A word against Grigora's absurdities

Essay rights. Nicholas Kavasila's "Word against the absurdities of Gregoras" was a response to the treatise of Nikephoros Gregoras, in which he presented his version of the dispute of 1355 with St. Gregory Palamas. In his work, righteous Nicholas denounces Gregoras, ridiculing his rhetorical style, philosophical views and theological constructs. The author criticizes him for his arrogance, claims to originality despite the distortion of classical texts (particularly Aristotle), and for a “materialistic” approach to knowledge that confuses the mind and sensory perception. He accuses Gregoras of using "Chaldean prophecies" and of making up "blasphemy" from ancient heresies, without having any sound arguments of his own. The essay serves as a defense of St. Gregory Palamas, presenting him as a revered shepherd and true theologian of Thessalonica, whose dogmas Nicephorus Gregoras distorts. *The title of the work in Greek is Κατὰ τῶν τοῦ Γρηγορᾶ ληρημάτων λόγος. Ideological polemics in Byzantium in the 50s. XIV century: Nicholas Kavasila and Nikephoros Grigora Research on disputes between the Palamites and their opponents in the 50s. XIV century largely shaped modern ideas about the spiritual life of late Byzantine society. When analyzing polemics, Byzantinists quite often mention the small psogos “The Word Against the Absurdities of Gregoras,” created by the famous Byzantine intellectual of the 14th century. Nikolai Kavasila 1. The full text of the work was published by A. Garcia in 1956 2. This work has already been studied in detail as a literary work of the genre of journalism 3, but to date there is no complete translation of the text into any of the European languages. The purpose of our work is to present a Russian translation of the pamphlet, which will help supplement its analysis with some new comments. The appearance of psogos was preceded by a number of political events. In 1354, after the resignation of John Cantacuzenus and the capture of Gregory Palamas by the Turks, opponents of the Palamites received hope for revenge and the abolition of the hated tomos of 1351, which for many of them meant persecution, loss of positions and imprisonment in prisons and monasteries. However, John V Palaiologos, who ascended the throne, was in no hurry to start a new discussion, primarily fearing for his power, and, to a large extent, because of the position of his wife. Empress Helena, daughter of Cantacuzenus, would not have approved of the condemnation of her father and his spiritual associate Gregory Palamas 4 . The indomitable ex-emperor and monk himself, having learned about the possibility of a new discussion, actively began preparing for it, ransoming his main ideologist from captivity for this occasion 5, although there is a report that the ransom was paid by the Serbs 6 or “Serbs and Dalmatians” 7. In 1355, on behalf of the Pope, Bishop Paul of Smyrna arrived in Constantinople to learn about the Palamites. First of all, the Catholic Church was interested in how differences in Orthodoxy could affect the negotiations on union 8. The bishop was dissatisfied with the conversation with Palamas and asked the emperor for a new discussion between Nicephorus Gregoras and Gregory Palamas. John V agreed, having previously notified the Empress. And so, Nikifor Grigora, who did not suspect anything, is called to the palace under some pretext, and only on the spot does he learn what awaits him. Gregoras at this time was suffering from migraines and therefore found himself unprepared for the debate, 9 which he did not expect, having previously received a royal refusal to his request to restore the true faith. Apparently, they assumed that he would abandon the argument, but Gregoras did not back down, fearing reproaches for cowardice. He himself writes: “As soon as Gregoras was healed to a small extent from his usual headaches, the great logothete came from the emperor, commanding him (to appear) on some matter. Since it was impossible to refuse, as soon as he got up and left, I immediately followed, obeying him. It was already late, after sunset. Gregoras, having arrived and given the emperor the due greeting, sat down. Immediately Palamas entered there, I don’t know why: either he was sitting there somewhere waiting because he had arrived earlier than the appointed time; or at the behest of fate, as most things in the world usually happen” 10. This invitation is also described in Kabasila’s pamphlet (Cabas. 524–525. 21–25), and it is not the great logothete 11 that is mentioned, but the indefinite pronoun “someone” casts doubt on the entire episode as an invention of Gregoras. Probably, Nikolai Kavasila is trying not to touch upon the role of the emperor in organizing the dispute. Nikifor Grigora, on the contrary, emphasizes the initiative of the monarch. In his History, John V says: “So, I wished, through the free speech of the assembly, to bring about the correction of matters that were not permissible at this time. I want to hear from you, who have now gathered here under various pretexts, at least about some kind of unity. For the tomos, which collected chatter about strife and disagreement, appeared while I was in Thessalonica, so that I do not understand anything that he says; nor whether it contains truth or falsehood, if one were willing to examine it carefully. In fact, I am afraid that I too might suffer punishment from God, that then I, having arrived in the capital later, when at that time another (John Cantacuzene. - S.K.) had power, involuntarily signed 12, forced by him (for I was silent in the thick of events), being unable to escape the violence of that time "(Greg. 268.10 - 269.1). The outcome of the discussion was unclear. John V doubted the determination of the winner, since, as usual, he did not want to offend anyone, and he remembered his energetic test. This circumstance, however, did not prevent