore, if Eunomius assumes that the nature of the Only Begotten and the Spirit can be easily transformed into the worse, then he rightly belittles the concept of Their goodness, since They can be carried away by the opposite. And if the divine and unchangeable nature does not allow anything worse to come to Itself (and this is recognized by the enemies themselves), then, without a doubt, It appears to the mind to be indefinable in the consideration of good; and the indefinable is one and the same with the infinite. In the limitless and indefinable, it is extremely unreasonable to imagine increase and decrease. For how will the concept of infinity be preserved if we assert about the infinite that it can be more and less? We learn more from mutual comparison of limits; and what has no limits, how can anyone imagine an excess? Or does Eunomius, imagining not this, but a certain superiority in time, attach the concept of greater to that which is older in antiquity, and for this reason calls one essence of the Father superior? So, let Eunomius say, how did he measure this greater thing in the life of the Father, when no temporal distance appears before the hypostasis of the Only Begotten? But even if there were this distance (let this be said conjecturally for now), an essence that preceded in time the one that came into being after, what advantage does it have in being (I mean in relation to the very concept of being) to call one superior and in the proper sense so called, and about the other to assert that it is not such? For in the case of the predecessor, in comparison with the younger, although the life span is longer, the essence is nevertheless neither greater nor less. This will become clearer from examples. In relation to essence, was David, who was born through fourteen generations, less than Abraham? Has humanity changed in any way? Was David less of a man because he lived later than Abraham? And who is so stupid that he could say this? For the concept of essence, which does not change in the least with the passage of time, is one in relation to both. And no one will say that one is more human because he preceded him in time, and the other is less involved in human nature because he entered life after the others, as if either the nature was wasted by his predecessors, or time exhausted its strength in those who lived before. For it does not belong to time to determine the measure of nature for everyone; on the contrary, nature abides by itself, maintaining itself through those that appear again; and time flows on its own course, either containing or bypassing a constant, immutable nature, abiding within its own limits. Therefore, even then it will not be proven that the father alone has, in the proper sense, a superior measure of essence, if it were assumed that in time He has more, as the word suggested; and without any difference in the precedence of time, how can anyone imagine such something about the pre-eternal nature? Since every measurable distance is revealed in that which is lower than the nature of God, what reason remains for those who pre-accept a pre-temporal and incomprehensible essence to distinguish by the difference of concepts: above and below? But there is no doubt that the defense of the Jewish dogma is what they assert, proving the existence of a single essence of the Father (to which alone they decisively attribute existence in the proper sense), and positing the essence of the Son and the Spirit among the non-existent; because everything that does not exist in its proper sense is attributed existence only in words, according to the usual incorrect use of words; just as someone who is not likewise shown in an image is called a person; on the contrary, in the proper sense, the one called by this name is not the likeness of a person, but the prototype of likeness. But the image by name is only a man, and therefore cannot in the proper sense be called what it is called; since by nature it is not what it is called. So here, if the essence of the Father alone is called in the proper sense, but the essence of the Son and the Spirit is not in the proper sense, what is meant by this? Is this not a clear denial of the saving sermon? So, let them flee again from the church to the Jewish synagogues, not yielding to the Son of existence in the proper sense and thereby proving that He has no existence at all; because the invalid is the same as the non-existent. And since Eunomius would like to be wise in such things, and does he despise those who attempt to write without logical rigor? then let him tell us the despised: from what wisdom did he gain knowledge of the greater and the lesser in relation to the essence? What reason established such a difference that some essence is greater than another essence according to the very meaning of this word: “essence”? For let him not present to us those differences in qualities, or in distinctive properties, which, according to the law of thought, we understand as belonging to the essence, constituting something different from the subject. For it is not the differences in vapors, or colors, or gravity, or strength, or dignity, or behavior and disposition, or anything else seen in the body and soul, that is now proposed to be investigated; but I mean the subject itself, to which in the proper sense the name is given: essence; about this the question is asked: does any essence really have a difference from another in a greater degree of being? But until now we have not yet heard that of two beings recognized as having existence, while both exist, in one there was existence to a greater extent, and in the other to a lesser extent; because both have existence equally as long as they remain what they are, and, as has been said, there is no reason for preferential or lasting existence in any one. Therefore, if Eunomius does not at all allow us to imagine the Only Begotten as having an essence (for this seems to be the secret direction of his speech); then he who does not attribute existence to Him in the proper sense, let him, when reasoning about Him, concede no less to Him. If, however, he confesses the Son, no matter how he exists in being, by self-existent power (we have not yet had a dispute about this); then why does he again take away what is given, proving that the One whose existence he confessed does not have existence in the proper sense? And this means the same thing, as was said, that it does not exist at all. How impossible it is for someone to whom the concept corresponding to this name is completely inapplicable to be a person; and whoever lacks distinctive properties, the whole concept of essence is taken away from him; Likewise, about every thing that is attested to have existence imperfectly and not in its proper sense, the private recognition of existence does not contain any evidence of hypostatic existence; on the contrary, the indication of imperfect being proves the complete non-existence of the subject. Therefore, if you are sensible, then let him turn to pious understanding, removing from dogma the concept of the lesser and not actually so-called essence of the Only Begotten and Holy Spirit. If he decided to blaspheme (and I don’t know why he wants to repay his Creator, God and benefactor with blasphemy); then let him suffer punishment for the opinion of his learning, as if he means something, by ignorance subordinating one essence to another, asserting that, but to an as yet undiscovered law, one essence is higher, the other lower, testifying that one is in the proper sense, and the other is not in the proper sense, so called. For even among those who philosophized outside the faith, we did not know a single one who would indulge in this nonsense; because such wisdom does not agree with either divinely inspired sayings or general concepts. Therefore, the purpose of inventing these names, I think, is sufficiently explained by what has been said, namely, that Eunomius first posits these sayings as a refuge and as the basis of all his evil intentions regarding the dogma, so that, preparing the mind, he can imagine one essence only in the most proper and highest sense, without difficulty deciding about others as being intelligible in a lower and not proper sense. He shows this most especially in what follows, where, when expressing his opinions about the Son and the Holy Spirit, he does not use these words, so that, as I said before, these names involuntarily do not show the properties in their nature; but this teacher makes an anonymous mention of them, teaching that “the understanding of those who listen should be raised from related names and sayings.” But what name is more akin to that used by Truth itself? Eunomius teaches contrary to the Gospel, naming not the Son, but the Essence that comes from the highest and comes after it before all beings. And that this is said to distort the pious concept of the Only Begotten, this will be even more revealed from the rest of Eunomius’s reasoning. But since in what he said, apparently, the middle is observed, so that even one who does not affirm anything ungodly about Christ could sometimes use these sayings; then for this reason I will not now touch upon the teaching about the Lord, in order to save space for refuting the most obvious blasphemies against Him; but to the best of my ability I will examine the teaching of Eunomius about the Holy Spirit, because he utters obvious and undisguised blasphemy against Him, saying that the Spirit is not equal in honor to the Father and the Son, but is subordinate to One and the Other. 16. Therefore, let us first understand what the meaning of the word “submission” is, and in what cases the divine Scripture uses such a phrase. Having honored man by being created in the image of the Creator, God the Creator subjugated every irrational nature to him, as the great David exclaimed, depicting this grace in songs. For he says: “You have subdued everything under his nose” (Ps. 8:7), and mentions his subordinates by name. But in the Divine Scripture something else is also meant by the word “submission,” for David, ascribing the reason for his successes in battle to the God of all things, says: “Put the people under our feet and the languages ​​under our feet” (Ps. 46:4), and also: “subdue the people under me” (Ps. 17:48). And in the divine Scriptures one can often find this word meaning dominion over the opposite. For the Apostle’s saying about the future and final subordination of all people to the Only Begotten and through Him to the Father (1 Cor. 15:28), where he says in the depths of wisdom that he himself is “the mediator of God and men” (1 Tim. 2:5) will submit to the Father (by this submission to the Father of the Son, who became partaker of humanity, meaning the submission of all people), as requiring more and much more difficult research, I will leave for a while. But in clear passages, from which there is no doubt about the meaning of the word “subordination,” in what sense is it stated that the essence of the Spirit is subordinate to the essence of the Son and Father? Is it in the way in which the Son is subordinate to the Father, according to the understanding of the Apostle? But therefore the Spirit is placed in one rank with the Son, and is not subordinate to Him, unless there are two subordinates. Or not in this sense? Therefore, in what other way than that in which, as the psalm taught us, the irrational is subordinate to the rational nature? Consequently, they are as different as the nature of irrational animals is different from the nature of humans. But perhaps Eunomius will reject this concept too? Consequently, it will come to the rest of the meaning - that nature, which opposed and fought before, is then forced by strong necessity to bow under the power of the one that prevailed. Let him choose whatever he wants from what has been said; but I don’t know what exactly, having chosen, he will avoid the inevitable condemnation of blasphemy: will it be when he says that, along with the dumb, the Spirit is subordinate, just as fish, birds and sheep are subordinate to man; or when, like one who has been put aside, he will be brought captive to the one who abounds with force? Or will he not agree with any of these sayings, but will he say that he used the word “submission” not according to the concept adopted by Scripture, but in a different meaning he calls the Spirit subordinate to the Father and the Son? What does this mean? Or by the fact that the Spirit is third in the order in which the Lord gave it to the disciples. Does Scripture legitimize subordination, and not put in a row? Therefore, on the same basis, let him subordinate the Father to the Only Begotten, because divine Scripture often, having presented the name of the Lord, in second place makes mention of God existing above all. “I am also the Father,” says the Lord (John 10:30), introducing His name. And again: “The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God” (2 Cor. 13.13); and those who carefully search for evidence in Scripture can collect thousands of such passages, such as, for example, the following: “Now the divisions of gifts are, and the same is the Spirit: And the divisions of ministries are, and the same is the Lord. And there are divisions of actions, and in the same there is God” (1 Cor. 12:4-6), so on this basis let the God above all, mentioned by Paul in third place, be subordinate to the Spirit and the Son. But even now we have not yet heard this wisdom, which, being called second or third in any series, is relegated to the rank of subject and subordinate. Eunomius just wants to prove that the order of persons known according to legend indicates the advantages and lower degrees of virtues and natures; for he claims that the order of places serves as an indication of the otherness of natures, I do not know where he borrowed such an idea from and by what necessity he was brought to this assumption. For numerical order does not produce a difference of natures; on the contrary, what is countable, as it is by nature, remains such in itself, whether it is countable or not. A number is a sign that lets you know the quantity of things; and it is not always necessary to relegate into the second row that which is lower in the dignity of nature, but by the arbitrariness of those who count, it brings into the row only things denoted by number. “Paul and Silvanus and Timothy” (1 Thess. 1:1) - three persons are mentioned here by the will of the one who mentioned them; Does the number show that Silvanus, placed second after Paul, is something other than a man? Or does Timothy, placed in third place, because of this place given to him in the series of those mentioned in this way, appear to be different by nature? No, because each of them is a person both before and after number; the word, since it was impossible to suddenly mean three in one sentence, mentions each separately in an arbitrary order, but connects the names with a union placed between them, so that, as I think, by this connection of names to show the agreement of the three in a single matter. But this is not what the innovator of dogmas wants; he legitimizes what is contrary to the order of God's word; and what the Lord Himself placed in a row with the Father and the Son, then, separating it from its characteristic and natural place in the row and combination, He ranked it as subordinate, and says that this is the work of One and the other - the Father, as producing the cause of origin, and the Only Begotten, as producing His Hypostasis from Himself; and determines that this is the reason for subordination, although he has not yet discovered what is meant by the word “subordination.” 17. Then he says: “Without a doubt, the actions that follow the essences and the names akin to them are taken together.” The meaning of these words is not very clear, being hidden by the great darkness of wickedness; but as much as others can guess by conjecture, it is this: by the actions of essences, Eunomius, as I think, calls the forces that produce the Son and the Holy Spirit, with which the first essence produced the second, and the second the third, and says that the names of the accomplished deeds are composed akin to the deeds. But we have already explored the trick in reasoning names, if possible; and when we reach this part of the study, if the word requires, we will continue the study. And now it’s time for some reasoning: how do actions follow entities? What are they by their own nature? Is it different with the entities that are followed? Or part of essences and nature? And if otherwise, how or from what do they come from? If the same, then how do they separate and, instead of being inseparably with them, follow them from the outside? For it is not easy to find out anything that has been said. Is there any natural necessity that involuntarily forces action, whatever it is, to follow the essence, just as combustion and vapors and vapors follow fire - the bodies from which they originate? But I think Eunomius himself will not say this; as if God’s essence should be revered as some kind of diverse and complex property, which, not separately but seen together with it, has an action that is revealed in the subject, as if something accidental. On the contrary, he says, that voluntarily and freely moved entities themselves produce whatever they please. And who will say about what is done arbitrarily by industry that it follows as something externally accompanying? For we do not know that, according to the general usage of words in such cases, such a way of expression is very common: to say about the action of a worker on something, “the action follows the worker.” For it is impossible for one who has separated one thing from the other to comprehend the rest in itself; but whoever said “action”, in this word he also understood the movable in accordance with the action, and whoever mentioned the action, he, of course, at the same time silently designated the action. But what has been said will be clearer in examples. We say that so-and-so forges or does carpentry, or does something else like that. So, in one word in speech both the work and the person doing the work are represented together, so that if one or the other is defined, the rest will not remain. Therefore, if two objects - the action itself and, in accordance with it, coming into motion - are represented one with the other together, then why is it said here that the first essence is followed by an action that produces the second essence, as if constituting a medium between both essences and being neither in agreement by nature with the first, nor in contact with the second? For it is separated from one by the fact that it is not nature, but the movement of nature; does not agree with what follows it, because through it it was not pure action that occurred, but an active essence. 18. Then, together with this, we will examine this: Eunomius calls essence the work of essence, the second essence the work of the first, and again the third second. How did he prove this teaching beforehand? What arguments did you use for this? In what way has he brought us to the necessity of believing that the subsequent entity must be the action of the preceding one? If, based on everything else seen in the creature, it was necessary to infer about this, then, although in this case it is not good to guess about the higher things from below, at least, perhaps, it would be somewhat excusable for the mind to wander through the incomprehensible through the visible. Now, who will dare to assert that heaven is the work of God, and the work of heaven is the sun, and the sun is the moon, and the moon is the stars, and the stars are anything else in creation? For all this is the work of the One; because “there is one God and Father of all, of all things worthless” (Eph. 4:6; 1 Cor. 8:6). If, however, something comes into being through each other, like the birth of animals, then in this case something different does not happen, because in the one who is born again the same nature remains. So, why, not being able to say the same about anything seen in creation, does Eunomius prove this about a superior essence, that the work of the first is the second essence, and so on? If, having in mind the birth of animals, we imagine something similar about the most pure nature, so that we imagine what follows as the work of the previous one, then even in this case Eunomius does not preserve the sequence of speech. For what is born by another is certainly homogeneous with that from which it is born; but he, in order to show the abundance of lies, like a clever fighter, having undertaken to overthrow the truth with both hands, attributes heterogeneity and foreignness to those who come from each other. To show the subordination and in natural dignity the derogation of the Son and the Spirit, he says that from one came the other. And so that in this way of coming into being those who know the birth of one from another are not led to the concept of kinship, he fights with the very law of nature, saying that from one comes the other, and asserting that the Begotten, as regards the nature of the Begotten, is not a true son. But for what, it seems to me, others have the right to reproach Eunomius first of all is the following. If it were someone else, who, due to inexperience in words, was not accustomed to such constructions of thoughts and did not practice them, and then began to assert what presented itself to him by chance, then perhaps it would be excusable for him not to use the methods that are in use to prove dogmas. Since Eunomius has so much strength for this, that in his desire to comprehend everything he extends even to what is outside the realm of our nature, then why did he not know the beginning with the help of which in these attempts of the mind the understanding of everything hidden is accomplished? For who does not know that every word, borrowing principles from the obvious and known by all, through this imparts probability to the doubtful, and that nothing hidden can be comprehended otherwise than by guiding the understanding of the unknown by what has already been recognized by us? If what is taken as the beginning of concepts for the discovery of the unknown contradicts the assumptions of many, then it is with difficulty that what we do not know can be discovered through this. Those who belong to the Church have all the struggle and all the dispute with the Anomaeans regarding the dogma - whether the nature of the Son and the Spirit should be recognized either, according to the opponents, as created, or uncreated, as the Church believes. But Eunomius presents the very thing that everyone contradicts as being confessed by everyone and, having not found any evidence that the subsequent essence is the work of the previous one, boldly asserts that this is really so, I don’t know by whose instruction or by what wisdom he dared to do this. For if every argument and proof must be preceded by some indisputable and undoubted confession, so that the unknown is proven to the preconceived, being presented in an adaptive manner to the intervening arguments, then the one who turns what is still sought into an argument for something else prepares nothing other than ignorance - ignorance, and deception - deception. And this is the same as “making a blind man, as the Gospel says nowhere, make a blind man a leader” > (Matthew 15:14). For truly, to the blind and vainly strengthened word, which asserts that the Creator and Creator of all things is a creature and a work, adds another blind word, that the Son is something alien to the nature of the Father, not similar to Him in essence, not at all part of the natural property with Him. But this is not what we are talking about yet, for where Eunomius more clearly reveals the wickedness of his wisdom, there it would be opportune for us to place a denunciation of wickedness; Now we must return to the continuation in order of what he said. “Also, since each of these essences is pure, simple, completely united and is represented as such by the mind according to its own dignity, while actions are determined by actions, and actions are commensurate with the actions of those who acted, then, by all necessity, the actions that follow each essence are some less, others more, and consist either in the first or in the second row.” The meaning of all that has been said, although Eunomius contains many words, there is one, namely: he tries to show that there is no connection between the Father and the Son and also the Spirit with the Son, but the essences are separate from one another, disconnected, they are some kind of alien natures, unrelated to each other, and different not only in this, but also in quantity and in the reduction of merits, so that they are alone, as Eunomius himself says, some are thought to be large, others are smaller, and in everything else they are dissimilar. Although it will seem unnecessary for many to dwell on the obvious and try to expose in detail everything that, in the opinion of many, is in itself false and vile and has no power; however, in order not to give the idea that, due to a lack of denunciation, something of what he said was overlooked unexamined, let us proceed to this as best we can. “Each of these essences,” says Eunomius, “is pure, simple, completely united and is represented as such by its own dignity.” Here again, presenting the doubtful as universally accepted, he thinks as if he had said something, when instead of any proof he considers it sufficient to confirm what was said. Three, he says, essences, for this appears from what he said: “each of these essences,” which he would not have said if he had recognized one essence. Therefore, if this means the mutual difference of essences, so as not to suggest that he is carried away by the wickedness of Sabellius, who assigns three names to one subject, then we also agree with him, and none of the pious will contradict this teaching, unless Eunomius seems to be sinning in some names and in the use of words, when he names essences instead of hypostases; for not all those things to which the same concept of essence belongs, in a similar way the concept and hypostasis fit under the identity. Peter, James, John, in terms of essence, are one and the same with each other, because each of them is a man; but in terms of their distinctive properties, the hypostases of each of them do not agree with each other. Therefore, if Eunomius proved this, namely, that one should not confuse hypostases and assign three names to one person, then, according to the testimony of the Apostle, “his word is faithful and worthy of all acceptance” (1 Tim. 1:15). But because this is not what he means, and he says this, not distinguishing hypostases from each other according to the properties seen in them, but proves that the very essence to be considered is different from another, or, better said, from itself, and therefore names many essences, so that each has a certain otherness that sets it apart from others; Therefore, I affirm that Eunomius’ reasoning has neither a beginning nor a main basis and does not prove blasphemy with anything generally accepted. For he has no proof by which another could be led to such a concept of dogma; on the contrary, as if when retelling a dream, the voice and unproven statement of wickedness are retained. For whereas the Church teaches not to divide the faith into many essences, but to believe that in the three Persons and hypostases there is no difference in being, and opponents believe in modification and dissimilarity in the essences themselves; Eunomius, with not a single word, boldly confirms what has not been proven (which cannot even be proven) as proven, and to this day, perhaps, without uttering anything into the ears of his listeners. But he could have learned, by looking at those who listen wisely, that all speech, while arbitrarily carried around unproven, is the so-called idle talk of old women, which has no power to prove what is sought - when neither divine Scriptures nor human conclusions are cited in defense of what is said. But enough about that. 19. Let us consider what has been said. Eunomius says that each of these essences that he depicted in words is simple and completely united. But that the simply divine, blessed and every mind exceeds Nature, this, we think, will not be contradicted by those who are too rude and low in understanding. For would anyone suppose a multiform and complex nature, having neither appearance nor external image, detached from all quantity and measure in size? But that recognizing a superior essence as simple is not in accordance with the dogma proven by the followers of Eunomius (although in words they all agree), this will obviously not be for long for those who stop at this. Who does not know that the simplicity of the Holy Trinity, by its very concept, does not allow more and less? For in an essence in which it is impossible to imagine any mixture or confluence of qualities, but which is comprehended by thought as a certain indivisible and uncomplicated force, why and on what basis would anyone recognize the difference between a greater and a lesser magnitude? The one who defines these differences, of all necessity, must imagine the clash of some qualities in the subject, because he either imagines in them the difference of excess and deficiency, and through this introduces the concept of quantity into what is sought, or establishes the idea that one essence is superior to another or inferior to another in goodness, power, wisdom, or something else that is only piously understood about the Divine; in such a case the concept of complexity is inevitable. For that being has no lack of wisdom, power or any other good, whose good is not something acquired, but what it is, remains so by nature. Therefore, whoever says that the Divine nature contains smaller and greater essences, without noticing it himself, proves that the Divinity is composed of something unlike, so that, according to his understanding, the other is the subject itself, and the other is acquired by it again, by participation in which it becomes good, without being such in itself. If Eunomius imagined a truly simple and completely unified essence, which in itself is good, and is not achieved through acquisition, then he could not attribute to it majorities and minorities. For even before this it was said that good is diminished only by the presence of evil. And whose nature is inaccessible to the worst, we cannot imagine the limit of goodness; The indefinable is not such in relation to something else, but what is represented in itself escapes the limit. If we say “the infinite is greater or less than the infinite,” then I don’t know how it will come together in thought. Therefore, if Eunomius admits that, exceeding the essence, it is simple and agrees with itself in everything; then let him agree that it allows communication in simplicity and infinity. If he separates and alienates one essence from the other, imagining to himself the essence of the Only Begotten as different from the Father and also different from the essence of the Only Begotten as the essence of the Spirit, and says about them: “this is greater and this is less,” then let him admit that, although, apparently, he ascribes simplicity to them, he actually affirms their complexity. Let us return again to what he said in order. “Since the essence is pure, simple, completely united,” he says, “and is represented as such by its own dignity.” What does “on its own merits” mean? If one considers essences according to their general Dignity, then in this case too it would be unnecessary, it would in vain lengthen the speech by this addition, stopping at the genera recognized by all; but, perhaps, the inappropriateness of expression would become somewhat excusable, because a pious meaning would give even the emptiness and excess of speech the quality of being bearable. But now there is a danger that he will sin not only in words (this illness would be easily curable); on the contrary, it is a matter of crafty tricks. Eunomius calls each of the three essences simple, according to its own dignity, so that at the beginning the definitions of the first, second and third essence expressed by him would damage the concept of simplicity. For just as he called the essence of the Father one, superior and unique in the proper sense, the so-called, without recognizing anything about the Son and the Spirit, without using the expressions “higher” about them and in the very proper sense,” in the same way he called the essences simple, according to the merit seen in each, and about the concept of simplicity he thinks that it should be adapted: why in the most proper sense the so-called and first essence is conceptualized as the highest and perfect simplicity, the second, accordingly, as it moves away from primacy, is lowered in the concept of simplicity, and the latter is also lowered so much in the concept of perfect simplicity, to the extent that the measure of dignity is diminished to the extreme, so that according to this, the essence of the Father is thought to be purely simple, the essence of the Son is not exactly simple, but in the application of a complex nature to it, and the nature of the Holy Spirit has great complexity, since the measure of simplicity is last is gradually diminishing. For just as we admit of an imperfectly good thing that in some part it partakes of an opposite property, so that which is not completely simple inevitably seems complex. 