Глава 2. Фома Аквинский об обожении

2.1 Terminology of deification in scholasticism (before Thomas Aquinas) There is no information that the distinction between created (gratia creata) and uncreated grace (gratia increata) arose in Western theology earlier than the first half of the 13th century. It probably first appeared in Alexander the Gaelic (1186–1245) 63 and then became established in Latin theology. In a general sense, grace is any gift from God. When God gives the Holy Spirit, which dwells in some way in the heart of a person, then, according to Alexander of Gael, we can speak of the Holy Spirit as uncreated grace, gratia increata. 64 In this sense, the Third Person is a gift of grace, transforming the one to whom it is sent (being a transforming form, forma transformans). The soul of a person who has received such grace from God is a transformable form (forma transformata); but it cannot be identical to God, being a created reality, and therefore the likeness of the human soul to God can be called created grace, gratia creata. Alexander Gaelsky speaks of it as a necessary preparation of the soul so that it can accept uncreated grace. 65 Another term, gratia unionis, refers to the grace of union with God. It was introduced by Peter of Lombardy in the 12th century. Initially, the term referred to the action of God causing the union of the human and divine natures of the Son of God, but later it came to primarily designate the predisposition of the human soul created by God to the knowledge of God and love for Him, becoming essentially a synonym for gratia creata. 66 In the writings of Thomas Aquinas, the discourse of deification, expressing man's acquisition of participation in God, is expressed by the terms deifico, deiformis, deiformitas. But more often than not, Thomas, when speaking about deification, does not use explicit terminology. Thus, he does not use the noun deificatio, which corresponds to the Greek word ϑέωσις, except when commenting on Byzantine authors. More often, in the context of deification, he speaks of unio (union with God), beatitudo, VIsio beatifica or love and knowledge. 67 2.2 Aquinas's doctrine of participation in God 2.3 About Thomas' theological method Although Thomas Aquinas is often reproached for “rationalism,” he himself pointed out that he does not seek to derive the truths of faith from natural reason, but considers it correct to use reason in deriving the corresponding consequences from the rules of faith. 68 Those authors who contrast “Eastern mysticism” with “Western rationalism” argue that the contradictions that have arisen cannot be resolved through dialogue: “The real obstacle to unification was that in the East and West the sense of religion was different; It’s hard to argue about feelings.” 69 I. Meyendorff believes that Western theology excludes the role of mystical experience and writes: Since the concept of theology - theology - in Byzantium, for example among the Cappadocian fathers, was inseparable from theory ("contemplation" in Greek), theology could not possibly be - as it was in the West - a rational deduction from "revealed" premises, that is, from Scripture or from the statements of the church magisterium; rather, it was an experienced vision of saints, the authenticity of which, of course, should be verified by comparing them with the evidence of Scripture or Tradition. 70 Also, other Orthodox authors tend to believe that the theological reflection of Western authors does not take into account mystical experience. With regard to Thomas Aquinas, such an accusation is clearly unfair. Biographers of Thomas write that to resolve complex issues, he often resorted to vigils and fasting. True, in his texts there is almost no mention of his own mystical experience or visions experienced, but some other prominent theologians, for example Gregory of Nyssa, do not mention this. Anna Williams reminds that, according to Teresa of Avila, a believer should no more talk about what happened between the soul and God during prayer than a spouse should talk about what happened in their bedroom. 71 The highly anti-Latin scholar Philip Sherrard exaggerates the difference in theological method, arguing that according to Thomas, "the human intellect in our earthly life can only know by referring to the material and tangible," and saying that the philosophy of Thomas denies the "gnosis" of the Church Fathers. In this case, there is an incorrect understanding of the works of Aquinas by the Orthodox author. 72 Anna Williams believes that mistakes such as labeling Thomas Aquinas as rationalism can be avoided by more carefully reading his texts themselves, undistorted by interpretations. 