each party from declaring their victory, although the dispute itself made a “dark impression” on the emperor 13 . A description of the dispute is included in the “History of the Romans” by Nicephorus Grigora (book XXX). It can be assumed that she soon became known in Thessalonica, where the historian had many learned friends. The dispute of 1355 intensified the journalistic activity of both sides 14. John Cantacuzene, having gathered Palamite theologians around him, began to publish works and even, remembering his old friendship, invited Gregoras to his place for a new discussion 15. Therefore, it is not surprising that Gregoras’s work did not go unanswered in Thessalonica. The pamphlet under study is built mainly on a refutation of selected quotes from the XXX book of “History of the Romans,” although to some extent it also concerns Grigora’s rhetorical style in general. The pamphleteer sought first of all to discredit the opponents of Palamism in Thessalonica. The accuser, turning to the reader’s patriotism, tries to portray Nikephoros Gregoras as a daring and insolent stranger, seducing the townspeople, demanding worship from men who are not accustomed to please (Cabas. 524.1–20, 532.195), and contrasts him with Gregory Palamas, the revered shepherd of the souls of the Thessalonians and “the most divine representative of Thessalonica” (Cabas. 524.12, 525.35, 528.97). Probably, in a more general sense, metropolitan education is here opposed to local piety. Cabasilas ironically calls the people of Constantinople, in the ancient manner, Byzantines (Cabas. 524.2). Creating an expressive intellectual portrait of his opponent, Nikolai Kavasila reveals familiarity with the individual traits of Grigora’s communication and behavior. Personal impressions undoubtedly formed the basis of the work. This is probably how the famous capital philosopher appeared before the appraising gaze of an educated young man from a noble family. It is no coincidence that the careless, in the opinion of the accuser, treatment of Nicephorus Gregoras with his students is so clearly depicted (Cabas. 529 - 530.130-140), although Kavasila is somewhat arrogant towards them. The pamphleteer criticizes his, we think, former teacher from all sides as a publicist, orator, philosopher, theologian, logician, astronomer, ridicules his knowledge of Chaldean prophecies and divination 16, accusing Gregoras mainly of a materialistic way of thinking, of the fact that, trying to know things “bodily,” he expels the “soul from bodies” (Cabas. 530.145–147:151–152). It is interesting that the Italian humanists understood by “nature” primarily that which was “the subject of self-sufficient and completely disinterested contemplation and only in its extreme development became the subject of experiment” 17. In general, most of the defamations of the psogos, except those that concern the individual qualities of Gregoras, according to the laws of the genre, either repeat the latter’s reproaches against Gregory Palamas in the XXX book of the Histories, or, for example, the accusation that the lack of evidence from the Holy Scriptures forces the enemy to speak “on his own” (Cabas. 528.100–103), has long become a commonplace in disputes of both parties. It is probably possible to talk about the existence of a certain special polemical type of thinking, common to late Byzantine intellectuals. This may explain the use of speech cliches and images by the author of psogos, which often coincide with the vocabulary of Nikifor Grigora. For example, the image of chaotic mixing, weaving together statements and then pouring them out on the interlocutor is found in both Grigora and Kavasila (Cabas. 525.39, 528.97–98:111). In the “History” we read: “It is he (Palama. - S.K.) who now proclaims those heresies, uniting them into one, as if drained into one vessel” (Greg. 274.5–6); Palamas, “weaving so many things one after another, lied equally against every saint” (Greg. 278.6–7); Palamas says, “mixing the immiscible” (Greg. 282.1). In general, heresy, in our opinion, is presented by the Byzantines as something liquid, foul-smelling, prepared by mixing and then pouring on the interlocutor, regurgitating, vomiting or spitting. Speeches are something long, woven or cut into pieces. There are numerous other parallels of images and comparisons. Palamas, in the words of Gregoras, “makes a fool of himself” (Greg. 278.7), Gregoras plays a comedy (Cabas. 525.32:36). Accusations of rudeness of speech (Cabas. 526.70; Greg. 281.15) and self-refutations, which the opponent does not notice due to his ignorance (Cabas. 528.95; Greg. 281.14), as well as in the manner of conducting a discussion - loud cries unworthy of the talking sage (Cabas. 525.40) echo each other. Gregoras sarcastically remarks to Palamas: “Even if you were overstrained from screaming” (Greg. 282.1). It can be noted that Nicholas Cabasilas depicts the vicious method of conducting a dispute according to the diagram given in Aristotle’s treatise “On Sophistic Refutations”: “So, the first means for refutation is the length of speech, because it is difficult to see many things at the same time... The second is speed... The third is arousing anger and provoking, for those who are confused are less able to defend themselves. The main means of arousing anger in the respondent is to make it clear to him that they want to treat him unfairly and completely shamelessly. Fourth, ask questions interspersed..." 18. Apparently this treatise was popular at the time. Barlaam of Calabria mentions it in his first letter to Palamas, when he talks about the dual understanding of the singular 19. A very expressive image in the historical work of Gregoras - “and you breathed out everything new-sounding from your own stomach” (Greg. 278.19–20) - is used more than once by the author of Psagos (Cabas. 