20. And that Eunomius used this saying with this thought appears more clearly in the continuation of the speech, where the more open concept of the Son and the Spirit reduces it to some kind of creeping and base assumptions on the earth. “Since,” he says, “actions are determined by actions, and actions are proportionate to the actions of those who acted, it is therefore necessary that the actions following each essence should be some less, others more, and some should be in the first, and others in the second row.” And although, having carefully covered this with the vagueness of word expression, he made sure that the concept of this is elusive for many, it can still be conveniently explained from the connection of what is being investigated. “Actions,” he says, “are determined by deeds.” And he calls the Son and the Spirit works, while actions are the productive forces by which they are accomplished and about which he said shortly before that they follow the essences. The phrase “to be determined” expresses the coming into balance of the produced essence with the producing force, or, better said, not by force, but by the action of force, as Eunomius himself calls it, so that the product is not the work of the entire active force, but of some particular action, when the whole force has come into motion to the extent that it needs to be revealed to accomplish what is produced. And again putting the same thing in reverse order, he says: “And the deeds are proportionate to the actions of those who acted.” And the meaning of these words will become more familiar to us from the example. Suppose that we are talking about some tool for leatherworking in the following way: if a cutter made in the form of a circle is applied to something on which such an image should be made, then what is cut out by it is determined by the type of iron, and in the cutting there will be a circle of the same size as the iron; and again - no matter how far the gun travels, it will describe a circle with such a cutout. Similar to this is the thought of this theologian about the divine hypostasis of the Only Begotten. A certain action, he says, like an instrument following the first essence, accomplished a work commensurate with itself - the Lord. This is how he knows how to glorify the Son of God, who is now glorified in the glory of the Father and will be revealed at the time of judgment! He says about Him that He is the work and is proportionate to the action that produced Him! Therefore, what kind of action is this that follows the God of all, is conceptualized before the Only Begotten and determines His essence? Is this some kind of essential and independent force, producing with free movement whatever it pleases? Therefore, she is the Father of the Lord, and why is the title of Father ascribed to God who still exists above all, if not by Him, but by some subsequent external action, the Son was produced? Why is the Son, about whom Eunomius says that He came from something else, as if some anonymous one (may the Lord forgive this word!) invaded the relationship with the Father, being honored only by the name of the Son? Why, then, after the God of all things, does he also place the Lord third, who reckons the Son after the Father, because in second place after the God who exists above all, this mediating action is revered? In the same order, the Holy Spirit, of course, will take not the third, but the fifth place, since, according to Eunomius’ word, the action that follows the Only Begotten, from Whom the Holy Spirit came, is, of course, considered between them in the middle. But as a result of this, what was said “all things were” by the Son (John 1:3) will turn out to be untenable, because this new theologian invented another certain hypostasis, which is older than the Only Begotten, and which it would be fair to recognize as the cause of the creation of the universe, since, according to them, the origin of the Only Begotten itself depends on this action. If, avoiding these inconsistencies, he says that the action, the product of which he defines the Son, is something unrealized, then let him also say how nothing follows a being? And how does the unfulfilled produce the realized? For as a result of this it will be revealed that, although what follows God does not exist, yet this non-existent has become the cause of beings and what has not been realized in its nature determines the nature of what has been realized, and all the power that accomplishes and creates creation is in its natural basis contained in the non-existent. Such are the dogmas of this theologian, who is about the Lord of heaven and earth, about the Creator of all creation, about the Word of God who is in the beginning, about the One by whom “all things were” (Jn. 1, 3), says that from some non-existent and failed thing or dream, or, I don’t know what the action now invented by Eunomius should be called, He came into existence and is defined by this, as if by some kind of fence, enveloped everywhere by non-existence. But this seer of the invisible did not understand to which end the connection of speech turns. For if God’s action is not carried out, but God determines the work produced from non-existence, then, of course, the work will be recognized by nature as the same thing as the nature of the one who produces the work is depicted in words. For everyone knows what is produced from non-existence and embraced by non-being, namely, nothing; because it is not natural for the opposite to be contained in the opposite, just as in fire there is no water, in death there is no life, in darkness there is no light, in the non-existent there is no existing. But Eunomius, due to the overabundance of wisdom in him, either did not understand this, or arbitrarily closed his eyes to the truth. For some reason it is necessary to imagine a minority in the hypostasis of the Only Begotten and again to see a certain strengthening of the minority before the Son in the Holy Spirit, expressing this in these words: “by all necessity, the actions that follow each essence must be smaller and greater.” This necessity, which forces the Divine nature to do this and assigns more and less by lot, we did not recognize from it, and we ourselves were not able to understand until now. For among all who accept simple preaching in its simple sense, the teaching still prevails that there is no necessity in the Divine nature that would incline and force the Only Begotten, like some kind of slave, into the minority. But, leaving this aside, even if it was worth no small study, Eunomius only teaches that one should imagine less. But necessity does not only stop the word there, but also prepares something more in blasphemy, as has already been partially found. For if the Son did not come from the Father, but from some unrealized action, then not only will He be recognized as lesser than the Father, but the entire teaching will necessarily become completely Jewish. For the creation of a non-existent does not only show a small consequence of this necessity, but something that is not safe for the one who accuses to utter. Just as that which is born from an existing thing is necessarily recognized as having existence, so that which comes from a non-existent will necessarily be recognized as having a completely different existence. For when something does not exist in itself, then how can something else come into existence from it? Therefore, if this action that follows God and produces the Son does not have its own essence, then who is so blind that he does not understand the blasphemy being prepared, namely, that the goal of Eunomius even tends to deny our Savior? And if, as a result of their teaching, the Hypostasis of the Son is stolen from faith and nothing is left to Him except one name, then it will be difficult to believe that the Holy Spirit also has its own Hypostasis, which, according to their genealogy, is produced from a number of those who have no existence. For when there is no action in existence that is essentially subsequent to God, and the product of it in the teaching is necessarily accepted as unrealized, and this is again followed by another non-existence of action, then from it, they prove, the Spirit arose; Then is not the blasphemy obvious to everyone, namely, that since their teaching pursues shadows and unrealizable fictions and is not based on anything truly consistent, then, according to their proof, after the ungenerate God, nothing exists in the true sense. And the very proof of those who teach such things plunges the teaching into such inconsistency. 21. But let us assume that this is not the case, because they also confess this and in words show love for mankind, yielding to the Only Begotten Son and the Holy Spirit existence in Their own hypostasis. However, if, in confessing this, they also confessed together the accepted opinions about Them, then, of course, they would not dispute the dogma of the church and would not break away from the common hope of Christians. If, as if preparing for themselves some substance for blasphemy and a reason for it, they give existence to the Son and the Holy Spirit, then (although it may be bold to say this) it would be more useful for them, having renounced the faith, to transfer themselves to the side of Jewish service, rather than to insult the name of Christians with an imaginary confession of faith. For the Jews, until now remaining not having received the Word, are ungodly to the extent that they do not confess Christ who has come, but hope that he will come; It is not heard that anyone has expressed any bad concept that degrades the glory of the One they are waiting for. Confessors of the new circumcision, or better yet, as the Apostle says, “from the cutting” (Phil. 3:2), although they do not deny that the One Waited for has come, they nevertheless imitate those who, through unbelief and insulting speech, dishonor the coming of the Lord in the flesh. The Jews intended to throw stones at the Lord (John 8:59), but they intersperse blasphemous words with the word of truth. They made birth according to the flesh look low and inglorious, without even touching upon the thought of the birth of the Divine and Eternal; likewise, these too, having refused to confess the magnificent, lofty and ineffable birth from the Father, affirm that He accepted the existence of creation, by which existence is communicated to both the human race and all created things The Jews made it a sin to recognize the Lord as the Son of God above all; These too are indignant at those who confess this about Him in truth. And they thought to honor the God of all by denying equal honor with Him to the Son; and these also offer as a gift to the One who is above all, taking away glory from the Lord, giving honor to the Father. Who, as it should be, will depict, etc., how many and what insults are being shown to the Only Begotten? Having conceived of some action that preceded the hypostasis of Christ, to call Christ the work and work of it, which the Jews had not previously dared to do. Then they limit the nature of the Lord, enclosing Him within some limits of the power that produced Him; and as if by some kind of measure, surrounding him with the amount of action by which He was produced, with this action invented by them, like some kind of clothing, clothed from everywhere. We cannot blame the Jews for this. Then they perceive some kind of reduction in essence in the sense of a minority, I don’t know how, having measured in their assumption what is non-quantitative and without magnitude, having had the opportunity to find how much the Only Begotten of God lacks in magnitude to perfection, lacking which He is seen as diminished and imperfect, and many other things, partly admitting openly, and partly confirming secretly, they turned the confession of the Son and the Holy One into an exercise of their wickedness Spirit. Therefore, is their fate not worse than the Jewish condemnation, if the Jews never dared to do something, it is so clearly affirmed by them? Whoever belittles the essence of the Only Begotten and Holy Spirit by agreeing to say or listen to this will perhaps seem a little ungodly. But if anyone studies this teaching exactly, he will expose himself to the gravest blasphemy. Thus, let us consider this, and may I be allowed, in order to study and clarify the lies asserted by our opponents, to turn the word to an exposition of our concepts about this. 22. The highest division of all beings is to divide everything into rational and sensory. And the Apostle generally calls the sensory nature “visible” (Col. 1:16). For, just as every body has a color, which is noticed by sight, then, leaving other qualities that essentially belong to bodies, I called visible according to the quality more accessible to the senses. The common name of every rational nature, as the Apostle says, is “invisible”; for the withdrawal from the comprehension of the sensory is guided by the understanding of the incorporeal and rational. But reason and the concept of the rational are divided into two: uncreated nature, and after it another created one is taken; the uncreated creates the creature, and the created in the uncreated nature has a cause and the possibility of being. Therefore, sensory beings include all those that are comprehended by bodily senses, and in which differences in qualities allow the relationship of greater and lesser, while differences in quantity, quality, and other distinctive properties are seen in them. But in rational nature, I mean the nature of the creature, the same relationship of differences does not take place as is noted in the sensory; but another method opens up, revealing the difference between the greater and the lesser. Because the source, beginning and gift of every good is seen in the uncreated Nature, and every creature turns its gaze to Him through communication in the first good of the highest nature, approaches Him and becomes a partaker of Him by necessity in proportion to the participation of the highest gifts, while, by free will, some perceive them to a greater extent, others to a lesser extent; then in the creature the greater and the lesser are known according to the desire of each. For nature is conceived in creation as placed at the mutual limit of goods and the opposite of goods, as capable of freely accepting one and the other, to which, by choice of the will, it has an inclination, as we learned this from Scripture; and therefore, as we retreat from the worst and approach the beautiful, it will be appropriate to say about that which is superior in virtue: “more” and “less.” But the uncreated Nature is far removed from such a difference, because it has good that was not acquired, and did not receive beauty into itself by participating in any higher beauty, but in itself, as it was from the beginning, it is good, and is mentally represented as good, and is the source of good, and is simple, and monotonous, and uncomplicated, according to the testimony of even those who argue with us. It has within itself a difference befitting the greatness of nature, seen not in the greater and the lesser, as Eunomius thinks. For one who belittles the concept of good in any of the Persons recognized by faith in the Holy Trinity, without a doubt, leads to the thought that in one who reveals a lack of good in himself, something from the opposite state is mixed, but to think this about the Only Begotten and the Holy Spirit is not pious. On the contrary, the uncreated Nature, contemplated in extreme perfection and incomprehensible superiority, according to the distinctive properties that each Hypostasis of the Holy Trinity has, has an unfused and perfect difference. According to communication in uncreatedness it has indifference, and according to the exclusive property of each Person - incommunicability. The peculiarity seen in each Hypostasis clearly and purely separates one from the other; Thus we confess about the Father that He is neither created nor begotten, for He is neither begotten nor created. Therefore, He has this uncreatedness in common with the Son and the Holy Spirit. But the Father is also unbegotten; this is special, incommunicable, which is not found in any of the other Hypostases. The Son, by uncreatedness, is one with the Father and the Spirit, but in that which exists and is called the Son and the Only Begotten, it has a peculiarity that neither God who exists above all, nor the Holy Spirit has. The Holy Spirit, due to the uncreated nature of having commonality with the Son and the Father, again differs from Them in its own characteristics. The sign and feature that especially distinguishes Him is to be nothing of what the mind perceives in the Father and the Son. For not to be and not begotten and only begotten, but in general to be is His exclusive feature before the named Persons. Being one with the Father by uncreatedness, he again differs from Him in that he is not the Father, similar to this Father; in unity with the Son by uncreatedness, being one with Him and because He has the cause of being in the God of all, not one with the Son again by His own peculiarity, because He does not come from the Father only begotten, and appears through the Son. And again, since creation was brought into being by the Only Begotten, lest they think that the Spirit, as manifested through the Son, has some kind of commonality with creation, immutability, immutability, and the absence of the need to borrow goodness from others. The Spirit differs from creation, because creation does not have immutability in nature, as Scripture says, telling about the fall of the Virgin ( Isa. 14:12), about which the Lord, revealing the sacraments to the disciples, said: “I saw Satan like lightning falling from heaven” (Luke 10:18). But in what way it differs from creation, it thereby consists in its affinity with the Father and the Son. For the concept of immutability and immutability is the same for all beings, who by nature do not accept the worst into themselves. So, having stated this in advance, it is time for us to finally examine the teachings of our opponents. “It is necessary,” says Eunomius, “in the doctrine of the Son and the Holy Spirit to be greater and lesser entities.” So, let's see in what sense is the necessity of such a difference understood, by what comparison is made between those measured by each other, whether bodily or perceived mentally in the excess and deficiency of virtue, or by essence itself? But about the essence, those who are knowledgeable in philosophy about such things have proven that it is impossible to imagine any difference in it if someone, having cleansed and exposed the essence from the qualities and properties seen in it, examines it in itself, according to the very concept of being. By strengthening and weakening of virtue, to imagine such a difference in the Only Begotten and the Spirit, and as a result of this, their nature must be assumed to change into both, as equally accepting opposites and standing at the mutual limit of the beautiful and the opposite, - characteristic of extreme wickedness. For whoever says this proves that something else is this nature according to its own structure and is made something else by the participation of the beautiful and the bad. This happens with iron, which, remaining in the fire for a long time, takes on the quality of heat, continuing to be iron; if it is in snow or ice, then it changes this quality into another, which takes over it, taking on the coldness of the snow in its own parts. Therefore, just as we do not call this substance by the quality seen in iron, we do not call it either fire or ice, when it has taken on the quality of one of these substances, so if, according to the teaching of the wicked, it is assumed about the life-giving power that goodness does not essentially reside in it, but comes from communion, then it will no longer be called good in the proper sense; on the contrary, such an assumption will force one to imagine something else, namely something something in which good is not eternally seen, and which, taken in itself, does not lie in the nature of good, so that there has never been good in this power and never will be again. For if something better becomes good after communion, then it is clear that it was not such before communion. And if something, being different, in the presence of a good took on its color, then, without a doubt, as soon as it is separated from the good, it will be recognized as something else, and not as a good. And if this thought prevails, then the Divine nature will be revered as much as the dispenser of goods as it is itself in need of a provider of goods. For how can anyone communicate to another what he does not have himself? Therefore, if he possesses goods perfectly, then let us not imagine any diminishment in perfection; and the one who believes less in the perfect is not grounded. If they consider the participation of good to be imperfect and therefore call it a minority, then look what follows from this. Precisely, what he has in himself to such an extent will not do good to the poorest, but will make an effort to make up for what is lacking for himself; so, in their opinion, the teaching about providence, about judgment, about economy and about everything that, according to our belief, is accomplished and is always accomplished by the Only Begotten is false, because, according to their teaching, as is natural, He is busy taking care of His own good and has left the management of the universe. If the prevailing opinion was that the Lord is not perfect in every good, then it would not be difficult to understand what the blasphemy would turn into. For in this case faith is in vain, preaching is in vain, hopes realized by faith are unfounded. Why are they baptized into Christ when He does not have His own power for goodness? May this blasphemy be removed from my lips! Why do they believe in the Holy Spirit if they think about Him? How are they reborn by baptism from a corrupt birth, when, as they think, the power that regenerates them does not possess natural infallibility and inexhaustibility? How will the Transformer transform their body of humility, when He Himself, as they believe, has a need to change Him for the better, demands for Himself another who would also transform Him? For as long as the good of nature is possessed to a small extent, since the highest naturally invests in those who are insufficient a certain constant attraction to Him, the desire for more will in no way cease, but with the always intense desire for what has not yet been received, what has the less will desire more and more, always change into the highest and will never achieve perfection, because it will not find a betrayal, which, having taken hold, could stop in its ascent. Since the first good is by nature limitless, then, of necessity, the participation of the one enjoying the good will also be limitless, since it always embraces more than before and each time finds an immense excess, and can never be compared with it, because what is shared has no limit, and what increases from participation does not cease to increase. Such are the blasphemies that arise from the concept of difference in the possession of good. If in the Only Begotten and in the Spirit they see in a certain bodily concept the greater and the lesser, then the incongruity of the teaching is revealed by itself without an exact study in detail. For, of all necessity, with such an assumption certain qualities are introduced into the Divine nature: distance, volume, outline, and everything that is included in the concept of body. And where the complex is allowed, there, without a doubt, the decomposition of the complex is also recognized. But by this incongruous teaching, which dares to assert that in that which has no magnitude and complexity there is something smaller and greater in magnitude, this and similar things are proven, as out of many things the word has not revealed much to us, because it is not convenient to reveal in the word all the lies hidden in this teaching. And not many of what has been said, however, will reveal the inconsistency of what is revealed as a result of Eunomius’s blasphemy. But we will proceed to the continuation of the essay, having provided little else to confirm our teaching. And since in any dogma a reliable test of truth is divinely inspired testimony, then I think it will be good to confirm it in our word by adding Divine words. 