Задачи политической экономии

The field of knowledge of all mankind in general is so diverse - from knowledge of how to mine iron to knowledge of the movements of the stars - that a person is lost in this multiplicity of existing and in the infinity of possible knowledge, if he does not have a guiding thread along which he could arrange this knowledge, distribute it according to the degree of its meaning and importance. Before a person knows anything, he must decide that this object of knowledge is important for him, and more important and necessary than those other countless objects of knowledge with which he is surrounded. Before studying anything, a person already decides why he is studying this subject and not the others. 1. About subjectivism and objectivism in political economy. Political economy has a privileged position among the intellectual interests of modern cultural humanity, and it must be said that it rightfully occupies such a position. A modern person may have no idea about chemistry, not know physics, be ignorant of astronomy, etc. without significant damage to his moral personality, but unfamiliarity with the fundamentals of political economy deprives him of an understanding of the most important phenomena of society and therefore makes him deaf to the requirements of social morality, and therefore introduces a significant defect precisely into his moral personality. This role of political economy is not determined by the theoretical significance of its problems. The questions it deals with are factual in nature and concern the establishment and causal explanation of various phenomena of social life; therefore, in their immediate content, they are completely devoid of that burning and persistent nature that is characteristic, for example, of the basic questions of philosophical and religious consciousness, questions about good and evil, about the meaning of human life, about the content of the historical process, etc. We can say that in general, questions of political economy belong to the field not of theoretical, but of practical reason; they are dictated by the social and ethical quests of modern humanity, its aspirations to organize social relations on the basis of social justice, to ensure the greatest freedom of the individual from economic and social oppression. These liberating aspirations of our time bring to the forefront countless large and small questions of a practical nature, which as a whole merge into one common problem, whose name is the social question. The social question is the main and even the only problem that determines the entire content of political economy, its moral center. And if every morally developed person can and must remain indifferent to the demands of social justice, then he is thereby led to the study of political economy, which is therefore rightfully ranked among the general sciences (if the latter are those sciences that educate a person as a spiritual, rational and moral person, but only impart to him some special knowledge). So, political economy as a science is not autonomous, but heteronomy, its ideal or main task is given from the outside, and therefore it is not a science in the proper sense, but technology (in the above sense, see the article On the Economic Ideal), and more precisely, applied ethics. The question now is, how will the logical nature of political economy, its rights and obligations as a science be determined under these conditions, and where exactly is the boundary that separates the field of technology and pure science? The question of the unique logical, and at the same time ethical nature of social science in general and political economy in particular is not new in Russian and European literature. The clash between subjective sociology and economic materialism, which is still fresh in the memory of the Russian reader, occurred precisely on the basis of different understandings of the nature of social science. At present, we think, it is already possible to sum up some of the results of this literary struggle, showing the relative truth and untruth of both warring directions. Representatives of subjective sociology (and Mr. Mikhailovsky at their head), following Comte, argued that the ethical element from social science cannot be eliminated. Their merit here lies in the fact that, following the voice of natural feeling protesting against naturalistic doctrinairism, they refused to equate social science with natural science, defending the rights of the social ideal, the ethical demands of a living individual (this feature is especially evident in the struggle of Mr. Mikhailovsky with the naturalistic objectivism of Spencer’s sociology). But the subjectivists defended their just cause with absolutely unsuitable and, in the face of science, illegal means. The “subjective method” in science, this embodied logical contradiction, fundamentally destroys the very possibility of science - at present there is no need to prove this in detail, and this construction exhausts all the positive creativity of subjective sociology. She turns out to be powerless not only to solve, but also to correctly pose her problem. And this becomes clear as soon as we pay attention to the philosophical foundation on which subjective sociology built its edifice. It was dogmatic positivism, which leaves no room for autonomous ethics at all and, thought out to the end, leads to fatalistic determinism. This consequentiality, with which living consciousness does not and will never be reconciled, was avoided by subjective sociology only at the cost of logical inconsistency. Instead of turning to critical self-analysis, to the study of its philosophical foundation, subjective sociology began to engage in dogmatic constructions, not noticing their inconsistency. Therefore, it was quite natural that she was destined to be defeated by that teaching, which was based on the same philosophical foundation, but at the same time was distinguished by logical decisiveness, which did not stop even in the face of absurdity, as long as it represented a consistent conclusion from accepted, even one-sided or incorrect premises. Marxism was precisely that consistent application of positivism in sociology, which subjective sociology did not dare to be; and the denial of the meaning of ethics in sociology, the autonomy of the ideal, the role of the individual in history, in a word, Marxism consistently derived all its harsh doctrinarism from its philosophical premises, from its dogmatic positivism, therefore the victory of the “relentless objectivism” of Marxism over the “subjective method” turned out to be a completely natural and inevitable matter, for Marxism came not to destroy, but to fulfill the precepts of the dogmatic positivism that it served, but subjective sociology did not remain faithful to the end. However, the victory of Marxism was a Pyrrhic victory of dogmatic positivism, because it cost it too dearly, more than a living person could ever pay. Being associated in life with the current of practical idealism, Marxism was constantly tormented by an internal struggle between its logical consistency, which led to fatalistic determinism, and the demands of an effective moral consciousness, which did not put up with it. By a strange irony of fate, Marxists sought theoretical support for their social and ethical aspirations in a teaching that fundamentally excluded any independent role for ethics. If in subjective sociology the entire unbearability of consistent positivism was recognized, because the contradictions were blunted, now the situation has become hopeless. There was only one thing left: to subject to a critical test the philosophical foundation common to subjective sociology with Marxism, to transfer the question to a ground on which it can at least be discussed, that is, to the ground of the theory of knowledge, philosophical criticism. Stammler did this with the greatest success, and this is the enduring significance of his book in the history of social philosophy. 251 Stammler accomplished what subjective sociology, based on dogmatic positivism, strived for, albeit unsuccessfully. He, firstly, recalled the relativity of the law of causality, which is only a condition of knowledge, and by no means an absolute principle that does not tolerate competition or limitation, as it is accepted in the philosophy of dogmatic determinism. And, secondly, in this regard, he established the autonomy of the social ideal regardless of any special content of social science (although he left open the question of the metaphysical justification of this ideal; however, Stammler’s conclusions, which he himself did not associate with any metaphysical doctrine, necessarily lead to metaphysics). The blank wall of deterministic fatalism had been breached. 