530.142, 145:150). The first “Anti-Rhetics” points to the New Testament origin of this metaphor: “Isaiah accurately calls them “vain talkers and ventriloquists” and “those who sound from under the earth and from the stomach,” and “those whose god is their belly,” says the divine Paul” 20. The passage on imitation of Plato (Cabas. 527.80–81) is inspired by the phrase: “and truly you (Palama) yourself would listen to that joke of Plato, that you are ignorant, O friend, and do not understand” (Greg. 283.1–2). The age of the interlocutors gives reason for barbs on both sides (Cabas. 532.200 – 3, p. 284.12). Both are already elderly: Nikifor Grigora was 63 years old (probably born in 1293 21), Gregory Palamas was about 59 years old (1296?) 22. In addition, we note that the heretic in both authors has the habit of committing villainy in some beautiful place filled with virtues: in the psagos of Nicholas Cabasilas, this is prosperous Thessalonica, inhabited by worthy men, and the first Antiretic of Nikephoros Gregoras begins with a description of the delights of Mount Athos 23. The new blasphemy is a compilation of previously condemned heresies. Therefore, the main task of the defender of dogmas is a complete classification of the opponent’s views by reducing them to those already known and stigmatized (Cabas. 526.58–63). How thoroughly Nikephoros Gregoras approached the matter can be seen from his catalog of heretics from the devil to Palamas inclusive 24 . In this sense, the constantly resurgent heresy is inseparable from dogmas, while the confrontation between the heretic and his antagonist, repeated from century to century, takes on the character of a kind of universal struggle between Good and Evil, in which the person accused is no longer a specific person, but the very embodiment of evil forces and therefore potentially capable of any crimes 25. Isn’t the reason for the fierceness of the ideological disagreements of that time that each of the opponents could feel like a fighter on a cosmic scale? A significant part of the psogos text is devoted to criticism of the enemy’s philosophical views, in particular his theory of knowledge is touched upon. The controversy into which Nikephoros Gregoras entered in 1347 required him to present his understanding of methodological issues. Turning to Palamas, he says: “There are two (types) of syllogisms that the majority of those arguing use, which of the two do you (Palama - S.K.) allow for yourself?” 26. Syllogisms were used by both sides: “...Willingly or unwittingly, we must admit that here the two parties fought with exactly the same weapons. There is no trace of any open or also only hidden opposition between pagan-tinged thinking and Christian spirituality! 27. Moreover, the Palamites, in particular Neil Cabasilas, who reveals “exactly the same understanding of the use of syllogism in theology as the “godless Barlaam” refuted by him 28, often used the ideas and arguments of their opponents. Nicephorus Gregoras sarcastically remarks: “For by the fact that you (Palama. - S. K.) you allow yourself to construct syllogisms, it must be assumed that you praise it; but by the fact that you convince us to abstain, you place this thing, in any case, somewhere among the blameworthy” 29. As for the method of syllogisms, according to Grigora, dialectical syllogism is not a science, “since it has probabilistic and dual premises and does not concern a single category in any specific way” 30. About another type of syllogism, he wrote: “Then he (Aristotle. - S.K.) does not say that the apodictic proof (apodeixis) is scientific and does not allow, even having received an indisputable (proof), to apply it, at least without a doubt, since it delivers to the mind individual things separately through inductive fragments and in general transforms this precisely into experience and into reduction to certain conceivable prototypes (eidos) of imprints and shadows of external things, as if (by collating) into a book of imagination. For by receiving deceptive shadows from there (from outside), how could the mind approach the truth? So that soaring and contemplating mind is exposed by you (Palama - S.K.) to the danger of being an imagination and a mind devoid of mind. For by the fact that the imagination receives from hearing and sight and other sense organs the shadows of external things and the imprints that come from there (from outside), it receives only when the thing is something other than what it receives; in any case, this is an image of the thing, and not the thing itself. However, thinking that he has, he (mind - S.K.) will have nothing at all, since matter has a nature that is always fluid and not abiding" 31 . So, firstly, the senses, according to Grigora, do not give the mind an idea of ​​a thing in its entirety, but only in fragments; secondly, as a modern philosopher notes, “the frequent and continuous fluidity of things fundamentally makes it difficult to distinguish one thing from another and even within the limits of one thing makes it difficult to name it as a whole” 32 ; and finally, like is comprehended only by like, and mind and matter cannot be identical to each other. It follows that both in the cosmic mind and in the things of the world there must be something similar and immovable, allowing the mind to comprehend the world. This common part is the “eidos” or “idea” of a thing: “the eternal and generative model of a thing” 33 . The most indicative in this regard is a quotation from psogos, dedicated to the problem of “name and verb” (Cabas. 529.119–120). Grigora himself wrote: “Of course, this will be a talk about what names and verbs are. For first it is necessary to establish, they say, what a name is and what a verb is, as a kind of solid foundation, then what there is affirmation and negation and utterance and speech, and how many of them are produced from this human interweaving and synthesis of names and verbs. For sounds are in some respects shadows of things, taking shape according to the movements of the substrata and confusing names and verbs” (Greg. 284.15–22). Here the first phrase of Aristotle’s treatise “On Interpretation” is repeated almost verbatim: “First of all, it is necessary to establish what a name is and what a verb is, then what is negation and affirmation, utterance and speech” 34 . Nikolai Kavasila objects to the addition of the words “like some solid foundation” to Aristotle’s quote (Cabas. 