Origen's problem of evil

Although in the history of the Christian tradition Origen is usually perceived as a very extraordinary thinker, his approach to the problem of evil can only be adequately understood in the context of the general formulation of this problem characteristic of his era. Statement of the problem of evil in the era of Origen Firstly, the problem of evil was perceived by thinkers of that time primarily as metaphysical, i.e. as a question about why evil generally exists in being as such. Secondly, consideration of this problem was then almost always carried out in the context of one or another theological discourse. As a result, it was reduced to a theodicy, i.e. to how to reconcile the existence of evil with the goodness of God. Therefore, the goal was not just a neutral clarification of the metaphysical conditions for the existence of evil, but a value-based justification of the entire objective system of being (primarily God as the metaphysical principle behind it), despite the presence of evil in it. To solve the problem of evil, by the time of Origen, a number of methods had been developed, various combinations of which are found both in ancient philosophy and in Christian theology: 1) dualism: this is a solution to the problem of evil generally rejected by Christianity, which presupposes the recognition of good and evil as equal metaphysical principles (for example, in Manichaeism) or, at least, admitting the eternity and irremovability of evil (for example, in Platonism). This approach removes responsibility for evil from God, but does not allow us to justify objective existence as a whole; 2) holism: this type can include any concept according to which evil is a phenomenon that exists only at the level of individual beings and is necessary for the good of the whole or the entire system of beings; 3) privative doctrine: according to the privative doctrine, evil does not have a positive existence, but represents only the absence or deprivation (privatio) of good; 4) reorientation of attention from physical to moral evil. Thinkers of the era of Origen, as a rule, considered it possible to justify suffering or physical evil by value, after which moral evil, that is, sin or vice, was recognized as the only serious problem, and then separate methods were invented to explain it 1. The most typical ways to solve the problem of physical evil were the following: a) simple denial of the negative value of suffering and the factors contributing to it (illness, poverty, ugliness, etc.) in the spirit of the Stoic concept of the “indifferent”; b) the application of compensatory logic, contrasting the insignificance of any earthly suffering with the unimaginable spiritual joys awaiting the righteous in the afterlife; c) retributive interpretation of physical evil: any suffering is a just punishment for moral evil and therefore represents a moral good; d) “pedagogical” or essentially similar “medical” interpretation of physical evil: any suffering is a means of moral education or healing of the sinner and, thus, is again a moral good; e) what can be called a “preventive” interpretation of physical evil: suffering is a means to prevent moral evil that has not yet been committed. The last three techniques place suffering in a fundamental relationship with the moral evil of the suffering subject himself, which is thought of as the cause of suffering. The problem of moral evil was solved primarily by recognizing its source as the activity of some lower spiritual being, independent of God. In the Christian tradition, this solution took the form of a statement that the cause of moral evil is not God, but the free will of a rational creature. Since it is quite difficult to consider a specific empirical individual, who from the very beginning exists in a situation where both moral and physical evil already exists, as the cause of evil in general, this problem was solved by appealing not to the empirical reality of evil, but to the mythological idea of ​​the archetypal situation of the free emergence of the first moral evil in Adam (or Satan), which in turn made suffering as such possible. In such a context, the solution to the problem of moral evil depended on justifying the possibility of freedom itself. Therefore, reasoning of this kind naturally led to the formulation of a number of related classical problems - such as the problem of the relationship between: a) freedom and divine providence; b) freedom and divine predestination; c) freedom and grace, etc. In the context of this general scheme, individual points of which, of course, can be clarified, it is necessary, in my opinion, to consider the formulation of the problem of evil in Origen. In the future, I