252 But Stammler himself not only did not make a wide enough passage in it, on the contrary, he seemed to deliberately obstruct the newly opened path and did everything to obscure the true significance of his work. Not only did he not use the data of his research for even a general outline of critical sociology, but he himself significantly distorted its true features. It was precisely by his doctrine of two “fundamental unities” in the “understanding” (Einsicht) of social phenomena that he introduced an impossible dualism into social science, and at the same time fell into contradiction with the unity of transcendental consciousness, which constitutes a necessary condition for all experimental knowledge. (This argument, which I put forward in previous articles about Stammler (Articles I and II), I fully support now). Thanks to this, there is significant ambiguity and incompleteness in the entire doctrine of social idealism. It is precisely the following question that remains unexplained: if we recognize the autonomy of the social ideal, which in this sense is a priori given or given for social science, then how then will the tasks of this latter be determined? In Stammler’s scheme of Causalität and Telos, the points of view of causality and ought or ideal remain equal, but not reconciled in experimental science, while one or another of their practical reconciliation is necessary for the very existence of social science (leaving aside the metaphysical side of this problem). Causality or obligation, the demands of the knower, theoretical reason or practical reason, will, in any case, one must be given priority in order to just get away from the soil of dualism. In our opinion, “primacy” in social science belongs to practical reason, social obligation. The social ideal creates social science, and is not created by it - this is what is clear here at first glance, and how it is defined as technology in contrast to pure science. But doesn’t this detract from science’s rights? By establishing the logical priority of the social ideal and declaring social science in general and political economy in particular as applied ethics, are we not denying its scientific character? Are we not subject to the same reproaches that were deservedly made to the representatives of subjective sociology by the Marxists? These are the fears that naturally arise in every representative of social science. How are subjectivism and a certain bias, which is inevitably introduced by the a priori nature of the social ideal, combined with objectivism and the demands of science? Is it possible and in what sense is “subjective” sociology constructed not dogmatically, by blunting irreconcilable contradictions, but critically, by logical delimitation of conflicting interests and their harmonious coordination? The existence of political economy is determined, on the one hand, by the presence in our consciousness of ideas about social justice or a social ideal that is in conflict with reality, and the resulting desire to embody the ideal in reality, to bring it closer to the ideal. If there were no discord and contradiction between ideal and reality, if everything in social life were smooth and nothing offended our moral consciousness, we would not need political economy and, of course, would not exist. Its purpose is to help in the fight against social evil, that is, with precisely what causes the existence of political economy - it sets itself, in this sense, the task of self-abolition, strives to make itself redundant. On the other hand, in addition to the conflict between the ideal and life, the objective condition that causes the existence of political economy lies in the complexity of the social reality with which modern humanity has to deal. If economic and social relations were so simple and transparent that personal experience and common sense would be enough to understand them, political economy could not develop into a special science; it would simply not be needed. The insufficiency of personal experience and individual understanding creates the need for collective and systematic observation, verified and supplemented by the collective work of thought; Along with the complication of economic life and its tasks, the content of political economy naturally becomes more complex. So, the main task of political economy is given to it from the outside; all of it is work on a given topic, and not of a scientific, but of a practical nature. And this determines its initial subjectivism, which cannot be eliminated by any appeals to objectivism and “scientificness.” But does this feature of political economy really threaten its scientific character in any way? Not at all. It is extremely easy to protect the rights of science and draw the line between the subjectivity of the task of political economy and the scientific nature of its implementation. The rights of subjectivism are limited only by this general statement of the problem. His demands boil down to the fact that the social question constitutes, indeed, the moral center of economic science, which can be connected by a radius to any of the points on the periphery of economic research. Those problems and scientific tasks to which this radius cannot in any way be extended stand outside political economy and, although they may turn out to be very interesting in some other respects, they are not of economic interest. Having a clear idea of ​​what exactly a given science asks is necessary in every branch of knowledge, for this represents a necessary condition for conscious and reasonable scientific work, which is precisely this consciousness that differs from soulless gelerterism, alien to true science. Therefore, an economist also needs to know what science asks him about in order to be... an economist. Without a clear consciousness of the applied tasks of social science, lawyers, in the old expression of Kant, are still looking for the concept of law, and economists disagree in the definition of an economic phenomenon and the corresponding subject of political economy. Without stopping to critically clarify the nature of political economy and its tasks, they want to create them with verbal definitions; Therefore, at the threshold of most textbooks and systems of economic science, you are greeted by a whole forest of similar definitions, which each author composes from his own head. Good with countless classifications, economy, income, wealth, utility, value, labor, etc., etc., all these verbal definitions, which exist mainly in order to “make systems out of words,” represent the fruit of such writing in the bad sense of the word, but, having safely passed this terminological purgatory, you reach the real content of economic science, which in general remains the same and is not determined at all by verbal wisdom. but by the demands of practical consciousness. The futility of terminological debates is explained by the fact that economists think by successful definitions to create the subject of their science, while it was given to them in advance and all that is required of them is the conscious pursuit of this goal. Therefore, perhaps, the best definition of economy (as well as law) is the absence of any precise definition, 253 due to the impossibility of which one has to be content with a practical surrogate of definitions made for a special purpose or from a special point of view, or based on external and crude signs. Stammler, in our opinion, made a big mistake in that he began to look for a constitutive feature of the economy, economic phenomena, etc., and saw this feature in legal regulation (hence his entire subsequent construction with its empty and sterile formalism). We cannot establish or constitute the subject of political economy, because we are not logically free here: we are given a certain practical problem, to the solution of which we must subordinate the entire logical apparatus of science. Meanwhile, according to Stammler and generally supporters of logical formalism (in the above sense), we must close our eyes to this vital and natural task of economic science and artificially compose it, or, in Latin, constitute its subject. It should also be noted that this constitution is essentially devoid of any objective criteria and restrictions, which is why other constructions that equally satisfy the requirements of logical formalism can be put forward next to Stammler’s construction. 254 By defining the general tasks of political economy or economic interest, the influence of subjectivism in economic science is limited, and then the bark of objective scientific research begins. Political economy, like any historical science, must, having outlined the circle of its observations in a certain way, pursue one task - the search for scientific truths by those scientific methods that are most suitable in each given case, and since political economy really wants to be a science, it must shun all subjectivism, i.e. tendentiousness, otherwise it becomes false and turns into mythology, so it is high time to forget the internally contradictory qualifications: bourgeois and proletarian science, which means nothing more or less than tendentious (in one direction or another) or false science; Such a qualification can only have the meaning of reproach or censure, and not at all any kind of praise. Conscious social policy requires a scientific understanding of social relations, scientific political economy. Engaging in any profession requires special training, special knowledge: a shoemaker must know the craft of shoemaking, an engineer must know the art of building railways, a banker must know banking. As part of economic science, with the development and complexity of economic life, an increasing number of different specialties are differentiated, which can rightfully be used by individual technical specialties: different types of banking, tariffs, railways, all kinds of branches of the financial economy, different branches of agrarian, industrial and trade policy, money, consumer societies, various cash desks, etc., etc. So many such semi-independent branches of economic technology have now been created that specialization within the limits of political economy