529.119–120); in his opinion, Nikephoros Gregoras thereby distorts the thought of this philosopher, making claims to some kind of his own original theory (Cabas. 527.77, 529.120–124, 531.162–169). Meanwhile, it is precisely this addition, which precedes further discussions about names and verbs in the spirit of Neoplatonism, that makes the transition from the thoughts of Aristotle to the views of Plato. Next, Nicholas Cabasilas gives an extensive excerpt from the History (Greg. 287.9–17), dividing it into two parts. From the first he concludes that Nikephoros Gregoras confuses the mind and sensory perception (Cabas. 530.159; 531.171–175), from the second - that, on the contrary, he separates, thereby refuting himself “like those possessed by demons” (Cabas. 531.187 – 532.195). The author of the psogos, perhaps not understanding the teachings of Plato, objects to Gregoras thesis that the mind is present in some part in sensory things (Cabas. 531.176–179). In addition, he, probably deliberately, does not provide the continuation of the passage, which allows us to understand Gregoras’s thought: “For the same thing (sensory knowledge), perceiving the imprints of external things with the organs characteristic of it and as if writing down images in the book of the imagination of the soul, (Sinesius) says, instead of prototypes, he places them here, trying to harmonize the things (of the world) with the imaginable (things). Therefore, it (sensory perception) experiences the need for speech, capable, on the one hand, of becoming like mental objects, and on the other, of adapting to things” (Greg. 287.17–23). The mention of “imagination” is interesting, which indicates the development of these ideas from the commentary of Nikephoros Gregoras to the treatise “On Dreams” by Synesius of Cyrene, a work that differed from most Neoplatonic works in that it placed the power of human imagination (fantasy) at the center of consideration: “For the mind has prototypes of what exists, says some ancient philosophy; we could add, the soul is the prototype of the becoming, since the mind stands in the same relation to the soul as the existing to the becoming.” And further: “It (the soul) now has everything (prototypes of what is becoming), projects suitable ones and reflects with imagination, through which a living being has the perception of what lies on the other side” 35. It can be assumed that the very formulation of the problem of comprehending the otherworldly, its boundaries and possibilities, is of a Neoplatonic nature. Thus, Nikifor Grigora realized the need to supplement Aristotle’s epistemology with Plato’s doctrine of ideas, which is not only consonant with the views of ancient Neoplatonists, but was also to some extent dictated by the interest of the era when such “organic unification (Plato and Aristotle - S.K.) remains a characteristic phenomenon for all Renaissance Neoplatonism” 36. Although there is no doubt that Gregoras distorts and paraphrases Aristotle, who speaks not about perception, but about the apodictic and dialectical premises of syllogisms 37, one cannot ignore the observation of G.-G. Beck that “the denial of the apodictic conclusion anticipated that absolute transcendence of the divine essence, which, only a little later, Palamas clearly perceived in its originality” 38. As already noted, the philosophical refutations of Nicholas Cabasilas (Cabas. 531.167) are formal. In general, the author of Psagos, without expressing his own ideological position, tries to “catch” his learned opponent in imaginary contradictions by selecting quotes and is not interested in any kind of philosophical dispute. However, he himself preferred to devote a significant part of the text to the analysis of philosophical problems. This is most likely due to the continuing prestige of “high education” 39 and the values ​​of the former intellectual environment. After all, it is philosophy that Gregory so successfully teaches to the townspeople and youth of Thessalonica (Cabas. 532.195–197). Because of this, it was necessary to refute the accusations of ignorance against the founder of Palamism, that Palamas does not use “any scientific method” (Greg. 287.20) and “takes on his own to construct syllogisms regarding things inaccessible to syllogisms” (Greg. 277.8–9). After all, it is precisely the lack of philosophical education that is the main reason, according to Nikifor Grigora, for Palamas’ misinterpretation of the writings of the church fathers 40 . It is interesting that just at this time (1356–1358) in one of his works against Nikephoros Gregoras, Gregory Palamas recalls that when he (Palama) was seventeen years old, Theodore Metochites praised his knowledge of Aristotle. Philotheus Kokkin repeats this fact in the encomium to Palamas 41. Contrary to the assertion of his detractor, Nikifor Grigora distinguishes things perceived by the senses from those perceived by the intellect. Such a reproach, rather, can be made to the founder of Palamism himself, who speaks of “intelligent sensory perception” 42. Such insensitivity to the philosophical subtleties of both doctrines may be explained by the polemical vehemence of the accuser, but he is unlikely to be one of those who, after 1347, began to call Barlaamites those whom he had previously called Palamites 43, and therefore we are inclined to see a deeper basis in it. In this regard, “The Word against the Absurdities of Gregoras” can be compared with another work of Cabasilas, which develops the theme of “life in Christ” and shows the undoubted difference between the views of Cabasilas, in particular his mysticism, and the mysticism of Palamas 44. According to the remark of G.