would like to dwell on such aspects of his interpretation of evil as the definition of the very concept of evil, the relationship between evil and freedom, the solution to the problem of moral evil, the solution to the problem of physical evil, as well as the fate of evil in cosmic history. Origen distinguishes between “evil in the proper sense” or “true evil” and “evil in a figurative sense” 2. In particular, he states: “In the proper sense, according to the divine Scripture, good is the virtues and actions in accordance with them, in the proper sense, evil is the opposite of them. In a less direct sense, perhaps, one can find that both bodily and external [things] are called [in Scripture] good, promoting life in accordance with nature, and evil, hindering it” 3. The reduction of good and evil to virtue and vice carried out in this definition is obviously Stoic in nature 4 . A direct terminological borrowing from the Stoic tradition is the two-part formulation: “virtues and actions in accordance with them.” In “Philocalia...” 5 Origen mentions that according to the Stoics, “only virtues and actions in accordance with them are good, and vices and actions in accordance with vice are evil” 6 . Analogues of these Origen formulations can be found in the characteristics of Stoic ethics in Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius 7 . Origen's assertion that "bodily and external [things]" can, with some degree of convention, be called good or evil, "promoting life according to nature" or "hindering it," appeals not only to the Stoic definition of the highest good as life according to nature, 8 but also to a nuance of the Stoic doctrine of the "indifferent." By distinguishing “preferred” and “avoidable” 9 within the realm of the “indifferent”, the Stoics sometimes concretized the essence of these concepts, precisely based on the criterion of life in accordance with nature. For example, Diogenes Laertius writes in expressions very close to Origen: “Among indifferent objects, some are preferred, others are avoided... Preferred are those that have value, avoided are those that have no value. And, according to them, there is value. benefits that promote a life in harmony with nature - such benefits... bring both wealth and health” 10. To somehow designate the second type of evil, which is not evil in the proper sense of the word, Origen uses the formulation “bodily and external [things].” This terminology goes back to the well-known Aristotelian classification of types of goods, according to which they are divided into mental, physical and external 11. Origen extends it to evil: “They (i.e., the Peripatetics. - A.S.) believe that some of the goods relate to the soul, others to the body, and still others to external ones. The same applies to evil” 12. In Aristotle one can also find another formulation close to Origen, according to which it is the spiritual good that should be considered as a good “in the proper sense”: “We call goods in the proper sense and primarily the goods that relate to the soul” 13 . Thus, Origen distinguishes two main forms of evil, but does not stop at simply stating such a difference, but argues that only the first of these forms of evil, i.e. moral vice should indeed be considered evil. From a historical and philosophical perspective, this means that Origen, using both Stoic and Peripatetic concepts, opts for a position very close to Stoicism rather than Aristotle. At the same time, Origen himself, formulating the definition of evil, claims that it is given to him “according to divine Scripture.” However, the biblical texts he cites at best demonstrate that there are places in Scripture where the term “evil” can mean “vice” or “bodily and external” evil, but these passages do not prove that only vice is the true form of evil. On the other hand, it should be noted that the dualistic concept of evil presented by Origen is very popular in the Christian tradition. In the East it is reproduced by Basil the Great 14 and John of Damascus 15; in the West, a certain analogy can be found in Tertullian 16 and Augustine 17, and in the Middle Ages - in Anselm of Canterbury 18. The Origin of Evil and Freedom In general, Origen, like almost all Christian authors of his era, resorts to the fundamental idea of ​​the rooting of moral evil in created freedom. Firstly, only free will makes the very concepts of virtue and vice meaningful. Origen criticizes various deterministic teachings: the Gnostic concept of natural predestination to virtue or vice 19 , the Stoic doctrine of the “eternal recurrence” 20 , the astrological determinism of Celsus 21 because, as he puts it in relation to the latter theory: “If this were so, I do not know how freedom