has become an urgent necessity, and economists who know well or even simply know all the special branches of political economy have long ceased to exist. However, the need for these special branches of economic technology does not yet determine the need for scientific political economy; these economic specialties can exist independently of it (although, of course, they suffer certain damage from this). Scientific political economy, although its existence is caused by demands of a practical nature, does not directly serve any directly utilitarian purpose. Like any science, it is guided by the interests of a scientific and purely theoretical understanding of socio-economic reality. The task of political economy is the scientific analysis and causal explanation of the modern socio-economic system, which represents the environment where social policy has to act. Pursuing the tasks of scientific understanding, political economy does not directly teach its adherents any practical skill, but it gives that wisdom, which for practice is often more important than technical training. The practical results from the study of political economy cannot therefore be subjected to precise accounting, for they consist only of general political-economic development. However, this latter is something practically tangible, because the presence or absence of the skill for systematic thinking in a certain direction and the general breadth of spiritual horizons is reflected in any special activity. The usefulness of political economy therefore lies in the fact that, by providing general economic development, it increases the degree of consciousness in social policy. Having abandoned the narrowly utilitarian and petty practical criterion, we must define the very tasks of understanding socio-economic reality with the breadth with which modern scientific thought poses them. Although the ultimate goal of political economy is to understand the needs and events of our time, to analyze the current capitalist system, this does not mean that one can draw the absurd conclusion that political economy does not need, for example, economic history. On the contrary, history is a necessary and in many cases irreplaceable means for understanding modernity; comparative historical study often sheds completely new light on some of its aspects, just as statistical research allows us to look into areas that are accessible only to mass observation. Therefore, it is absolutely impossible to determine by any external boundaries where the area of ​​study necessary for understanding modernity ends, and modern political economy has spread in its study over almost all centuries and all the most important areas of the historical existence of mankind. But even in the absence of such external boundaries, one should still tie up loose ends and be always able to draw a radius from a given point on the circle of economic research to the moral center of political economy indicated above. This connection, of course, may not be direct, but indirect and mediocre, but it must exist. 255 Otherwise, we cross the threshold of political economy, and economic interest gives way to historical, archaeological, etc. The more vividly this connection is recognized by the researcher, the more vital (from an economic point of view) the subject of his chosen research will be; on the contrary, in the most distant corners where scientific research only goes under the conditions of modern academic (especially German) teaching, this connection is sometimes completely lost, scientific work, devoid of creative thought, turns into handicraft, and I am afraid that many of these handicraft products, which now appear in such abundance on the book market, despite their external scientific nature, remain and will forever remain useless for science and internally alien to it. Since it is impossible to draw an external boundary to the study of economics, the definition of this boundary is left to the discretion of each economist, and it is difficult to find two systematic treatises in which the scope of economic science is understood in exactly the same way. With its development, scientific material grows both in breadth and depth, due to which more and more of it goes into special departments and thereby remains outside the general and main content of political economy. Since political economy explains economic reality, it sets itself a task of a specific historical nature: it is possible to accurately describe, analyze and explain our economic system, that is, a certain historical fact. All studies of political economy in economic history and theory have the significance of an auxiliary means for the fulfillment of this main task. Within these limits, the tasks of political economy come close to almost complete coincidence with the tasks of historical science in general and economic history in particular. This convergence is so great that in some cases the difference between political economy and history is almost imperceptible, so that many economists can rightfully be considered historians and vice versa (Schmoller, Bucher, Inama, Ashley, Rogers, etc.). The difference between history and political economy nevertheless exists, and it is determined by their ultimate tasks - history is interested in economic evolution from the point of view of the general historical process, and political economy as an arena for the practical activities of a social politician, and this difference is reflected in the direction of scientific interests. Such a detailed study of the modern national economy in its smallest branches, such as we currently have in political economy, almost seems unnecessary for the purposes of history. In political economy, sometimes (especially in Marxism) the task is to find the “law of development” of society, according to which it would be possible to predetermine the nature of future social development, in short, to make a prediction or “forecast”. By fundamentally denying the possibility of such a forecast and historical prediction in general, we eliminate the task itself from economic science. However, do any practical differences arise from this between the content of political economy, which it has both among those who are looking for the mentioned law of development, and those who deny the possibility of finding it? After all, if we really do not have the means to predict future events, then desire alone does not provide the necessary means for this. By establishing the competence of social science, we do not at all mean to cut off its truly existing wings and stop its flight, therefore those who admit the possibility of predictions, considering themselves the possessors of some more complete and perfect knowledge that allows them to lift the veil of the future, obviously fall into illusion and take illusory knowledge for real knowledge. The point is this. As a result of historical and statistical analysis of the national economy, we come up with, as a final generalization, the most general and summary idea of ​​the nature or type of development, or, in generally accepted language, of its general trends. The idea of ​​development trends is always more or less abstract in nature, the individual features of the process are erased, and only its general features come to the fore. (In statistics, this destruction of the individual is achieved by applying the law of large numbers). Development trends, representing the highest and final stage of historical generalization, play a very important role in our aspirations for rational social policy and its plans. But, relying on the development trends established by social science, we must constantly remember their real meaning so as not to fall into gross errors. Firstly, it must be remembered that development trends represent a generalization of a very high degree of abstraction, and as such they do not correspond to individual, specific reality. Therefore, any use of them for judgment on issues of practical life necessarily requires individualization and careful consideration of specific conditions. Otherwise, the result is bias and doctrinaire, in which familiarity with general development trends does not contribute to, but rather hinders, an understanding of reality. So, for example, the undeniably existing tendency of industry towards concentration does not at all exclude the fact that, given certain conditions, this concentration may not exist, which is why it may be economically feasible to maintain small industry, for example, many handicraft industries; Meanwhile, in our country for a long time, and even now many are still putting an end to the entire handicraft industry, only on the basis of a general tendency towards concentration. We have an even more striking example of the same in the straightforward spread of the same tendency to concentrate on peasant farming, over which the death sentence was also pronounced on the same basis. The logical mistake that is made in this case is that general and summary features of the process are attributed to any individual development. Such a doctrinaire understanding of economic life is directly opposed to socio-political realism, which constitutes a healthy and viable grain of the economic system of Marxism. Secondly, we must not lose sight of the fact that the development trend established for a given moment has very limited significance for the future. History does not repeat itself; the historical principium individuationis lies in the non-repetition of