73 Also, a common argument from Orthodox writers against Thomas and Western theology in general has been the accusation of relying on logic where it cannot work; The abuse of syllogisms was especially often discussed. However, an analysis of the texts shows that this kind of accusation has no real basis: after all, Aquinas almost never expresses his reasoning in the form of syllogisms. His argumentation is often strict and formal, but does not use syllogisms. The charge of rationalism is also unfounded, since Thomas does not develop his thought in a deductive manner, moving from self-evident premises to conclusions regarding Christian doctrine. On the contrary, he takes the evidence of Scripture and previous tradition as the starting point of his reasoning. He does not seek to make the supernatural transparent to the human mind, but tries to paint a picture that makes sense. In general, the task of the theologian is to describe the God of the Bible and tradition in the language of human experience: after all, we have no other language. If anyone declares that language based on human experience is generally inadequate for theological research, then he will inevitably be forced to reject the works of Gregory Palamas. 74 Aristotle gives Aquinas not the means to penetrate beyond what the Christian Revelation says, but the ways of expressing thought. Aristotelian philosophy is only a tool for Thomas, and when Aristotle's conclusions contradict the testimony of Scripture or Tradition, Thomas does not hesitate to reject them. At the same time, we must understand that the Orthodox tradition, in order to solve many difficult problems of theology, is also forced to resort to categories that are not found either in Scripture or in the early tradition. For example, one can recall the concept of “synergy” or the trinitarian language that speaks of hypostases and essence. 75 2.4 Basic principles of Aquinas’s doctrine of deification There are several direct reflections on likeness to God in the Summa Theologica. ST I a -IIae, q. 62 describes what the Church Fathers understood by theosis and quotes 2 Pet. 1:4. Here we examine the question of virtues, which is extremely important in the concept of the Summa Theology of Thomas. The author gives an analysis of theological virtues and calls them VIrtutes theologicae precisely because they lead to God and make them like Him. It is the theological virtues that enable a person to achieve his ultimate goal. Three circumstances allow us to determine their role in Aquinas’s doctrine of deification: they have God as their object, they are infused directly by God, and we know about them because God revealed this to us in His Revelation. Anna Williams believes that this article contains a microcosm of the Summa Theology: first a discourse on the knowledge of God, then God in se as the end of man, and finally the means to a supernatural end. 76 Here Thomas establishes the principles of the doctrine of deification. Thomas says that nature can be attributed to a subject in two ways: essentially (essentialiter) or by participation (participative). 77 It is in the latter way that a person can participate in the divine nature: this is the core of the Thomist doctrine of deification and bridging the gap between Creator and creation. Thus, according to the teaching of Thomas, a rational creation can be called the possessor of the divine nature, but not in the same sense in which God possesses it. We can truly be “partakers of the divine nature.” Then, in response to the first objection, the principle of analogical relation is formulated - this is the principle of proportionality: “theological virtues are proportional to a person according to the Nature in which he participates” (secundum naturam participatam). Finally, Aquinas, responding to the third objection, views human nature in terms of reason and will. Here we find a connection between the doctrine of the Trinity and theological anthropology, that is, we see an analogy between the structure of the Trinity and the structure of the human personality, fundamental to Thomas’s doctrine of deification. 78 Theological virtues guide man towards his supernatural goal, which is spiritual union with God. Although nature, according to the Summa Theology, is directed towards natural ends, and supernatural grace towards supernatural ones, nevertheless, these areas have an intersection in that both ends are achieved by the individual. Grace does not change the essence of a person, but it expands the capabilities of the individual. Although grace does not belong to us, surpassing human nature, it works through this nature. 79 Thomas's doctrine of deification comes essentially from the doctrine of God, in particular the patristic statement of the simplicity of God, which Thomas interpreted as a statement of God as Ipsum Esse, pure Being. The radical simplicity (non-composition) of God, according to Thomas, is that God does not consist of essence and being as a creature, but Deus est suum esse: God is his own being. The name of God “Existent” for Aquinas “means the eternal presence of God, and the immanence of divine action to creatures is at the same time the cause of their being and their duration: Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, ed quod profundius omnibus inest... Undi oportet quod Deus sit in omnibus rebus, et intime (So being is that which constitutes the very core of every thing and what is rooted in it deeper than everything else... From here it follows that God must dwell in all things, and in the deepest way). 