and reasonable grounds for praise and blame would be preserved” 22 . Freedom is no longer just an external condition for the possibility of virtue and vice, but is included in the very definition of their essence: “If you take away voluntariness from virtue, then [thereby] you take away its essence” 23. Secondly, free will is a condition for the real existence of both virtue and vice, since it is nothing more than the ability to choose between good and evil 24 . This ability to choose is considered by Origen as a manifestation of the fundamental variability of created beings, due to the fact that they arise as a result of the transition from non-existence to being, which also represents a change 25. Thus, freedom itself is deeply rooted in the ontological status of a rational creature and is essentially its substantial or natural characteristic. (To take it away would mean “to change the quality of their very nature” 26). But the specific result of free choice, i.e. virtue or vice always has only an accidental status 27. And only the uncreated, i.e. divine, nature has substantial goodness 28. This leads to one of the key problems of Origen's thought. Since the freedom of creatures is substantial, and their virtue is accidental, a state of final and stable goodness is impossible for them, but a new fall is always possible. On the other hand, in combination with the accidental nature of vice, the same substantiality of freedom also determines the possibility (though, of course, not the necessity) of universal correction. In this way, Origen quite logically arrived at the well-known hypothesis of a universal apocatastasis, after which, however, a new fall may occur. The difficulty that Origen faced is that without freedom of choice, virtue is unthinkable, but this same freedom causes the fundamental instability of virtue. His attempt to solve this problem was not entirely successful and boiled down to the statement that as a result of long exercise, virtue can pass into nature (cf. De princ. II, 6, 4-6 about the soul of Christ). Vice, according to Origen, can also pass into nature 29. Henri Kruzel believes that this last thesis contradicts the possibility of total apocatastasis 30. However, in Cels. III, 69 Origen discusses the opinion of Celsus, according to which “it is very difficult to completely change nature.” And in this regard, he states: “We, knowing that the nature of every rational soul is one, and asserting that not a single [soul] was created evil by God who created everything, but many became evil as a result of upbringing, corruption and environmental influences, so that in some the vice even passed into nature, we are confident that for the Word of God to change a vice that has become nature is not only not impossible, but not even very difficult... If for some it is very difficult to change, then it should be argued that the reason [for this] is connected with their ability of consent (τὴν συγκατάθεσιν), which is in no hurry to agree that God, [ruling] everything, is for everyone a fair judge over all [deeds] done in life. For [free] decision and exercise (προαίρεσις καὶ ασκησις) are capable of much even in what seems very difficult and, to put it exaggeratedly, almost impossible” (Cels. III, 69, 2-11; 15-21). This text contains three theses: 1) vice can pass into nature; 2) a vice that has become nature can be corrected; 3) correction of such a defect is possible on the basis of the free consent of a rational being. The combination of these theses seems contradictory from the point of view of the general ontological premises of Origen’s concept of freedom, but, on the other hand, it clearly shows that for Origen there is no insoluble contradiction between the transition of vice into nature and universal salvation. Considering the question of the origin of evil, Origen rejects dualistic theories that assume that evil exists forever (for example, the Platonic concept of Celsus, according to which the source of evil is eternal matter 31). Thus, from the point of view of Origen, the divine creation was initially entirely and completely good, and then rational creatures themselves essentially created moral evil 32. Origen systematically connects this idea, which is quite standard for Christian thought, with the idea of ​​the complete destruction of evil in the future, which should be considered as a hint at the hypothesis of universal apocatastasis. So in Comm. Jo. II, 13, 93 he cites the point of view according to which “vice is something non-substantial,” and explains it as follows: “... for it did not exist from the beginning and it will not exist forever.” Similar formulations are found in Greek fragments 33 . However, in Comm. Jo. II, 13, 93 