historical events; therefore, any given development trend is modified by the inexhaustible creativity of history. However, despite the unsuitability of development trends for a completely scientific judgment. Regarding the future, practically we cannot refuse such a judgment, and the only material for this judgment is the present, the data of which are generalized in development trends. With such use of them, we are right insofar as the future is the legacy of the present, although not a literal repetition of it; In this case, we judge not so much about the future itself, but about the present, as an element of the future. This is practically enough to base the activities and plans of social policy on the development trends established by social science, because the plan of this activity, although its task is the future, is always carried out in the present. However, theoretically, any such use of trends of present and past development to judge the future requires one essential reservation, namely ceteris paribus, other things being equal. But we know that this clause can never be fulfilled, because history does not tolerate ceteris paribus, and therefore the book of future events always remains closed. However, different shades are possible here: some of the conditions of historical development change, as we know from experience, faster, others more slowly. Regarding the conditions for which this slowness is greatest, social science becomes able to make almost exact predictions. We have a striking example of such predictions in some departments of statistics, where they create completely solid ground for the activities of insurance companies. 256 On the contrary, where the pace of historical development is less regular and more rapid, there the methods of statistical knowledge are inapplicable. It is in vain, therefore, to think that statistics is an ideal for all social science and that its advantages are explained by any special advantages of the statistical method: this is explained solely by the limitations of its object, precisely by the fact that statistics deals with the most stable conditions of social life, and where these conditions become more mobile, statistics turns out to be powerless for predictions. Those who generally admit the possibility of social forecast discard this essential clause ceteris paribus; They do not notice that in wanting to predict historical events, they eliminate them in advance, because each such event represents something completely new and denies the ceteris paribus formula. It is only on this logical error, from which social forecasts are based, that the illusion of historical prediction rests. Above we noted the difference between history and political economy, as it affects the direction of their interests. But it is also expressed in the fact that, while the task of the historian is exhausted by objective historical analysis, the economist in no way can consider his task to be over. He also has the responsibility to develop a social policy plan based on objective research data; his tasks include, along with the study of social existence, the establishment of social obligations. Social policy is not at all some kind of external, mechanical appendage to political economy or its “department”, which may or may not exist, like any other special department; on the contrary, it is an integral part of political economy, its raison d’etre. For as technology (in the above sense) or applied ethics, political economy asks not about what is, but about what should be, and only in matters of determining this ought does it turn to a biased analysis of historical existence. In this sense, we can say that social policy is not only not a part of political economy, on the contrary, all political economy in its internal structure and ultimate goal is social policy. It is very characteristic in this sense that different schools of political economy differ not so much in theoretical differences as in socio-political ones: free trade, kateder-socialism, socialism, agrarian or industrial protectionism, the politics of the “middle class”, etc. But here we return again to the question of the peculiar logical nature of political economy. The task of social policy is to establish social obligations. It presupposes, firstly, a certain assessment of existing reality and, secondly, the construction of an ideal and certain practical requirements, meaning a change in the existing system in the direction of this ideal. It is not difficult to see that in this part of political economy is characterized by fundamental and irreducible subjectivism. In fact, the ethical assessment of existing reality and the construction of the ideal of social policy is a deliberately subjective matter, simply because it necessarily includes an element of creativity, which is close to artistic creativity. First of all, as for the assessment of reality, it is true that it is made on the basis of the absolute and objective idea of ​​​​social justice. But we already know that it, being abstract in itself, represents only a regulatory idea that creates the possibility of moral judgment in general, but does not determine its specific content. The latter still needs to be found, and this search, this substitution of concrete, numerical quantities into an abstract algebraic formula, is a process of moral creativity, which has a complete analogue in artistic creativity. Creating a specific ideal and finding ways to it is a matter of creative intuition. Subjectivism is necessarily inherent in any creativity, creation from oneself, or from one’s subjectivity, and since political economy is not only a science, but also technology, it not only states what exists, but also postulates what should be, subjectivism cannot be eliminated from it. This judgment, in the eyes of many, means a death sentence for political economy as a science. However, such a conclusion seems to us to be highly erroneous; it is simply a prejudice based on the identification of the concepts of subjectivity and arbitrariness. It is indisputable that the inevitability of subjectivism from political economy makes a radical, fundamental difference between it and, for example, chemistry or physics, which are free from any subjectivism. But this difference is created here not by the fact of the presence of subjectivism or its absence in itself, for it is not independent here, but a derivative result of a deeper difference in the subject itself and the tasks of study, which in either case cannot in any way be equated with each other. Spinoza’s motto: “not to cry, not to laugh, but to understand” and “to consider human actions as if they were planes and geometric bodies” (which previously seemed to me an ideal for social science) does not at all express the general requirement of true scientificity, without any distinction applicable to all branches of knowledge. In fact, what is the essence of the phenomena that social science studies, what is our cognitive interest here? Not at all in the affairs and relationships of people depersonalized to the point of geometricity, because such depersonalization destroys the phenomenon itself, that is precisely in it, in which it exists for us. A certain passion, laughter and tears, approval and condemnation are immanent in social science and social understanding, and therefore the motto of Spinozism and any “abstract” objectivism in general destroys the very possibility of social science, seeking to restore its rights. So, social science in general and political economy in particular cannot understand without crying and laughing; this is not only its right, but also its duty. And the one for whom human affairs really appear as geometric drawings, but can be a sociologist, just as a blind man cannot be a painter, and a deaf musician. And vice versa, all those who wrote their names in the history of social science were people who were extremely passionate about various phenomena of social reality, who burned with great love and hatred, and brought this flame that burned themselves into the social laboratory (such are the majority of socialists); on the contrary, history does not know significant sociologists of the “geometric” type. Therefore, the success of studying social science presupposes in a sociologist the presence of not only mental, but also moral development; social science will help to treat his moral personality with that indifference that is completely natural, for example, in chemistry and physics. And in this struggle with the claims of arrogant objectivism - I repeat this again - lies the truth of subjective sociology, no matter how poorly the latter has substantiated it philosophically. 