80 In the third question of the first part of the Summa Theology, Thomas’s task is not any assertion of the priority of the divine essence over the Hypostases (although Orthodox critics often reproach him for this) - this is obvious, if only because he nowhere refers to this kind of hierarchy. The purpose is to show that God is not composed of matter and form, essence and existence, substance and accidents, and does not have any attributes separate from himself. 81 God is unique, one and unchangeable - this is his difference from created things. In the 13th question, Thomas explains that the impossibility of describing the essence of God has its cause not in God, but in man, namely in the insufficiency of human language, since the latter is intended to describe creatures. 82 The terms of human speech can be related to God only by analogy, and in this order the relationship between God and creation is not two-way: only creation depends on God, but not God on creation. 83 As many researchers note, the order of analogy in Thomas is supplemented by the “order of superiority” (VIa eminentiae) - the postulation that any names related to perfections, in their own sense, can be predicated only to God, and they relate to creations only to the extent that creations participate in the perfection of God. 84 The human intellect works by breaking things down into their component parts, that is its modus operandi. Thomas does not say that we cannot attribute to God any categories of our knowledge, but he constantly reminds us that this operation reflects only the structure of our thinking, and not God’s own nature. Therefore, to understand God as He is is impossible for our thinking. 85 2.4.2 The connection between creation and deification To understand Thomas's teaching on deification, the following principle is important: God creates in order to give the creation communion with himself. Having created man, he instilled in him the desire to unite with God, and then constantly gives man the means so that he can achieve his goal. At the same time, He remains absolutely Other; we can grow in likeness to Him, but we will never become the same as Him. 86 Speaking about the connection between creation and deification, Thomas shows that God the Father is the Father not only in intra-Trinitarian relationships, but in relationships with creation, sending grace. 87 For the patristic authors who developed the theology of deification, the most important principle was the Christological principle. Also for Thomas, Christ is not only the Redeemer, but also the one through whom creation was accomplished, as well as the one who united human and divine natures in his Hypostasis. 88 The very union of creation and God is the result of sanctifying grace, which is a Gift (Donum): none other than the Holy Spirit himself. Thus, one union with God is a prerequisite for another union: God gives himself so that the creation can know and love God, becoming the church where he dwells. 89 In general, sanctification is the bestowal of the Holy Trinity upon man; The Son is the author of sanctification, and the Spirit is its sign (ST Iª q. 43 a. 7 resp.). In ST Iª q. 13 a.m. 9 resp. Thomas makes an important reservation that the nature of God cannot “multiply” (natura autem divina multiplicabilis non est), which excludes the communication of the divine nature, but leaves the possibility of deification by participation in it. 2.5 Aquinas on the beatific vision (VIsio beatifica) 2.5.1 Bliss as contemplation of the divine essence Beatitude, or the ultimate goal (ultimus finis), towards which all human nature strives, according to Thomas, is VIsio beatifica (beatific vision), that is, intellectual knowledge of the divine essence. This is an action primarily of the intellect and not of the will; Thomas's strict intellectualism later became the permanent position of the Dominican Order in its difference, for example, from the Franciscan. 90 Being the ultimate goal, this bliss cannot be changing or temporary. When the souls of the saints in the general resurrection are united with their bodies, then beatitude increases: although contemplation is an activity of the mind, but, as Thomas explains, “the perfection of the body in some way contributes to the perfection of intellectual activity,” since the union of the body with the soul serves the perfection of the soul. 91 The beatitude of the saints varies according to the degree of clarity of the VIsio beatifica, and clarity in turn depends on the perfection of the three supernatural virtues. 