this thesis is also connected with the privative concept of evil presented here. Origen refers to it in connection with the interpretation of John 1:3: All things came into being through Him, and without Him nothing came into being. So that the thought does not arise that evil was created “through” the Word, Origen declares that evil is “non-existent” and therefore is not part of “everything”, about which it is said that it began to be through the Word. A hint of a privative theory of evil is also contained in De princ. II, 9, 2, 43–49, where it is embedded in the description of the fall of spiritual beings and is associated with the well-known Origenian idea that the main motive for this fall was their “laziness” or “carelessness.” It was the idea of ​​the collective fall of spiritual beings that explained, from the point of view of Origen, how moral evil first arose in the course of cosmic history. According to his hypothesis, even before the creation of the material world, God created a limited number of equally perfect rational creatures, which, in accordance with their own free wills, fell away from the original perfection and were distributed among the various ranks of the resulting spiritual hierarchy of angels, people and demons. At the same time, Origen, as a Christian thinker, had to take into account mythological ideas about the emergence of evil, dating back to the Bible, i.e. myths about the fall of Satan and the fall of Adam. Origen does not deny the “historical” meaning of these plots and - especially in some Latin texts - can, in a completely traditional spirit, consider Adam as a specific historical character in Sacred History, who committed the first sin, the consequences of which spread to all subsequent humanity 34. But along with this, he can also demythologize the story of Adam, seeing in him a symbolic designation of human nature or the human race as a whole 35. In the context of such an interpretation, the biblical story of the Fall of Adam begins to be perceived as an allegorical depiction of the fall of all those rational beings who, unlike angels and demons, acquired crudely material bodies 36 and constituted the human race 37 . Origen also reproduces the traditional view, according to which the first created being who committed moral evil was Satan 38, and the fall of Adam occurred under his evil influence 39. But these generally accepted mythological details are used in the context of the doctrine of pre-existence, which leads to fundamental differences from the orthodox view of the origin of evil. First of all, if traditional Christian doctrine views people and angels as two fundamentally different classes of created beings, then for Origen the nature of all fallen creatures is completely the same, and all hierarchical differences between them arise only as a result of the fall and are accidental in nature. In addition, if the orthodox approach explains the general possibility of suffering of all people by the sin of a mythological personality not identical to them, then Origen, according to one Greek fragment 40, already felt in this explanation the difficulty that the Pelagians later emphasized 41 - one cannot punish one subject for the guilt of another. For most orthodox authors, this problem was solved by the idea of ​​the mystical solidarity of Adam and humanity or the essentialist doctrine of the sameness of their essence42. But for Origen himself, this question simply does not exist, since the physical evil endured by each subject in his empirical existence is considered by him as an individual retribution for, again, an individual degree of guilt committed by the same subject in pre-existence. Origen shares the concept that moral evil is the cause of any physical evil that exists in the world: from global catastrophes (periodic floods and fires in the universe) 43 to ordinary natural disasters, such as crop failure 44, or individual suffering 45. The specific meaning of the causal relationship assumed here is that when a subject freely commits sin, God, for his part, considers this as a sufficient reason to inflict suffering on him for the purpose of just retribution and moral re-education. In this sense, the immediate active cause of physical evil is God himself: “He creates physical or external evil, purifying and educating those who did not want to be educated by the word and sound doctrine” 46 . Other texts of Origen allow us to attribute to him a more moderate point of view, according to which God rather does not prevent physical evil, and its immediate efficient cause is demons and sinners 47 . There is no contradiction in this: in the treatise “Against Celsus” Origen claims that God is the creator of physical evil