Some questions to iconoclasts who claim that our Lord Jesus Christ is indescribable in bodily form
Некоторые вопросы иконоборцам, утверждающим, что Господь наш Иисус Христос неописуем по телесному образу
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The essay “Some questions to the iconoclasts who claim that our Lord Jesus Christ is indescribable in bodily form” was written by St. Theodore the Studite during his imprisonment for icon veneration in Vonita in 816-817.
The work contains 15 points in favor of the possibility of depicting Christ on icons.
The basis of the argument of St. Theodora is the connection between icon veneration and the dogma of the Incarnation of God the Word. If Christ truly took on human flesh, then He must be “describable” (i.e., have a visible, depictable image). Denying the image of Christ is tantamount to denying the reality of His humanity and leads to heresies like docetism (the doctrine of the apparent body of Christ) or monophysitism (the doctrine of the merging of two natures into one).
The author explains that the Divine nature of Christ is indescribable in its essence. He claims that the properties of two natures (Divinity and humanity) - indescribability and describability, invisibility and visibility, intangibility and tangibility - remain different and unmerged even after their union in the single Hypostasis of Christ. Refusal to recognize the describability of Christ's human nature means that one of the properties of His nature has disappeared or changed, which is impossible without the destruction of nature itself. If Christ is “indescribable,” then the apostles could not “see the Lord,” which contradicts the gospel testimony.
* Title of the work in Greek: Προβλήματά τινα πρός εικονομάχους.
* Title of the work in Latin: Quaestiones aliquae propositae iconomachis; Problemata ad iconomachos.
1. If Christ consists of two natures and abides in two perfect natures, then tell me by what nature he is indescribable - whether by the one that received (Divine), or by the one that was received (human)? And if - according to the first, then He will be described according to the second, and vice versa. If He is (indescribable) in both ways, then how is this? Was it not from both that one complex nature was formed, with one complex property? It can be neither describable nor indescribable, but describable-indescribable, as composed of two and not perfect in either of the two. If this is so, then how can Christ not be different in essence from the Father and from us? From us - because we are depicted by a complex body, and from the Father - because He, due to his uncomplicated nature, cannot be described in any way.
2. Since the property of each nature is inseparable from it, and in the humanity of Christ (lies) describability, then if He cannot be depicted by humanity, obviously (descriptability) is removed. If it was deleted, then where did it go? Is it in the nature of His Divinity? But if this is so, then the Trinity received an addition by accepting a property that did not belong to it by nature - and this is impossible. If she didn’t move here, then where could she be? If it was destroyed, then of necessity, along with it, its nature, to which this property relates, was destroyed, since it is impossible to separate one from the other, as is agreed upon.
3. The indescribable and the describable (the essence of the phenomenon) are either of the same order or of a different order. And if it is of the same order, then (one would have to admit) God the Word is of the same essence with the perceived flesh, since He is indescribable. For properties of the same class and of the same nature must exist unchanged. If (the indescribable and the describable) are of a different order, then, in any case, the Word, being of a different essence in comparison with the flesh, in relation to it, obviously, can be described; in general, according to each essence of His Divinity and humanity, due to the combination of properties belonging to them of a two kind, It is describable and indescribable, as well as visible and invisible, tangible and intangible.
4. If the properties of material and complex (objects) are material and complex, then how can Christ be indescribable in bodily appearance? After all, the indescribable is immaterial and uncomplicated, but the body is material and complex. For it is necessary that the property does not allow change in comparison with nature and does not perceive anything alien to itself from the property of the opposite. But if He is indescribable, then one thing has changed in comparison with the other (property with nature), and also (it must be admitted) that the material is not identical with the immaterial, and the uncomplicated with the complex. Therefore, we can describe Christ by body, otherwise there would be change in the unchangeable and complexity in the uncomplicated.
5. If Christ is God and man, then not by the same nature by which He is God, He is also man. It is obvious that not by the same property by which He is indescribable, He is also describable, since one thing differs from the other; and neither natures nor the properties existing with them can come into that communion, which (would consist in) identity and equality in essence. If this is (so), then how is it that Christ, consisting of both (natures and properties) and knowable on both (sides), is not (together) describable and indescribable?
6. Did God appear to people in a describable or indescribable form? And if he appeared in an indescribable form, then, obviously, also in an invisible one, since both - I mean the indescribable and the invisible - belong to the same category - How did the disciples say: “I saw the Lord” (John 20:25)? Consequently, (He appeared in a form) describable, although invisible by Divine nature. If (He appeared in an image) that can be depicted, then who will dare to say that what is being described is indescribable, unless he reaches the extreme degree of madness?
7. If to say that Christ is only describable means to deprive Him of His Divinity, whose property is indescribability, then it is obvious that to call Him only indescribable means to deprive Him of humanity, whose property is describability. And equally absurd is what Paul of Samosata said absurdly, that Christ is a simple man, and not both God, and the unreasonable thing said by Manes of Persia, that Christ is only God, and not also a man. So, look. – rapids on both sides! Whichever of the two wicked heresies you think to avoid, you will of necessity find yourself in community with the other, since you adhere to both. For if you say that you do not follow Paul, then why are you Manichaean, not portraying Christ as the incorporeal Word - which Paul avoids? If you say that you are not Manichaean, then why do you follow Paul, teaching that Christ is, as it were, a man clothed with a body - which Manes avoids? Thus, by being a Manichaean you are following Paul and vice versa.