92 This perfection determines the intensity of the light of glory (lumen gloriae), which alone makes it possible to see the divina essentia (the essence of God), according to ST IIª-IIae, q. 175 a. 3 ad 2; the intensity of light, determined by participation in the divine light (ST IIIª q. 10 a. 4 resp.) varies depending on the perfection of virtues. However, at the same time, those who have a lesser degree of bliss will not have an unsatisfied desire for more. 93 Since bliss is the ultimate goal, it cannot be achieved in earthly life (in statu VIae). For those on the way, contemplation of an intermediate type is possible, like that of Moses or the apostle. Pavel. 94 2.5.2 The question of the knowability of God Aquinas argues that God is knowable (cognoscibilis est), but not in the sense that the essence of God can be understood (comprehendatur). After all, the knowledge of the one who knows is limited by the way of being of the knower (Scriptum super Sententiis, I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1). However, the way of being of the creature does not achieve divine greatness, and therefore no one can know God as God knows himself, which means that it is impossible for the human intellect to fully understand God - so as to know all the consequences of His essence. 95 This is impossible, because otherwise the created intellect in its knowledge would be equal to the power of God. 96 The blessed contemplate everything created through the divine essence, but not like God, but only to a limited extent: the limits of their contemplation are determined by the perfection of the contemplator. 97 Answering the question of how the mind can contemplate the essence of God, Thomas in Scriptum Super Sententiis, IV, d. 49, q. 2, a.1 explains that the mind contemplates God as an intelligible form through the divine essence itself. Thus, in this case, the apprehended form is both that which is apprehended and that by which it is apprehended. 98 Drawing an analogy with the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, we can say that in this case the divine essence plays the role of both active intelligence and possible (potential) intelligence. In the Summa against the Pagans, Thomas repeats that in this contemplation the substance of God cannot be contemplated through any created form, and therefore it follows that the divine substance, since it is contemplated, must be contemplated through itself; thus, it is both that which is contemplated and that by which it is contemplated. 99 Thus, the contemplation by the human intellect of the substance of God is nothing other than God’s contemplation of himself. 100 In his last work, the Summa Theologiae, Thomas, using the terminology of deification, says: “When the created intellect contemplates the essence of God, then the very essence of God becomes an intelligible form of intellect.” 101 In the same 5th article, Thomas identifies themes that are important for the theology of deification: light, glory and the life of the blessed. The light of glory enlightens the blessed so that they can see God, and thereby become like God (Et secundum hoc lumen efficiuntur deiformes, idest Deo similes). 102 Although critics often repeat that in Aquinas's system deification is reduced to a purely intellectual encounter with God, it must be argued that Thomas emphasizes the importance of love, which is directed towards the knowledge of God and determines the degree of this knowledge. The intellect and the will act together, and Thomas is least inclined to think that sanctification in this life is something separate from the saving consummation and fulfillment (consummatio) in the life to come. 103 At the same time, since the highest bliss for a person can only be the realization of his highest ability, which is the activity of the intellect, then without the ability to contemplate God with the intellect, a person would never achieve bliss, but such an assumption contradicts faith (ST Iª q. 11 a. 1 resp.). Thomas's epistemological statement that to truly know something means to become like it is very important here. Thus, God is both the end and the means to achieve this end, causa efficiens et causa finalis (ST Iª q. 12 a. 2 resp.; Iª q. 12 a. 9 resp). Thomas writes that not a single created intellect is capable of cognizing self-subsisting being, since not a single creation is its own being, because it has being only by participation. If the way of being of the known exceeds the way of being of the knower, then the nature of the knower is not capable of knowing it (ST Iª q. 12 a. 4 resp.). So, the very essence of God must become the intelligible form of the intellect contemplating this essence (ST Iª q. 12 a. 5 resp.). In this case, the integrity of the cognizing intellect is not violated, since the knowledge of God becomes possible thanks to the union of grace. 104 God's love for creation is manifested in its self-communication, to use modern terminology. God, by giving himself, makes his being part of the being of creation. 