-G. Beck, “the mysticism of Cabasilas is a successful attempt to show the disappointed humanists of Byzantium some other mystical ideal, one that corresponded to their spiritual structure” 45. This is probably the reason why the presentation of doctrinal issues in the pamphlet is “very brief and superficial” and does not reveal the essence of the hesychast dispute 46 . It may also be mentioned that in one of his writings, Nicholas Cabasilas directly opposes the condemnation of secular sciences, which can be found in the “Defense of the Hesychasts” by Gregory Palamas 47. In general, the image of Palamas in the pamphlet is inexpressive. He can be likened to the “god ex machina” of ancient tragedy, bringing order to the world. The work itself is primarily directed against a specific person, fascinated by the starry sky and philosophical reasoning. It is this circumstance, we believe, that allows us to classify this text as a monument of the humanistic tradition. So, before us is the creation of the mind and spirit of the Byzantine of the Palaeologian time. It would be natural to assume that it “gives an idea of ​​the relationship between two contemporaries” 48. But how accurately can a modern reader comprehend these relationships? Do we not see poisonous irony where for the Byzantine there was only a faceless banality, an educational stamp, a kind of “certificate of education”? Unfortunately, we do not know many of the circumstances surrounding the origin of the source. Did Kavasila write his psagos “to order”, with the expectation of some benefit, or “at the behest of his heart”? What goals did he pursue and did he achieve them? The literature has already raised the question that the researcher of the Byzantine psagos cannot always correctly understand the “author’s position” 49, although the proposed solution, in our opinion, modernizes the problem too much. It is hardly possible to comprehend the product of Byzantine consciousness through the “totalitarian mentality” in the spirit of the 20th century, the political processes of the Stalinist regime and even the “life experience” of the researcher himself 50. Most likely, we are faced with a way of thinking for which it is difficult to find clear analogies. Of course, no one doubts that Byzantine thought, clad in the armor of tradition and subject to strict conventions, still had (even if a limited) set of means for expressing the position of the individual. However, in our opinion, not only the method of such expression in the polemical texts of late Byzantium requires further study, but also the content of the concepts used by intellectuals of the 14th century to determine their personal position. A word against Grigora's absurdities This wisest Gregoras, as if it was not enough for him that the Byzantines (Constantinoples - S.K.) are in amazement, he persuades the Thessalonians to sing hymns to himself, sending letters, and almost ordering that free men worship him, who do not at all know how to say or do anything to please anyone, this is the most pleasant thing in the character of the city. This best, like Xerxes 51, shamelessly used letters and, as if looking for some other tribute of approval, set the tongue in motion, demands praise for the curses themselves, which (speaks against the one) whom they (the Thessalonians - S.K.) reverence so much that they give their souls to him. I am surprised, firstly, that he sharpened his tongue 52 against their shepherd, the venerable representative of Thessalonica, and against him brought out fire from his tongue, and secondly, that he expected to acquire a good reputation among the Thessalonians, who, I do not know how long ago, consider him the most unworthy in regard to the ungodly ability with words towards God, which he has been professionally flaunting for so long now. But, perhaps, the misfortune of the head shifted the mind, precisely the one that carries up and down the essay against the representative of Thessalonica. “Immediately, as soon as Gregoras recovered from his headaches,” one of the emperor’s men 53 came and commanded him. Immediately, Gregoras, despising his headaches, expressed this and that, as it seems in the past, considering the pain as something significant and receiving this punishment from the evil head, since even the essay condemns the head that gave birth to him for some great storm, capable, on the one hand, of properly showing his father, on the other, of causing flaming ridicule. For, firstly, the very name of the work is unknown, and we do not yet know what to call it, as if it were born contrary to nature. For this best one displays himself, as if on a stage, extracting some words in the presence of the emperor for the venerable representative of Thessalonica, in order to interpret theology according to the desired; then as if forgetting the words that he introduced, resorting to comedy; then, recalling poets, and among them those who are funnier, and generally interweaving some numerous and varied, and when the most divine representative of Thessalonica is talking, he (Grigora. - S.K.) brings himself out, not being afraid and not plunging, but shouting loudly and speaking with complete freedom, although this is no more befitting of Grigora than fish; in the end, as the poets depict Achilles's horse, which said something to Achilles and predicted the end 54. Therefore, it seems that his treatise is a work of neither philosophy, nor poetics, nor rhetoric, but, what is most appropriate, a fable, I think we will call it, like Aesop's fables 55, which have the content of what those living beings who do not have the ability to speak advise and tell. Then, also, if someone decided to review the treatise in detail, he would cry out Aristophanes 56: “Give me a dish so that I can vomit,” - it is so filled with disgust, and thus is a kind of varied and motley offering, the fruits of evil. So, one of the things that he, thinking that he is theologizing, blasphemes, no less because of simplicity than because of villainy, he puts forward against his dogmas, the other is idle talk. Therefore, no one would stand to read (the treatise) to resolve difficulties if he did not want to fight with his allies as enemies; in particular, when the amazing representative of Thessalonica was prepared many times to fight against the representatives of heresy and showed that those (works) from which he composed his blasphemy were nothing sound, for he had nothing of this of his own. The arguments that he uses to formulate his dogmas, he tears out from ancient books, spoiling them so much that they are more fitting for him than for the books. At first, he calls the words addressed to the most divine Gregory a conversation, but without speaking at all, for most often he reviles and lectures his interlocutor on theological arguments to which the teaching is devoted 57. Shamelessly seizing the initiative, he asks questions very rudely, violating the order and law established in this regard. And he was not ashamed of the nickname he shared with philosophers, who tell us, if we ask in conversation, not to confuse the questions, not to cause trouble to the interlocutor, but, putting forward an affirmation and a negation, ask which of the two he believes in order to agree with what he wishes. For it is necessary, they say, for the questioner to determine whether a person is “this” or “not that” 58 and to give the choice which of the two parts of the contradiction he (the questioner) wants to affirm. However, in other respects he (Grigora. - S. K.) imitated Plato, since he calls his works “dialogues” 59, and interweaves expressions: “comrade” and “but only” and “you don’t understand, oh comrade” 60 and the like - only he did not imitate that, immediately starting, he turned to the story and poured into it many drunken outrages. When he recovered and had to say something on the topic, he did not address his interlocutor at all, for he did not consider it worthy, but told the emperor that Palamas is filled with many heresies 61 and is ahead of both Nestorius and Apollinaris 62 in blasphemy against God. Like some kind of heavenly judge of this place, he with difficulty condescended to the matter and claimed that he would show that “the only uncreated thing is the divine essence, everything else after it is created” 63, and called theologians witnesses 64. And this is evidence against the namer. He does not understand this, striking himself with a sword, but being proud of the victory and pouring out many empty speeches against the most divine representative of Thessalonica, he hardly allowed even him to say something 65, already showered with conclusions regarding the multitude, size and constancy 66 and saying that he himself (Palama. - S.K.) cannot bring any of the theologians as witnesses to his speeches, but defends his words from himself 67, that's how he took care of his protection. Further, Gregoras said: “let you be given this position (lemma)” 68, then the second, and the third, and up to the fifth and more positions, like this he continuously beat with noble provisions capable of imposing silence on Palamas. For everything is a long and varied curse, worthy of the way of thinking of a philosopher who flaunts that he knows “the existing, the future and the pre-existent.” For he also wants to seem like a kind of soothsayer, weaves something Chaldean and strews his words everywhere with fables and spells. However, this one, who brought together each part of the speech, did not learn that what those who prove call a proposition should be proved logically or mathematically, but he called the curse a proposition (lemma). So he says that he, the philosopher, having thus nobly beaten the provisions, was overcome with pity for the ignorance of Palamas and tried to teach what a name is and what a verb is. What is mentioned, what is a name and what is a verb, should be established by induction, “like some solid foundation” 69. This is how he understood this teaching (Aristotle - S.K.), not in such a way that he should give a definition and say, as some other position, the definition of a name and a verb, as we learn positions before mathematics, but this definition should be put in the foundation 70, as if building, perhaps implying the foundation of a ship, to which he relates his affairs and which he makes the model of his soul. For he (the ship) refuses him if he is silent to the questions of the youth, and becomes an anchor instead of the ship. For always, when they find themselves in a difficult situation regarding something, he now runs to take refuge on the ship and, mentioning the large luggage and the fact that it is difficult to unload what someone asks for and, adding that according to him this is the case, immediately resolving the difficulty, he commands them to be satisfied with this. For they are very fond of giving him the floor. For in this way he brought them up, so as not to dare to grumble when he speaks nonsense. Instead, I consider Gregoras blessed, who convinces so easily and am amazed at the strength of the ship, which not only frees him from many worries, but also adds praise: for as soon as he brings the ship to the shore, he enjoys numerous encomia from the youth; I don’t see how they are convinced (of his wisdom), in this respect the soul of Gregoras is like a ship, unless they have the custom of calling the stomach a soul, and for this reason it is magnanimous 71. For here in each case a sample comes up, not new where there are those “whose god is the belly” 72, therefore everything thinks no better than things perceived by sense, and with him everything is filled with matter and gravitates towards