and when such evil is caused by some created beings to others 48 . Thus, in essence, Origen means the same thing everywhere: some created beings fall into moral evil, and God, in response, initiates the infliction of suffering on them, using as an instrument other creatures who have also fallen into moral evil. The same applies to natural disasters, since the latter are considered to be the result of the activity of demons 49 . It is also worth considering that physical evil, in the opinion of Origen, performs primarily a pedagogical, rather than a retributive function. From the point of view of retributive logic, suffering is viewed as a moral good, because it is a fair punishment for sin, maintaining an objective moral balance in the world order, while for the sinner himself, suffering remains evil. But for the pedagogical approach, what is important is not so much the observance of objective justice as such, but rather the moral correction of the sinner by inflicting suffering on him, according to which physical evil is considered as a benefit for the suffering subject himself: “We believe that every threat, and sorrow, and punishment are what is caused by God and is directed not against those who suffer, but for their sake” 50 . In this case, according to Origen, the thesis that God is the creator of physical evil does not create any problems. The fate of evil in cosmic history In contrast to the orthodox position, which does not imply the possibility of posthumous moral correction, Origen believed that the process of re-education of sinners through purifying suffering is not limited to earthly existence 51 . Therefore, even such an extreme form of physical evil as death has a pedagogical meaning and is used exclusively for the benefit of the dying person 52. This entire pedagogical process, according to Origen, will sooner or later end in apocatastasis, which should be understood as the complete elimination of moral evil, i.e. sinful disposition of the will of rational beings. This point of view is repeatedly expressed by Origen in both Greek and Latin texts 53 . For example, in his treatise Against Celsus, he says: “We affirm that the Word will once prevail over all rational nature and lead every soul to its own perfection ... it is unlikely that it would be impossible for God and the rational [principle], [dominating] over all, to heal any evil in souls. For the Word is stronger than any evil in the soul, and the cure that is [contained] in Him is, by the will of God, provided to everyone, and the end of [all] things [consists] in the destruction of vice" 54 . Despite such statements by Origen, some scholars deny that the hypothesis of apokatastasis was significant for him, pointing to alternative texts that testify against the possibility of universal salvation 55. For example, Origen repeatedly asserts that by the end of this world there will be many sinners who have not turned to the good and who will be subject to punishment 56 , and even directly challenges the point of view that allows the opposite 57 . Although such statements exclude the possibility that Origen associated any hope of universal salvation with the end of this world, they still do not contradict the possibility of apocatastasis as such. After this world, Origen envisions the existence of many new ones, the succession of which will continue until the pedagogical process is completed in an absolutely successful manner 58 . It is to this final ending of cosmic history that those Origen texts in which we are talking about the complete destruction of evil should be attributed. True, the internal logic of this teaching seems rather vulnerable if we are looking for some principle that would necessarily ensure universal salvation. If universal appeal to the good were necessary, it could not be free. But if its possibility is based on freedom, then this means that nothing can guarantee it. This is indeed the antinomy inherent in Origen's thought. However, although universal salvation cannot be guaranteed, Origen believes that it will in fact take place as a result of the successful interaction of the free will of created beings and Divine pedagogy. This optimism is based, in fact, on faith in the effectiveness of pedagogical means, since they are used by God himself 59. True, the rooting of freedom in the ontological constitution of a created being, for which, by definition, substantial goodness is impossible, makes it inevitable to pose the question of whether the universal appeal to goodness, achieved at the end of history, will be final and irrevocable. Origen indeed sometimes mentions the possibility of such a question, but, in truth, avoids answering it. For example, having formulated the already quoted statement that “the end of [all] things [consists] in the destruction of vice,” he adds: “But whether it is so that it can never arise again anywhere or not, this does not relate to the subject of the present discussion.” 