257 Now we should more clearly delimit the rights and obligations of subjectivism. Although it cannot be eliminated from social science when assessing reality and constructing a social ideal, even here subjectivism should not be meaningless or even antilogical arbitrariness, or, simply, tyranny based on the principle: sic volo, sic jubeo. Such subjectivism has neither scientific nor moral value, and therefore, in both respects, remains outside social science. Legitimate subjectivism should strive for the possible elimination of personal arbitrariness and its replacement with objective ought (as rightly pointed out by Stammler). A work of artistic creativity acquires objective meaning insofar as it ceases to express only the subjectivity of the artist, but also makes the consonant strings of other people sound and contains a universal element. Likewise, the socio-political ideal is higher the more objective it is in its justification, the more completely personal tastes are eliminated from it, and the more scientific it is. The main requirement that must be presented to sociological subjectivism is that it must be scientifically possible, controlled by means of scientific experience. But are we not reproducing in this statement the same contradiction that lies in the concept of “scientific socialism” (as explained in the previous article)? It didn’t happen at all, because in both cases we are talking about different things. In one case, we were talking about the impossibility, on the basis of necessity alone, of obtaining any kind of obligation at all, and in the other we are interested in the question of the special content of an obligation or ideal, already given in a general form, but seeking a specific definition. The very ideal or idea of ​​social justice does not allow and does not need scientific justification; on the contrary, its special content must be discussed and proven on the basis of experimental science, and in this sense one can speak of a scientific ideal. And the more elements of scientific experience are included in the content and justification of a particular ideal, the greater the convincing power of its requirements in the minds of other people. Scientific argumentation, put forward to justify certain socio-political demands, various specific ideals, creates the ground for a scientific dispute between their representatives, and the very possibility of such a dispute presupposes, at least, an understanding of mutual argumentation, therefore, a scientific, objective-logical basis for discussion, which would, of course, be impossible with complete logical tyranny, excluding all logic and all reasons. In this way, the possibility of scientific continuity and, in general, collective scientific creativity in the development of specific ideals and objective progress in this area will be created. However, despite all the possible scientific nature of social policy, the influence of subjectivism in the construction of a social ideal is reflected in the fact that the sign of indisputability, objectivity, which would exclude the possibility of the simultaneous existence of different ideals, is absent here. Scientific truth, once recognized and proven, becomes a common property that must be learned by everyone who has once understood it; she does not tolerate competition. On the contrary, in social politics, where the dominant role is played not by knowledge, but by will and the associated subjectivity of desire, one cannot even dream of such unity and indisputability. Therefore, a specific social ideal can be to a greater or lesser extent scientific, supported by the data of scientific experience and trusted by them, but it cannot become a completely objective science, as the representatives of scientific socialism considered it (with its formula: Socialismus ist eine Wissenschaft). So, the mutual relationship between subjectivism and objectivism in political economy is generally defined as follows. The very subject of political economy is determined not by its objective, but by its subjective meaning, by the needs not of knowledge, but of will. But this subjectively determined subject of political economy is subjected to objective analysis, completely scientific study, and at this point political economy is logically no different from history and any objective science in general. But its final task - developing a plan for social policy - also necessarily includes an element of subjectivism, controlled, however, by scientific objectivism. 2. About the so-called theoretical economy. With the understanding of the tasks of political economy that was outlined above, there is no room left for the so-called theoretical economy, that is, for the theory of value, capital, profit, rent and related problems. Next in line we now have a critical discussion of the problems of theoretical economics, to which many economists attach such importance that they consider it political economy par excellence, its most scientific part. But before turning to its fundamental discussion, it is necessary to first clear the field for it by eliminating those misunderstandings that are associated with some teachings of theoretical economy, namely with the teachings of the school of Ricardo-Marx on the one hand and its opponents on the other. There is a strong opinion that the so-called labor theory of value and the associated theory of surplus value and capital justify the demands of socialism; proof of their validity is therefore considered extremely important for the establishment of these ideals. This opinion is shared not only by many adherents of socialism, but also by its opponents, who zealously criticize the Ausbeutungstheorie, believing that by doing so they prove the justice of the existing order of things and refute its critics. Thanks to its journalistic significance, the question of the theory of value, the most scholastic of all economic theories, received such a prominent place in economic literature and could arouse passions like any of the “damned” questions, and with such an understanding of its significance, it really turns into a “damned” question. Arguing about the labor theory of value, about surplus value and its norm, about the rate of profit, etc. etc., they were not arguing about these scholastic subtleties at all, but about burning questions of moral consciousness, about the social ideal; they were arguing, in the end - it’s strange to say - about the ideal tasks of human life. Anyone who understands the real ethical background of this interest in the problems of theoretical economics will find it quite natural that until recently they were given a fair place in general journalism, and their discussion aroused the greatest attention not among professional economists, but precisely among intellectuals hungry and thirsty for the truth. We believe, however, that such importance was attached to the problems of theoretical economy and in particular the labor theory of value by mistake and misunderstanding. 258 The main idea of ​​the labor theory of value and the resulting theory of surplus value is that profit on capital and all types of income in general, except wages, represent the product of unpaid labor or exploitation, which is why the labor theory of value is given the name Ausbeutungstheorie, the theory of exploitation. It aims to clearly show the injustice of the existing system, which is based on the recognition of property rights, but at the same time does not leave the worker with the product of his labor. True, Marx – through the mouth of Engels – warned against an ethical understanding of the theory of surplus value. However, it is clear to any unprejudiced reader of Capital that Marx was the first to fail to fulfill the requirement set forth by Engels - to see surplus value as a “simple fact” (see the preface to Elend der Philosophie). On the contrary, the presentation of this theory - especially in the first volume of Capital - represents a complete indictment of capitalist production. Like a merciless prosecutor, Marx monitors all – real or imaginary – capitalists’ tricks to increase the “exploitation rate” of labor, depicting the course of capitalist development as the result of the capitalists’ conscious desires to increase it. The entire second and third volumes of Capital are devoted to the further development and elimination of contradictions of this theory. If we exclude several chapters in the first volume of a historical nature, then we can say that the entire “Capital”, the entire unique economic system of Marx consists precisely in the development to the smallest detail of the theory of exploitation. (Russian Marxism, which brought to the fore the sociological side of Marx’s teaching, economic materialism, relied not so much on Capital as on the minor works of Marx and Engels), let us accept that Marx’s theory of value with all its conclusions does not suffer from any logical defects and does not raise any serious objections at all. But even in this case, for the purpose of substantiating the social ideal and for “criticizing the political economy” of capitalism, on the one hand, it is insufficient, and on the other, simply unnecessary. It is insufficient because the fact of the existence of surplus value in itself is not incriminating a given social system. By postulating the right of the working class to the entire product of social labor, we stand on the basis of antisocial individualism and the crudest materialism (in the sense of recognizing only physical labor as productive). In the modern productive process, which represents the result of a long historical development, can this or that worker say: I personally did this and that, and this belongs to me alone? Only Robinson could have said this on his island, because he really did everything with his own personal strength. In addition, this right, obviously, can be accurately formulated only in relation to representatives of physical labor, because only this labor is expressed in a sensory-tactile product (although not always), while the work of a scientist, engineer, technician, etc. would remain outside of this calculation. But, obviously, no production is possible if only physical labor is considered productive and, therefore, establishing the right to the product of labor. Otherwise, we