8. If you confess Christ in Divinity and humanity and do not hesitate regarding this, then what prevents you from saying that He is in one way describable, in another, indescribable, being knowable in the property of each of the two natures? According to the (nature) by which He is God, He is not subject to describability, just as (not subject to) sight and perception. By the same (nature) by which He is a man, He is subject to describability, as well as to sight and qualitative determination, unless you recognize Him in Divinity and humanity only in words and in fact do not consider Christ incorporeal and therefore indescribable.
9. Do you recognize the simple as one thing, and the complex as another, or (do you consider) both to be the same? And if (you admit) the first, then in any case you, together with us, must say that Christ is describable and indescribable, as consisting of both. For the nature of each of these two is contemplated in opposite properties, I mean (the nature of) the simple and the complex. i.e., Deity and humanity - just as, for example, in relation to fire and water - neither fire (does not rush) down, nor water (does not rise) up, nor dryness is moisture, nor moisture is dryness. Therefore, neither describability is indescribability, nor indescribability is not describability. For, due to natural opposition, one is separated from the other as much as possible; all the more, of course, (this is true) in relation to the third comparison than in relation to the two. If (to recognize Christ) only as indescribable, then how can we not assume the second?
And although you do not say (directly), but assume one simple (and at the same time) complex nature of Divinity and humanity, then you, together with the North, seem to admit a mixed state of fire-water (ὺδρόπυρον). After all, the unity of properties simultaneously proves the individual content of nature.
10. Affirmations are opposite to negations, and both are neither thought nor called the same thing, whereby affirmation is describability, and negation is indescribability. Christ consists of two (natures) - Divinity and humanity. In what state are the properties of these natures? Among these (properties) there are also those that are opposite to each other and not mixed into one; and then, according to the duality of essences, properties are of two kinds, among which describability is thought and called, as well as indescribability. If this is not so, but (Christ) is only indescribable, then what should not be mixed is confusedly mixed, and what (in fact bears) different names is called by one name. And (in this case) such states as walking and not walking, talking and not talking, existing and not existing, and, finally, being described and not being described, will be thought of and called identical, and this is very unreasonable.
11. From the indescribable and the describable, only the indescribable cannot be obtained, just as God alone cannot be obtained from Deity and humanity. For the natures, although united in a (single) hypostasis, did not change from one to another and, of course, did not change their own names, but even after being united in a single Person they retain duality, both in reality and in name. Consequently, their properties are in exactly the same state, have not changed in their natural quality and have not lost their double name, but remain intact in Christ; Among them, they agree - describability and indescribability, even if you, atheists, did not want to admit it.
12. If, as the divine Epiphanius says, everything that (is) in man is (is) man, and if the Only Begotten, having come, took on everything that is man, so that, being God, he could completely complete everything related to salvation in a perfect man, without losing anything human; then, if He were not describable by body, not just the accidental, but the main and most important thing would be left out, since the very first property of a person is that he can be depicted by his bodily appearance. Therefore, whoever forbids the depiction of Christ, he, men, must be called by the same name as those who deny the flesh of Christ, as the saint himself explains in the thirty-second chapter of Heresies. Blessed Macarius anathematizes such a (heretic) in his synodics.
13. Тем, которые спорят упорнее и говорят, что Христа, когда Его изображают, разделяют на двух Сынов, согласно с Несторием, – следует отвечать, что это значит не разделять Его, но именно судить в высшей степени здраво. Ибо как в богословии 1 то, что составляет особенность (Божеских) Лиц, не разделяет одной природы Божества, но общее по природе различается ипостасно; так и в учении о домостроительстве 2 , наоборот, то, что составляет особенность природы, не разделяет единой ипостаси Бога Слова, но то, что имеет общую ипостась, различается по природе. Если бы при описуемости вводило разделение то, что составляет особенность человеческой природы, то, следовательно, и здесь одну природу разделяло бы Нерожденное, Рожденное и Исходящее, – то, что составляет отличительную особенность трех Лиц; but, of course, it does not separate, although they are different from each other. Следовательно, и здесь неописуемость Божества и описуемость человечества, – хотя они и противоположны между Собою, – (не разделяют) единого Лица Христа.
14. If, on the basis of the fact that God the Word became incarnate, it cannot be said that the Father and the Spirit (Holy) received a body, although the Trinity is inseparable by nature; then, based on the fact that He is describable by humanity, it cannot be said that the Divinity is also describable, although by hypostasis it is inseparable from the flesh: if there the connection of nature does not merge the hypostases, then here the identity of the hypostases does not lead (both) natures out of their own boundaries.
15. If Christ in relation to the Divinity cannot be depicted, like us, then in relation to humanity He is not indescribable, like the Father, and cannot appear to have lost both or, rather, to have changed one property for another, and to be like God - describable, and like man - indescribable. If, having everything that belongs to the Father, He also has indescribability, then, obviously, having everything that is characteristic of man, He also has descriptibility, being perfect in both respects, and not half perfect on each of the two sides.
That is, in the doctrine of God in Himself.
That is, in the teaching about the face of Jesus Christ.
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