60 Some Latin texts still suggest that Origen considered the eschatological destruction of evil as final 61. To summarize, we can say that evil, from the point of view of Origen, is an exclusively moral evil or vice that first arose in an initially good universe as a result of various deviations of rational beings from the original perfection, which became possible (although not necessary) due to the presence of freedom of choice between good and evil, which is a substantial characteristic of the very nature of spiritual creatures. To correct this moral evil, God directly, or through demons and sinners, employs such a pedagogical means as physical evil or suffering, which ultimately - at the end of a long sequence of future worlds - must lead to the complete and probably final elimination of evil from the universe. Compare: Young F. M. Insight or Incoherence? The Greek Fathers on God and Evil // Doctrines of God and Christ in the Early Church. Ed. by E. Ferguson. N. Y.–L., 1993. P. 135. Contra Celsum (Cels.) VI, 54–55. Ibid. VI, 54, 4–6; 55, 1–3. Wed: Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (SVF) III 70; 117, etc. Philocalia sive Ecloga de operibus Origenis a Basilio et Grigorio Nazianzeno facta (Phil.) 26, 1, 6–8. Compare: Ibid. Phil. 26, 1, 33–34; 2, 4–5. SVF III, 75 = Adversus mathematicos, XI, 26; SVF III, 97a = Diog. Laert. VII, 95; cf.: SVF III, 76 = Diog. Laert. VII, 94. For example: SVF I, 179; III, 16. For example: SVF I, 191–194. SVF III, 126 = Diog. Laert. VII, 105 (Translation by M.L. Gasparov). Ethica Nicomachea 1098b 12–14 (cf.: 1153b 17–18). Politica 1323a 24–27. Ethica Nicomachea 1098b 14–15 (Translation by N.V. Braginskaya). Quod deus non est auctor malorum, Patrologia graeca (PG), 31, 333. De fide orthodoxa, IV, 19 (92). Contra Manichaeos, 15. Adversus Marcionem, II, 14. For example: De libero arbitrio, I, 1, 1. See also: De Capitani F., II “De libero arbitrio” di S. Agostino. Milano, 1987. P. 473. No. 7. Commetntarium in evangelium Matthaei. (Comm. Mt.) X, 11–12; Commentaria in evangelium Joannis (Comm. Jo.) XX, 13, 106–107. 24, 202–210. 28, 252–255; Fragmentain evangelium Joannis (in catenis) (Fr. Jo.) 42–43; Selecta in Psalmos (Sel. Ps.). PG 12, 1312–1316. Cels. IV, 67; V,21; De principiis (De princ.) II, 3, 4. De princ. II, 6, 5, 166–167: boni malique eligendi facultas (the ability to choose good and evil). Ibid. II, 9, 2; IV, 4, 8 (35). De princ. 1, 5, 5; 11, 9, 2; IV, 4, 8 (35). Cf. De princ. 1, 2, 4; 1, 2, 10; 1, 2, 13; 1, 5, 3; 1, 5, 5; 1, 6, 2 etc; Cels. 111, 70; VI, 44. De princ. 1, 6, 3; Sch. Mt. PG 17, 292; Comm. Jo. XX, 21, 174–175. For example: Crouzel H. Origene et Plotine. Paris, 1991. P. 314. Cels. IV, 66; cp.: Cels. III, 42. Sel. Ps. PG 12, 1653; Horn. Jer. 2, 1 ; Sel. Ez. PG 13, 820. Sel. Ps. PG 12, 1660; Exp. Prov. PG 17, 173. Cp.: Pisi P. Peccato di Adamo e caduta dei noes nell’esegesi origeniana // Origeniana Quarta. Die Referat des 4. Internationalen Origeneskongresses. Hrsg. L. Lies. Innsbruck–Wien, 1987, pp. 325–326. This is how Origen interprets the “robes of skins” from the Bible (Gen. 3:21). See about this: Crouzel N. Op. cit. R. 233–234. Cp.: Pisi R. Op.cit. // Origeniana Quarta. R. 323. Exp. Prov. PG 17, 180; 205. Fragmenta ex commentaries in epistulam 1 ad Corinthios (in Catenis) (Fr. Comm. 1 Cor.) 18. Cels. VI, 43. Comm. Jo. XX, 25, 224–226. Sel. Ps. PG 12, 1444; cf.: Cels. VIII, 40. For example: Rufinus, Libellusfidei VI, 37. Patrologialatina(PL) 48, 475 AB. See also: Beatrice P.F. Tradux peccati. Alle fonti della dottrina agostiniana del peccato originale. Milano, 1978. P. 51, 57. Cp.: Kelly J. N. D. Early Christian doctrines. L., 1993. P. 172, 354, 364. Cels. IV, 12. Cp.: Cels. IV, 20; 21; 64. Fragmenta in Psalmos 1–150 (Fr. in Ps.) 106, 34. Hanp., Selecta in Job (Sel. Job) PG 12, 1037. De princ. III, 2, 7; Fragmenta in Lamentationes (in Catenis) (Fr. Lam. 79); Exp.Prov. PG 17, 189. Cp. especially: Cels. VI, 56, 14–16. Cp.: De princ. II, 5, 3; Phil. 27, 7. For example: De princ. III, 6, 3; Comm. Jo. I, 32, 234–235; Cels. IV, 69. Cp.: Crouzel N. L’apocatastase chez Origene // Origeniana quarta. Op. cit. P. 284. De princ. II, 9, 8; Hom. Jer. 4, 3; 12, 10; 18, 1; Cels. IV, 9; Comm. Mt. XIII, 1; Comm. Jo. XIII, 43, 286. De princ. I, 6, 2–4; 11, 3, 5; 111, 6, 6; De oratione (De orat.) 27, 15; Comm. Mt. XV, 31. Cels. VIII, 72; De princ. III, 6, 5. Cels. VIII, 72. Cp.: Cels. IV, 69. For example: Commentaria in epistolam Pauli ad Romanos (lat) V, 10 (PG 14, 1053).