105 It may seem that the boundary between created and uncreated is being violated here. Anticipating this objection, Aquinas responds that the light of glory makes a person deified: ... for the air to take the form of fire, it is required that it be predisposed by some predisposition to such a form. But when the created mind contemplates God through his essence, the very essence of God becomes an intelligible form of reason. 106 To avoid too strong an understanding of this deification, Thomas, firstly, emphasizes the meaning of grace, and secondly, draws a distinction between complete comprehension (comprehensio) and less perfect, somewhat limited knowledge. Full comprehension of the divine essence is impossible for the created mind due to the fact that the created mind is not infinite. Moreover, although we know created things through the light of glory, we know them just as God knows them, the contemplation of the divine essence does not give us divine omniscience. We cannot know God to the same extent that He knows himself - due to the limitations of our nature. 107 At the same time, Thomas emphasizes that beatitude, which is an intellectual act, for a creature is not the same as beatitude for God. In a creation that has achieved bliss this act has a created character, but in God it is uncreated (ST Iª q. 26 a. 3 resp.): …the bliss of the rational nature consists in the act of reason. But two [moments] can be distinguished in it: the object of the act, that is, the intelligible, and the act itself, that is, thinking. If, therefore, beatitude is considered from the side of the object, then only God is beatitude: for one is blessed only because he thinks of God, according to these words of Augustine in book V of the Confessions: Blessed is he who knows Thee, even if he knows nothing else. If bliss is considered from the side of the act of thinking, then it is something created in the blissful creation; in God, even in this respect, it is something uncreated. 108 Aquinas describes the single process here in two ways - depending on the nature of the nature to which it is related. In no case should one think that Thomas is postulating two different beatitudes here. It is called created only when it becomes part of the created intellect. 109 2.5.2 Unity of human substance It is also worth noting the aspect of the unity of human substance, which is important for the anthropology of Thomas. Since the complete substance is not the soul, but the whole person, then his body in some way participates in the beatific vision. Etienne Gilson summarizes what Thomas says in ST Iª-IIae, 4, 6, resp.: “Until man has achieved beatitude, the body is the authorized representative of the soul and the instrument of actions of the lower order that provide access to beatitude. When bliss is achieved, the soul rewards its servant, imparting to him incorruptibility and participation in its immortal perfection: ex beatitudine animae fiet redundantia ad corpus, ut et ipsum sua perfectione potiatur (the bliss of the soul is poured onto the body so that it too reaches its perfection). Therefore, the soul, united with the body (once animal, but now spiritualized by its glory), should no longer indulge in only the material benefits associated with animal life. She no longer needs any other friends than God, who supports her with His eternity, truth and love. However, we are not forbidden to believe that joy in heaven is not experienced alone and that the heavenly bliss of the righteous, completed by the contemplation of joy experienced together, is also adorned with eternal friendship.” 110 In explaining God's self-communication in terms of participation, Aquinas uses language similar to that of Neoplatonic philosophy. On the other hand, those used by him in ST Iª q. 44 a. 1 resp. the images are very reminiscent of patristic texts about deification. Here is the image of iron, likened to fire in the flame of a forge, and the statement that the degrees of perfection of created things are determined by their participation in the one who has the maximum degree of perfection. There is also a new theme: the very existence of things reveals their participation in self-existent Being, Ipsum Esse. It is this initial participation of creation with God through the very existence of creation that is the foundation for subsequent degrees of participation and renewal in grace. This participation in God in grace is not some spontaneous Neoplatonic emanation of divine being (although in question 45 Thomas still uses the term “emanation” when speaking about the origin of all things from God), but a free gift of God. 111 Moreover, Thomas, as usual, stipulates the independence of God from creation, pointing out the one-sidedness of this connection: creation depends on God in reality, but God depends on creation only conceptually. 