23. So, in the division of beings we recognize the following differences. I call the first (since it is the first for our comprehension) the sensory; after this, according to the guidance of the sensory, what is perceived by the mind - and this, as we have said, is reasonable. And again in the rational we recognize another difference, dividing it into created and uncreated, and about the uncreated nature we have determined that this is the Holy Trinity, while everything that appears after Her is created and is called. Therefore, so that our distribution does not remain unproven, but is brought into certainty by the testimony of Scripture, let us add the following to what has been said: the Lord, as God the Word, personally testifies in the Gospel that He was not created, but came from the Father in this ineffable and inscrutable way of birth or procession. And what truer witness can there be than the Word of the Lord Himself, Who in the entire Gospel calls the true Father Father, and not His Creator, and calls Himself not the work of God, but the Son of God. For just as, to signify His commonality in the flesh with the human race, He called the visible the Son of man, showing the affinity in the nature of His flesh with that from which it was borrowed, so the true and sincere union with God of all is signified by the name of the Son, the word “Son,” showing the affinity by nature, although some to distort the truth, taking excerpts from a parable saying and offering without explanation what is said is common, dark and in the form of a riddle, the word: “created” (Proverbs 8:22), which the tributary introduced into the speech on behalf of Wisdom, is used in defense of their perversion of the dogma, saying, in the words: “The Lord created Me,” there is a confession that the Lord was created, so that the Only Begotten Himself does not deny such a thought with this word. But we should not pay attention to these words, for they do not provide evidence that these words must certainly refer to the Lord, and they cannot prove that, according to Jewish reading, the meaning of the saying leads to this meaning, because other interpreters, instead of “created,” translated “acquired, fasted.” But if there had been such a reading in the original Scripture, the meaning of the expression would not have been difficult and clear, because the tributary teaching does not show the purpose of the predicate explicitly, but covertly, not in direct expressions, as from what was said in connection with this place one can recognize the incomprehensibility of the word. For example, it is said: “When His throne is driven away by the wind” (Proverbs 8:27) and the like. What is God's throne, of course? Real or mental? And what kind of winds? Are these ordinary and famous ones, which, according to naturalists, come from vapors and vapors? Or imagined to have happened in a different way that is unknown to ordinary human knowledge? And these winds, according to the word of the influent, served as the foundation of the throne? And what is the seat of the incorporeal, indescribable, indescribable God? And who can understand all this from the ordinary meaning of these words? Therefore, it is clear that the presented sayings are some kind of riddles that contain a deeper view than their meaning, which is presented at first; therefore, the assumption that the Lord was created will in no way be made from this passage of Scripture by those who reason piously, and especially by those taught by the great voice of the Evangelist, who says that everything that was created was created by Him, and came to pass about Him. For it is said: “All things were by Him, and without Him nothing came into being” (John 1:3) about Him. The Evangelist would not have said this affirmatively if he had believed that the Lord Himself is one of the creatures. For how would everything have been created by Him, and what was created about Him would have had consistency, if He, as the Creator, had not necessarily been something other than the nature of the created, and He had not made Himself, but the creature? If creation is by Him, and the Lord Himself is not Himself, then, of course, He is still something else, and not a creature. Therefore, when the Evangelist said: “All things were made by Him, and without Him nothing came into being” about Him, he obviously showed that all created things were created about the Son, and not by another Who was brought into being. Paul continues this word and, in order not to leave any reason for blasphemous speech, precisely to this? the nature of the Spirit to be ranked among creatures, lists (saying what exactly it is) what the Evangelist calls and means by the word “all.” And just as the great David, having said that everything is subjugated to man, added those genera that are included in the word “all”, that is, animals of the earth, water and air (Ps. 8: 7-9), so does the interpreter of the divine The Apostle Paul, when he said: “by this were all things created” (Col. 1:16), defines the concept of the word “all things” as enumerated, for he says “visible and invisible,” by the word “visible,” as already said, embracing what is known to the senses, and by the name “invisible,” meaning the nature of the rational. But as for the sensual, the Apostle had no need to list everything down to the smallest detail by name. For no one is so carnal or bestial as to suppose the Holy Spirit to belong to the sensual. Having mentioned the invisible, since the nature of the Spirit is also rational and incorporeal, so that no one would think to include the Spirit among them due to the general property of invisibility, he makes a very clear division between the creation brought into being, and between the essence that exceeds creation. For he enumerates in words what has been created, naming certain “thrones, principalities, powers, dominions” (Col. 1:16), and using certain generic and collective names, expounding the doctrine of these invisible powers, and what is above creation, he by his very silence places outside the number of created beings. As if someone, having received an order to recite the names of the small and lower commanders in the army, those who control a number or a platoon, centurions and thousanders, and if there are other names of the authorities over the units, having named everyone, does not make any mention of the power that contains everything and controls all power, not out of contempt, or not out of oblivion, keeping silent about this predominant leadership, but because it was ordered to it was, or he himself proposed to list only the subordinate and subordinate ranks, and by including in this memorable list the lower and superior ones, he would have insulted him: it seems to me that Paul, initiated into the unspeakable mysteries, did the same when he was raptured into paradise, and having become a spectator of heavenly miracles, he saw and heard unspeakable things for people. And he, intending to teach the doctrine of what was created by the Lord, when he depicted this in words with certain collective names, describing angelic and supermundane power, he stopped his speech at the above-mentioned, without including in the list of creatures that which is above creation; so that it is clearly attested in Scripture that the Holy Spirit is higher than creation. But if anyone objects to this, that Paul did not mention the cherubim, but in the enumeration of created things they are silent about them, as well as about the Spirit, and by the fact that no mention is made about them, he begins to prove that either they must be recognized as the highest creatures, or this about the Spirit should not be recognized: then let him delve into the meaning of the listed names, and apparently see what was omitted in what was said, because the mention was not made by name. For, having mentioned the thrones, the Apostle depicted the cherubim with a different name, expressing an obscure Hebrew word in Hellenic with a more well-known name. Hearing that God sits on cherubim, the Apostle called these powers the thrones of Him who sits on them. But also the seraphim in Isaiah (Isaiah 6:2), who clearly preached the mystery of the Trinity, when, amazed at the beauty of each Person in the Trinity, they miraculously cried out this word: “holy,” are included in the list of those mentioned, called the word “powers” ​​by the great Paul and even before this by the Prophet David. For he says: “Bless the Lord with all His might, His servants who do His will” (Ps. 102:21). Isaiah, instead of saying: “bless,” wrote the very words of blessing: “Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord of hosts: the whole earth is filled with His glory” (Isaiah 6:3). And that the servants are these forces that do the will of God, the Prophet made this clear in the cleansing of sins, which, by the will of the Sender, was accomplished by one of the seraphim (Isa. 6:6-7). For this is the ministry of these spirits - to be sent to save those who are being saved. This, it seems to me, having understood and learned that the same thing is meant by different names in the two prophets, choosing the most famous saying, the divine Apostle called the seraphim powers, so that the slanderers would not have any pretext to assert that the Holy Spirit, along with one of them, was omitted from the list of creatures. For one thing has been said, according to what has already been proven, but about another it is silent, as this can be learned from what was named by Paul, who numbered the whole creation in the plural number, but mentioned what was named individually in the singular number; because this is characteristic of the Holy Trinity - to be proclaimed singly: one Father, one Son, one Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, everything named by the Apostle is expressed in plurality: “principals, powers, dominions, powers,” so as not to give rise to the assumption that the Holy Spirit is among them. But Paul is silent about the unspeakable, and does this beautifully. For he knew how to hear in paradise “unspeakable verbs” (2 Cor. 12:4), and to refrain from interpreting the inexpressible in words when talking about something lower. 24. The enemies of truth dare to touch the unspeakable greatness of the Spirit, insulting by reducing creatures to baseness, as if they had not heard how God the Word Himself, conveying to the disciples the secret of the knowledge of God, said that in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit the life of those regenerated is accomplished and communicated to them, and through this the Spirit, uniting with the Father and with Himself, excluded from the concept of creation; so that a pious and godly thought about Him is formed, both when Paul, at the mention of creation, remained silent and did not mention the Spirit, and when the Lord, at the mention of the life-giving power, joined the Holy Spirit to the Father and to Himself. Thus, our teaching, guided by Holy Scripture, places the Only Begotten and the Holy Spirit above creation, and, according to the saying of the Savior, suggests contemplating them by faith in the blessed, life-giving and uncreated nature; so that the highest of creation, according to our belief, one in the primacy and throughout perfect nature, in no way admits the concept of a minority, although the leader of the heresy truncates the indefinable by the invention of this minority, as if belittling and reducing the perfection of the Divine essence, when he claims that he sees in it both more and less. Therefore, let us see what Eunomius adds in order to what has been said. After the words that “by necessity it must be assumed that some essences are smaller, and others are greater,” and some are in the first row, due to some difference in size and dignity, elevated to preference, while others are humiliated according to the lowest degree of nature and dignity, he added the following: “They reach such a difference as matters reach; for it is not permissible to call the same action by which God created the angels, or the stars and the sky, or man; but to the extent that some actions are superior and preferable to other actions, another will call one action superior to another, confident that the same actions produce the identity of actions, and different actions indicate different actions.” Therefore, I think that the writer himself could not easily say what exactly he meant by writing this; the meaning of what was said is so obscured by the impenetrability of expression that no one will be able to comfortably consider in this mud what the purpose of those expressing themselves is. For the expression: “they reach such a difference as things reach,” others recognize as the saying of some kind of pagan fable of a soothsayer who confuses words to deceive his listeners. If, following what has been discussed so far, one must guess about what Eunomius wants to prove here, then this is proven: as much as there is a difference between one thing and another, so much will be recognized as a mutual difference in actions. Therefore, what matters are being discussed here cannot be found in what has been said. For if Eunomius speaks of what is visible in creation, then I don’t know what connection this has with the previous one. Since the question is about the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, is it appropriate for Eunomius to speak naturally about earth, water, air, fire, about the varieties of animals, to describe this in words, to depict actions that are older and preferable to other actions, and not without reason to assert that one action is superior to another. If he calls the Only Begotten Son and the Holy Spirit works, then what kind of different actions are he talking about again by which these works were accomplished? And what are those very actions by which others are exceeded? For he did not explain what he meant by ascension, by which one action, as he says, surpasses another; nothing is also said about the nature of actions, but even to this day his speech has not reached anything definite, just as he does not assert that action is something realized, so he does not prove that it is some kind of unrealized movement of the will. For the meaning of what has been said, completely left in the middle between one and the other assumption, is inclined towards each of these concepts. Eunomius adds that it is not permissible to call the same action by which God created the angels or the stars and the sky, or man. Again, by what necessity or connection did I add this to what was said, or what is especially proven by this? Unless actions differ from one another to the extent that there is mutual difference in deeds, this proves that not everything is the work of one and the same thing, but something else is brought into being another. But I don’t see this. From Scripture we learned that everything is the work of One: the sky, the angel, the stars, and man, and everything that is intelligible in creation. The teaching of their dogma asserts that the Son and the Spirit are not the work of one, but just as the Son is the work of action subsequent to the first essence, so the Spirit is again another work of the first work. Therefore, let Eunomius himself or one of the accomplices of his ineffable wisdom say what heaven and man, and angel, and star, now united in a word, have in common with what they affirm. For the wickedness of this is clearly revealed in what has been said, and on what this wickedness is based does not even agree with itself. For it is obvious wickedness to think that in the Holy Trinity there is as much difference as there is in the sky, which embraces all creation, and in one person in number or in one star visible in the sky. The comparison of concepts and the connection of evidence for all this (I affirm this) is incomprehensible to neither me nor, perhaps, the father of blasphemy. If he had reasoned similarly about creation, namely, that the sky is the work of a higher action, and a star is the product of an action subsequent to the sky, and the product of stars is an angel, and an angel is a man, then his speech by comparing similar things would serve somewhat to confirm the dogma. If all this is brought into being by one thing, in which he himself agrees, unless he completely goes against the word of the Scriptures, and determines the origin of the Son and Spirit in some other way, then what does what follows have in common with the previous one? But let us concede that this has something in common with the proof of the difference of essences, because it is desirable for him to prove this by what he says. But let’s listen to how he connected what followed with what was said. “As some deeds,” he says, “are older and preferable to other deeds, so action, as another piously-minded person will say, is superior to action.” If he says this about something that is subject to the senses, then his speech is far from what was supposed, for for someone who assumed to talk about dogmas, what need is there to philosophize about the order of the world and to assert that the highest and lowest actions of the Creator are proportionate to the magnitude of each created thing? And if he is not talking about that and calls the works older and more preferable than other works that he has now invented in dogma, that is, the Son and the Holy Spirit, then it may be better to be indignant at this thought in silence rather than, having entered into a struggle with it, thereby proving, apparently, that it has significance. For how can one find what is preferable where there is nothing disrespectful? If in Eunomius the inclination and readiness for evil has extended to the point that the name and concept of disrespectful presupposes in something that, according to our belief, is in the Holy Trinity, then we must cover our ears and, as much as we can, flee from evil hearing, so that in the listener no communication with impurity occurs, when, as from some vessel full of uncleanness, the word is poured into the hearts of those listening. For how can anyone dare to say anything about the Divine and supreme nature that, in comparison, in the word suggests something less worthy of respect? “Yes, all, it is said, honor the Son as they honor the Father” (John 5:23). Since this saying legitimizes equality, since the divine word is the law, then Eunomius will sweep away both the law and the Lawgiver himself, he gives more honor to one and less honor to the other, I don’t know where he found the measure of the excess of honor. For according to human custom, differences in merit are determined and honors to those who possess, so that the subordinates are not presented in the same and equal form to the kings and lower authorities, but the greater and weaker manifestation of fear and respect in those who are presented shows a lack or excess of honor before the honored ones, and therefore the most preferable can be found by the disposition of the subordinates, when someone is most terrible for their neighbors and, apparently, receives more respect than others. In the Divine nature, since in it all the perfection of goods is revealed, according to the word of God, it is impossible, as far as we understand, to find a method of preference. In Them neither excess nor deficiency of strength, glory, wisdom, philanthropy, or anything generally understood as good is conceivable; on the contrary, all the benefits that the Son has belong to the Father, and everything that belongs to the Father is seen in the Son. How can we be justified, giving great honor to the Father? If royal power is comprehended by understanding according to its dignity, then the Son is the King. If we imagine a judge in our minds, then all judgment belongs to the Son. If our soul is occupied by the greatness of creation, then “all that was” (John 1:3). If we understand the reason for our life, then we know that true life has descended even to our nature. And if we have learned about death from darkness, then we will not fail to recognize the true light by which we have been freed from darkness. But if wisdom seems precious to anyone; then Christ is “God’s power and God’s wisdom” (1 Cor. 1:24). So, since our soul, in justice, as much as possible for it, is so filled with wonder at such and such great miracles of Christ, then what excess of honor can be imagined, primarily given to the Father alone, in whom it would be fitting for the Lord not to have a part? For this very human honoring of the Divine, considered in its proper sense, is nothing other than full of love affection and confession of the good things inherent in Him, and it seems to me that love is prescribed in God’s word when it is said: this is how one should honor the Son, just as the Father is honored. For the law, commanding us to love God with all our hearts and with all our strength, commands us to give Him similar honor; and here the word of God, legitimizing equal love, says this: The Son must be honored as the Father is honored. The great David also performed this method of honor before the Lord; in the preface to one psalmody, confessing that he loved the Lord and listing the reasons for love, he calls God “a strength, a confirmation, a refuge, a deliverer, a God, a helper, a hope, a protector, a horn of salvation,” an intercessor and similar names (Ps. 17:2-3). Therefore, if the Only Begotten Son was not made this for people, then let, according to the law of heresy, the exaggeration of the honor given for this be stopped. If we believe that all this, and what is even higher, is and is called the Only Begotten God, according to every mental representation of a good deed and a good thought, being in equality with the greatness of the goodness that exists in the Father, then how can anyone call it reasonable either not to love such a thing, or not to honor the beloved? For no one will say that love should come from all the heart and with all the strength, and honor from half. Therefore, if the Son is honored with all the heart, because all love is dedicated to Him, then what idea can invent anything greater than this honoring, when the whole heart, as much as it can contain, brings honor to Him as a gift of love? Therefore, it is vain who, when he is venerable by nature, teaches about what is preferable, and with such a comparison stops the thought on what is unworthy of honor. 25. About the creation one can rightly say “this is older”, because the sequence of affairs is shown in the order of days, and about the creation of man another will say “the sky preceded it so much” and measure the time that has passed in the meantime by the distances of days. In the first nature, which is higher than any concept of time and cannot be contained in any intelligible idea, to imagine some things as being ahead of time, others being late, belongs to the now newly revealed wisdom. For He who asserts that the Father is older than the Hypostasis of the Only Begotten asserts nothing else than that the Son himself is younger than what was created by the Son; unless it is true to say that all ages and all temporal distance are produced after the Son and by the Son. And to this (which most exposes the absurdity of the teaching) on ​​the basis of this, not only will some temporary beginning of being be attributed to the Son, but as a result of this they will not spare the Father, and they will claim about Him that he had a beginning in time. For if any indication is attached indicating the birth of the Son, then it will clearly determine the beginning of the Father’s hypostasis. But it is not untimely, perhaps, for the sake of clarity, to examine this teaching more carefully. He who presents as a dogma that the life of the Father is older than the life of the Son, by a certain distance of time, separates the Only Begotten from God who is above all, and about this average distance between Them presupposes that it is something either unlimited, or enclosed within certain limits and defined by obvious signs. But calling Him unlimited does not allow the thought of the environment, which will certainly limit in the mind both the concept of the Father and the concept of the Son; and the mind itself will not understand this environment until the infinite is defined on any side and the concept of the Father from above does not block the continuation of the infinite, and the concept of the Son from below does not stop the infinity, because the very concept of the infinite requires that nature be poured out everywhere and not be limited from anywhere by any limit. Therefore (in the reasoning of the Father and the Son, may the concept of being remain firm and immutable!) There will be no possibility of imagining this distance as limitless; On the contrary, by all necessity, they imagine the Only Begotten at a certain distance from the Father. And this, as I affirm, means that according to this teaching, God who is above all is not from eternity, but began from a certain point in time. This is my thought that I say; To explain it with known examples, so that through the visible the unknown may also become clear to us, I will add: according to the Mosaic Scripture, affirming that after heaven on the fifth day man was created, with this word, without saying it out loud, we also affirm that five days before this there was no heaven; Thus, what happens after something by the distance of time preceding it determines the existence of that which is mentally imagined to have happened before. If we have not sufficiently clarified our thought with this example, then we can present what we mean differently, saying that the law was given through Moses after four hundred and thirty years from the promise to Abraham. If, having returned from the law and flowed through the time preceding it in thought, we reach the limit of the named number of years, then we will clearly understand that until this time the promise of God had not yet existed. And a lot can be said similar to this, but I refuse to list all this one by one, since this is a boring matter. Therefore, in view of what has been said in the examples, let us examine the question at hand. And it is the following: about the hypostases of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, should we assert that, according to the opinion of opponents, one is older and younger than the other? Therefore, when, having passed beyond the birth of the Son, as the heretical teaching is expressed, we then proceed to the average distance, which is assumed in the unfounded opinion of those who teach this teaching and assert that there is a certain distance between the Father and the Son, then, if we reach that extreme point by which the heretics delimit the intermediate distance, then we find there the life of the God of all standing above, so that before this point, of necessity, a something where one must believe there is no eternally existing God. If you still doubt, then again we will make this idea clear with the help of examples. For as on two rulers, when one is shorter and the other is longer, having equalized their bases, we recognize the excess at the upper ends, because by applying the end of the smaller ruler, we see from it what the excess is in the one that is longer, and we find what is lacking in the one that is shorter, equating the remainder to the end of the larger one to some measure; whether it be a cubit or another value by which the larger ruler is not equal to the smaller one; So, if, according to opponents, there is any excess of the life of the Father over the life of the Son, then, of course, it consists of a certain certain distance; It is not (on this that opponents will necessarily agree, for even the enemies of the truth confess that the Father and the Son are equally immortal) not in excess of continuation; on the contrary, this difference is imagined at the upper limit, the life of the Son is not equal to the life of the Father, but by the extension of life expanding the concept of the Father. So, since the distance is determined by the two ends; then, of course, out of all necessity, and in the distance they invented, two points are taken to designate the ends. Therefore, just as one part, according to them, has its beginning in the birth of the Only Begotten, so the other part will certainly end with another certain limit by which the corresponding distance limits itself. Therefore, let them say for themselves what this limit is, if they are not ashamed to follow their own words. But there is no doubt in this thought, namely, that to one part of the distance they have invented they will not find another part, unless some beginning is certainly presupposed to the unborn, after which they mentally take the middle for the birth of the Son. Therefore, we affirm: whoever says that by some extended continuation the Son is later than the life of the Father, he also gives to the Father a certain beginning of existence, described by an fictitious average distance, and in this case, as a result of such an argument, this notorious ungeneracy of the Father will turn out to be concealed by the very defenders of ungeneracy, since they say that the unborn God does not always exist, but they claim that from a certain beginning He had the beginning of existence; for He who has the beginning of being is not without beginning. If, in any case, it is necessary to confess the originlessness of the Father, then do not inquire about any definite indication of the beginning of the life of the Son, from which, having begun being, He is separated from the life that is on the other side of this indication; but it is enough to imagine that the Father is before the Son in the sense of only a cause, without assuming that the life of the Father was separate and special at some time before the birth of the Son, so that with this concept there does not come along some idea of the duration, until the appearance of the Son, measured by the life of the One who gave birth, the necessary consequence of which will be the assumption of some beginning in the life of the Father, at which the fictional duration of time will stop, while the Father was not the Father, extending upward and defining the beginning of what they mentally imagine the previous life of the Father. But confessing that which is from the Father, although it may seem bold, we do not deny that it is with the Father, guided to this concept by Scripture. For hearing from wisdom about the brightness of eternal light (Heb. 1, 3), together with eternity, we contemplate the radiance of the primordial light, both imagining the reason for the radiance, and not allowing for eldership. And thus the teaching of piety is preserved among us: the Son does not lack the highest part of life, and the eternity of the Father is not diminished by the assumption of a certain beginning in the Son. 26. But some of the opponents of this position will say, perhaps, that the creation, as is recognized, has a beginning, but what was created is not thought to be coeternal with the Creator and does not, with its own beginning, introduce definition into the indefinable life of God, as the study of the Son and the Father showed the inconsistency in this. And therefore one must either recognize creation as co-eternal with God, or fearlessly assert about the Son that He is later than the Father. For the idea of ​​distance turns out to be equally incongruous when it is applied from the creature to the Creator. But the one who makes such an objection, perhaps not accurately understanding the meaning of the dogma, disputes what was said with the help of something that is alien to what was proposed and has nothing in common with it. For if he had pointed out something higher than creation and having the beginning of realization at some distant point, and this was recognized by everyone as possible, that is, that the concept of the passage of time was conceivable before creation, then perhaps the objector would have an opportunity to try to refute the eternity of the Only Begotten, which has been previously stated, with such arguments. Since, according to the general verdict of all the pious, it is recognized that, if we take all creatures, then some came into being by creation, and others were before creation, and we believe that the Divine nature is not created, and, as the word of piety teaches, in Him one thing is a cause, another has a Hypostasis inseparably from the cause, while the creature is seen in a certain extended distance, then the entire temporal order and series of created things is encompassed by centuries, the pre-eternal nature avoided these differences - being older or younger - because in the Divine and blessed life nothing is seen that the mind actually sees in creation. For every creature, as it is said, brought into being in a certain succession in order, is measured by the distance of centuries; and if someone, through the series of created things, ascends with reason to the beginning of what was brought into being, then he