must make a deduction from the total product of labor in favor of the representatives of intellectual labor, and this deduction, from the point of view of the representatives of physical labor, is already surplus value. It is also necessary for children, disabled people, and, since man does not live on bread alone, it is also necessary to support the existence of representatives of the so-called liberal professions. In general, if we recognize that all humanity cannot equally engage in physical labor, both due to physical and moral conditions, then the surplus value or deduction from the national product (not counting the necessary deduction for capitalization or expansion of production) will remain irremovable even under a communist system, as Marx points out. 259 In general, there is no possibility and no sense in putting forward such a purely individualistic principle of distribution in a collective mode of production, and its consistent application would lead to the greatest injustices. On this basis, the mere fact of the existence of surplus value does not yet compromise capitalist production, since it is characteristic of various economic organizations, and in general it turns out to be irreducible. What really compromises capitalism is not this fact as such, but its setting and the meaning it receives from it. But this situation can be studied in itself, and the theory of surplus value adds nothing to its analysis. The exploitation of child labor is equally terrible, whether it is carried out out of "Profitwuth" or because of the struggle for existence (for example, in small crafts), both in the case when it is profitable and when it does not give the expected profit, which often happens in industrial life. And vice versa, from the point of view of these accompanying circumstances, the transition from the organization of labor in which there is no at least any direct “exploitation” to an organization based on it may turn out to be true social progress, if this transition is accompanied by an improvement in the economic or social situation of the working people (example: the transition from an independent, but bankrupt peasant economy or declining small craft to factory labor; the main idea of Russian Marxism as applied to the economic development of Russia was precisely the inevitability and socio-economic progressiveness of such a transition). This means that if the point is not in surplus value as such, but in the general social situation, then it is obvious that the theory of surplus value in itself is not enough to substantiate the social ideal and criticize the existing system. But, being insufficient for this purpose, the labor theory of value thereby turns out to be superfluous. It is unnecessary to substantiate the social ideal, however, also because it already has a completely sufficient substantiation in the doctrine of the ideal nature of the human person and its natural rights and responsibilities arising from the idea of ​​social justice (see the previous article), and this substantiation is so indisputable that looking for another is unnecessary wasted work. However, any attempt to find another, special, justification for the social ideal, as far as it achieves the goal, leads to the same central concept of social justice. In particular, the theory of surplus value, establishing the fact of economic exploitation as the basis of the capitalist system, has the goal of nothing more than to show the injustice of this system, in order to then put forward an ideal that denies this injustice. But for a general assessment of the justice or injustice of a given system, this dialectical detour, which is the theory of surplus value, is unnecessary if the same conclusion can be obtained by looking at things directly and without recourse to the theory of value; This requires facts, not theories. The best proof of this is that there are socialists who reject the labor theory of value as incorrect and unscientific; therefore, it does not at all represent the only door through which one ascends to the social ideal. So, in the interests of substantiating the social ideal, those complex structures that were built in the economic doctrine of Capital turn out to be unnecessary. But perhaps theoretical economy is self-sufficient, and Marx’s theory of value has independent economic significance, regardless of the real or imaginary relationship to the social ideal that is ascribed to it? This brings to the fore the question of the meaning of theoretical economy and its problems. The task of political economy, like any science, is not only to critically establish the facts of economic life, their classification and grouping, but also to explain them, that is, to establish causal relationships between known groups of economic phenomena. In the motley variety of phenomena, the unity of the causal connection that penetrates them is sought, the law of development of these phenomena or their type. Knowledge of laws is the goal of any science, which, beginning with actual research, ends with scientific theory. Similarly, in political economy, factual or inductive study is summarized into more or less broad generalizations concerning the causal relationship of the phenomena being studied, the law of their development. Depending on their nature in each given case, the very establishment of facts sometimes requires preliminary research using the most complex methods of historical and statistical analysis, and sometimes, on the contrary, they are known from direct experience, and therefore such research becomes unnecessary. In political economy we naturally have as many scientific theories as there are individual questions, and the number of both is constantly increasing. Thus, the study of the history of prices leads to a theory of prices, that is, to a causal explanation of their movements; observations of the phenomena of monetary circulation create a theory of money, both metallic and paper monetary circulation; the study of the history of wages leads to the creation of various explanations of its movement, to theories of wages; the study of the phenomena of land circulation and the formation of land prices ends with well-known generalizations regarding the conditions for setting land prices; the study of the conditions of capitalist circulation of goods creates a theory of jerks; observations of the movement of population lead to a theory of population: the study of the general conditions and prerequisites of a capitalist economy leads to a general theory of capitalism, etc., etc. Here it would be necessary to list the entire content of political economy in its entirety. Any such scientific theory, regardless of the breadth of its range of observations and, consequently, its task, strives for the same thing, namely, a causal interpretation of observed phenomena, to find the unity of patterns in their diversity. Scientific theory in general and economic theory in particular does not have and cannot have any other task. In this sense, the teachings of so-called theoretical economy are distinguished by a completely special character. These teachings are completely unsuitable for the type of realistic theories that were just discussed. A scientific theory is a natural continuation and final result of actual study; it is inextricably linked with this factual basis on which it rests. The construction of every scientific theory therefore begins with the establishment of facts. Theoretical economy does not establish any special facts, using data already established in science. It also does not set out to discover new facts in any special deductive or theoretical way (just as the planet Neptune was discovered through mathematical calculations); theoretical economy in this sense has not discovered anything and will not discover anything. Theoretical economics also does not set as its task an empirical or historical analysis of economic phenomena: the theory of value is not at all a catallactic or a guide to commodity science and trade, and the theory of capital not only does not give those practical instructions that one respectable businessman expected from it, who bought “Capital” (in quotes) in the hope of learning from it the surest way to make capital (without quotes), but also does not concern the practice of industrial life at all. (It is characteristic in this regard that competition analysis was excluded from Capital by design). Theoretical economics does not set itself the task of explaining certain aspects and issues of empirical reality, which is done by any special economic theory. What, then, is the proper work of theoretical economy, what does it do? It deals with reasoning about facts established and analyzed in special departments of political economy. She poses approximately the following question: how can one think in abstraction about the connection between certain facts (the phenomena of prices, profits, capital, rent), in addition to the empirical connection between them, established and explained in political economy? What logical bridge can be built based on these solid foundations? It does not find its task directly in experience, but invents it, composes it, and thereby invents itself. That theoretical economics does not actually have the goal of experimental knowledge, study and analysis of reality is clear from its content. After all its logical efforts and constructions, our empirical knowledge is not enriched at all, so for the understanding of economic reality, nothing will be lost by those who remain completely alien to speculation about value, etc., as is well known from the history of economic science. 