112 2.6.1 Dynamics of becoming like God Thomas speaks of a three-stage assimilation to God. First, there is a natural likeness to God, based on the rationality of human nature (ST Iª q. 93 a. 4 resp.). Secondly, he writes about the likeness to God through grace that can grow in this life. Finally, there is the likeness in glory, which is an attribute of the life of the age to come. Moreover, all three stages are united by continuity. Karl Rahner, in Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace, comments on Thomas: “The life of grace and the life of future glory are not merely in a moral and legal connection with each other, as if the latter were merely a reward for the former, as a merit. The life in glory is the flowering (manifestation, revelation) of the life in divine sonship that is already there, although “hidden” at the present moment. Then, grace, as the ontological basis of the supernatural, is also the inner essential principle (at least in part) of the contemplation of God.” 113 Reflecting on man as the image of God (imago Dei), Thomas emphasizes not the static natural aspect, but the dynamic likeness to God through the development of virtues. 114 For Thomas's teaching on deification, of particular importance are faith, hope and love - the theological virtues (VIrtutes theologicae), - so called not because thanks to them God is virtuous, but because through them “God directs us to himself” (ST Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 2) and because they have God as their object (ST Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 resp.). Love is most adoring. Quoting Pseudo-Dionysius, Thomas emphasizes (ST Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 2) that she is a connecting force. This is important for understanding the principle of deification: the subject is transformed, being attracted to friendship with God. 115 Unlike Peter of Lombardy, who spoke about the indwelling of the Holy Spirit directly in a person, Thomas speaks of infused (infusa) love, caritas causata, but not because he means some real difference between infused love and the divine essence (he nowhere defines what the difference could be), but with the aim of emphasizing the created status of a person participating in the divine nature. 116 At the same time, love remains closely connected with knowledge. Thomas refers (Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 s. c.) to the famous maxim of Augustine, formulated by him in the X book of De Trinitate: “no one can love what he does not know.” The relation of the human intellect to the will, according to Thomas, in relation to the attainment of beatitude, corresponds to the relation of faith and hope to love. Love cannot exist without faith and hope, but in the future life only love remains. Although the intellect does not cease to exist in the future life, it does not achieve perfection in the future life, unlike love. And this lack of perfection in no way prevents the achievement of man's supernatural goals. 117 To understand Aquinas's teaching on deification, the very structure of the Summa Theology is important: Thomas begins his cross-cutting discourse on sanctification with chapters on God. Only by looking at God can a person understand himself (this is due to the fact that the structure of man, including knowledge and love, to a certain extent reflects the life of the Trinity). Thus, in God we find not only divine perfection, but also the ideal model of humanity. Looking at God, we understand both what we are and what we should become (cfr. ST Iª q. 93 a. 7). 118 2.6.3 Sanctifying grace as an expression of continuity of sanctification in this life and in the age to come Aquinas teaches that union with God is possible not only in the beatific vision, but also in this life - through the bestowal of sanctifying grace. However, the renewal of people by grace can only apply to the state of those still on a journey. 119 Grace for Thomas is the beginning of glory - gratia nihil est aliud quam quaedam inchoatio gloriae in nobis (ST IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 2). This expresses the continuity of sanctification in this age and future bliss. The purpose of human existence is continuous and endless growth directed towards God. It is important that the necessity of grace is not merely a consequence of the Fall (here Thomas does not strictly adhere to the Augustinian tradition), but follows from the very limitations of human created nature, directed towards a supernatural infinite goal. Grace, according to Thomas, is not so much an “antidote to sin” as it is the beginning of glory. 