will limit his research to the foundation of centuries. The essence superior to creation, as far from any idea of ​​continuation, escaped the entire temporal series, from any similar beginning, in any way found according to any order, without approaching any limit or without concluding its course with this limit. For whoever passes centuries and everything that has happened in them, the contemplation of the Divine nature, appearing to his thoughts like some vast sea, does not give any sign in itself indicating any beginning, no matter how far he stretches his intelligible imagination, so that he who inquires about something that is older than centuries, and ascends to the beginning of things, cannot stop at anything with his thoughts, because what he is looking for always runs away and the inquisitiveness of the mind nowhere indicates a place to stop. But this teaching is clear to anyone who has delved into the nature of beings, namely, that nothing can be a measure of the Divine and blessed life, for it is not in time, but time is from it; the creature certainly strives from some recognized beginning towards its own goal, walking temporary distances; so one can, as Solomon says somewhere, discern its “beginning and end and middle” (Wis. 7:18), temporal divisions meaning a series of events occurring in it. But the highest and blissful life, since it is not accompanied by any extension, has nothing to measure or embrace it. For everything created, limited by its own measures, as the wisdom of the Creator pleases, as if by some limit, is encompassed by a decent measure, as much as it is necessary for the well-being of the universe. Therefore, although due to the weakness of the human mind it is not possible to interpret what is seen in creation, it is certain that everything is brought to perfection by the power of the Creator and is within the limits inherent in creation. The power that creates beings, which describes in itself the nature of the created, does not itself have an embracer; every thought that strives to ascend to the beginning of divine life lies within itself, exceeding any measure of inquisitiveness and curiosity that intensifies to reach the limit in the definable. For every ascent of the mind above the ages, and reaching into the distance, will only rise to such an extent that one can see the unsearchableness of what is sought, and apparently, as if the measure and limit of the movement and activity of human thoughts are time and being in time, and what is higher than this remains incomprehensible and inaccessible to reason, pure from everything that can approach human understanding. For in that which is not represented by a form, a place, a magnitude, a measure of time, or anything else intelligible, in that the comprehending power of the mind, seeking what it can take up, of necessity, as akin and close to itself, will seek time and creation in time, since the incomprehensible nature eludes it everywhere. Anyone who has delved into beings at all knows, I think, that the Creator of all things, having founded the eyelids and a place in them, like a container that receives what has been created, already creates everything in them; because it is impossible for anything that has come or comes into being through creation to have existence other than in place and time. Nature, having no need for anything, is eternal, containing within itself all beings - neither in place nor in time. It is before them and above them; according to the ineffable law, by faith alone it is contemplated in Itself, not measured by centuries, not flowing over time, but stopped on Itself, established in Itself, not contemplated together with the past and not with the future. With Him and outside of Him there is nothing of which, as the passage continues, one is already passing, another will pass. For these accidents are characteristic of creatures whose life is divided according to the division of time for hope and for memory. In this same high and blissful power, in which everything is always present as the present, it is seen that the expected certainly possesses a comprehensive power. Therefore, She is the very essence in which, as the Apostle says, “all things are made up in Him” (Col. 1:17), and we, each especially partaking of existence, “live and move and are” (Acts 17:28); It is above every beginning, does not represent signs of its own nature, and is known only from what cannot be comprehended. For its most intrinsic feature is that its nature is above any idea of ​​distinctive properties. Therefore, the creature, since it does not have the same meaning with the uncreated, does not enter into comparison and communication with the Creator on this very basis, that is, on the difference of essences, and because in itself it borrows its own representative type of nature, which has nothing in common with what it came from. The divine nature, as alien to all signs, especially those seen in creation, leaves temporal divisions below itself, I mean: “elder”, “younger”, and all local notions, so that the word “above” is not spoken of Him in the proper sense. For everything that is intelligible about uncreated power is the very height and beginning and holds the meaning of what is said in the most proper sense. So, since what has been said has been made certain that the Only Begotten Son and the Spirit of God are not among creation, but on the contrary, one must believe that They are above creation, then perhaps creation, through the curiosity of those who are intensifying to find something similar to this, will be comprehended at some special beginning, and what is above creation will not become in the least accessible to knowledge, because there is no sign in it indicating before the ages. Therefore, if in the uncreated nature wonderful Persons and names appear: Father, Son and Holy Spirit, then is it possible for the inquisitive, inquisitive mind, which it comprehends in the earthly, comparatively basing one on the other according to some distance of time, also to recognize the essence as uncreated and pre-eternal, in which the Father is without beginning, ungenerated and is always mentally represented as the Father; and from Him the Only Begotten Son is continuously and inseparably imagined together with the Father; through the Son and with Him, before thought encounters any emptiness and unrealized environment, the Holy Spirit is immediately and unitedly comprehended no later than the Son in being, so that the Only Begotten was once intelligible without the Spirit; but He is also from the God of all, and having as the cause of being that same thing from which the Only Begotten is the light that shone from the true light, is not separated by any distance or otherness of nature from the Father or from the Only Begotten. For in the eternal nature there is no distance, and no difference is essentially possible, because it is impossible to imagine the difference between the uncreated and the uncreated; and the Holy Spirit is not created, as has been proved in the preceding words. Since this is how everyone understands this, accepting the simple meaning of a simply expressed sermon, would it be appropriate to attempt to dissolve the union of the Son with the Father based on the concept of creation, as if there were some necessity for the creature to be co-eternal, or to admit that the Son was born after? For the birth of the Only Begotten was not in the continuation of centuries, and creation was not before centuries, and therefore in no way should one divide the unextended nature into parts and introduce a certain mental interval into the creative cause of everything, saying: He who gave existence to everything once had no existence. So, the word said before is true, that with the ungeneracy of the Father the eternity of the Only Begotten in generation is also imagined. And if anyone allows any intermediate distance by which the birth of the Son is cut off from the life of the Father, then this will determine the beginning of the life of God who exists above all, which is absurd. But the creature, which by its own nature is something different from the Creator, nothing prevents the mind from imagining that it has some special beginning of its own, but what we have said is in no way similar to the most pure and eternal nature. To say that from non-existent things or, as the Apostle says, “from things that are not revealed” (Heb. 11:3) the heavens or the earth, or anything else visible among creatures, came into being does not do any dishonor to the Creator of all things, since we have learned from the Divine Scripture that creatures do not exist from eternity and will not endure forever. If something of what, according to your belief, is in the Holy Trinity is recognized as not existing eternally with the Father, but on the contrary, according to heretical teaching, someone comes up with the idea of ​​depriving God who is above all of Him for a time of the glory of the Son and the Holy Spirit, then nothing else will turn out, but only that God, according to the heretical teaching, is far from all good, from everything that is actually and conceptually divine. But if the Father, who exists before the ages, is eternally glorious, and the glory of the Father is the eternal Son, and likewise the glory of the Son is the Spirit of Christ, eternally contemplated together with the Son and the Father, then from where, and from what teaching does this sage borrow, affirm that among those who exist not in time there is the oldest and among those who are venerable by nature the most venerable, comparatively placing one above the other, and preferring one to dishonor the others? For, without a doubt, it is obvious where this distinction of venerability leads. 27. What does Eunomius add to what has been said, and what follows? “The same actions,” he says, “produce the sameness of actions, and different actions indicate different actions.” Excellently, this timid one proceeded to an irresistible defense of his word! “The same actions,” he says, “produce the sameness of actions.” Therefore, let us verify what has been said with deeds. The effect of fire in warming is one; Let's see, what kind of agreement do things have? Copper melts, clay hardens, wax burns out; other animals, if they are on fire, die, but the salamander multiplies; cotton burns, stone flax is washed away in the flame, as in water. Such is the identity of deeds from one action! And the sun? Isn’t it the same thing, and isn’t it with one and the same power, warming everything equally, that one of the plants grows and the other dries up, changing the end of the action in accordance with the power that is subject to it? What grows on a stone dries it out, but what grows in deep soil increases its size a hundredfold. And if you delve into the affairs of nature and see how many multi-artistic things it produces in bodies, then you will understand even more the prudence of those who claim that one and the same action produces an identity of works: the cause of conception is one action, but the composition of what is built inside is diverse, so that no one will be able to easily enumerate the differences in qualities in the body. Again, one action in infants is sucking milk, but can any word depict the various works of such writing? As if through a pipe, it diverges from the mouth into the separating ducts; the transformative power of nature carries milk to it in accordance with each member, breaking up the food into thousands of varieties through digestion, and in proportion to the need of each member transforming it into something homogeneous with it. For the beating and blood veins, brain, meninges, bone marrow, bones, sensitive veins, ligaments, dry veins, flesh, appearance, cartilage, fat, hair, nails, sweat, perspiration, phlegm, bile and everything else that is unnecessary and unsuitable depend on the same reason. And if you rename the members, and instrumental, and sensitive, and everything else that fills the bodily composition, then in relation to food, with the same action, this changes into so many different things. And if anyone pays attention to the arts, then in them he will find what has been studied about dogma; for in every art those who do something with their hands mostly see the same action, I mean the same movement of the hands. But let's see what the works have in common? What, for example, is common in building a church and preparing clothes, while in both cases art works by moving the hand? Someone moves the hand and breaks the wall; it is moved by someone who digs a well, and extracts metal from the earth, and a person is given over to death; all this is a matter of hand movements; and a warrior in battle defeats enemies with his hand, and a farmer with his hand again softens a block of earth with the help of a spade. Therefore, how does our founder of dogmas assert that the same actions produce the sameness of deeds? But if we assume that there is some truth in what has been said, then this further confirms the affinity in essence of both the Son and the Father, and the Spirit and the Son. For if there were any difference in actions, so that the Father acted differently, and the Son acted differently according to his discretion, then it would be fair to conclude from the difference in the actions about the difference in the essence that acted in each action. If in some way the Father acts, in a similar way the Son also creates everything, according to the word of the Lord Himself and at the request of reason (because one acts not incorporeally, but another with the help of a body, not from one substance, and from another, not at another time and not in another place does what is pleasing to him, and the differences in the instruments themselves do not make a difference, but one movement of the will and the aspiration of arbitrariness, which accompanies and accompanies in bringing beings into existence, is enough the power that accomplishes everything), and in everything, both the Father, “from whom are all things,” and the Son, “who are all things,” act in the same way in all things (1 Cor. 8:6), then why does this Eunomius, from the difference in the action of the Father and the Son, separating them one from the other, think to prove the difference of the Son and the Spirit in essence? For, as we said, this turns out to be the opposite, because in the Father and the Son no kind of difference in actions is seen; and that there is no gradualness in the essences of the Son and the Spirit, this is revealed from the identity of the fulfilling power, as our word and the testimony of this writer confirms, so read literally: “as actions,” he says, “produce the sameness of deeds.” Therefore, if the identity of works is produced by the sameness of actions, and, according to them, the work of the Father is the Son, and the Son is the Holy Spirit, then the uniformity of the actions of the Father and the Son will, without a doubt, prove the identity of the producing essence. Eunomius adds: “different deeds show different actions.” Therefore, let us consider again this, in which the firmness of this position consists, and, if you wish, we will present clear examples of this. Is it not one act of command by His sole will, Who brought to pass the whole world and everything in the world? “As He spoke, and He commanded, and He was created” (Ps. 149:5). Wasn’t the command equally fulfilled in everything, and wasn’t a single will sufficient to bring into being the non-existent? Why, when the consequence of one action, which consisted in a command, is seen to be so much difference: Eunomius, as if not seeing what happened, says that the difference in deeds proves the difference in action? On the contrary, everything in the world should be monotonous if, according to the founder of dogmas, the difference in actions reveals a difference in actions. Or does he see all this as similar and only sees dissimilarity in the Father and the Son? So, if you didn’t pay attention before, let him now look at the difference in the elements, and at how in the world every thing that is part of the whole is by nature directed towards the opposite. Some are light and usually strive upward, others are heavy and ready to fall down; one is always motionless, the other is constantly moving; and from the movable, others have an unchangeable movement, in one direction, such as the sky and the moving stars, the flow of which always returns to its previous path; and others, being spilled everywhere, always rush wherever they happen, such as the air, the sea and all the nature of the liquid essence. What can anyone say about the resistance of warm to cold, or about the difference between wet and dry, about the distance between upper and lower? How many natural differences do animals have? And what human word can enumerate the varieties of plants by type and size, but also by fruits and qualities? 28. But this sage proves to us that for different deeds and actions are different, either without yet recognizing the image of Divine action about which Scripture speaks, that by the word of command everything was “created,” or remaining blind to the discernment of the differences in created things; and telling us so without caution, he establishes the law on divine dogmas, perhaps without having heard from anyone else, that everything that is affirmed decisively, if not in general, then in the discussion of a known subject, must be indisputable and generally accepted. And whoever freely dogmatically asserts something in which none of the prudent people agrees with him, is in no way different from those who tell dreams or fables at a feast. And since there is such incomprehension in what Eunomius said, just as those who recognize it as valid that in a sleepy dream they see something that worries them in reality, ardently become attached to what does not exist in reality and believe that they have what they want, because the desire for the visible confirms this with a deceptive vision, so Eunomius, as a result of this dream-like imprint of dogmas, dreamed that what he says is valid, asserts that it is really so and thereby tries to prove the rest. This place in Eunomius is worth bringing here; literally it reads like this: “since this is really so, and an indispensable connection is maintained by the mutual relationship of one to the other, then those who carry out research in an order akin to things and do not try to mix and merge everything together, if any doubt is raised about the essence, it is necessary from the first and directly belonging to the actions of the essence to produce certification in what is being proven and the resolution of the doubt, and to resolve the doubt about the actions from the essences.” 29. So, I think that to demonstrate the absurdity of what was said, the very words of impiety are sufficient. For just as one who depicts in words a face disfigured by suffering will best show the disease by removing the veils, so that those looking at what is visible will not have to recognize anything in the verbal image, so for those who are capable of seeing with their souls, I think it is sufficient for the ugliness and distortion of the heretical teaching to be revealed through one reading. But since, like a finger, pointing a pointing word at the rottenness of the teaching, it is necessary to more clearly present for many the harm that lies in the teaching, then I will repeat again in order what has been said. “Because,” he says, “this is really so.” What is the dreamer expressing? What is "this"? And what does “so” mean? That the one actually so-called and superior essence is the essence of the Father; and therefore, without a doubt, the one following it is not actually called that way, and even less so is the third essence; This is what he decreed by law in what was said! Is it because the first essence is followed by a certain action, the product and work of which is the Only Begotten Son, bound by the measure of the action of Him who produced Him? Or is it because the essences seem to be smaller and larger, because they are somehow contained in one another, and the smaller is embraced by the larger, as happens with vessels that are put into each other, as a result of which Eunomius sees as larger and smaller those essences that do not have an end and limit limiting them? Or is it because the differences of creatures show the signification and creators, so that it is impossible for different creatures to come from identical actions? So, is it possible that someone’s soul’s senses are immersed in such a deep sleep that, having heard such teachings, they immediately agree with those who say: “Because this is so, and in relation to each other an inextricable connection is observed in this.” For, I think, it is a sign of complete insanity in the mind to say something like this, and without research to listen to those who claim that, through mutual relations, some kind of connection corrects the dissimilarity in nature that is separated from each other. For, according to our understanding, it is connected either by essence, and in this case, by mutual relation, it maintains an inextricable connection, or it is separated from one another by the signification of nature, as he thinks. And in what is alien to each other, what relation of connection can be found that maintains continuity? What kind of order is this, akin to things, according to which Eunomius legitimizes research? If he had before his eyes the teaching of truth and, as a result, reasoned about the difference concerning one order in what constitutes the subject of belief in the Holy Trinity, then, since this, as Eunomius says, akin order makes the distinction of hypostases not united, so that they are recognized as having communication in essence, and separated according to the concept of hypostasis, and Eunomius, of course, would not be counted among the opponents, saying something that we would also defend. Now his entire work, tending towards the opposite, makes it difficult to understand the order he understands here. There is a very large difference between that which is voluntary and that which involuntarily, by some natural necessity, reaches the end. Warmth is natural to fire, lightness to a ray, flow to water, falling down to a stone; and many similar examples can be cited. But if someone has built a house, or taken over the management, or started a trade, or undertaken some other occupation, and, having thought about the matter and prepared for it, then it cannot be said about him in the proper sense that in what he has done there is some kind of order akin to this, because according to the desire of the one who chooses and with the benefit of the work being done, order is introduced by the producers of each case. So, since here the heretical teaching separates the Son from his natural attribute with the Father, and the same thought is held about the Spirit, as alienated from unity with the Son and the Father, and throughout the entire work it is proven that the Son is the work of the Father, and the Spirit is the work of the Son, yet these are works of will, and not works of nature, then why does Eunomius determine that the work of the will is a certain related order of affairs? I don’t know what Eunomius meant in this work: was it that the God of all, having created this nature of the Son and the Holy Spirit, created such a gradualness of essences that one is subordinate to the other? And if he understands this, then why didn’t he explain what was said, on what basis does he imagine that he knows this about God, as if His great power is revealed in the smallness of deeds? But who will agree to this, that in the smallness of works a great reason and power is seen, and will not say, on the contrary, that He could not give perfection to everything that came from Him? And how will Eunomius testify that the highest and in the most proper sense intelligible superiority belongs to God, if he proves that power is less than will? Or will he say that by descent from Him there is no reason for perfection, so that, of course, honor and glory would not be diminished by the superiority of what is honored? But who is so pitiful that he does not imagine the divine and blessed nature to be pure from the passion of envy? Therefore, what is a plausible reason for the God of all to establish order for the Only Begotten and the Spirit? But this is not from God of all sorts, he says. From whom else, if in those who are related by nature there is no sense of an order akin to them? But perhaps he calls the lower degree of essence in the Son and Spirit akin to order? However, I need to find out the reason for this very thing, why the Son is diminished in essence, while essence and action are recognized with equal, even the same, signs and distinctive properties. If the concepts of essence and action are not the same, but what is meant by both words is different, then why are the proofs of what is sought borrowed from something foreign and foreign? If someone, when they are curious to know about the human essence, asks whether a person is a funny animal or not capable of learning grammar, he will take as proof of what is presented the structure of a house or a ship made by the builder of one or the other, then he will confirm this with such a wise word: we know essences by actions; the house and the ship are the action of man, and from this we conclude, being slow-witted, that man is an animal with blunt nails and funny, - to such an answer another will say: the question was not whether man has any kind of movement and action, but about what is by nature the action itself - this is what I especially need to learn from the answer. If I wanted to know something about the wind, then by pointing to a pile of sand blown by the wind, or a pile of straw, or raised dust, you would not give a useful answer to the question, because you have a different concept about the wind, and instead of what you are looking for, you point to something else. Therefore, how does Eunomius prove essences by actions and represents the basis of the being of the being itself from what the being produces? Then let us consider this: what is the work of the Father, by which, says Eunomius, the essence of the one who acted is comprehended? Of course, he will name the Son if he speaks normally. But the Son, according to your reasoning, the wisest, being measured by the action that produced Him, points to one thing; but what is sought nevertheless remains unknown, unless the action, as you have attested, is something subsequent to the first essence, because, as you say, it extends to the same extent as the deed accomplished by it, and in the work the action is not revealed to be what it is by nature, but only to the extent that it is seen in the deed. For just as in a coppersmith not all his strength was mobilized to make a drill, but in what proportion was required to make the projectile, such was the art of the craftsman, who has the ability to produce many different things, acted, so the measure of action is shown in himself by who he produced. But our question is not about the quantity of action, but about the very essence of the action. On the same basis, if he says that through the Spirit (and by the Spirit he calls the work of the Son of the subsequent action) the nature of the Only Begotten is comprehended, then there is no consistency in His word, because here again the action extends no further than the work, and does not show by what is produced what the nature is both of himself and of the one doing it. But in order not to argue about this, we agree that essences are known by actions. So, the first essence is known by its work, and the second essence is also shown by the work it does. Therefore, tell me, sage, about the third, what serves as its indication? No such thing is seen in the third entity. If essences are comprehended, as you say, by actions, then you will have to admit that the nature of the Spirit is incomprehensible, without having a similar action immediately following It, from which, if we stop here, one could conclude about the nature of the Spirit. Therefore, either show some essential work of the Spirit, by which, as you say, the essence of the Spirit is comprehended, or your entire web will disintegrate at the touch of the word. For if, according to your understanding, the essence is known by the immediately following action, and the Spirit does not have any essential action, while the work of the Father calls the Son, and the work of the Son - the Spirit, then this admits that the nature of the Spirit, of course, is unknowable and incomprehensible, as not detectable by any action, mentally represented by the hypostasis. If the Spirit avoids comprehension, then how is the essence comprehended, exceeding what is not comprehended? For if the work of the Son, who, as they say, is the Spirit, is not knowable, then, of course, the Son cannot be known, hidden behind the lack of knowledge of Him who should be a testimony to Him. And if in this case the essence of the Only Begotten is hidden, then the “highest and properly so-called” essence will be revealed as the hidden essence, when the ignorance of the Spirit is in reverse order through the Son transmitted to the Father; and from this and from the testimony of our enemies, it is clearly revealed that the essence of the Father is completely incomprehensible? Therefore, on what basis does this seer, seeing the non-existent, and the very nature of the unmanifested and incomprehensible, see one through the other and commands us to see, asserting that by deeds essences are comprehended, and by essences deeds? But let’s consider the continuation of the speech. “Doubts about actions,” says Eunomius, “should be resolved by essence.” Is it possible for someone to rid him of these empty assumptions? Doubts about actions, he thinks, can be resolved by comprehending essences! How does the doubtful through the incomprehensible lead to faith? For if the essence is comprehended, then what is the need to be curious about actions, as if by them we will be led to the comprehension of what we are looking for? If the study of action is necessary because we are guided by it to the knowledge of the essence that produces it, then how can a nature that is not yet known by us be able to resolve doubts about actions? The proof of every doubtful thing is borrowed from what is generally accepted. And when both are equally unknown in what is sought, how, according to Eunomius, are things in themselves unknown comprehended one through the other? When there is confusion about the essence of the Father, he argues, what is sought becomes clear from the action that follows the Father and the deed performed by him. And again, when asked what is the essence of the Only Begotten, Whom Eunomius calls sometimes the action, sometimes the product of the action (for he uses both words), according to the essence of the one who produced, he says, it is not difficult to resolve the confusion about the Only Begotten. 