260 The inexperienced nature of the teachings of theoretical economy was well expressed by Sombart when, analyzing the economic teachings of Marx, he gave the following definition of value: value is a mental fact (Werth ist Gedankeuthatsache), existing in the head of a theoretician-economist. And this should be said not only about value, but also about all the most important concepts of theoretical economy. Using a philosophical term, we can say that behind economic phenomena it looks for the economic thing in itself (Ding an sich): in prices it looks for the value hidden behind them, in different types of income - a single surplus value, etc. Readers of Capital will remember that it opens with the doctrine of the substance of value, which is also defined as a kind of thing in itself, never observed in experience: abstract human labor, that is, labor devoid of any quality, reduced to a homogeneous and, moreover, average social quantity, measured by labor time: truly Gedankenthatsache! If we turn to the Austrian school, then here too we will find an economic thing in itself, albeit of a different kind, namely the unit of need, in general the quantitative measurement and comparison of different needs, which in experience exist only qualitatively different. Thus, theoretical economy has a very great external resemblance to metaphysics. But is it possible to seriously equate theoretical economy with metaphysics? Of course not. Not to mention the fact that most economists shy away from metaphysics, not to mention the fact that when it comes to questions of the theory of knowledge, most economists stand on the basis of the most primitive empiricism, which excludes the very possibility of a real understanding of the difference between metaphysics and experimental knowledge, the similarity between metaphysics and theoretical economics is limited to purely external features, because theoretical economics does not want to go beyond the limits of experience, strives to provide an explanation of experimental reality, albeit from a slightly different angle than special theories. Such a meta-empirical, but at the same time not metaphysical discipline, obviously, can only operate with abstractions, and these abstractions do not correspond to empirical reality, even in the most general terms. The possibility of such a discipline is explained by the fact that we have a formal ability for abstraction, which we must, however, constantly keep under the control of criticism, so as not to fall into self-deception and not consider our logical fantasies to correspond in any way to reality. The ability for abstraction is likened to a windmill that works in any wind, regardless of whether there is grain to grind in it. Theoretical economics, in essence, poses the question this way: if we agree to consider value (or profit, or capital, etc.) as this or that, then how can one think in the abstract about the connection between this concept and other concepts abstracted from experimentally established facts? She considers her task solved if she manages to carry out the chosen feature through Scylla and Charybdis, that is, without falling into internal logical contradictions on the one hand, and direct contradictions with facts on the other, a theory that will be free from these contradictions will be considered correct. But under this condition, it is quite possible that several theories may turn out to be “true” in this sense (at present, two equally developed systems of theoretical economy claim their right to be true: the teachings of Marx and the Austrian school). The sadness of the situation of theoretical economy and the inevitability of such a situation becomes completely understandable, because the starting point of the entire abstract construction hangs in the air, is determined by arbitrariness: I can recognize as the “substance of value” abstract labor, marginal utility, simply usefulness, rarity, whatever, and if I am able to carry this feature through the whole system without contradictions, then I am in the same full right as other theorists, and my theory in this sense is as correct as everyone else the rest. We can take another step in this direction. Instead of abstract concepts, you can start using algebraic signs. Of course, the algebraic sign is already the last degree of abstraction, but there is no need to object to the possibility of using even this degree of abstraction, since such uncontrolled powers are generally given to it. If we allow ourselves this small liberty - we equate economic phenomena and relationships with algebraic signs, we, of course, will have full scope for economic “theory”, because then we have both integral and differential calculus at our service, in general all of mathematics, you can turn to geometry and depict economic life graphically... It may seem to an outside reader that I am slandering theoretical economics and its caricature, but anyone familiar with economic “trends” knows that there is no fiction here at all and that in fact, among them there is a mathematical trend that actually fulfills, but at least in an external way, Spinoza’s motto - equating human affairs and relationships with geometric and mathematical quantities (Cournot, Walras, Gossen, Jevons, Edgeworth, partly Hobson and others). The mathematical direction is the last word and at the same time a reduction to the absurdity of theoretical economics and its tasks, for it turns it into innocent mathematical exercises, a game of a philosophically undisciplined mind. 261 Given the nature of theoretical economy, any progress in science that would lead to clarification of the issue and, if not to agreement and the establishment of generally accepted truths, then at least to its possibility, is obviously out of the question. Anyone who studies theoretical economics considers it his scientific honor to invent something of his own; therefore, the number of new teachings and their shades is increasing, and each new work in this area only increases existing disagreements and misunderstandings. This is how this new scholasticism multiplies, a sad monument to the impotence of overly specialized thought, which in its isolation has lost a living sense of reality. And the more gifted the author and the more intelligence and wit he expends on his work, the more sad the impression this fruitless expenditure of mental energy makes (the works of the luminaries of the Austrian school, Monter, Wieser, etc., also make on me). And Tolstoy’s caustic irony involuntarily stirs in my soul, which, unfortunately, applies to any science, but for this case is quite suitable. “Nekhlyudov asked the boy if he had learned to add? “I learned,” answered the boy. “Well, put it down: paw.” - “Which paw is a dog’s?” – the boy answered with a sly face. Nekhlyudov found exactly the same answers in the form of questions in scientific books” (Resurrection). It seems to us that theoretical economics poses with a significant air the same idle question in the theory of value: which paw, a dog’s? Naturally, the further into the forest, the more firewood. Given this general state of affairs, of course, extraordinary importance is attached to purely verbal disagreements, verbal definitions. That is why terminology grows so excessively and without real necessity, because such verbal differences sometimes lead to different theoretical constructions. 262 Based on what has been said, we come to a radical solution to the question of theoretical economy: it, with all its scholastic baggage, must be thrown overboard of political economy as the fruit of a scientific misunderstanding, because there is no problem here. By eliminating economic pseudo-metaphysics (which has a much more implacable enemy in real metaphysics than in positivism) and preserving the character of a strictly empirical science for political economy, we take a step towards the historical school in political economy, although we do not share its fear of any scientific generalization, from which, however, it, in the person of its best representatives, is free. To an even greater extent, we do not share its indecision, and sometimes even bourgeoisism in matters of social policy; the progress of economic science should, in our opinion, be made in the direction of a synthesis of the socio-political requirements of Marxism and the scientific empiricism of the historical school. We have outlined the general outline of the system of idealistic social policy, as it appears to us both in its ideal foundations and in its scientific and empirical part. As the reader can see, it differs from the socio-political system of Marxism not so much on practical requirements as on theoretical grounds. Trying to substantiate in positive science a social ideal that is absolute in nature and meaning, Marxism not only fails to achieve this goal, but for the sake of this it clutters up economic science with unnecessary scholasticism. On the contrary, if we recognize in advance that the absolute ideal is higher than experimental justification, because it is rooted in metaphysical and religious truths, then the ideal itself receives the necessary indisputability and inviolability, and social science is freed from a whole series of incorrectly posed and therefore insoluble problems that needlessly hinder its development. So, the system of social idealism