120 In his discussion of the connection between nature and grace, Thomas formulates his famous principle: “nature is not destroyed by grace, but is brought to perfection” - natura non tollitur per gloriam, sed perficitur (ST IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 13 s. c). Thomas writes that sanctification is the grace bestowed through the Sacraments (the operation of which is a consequence of the hypostatic union realized in the Incarnation, and which occupies a very important place in Thomas's discourse on sanctification); “renewal in grace”, “infusion of grace” is nothing other than God giving himself to his creation. It is not a “heavenly medicine” that is different from or less than God. 121 Aquinas's teaching on grace is characterized by bipolarity, on the one hand, insisting on the genuine participation in God of the person who receives grace, and on the other hand, affirming the ontological difference of the Creator and creation. More often than not, Thomas places grace at the center of a spectrum whose poles are the identification of grace with the divine nature, on the one hand, and the understanding of it as creaturely consequences, such as virtues, on the other. 122 It should be said that the term “created grace” caused a sharply negative reaction from a number of Orthodox authors who saw in this term a denial of the reality of deification. It should immediately be noted that this term does not appear in that part of the Summa Theology that directly deals with grace, despite the wide variety of terms used here by Thomas: gratia gratum data, gratia operativa (efficacious grace), gratia praeveniens (prevenient grace), gratia habilualis, gratia cooperativa (cooperative grace), and so on. All these categories refer only to how one can think about grace, since in reality there is one grace, although it operates in various ways, as Bernard Lonergan noted in his work Grace and Freedom. 123 In this discourse of Thomas, grace is not some kind of mediator between the soul and God, it does not mean the presence of something created that is in the soul. For Thomas, it is important to show that the divine action, in which God meets man, does not destroy the human personality, but preserves its integrity: it acts inside man, taking on a form corresponding to man (Thomas’s metaphysics requires that in addition to the efficient cause, which is God, there must also be a formal cause). We are talking about created and uncreated grace in order to emphasize the presence of two subjects: created and uncreated. If grace were always considered as uncreated, this would mean either the hypostasis of grace with the absorption of the created subject, or such a radical change in its nature that it would turn into uncreated. Although Maximus the Confessor makes mention of such a fundamental change in status, this can only be considered as a hyperbolic statement (otherwise colossal theological and logical problems arise). 124 Then, given that Thomas uses the concept of created grace solely for the purpose of showing the createdness of the human subject, it should be said that Thomas’s concept of grace is analogous in nature. Thomas himself defines grace this way in ST IIIª q. 62 a. 1 resp.: “grace is nothing more than a participatory likeness to the divine nature” (participata similitudo divinae naturae). Fundamentally, grace is the Holy Spirit himself – gratia increata. The action of grace in the human person is the beginning of glory. 125 Many authors, starting with Etienne Gilson, have noted that Thomas's main work, the Summa Theologiae, although it appears Aristotelian in its details, is in composition consistent with the Platonic exitus-reditus scheme. It begins with a discourse about God, and returns to Him - in sections with connection with God. This framework for theological reflection helps us understand our divine purpose. Anna Williams clarifies that not only the overall scheme of the Summa, but also the interconnection of the individual parts, indicate that the theme of deification is dominant for this work. Each part highlights two principles that act as two parallel forces of deification: union/love and bliss/knowledge. The relationship of individual parts is also regulated by these principles: in the first part, exitus is marked by the emanation of love and knowledge from God, reditus is the return of creation to God through the theological virtues of love and knowledge given to it by God in the form of theological virtues. The growth from grace to glory is the advancement of the imago Dei, the image of God, towards greater likeness to the Creator, namely union and the beatific vision. A feature of Thomas's theology is that he views the beatific vision as the final fulfillment of human life, the ultimate goal. Unlike Gregory Palamas (more on this in Chapter 3), he does not show much interest in the mystical visions possible in this life. 126 Orthodox commentators often object to the idea that saints can see the divine essence, since this, in their view, calls into question the transcendence of God. To correctly understand Thomas's thought, we must first take into account the difference between knowledge (apprehensio) and complete awareness (comprehensio). Thomas spoke only about knowledge of the divine essence, but denied the possibility of its complete understanding. Secondly, Thomas nowhere says that a person can directly see the essence of God: he only speaks of granting a person participation in the self-knowledge of God. To some extent, this teaching is similar to the thesis of Gregory Palamas that he who unites with God “sees God through God” 127, although Palamas denies the possibility of seeing the divine essence as such. And yet, the principle of contemplation in both cases is based on the action of divine grace. 