30. I would also like to know from Eunomius the following: is it about God’s nature alone that he asserts that the perplexity about agents is resolved by the active essence, or regarding every thing for which there is a certain creative power, by the essence of the creator he knows the nature of the created? If such a teaching is taught about the one power of God, then let Eunomius show how he resolves bewilderment about the works of God by the nature of the One who did it. For here is the undoubted work of God - heaven, earth, sea, the whole world. Let one presumably ask about the essence of any one of those enumerated, and let the sky be offered to the view of reason. So, since the essence of heaven is doubtful due to the various opinions about it, the natural philosophers who reasoned differently about it, as it seemed to everyone, then how will speculation about the Creator of heaven give us a solution to the bewilderment about what we are looking for? The Creator is immaterial, invisible, has no visible image, is not born, abides forever, remains inaccessible to decay, transformation, change and everything that is similar. Therefore, how will one who has acquired such a concept of the Creator be brought to the knowledge of the nature of heaven? How can one understand what is visible from what is invisible, what is subject to corruption from what is incorruptible, what is ungenerated from existence that has taken place in time, from what is eternal - what has received its temporary existence, and from everything that is opposite will form an idea of ​​what is sought? Let him who delve into beings say this with precision, let him say how things that are dissimilar in nature can be cognized by one through the other. But by the very same thing that Eunomius says, if he had been able to remain true to his own word, he would have been brought into agreement with church dogma. For if the nature of the Creator shows what He created, as he says, and the Son, according to their own words, is the work of the Father, then, of course, he who understood the nature of the Father knew through Him the nature of the Only Begotten, if only the nature of the one who acted served as an indication of what was produced. 31. Just as through this very inequality the Only Begotten is removed from the affairs of providence, let birth not be the subject of inquisitive research, and thus let the inequality of the Only Begot not be exposed with effort. For even the difference of wills is enough to reveal the otherness of nature. Since the first essence, as even our opponents agree with us, is simple, it is necessary to imagine the will that accompanies nature. And just as good will is proven by providence, it also proves the goodness of nature, which has will; and since the Father alone does good, but the Son does not have the will to do so (I say presumably for the sake of opponents), then the difference in essence will be obvious, evidenced by the difference of will. If the Father provides for everything, then the Son also provides for everything; for what the Father sees creating, “the Son also does likewise” (John 5:19), then this identity of will, of course, indicates the commonality of nature in those who have the same will. Why is the concept of providence not valued, no matter how little it contributes to the solution of the issue, although our word is confirmed by many examples encountered in life - I mean examples known to everyone? Anyone who has seen the light of fire and experienced its calorific power, if he approaches another such light and another similar heat, will obviously be led to the concept of fire, which by the similarity of the phenomena is led to the idea of ​​the affinity of the nature that produced these phenomena; for what is not fire does not produce everything that is characteristic of fire. So, if we see in the Father and in the Son, similar and equal, the same law of providence, then, based on what has reached our knowledge, we guess about something that exceeds our understanding, which is not alien by nature, known from equal and similar works. For, in whatever mutual relation the external signs of each thing consist, so, of necessity, do these very subjects relate to each other. And if outwardly the signs are opposite to each other, then, of course, the things that are revealed by these signs should also be recognized as opposite. And if the signs are the same, then the things are not opposite. And the Lord says in the parable that fruits are signs of the nature of trees, so that the fruits do not differ contrary to the nature of the trees, and bad trees do not have good fruits, and vice versa, good trees have bad fruits; “By their fruits, it is said, the trees are known” (Matthew 7:20). Thus, since the fruit of providence has no difference at all, we see one nature that has grown these fruits, although the fruit falls from different trees. Therefore, due to what is known to our understanding (we know the rational principle of providence, equally seen in both the Father and the Son), both the similarity in nature and the the community of the Only Begotten with the Father, recognizable by the identity of the fruits of providence. 32. But, so that they do not think this, Eunomius, as if forced by some necessity, says that he leaves reasoning about the affairs of providence, and turns to the image of birth, “because,” he says, “the image of birth will follow the image of likeness.” What convincing arguments! How strongly this abundance of Eunomius’ art in the word makes us agree with what was said! The image of birth, says Eunomius, will be followed by the image of likeness. How much art and prudence there is in this position! Therefore, if the image of birth is known, the image of likeness will also be revealed. Therefore, since all or the majority of animals born carnally have the same image of birth, and the image of birth, according to the teaching of the Eunomians, will be followed by an image of likeness, then all those born in the same way will, of course, be in a similar relationship to those born alike. So, if the image of birth, as the heretical word says, likens what is born to itself, and this image, despite the many different varieties of animals, does not differ in any way among them, but for the most part is the same, then it turns out that the general, without any limitation, position made, due to similar birth, represents everyone as similar to each other: man, dog, camel, mouse, elephant, leopard and all other animals that are usually born in a similar way. Or does Eunomius not call all those born alike similar to each other, but means the similarity of each one born with the one from whom he is born? But if he wanted to express this, he had to call what was born like to the one giving birth, and not the image of likeness - to the image of birth. But although this is true, and is seen in nature, namely, that what is born is homogeneous with the one who gives birth, it is not accepted so unconditionally that there is nothing to turn into an objection to the position. For if he says that what is born is like the one who gives birth, then everything that Eunomius has so carefully composed about the dissimilarity of essences will be vain and untenable. Now he says that the image of birth will be followed by the image of similarity; this will not turn out to be completely incomprehensible for those who know how to accurately analyze the basis of thought? For he who hears the expression “image of birth” will be in great difficulty as to what he should understand. Is Eunomius talking about the external appearance of the person giving birth? Or about direction, or about location, or about place, or about time? Or that the embryo is perfected by conception? Or is it mentioned about the places of origin themselves? Or is he not talking about this, but about something else related to before birth? And how do we find out the meaning of what was said? For the imprecision and obscurity of the phrase “image” leads us to doubt the signified, because all meanings equally come to mind, and each equally has no connection with the subject. And also, what we call an image of similarity, we imagine to be alien to any meaning, meaning examples that are known to everyone from custom. For what is born is not likened to the type or image of birth; procreation in carnal birth is a separation of the body, bringing out a living being brought to perfection by formation in the womb; and what is born is either a man, or a horse, or an ox, or whatever it is that is brought into being by birth. How, therefore, the image of the likeness of the one born will follow the image of birth, let Eunomius himself say this, or if someone else learned the art of midwifery from him. For the other is generation and the other that comes from generation, and the concepts of both are different. And therefore, what was said by Eunomius and in the reasoning of those born according to the flesh is false, no one with understanding will contradict this. If Eunomius calls making and preparing a thing the image of its birth, which, according to him, follows the image of the likeness of the one being born, then even in this case his word is far from justice. Let's look at this in the following examples. Under the blows, iron is transformed, transforming it into something useful for life. So, if you take a chisel, then in what way its external appearance is similar to the hand of a craftsman or the way of preparation, for example, hammers, coals, bellows, anvil, with the help of which the maker brought it into this form, no one is able to say. But what was said in the discussion of one example has an application to everything that is produced through any kind of production, namely: what is produced is in no way similar to the image of the work. For what does a clothing store have in common with a spindle or a spinning wheel, or a shuttle, or in general with the way of preparing fabric? or at the bench - with wood lining, or at some other work - with the appearance of someone working? But I think even the opponents themselves will agree that this position has no force in the sensual and physical. It remains to be seen whether this adds something to the composition of blasphemy. So what did you need to know? How should we confess about the Son, whether He is similar or not similar in essence to the Father? Since, says Eunomius, it is impossible to catch up with this from the concepts of providence, he turned to the image of birth in order to learn from this not that the one who is born is similar to the one who gave birth, but that he has some image of similarity. And as many do not know this, Eunomius goes into interpretation about the essence that gave birth. Why does he already forget about his own definitions, in which he says that essences must be knowable from deeds? And then, since about the born essence, which he calls the work of the highest essence, it is not yet revealed what it is by nature, why does he, having bypassed, in his own words, the lowest and therefore most accessible to the concept of seekers, takes up the essence, in the very proper sense, the so-called highest? And proving in his words that he knows the divine sayings exactly, now he shows little respect for them, as if not knowing that it is only possible to come to the knowledge of the Father only by approaching him through the Son. For it is said: “No one knows the Father, but only the Son, and to him, if the Son wills, are revealed” (Matthew 11:27). On the contrary, Eunomius, when he intends to ridicule the pious and godly concepts of the Only Begotten, asserts without any evidence that He is less, and in the doctrine he invented about the knowledge of the divine, without noticing it, he proves that He is greater; as soon as the essence of the Father, recognizing it as more accessible to understanding, through it attempts to track down and understand the nature of the Son. 33. He ascends to the essence of the one who gave birth and through it examines the born, because, as he says, the natural dignity of the one who gave birth is shown by the image of the birth. And this position, again throwing the questioner’s thought simply and vaguely, leads to it being equally extended to everything. For such is the property of universal definitions that their meaning must apply to everything, and nothing is excluded from the comprehensive verdict. So, if the image of birth is certainly made known by the natural dignity of the one who gives birth, but there are many who give birth to differences in dignity and, moreover, understood by him in many senses (for a Jew, a Greek, a barbarian, a Scythian, a slave, a freeman is born), then what is this proving? The fact is that as much as there are differences in natural merits in those who give birth, so many, but in all likelihood, there will be images of birth, so that birth is not carried out in the same way for everyone, but with the merits of those who give birth, the natures change, and for each of those born, according to the difference in merits, a special certain image of birth must be invented. For in any individual being, certain virtues akin to it are certainly seen, but differing from one another in the degree of perfection or imperfection; so that everyone will have a family, rank, faith, fatherland, power, slavery, wealth, poverty, freedom, subordination, everything that produces everyday differences in merit. Therefore, if the natural dignity of the one who gives birth, as Eunomius says, indicates the image of birth, and there are many differences in dignity, then, of course, in the opinion of this teacher, there will be many images of birth, since the difference in dignity legitimizes generation by nature. If Eunomius does not accept that such virtues are natural, as seen outside of nature, then we do not contradict. Although, of course, we must agree that human life, without a doubt, differs from dumb life by a certain natural dignity, however, the image of generation from the difference in natural dignity does not have any difference, because nature uniformly introduces both verbal and dumb people into life by birth. If Eunomius understands the inherent dignity of only one, as he calls it, the so-called highest essence, then let’s see what he means when he says this. For, according to our reasoning, the dignity akin to God is divinity itself, wisdom, strength, also being good, a judge, just, strong, long-suffering, true, creator, ruler, invisible, endless, and if anything else is spoken in the inspired Scripture for His praise; and all this, in the proper sense, is seen as belonging and akin to the Only Begotten Son, as we affirm, recognizing the difference in the mere concept of beginninglessness. But we do not recognize this concept in any of its meanings as not belonging to the Only Begotten. Let no one persecute this word with slander, as if we intend to prove that the true Son has not been born! For we affirm that those who speak like this dishonor no less than those who teach about dissimilarity. But since the word “beginning” has many meanings and is attached to many things mentally, we affirm that in some respects the name without beginning is not indecent for the Only Begotten Son. For when by the word “beginningless” we mean to have a hypostasis not due to any reason, then we recognize it as characteristic only of the Father. But when we study the rest of what is meant by the word “beginning,” since the beginning of creation, time, and order is understood, then in these cases we also testify about the Only Begotten that He is above the beginning, since we believe that He is above every beginning of creation and the concept of time and the sequence of order. That by which everything is brought into being. And therefore, in the discussion of hypostasis, it is not that the person who is without beginning is confessed to have no beginning; and therefore, just as the Father is both beginningless and unbegotten, so the Son, although beginningless in the sense said, is nevertheless not unborn. So, what kind of dignity of the Father, having in mind, does Eunomius conclude about the manner of birth? Of course, he will say: unbornness. So, if we call all the other names that we have studied for the glorification of the God of all as not serving the purpose and meaning nothing, then the enumeration of such speeches, offered in an empty list, will be something superfluous and unnecessary, since none of the other names gives an idea of ​​​​the natural dignity of what exists above all. If, with each of the spoken sayings, a special thought is recognized that is appropriate to the idea of ​​God, then, obviously, by the number of names, the number of akin to God’s dignities is also discerned, and they prove the similarity of the essences, if only the dignities akin to the essences serve to cognition of the subjects. Since in each of them the same virtues are visible, then the same virtues of the subjects clearly show their identity in essence. For if the difference in one name is considered sufficient to show the heterogeneity of the essence, then wouldn’t the identity of a thousand names be much more powerful in showing the community of nature? What is the reason why other names are ignored and only the birth is indicated? And why do they teach about the only related dignity, about the ungeneracy of the Father, without touching on other advantages? In order to contrast the unborn with the begotten to pervert the concept of the image of non-similarity, which, at the appropriate time, being considered, equal to what was said before, will turn out to be weak, untenable and meaningless. 34. And that all preparations are tending towards this is shown by what Eunomius presents, where he praises himself, as if he had properly used that path to prepare blasphemy, not suddenly discovering the outline of the teaching and not offering wickedness to an ear that had not yet been trained before bringing the lie into a coherent structure; and not at the beginning of his words calls unbornness an essence and proclaims the otherness of the essence. Does he literally say this: “or, as Vasily legitimizes, it should have begun with the very thing that the question is about, incoherently calling unbornness an essence, and proclaiming the otherness or sameness of the essence”? And having inserted in the middle a lot of ridicule, curses and insulting expressions (this is how this sage knows how to strive for his own dogmas), he again returns to his previous speech and, continuing it to the enemy and placing the blame on him for what he was saying, says the following: “since you are guilty of these errors before others, having given the same essence as an inheritance to both the father and the born, therefore you have made for yourself for this reproach, as if some kind of inevitable net, after you pronounce a fair judgment on yourself, for you are exactly subject to your own reproaches, recognizing that these essences are without beginning separated from one another, introducing one of them through birth into the rank of the Son, and about what exists without beginning, striving to prove that He is born of the Being, for whom you represent as unborn, to Him you attribute birth from another; or confessing that the one and only essence is without beginning, then by birth concluding it in the Father and in the Son, you affirm that the ungenerated essence is begotten of itself.” Therefore, what Eunomius wrote before reading it I will now pass over in silence, as characterized by pure shamelessness before our teacher and father, and not in the least serving the intended purpose. But since what has been said, having hardened these double-edged denunciations on both sides, terribly attacks us with the invention of dilemmas, it is necessary for us, not in silence, to accept the attack on dogma, but, as much as we have the strength, to fight with words and prove that this terrible and double-edged sword, which he sharpened against the truth, is weaker than what is visible in the picture. In a twofold form of representation, he condemns the community of essence and says that either we call two ungenerated principles, opposed to one another, one the Father, the other the Son, affirming that what exists is born by what exists, or we intelligibly represent one and the same essence as taking upon itself partly each of the names, so that the essence is both the Father and the Son, proceeding from itself through generation. I am writing this in my own words, not reinterpreting the thought of Eunomius, but correcting the pomposity and confusion in expression, so that by revealing the thought in clear words, his intention becomes obvious to everyone. For he scolds our ignorance and speaks of us for having begun to speak without sufficient preparation, and so embellishes his speech with the brilliance of expressions, so much so that he smooths out with his fingernail, as he himself puts it, the sayings, embellishing his writing with this excessive eloquence, which immediately captivates the listener with the pleasantness of speech, which, among many other things, is what we have read today, that, if you wish, I will read again: “therefore you have made for yourself for this reproach, like some kind of inevitable net, after you pronounce a fair judgment on yourself.” Look at these flowers of ancient Attica! How this smooth and polished speech shines with word composition! How gracefully and variedly the beauty of words blooms! But let it remain for everyone as it seems to him. And let our attention turn again to the meaning of what has been said, and, if you wish, let’s begin in the writer’s own words: “for recognizing precisely that these essences are separated from one another without beginning, introducing one of them through birth into the rank of the Son, and striving to prove about the unoriginably Existing One that He is born of the existing one...”. Enough of this. Eunomius says that we recognize two unborn entities. How does he who complains about us claim this, that we mix and merge everything, because we profess one essence? If our teaching, along with those teaching about dissimilarity, recognized two natures, alien to each other in existence, then it would be fair to admit that the division of nature into two suggests the idea of ​​some kind of unborn. If we confess one nature in different hypostases, and we believe in the Father and glorify the Son, then why do opponents slander that such a dogma recognizes two principles? Then, of these two principles, one, says Eunomius, is elevated by us to the rank of the Son. Let him indicate who is the leader of this teaching, and we will remain silent if any person denounces that this was said to him, even if he knows that this word is simply repeated in the church. For who is so unreasonable and foolish as to call the Father and the Son and again recognize two unborn, and at the same time consider one begotten of the other? And what necessity forces our teaching to make such assumptions? And what evidence was presented to them that this inconsistency had to arise? For if he had presented something that we profess, then from this, either through sophisms or by some force of argument, had deduced a similar slander, then perhaps he would have the right to present something similar to denigrate the dogma. If there is not and cannot be such a teaching in the church, no one is exposed by those who proclaimed it, no one is identified by those who heard it, and no necessity is revealed as a result of anything forcing such an incongruity, then I don’t see why Eunomius likes this fight with the shadow. It is as if someone, in a maddened state of mind, imagined that he was fighting with someone, when no one was fighting him, and then, diligently striking himself with blows, imagined that he was beating the one fighting him. This wise writer also suffered something similar, inventing and attributing to us such opinions as we do not know and, fighting with the shadows that he composed in his own thoughts. For let him say, what need is there for him who confesses that the Son is begotten of the Father to go into the assumption of two unbegotten? Who is more likely to recognize two unborn: the one who proves that the Son is falsely called so, or the one who claims that the name Son is the truest. He who has not accepted the true birth of the Son, but generally confesses His existence, is more justified in suspecting that he calls unborn, although he exists, but has existence not through birth. And whoever believes that the distinctive sign of the hypostases of the Only Begotten is that He proceeds by birth from the Father, what will prompt him to recognize Him as unborn? Although, according to your teaching, wise men, the position is still in force that the Son is not born of the Father in one certain sense of the word “unborn,” and He will be called in the proper sense unborn. Since some things come into existence as being born, and others as being created by art, then about what happened not through birth, nothing prevents us from saying that it happened unbornly, with regard only to the meaning of the word “birth”. But this is what your teaching about the Lord leads to, recognizing Him as a creature. So, according to you, wise ones, as a result of this position, and not according to our dogma, the Only Begotten will be called unborn and it will turn out that condemnation, as you call it condemnation, is pronounced upon us by you as a result of your provisions. For it is time to spit on the abomination of this teaching with the mud of the speeches there. And the other part of Eunomius's presentation of the dilemma is possessed by equal stupidity. “Confessing,” says Eunomius, “that the one and only essence is without beginning, and then, by birth concluding it in the Father and in the Son, you affirm that the ungenerated essence is begotten of itself.” What is this new and strange speech again? How is someone born of himself, having himself as a Father and again being his own Son? What kind of dizziness? What madness of the mind? Did the ceiling turn downwards and the floor become above their heads? What do they imagine, whose head is heavy with rapture, they shout, they assure everyone that the ground is unsteady under their feet, and the walls are running, and everything is going around, and nothing visible stands still; Having a soul in the same whirlpool, perhaps this writer also wrote this, and one should rather regret what he wrote than to disdain it. For who is so ignorant of divine dogmas, who is so far from the mysteries of the church, as to admit such a thought contrary to faith? It is better to say (and perhaps it will not be expressed in this way) that no one, contrary to faith, will think of this incongruity, but also of human nature or of anything else comprehended by the senses, who, as soon as he hears about the community of essence, either recognizes as beginningless everything that in relation to essence one converges with the other, or says that it comes of itself into being, gives birth to itself and is born of itself? The first man and the one who came from him received existence, each differently: one - from the combined parents, the other - from the creator of Christ - and in relation to the essence we recognize them as two and do not separate them from each other, and do not say that two beginningless essences are introduced to each other oppositely, and two people were never represented as one, such strange expressions were not used, as if they were recognized as their father and again as their son. For both are human, the concept of essence is common to both. Each of them is mortal, equally intelligent, equally capable of mastering thought and knowledge. Therefore, if the concept of humanity in the reasoning of Adam and Abel does not differ from the difference in birth, since neither the order nor the manner of implementation produces any difference in nature, but by the general agreement of sane people it is recognized as the same, and no one will contradict this, unless he is completely devoid of intelligence, then what is the need to construct such a strange concept of the divine nature? From the very truth, hearing the names “Father” and “Son”, we are taught in these two persons the unity of nature, which by these names is naturally signified by their mutual relationship to one another and again according to the same word of the Lord. For he who said: “I and the Father are one” (John 10:30) expresses nothing else by confessing the Father as His non-origin, and by unity with the Father as a community of nature. And therefore, I think, by the said teaching of faith he keeps himself clean from being seduced into one or another heresy: neither Sabellius has the right to bring the identity of the hypostases to a merger, because the Only Begotten himself clearly distinguishes himself from the Father, saying: “I and the Father,” nor Arius is able to prove that nature is alien, since unity does not allow division by nature. For in this saying in the discussion of the Father and the Son, nothing else is signified by unity than unity in its very essence. Regarding all other benefits that are seen in nature, if anyone says that they are common to everyone, even those brought into being through creation, then he will not sin. For example, the Prophet calls the Lord “generous and merciful” (Ps. 102:8). It is also pleasing to the Lord that this is what we should be and be called: “Be ye therefore merciful” (Luke 6:36) and: “Blessed are you of mercy” (Matthew 5:7); there