the bottom and, if one should joke about the interlocutor, hints at his body, and if one should praise, he will praise the beautiful and large; even one that can barely catch its breath due to its large insides. However, what am I saying? And this is how he physically takes up even the sciences, although they turn the soul away from bodies to something more sublime and, while practicing astronomy 73 in words, he does not communicate anything from science, but fills his house with balls, books and diagrams; he displays even instruments 74 and ceilings filled with wisdom 75 , all rather than his soul. Moreover, it shows that he, being a man, thinks only in relation to sensory perception, I don’t know how, like irrational living beings: he assumes that sensory perception is the mind itself. That I speak the truth is clear from what he himself said when talking about the mind. For, since he wanted to save Palamas from great ignorance, he expounded the most perfect doctrine about the definition of name and verb, which, he says, is the basis and beginning of all speech, but the best does not know that before any specific definition there is a definition in general and it follows that the one who knows the definition of name and verb should first know the definition simply. So, when he had taught enough about the name and verb and no longer needed anything, he introduces additional teaching, guiding his student from the smallest to the most sublime, and says: “For God, having made man into creation, endowed him with mind and feeling. Of these, it is the mind, which maintains identity in relation to things in the world, that does not need a voice, having already acquired direct knowledge of them. For what they are by nature, he thinks in a way accessible to him, from them themselves” 76 . Therefore, therefore, the mind is sense perception. For if, of the knowledge that is in us, only sensory perception directly comprehends sensory things, then the opposite is also true: sensory perception will be direct comprehension of sensory things. So, this is the mind of a philosopher. Consequently, he says that the mind is sensory perception and that what is perceived by the senses is no different from what is thought, let it be so that he understands: “does not need a voice.” And how is it not senseless if the mind, human and receptive to knowledge, “does not need a voice” for learning? After all, people truly have nothing else than a voice to communicate with each other. Or rather, why are other words needed? For he immediately, a little later, refutes himself, like those possessed by demons, adding the following: “necessity, forcing people to participate in affairs with each other (and to express the secrets of a greedy soul), decided to use sensory perception as an intermediary between thinking and deeds” 77 . Consequently, the mind does not directly reach what is sensed, although, in fact, it suggests the opposite of this above. This is how he goes crazy and introduces such a strong storm into the teaching, perhaps being unkind to the Thessalonians if he wants to get them as accomplices of his philosophy. For he offers what he has mentioned for young people who want to learn. For he says that he is unkind to them and therefore does not provide language 78 . I am surprised at this man not because he, ashamed of his friends, wants to seem ill-wisher regarding the study of words at such an old age, preferring to be considered the worst in his intention rather than (to be known as) a bad artist of words and a villain more than a failure. This is not why I am surprised at this man, but because he turned out to be able, now teaching, now learning, in such a great sea of ​​words and time, to keep his soul unsuffering, just as we are surprised at magicians, without suffering evil, passing through fire, water, and swords. Angelopoulos A. Nicolaos Kabasilas Chamaetos. Not dzoe kai to ergon autou. Symbole eis ten Makedoniken Byzantinen Prosopografian Thessalonice, 1970. P. 84; Guilland R. Essai sur Nicephore Gregoras: L'homme et l'oevre R., 1926. R. 46; Beck H.-G. Humanismus und Palamismus // Actes XII-e Congres Intern, des Etudes byz. Belgrade; Ochride. 1963. Bd. 1. S. 80. Garzya A. Un opuscule inedit de Nicolas Cabasilas // Byz. 1954. Vol. 24. P. 521–532 (hereinafter referred to as Cabas.). Polyakovskaya M. A. About the pamphlet of Nikolai Kavasila // ADSV. 1971. Issue. 7; She is the same. Portraits of Byzantine intellectuals. Ekaterinburg, 1992. Gregoras Nikephoros. Romaische Geschichte. Historia Rhomaike / ubersetzt von Jan Louis van Dieten. Stuttgart, 1973, 1979. S. 30. Beck H.-G. Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich. Muenchen, 1959. S. 713 Radchenko K. F. Religious and literary movement in Bulgaria in the era before the Turkish conquest. Kiev, 1898. P. 101 Gregoras Nikephoros. Romaische Geschichte. S. 32 Gregorae Nicephori. Byzantina Historia. Bonnae, 1829–1855. Vol. 3 (hereinafter referred to as Greg.). Nikephoros Metochites Lascaris, son of Theodore Metochites. See: PLP. No. 17986. We are talking about the tomos of 1351, signed by John V at the beginning of 1352 (Gregoras Nikephoros. Romaische Geschichte. S. 25). Beck H.-G. Kirche und theologische Literatur... S. 713 There is also an overview of the discussion from the Palamite side, compiled by protostraetor George Fakrasis, a follower of John Cantacuzenus. See: Orientalia Christiana Periodica. 1956. T. 16. P. 328–356; PLP. No. 29575. The depicted character is a caricature of the ideal of Byzantine education, as described by Nikephoros Gregoras in the image of Synesius of Cyrene (c. 370 - c. 413): See: Gregoras Nikephoros. Antirrhetika I / Einl., Textausg., ubers. und Anm. von H.-V. Beyer. Wien, 1976, S. 27–28. Losev A. F. Renaissance aesthetics. M., 1978. P. 106. Aristoteles. Sophistici elenchi. 