128 The fact that Thomas's doctrine of the Beatitudes in the next century emphasizes the intellectual aspect is not due to Thomas' theological anthropology (although some commentators believe that this emphasis indicates that Thomas underestimates the corporeality of man), but to the doctrine of God as supremely intelligible. 129 In general, Thomas' theological method starts from the doctrine of God and goes to anthropology. The structure of the human personality, its basic anthropological principles, such as intellect and will, are initially dependent on the doctrine of God, set out in the treatise De Deo Uno (in the Summa Theology), where intellect and will are shown as the main divine attributes, and the origins in God themselves are the result of knowledge and love. 130 The fact that Thomas characterizes bliss sometimes as created and sometimes as uncreated is not a logical contradiction. Speaking about the created bliss of contemplating the essence of God, Thomas wants to emphasize that the human subject itself is created, but bliss as such is nothing other than the divine essence. 131 It is necessary to understand that knowledge for Thomas is inferior in importance to love, which he often identifies with the essence of God. 132 Insisting on the ontological distinction between Creator and creation, Thomas also introduces the concept of “created grace,” which has caused objections from Orthodox critics. To correctly understand Thomas’s thought, one must realize that he designates the same grace as uncreated when talking about God giving it, and as created when considering the creation receiving it. Participation in uncreated nature does not yet make a creation God, and for Aquinas an important task in his discourse on deification is to designate the radical difference between the Creator and the creation. 133 Daniel Monsour, The Relation between Uncreated and Created Grace in the Halesian Summa: A Lonergan Reading, Toronto 2000, 86 A. Williams, Deification, 261 cfr. Summa Theologiae Iª, q. 1, a. 7 ad 1. Stephen Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity, St. Petersburg 2006, 99 John Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology. Historical trends and doctrinal themes, Minsk 2001, 9 A. Williams, Deification in Thomas Aquinas and Gregory Palamas, 474–75 A. Williams, Deification, 73–74 ST Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 1 A. Williams, Deification, 76–77 Quoted in: Etienne Gilson, Selections: Volume 1. Thomism. Introduction to the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Moscow – St. Petersburg 2000, 142 A. Williams, Deification, 84 A. Williams, Deification, 91 William Owen, Seeing God: Theology, Beatitude and Cognition in the Thirteenth Century, Iowa City 2006, 99–100 W. Owen, Seeing God, 113 “...Divina substantia non potest videri per intellectum aliqua specie creata. Unde oportet, si Dei essentia videatur, quod per ipsammet essentiam divinam intellectus ipsam videat: ut sit in tali visione divina essentia et quod videtur, et quo videtur.” (SCG, III, 51) W. Owen, Seeing God, 150 "Cum autem aliquis intellectus creatus videt Deum per essentiam, ipsa essentia Dei fit forma intelligibilis intellectus." (ST Iª q. 12 a. 5 resp.) cfr. A. Williams, Deification, 81–82 “... dispositio ad formam ignis non potest esse naturalis nisi habenti formam ignis. Unde lumen gloriae non potest esse naturale creaturae, nisi creatura esset naturae divinae, quod est impossibile. Per hoc enim lumen fit creatura rationalis deiformis, ut dictum est.” (Iª q. 12 a. 5 resp.) A. Williams, Deification, 104–105 “... beatitudo intellectualis naturae consistit in actu intellectus. In quo duo possunt considerari, scilicet obiectum actus, quod est intelligibile; et ipse actus, qui est intelligere. Si igitur beatitudo consideretur ex parte ipsius obiecti, sic solus Deus est beatitudo, quia ex hoc solo est aliquis beatus, quod Deum intelligit; secundum illud Augustini, in V libro Confess., beatus est qui te novit, etiam si alia ignoret. Sed ex parte actus intelligentis, beatitudo est quid creatum in creaturis beatis, in Deo autem est etiam secundum hoc, aliquid increatum.” A. Williams, Deification, 122–23 Quoted in: Etienne Gilson, Selections: Volume 1. Thomism. Introduction to the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 424 cfr. A. Williams, Deification, 157 Quoted in A. Williams, Deification, 170 A. Williams, Deification, 147–48 A. Williams, Deification, 220–21 Gregory Palamas, Triads in defense of the sacredly silent, Moscow 1995, 238. A. Williams, Deification, 402 A. Williams, Deification in Thomas Aquinas and Gregory Palamas, 432, 447–48