presupposes an internal connection between the super-experienced ideal and experienced reality. I tried to show the necessity, possibility and even inevitability of this connection in this book, and this is its main and most sincere idea. The riddle of life is solved not by the one who, from the height of “detached” idealism, coldly surveys our life, where the high is mixed with the low and good fights with evil, and not by the one who in this struggle forgets about the ideal principles in the name of which this struggle is waged and without which life would turn into a meaningless game of elements and passions, but by the one who in thought and in life realizes the principles of effective idealism, who, in the words of Vl. Solovyova, The golden chain will close and connect heaven and earth. For a presentation of Stammler’s teaching, see the article “On the Law of Social Phenomena,” Chapters I-II. The most deadly thing for Marxism, as a consistent determinism, in Stammler’s book is his doctrine of freedom, if only in the epistemological sense, and the doctrine of the autonomy of the social ideal based on it. It is natural, therefore, that at one time the main efforts of my Marxist criticism (Articles I and II) were directed precisely against these teachings. As a result of the polemic with Stammler and Struve, it became clear to me that the ideal is not given by science, as real Marxism thinks, but by “life,” therefore, it is not scientific or unscientific and in this sense is autonomous relative to science. Of course, it was impossible to be satisfied with such a unique epistemological category as “life” for long, so in the end we had to return again to the question of the nature of the social ideal. This time it became quite clear that the negative definition of the “extra-scientific” ideal is not enough and that by its nature it is not only extra-scientific, but also super-scientific, super-experimental and, therefore, refers to metaphysics. Wed. article "Economy and Law". Of course, the definition has a completely different meaning when it is given at the end of the study and is its result. In this case, it represents, as it were, an abbreviated formula for the conclusions of the study. But a definition in this sense has a purely external resemblance to that preliminary and purely verbal definition, which does not want to be determined by research, but predetermines it. This evil makes itself felt most forcefully in the so-called theoretical economy (about which below). Obviously inspired by Stammler, we find the formulation of the problems of political economy in Sombart: “I proceed, he says in the introduction to Der modeme Kapitalismus, from the assumption that the specific feature of the theory should be seen in the application of the unifying principle of explanation.” This very vague and indefinite formulation remains, however, without any serious influence on the nature of Sombart’s research and, at most, is expressed in the desire to find traces of “capitalism” everywhere. This connection of the most apparently remote subjects of economic study with the burning interests of this modernity is often accessible even to superficial, direct observation: for example, the emergence of theories of socialism aroused special interest in the historical study of doctrines and economic institutions, more or less akin to socialism; the question of the communal life of the Russian peasant arouses interest in the communal life in India, Java, the Inca state, etc.; if the revision of trade treaties is next in line, literature is quickly created on their history and current situation in different countries; Modern life provides such examples at every step. But even in cases where statistics provide for known quantitative changes, for example. population growth, it does this based on the idea of ​​​​a certain and unchanging type of these changes; but as soon as any extraordinary reason appears (epidemic, famine, etc.), all her calculations turn out to be incorrect. Of course, while defending the legitimate rights of subjectivism, we do not preach tendentiousness or arbitrariness at that stage of social research where it is devoted exclusively to historical analysis and where the demands of Spinozism are quite appropriate. We believe that the previous presentation has sufficiently eliminated the possibility of such an assumption. Like most Marxists, the writer of these lines had a long-term logical love affair with the labor theory of value. Just before the publication of the third volume of Capital, I prepared for publication a work on the equal rate of profit on capital based on the labor theory of value (my respected teacher, Prof. A. I. Chuprov, first drew my attention to this issue and its decisive importance in the entire economic system of Capital). In this work I turned out to be plus rojaliste que le roi, because I tried to resolve the issue without any restrictions of the labor theory of value (through the combined influence of differences in the rate of surplus value and the different speed of turnover of circulating and variable capital in it, which for capitals of different organic composition creates a different annual rate of surplus value and thereby equalizes its total amount per capital of a given size). The publication of the third volume of Capital brought me severe disappointment, because, contrary to all the promises of Engels, it did not give anything new in comparison with Rodbertus and contained a decisive modification of the understanding of value that was outlined in the first two volumes of Capital. (This disappointment was fully reflected in the article “The Third Volume of K. Marx’s Capital,” published in Russian Thought 1895, III). Despite the fact that I suffered the fate of Alyosha Karamazov when his old man “smelled away,” I (like Alyosha) soon managed to restore my former attitude towards Capital (so that subsequently I never changed the labor theory of value for the sake of its Austrian rival). But for this, I had to make persistent and constant efforts to maintain the difficult position created by the combination of the teachings of volumes I and III of Capital - as a result, a series of conciliatory attempts appeared, beginning with the article “What is labor value” (Collection of Jurisprudence and Social Knowledge, ed. Moscow. Legal. General, vol. VI), continuing with the articles “Basic concepts of political economy. I. Value. II. Capital" (Scientific Review, 1898, VI and 1899, I-II) and ending with a chapter on rent in the book "Capitalism and Agriculture", vol. I, ch. II. Pas Kapital, III, 2. 354. Such a judgment may be objected to by reference to Marx, in whose presentation the theory is directly combined with empirical material, so that the impression of real unity is obtained. But this unity is only visible and is explained by the purely external schematism of the arrangement of empirical material in Marx. The empirical theories contained in Capital lose nothing if their connection with the central theoretical trunk is severed (for example, the doctrine of overpopulation, the working day, factory legislation, forms of industry and machines, primitive accumulation, etc.). Their scientific tenacity is completely unrelated to the fate of the theoretical constructions of Capital and may well survive even if these latter are rejected (which we observe among many economists and even some Marxists). We are generally of the opinion that the entire theoretical scheme can be removed from the historical content of Capital, like a glove from a hand, without any harm to this content, which is subject to historical rather than theoretical criticism. Mutatis mutandis the same can be said about Rodbertus, who, however, is much less guilty of external schematism than Marx. Those economists who were not satisfied with such naive practice of political economy made an attempt to critically substantiate this right to logical arbitrariness when choosing the central concept that forms the basis of the system of theoretical economy. In this way, a critical direction in theoretical economics is created, which, however, has so far been represented only by Stammler, Sombart and the writer of these lines (in the articles “On the Basic Concepts of Political Economy”). In these articles, I considered it still possible to “constitute,” that is, to create, according to purely formal and arbitrarily chosen criteria, an object of knowledge of theoretical economy (which, of course, has no justification in empirical science). But already in these articles much of what is usually introduced into the theory of value was thrown overboard. Going further in the direction of criticizing the problems of theoretical economy, I necessarily came to my current point of view on this issue, that is, to a complete denial of their right to exist. In connection with the question of the rights of theoretical economy, a strange dispute arose about the deductive and inductive method in political economy, which occupies such a prominent place in economic literature, as if political economy had any methods of its own, in contrast to general logical ones, and as if it were possible in scientific or everyday thinking to limit oneself to deduction or induction. In connection with the rights of theoretical economy, the question of motivation was also discussed, also inflated and exaggerated. Both of these questions are not of fundamental importance, which is why we do not dwell on them in detail here.