are other similar places. Therefore, if someone, having carefully and diligently conformed himself to the will of God, has become good, generous, merciful, or meek and humble in heart, as it is testified about many saints that they have achieved these advantages, then is he therefore one with God or united with Him by any of these qualities? No. Not in everything that is identical cannot be one with what is different in nature. Therefore, man and man become one when by will, as the Lord said, they are “made perfect into one” (John 17:23), while unity by will is preceded by a natural union. Both the Father and the Son are “one” (John 17:22), because what is common both by nature and by will converges into one. And if, being united by one will, the Son was separated by nature, then how would He testify to His unity with the Father, when separated from Him in the very proper sense of this word? 35. So, hearing: “I and the Father are one,” by the saying of these words we were taught both the procession of the Lord from the Author, and the indifference of the Father and the Son by nature; We do not merge the concepts of Them into one hypostasis, but just as we keep the properties of the hypostases separate, we do not share the unity of essence with the Persons, so that by the word “beginning” someone would not understand two heterogeneous ones and through this would not open the entrance to the teaching of the Manichaeans. For the created and the uncreated are resolutely opposite in meaning to one another. Therefore, if two persons are elevated to the beginning, then Manichaeism will imperceptibly introduce its poison into our Church of God. I say this out of jealousy and with great attention examining the teachings of my opponents. And no one, perhaps, will object that this view is not closely directed to what it should be, because if a created being is strongly on a par with the Uncreated, the alien will in some way resist that which is not the same by nature. And until neither of them loses strength, both, in some state of disagreement, will oppose each other. For, of all necessity, it must be admitted that they agree with each other, that will is in accordance with nature, and that if they do not have similarity by nature, then they are not similar in will. And since both have enough strength, neither will be weak in fulfilling its own will. And if everyone is able to do as much as he wants, then being the beginning for everyone will become a subject of dispute, which, if there is a lack of strength, passes to the enemy. And thus the teaching of the Manichaeans invades, while under the name of the beginning certain two beings opposite one another will appear, divided to the point of opposition by the difference of nature and will. And among them, the proof of the minority becomes the beginning of the Manichaean teachings, for the disagreement of the essence, as the word has shown, leads the teaching to two principles, divided into the created and the uncreated. But many, perhaps, will begin to complain that the proof of absurdity is presented here forcedly, and will express a desire that this should not be written at all along with other things. Let it be so, and we do not contradict this. For not by our own desire, but by our opponents, we were brought to the point that, following them, we allowed the word to rush into this search. If this should not have been said, then much earlier it was necessary to silence the word of the opponents, which serves as a reason for such a refutation. For it is impossible for an objector to refrain from speaking evil otherwise than by destroying what requires objection. At the very least, I would gladly advise those who have such a disposition to stay somewhat away from the love of controversy and not too ardently defend their assumptions with which they are already pre-occupied, and not everywhere strive to have an advantage over their opponents, but, since the matter concerns the soul, to cleave only to what is useful, and to concede victory to the truth. Therefore, if someone, having abandoned the love of controversy, considers the word of Eunomius, what it is in itself, then it will not be difficult for him to find the incongruity revealed in the teaching. For let us assume that this is conceded by us, that is, according to the teaching of our opponents, unbornness is an essence, and again birth is also taken as an essence. Therefore, if anyone follows with precision in thought what is being said, then in this way the Manichaean teaching will be renewed among them, if only the Manichaeans like to teach the opposite of evil - good, light - darkness, and everything like that - opposite by nature. And that I say this fairly, I think anyone who will skim through the essay will agree. So we will consider it. In each object, there is, without a doubt, certain signs akin to it, by which the peculiarity of nature in the object is recognized, whether the doctrine of the diversity of animals or everything else will be subject to research. For a tree and an animal do not have the same properties, and man does not have the same characteristics in common with animals that distinguish him from the dumb nature. And again, both life and death do not show the same thing, but in one word, in everything, as has been said, there is a certain unmixed and incommunicable difference of objects, in no way merging in visible signs according to any commonality. Therefore, in accordance with this sequence of thoughts, let the teaching of opponents be examined. Unbornness, they say, is essence, and birth is also elevated to essence. But just as a person and a stone have different, and not the same, distinctive signs, for, defining what is animate and inanimate, you cannot attribute the same concept to both, so of course, the Eunomians will agree that the unborn is cognizable by other signs, and the born by others. So, let us consider those distinctive properties of the unborn God, which we are taught by Holy Scripture to piously speak about Him and imagine in thought. So what are these properties? Not a single Christian, I think, knows that God is good, that He is kind, that He is holy, righteous, reverend, invisible, immortal, inaccessible to corruption, vicissitude and change, powerful, wise, benefactor, Lord, Judge and all the like. For should the word continue, stopping at what everyone confesses? Therefore, if we imagine this in an ungenerated nature, and to be born, in concept, is the opposite of being unborn, then determining that ungeneracy and birth are essences, it is necessary to agree regarding the opposition of begotten and unborn, that the distinctive signs of a begotten essence are opposite to what is seen in the ungenerated nature. For if they say that these signs are the same, then by the sameness of what is seen, the otherness of nature in the subject will not occur, for in others, without a doubt, the distinctive signs must also be assumed to be different, and that which is identical in relation to the essence obviously differs in the same signs. Therefore, if the same is attributed to the Only Begotten, then, as has been said, they do not imagine any difference regarding the essence. If they remain with their blasphemous sayings and prove the difference of nature by the difference between the born and the unborn, then, of course, it is very convenient to see what is revealed as a result of this, namely: since, by the opposition of names, the natures signified by names are recognized to consist in opposition, then, by all necessity, what is seen in each nature must differ to the contrary; so that the opposite of what is predicated about the Father will befit the Only Begotten - His Divinity, holiness, goodness, incorruptibility, eternity, and if anything else, according to pious concepts, appears to us about God existing above all. Therefore, everything that is indecent and contrary to every characteristic recognized as the best will have to be considered characteristic of the born essence. But for the sake of explanation we must stop at this point. As in heat and cold, opposite in nature (let fire and ice be represented in the word), each of them is exactly what the other is not; the properties represented in each of them are, without a doubt, different from each other, because ice is characterized by coolness, and fire is characterized by warmth; so if, by the opposition of the names of the unborn and the born, and the nature signified by the names reaches the opposite, then it is impossible for the forces of the opposite in nature to be similar to each other, just as it is impossible for coolness to occur in fire and heat to occur in ice. Therefore, if goodness is intelligible in the ungenerated essence, and ungeneracy in relation to nature, as they say, is different from the generated essence, then, without a doubt, what is characteristic of the ungenerated will be different from what serves as the property of the begotten. Therefore, if in the first the good is imaginable, then in the latter the opposite of the good must be imaginable. And thus, with the help of these wise teachers, Manes will again come to life among us, opposing the nature of evil to the Good and teaching the opposites in their powers through the otherness of essences. If it is necessary, without hiding anything, to speak freely, then it would be fair to think that the more excusable is the Eunomian Manes, about whom they say that he, as the first one who dared to introduce Manichaean teachings, gave the name of heresy. I say this as if choosing who is more humane: the viper or the asp? But, however, just as there is a difference in animals, so do not the considered teachings of the Manichaeans and Eunomians show that some are more tolerable than others? Manes thought to protect the Author of good things himself, saying that not a single cause of evil originates from Him. And therefore he attributed to another special principle the cause of everything that is considered worse, as if justifying the God of all, because it is not permissible to see in the Source of good things the reason that they sin against the law. Due to the baseness of his soul, he did not understand that it was possible not to recognize God as the creator of evil and not to imagine something other than God. This is a long discussion and would be out of time now. And why did we mention what was said? Because, and in the opinion of Manes, the beginning of vice should represent everyone far from God, and the Eunomians are preparing their more serious and absurd blasphemy against God than the Manichaeans. For, similar to the Manichaeans, they teach that the nature of evil is determined by the opposite of the essence, but at the same time they also assert that the Creator of such a work is the God of all things, by whom, they say, perfect birth by nature has an essence different from the Creator, and by this very thing (in comparison with the mentioned Manichaeans) they fall into greater wickedness, because they not only attribute hypostasis to that which is by nature opposite to good, but also assert that the good God is the originator of another God who is different in nature, and in this dogma they almost cry out into reality that there is something contrary to the nature of the Good, having a Hypostasis from the Good itself. For when, according to our belief, the essence of the Father is good, and the essence of the Son, as is desired by heresy, in the reasoning of nature is not the same with the essence of the Father and, as a result, turns out to be opposite to it, then what is prepared by this? That there is something opposite to the good and that from the Good itself came the opposite of Him by nature. This, of course, is worse than Manichaean absurdity. If the Eunomians deny that their words contain blasphemy, which turns out to be a consequence of their teaching, but say that the Only Begotten inherited the blessings of the Father, not being, in the opinion of these wicked people, in reality the Son, but as a created being, having this Hypostasis, then we will again examine this also, whether such an opinion can be allowed by fair understanding. For if, according to the reasoning of the heretics, we concede that the Lord inherited everyone, not being in reality the Son, but as created and appointed to rule over those similar to Him, then how can we accept this and not be indignant at the other creation, brought into subordination from the same tribe, if it, being no less by nature (for it was created in the same way as He), is then condemned to be in slavery and obedience to the same tribe? For a thing like this resembles arbitrariness, that is, when dominion is not given to the superiority of the essence, but although the nature of the creature remains equal, it is nevertheless separated, one into slavery, and the other into domination; so that in one and the same creature part is in charge, and part remains subordinate, because according to the lot that accidentally fell on dignity, along with the lot preference is given over similar ones. For man, not as being of equal honor with the nature subordinate to him, inherited authority over the dumb, but, being superior in reason, dominates over others, being placed over them, because his nature prevails in perfections. Human power is subject to rapid vicissitudes for the very reason that what is equal by nature does not agree to have an unequal share in the best; On the contrary, everyone has a natural desire to compare their possessions with those of their own tribe. How can it be true that all things are brought into being through the Son, if it is true that the Son himself is one of those brought into being? For either He will create Himself, so that what is written does not turn out to be false: “All things came into existence” (John 1:3) - and in this case, the absurdity cleverly invented by heretics against our teaching will have force against them - they will have to say: the Son brought Himself into being; or, if it is strange and unnatural, then, of course, the first one will also be untenable. It will be confirmed that all creation was brought into being by Him. For the exclusion of one makes the word about all false. Therefore, as a result of the definition that the Only Begotten is a creature, and the word, of course, will not escape either of two errors and absurdities: either that the Son is not the author of all those brought into being, if He himself is excluded from all, according to what they affirm, being one of the works, or that the Son will turn out to be the Creator of Himself, unless he preaches a lie that from what has received being, nothing is brought into being without Him. Therefore such are the teachings of the Eunomians. 36. If anyone, heeding sound teaching, believes that the Son is from the Divine and the purest nature, then everything will agree with the dogma of piety: both that the Lord is the Creator of everything, and that He reigns over creatures, not by lot or by some arbitrary dominion placed over those of His kindred, but by the superiority of His nature, having power over all. And beyond this, the doctrine of unity of command does not allow division into different authorities, separated by the otherness of nature, but requires the belief that there is one Divinity, one authority, one power over all. The Divinity is contemplated in the agreement of likes, and from like to like the understanding leads, as the beginning of everything (and this is the Lord), through the Holy Spirit it shines in souls. For it is truly impossible to contemplate the Lord, according to the word of the Apostle, except “by the Holy Spirit” (1 Cor. 12:3). And through the Lord, Who is the beginning of everything, we find that, above every beginning, “He is God above all” (Rom. 9:5), for the original good can be known only in the form of the “Invisible One” (Col. 1:15). But, as if going in the opposite direction, after the main thing in the knowledge of God, I understand the very existing God above all, through what is close and characteristic of Him, ascending in thought, from the Father through the Son, we approach the Spirit. For having entered into the comprehension of the unborn Light, from here they also understood, by their mutual proximity, the Light existing from It, like a certain ray co-existing with the sun, as the reason for its existence in the sun, so its very existence together with the sun does not come later with time, but appears with it, as soon as the sun becomes visible. It is better to say (for there is no need, while subservient to every image, to give slanderers an opportunity to object to the lack of strength in the example): let us imagine not a ray from the sun, but from the unborn Sun another Sun, together with the idea of the first, born from it, shining and identical with it in everything: in beauty, in strength, in lightness, in size, in clarity - in a word, in everything that is seen in the sun, and another similar Light like this in the same way, not separated by any temporal distance from the born Light, but illuminating through It, having the cause of hypostasis in the primitive Light, Light, which itself, in similarity with the previously imagined light, shines, enlightens and produces everything else characteristic of light. For in this very same Light there is no difference from another Light, when it appears without the slightest deficiency or detraction in illuminating grace, but is exalted in all perfection to the highest degree, is intelligible with the Father and the Son, is numbered according to the Father and the Son, and by Himself grants “bringing” (Eph. 2:18) to the intelligible light that is in the Father and Son to all who are capable of becoming partakers. Son. But enough about this. 37. Since Eunomius is very abundant in slander, insult serves as a preparation for the beginning of any case, and every proof is replaced by slander, let us briefly retell how much insulting slander against our teacher, regarding the saying “Unborn,” he wrote both about himself and about his word. He cited the teacher’s saying about this, which says this: “And I would say that in fairness the very name “Unborn” is worthy of silence, which, although very close to our concepts, is not used anywhere in Scripture and serves as the first basis for their blasphemy, because the word “Father” is equivalent to the word “Unborn.” For the true and only Father comes from no one else. And having not come from anyone means the same thing as not being born.” So, let us listen to what evidence Eunomius presents that this is supposedly said in a bad way. “Therefore, he mixes the inconsistency of words, no less through recklessness, as well as through shameless slyness, into his arguments, wavering in one direction or another due to unsteadiness of thought and weakness of reason.” Look at the fidelity of Eunomius’s answer, with what art, through this reasonable care, both crushes the power of what was said, and in its place introduces a more pious concept into the thought. He calls Vasily not observing correspondence in words, no less rash, as well as crafty in his way of thinking, unsteady, due to the weakness of his mind, wavering in one direction or another. Where does this come from, what is the aroused reason for the one who is strong in his thoughts and has a sound mind? What is most condemning in what Vasily said? Is it that the concept contained in the word “Unborn” is accepted, but the word itself, as badly accepted by those who pervert its meaning, is called worthy of silence? Because what? Is it not from sayings and pronunciation that the unshakability of faith is in danger, but there is not a word about accuracy in the meaning? Or is it not through the purity of the heart that the word of truth is prepared from evil thoughts; to detect spiritual movements, one must use utterances that can reveal what is hidden in the mind without petty inquiries about the known sound of a word? For what is said one way or another does not become the cause of the thought formed in us, but on the contrary, the innermost thoughts of the heart provide the reason for the utterance of certain words. For, as has been said, “out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks” (Matthew 12:34). And we make the word the interpreter of what is thought, and not vice versa, from what we speak, we collect thoughts, although both of these actions converge with each other, both to think correctly and to interpret, a person is perfect in both. But if the second is lacking, there is little harm from this to a person uneducated in words, as soon as his spiritual vision is directed towards good. It is said: these people “honor Me with their lips: but their heart is far from Me” (Matthew 15:8). What does this mean? That before God the Judge, Who hears ineffable groanings, the disposition of the soul towards the truth is preferable to verbal splendor in speeches. For they can be used for the opposite purpose, since the tongue, according to the power of the speaker, conveniently serves anything, and the spiritual disposition, as it really is, is how he who despises the innermost sees it. So, why did he become disobedient, rash, and no less crafty, who, although piously understood and accepted by the word “Unborn,” yet, since this word gives rise to impiety for people who unjustly interpret dogmas, commands it to be kept silent? If he had said that God should not be imagined as unborn, then Eunomius would perhaps have the right to address him with this and even greater slander. If he confesses in accordance with the general belief of the pious, but also, as it were, gives his own opinion, befitting the teaching rank: refrain from using this word, since in it the beginning of a pretext for perverse teaching finds itself; The same concept of God, that He is unborn, commands to be observed under other names, for this reason it does not in the least deserve these reproaches. Isn’t this what we have been taught to do by the Truth itself, that is, not to keep even something very dear to ourselves, if any of this leads to the worse; Thus, commanding equally the right eye and the leg and the hand to be cut off when something seduces a person, with this parable he teaches nothing less than what is good in appearance, if through the recklessness of those who use it, it involves a person in something bad, to leave it in disdain and not carry it out, because it is more useful for a person to cut off what leads to sin and save himself, than to keep it to himself and perish. What about the imitator of Christ Paul? And in the depths of wisdom he teaches the same. Having said in advance that “everything is good and nothing is to be counted if it is received with thanksgiving” (1 Tim. 4:4), otherwise the conscience of the weak will again reject something of what is permitted and commands one to move away from it. For he says: “If your brother grieves for the sake of meat” (Rom. 14:15), “I will not eat meat forever” (1 Cor. 8:13). Therefore, this is also done by the imitator of Paul, who, seeing that through the abuse of heresy the phrase “Unborn”, the deception through this word of those teaching the dissimilarity of Persons is intensified, advised to preserve in the souls the pious meaning of this word “Unborn”, but not to stand too much for the saying itself, as for those who are perishing it serves as a path to sin. For the name “Father” by its meaning gives us a sufficient concept and the words “Unborn”. Hearing the word “Father,” we immediately imagine the author of the existence of everything, who, if he had any other higher cause for himself, would not be called Father in the proper sense, because the name Father in the proper sense would belong to the reason presented above. If He is the author of everything and “all things are made of Worth,” as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:6), then, obviously, nothing can be imagined as preceding His existence, and this means believing that He is unborn. 38. But that this is true, he who does not even agree to admit that the truth is more reliable than himself does not concede; on the contrary, he argues, objects and ridicules (Vasily’s) word. If you wish, let us consider these unoriginal conclusions and various twists of false reasoning with which he thinks to refute this word. But I am afraid that the indecency and vileness of what Eunomius said may in some way serve to condemn in this respect what was said on the contrary. For adults, if they get involved with children who challenge them to fight, their diligence in such a matter is more reproached than the victory itself is praised. But, at least, this is what Eunomius says, what he said to insult us with the usual euphony with which he tends to express himself, and what we offer to show the experiences of our generosity, we recognize as worthy of silence and oblivion. For I do not consider it decent, peppering my serious reasoning with his funny sayings, to end my concern for the truth with ugly and rude laughter. And when reading this, it is impossible not to laugh if we listen to the lofty and majestic eloquence with which Eunomius speaks. When the addition of words produces an increase in blasphemy, then it is half easier to keep silent these words than to pronounce them. But let those who know what is worthy of approval and what is worthy of laughter laugh at this. We will consider the power of inferences with which he amazes our teaching. Eunomius says: “If the name Father is equivalent to the name “Unbegotten,” and names that have the same power, without a doubt, mean the same thing, the name “Unbegotten” means with them that God has existence from no one else, then the name “Father” necessarily means that God has existence from no one else, and not that God begot the Son.” Is this really not meant by the word “Father,” if this same name expresses to us the originlessness of the Father? If one excludes the other due to the property of opposites, then the position of one necessarily leads to the exclusion of the other. If nothing prevents one and the same person from being both the Father and the Ungenerate, if under the name Father, according to some understanding, we imagine also the ungeneracy, then what is the need for the relationship to the Son to no longer be cognizable from the word “Father”? For all other names that have something in common with each other are not all similar in concept. We call the Tsar both an autocrat and not subject to anyone, and we call him the ruler of his subjects; and it would not be a lie to say about him that the word “king” also means insubordination. And we affirm that if autocracy and anarchy are meant by the same word, then there is no longer any need to conclude that dominion over the submissive is no longer signified by the word “royal power.” For the word “royal power,” meaning something in between one and the other concept, partly indicates non-subordination, and partly indicates command over those under authority. Therefore, in this case, if the Father of our Lord has another Father imagined before him in his mind, then let those who boast of hidden wisdom show this, and then we will agree that the concept of the unbegotten cannot be contained in the naming of the Father. If the first Father does not have a higher reason for His origin (and together with the name Father, of course, the Hypostasis of the Only Begot is also implied), then why are we frightened by those who intend to convince us with these artificial webs of false reasoning, or better yet, to mislead us, that if with the name “Father” we confess the ungeneracy of the God who exists above all, then this takes away the concept of the relationship of the Father to the Son. But, having despised this childish and frivolous enterprise of the heretics, we courageously confess what they proclaim to be absurd, namely, that the name of the Father means the same thing as the word “Unborn,” and the word “unborn” shows that the Father does not have existence from anyone else, and the name “Father,” by indicating the relationship to it, together with Himself, introduces the concept of the Only Begotten. For the saying proposed in the word of the teacher (Basily), this terrible and irresistible fighter (Eunomius) stole from what was written, excluding what was irrefutably said, making it easy for himself to object. For what the teacher said word for word reads like this: “And I would say that in fairness the very name “unborn” is worthy of silence, which, although very close to our concepts, is not used anywhere in Scripture and serves as the first basis for their blasphemy; because the word “Father” is equivalent to the word “Unborn” and, moreover, through the indication of the relationship, together with it brings with it the concept of the son.” This same intrepid champion of truth, as a precaution, added to the word, I mean the saying: “and through the indication of the relationship together with himself, he brings in the concept of the Son,” out of his own kind of courage, he excluded. And having delved into the basis of what is written, he enters into competition with the rest; and having dissolved the connection of the whole, having made, as he believed, more compliant to him and more convenient for refutation, he deceives his followers with unfounded and weak false thinking, claiming that for some reason what is common, and in everything has a common meaning, and inclining their unintelligible hearing to his side. Since we have said that the word “Father”, by a certain meaning, also holds the meaning of the unborn, then Eunomius, having made the full scope of the signified from the ordinary meaning of names, convicts the word of absurdity, as if this name no longer shows the relationship to the Son in the event that it also meant the thought of the Unborn. Thus, if someone, having acquired two concepts about bread, that it is composed of wheat and that it serves as food for the user, begins to dispute the one who says this, using a similar method of false reasoning against him, namely, that the composition of wheat is another matter, and again food is another; why, if it is conceded that bread is made from wheat, then this same thing will not yet be called food in the proper sense - this is the meaning of Eunomius’ conclusion. For if