174a. 17–29; Aristotle. Op. M., 1978. T. 2. pp. 562–563. Schiro G. Barlaam Calabro. Epistole Greche i primordi episodici e dottrinari delle lotte esicaste. Palermo, 1954. P. 250, 535. Gregoras Nikephoros. Antirrh. I. S. 258–259.20–21; Phil. 3.19. Beyer H.-V. Eine Chronologie der Lebensgeschichte des Nikephoros Gregoras // JOB. 1978. Bd. 27. S. 130. 1296 according to: Meyendorff J. Introduction a l'étude de Gregoire Palamas. P., 1959. P. 45; according to: Beyer G.-W. Chronologie ... S. 152. – in 1294 Gregoras Nikephoros. Antirrh. I. S. 125–126. Ljubarskij Ja. The Fall of an Intellectual: The Intellectual and Moral Atmosphere in Eleventh-Century Byzantium // Byzantine Studies Esseys on the Slavic World and the Eleventh Century. N.Y., 1992. P. 180. Gregoras Nikephoros. Antirrh. I. S. 291. 22–23. BeckH.-G. Humanismus und Palamismus. S.74. Gregoras Nikephoros. Antirrh. I. S. 289. 10–12. Losev A. F. Aesthetics of the Renaissance... P. 80. Aristotle. On interpretation // Aristotle. Op. M., 1978. T. 2. P. 93. Synesios. De insomniis. 134A (149.18 – 150.1. Terzaghi); 134V (150.5–7); cf.: Beyer G.-W.: Gregoras Nikephoros. Antirrh. I.S. 29–30. Losev A. F. Aesthetics... P.44. Gregoras Nikephoros. Antirrh. I. S. 288, 290. Beck H.-G. Humanismus und Palamismus. S.73. Polyakovskaya M. A. Portraits... P. 96. Podskalsky G. Theologie und Philosofie in Byzanz // BA. 1977. Hf. 15. S. 163. Meyendorff J. Society and culture in the fourteenth century: Religious problems // Byzantine hesychasm: Historical, theological and social problems. L., 1974. P. 56. Podskalsky G. Theologie ... S. 91. Uspensky F. I. Philosophical and theological movement in the XIV century // ZhMNP. 1892. No. 279 (Jan.-Feb.). P. 411. Beck H.-G. Kirche und theologische Literatur... S. 367, 780. Beck H.-G. Humanismus und Palamismus. S.78. Polyakovskaya M. A. About the pamphlet... P. 152, 154. Beck H.-G. Humanismus und Palamismus. S.75. Polyakovskaya M. A. About the pamphlet... P. 156. Ljubarskij Ja. The Fall of an Intellectual... Xerxes (519–465 BC) - the great king of the Persians from 466 BC, trying to conquer the Greek city-states, sent out letters demanding submission to him. We find a similar statement regarding Judas in the hymn of Roman the Psalmist “On the Laver” (see: Romanos le Melode. Hymnes. Introd., texte critique, trad. et notes par J. Grosdidier de Matons., IV (Sources Chretiennes, 128). P., 1967. P. 68–97 (hymn 33). Gr. Niceph. Hist. XXX, 267 (2). 1–2. On August 15, 1351, John Cantacuzene laid the tomos of the synod on the altar of the Church of Hagia Sophia. Having learned about this, Nikephoros Gregoras quoted the words of the Gospel: “If you see the horror of desolation in the Holy of Holies, then know that the fall of the Roman Empire is near” (see: Nikephoros Gregoras. Rhomaische Geschichte. S. 25. Aesop is a legendary Greek fabulist of the 6th century. BC e. - lived on about. Samos. Aristophanes (c. 445–306 BC) was a Greek poet and author of numerous comedies. Aristotle writes: “...To instruct is one thing: but to reason is another, and that the one who instructs should not pose questions, but explain himself, while the one who reasons should pose” (Aristotle. On sophistic refutations // Soch. M., 1978. Vol. 2. P.554. Probably the aforementioned treatise is meant, in which we read: “Almost all imaginary errors in speech arise from tode” (“this”)... this, although it denotes the neuter gender, often indicates masculine and feminine (see: Aristotle. On sophistic refutations. P. 561). “Man,” the most common example in Aristotle’s philosophical works, is a masculine word, so one can see the irony of Cabasilas in that he wants to emphasize Gregoras’s intention to intimidate his interlocutor with the clumsy sophist trick of speaking about a masculine word using the neuter demonstrative pronoun. Nicephoros Gregoras wrote the XXX book of his “History of the Romans” in the form of a dialogue in which a certain eyewitness, Agofonikos, reports everything to his friend Theotimus (see: Nicephoros Gregoras. Rhomische Geschichte. XXX. 266 (1). 7-12). In fact, Gregoras compares him with other heretics: Markellos Galatis, Photinos, Eunomius (see: Ibid. 274 (10). 3). Ibid. 274 (10–11). 19–20. Ibid. 275 (11–12). 6–18. Gregoras here refers only to Athanasius. He allows Palamas to present two arguments in defense of his teaching and references to Athanasius and John of Damascus (see: Ibid. 277 (14).10 – 278 (14).5). Gregoras speech takes up four pages (see: Ibid. 273 (9). 4 – 277 (13). 7). Gregoras says the same thing against Palamas, but not Palamas himself (see: Ibid. 277 (14). 8–10). For the first lemma see: Ibid. 278(15). 8–12; second – Ibid. 279(16). 6–19. Grigora begins an argument before presenting his opponent's argument; for the third lemma see: Ibid. 280 (17). 14–15; fourth – Ibid. 281(18). 3–5; fifth – Ibid. 281(19). 10–12; sixth – Ibid. 281(20). 19–20. Ibid. 284(22). 16–20; Arist. Peri herm., 16 a. Probably an allusion to Nikephoros Grigora's crude use of Aristotle's method, in the manner of carpenters. Here and below, there is probably an indication of the appearance of Nikifor Grigora. However, this cannot be stated with certainty, since no descriptions of it have been preserved. Gregoras began to study astronomy as a young man under the guidance of his teacher Theodore Metochites. Thanks to them, the study of astronomy spread in the intellectual circles of the capital and even acquired a certain social prestige (see: Gregoras Nikephoros. Antirrh. I. S. 21). No suitable meaning has been found for the word “skimpus” (see: LSJ. R. 1611). We assume that we are talking about a stand for a globe or for some astronomical instrument. We are probably looking at a description of Grigora's astronomical laboratory: with globes, diagrams and a star map on the ceiling. There is no doubt that Nikolai Kavasila, while in the capital, attended classes with Nikifor Grigora. Gregoras Nicephoros. Hist. XXX. 287(25). 9–13. See above the criticism that Gregoras does not allow students to challenge their views.