unbegottenness, he says, is signified by the name of the Father, then this word does not yet show that the Son was begotten of the Father.” But it may be timely for us to turn this period of separation, worthy of respect, against the speaker. For like, of course, is fitting for like; and Eunomius would have had more right to appear chaste if he had provided security in complete silence. For to whom the addition of words serves as an increase in blasphemy (or better yet, extreme madness), for him it is easier to remain silent, not half, but completely, than to speak. Perhaps what is said differently about Eunomius himself will more likely lead to the truth of what we are talking about. And truly, leaving behind the tortuous web of false thinking, let us talk about our subject, adhering to simpler and more general concepts. Your father, Eunomius, of course, was a man, but he himself became the culprit of your existence. Did you really use this wisdom in his reasoning, namely, that your father, if we take the definition of his nature by the fact that he is a man, cannot still mean his relationship to you? For, of course, it must be one of two things: either that he is a man, or that he is the father of Eunomius. After this, it is not permissible for you to pronounce the names of your relatives out of the nature of their meaning; but, although, as an insult, you will complain about someone else who, laughing at you, jokingly changes names, you yourself will not shudder and, laughing at mysterious dogmas, laugh with impunity? For the name “your father” also shows his relationship with you, and this in no way prevents him from being a man. And none of the sensible people, instead of calling the one who gave birth to you your father, will draw up a definition of what a person is, and again, being asked about the family and admitting that he is a man, will not say that this very confession forbids him to be your father. So, regarding the God of all, the pious will not deny that the name Father also means His ungenerated existence, but the property with the Son is shown by a different meaning. But whoever laughs at the truth says that being called Father does not mean that the Son was begotten, although we learn by this word the existence of the unbegotten. To expose the absurdity of what has been said, let us also take something that, as I affirm, even a small child knows, who is just beginning to learn the art of naming from a grammarian and an instructor. For who does not know that some of the names are detached and non-relative, while others are given in some relation? Again, of these names, others, according to the will of those who use them, are capable of both, and when pronounced by themselves they show simple power in themselves, and when applied to something they often borrow power from that to which they are applied. And so as not to prolong the words by giving examples from something far from the subject of our discussions! What I affirm will be explained from the dogmas themselves. God is called both Father and King, and in Holy Scripture he is called by thousands of other names. Therefore, some of these names, mentioned so simply in themselves, can be used detachedly, such as, for example: “incorruptible” (1 Tim. 1:17), “eternal” (Rom. 14:25), “immortal” (1 Tim. 6:16) and any other similar name. They, although no other concept is implied, contain within themselves a certain perfect thought about God. Other names mean only something useful for something, such as: “helper, protector and intercessor” (Ps. 17:3) and all the others, how many of them there are of similar meaning, which are such that if there is no one who needs help, the power expressed by the name will remain inactive. But there are also such, as said before, names that are used both in themselves and in relation to something, for example, “God”, “good” and all the like. For thought does not always remain with their meaning detached. And the God of all often becomes the caller’s own God, as one can hear from saints who appropriate for themselves a Nature beyond their control. “Holy is the Lord God, who has hitherto been said not in relation, but who has added to what has been said: ours” (Ps. 99:9) makes it clear that the name is not in it in itself, but in relation to himself, recognizing the signified as his property. And again: “Abba Father” (Rom. 8:15), - the Spirit cries, this is a saying, detached from a private relationship. But we are also commanded to call our Father The Father who is in heaven (Matthew 6:9) - here again the meaning is relative. Therefore, just as He made God of all His God, He did not in the least humiliate His superior dignity above all, so there is no obstacle to the one who points to the Father and to Him who is from Him, “the firstborn of all creation” (Col. 1:15) by the name of the Father to signify at the same time that He begat the Son, and with the same word explain, that He Himself is not from a higher cause. He who named the first Father indicated the intelligible first of all. This is the One who is beyond everything, the One for Whom there is nothing that He saw before Himself, Who does not have an end for Himself, by which His existence would cease, but is equally always from everywhere, and both the finite limit and the concept of the beginning, transgressing the infinity of life, in every name it gives to imply eternity. But Eunomius, strong in speculation about the incomprehensible, does not accept this simple teaching and does not believe that what is meant by the word “Father” has a twofold meaning - that all things are from the Father and, first of all, the only begotten Son, by whom are all things; another meaning is that there is not a single higher reason for Him. But, although Eunomius rejects our word with contempt, imputing his contempt-filled laughter to nothing, we boldly answer what we have already said, namely: the word “Father” is the same as “Unbegotten” and means that He begat the Son, and confirms that He had being from no one else. But Eunomius enters into an argument with what has been said, begins to speak, and the word again turns to the opposite. “If God is the Father, because he begot the Son, and by the same meaning the Father is also the Unbegotten, then God, because he begot the Son, is the Unbegotten.” So, let us consider the basis of the distortion made by Eunomius, why the composition of the first false thinking is decomposed into the opposite, and this again puts us in inevitable difficulties. The first conclusion presented this incongruity: “if the word “Father” means that God had existence from no one else, then this does not yet show that He necessarily begat the Son.” This same conclusion, by perverting it to the opposite, informs us of another incongruity in our teaching. Therefore, what is the solution to what is shown there? “If,” says Eunomius, “God is the Father, because He begot the Son.” This was not what the first conclusion presented to us; on the contrary, although the consequence of the inference would have shown the possibility of the name of the Father, if it meant the ungeneracy of the Father, to signify His relationship to the Son, yet this, that God is the Father because He begot the Son, did not in the least determine the construction of the first reasoning. Therefore, I still don’t understand what this distortion with dialectical and artificial subtlety means. But let us at least look at the meaning of what was said. “If God is the Unbegotten because He begat the Son, then before the Son was begotten He was not unbegotten.” Again, a simple word of truth is ready for what has been said, namely: the name Father shows that He begat the Son, as we showed this in what was said before, and that He who begat seems to have not come from any cause. For if you pay attention to what exists from Him, then with the name of the Father the Hypostasis of the Only Begotten is recognized. If you examine what comes before Him, then the name Father shows the originlessness of Him who begat the Son. To assert that God was not unborn before the birth of the Son - these two accusations prepare the writer for slandering us and insulting dogma. For he denounces what our teacher did not say and is not now presented by us as recognized, and says: God later became the Father, having previously been something else, and not the Father. For by what Eunomius ridicules the inconsistency of our teaching, he thereby proclaims his own lawlessness in the reasoning of dogma. For, considering it to be recognized that God, having previously been something else, was subsequently made and called Father, Eunomius says the following: “until he begat the Son and was therefore called Father, he was not unborn, if ungeneracy is made cognizable from the concept “Father.” How much foolishness there is in this, I think, should not even be said about this to the one who accuses, because this is enough of itself for those who have intelligence. For if God, until he became the Father, was something else, then what will the defenders of this teaching say? In what state did they say God was represented? What name will be given to the then way of life? Is it the name of a youth, a baby, a newborn or a young man? Or will they not say anything like that, perhaps ashamed of the obvious incongruity, but will they not deny that He was perfect from the beginning? After this, how could he be perfect if he could not yet be the Father? Or will they not deprive Him of this opportunity, but will they say that it is indecent for Him to be a Father along with being? And if it was not good and indecent for Him from the beginning to be the Father of such a Son, then why, by going forward, did He acquire what is not good? But now it is good and fitting for the Majesty of God to become the Father of such a Son. So, heretics lead to the idea that God in the beginning had no share in good things; They will say that while God did not have a Son (may God not be angry for this word!), He had neither wisdom, nor power, nor truth, nor anything else, which in our various concepts is what is called the Only Begotten Son. But let this be turned on the heads of the guilty! And we must still return to where we started. “If,” says Eunomius, “God is the Father because He gave birth, and Father means unbornness, then until He begat, He was not unborn.” If this were said in accordance with what is usual for people for whom it is impossible to acquire any skill for many occupations at one time, without studying each of the subjects of occupation in order and sequence over a period of time, if this were to reason about the God of all things, which now has ungeneracy, after which it receives power, then incorruptibility, then understanding, and, doing further, becomes the Father, and also truthful, and after this - eternal, and in some sequence will acquire everything that the mind imagines to be characteristic of God, then perhaps it would not be very absurd to think about the names of God, that one precedes the other, and at first God was called born, and after that he became Father. Now, who is so poor in meaning, so little versed in the greatness of divine dogmas, that, having declared in thought the Cause of beings, he does not comprehend together and coherently with the total understanding of everything that is piously conceived of God, but thinks that one thing surpassed Him in the aftermath, another - in the beginning, and another according to some sequential order - in the middle? Whoever has comprehended in his mind something piously said about God will not come across any thing or any concept that could surpass what was said in antiquity. On the contrary, every name of God, every magnificent thought, every speech and opinion consistent with the concepts of God are connected and united with each other; and all ideas about God: His patronymic, unbornness, power, incorruptibility, goodness, power and everything else - are perceived as inextricably linked and combined with each other, because each of them is not particularly separately from the others in itself, at some time distance, as preceding or following another, but, no matter what splendid and pious name is found, it appears together with the eternity of God. Therefore, just as it cannot be said that God is ever not good or not powerful, or not incorruptible, or not immortal, so it is equally wicked not to always attribute to Him a patronymic, but to say that it surpassed it later. For whoever is truly a father is always a father. If this “always” is not added to the confession, but some concept that was thought up in advance in vain truncates and subtracts from above the thought of the Father, then it will no longer be confessed that He is truly the Father in the proper sense, since this invented concept of the Unborn Son destroys the eternity and unceasing existence of the fatherhood. For how is it possible that something that happened ever after could be represented by the mind under the name by which it is now called? Therefore, if, at first being unborn, he later became and was called Father, then, of course, he was not always what he is now called. But God, who now and always exists, without becoming either worse or better by increase, does not accept anything else from another, does not change, but is always identical with Himself. Therefore, if he was not the Father in the beginning, he did not become one afterward. If we confess that He is the Father, then I will repeat the same word again - that if the Father is now, then he has always been the Father, and if he has always been, then he will always be. Consequently, the Father is always the Father, and just as, together with the Father, the Son is, of course, also conceptualized, because it is impossible to become firm in the name “Father,” if it does not justify the name “Son,” then everything that is conceptualized in the Father is also seen in the Son. For everything that the Father has belongs to the Son, and everything that belongs to the Son belongs to the Father. The Father has what belongs to the Son, said the Son, not so that the slanderer would get the idea, in mockery of everything, to add together that the Son is unborn, according to what was said: “everything that belongs to the Father, the Son has,” or also that the Father was born, because everything that belongs to the Son is seen in the Father. For if the Son has everything that the Father has, then is He the Father? And conversely, if everything that the Son has is seen in the Father, then is He not the Son? So, if anything belongs to the Father, all of it is in the Only Begotten, and He is in the Father, and the patronymic is not separate from ungeneracy, then about the Father, before the concept of the Son, can anything be conceived separately by itself at some distance? I don't see this. Therefore, we must fearlessly dare and enter into a struggle with the objections that false thinking makes us, and not in the least afraid of the terrible conclusion invented to make children tremble, to say that God is holy, and immortal, and the Father, and unborn, and eternal, and all this together, and if it is supposed to concede that there is not one of the things that are affirmed about Him piously, then one everything is destroyed. For if one is not immortal, then it is impossible for anything else to be. But what is said about the part, understand about the whole. Therefore, there is nothing older or younger in Him, or else it will turn out that He is both older and younger than Himself. For if God is not always everything, but in a certain order and sequence He is by some and done by others, there is no complexity in Him, but what He is is all, and according to the heresy, being previously ungenerate, after this He becomes the Father, then, since there does not seem to be any plurality of actions in Him, nothing else happens, but only that all of Him becomes older and younger than all of Himself, due to ungeneracy preceding Himself, but according to the concept of the Father, becoming second to Himself. If God, as the Prophet says about Him, “thou art the same” (Ps. 101:28), then it is unreasonable to assert that until He gave birth, He was not unborn, because none of these names: neither the name of the Father, nor the name of the unborn, is found one without the other, but these two concepts together, and one with the other appear in the minds of those who reason piously, because God is from eternity the Father and the eternal Father, and everything that is said piously about God is named together, since this temporal sequence and temporal order, as we said, have no place in the discussion of the eternal nature. Let's look at the remnants of dialectical resourcefulness, which he himself ridicules and at the same time calls pathetic. And he says this well, because truly uncontrollable laughter is aroused by what is said, or better yet, a great cry that seduces the soul. Since the word “Father” in some sense contains the concept of the unborn, as our teaching asserts, then Eunomius, turning the own meaning of the word “Father” into the concept of ungeneracy, says the following: “if we say the same thing: “Unborn” or “Father,” then we, leaving the word “Father” and instead taking the name “Unborn,” can say: “The Unborn is the Unborn of the Son,” for just as the Unborn is the Father Son, so, on the contrary, the Father is the Unbegotten Son.” Finally, I have to marvel at the skillful man, his many-sided and varied learning in the discussion of dogmas, and honor him as having greater strength than many. What our teacher said is briefly expressed in one word, namely: the name Father can mean unbornness, but Eunomius said so much, and the multitude does not consist in different thoughts, but in the turn and transformation of similar sayings. For just as those who run around a millstone with their eyes closed remain in the same place after completing a long journey, so Eunomius always turns around the same place and stands in the same place. Once he said in mockery that the word “father” does not mean to be born, but not to be from someone else; again leads a similar chain: if the word “Father” means “Unborn,” then until He gave birth, He was not unborn. Then for the third time he returns to the same thing, for he says: to us who accept the word “Unborn” in this sense, we can say: “The Unborn is the Unborn of the Son,” and immediately repeats what he has already spewed out many times, and says: just as the Unborn is the Father of the Son, so on the contrary, again the Father is the Unborn of the Son. Oh how many times does he return to what he has vomited! How many times does he return to the same old thing! How many times does abundance do the same! And will we not also become burdensome to many, by allowing our ears to be carried away by the emptiness of what Eunomius offers? In such cases, it may be more decent to remain silent. But lest anyone think that we are stopping the word due to impotence, we will answer what has been said with the following: you cannot say that the Father is the Unbegotten Son, even if the name Father meant that the one who begot was not from a cause. Just as, according to the example we have presented, when we hear about the kingship, we understand two things from the name of the king, namely: that the one with the predominant power is not subordinate to anyone and that he has subordinates, so the name Father in relation to God presents us with a double meaning, one understood about the Son, and the other, that God does not depend on any pre-intelligible cause. Therefore, as for a king, it is impossible to say that if this name alone signifies both the possession of subjects and the absence of a boss over oneself, then one can call him a prince of the people, but not having a king over oneself among his subjects; We also do not agree to say about the king in this way: just as he is called the king of the people, so he can also be called the one who does not have a king over him among the people; in the same way, to the word “Father”, which points to the Son, and gives the concept of the unborn, having shifted the meaning inappropriately, it is impossible to attach the concept of the unborn to the property with the Son in a ridiculous way, saying: Unbegotten of the Son. But, having expressed himself in this way, as if having achieved the truth and exposing the absurdity of the opposing ones, Eunomius proudly says: “who of the sane people ever considered it fair to remain silent about a natural concept and respected unreason”? No one, O wise one; Therefore, our word is not guilty of this either, asserting that the name “Unborn” is in accordance with concepts, and that it should keep it motionless in the hearts, but instead of the word that is perverted among us, the name “Father” is sufficient and leads to the same concept. For you remember what words you yourself cited. Namely: Vasily did not recognize it as fair to keep silent about a natural concept, but respected, as you call it, unreason; on the contrary, the very name “Unborn”, that is, the pronunciation of syllables as poorly chosen and, moreover, uncommon in Scripture, advises safe silence, and says about what it means that it is most consistent with our concepts. But what we affirm is this; and he, slandering that we are sophists, arming the word with truth, condemning our sins, does not blush when discussing dogmas, masquerading as false reasoning and imitating those who at feasts make laughter with some sweet speeches. Look at this terrible and processed web of inference, for again I remember the same thing: “if to say “Unborn” and “Father” are one and the same, then we, leaving the word “Father” and taking instead the word “Unborn,” can say: “The Unborn is the Unborn of the Son,” because, just as the Unborn is the Father of the Son, so on the contrary, the Father is the Unborn of the Son.” And this is as if someone, according to fair and common sense, said about Adam: there is no difference whether to call him the father of all people or the first man created by God, because both mean the same thing; Then one of the dialecticians like Eunomius would stand up and begin to imitate such a trick in what was said: if we say the same thing about Adam, either that he was the first created by God, or that he is the father of people who came after him, then we, leaving the word “father” and replacing it with the word “primeval,” can say: Adam is not the father, but the primordial of Abel, because just as the primordial is the father of the son, so on the contrary, the father is primordial son. If this had been said in the tavern, then how much applause and laughter would have been heard from the drinkers, delighted by the elegance of the find! In such reasoning, the wise theologian finds support against us and attacks the dogma, truly having the need for some kind of guide and rod in order to learn that not everything that can be said about something necessarily refers to one signified, as this is shown in the example we presented about Abel and Adam; for it is fair to say about Adam that he is both the father of Abel and the work of God, but since he is both, it does not follow from this that in Abel’s reasoning it has two meanings. Likewise, about the God of all things, the name Father makes it possible to see what is actually meant by such a word, that is, that He begat the Son, and shows that no cause can be conceived before the Father, taken in the true sense. However, when we mention the Son, there is no need to call the Father not Father, but to call the unborn Son; and one more thing: if in relation to the Son the originlessness was silent, there is no need in our understanding to deny God’s ungeneracy. But Eunomius rejects this use of names and, like jesters, laughs at what we say, the strangeness of false thinking produces laughter at dogmas. For again I will recall what he said: “If we say the same thing, “Unborn” or “Father,” then, leaving the word “Father” and taking instead the word “Unborn,” we can say: “The Unborn is the Unborn of the Son,” because just as the Unborn is the Father of the Son, so, on the contrary, the Father is the Unborn of the Son.” But, if you like, we will answer him funny, turning this false thinking into the opposite. If the Father is not one and the same with the Unbegotten, then the Son of the Father will not be the Son of the Unbegotten, because, having this relation to the Father alone, of course, it will be alien by nature to the One who is something else and is not similar in concept to the Father, so that if the Father is something different from the Unbegotten, and the name “Father” does not include what is signified by the word “Unbegotten,” then the Son, being one, cannot be divided into two relations, so as to be one and the same Son of both the Father and the Unbegotten. And just as it has been recognized as absurd to call God the Unbegotten Son, so, without a doubt, in the converted speech it will turn out to be equal absurdity to call the Only Begotten Son of the Unbegotten. Therefore, one of two things: either the Father is one and the same with the Ungenerated, so that the Son of the Father may be the Son of the Unborn, and our teaching is in vain ridiculed, or if the Father is something different from the Ungenerated, then the Son of the Father is alien to the relationship with the Unborn. And if this thought prevails that the Only Begotten is not from the Unbegotten, then, of course, as a result of this teaching it will turn out that the Father is begotten by Him, because what exists, but what is not unbegotten, undoubtedly has a begotten Hypostasis. Therefore, if the Father, as something different from the Ungenerate, in their opinion, is born, then where is this notorious ungeneracy? Where is the basis and support of heretical pandemonium? They disappeared and turned into nothing due to the instability of false thinking; those who thought that they were apparently holding on to the handle for the time being, the unbornness slipped away, and the proof of the dissimilarity, like someone’s dream, dissipated, fled from the touch of the word, flying away along with the unbornness. Thus, when some lie is considered the truth, although due to deception it has power for a short time, it soon falls by itself and is ruined by its own constructions. This is suggested by us in order to laugh only at the subtleties that Anomeus rewards. But it’s time to put the word in proper order again. 39. Eunomius does not want the word “Father” to include the meaning of the word “Unborn”; he needs to prepare the idea that the Only Begotten never existed. For his disciples often repeat the question: “How is being born”? I believe the reason for this is that it is not desirable for them, thinking about the Divine, to renounce the human use of names. But we will willingly lead this erroneous opinion onto the straight path, saying that we know about this. Our names mean something different, Eunomius, but they represent a different meaning about a superior power. For in everything else, the Divine nature is separated from the human by a great mediastinum; and experience does not show here anything like everything about which conclusions are made based on some guesses and assumptions. In the same way, in what is signified by names, although there is a certain similarity between the human and the eternal, but according to the distance of natures, what is signified by names is separate. So, for example, the Lord in the parable calls God “a homely man” (Matthew 20:1), but this name is often used in life. Therefore, is the dignity of a person like us the same as the person understood in the parable, and is our house like that great house in which, as the Apostle says, “vessels of gold and silver,” and what other substances are listed (2 Tim. 2:20)? Or are those that are not easy for others to know, mentally imaginable in incorruption and bliss, and different are those that are made from earth and decompose into the earth? In the same way, in almost all other things there is a certain similarity between the Divine and ours, which, despite the identity of the names, shows a great difference in what is signified. Why can the names of the members and senses be found similarly distributed both among us and for the Divine life, which all people recognize as supersensible. “Fingers”, “muscle”, “hand”, “eye”, “leaders”, “hearing”, “heart”, “feet”, “boots”, “horses”, “eating” (Hab. 3:8), “chariots” and thousands of similar words from human life are added by Scripture to the divinatory expression of the Divine. Therefore, just as each of these names is spoken humanly, but is not humanly signified by it, so the name “father,” although it speaks equally about our and God’s nature, but in proportion to the difference in the named objects, what is signified by the words is different, because differently we imagine the birth among people, and differently we guess about the Divine birth. A person is born in time, and, of course, some place takes his life into itself, and without this his nature cannot exist. Therefore, in human life there are necessarily temporal divisions, I mean: what comes before it, what goes with it, and what comes after it. For it can truly be said about anyone who is born that, having not once been, now he exists and will also once again cease to exist, and about the pre-eternal birth these temporary concepts, as having no affinity with that nature, do not even come to the mind of those who reason soberly. This extension, from a height, will be viewed more sublimely, and what it sees in human birth will not be considered enslaved by a birth beyond its control. In this nature, the origin of man is preceded by suffering, for the structure of a living being, certain bodily foundations are laid down, and by the will of God this rests on the nature that performs such miracles, which collects from everywhere what is characteristic and proper for the improvement of what is born: from the elements of the world (from each as much as is sufficient), from the assistance of time its own measure, and from the nutrition of those who form what is born, as much as this is characteristic. formed; to put it briefly, nature, which, passing through everything that serves to structure human life, thus the non-existent leads to birth, which is why we say that the non-existent comes into being, since what did not exist at some time, then at another time begins to be. The concept of the Divine birth does not allow for the obliging nature of nature, nor the passage of time to collect the offerings needed by the one brought into being, nor all that the mind sees in a long birth, and one who approaches the Divine without carnal concepts does not fall into any of the basest thoughts. On the contrary, he is looking for some concept befitting the greatness of the signified, because he will not imagine suffering in the impassive, will not think that the Creator of all nature has a need for natural assistance, and will not allow temporary extension in eternal life; on the contrary, imagining the Divine birth pure from all this, one will only agree that from the meaning of the name “Father” the not beginningless existence of the Only Begotten is revealed, so that although He has the cause of existence in the Father, the beginning of the hypostasis is not intelligible in Him due to the impossibility of imagining any sign of what is sought. For in the representation of what was long ago and the newest, and in all such representations that take place in temporal distances, if you mentally take away time, at the same time all such signs are taken away and are stolen over time. So, since it is ineffable before the ages that He who existed with the Father does not allow this concept - “once” - then He, although existing born, does not ever begin to be, because He has life neither in time nor in space, but by taking away both space, time, and any similar idea of ​​​​the hypostasis of the Only Begotten, what is intelligibly imagined before Him is the one Father. But in Him He exists and is the Only Begotten, as He Himself says (John 10:38), making it impossible to assume that He never existed. For if there had once been no Father, then the non-existence of the Father would necessarily have cut off the eternity of the Son from above. If there is always a Father, then how could there ever not be a Son, Who cannot be thought of in Himself without the Father, but even when silent is always named with the Father? For the name Father equally has the meaning of two persons, since the thought of the Son with this word comes by itself. When was there no Son? What was the essence of His non-existence? Is it in space? But there was no space. Is it in time? But the Lord is before time. Therefore, if he was before time and space, then when was he not? And if he was in the Father, then what was he not in? Say, you who see the invisible, what environment did your thoughts imagine? How do you imagine being deprived of the Only Begotten? Is there any thing or concept that, being extended with the Father, shows that their life is longer than the Only Begotten? And why am I saying this? For even about a person it cannot be said in the proper sense that someone who does not exist was born. Levi, many generations before his birth according to the flesh, gave tithes to Melchizedek, for this is what the Apostle says: “Levi,” who received “tithes, gave tithes to eat” (Heb. 7:9), and as proof of what was said he adds that he was in the loins of his father when Abraham met the priest of the Most High. Therefore, if a person is born in some way existing, according to the apostolic testimony, having pre-existed in the general essence in him who gave birth to him, then how dare they pronounce this word about God’s nature, that without existing, He who is in the Father was born, as the Lord says: “I am in the Father, and the Father in Me” (Jn. 14:11), namely by saying that each of Them is in the other, one according to one, and the other according to another concept: the Son in the Father, like the beauty of an image in a primitive image, and the Father in the Son, like a primitive beauty in His image. But in images made with hands, the intermediate time, without a doubt, separates the received image from the prototype, and there it is impossible to separate one from the other: neither “the image from the hypostasis, nor the radiance from the Divine glory,” as the Apostle says (Heb. 1:3), nor the image from goodness, but he who has thought about any of this accepts in thought what is mentally represented together with it. For it is said: “This is the radiance of glory; "He who is" and not made, so that the Apostle clearly removes by this everything that is ungodly in both assumptions, and does not recognize both the fact that the Only Begotten is unborn, saying: "the radiance of glory," because the radiance is from glory, and not vice versa, from the radiance glory, and the fact that He once began to be, because the evidence of the word "He" makes it clear the eternal existence of the Son, His eternity and superiority over any temporary meaning. Therefore, it is timely to somewhat present this unfortunate question of the opponents, composed by them to the detriment of piety, and which, as insurmountable, they offer us as proof of their own teaching, asking: “Is Jehovah born?” One can confidently answer them that He who is in the Unbegotten was born of Him, having in Him the cause of being, for he says: “I live for the Father’s sake” (John 6:57). It is impossible to speak about the beginning when there is nothing mediating, no representation, no temporal distance - nothing that distinguishes and separates the existence of the Son from the Father, and there is no sign showing that the Only Begotten, having renounced the life of the Father, accepts some special beginning. Therefore, if there is no other principle that precedes the life of the Son, on the contrary, the teaching of piety sees; that before the Hypostasis of the Son there is the relentlessly one Father, but the Father is beginningless and unborn, as he confesses together with the testimony of his opponents, then how does he accept the beginning of being contemplated in the Beginningless? What harm is there to the teaching of piety from agreeing with the words of opponents, which they present as absurd, saying: “Is Jehovah born”? For we do not say that, due to the gross bewilderment of Nicodemus, which he expressed to the Lord and according to which he believed that it is impossible for an existing one to come to a second birth (John 3:4), so the Existing One accepts birth; On the contrary, we say that he who has his being united with the always and without beginning Existence, who does not deviate from the love of the elder and precedes in the surpassing love of the mind, and is not separated from any thought about the Father, does not begin to be, and is not born, but was also born, and has always been, relatively to the cause recognizing birth from the Father, and according to the eternity of life, not allowing it to ever not have existence. 40. But what has been said is opposed to the point of excess by the one who becomes wise and separates the essence of the Only Begotten from the nature of the Father, because one was born and the other unborn; and when there are so many names that show a pious view of the nature of God and in which no modification is seen in relation to the Son, but are still befitting both the Son and the Father, Eunomius, without mentioning any of the other names that denote community, is attached to one name - “ungeneracy” - and even that he does not take in the usual and recognized meaning, but introduces a new concept unborn, rejecting the general assumptions of this word. What is the reason for this? For it is not without some important impulse that he deviates in speech from the ordinary meaning of names and wanders by changing the meaning of words. He knew exactly that if the use of names were preserved according to custom, he would not find any support for the perversion of sound teaching; If the sayings do not retain the general and recognized concepts behind them, then by this distortion of words it will be easy to distort dogmas. For example (let’s move on to the very sayings that were dealt with so badly), if, according to the general understanding of dogmas, Eunomius agreed that God is called unborn because he was not born, then their whole edifice of heresy with the false thinking about ungeneracy, deprived of its support, would collapse. For if, as a result of this, by the similarity of almost everything introduced into use in the Church of God, he was convinced that God, who exists above all, is conceptualized as invisible, passionless and incorporeal, and ungenerated, agreeing that each of these names signifies something that God does not have at all, such as: body, passion, color, and having existence from a cause; if he admitted that this was really so; then their doctrine of dissimilarity would have no force, since in everything else that is imagined about the God of all, the opponents concede to the Only Begotten equality with the Father. But so that this does not happen, of all God's names, I mean names indicating supreme power, Eunomius prefers the name of unbornness and makes it a refuge for carrying out attacks on our teaching, transferring the contradiction of the born to the born in the reprimand of the word to the persons to whom names are given, and through these names, from the difference between them, he manages to recognize the otherness of essences, agreeing that someone is called born not because born, and unborn not because he was not born - on the contrary, because he was born, so to speak, accomplished by birth (I don’t know what wisdom guided him to such an understanding). For if anyone recognizes the meaning of names, what they are in themselves, in abstraction from the Persons from which, apparently, they have their weight, he will find emptiness of thought in what Eunomius said. Not because the Father, according to the true teaching of faith, is thought to be before the Son, and let everyone recognize the order of names as being consistent with the dignity and order of the Persons signified by these names, but let him look at the names, which of them, taken in itself, is presented to another in relation to its composition (again, I mean the name, and not the thing signified by the name), which of the said names shows a positive thought about something, and which is a negation positive thought. For example (for clarity, I think it is necessary to present similar examples in the word), let’s take education and lack of education, passion and dispassion and other names of the same kind, which of them can be intelligible before others? Are they those that represent the negation of the position, or those that express the position of the present? I affirm the latter, because education, anger and passion are first imagined, and then the denial of what is mentally represented; the same must be said about birth and unbirth. And let no one, out of self-imposed piety, condemn this word, as if they prefer the Son to the One Who Begotten, for we do not affirm that the Son is placed above and is thought to be before the Father, if the meaning of the names “begotten” and “Unbegotten” is understood in the word. Therefore, birth means the position of some thing or thought, and ungeneration, as I said, the negation of the position, so that in any case the name “birth” appears to the mind before the name “unborn.” Why, then, that in the number of men there is a second in order, they are strengthened as characteristic of these concepts to adapt to the Father, and the idea that denies anything, they recognize the indicative and encompassing essence of the name and are indignant and irritated at those who expose the instability of their teachings? 41. For this is how vindictive he is against the one who exposed him for his infirmity and impotence of malice, and how he takes revenge on him in whatever way he can; maybe just backbiting and insulting, and the wealth of such opportunity is abundant beyond measure. For just as in the case of skillful copyists of books, some connecting signs fill the gaps in the lines, imparting euphony and harmony to the style of speech, so Eunomius in most of his works peppers the work with slander, as if embellished with an excess of power to insult, because, according to him, again we are vain, again we sin against common sense, without sufficient preparation for the need we begin word debate and do not comprehend the meaning in the words of the speaker. For all this and even more than this will be written to our teacher by these imperturbable lips, and perhaps the reason for the anger is not unreasonable, but the borzoscribe is rightly irritated. For how much should this word, exposing the ills of this word, upset him, expose and make obvious to the common people the blasphemy covered by the possibility of false thinking? Why doesn’t he cover with silence that which is not firmly established in dogma, but exposes this pitiful person to shame, when he should have pity and cover with silence the indecency of the word? And he denounces and brings to the spectacle a man, no matter how respected by his students for his wisdom and subtlety of mind. Eunomius said somewhere in his words that unbornness follows God. About this saying, our teacher noted that the following is something seen from the outside, and the word “essence” shows the meaning not of something external, but of being itself, since a thing exists. The complacent and irresistible Eunomius is indignant at this and abundantly exudes reproaches, because, having heard what was said, he felt the meaning. What did Vasily do wrong if he carefully followed the meaning of what was written? If he misunderstood what was said, then your reproaches are fair, and we will forget them. If you blush at reproof, why do you not blot out what is written, but speak evil of the one who reproaches? “Yes,” he says, “but he did not comprehend the purpose of the word.” What is our untruth if, like people, we guess the meaning from what has been said, without having any idea about what is hidden in the heart? It belongs to God to see the invisible, and to examine the features of what is in no way comprehended, and to recognize the dissimilarity in the invisible, and we judge solely by what we hear. Therefore it is said: “they follow God,” and among the following, according to our fortune telling, Eunomius means unbornness; It is also said: “It is better to say that unbornness itself is the essence.” We were no longer able to comprehend the connection of this, imagining to ourselves the apparently great difference and strangeness in the signified. For if ungeneracy follows God, and ungeneracy is an essence, then, of course, this word leads to the concept of two essences in one and the same, so that God exists together as he once existed and as, according to our belief, he still exists, but he also has another essence following Him, which is called ungeneracy and which is something else with Him Whom he serves as an accompaniment, as the teacher says. And if this is what he commands to understand, then may he forgive us, the ignorant, who are unable to reach this subtlety of views. If Eunomius rejects this teaching and does not agree that he speaks of a twofold essence in God, of which one is known in the Divinity itself, and the other by ungeneracy, then let this rash and cunning man advise himself not to go into much slander in the competition for the truth, but to explain to us, the unlearned, why there is not another that is subsequent, but another that is previous, but both are done one. For what he now says in defense of his teaching remains, as before, incongruous and, as he himself says, the addition of these strictly calculated sayings does not correct the discrepancies in what was said, because what kind of instruction could be found in them - I could not find it. But let's say word by word what exactly was written by him. “We said,” says Eunomius, “it would be better to say that the unborn itself is that which is proven to follow. They said, not including this into being, but adding what follows to the name, and what is in itself to the essence.” If we put this together, then the complete speech will be as follows: the name “unborn” will follow, because the thing that is named is the Unborn. Therefore, who shall we present as the interpreter of what has been said? “Not into being, including what is proven will follow,” says Eunomius. But the word “including,” perhaps some of those who like to express themselves mysteriously will say, was used by Eunomius in the sense of the word “connecting.” And who knows the meaning and sequence of other things? What is revealed consistently, says Eunomius, consists not in connection with the essence, but with the name. What is a name, wise one? Does it disagree with the essence or agree with it in concept? If the name is not in connection with the essence, then what distinctive features of the essence are signified by the name “Unborn”? If, as you yourself call it, the essence is naturally united with unbornness, then why is it separated here. “And the name of the essence follows one, and the essence itself follows the other.” How is the whole speech composed? God, he says, is followed by the name “unborn,” because He Himself is unborn. Does he affirm that God, since He is nothing other than ungenerate, is followed by this name? And how does the Deity define ungeneracy, but say that God, who exists ungenerately, is followed again by ungeneracy? And who will solve the network of these mysteries for us? Preceding ungeneracy and subsequent ungeneracy, and the name of the essence, now naturally adapted, now again subsequent, as alien? And what is this great amazement he has at the name “unbornness”, so that he ascribes to it the entire nature of the Divinity; and if it is so called, then there will be no lack of piety; if not, then the entire doctrine of faith will be in danger. If anyone does not consider a brief discussion about this to be unnecessary and irrelevant, then let us judge it this way. 42. The eternity of Divine life, if anyone begins to describe it by enclosing it in a certain definition, is this: it is always embraced by being, and does not allow the thought that it once did not exist and once it will not exist. As with the outline of a circle, since the line at an equal distance from the center itself bends, those measuring the earth's planes say that the beginning of the drawing is indefinite, because the line does not stretch either to a noticeable end or to a clear beginning, but everywhere at equal distances from the center it is connected to itself, avoids showing any beginning and ending, so (and let no one slander, as if in the word to this limited outline we liken the infinite nature), not looking at the circumference of the circle, but looking at the similarity of life, everywhere immense, we say that this is the concept of the eternal. For from the present moment, as from the center and some sign, our thoughts stretch out and run everywhere into the immensity of life, and, as in a circle, we are equally and equally carried away by the immensity, everywhere meeting with the Divine life, which does not cease and is inseparable from itself, and we are unable to recognize any limit and any part. This is exactly what we are talking about the eternity of God, which we heard in prophecy: God and the eternal King (Ps. 73:12), and reigns for centuries “and for ever and ever” (Ex. 15:18); therefore we define Him as the most ancient of every beginning and the latest of every end. Therefore, the name is the concept of the God of all, as befitting Him, mentally represented by us, we express the infinity, incessancy and eternity of living life and depicting the words “unborn” and “infinite”, for if any one of them is included in this concept, and the rest is silent, then, without a doubt, the signified will limp in the unsaid, since it is impossible for any of these The names fully represent the meaning of this and that. Whoever calls it infinite will only show that he is alien to the end, and will not say anything about the beginning; and whoever calls it beginningless will show that the signified is higher than the beginning, but will leave the question of the end unresolved. So, since these names, as I said, equally mean the eternity of Divine life, then it is opportune for us to examine why the heretics, dissecting what is signified by the word “eternal,” say about that mental concept by which the beginning is denied, that there is an essence, and not one of the properties of the Eternal, but that which does not admit of an end is considered to be outside the essence. I don’t know by what understanding, when making such a distribution, according to which not having a beginning is recognized as an essence, and not having an end is excluded from the essence. Since we have these two ideas about one and the same thing, it was necessary either to accept both of them into the concept of essence, or, if one was recognized as not belonging, to eliminate the rest together with it. If those who have divided the concept of eternity certainly want to attribute one thing to the essence of the Divine nature, and not consider the other among the essential (because they want to judge such things with a low mind, like birds that have lost their feathers, without rising to the heights of the mental concept of God), then I would advise them to turn their teachings into the opposite, so as to classify infinity as an essence, and consider the beginningless to be less respectful than infinity, writing down primacy to the future, full of hope, and not to the past and what has already been used. For (I say this for small souls, arbitrarily reducing the word to a child’s understanding) since the past part of life is counted as nothing by those who have lived it, and all the living’s concern is directed toward the future and the expected, then infinity must be more honorable than beginninglessness, because the immortal strives for the future and the expected. Therefore, either let the heretics’ ideas about the nature of God be divine and sublime, or, if they judge something like this with human reason, then let the future be more honorable for them than the past. And let them define God’s essence. For everything that has passed with the passage of time already disappears, and what is expected is realized through hope. But although I offer this funny and childish thing to you, like children who sit and play in the square (for whoever looks at the baseness and earthiness of heretical teachings, it is, of course, impossible for him not to be transported in thought to some kind of children's game), I nevertheless affirm that it would be good to add this to the word; the meaning of the word “eternal,” as stated above, is completed by both, the alienation of both the beginning and the end. If the essence of God is limited to one thing, then their concept of essence will turn out to be half and truncated, enclosed in one beginningless, but not having in itself the infinite in essence. If, having combined the one and the other, from both they form the concept of essence, then we will again see the incongruity in the word that opens up. For it will be found that this concept among them does not agree not only with the concept of the Only Begotten, but also with itself. Speech is clear and does not need great intelligibility. For the concepts of swing and end are opposite to one another, and what is signified by both is different, as is the case in other objects that are directly opposite to each other and between which there is nothing in between. Anyone asked about the beginning, what it is, will not answer this with a definition of the end, but in contrast to this will give a certain concept of the beginning. Therefore, the opposite of each of these concepts, in equal measure, will become different from one another, and another something will be recognized as beginningless, namely, that which is opposed to that which appears with a beginning, and another something will be considered infinite, namely, that which does not admit of an end. Therefore, if they ascribe to the essence of God, combining these two concepts together, I mean infinity and beginninglessness, then they will present their God as a confluence of two certain opposite and discordant qualities. For the opposition of the end to the beginning itself reveals the meaning opposite to each of them. Things that are opposite to their opposites are, without a doubt, themselves mutually opposite to each other. It is true that all things that are opposed to others are, by nature, opposite to each other, and they themselves are mutually opposite to each other, as can be seen from the examples. Fire is opposed to water. Therefore, the forces that are destructive for them will resist one another. For if moisture serves to extinguish fire, and dryness serves to destroy water, then the resistance of water to fire is retained in itself by the qualities opposite to it, just as humidity is recognized as the opposite of dryness. So, since both the beginning and the end are opposite to each other, then the names opposite to them, I mean beginninglessness and infinity, are conceptually in mutual struggle. So, if, according to the definition of heretics, which either one of these names indicates the essence (for I return to the previous speech), then in this case they testify that being belongs to God only half, claiming that His essence is limited to one beginninglessness, and not extending it even to infinity. If, having introduced both of these into the concept of essence, they do nothing more than put it together from opposites, then, according to what was said above, the opposites of the end and the beginning will show that the essence is divided by infinity and beginninglessness. And in this case, their God will turn out to be something diverse, complex, made up of some kind of opposites. But there is not and will not be such a teaching in the Church of God, according to which it would be asserted that the simple and uncomplicated are not only multiform and varied, but are even composed of opposites. For the simplicity of the dogmas of truth, teaching what God is, presupposes that He cannot be comprehended either by name, or by thought, or by any other comprehending power of the mind, is above not only human, but also angelic, and all supermundane comprehension, ineffable, ineffable, above all meaning in words, has one name, serving to the knowledge of His own nature, namely, that He is one “better than every name” (Phil. 2:9) which was also given to the Only Begotten, because all that belongs to the Son “as the Father has” (John 16:15). And that these sayings, I mean ungeneracy and infinity, mean eternity, and not the essence of God, this is confessed by the teaching of piety; and unbornness shows that there is no beginning or cause above God, and infinity means that His kingdom will not be limited by any limit. For the Prophet says: “Thou art the same, and Thy years shall not fail” (Ps. 101, 28), with the word “thou art,” meaning that it is not from what cause this existence occurred, but in the following speech showing the unceasing and endless bliss of life. But, perhaps, even one of the reverent, dwelling on what we have explored about the eternal, will say: as a result of what has been said, it is difficult for the doctrine of the Only Begotten not to encounter stumbling blocks. Of the two differently presented dogmas, it is necessary to agree with one. For either we will prove that the Son is unborn, which is absurd, or we will not cede eternity to Him, which is characteristic of those who blaspheme. If eternity is known by beginninglessness and infinity, then, of all necessity, we will either be ungodly, not recognizing the eternity of the Son, or in our opinions about the Only Begotten we will be carried away into the assumption of ungeneracy. So what are we going to do? If the ghost of some time presents the hypostases of the Only Begotten, who imagines the Father before the Son only as a cause, then the concept of the eternity of the Son may endanger our concept of the Son. Now this, which will never be, is equally and equally not recognized in the eternal nature both about the life of the Father, and about the life of the Only Begotten, and about the confession of the Holy Spirit. For where there is no time, “never” is excluded along with it. If the Son, imagined together with the thought of the Father, is always perceived as existing in being, what is terrible to testify to the eternity of the Only Begotten, who has neither the beginning of days nor the end of life. For just as from light is light, from life is life, from good is good, wise, truthful and strong, and also everything else, from like is like, so also from the eternal is certainly eternal. But the lover of contradictions and disputes seizes on this word and says: this connection of speech forces us to assume that from the unborn is the unborn. However, let this objector sober up his heart and stand firmly in his own word. Recognizing that the Only Begotten is from the Father, he also alienated the idea of ​​unbornness. And there is no fear that he calls one and the same thing both eternal and not unborn, because the existence of the Son is not limited to any period of time, on the contrary, both before the centuries and after them, the infinity of His life flows everywhere, and in the proper sense the Son is called eternal. And because again, being and being called the Son, together with Himself He makes it possible to imagine the Father, thereby avoiding the possibility of presenting the thought of Himself as if He exists ungenerately, always existing together with the Father who always exists, as the inspired word of our teacher said: “Being born being united with the ungeneracy of the Father.” We have the same teaching about the Holy Spirit, which differs only in order. For just as the Son is united with the Father, and from Him having being no later than Him at the beginning of being, so again the Holy Spirit relates to the Only Begotten, Who is only mentally represented in relation to the cause before the hypostasis of the Spirit. Temporary continuations have no place in pre-eternal life, so that, with the exception of the concept of cause, the Holy Trinity has nothing inconsistent with itself. Glory befits her! You might be interested in: