Часть I

I. The teaching of the blessed one. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, about God in His being: God is an absolute spiritual-personal Being Bl. had the one and only one. Augustine, 149 ep. Ipponsky, the center of his spiritual attraction, an inexhaustible source of living satisfaction of the highest interests of his brilliant and deeply religious spirit, all religious-moral and philosophical-theological questions and requests of his inquisitive mind and fiery heart..... This was the One who is above everything and everyone, Who is the Cause of everything that exists, the Beginning and the End of everything and every being, the Source of all knowledge and life and the Last Goal of universal aspirations. This was the One who, in the language of high religious and poetic inspiration, “fills everything with Himself, embraces, builds, preserves, Whom we call God.” 150 “It would hardly be wrong to say,” notes the famous Protestant systematizer of the teachings of Bl. Augustine Ad. Dorner, that in Augustine's worldview God occupies a central place. The first thing that stands out for him is unity with God. God is one and everything to him: in the contemplation of God he finds his bliss.” 151 “God is the central point of Augustine’s views,” continues the Western theologian we quote. This perfectly characterizes both his inner piety and his entire teaching, in which his attitude towards God comes to the fore everywhere.” 152 Without exaggeration we can say that God was for the bl. Augustine is everything: God and only God was the subject and ultimate goal of his many-sided, varied and extremely intense literary, theological and church-practical activity. He wants to live in God and only in God. He wants to know and study God and only God. “I wish to know God and the soul... and nothing more? Yes, nothing,” says Bl. decisively. Augustine 153 shortly after his famous conversion (conversio). “In these words of Augustine,” notes the contemporary German church historian and famous theologian A. Harnack, 154, “the main subject of his entire inner life can be briefly expressed.” At the same time, in the methodology of religious and philosophical consciousness, Bl. Augustine, as we will see later, Augustine’s knowledge of the soul (his psychological analysis) had only propaedeutic and auxiliary significance in relation to the knowledge of God. “In Augustine,” says the aforementioned German theologian Prof. A. Harnack, - the study of mental life was, so to speak, a theological need: he tried to find in every study of mental life the source of knowledge of God; “γνῶϑι σεαυτόν” became for him the path to God.” 155 Ritter apparently wants to say the same thing, 156 when he says: “Augustine defines two subjects as the content of philosophy, namely: the knowledge of God and the soul.... He directs everything towards the knowledge of God: his research is completely theological in nature; if at the same time he desires self-knowledge, then this is because we can only know God in the soul.” This is what God was for Augustine; This is what significance He had for the consciousness and life of the Western father of the church. What was God according to Augustine? What was God according to the consciousness and recognition of our church teacher? How did he perceive and understand Him and how did he express this consciousness and understanding in his numerous and varied literary works? Already in view of the above-described relationship of bl. Augustine to God, God, according to Augustine, must be that which is above and best. 157 Since being is higher than non-being and life is higher than what simply exists, He is, first of all, being (esse), real being; moreover, He is the highest reality of existence and the highest energy of life - summe esse atque summe vivere; 158 prima et summa vita, cui... idem est esse et vivere; 159 Deus summe ac primitus est. 160 Is there truth? To this probing question of our restless consciousness, we read in the “Confession” of Blessed. Augustine, the latter heard in response the voice of God as if from afar: “I am who I am” and “I am the Way, the Truth and the Life.” 161 As being, God according to the teachings of Blessed. Augustine is "substantia", or, more precisely, "essentia", in Greek: "οὐσία." 162 According to Augustine, God is given the name of being or essence because He possesses them in its own, true sense and because He alone is capable of being or existing in Himself, that is, in the highest and truest sense of the word. 163 As the highest being, He, by virtue of this, is at the same time a Person: His being is the same as personal being; to be for God, according to Augustine, already means at the same time to be a person (esse = persona esse). 164 “We attribute existence to things,” says one of the most thorough Catholic researchers of speculative theology, Bl. Augustine, commenting on this point of his, - therefore and insofar as they are substances, since being and substance, to express which concept the ancients used the term “nature” (natura), are one and the same. God, Who exists first of all and whose existence is so vividly and effectively revealed in the world as He is, is eo ipso substance: without the assumption of His substantiality, His being would not be existence at all.” 165 So, God, according to Augustine, is a certain substance (quaedam substantia), since what is not substance is generally nothing (nihil). 166 But He is the highest substance (summa substantia). 167 However, the expression “substance” (substantia), as correlative with the concept of accident and therefore inaccurately expressing the idea of ​​​​the absolute simplicity of the Divine, Augustine, as we will see below, more readily replaces with the word “being” (essentia). 168 So, God, according to Augustine, is being or essence. He is the highest essence (summa essentia), 169 above, outside and without which there is nothing, but below which, from which, with which and in which - everything. 170 What is the positive content of Augustine’s concept of God, what specific associations did he connect with this concept? It is not entirely easy to answer this question right away, since, in the theological and philosophical construction of the idea of ​​God, we see in Augustine a kind of duality: two, although not contradictory, but at first glance seemingly not entirely consistent. Either he seems to lean towards the side of the purely dogmatic incomprehensibility of God, or he searches in philosophical terms for analogous expressions for this highest idea. Sometimes both named currents of theological and philosophical thought of Bl. Augustine can be observed even in the same work. On one side bl. Augustine asserts that God, as the highest of all, is unknowable, incomprehensible, ineffable, indefinable, 171 regarding Whom ignorance is better than imaginary knowledge; 172 Who is truer in our thought than in our words, truer in His being than in our thought; 173 It is easier to say about Him that He is not (quid non sit Deus) than that He is; 174 Aristotle’s categories are not applicable to Him; 175 He is good without quality, great without quantity, universal without place, eternal without time, 176 etc., etc. On the other hand, we hear from Augustine that the Divinity is the absolute fullness (summa plenitudo, ubi nihil deest) 177 of all actual and possible perfections: He is the highest of what has real existence and what is accessible to thought; 178 highest nature, substance or essence; 179 the original higher life, which controls reason, will and feeling to the highest degree and in which being, life and knowledge are one. 180 An unconditional Being in its immutability and eternity, He is at the same time an all-conditioning Being: He is a substance or essence that creates, 181 rules 182 and permeates the world, 183 wholly obliged to Him both for the beginning and for the continuation of its existence 184 and serving as a revelation of His infinite properties and perfections 185, etc. This is the general background of the views of Bl. Augustine about God in His being. However, it would be unfair to find any contradictions here, as will become clear from what follows. How did Augustine arrive at the above concept of God? If we entered into a more detailed consideration of Augustine’s teaching about God and tried to determine Augustine’s method of knowledge of God, we would see that Augustine comes to knowledge of God in two ways or paths, known in modern theological systems under the names “via negationis” and “via eminentiae,” that is, the path of negation and the path of superiority. The first way (denial), which consists in denying or excluding from the idea of ​​God (as an Infinite or Boundless Being) all the features of finitude and limitation noticed in the world (as inconsistent with the innate human idea of ​​God), leads Bl. Augustine, as well as any seeker of God, moving towards the knowledge of Him through this natural path of knowledge of God, towards the recognition of God as an Infinite or Boundless Being (with the properties of immutability, simplicity, eternity, omnipresence, etc.). The second path of knowledge of God, chosen by Bl. Augustine and especially characteristic of him and in his use (the path of superiority), is that man raises to an infinite degree the virtues and perfections inherent in creation, especially the highest, and then attributed to God. In this way, the human mind can come to the concept of God as the Greatest and Most Perfect and even (since the highest creature is a person) the Personal Spirit, with properties that characterize a spiritual rational-moral personality, but only taken with a coefficient of infinity (for example, omniscience, wisdom, omnipotence, goodness, holiness, etc.). In his search for God and knowledge of God, Augustine takes a firm foot on this last path, deeply sharing the conviction in the so-called “representationism” of the creature, that is, its ability to reflect in the qualities and functions of its nature and life the properties and actions inherent in its Creator. This is the methodology of the speculative theological thought of the bl. Augustine: self-knowledge and world knowledge, as we see, should have led him to the knowledge of God and received in the latter his final and true goal. Starting to implement the above-mentioned goal, Bl. At the same time, Augustine makes a preliminary reservation about the difficulty with which solving the problem of knowing God is inevitably associated for a person. That God exists (i.e., a positive answer to the question: an sit Deus?) is for the religious and philosophical consciousness of the bl. Augustine, without any doubt, 186 for him this is a completely indisputable fact, as indisputably certified by the inner sense of God-consciousness inherent in man, and therefore having immediate self-authenticity and axiomatic significance. 187 This innate internal evidence of man’s self-awareness about the existence of the Supreme Being, in addition, constantly receives eloquent external confirmation from the world around man, 188 with its expedient structure and harmony of its parts, which also loudly tells man about the existence of God. The problem of the highest reality, 189 almost entirely and so powerfully breathtaking bl. Augustine (in the pre-Christian, or rather, pre-church period of his life), over time, if it does not completely disappear from the field of his religious consciousness, it is now relegated to the background and somewhat obscured by the increasingly growing church-dogmatic and church-practical interests. In view of this bl. Augustine does not dwell on this issue specifically or in detail. To a greater extent, 190 he is interested in another question, which has the significance of the most important problem of his theological and church-dogmatic consciousness, namely: what or who is God (i.e., the answer to the question quid vel quis sit Deus?). 191 The solution to this last question primarily occupied his theological attention and absorbed his literary energy (especially in polemics with contemporary non-Christian and non-church forms of religious consciousness). According to bl. Augustine, if we wanted to say about God what exactly He is as such (i.e., in His essence), then due to the lack or lack of expressions defining Him in this regard, in this case it would be easier for us to say what exactly He is in His opposition to Himself or what He is not (quid non sit?) 192 in comparison with finite substances, than what He is there is in a positive sense. In other words, God, according to the deep conviction of Blessed. Augustine, it is easier to know and define in a negative way than in a positive way. Bl. Augustine therefore believes that “God is better known by ignorance than by knowledge” (scitur melius nesciendo); 193 that “the soul has no other knowledge of the Father of the universe except the consciousness that it does not know Him”; (nulla scientia est in anima, nisi scire, quomodo eum nesciat); 194 that “God is incomprehensible to the thought of man and inexpressible in his word” (Supra mentem Deus; incomprehensibilis, 195 ineffabilis); 196 that nothing worthy of Him can be said about Him (de Deo nihil digne dici possit); 197 that by virtue of all this, God, who surpasses all reason and every language, will be best and most decently honored with nothing other than reverent silence (silentio): 198 all that remains for man in relation to God in this case is, in the opinion of the bl. Augustine, only feeling silent and feeling silently. The circle of these thoughts, which in their totality form the so-called apophatic or negative moment in the speculative theology of the bl. Augustine (in relation to the apophatics of the Eastern fathers and teachers of the Church, although with some shade of difference), expresses only the thought of the weakness, limitation and inadequacy of our knowledge of God, the incomprehensibility (incomprehendere) of Him in essence or the impossibility of knowing Him completely (totum Deum), and does not at all deny the fundamental possibility of knowing Him in general (scire) and the need to investigate (quaerere) and to know Him (cognoscere) to the best of our ability and according to the strength of our understanding. 199 Nor do they at all forbid us from using our language for the glory of His name. 200 The character and tendencies of “Augustine’s apophatics” completely exclude religious or philosophical agnosticism in the proper sense of the word. Augustine, as is understandable given his main point of view, according to Prof. A.I. Brilliantova, “does not bring the concept of the transcendence of the Divine to the point of denying in relation to Him all predicates borrowed from the finite world; it eliminates only some of them and raises others to an absolute degree.” 201 According to Augustine, notes the Catholic theologian Prof. Th. Gangauf, 202 - this knowledge, i.e. knowledge of what God is not (what is not in God), itself is already a rather valuable asset of our knowledge and a step forward to real knowledge, presuming at the same time a certain positive aspect (it already contains implicit elements of positive knowledge). 203 Therefore, Augustine, says the Protestant scholar F. Böhringer, 204, “does not dwell on these purely negative formulas. Although he is always aware that every formula is insufficient, this does not prevent him from giving positive definitions of the essence of God, since, as Augustine expressed it, God Himself put it into our minds to think of Him according to piety and truth” (Deus incomprehensibilis semper quaerendus est). 205 Well, based on what has been said, a person can and does know about God; What, more specifically, knowledge can the finite and, consequently, should have about the Infinite? This, our Ippon theologian answers the question posed above, is our knowledge of God of an apophatic nature, which we acquire by association of the contrast between God and creation, i.e., first of all, that He is incorporeal or immaterial (incorporalis vel incorporeus). 206 This definition contains the idea not only that the Divine Being is incorporeal and immaterial, but also that It is an absolutely spiritual Being, completely alien to any external or internal complexity; - that the Divinity is the purest and simplest Spirit with the predicate of absolute immutability. Although God is Spirit, argues Bl. Augustine, but the Spirit in the highest and primary sense of the word, and not like our created spirit, which, due to its origin from nothing by the omnipotent will of the Creator, like any other creature, is subject to random changes. 207 In the essence of God, as the Self-Existing or Absolute Being, already at the request of reason, any changeability and any kind of complexity (even if only potential or logical) in no case can be allowed and must be decisively eliminated from our thoughts about Him. 208 Reason necessarily postulates an Unchangeable God. On the contrary, the idea of ​​God as changeable and, therefore, finite and imperfect, turns out to be absolutely untenable before the judgment of that religious ideal (si Deus hoc [sc. commutabilis] esset, non esset Deus), 209 which is inherent in man by nature, which is even unconsciously presented to his normally developed mind and feelings and which alone can fully satisfy all their legitimate aspirations and requests. Recognition of such a God (i.e., susceptible to change in any respect) is tantamount to His denial in His very idea, and for a normal mind and heart, which always prefers the unchangeable to the changeable, is psychologically impossible. 210 Developing further his thoughts about the Supreme Being, as an absolutely Unchangeable and Simple Being and Life, Blessed. Augustine teaches: while about finite things it must be said that they have their own being and life, about God it must be said that He Himself is His being and life, namely being and life in the absolute sense of the word; by the power of which for Him it means nothing else to be and nothing else to live, but His being is at the same time His life, and His life is at the same time His being, 211 - a thought, as we will see, very often and in the most diverse combinations repeated by the bl. Augustine in his discussions of the Infinite Being. This sublime metaphysical concept of being, as pure, unchangeable and simple and therefore always equal, we must always connect with our thoughts and with our expressions about God, Who, according to Augustine’s deepest consciousness and his primary expression, is the Highest Being with the attribute of absolute immutability and unconditional simplicity. 212 But God alone is this pure, unchangeable, authentic being, 213 so that in contrast to Him or in comparison with Him, every created being, according to Augustine’s decisive statement, is outright non-existence. 214 Although God, as we already know, in His essence is unknowable by thought and inexpressible in words and therefore generally unnameable and indefinable, yet Scripture assigns Him some names and epithets, of which, according to the classification of Bl. Augustine, one name is the proper name of God, and the others are expressions of His relationship to the created world. – Thus, asked by Moses about His Name (so that Moses could convey to Israel Who sent him), God, first of all, as His name, assimilates to Himself that He is pure, simple being, namely: “Existing” - “Ego sum, Qui sum.” 215 This general definition of the Divine essence is best characterized in our poor human language by the Infinite and Supreme, Incomprehensible and Ineffable Being of God in Himself; and in the strict sense this name belongs properly and exclusively to Him alone, it is His own and exclusive name (proprium nomen, 216 nomen in se, nomen incommutabilitatis, aeternitatis). 217 Any other name of Him, such as, for example, the Lord, the Almighty, the All-Good, the All-Righteous, etc. or, for example, the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, according to the statement of the bl. Augustine, the essence of His names is that they define only His relationship to us, people (nomina ad nos), 218 or indicate only the actions of His power or omnipotence, goodness or love for mankind, etc. (nomina misericordiae). 219 As the Self-existent Life and the Being that draws life from Himself, God alone exists and lives in Se et ad Se, so that, on the basis of this original greatness and absolute self-sufficiency and, so to speak, in the sphere of this continuous, ever-essential life, His Divine thought and will, knowledge and desire are always and invariably realized (realized) in Him. All these acts of thought and will of the Divine, as limitless and most perfect, do not constitute anything different from His being and life, but are completely one with them, and therefore He Himself is, completely and entirely, both His being and life, and His mind and power. And all this is one, and all this is at the same time He Himself - One. (Ubi est prima et summa vita, cui est... idem esse et vivere: et primus ac summus intellectus... et unum omnia. 220 Voluntas et potentia Dei-Deus Ipse est). 221 But the human spirit is not limited to such an abstract metaphysical definition of the Divine; it cannot be satisfied with this abstractly sublime idea of ​​God as Unconditional Simplicity and Absolute Unity, alien to all attributes and changeability. He, first of all, wants to see in God the Absolute Beginning of the world in all the diversity of its being and life, the Most Perfect Source of all and every good for creation, to the extent of its “participation” in the Divine (adhaerendo Deo), and the Highest Principle of beauty, the reflection of which is a harmoniously and purposefully arranged universe. Finally, a normal mind and a healthy religious feeling imperiously and inevitably appeal to God as the One Living Source and the All-Determining Criterion of everything true, beautiful and good that exists in the world and in man himself. In other words, a person with a normally developed religious consciousness and heart necessarily postulates and ineradicably longs for a Living Personal God, who is capable of entering into communication with a person, satisfying all his highest and noblest requests and aspirations and who is at the same time their Highest and Living Ideal. Here we enter the area of ​​already cataphatic theology of the bl. Augustine, which represents God as analogous to the human spirit, the Highest and Most Perfect Personal Spirit with the attributes of reason, will and feeling. Bl. Augustine, indeed, teaches about the Divine Being. In his cataphatic theology, which to the highest degree affirms in God, as the Creator and Provider, what was denied to Him in apophatic theology (in contrast to creation), he, as the Absolute Beginning of all that exists, 222 considers the Divinity, as the Primary Beauty and the Principle of all beauty and harmony, 223 as the Highest and Most Perfect Good, 224 Good self-sourced (in se) and exuding it from itself to all creation, 225 which the higher it is, the more it can contain Him within itself and, conversely, the more it carries Him within itself, the higher, more perfect and blessed it itself becomes from this. 226 Lively, agile mind bl. Augustine, his deeply religious, fiery heart wants to see in God a Being who is not alien, close to the world and closest, similar to man. The latter, already as God’s creation (creatura) and especially as His image (imago), - and with the proper direction of life - and as His likeness (similitudo), more than any other earthly creature, imprinted God in himself and in the highest part of his two-part nature, i.e. soul, reflects more deeply His Divine Creator and Prototype. 227 This is the deepest basis for the possibility and necessity for a person of his search for God and communication with God (in thought and in life). That is why, this Boundless and Immeasurable Divine Being, infinitely towering above the world and inaccessibly hidden in Its essence, on the other hand, despite all His boundlessness and unspeakable greatness in our language, is still, according to Augustine’s extreme consciousness, internally closer to us than any other being surrounding us. Between this latter and us there still lie spatial boundaries separating each other, while in this Absolute Being (To whom we owe the beginning and continuation of our life), we “live, move and have our being” (Acts 17:28). 228 That is why the knowledge of this existence external to us, as it confronts us in all the multitude and diversity of its parts, for our knowing spirit is connected with even greater efforts and difficulties than the knowledge of the Divine Being, Which we feel in the deepest depths of our spirit, 229 Which no one can not know, 230 and Which we feel all the more deeply and tangibly in ourselves and the more fully and joyfully we experience within ourselves as the source of our bliss, the purer our soul or heart, this immaterial organ of our spiritual vision (oculus animae, oculus cordis), i.e., knowledge of God. 231 A similar phenomenon occurs in the physical world: if the bodily eye is healthy, then in the sunlight illuminating it it finds pleasure and enjoyment; if only he is in a pathological condition, then, on the contrary, the same sunlight on the same eye has a painful effect. 232 True, man, created in the image of God and endowed with all the organs necessary for the knowledge of God, 233 can and should even enter into direct communication with God (in knowledge and life), 234 but this is his spiritual contemplation of God (“with the eye of the heart or soul”), 235 the main organ and the main element of which here on earth is faith (fides), just like sensory vision, is still necessarily fragmentary and relative nature, 236 accessible to us to a weak degree and does not yet constitute knowledge in the strict sense of the word. 237 And therefore, according to the deep and sincere conviction of Bl. Augustine, this partial, fragmentary and relativistic knowledge that we currently have about God is still infinitely far from that epistemological (religious-cognitive) ideal (Dei visio, contemplatio), 238 which, as a well-deserved reward for the free feat of faith and moral purity of life (merces fidei, fructus fidei, fidei merito-merces cognitionis, intellectus-fidei praemium), 239 is promised to the “pure in heart” (soli mundo corde) 240 only in the life of the next century (in futuro saeculo), 241 when “faith,” according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 13:12), is resolved into “vision” (Dei visio), i.e. into knowledge or rational contemplation of truth “face to face” (facie ad faciem). 242 But even our current knowledge of God, which is only superficial and distant or, according to the Apostle, “vague and fortune-telling” (1 Cor. 13:12), as stated above, is also conditioned by a certain measure of the moral purity of the knowing subject himself. This moral moment of knowledge of God or the thought of purity of heart and holiness of life, as a necessary moral condition for true knowledge of God, generally inherent in patristic literature 243 and characteristic of it, is also strenuously put forward by our teacher of the church. 244 Despite, however, all the difficulties and shortcomings of our knowledge of God, we, according to the teachings of the bl. Augustine, we can and, therefore, must seek God and know Him: for this, after all, reason was given to us from above. 245 However, our very search, notes the Ippon theologian, implicitly presupposes some kind of knowledge. About every truth that they want to know, as Bl. very often repeats. Augustine - and this constitutes a rather characteristic feature of his teaching on the relationship between faith and knowledge - already have some kind of knowledge in advance, even if only the most general and most vague. 246 Moreover, according to Augustine, there is no end, even in the conditions of our earthly existence, to this search and the discovery that follows it. This last (i.e., acquisition), sharpening our ability to understand God, always gives a new right and constitutes a new motive for more and more new searches; and each new search is always followed by a new blissful discovery... and so on ad infinitum. 247 And Augustine himself, both in his own life and in his numerous literary and theological works, presents us with a living and clear example of such an extremely intense and animated search for God and knowledge of God. The same must be said about love, which, according to the repeatedly expressed confession of Bl. Augustine, lies at the basis of any quest, as its stimulus. “What they don’t know at all (what is completely unknown),” says Augustine, “cannot be loved.” 248 Love for God, calling on His name, by virtue of this, already necessarily presupposes a certain knowledge of God, Who Himself is Reason and Bliss, 249 Truth 250 and Love, 251 the highest Norm for the judgments of our mind and an inexhaustible Source of joy and consolation for our heart. 252 Such original or primary knowledge about God, as we have seen, is, according to Augustine, of a priori origin, the idea that the Divinity is the Highest, Most Perfect and Most Excellent Being and Life (in their highest unity), greater, better, more excellent than Whom there is no one and nothing in reality and cannot be admitted in thought. 253 This is the general feeling of God-consciousness or the power of God inherent in a person from birth, which in its further independent interpretation and philosophical formulation constitutes the circle of our following thoughts and statements about God. The highest and most perfect Being and Life, absolutely one, simple and unchangeable in its essence and properties, God is such a Being through which, as through its Supreme Principle, everything exists and lives that only has being and life in itself. As the Primary Source of all being and life, endowed with reason, will and feeling, He Himself must be the Highest Reason, Will and Feeling, that is, a spiritual-personal Being (esse = persona esse), self-conscious, willing and feeling. Since Reason, Will and Feeling in Him are absolutely identical with His very being and reside in Him not only in a potential (non potentiae), but always in a real state (from eternity realized in Him), then He is the Highest Truth, Good and Beauty in their highest harmony and concrete embodiment, the Author of everything true, good and beautiful that is in the world and in man himself, and at the same time - He is also the Supreme Principle and The Universal, Eternal and Unchangeable Criterion or Living Guiding Ideal for every rational, moral and aesthetic consciousness and activity of the human spirit. 254 Combining in one formula everything said by Bl. Augustine about the Being of God, one can briefly characterize his theological and philosophical concept of the Divine Being, rich in deep content and full of fruitful life significance. Eternally and immutably existing in the boundless and ideal fullness of his absolute qualities, metaphysical and spiritual perfections of his nature and life, God, according to Augustine, is the Highest and Most Perfect Spiritual-personal Being and Life, in other words, the Infinite Spirit or Absolute Personality, because being and personal existence with Him, as said, are completely identical. The above understanding of the Divine Being, at its core, perhaps, was absorbed by Bl. Augustine, still with the milk of his reverent Christian mother, 255 then, independently, so to speak, borne and suffered in the long and painful life process of his search for God and knowledge of God, and was supposed to finally resolve all the philosophical-theoretical and vital-practical queries and searches of the living, inquisitive mind and deeply believing heart of the blessed one. Augustine. It finally brought with it the long-sought and so long-desired “peace in God,” 256 for the brilliant, naturally deeply religious spirit of Augustine, powerfully bringing him to the quiet haven of the Christian Church and then placing him in the cathedra of Bishop of Ippona. This answer to the cardinal question for any religious-philosophical consciousness about the Being of God, suggested to Augustine, (of course, not without the grace influence from above), the entire past of his life, is at the same time the only correct solution to the question of “quid vel quis sit Deus et qualis sit cogitandus?” It is precisely this decision of his, serving as an expression of Christian scientific-church consciousness on the issue of the Being of God, that alone can properly satisfy all the highest theoretical requests and aspirations of the human spirit (mind), become a solid basis for a person’s moral life and become an inexhaustible source of high religious inspirations and internal self-exalting nobility. It is only in the light of such a religious ideal that the history of the world and human life receive their highest meaning and content and their sufficiently reasonable explanation and justification. The true religious ideal of man always and necessarily postulates God - the Living Infinite Spirit or the Self-Conscious Absolute Personality. This is precisely how we saw the blessed God. Augustine, at first, the best of the educated secular God-seekers of his richly talented era, and then, already famous during his lifetime as a Christian teacher and bishop of the Church of Ipponia. In direct connection with this general teaching, Bl. Augustine about the being of God, as his direct conclusion or particular explanation, stands his special teaching about the properties of God. II. The teaching of the blessed Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, on the properties of God (metaphysical and spiritual properties of the Divine Being) From the general scheme of the content of the Augustinian idea of the Divine Being 257 presented above, we saw that God, according to Augustine, is the One Infinite Personal Spirit. What, more specifically, is the positive content of this Augustinian concept of God, what specific ideas were associated with it in the theological and philosophical consciousness of the bl. Augustine? To answer this question means to expound the special teaching of Bl. Augustine on the properties of God. This latter is nothing more than a simple detailed disclosure or very particular explanation of those general thoughts or fundamental principles from which the view of the bl. Augustine on the Being of God, as the Infinite Spirit or Absolute Person. “Not a single person,” says the now well-known representative of the philosophically developed Christian consciousness, 258 “ever stops at a simple feeling of the power of God; on the contrary, everyone strives to increase this primary feeling into a complete and perfect concept of God... The consciousness of divine infinity serves as the first and main discovery of the human mind in the matter of knowledge of God.” If we turn now to the blessed. Augustine and his independent religious and philosophical quests, we will see that he always (albeit with an unequal degree of clarity) inherent in him the Christian concept of God, as an all-surpassing greatness and absolute perfection, he strives to express more fully and more definitely in theological and philosophical terms of a metaphysical and spiritual nature. According to one of the most authoritative new Russian researchers of the life and spiritual development of Bl. Augustine, the latter “from his very childhood, throughout his entire life, he invariably preserved the Christian concept of God as an all-embracing, unlimited being, alien to imperfections and shortcomings, great, absolute.” 259 A holistic system of views about God is constructed by Bl. Augustine, as said, in the definitions of His being, metaphysical (ontological) and spiritual (spiritual-moral). In his apophatic idea of ​​God, emanating from the thought of Him as the Boundless and Pre-mundane, ontological categories (mainly of a negative order) predominate, and his cataphatic concept of God, affirmed on the idea of ​​Him as the Greatest Creator and Provider of the world, is composed primarily of spiritual and moral predicates (positive properties). We will sequentially consider those and others, that is, metaphysical and spiritual definitions with which Augustine predicates the Divine Being, starting this review of ours with definitions of the first order. Christianity does not know a God who is either “absolutely comprehensible” or “absolutely incomprehensible.” It knows only God as “incomprehensible-incomprehensible” 260 and “unnameable-nameable.” The Divinity is presented in the same “incomprehensible-incomprehensible” and “inexpressible-expressible” way in the speculative theology of the bl. Augustine of Ippona. What is cognizable for the human mind in God and what is incomprehensible to it? God is inaccessible to human knowledge, as our Ippon theologian teaches, in accordance with Revelation and the Church, in His Being. The Infinite cannot be grasped, understood by the finite mind, and the Infinite cannot be defined in our poor human language. 261 In the latter case, the Infinite would no longer be Infinite, and the Ineffable could no longer be called the Unnameable. 262 Only the Infinite is able to embrace and understand Itself...... But, on the other hand, man ineradicably longs for living, direct communication with the Divine, and God, from the unattainable height of His immeasurable greatness, Himself descends to human insignificance and, in response to his searches and aspirations, reveals Himself to everyone who seeks Him with faith and love. 263 In what, besides essence, does God reveal Himself to man; what does the latter recognize in the First? Inaccessible in Himself, God, however, can be known by the human mind by the manifestation of His activity or His effective power in the world. In other words, Hidden and Incomprehensible to any created mind in His being, the Infinite and Supreme God, on the other hand, is accessible to limited human knowledge in His properties, insofar as they are reflected in the world created by God and governed by Him and, especially, the highest image of God on earth - man. 264 These infinite properties of the Divine Being, reflected in the final form in the world and depicted in Revelation, are only accessible (and then only partially and under certain conditions) to the human mind. They alone constitute what can be the subject of our thoughts and our expressions about God. That is why the content of the Christian teaching about the being of God can and should be the actual teaching about the properties of the Divine Being. All these basic provisions or main theses of church theological consciousness on the question of the essence of God or the knowledge of God are at the same time the thoughts of the apophatic and cataphatic theology of the bl. Augustine, in whose writings we find a fairly detailed ecclesiastical theological teaching about the properties of God. “In his teaching about the properties of God,” notes the German theologian Böhringer, 265, “Augustine expressed many beautiful thoughts.” According to Augustine, continues the Western scholarly commentator of the Ippon Bishop we quote, “in the divine properties, as in the refracted rays of the sun, a single incomprehensible absolutely divine being shines (becomes clear) for the human mind.” 266 In the development of his judgments on this issue of Christian dogma, Bl. Augustine often only reproduces what has already become the common property of the church-theological consciousness of his time. Some originality or known originality of the bl. Augustine can only be seen in the way of combining the theological and philosophical material related here and in the methods of his argumentation (understanding). As it has been said, his views about the essence of God are bl. Augustine formulates in terms of both metaphysical and spiritual nature. It is known that a person receives the concept of the metaphysical or ontological properties of the Divine Being by denying in God the features of world limitation and affirming in Him everything that is opposite to it. The same, of course, must be said about our Christian Ippon thinker of the end of the 4th century and the first half of the 5th century. Thus, comparing the Divine being with finite being, limited by the condition of time, Augustine comes to the concept of Divinity as a Beginning-Infinite Being or as an eternal, original, ever-present Being. Denying in God the dependence on the boundaries of space, Augustine necessarily affirms the thought of the Divine as unconditionally alien and absolutely free from all spatial dimensions and extensions, or as an immeasurable and omnipresent Being. With the opposition of God, as the only true and therefore absolutely unchangeable being, to the created world, as a transitory and changeable being and therefore untrue, illusory existence, the theological and philosophical thought of Blessed. Augustine goes back to the idea of ​​God as an absolutely unchangeable Being. Likewise, with the simultaneous and joint negation in God of space and time, these universal forms of all world existence and the physical and mental movement closely associated with them (as movement in space and time or changes in place and state), Augustine’s religious and philosophical consciousness, by association of contrast with the world of creatures, also necessarily postulates the absolute immutability and immutability of the Being of God. Giving, according to the circumstances of the time and his personal life, a detailed formulation of this property of the immutability of the Divine, Augustine most closely motivates the latter with the truth of the unconditional simplicity or uncomplicatedness of the Divine Being. With this last property of Divine immutability and its accompanying simplicity, as an exclusive and especially characteristic property of the Divine Being, we will begin our review of the Augustinian doctrine of the metaphysical properties of the Being of God. The property of Divine immutability is an exclusive property of the Divine being in its difference from any created being. 267 In close connection with it are some other metaphysical and spiritual properties of God. Divine immutability of bl. Augustine considers by association the contrast with the changeability of created being, determined, as is known, by its complexity. Therefore, unconditional immutability, as a property of the Divine being, is most closely associated in the consciousness of the bl. Augustine with the absolute simplicity and uncomplicatedness of God’s being (and is often motivated by the latter). 268 Bl. was encouraged to pay primary 269 attention to the idea of ​​Divine immutability. Augustine has special grounds and reasons - logical and life-psychological, both negative and positive in nature. 270 Logic of thought leading to bl. Augustine, through consideration of created being, to the denial of any features of variability in God and the recognition of His being as absolutely unchangeable, comes down to the following. Changeability in the broad sense of the word, inherent in the entire area of ​​created being already by its very origin ex nihilo, by the power of the omnipotent will of the Creator, is, first of all, a direct result of the complexity of all finite things, composed of individual parts and in turn decomposed into these constituent elements. The property or quality of a finite thing is not the same as the thing itself in its in se (the substratum of the thing) and is rather something external to its being or essence. Every attribute of a finite thing is, as it were, forma substantiae superaddita and is inherent in it only per participationem. 271 The structure of any finite thing is therefore always and everywhere, of course, complex. Not to mention the kingdom of lower material nature and the world of dumb (mindless beings), and man himself, already as a spiritual-physical being, is a complex organization. But the highest side of the two-component nature of man - his soul, in the strict sense of the word, does not constitute an exception to this universal law (created existence). Although the latter, like spirit, is a simple being, on the other hand it is still far from unconditionally simple. The simplicity of the human soul is only relative (compared to objects and phenomena of material nature). 272 In itself, in reality, it is a being of a complex order, since in it one can state the multiplicity and diversity of mental forces and the qualitative and quantitative diversity of their empirical manifestations. 273 This, in turn, is explained by the fact that in the human soul its quality or strength is not the same as its substance or carrier, 274 and each individual quality or property is not identical with another or others. 275 Augustine goes even further. His theological thought penetrates into the supersensible sphere of disembodied or pure spirits, i.e. angels (good and fallen). But also in their spiritual nature and life. Augustine reveals signs of changeability (mortality), which he contrasts with the One, Immortal and Unchangeable Creator God. So, the entire area of ​​created existence without exception - both simply bodily, and bodily-spiritual, and finally, purely spiritual - is complex and, as such, is subject to the universal and immutable law of psychophysical changeability. 276 It is this complexity of all beings and things of the created world or their composition of being (esse) and qualities (qualitates) that determines their variability. Thus, the complexity of finite things must necessarily postulate their changeability. Their changeability is assumed from the very beginning of their existence or from the moment of their origin, as a transition from non-existence to existence. Likewise, the further continuation of their existence is nothing more than a “continuous run towards death”, as a process of their gradual partial dying or return to non-existence. 277 That is why the entire existence and life of finite things is composed, in essence, of a continuous series of countless and varied changes: the latter, obviously, can only take place where there are (or are only possible) beginning and end, appearance and disappearance, addition and decrease, acquisition and loss, etc. This kind of thought is bl. Augustine find their vivid expression in the following, for example, his words. “Simplicity is the name given to that nature which does not have anything that it could lose; or in which something else contains, and other contents: such as, for example, a vessel or some liquid, body and color, or air and light and warmth, or soul and wisdom. For none of these things is what it has or contains. Neither the vessel is liquid, nor the body is color, nor the air is light or warmth, nor the soul is wisdom. Therefore, they can lose these things that they have, go into other states or change properties: a vessel, for example, can be freed from the liquid with which it is filled; the body may lose color; the air may become darkened and cool, and the soul may become unreasonable.” 278 As the direct opposite of every creature, always complex and therefore necessarily changeable, Divine Being exists as unconditional simplicity, as absolutely pure and uncomplicated, and, therefore, absolutely unchangeable Being. 279 But He alone is a simple being in the proper and true sense of the word, and therefore, unlike every creature, He alone can be called unchangeable. “There is only one simple and therefore the only unchangeable good,” says Blessed. Augustine, in his same monumental work “De Civitate Dei,” is God. By this Good all goods were created, but not simple ones, and therefore changeable.” 280 The nature of the Divine is called simple for the reason that what it has is itself. 281 Just as in absolutely simple being, in God the distinction between substance and accidents, which is usual in finite things, is unacceptable. 282 That the unconditional simplicity and immutability of God’s being completely excludes any accident, that is, a sign that is unimportant for the object or accidental, is understandable by itself and does not need proof. But the expression “substantia”, which has the meaning of a technical term, as being correlative with the concept of accident and therefore not completely eliminating the thought of accident, 283 bl. Augustine also recognizes it as inapplicable to God. 284 In God, according to Augustine, only “essentia” (essence) exists and should be conceivable (by us). 285 Further revealing his thought about the absolute simplicity and immutability of the Divine, our Christian philosopher and teacher of the Church emphasizes that in God both the essence and the properties, and these latter from each other, are inseparable and indistinguishable. 286 In God, essence (essentia) and qualities (qualitates) or substance and attributes are one and the same. 287 For God, as the bl. never tires of repeating. Augustine many times, “to be” (“esse”) and “to have” (“habere”) represent a real identity. 288 In other words, in God and for God, from Augustine’s point of view, the property and its bearer or the object and subject of possession are one. 289 The categories of position, state, place and time, if they can be attributed to God, then not in their own sense, but only in a figurative sense or only by analogy. 290 Predicates, assimilated to God in the proper sense, either relate to His essence, or define by themselves the hypostatic, eternal and unchangeable relationships that exist in God (the Three Persons of the Holy Trinity). 291 Since the essence and properties in God are identical and since everything that is in Him, He possesses “a se”, as the Original, and not only by virtue of “participatione alicujus”, 292 then, according to Bl. Augustine, it would be erroneous or at least inaccurate to say about God that He has wisdom or life.... No, He is Wisdom Itself and the Creator of all the wise; He is Life Itself and the Creator of all living things. 293 Also, all the names of God as Spirit, good, wise, blessed, eternal, great, etc., must also be understood substantially. All these and similar expressions about God should be understood, according to Augustine, only in a substantial sense (secundum substantiam vel essentiam est intelligendum). 294 Continuing to further develop his main idea about the unconditional simplicity of the Divine and His immutability resulting from it, Blessed. Augustine quite consistently asserts the unity and identity of all properties of the Divine essence and among themselves. If each of the divine properties individually is identical with the essence and if the essence in God is one and always equal to itself, then it is axiomatically obvious that all the properties of God are equal and identical with each other. Bl. Augustine literally says the following about this: “Although God is called in many different ways, such as the great good wise, blessed, true, etc., His greatness is the same as His wisdom... and His goodness is identical with His wisdom and greatness, and His truth is one with all this (the above). And it is not another thing for God (ibi) to be blessed, but another to be great and wise or true or good or in general to be himself.” 295 What has been said by itself resolves (in a positive sense) the question regarding the comparative metaphysical importance and moral value of the properties of the Divine nature. Equal - each separately - to the single Divine essence common to all of them, the properties of God are equally significant and, in ethical terms, are equal and equivalent to each other. According to the German learned theologian A. Dorner, “Augustine quite rightly believes that Divine simplicity would completely disappear if we recognized (in God) the presence of attributes more and less essential.” 296 “So, according to this,” concludes Bl. Augustine’s series of discussions about the simplicity of God’s being are primarily and truly divine because they are called simple, because in it there is no other property, and no other substance; and that it is not by communion with another that it is divine, or wise, or blessed... but what He (the Divine Spirit) has is also He, and this is all one.” 297 Just as complexity in the sphere of created being is a necessary postulate of its variability, so on the contrary, the absolute simplicity or uncomplexity of the Divine Being, which we have just examined, also determines His immutability, this ontological property of the Infinite in Its difference from everything finite. The conviction of the immutability of the Divine Being has always been inherent in Bl. Augustine and had an axiomatic meaning for his religious consciousness. 298 With particular force, this idea of ​​​​the immutability of the Divine is fixed in the theological and philosophical consciousness of Augustine under the influence of certain vital psychological reasons, negative and positive. We have in mind Manichaeism, Neoplatonism and some individual personality traits of the bl. Augustine and his spiritual development. Manichaeism, which for some time was the ruler of the thoughts and feelings of the future Bishop of Ippon, later became a negative factor in the development and formulation of the idea of ​​​​Divine immutability. It is precisely in contrast to Manichaean dualism and materialism in the doctrine of the Divine that Augustine, having freed himself from the shackles of this false teaching, now persistently emphasizes in his theological and philosophical speculation about the Supreme Being the predicate of unity and immateriality, simplicity and immutability. The same tendency - to strenuously put forward the idea of ​​​​immutability and simplicity in the concept of God - also inclined the bl. Augustine and his closer acquaintance with Neoplatonic philosophy, which could not have been more in keeping with the sublimely idealistic character of his theological and philosophical thinking and the general direction of his mental life (in its later era). This bl., so clearly and prominently outlined in theology. Augustine's apophatic idea of ​​the Divine immutability of God's being can be considered at the same time as a direct reaction of Augustine's religious and philosophical consciousness against the dualism and sensationalism of the Manichaean system and as a clear indicator of the shift of his theological and philosophical thought towards the idealistic worldview of the Neoplatonists. 299 Due to the absolute simplicity and uncomplicatedness we noted above, the Divine Being is in all respects and unconditionally unchangeable: any - even only logical or potential - changeability is resolutely denied and excluded - in principle and in fact - by His very being, since such a possibility would already be tantamount to the possibility of non-existence. 300 God, according to the teachings of Bl. Augustine, not only is absolutely unchangeable and immutable, but “in Him are contained the final causes of everything transitory, the immutable principles of everything changeable,” 301 He is the unchangeable basis and condition of the existence of all and every changeable nature. 302 Creativity (i.e., origin from nothing) and changeability on the one hand, changeability and death on the other, as we have seen, according to Augustine, are synonyms (synonymous or correlative concepts), mutually presuppose and condition each other. That's why bl. Augustine, as a result of his analysis of the idea of ​​​​Divine immutability in its antithesis with the changeability of finite world existence, comes to the following two conclusions in relation to the Creator and the creature. God alone, as original, as independent of anyone or anything, and therefore existing in the true sense, is at the same time and for this reason “ens simplicissimum” and “solus incommutabilis.” 303 All finite, created being, as non-original and, therefore, untrue, illusory, eo ipso must be changeable, transient, perishable, destructible. 304 And in comparison with the truly existing Being, that is, the Unchangeable and Imperishable God, everything created and therefore mortal, even if it can be called being, is only relative (aliquo modo est), and is rather only a ghost, unreality, non-existence (non est). 305 In numerous discussions of Bl. Augustine about Divine immutability, we quite often find in him an apology for the latter using the property of Divine originality. 306 Our Ippon theologian-philosopher owed this to a large extent to Neoplatonism, which helped him connect the concept of the immutability of the Divine Being with the idea of ​​true or truly existing being and thus, having clarified this idea in his mind, allowed him to give a deeper and more accurate justification and formulation of this metaphysical attribute as the exclusive property of the Absolute One (Creator). According to prof. I. V. Popova, “Augustine was always convinced of the immutability of God, but he did not see in what relation the idea of ​​​​the immutability of God stands to the idea of ​​being.” 307 From the Enneads Plotinus, with whom bl. Augustine later became acquainted (in their Latin translation by the rhetorician M. Victorinus), “he extracted the concept of absolute being, which is characterized by the sign of immutability and therefore is characteristic of God alone, and of relative being, fluid, changeable, characteristic of creation.” 308 With such a logical motivation for the idea of ​​​​Divine immutability, as a predicate of truly existing or true Being, we actually encounter in many places in the works of Blessed. Augustine. 309 Thus, if the Manichaean doctrine with its dualistic-materialistic understanding of the Divine served as a negative factor in the development of Augustine’s doctrine of Divine immutability and simplicity, then, on the contrary, Neoplatonism with its sublimely idealistic concept of the First Principle or First One, as absolutely simple and unchangeable and therefore the only true being, played a positive role for Augustine or was a positive factor. in the living process of formation of this central idea of his apophatic theology. 310 To what has been said, we can add that bl. Augustine, in his concept of God, strongly emphasizes the idea of ​​immutability and its correlate - simplicity, also for reasons, so to speak, of a psychological nature. The desire for absolute unity, as the highest transcendental ideal of universal peace and tranquility, in contrast to the restless empirical consciousness and concrete reality torn apart by contrasts and discord, was deeply akin to the psyche of the bl. Augustine and stood in connection with the prevailing mood of the later era of his independent religious and philosophical quest. Constituting at the same time the main motive of all the searches for religious and philosophical thought contemporary to Augustine, these aspirations and moods only clearly reflected that “age of general separation and discord.” 311 The Augustinian idea of ​​the absolute simplicity and immutability of the Divine Being, which we have considered, is the most strictly and clearly defined idea of ​​the apophatic theology of the bl. Augustine, however, is not a purely negative concept, but at the same time receives in his theology positive real-life content and meaning. According to bl. Augustine and in his language, the simplicity of the Absolute Being already implicite contains all the fullness and diversity of the spiritual content of the Highest nature and life. That's why bl. Augustine finds it possible for himself to simultaneously assert about God that He is “Deus simplex et multiplex.” 312 Thus, the simplicity (simplicitas) of the Divine being is thought of by Augustine as multiple (multiplex) and the plurality in Him (multiplicitas) as simple (simplex). In particular, about wisdom as a property of God, bl. Augustine puts it this way: “the wisdom of God is simple in diversity, uniform in diversity.” 313 This means, according to the consciousness and recognition of Augustine himself, Divine wisdom is simultaneously and jointly both absolute simplicity and infinite richness (completeness) of content in their highest all-reconciling or all-unifying synthesis. In view of this, Divine immutability and simplicity, as a property of God, stands in the closest and inextricable connection with other not only ontological, but also spiritual and moral qualities and definitions of the Divine, which characterize the inner spiritual-personal nature and life of the Absolute, and in a certain sense defines or explains them. 314 This, in general terms, is the content of the theological and philosophical teaching of Blessed. Augustine, bishop Ipponsky, about the simplicity and immutability of the Divine Being, and these are the logical foundations and vital psychological reasons for the emergence and development of this central idea of ​​his apophatic theology. It was shown above 315 that God, according to the teachings of Bl. Augustine, there is an Infinite Being: He exists without beginning and infinitely. This beginninglessness and infinity, attributed by the human mind to God in contrast to created being, in particular, affirm in Him the properties of supra-temporality and outside of spatiality. The timelessness of the Divine, according to the view of our Ippon thinker, not only presupposes the existence of God before all time, but also decisively denies in Him our category of time with its final definitions: “before,” “after,” and “now.” Absolutely independent of the conditions of time, God is an eternal Being. Moreover, the eternity of God cannot at all be understood as an endless series of known, even huge, periods of time, successively replacing each other. Just as the eternity of the Divine is not a purely negative or only a formal-logical concept: eternity, as a property of the Divine Being, is the originality of existence and the inherent nature of the manifestations of being and the spiritual-personal life of the Absolute (in acts of cognition, will and feeling) and is identical with His very being. In the same way, the extra-spatial nature of the Divine, according to the conviction of Blessed. Augustine, there is an immeasurability of Him by any spatial dimensions or extensions, and there is a complete negation in Him of all spatial categories. Absolutely free from the conditions of space, God is an omnipresent Being. At the same time, the omnipresence of God, from the point of view of the fully defined church-theological consciousness of our Christian philosopher, has not a sensual-material, but a spiritual-moral character: God is omnipresent not in the sense of His material-limitless extension in space or spatial infinity, but in the sense of His unchangeable and complete presence at every point in space or His eternal participation in everything with the fullness of His being. Already as absolutely simple and unchangeable, God eo ipso is completely independent of any conditions of time and space, 316 these general signs of any finite being, and therefore must also exist and be thought of by us with the predicates of eternity and omnipresence. What is eternity as a property of the Divine Being, according to the teachings of the bl. Augustine of Ippona? Of course, eternity (for our consciousness) is nothing more than the negation of time. 317 But what is time, according to the consciousness and recognition of our blessed teacher of the Church? Clarification of the concept of eternity is closely connected with the definition of the idea of ​​time, the negation of which it serves. Therefore, for a proper understanding of eternity, as a metaphysical Divine attribute, which also stands in a living and inextricable connection with the manifestations and internal spiritual-personal life of the Divine, it is necessary to first turn to at least a summary disclosure and clarification of the Augustinian idea of ​​time. 318 What is it according to the teachings of Bl. Augustine's time, in the form of which every created being exists and under the category of which it is cognized by us? Where does it begin and what is its significance? 319 Clearly aware of the difficulty of solving this most important metaphysical problem, that is, the problem of time, and in particular those difficulties associated with defining the very concept of time, Bl. Augustine openly states that “as long as no one asks me about time, I understand what it is without any difficulty (scio), but as soon as I want to explain this concept to those who question me, I become completely perplexed (nescio).” 320 Despite the clearly and repeatedly expressed bl. Augustine was aware of the difficulties that the human mind inevitably encounters in solving the problem we are considering; the latter, apparently, has long and vividly interested the theological and philosophical thought of Augustine, 321 who quite often in his various writings returns to discussions about this issue. 322 Time, which is the basic law of existence of the entire physical and spiritual finite world existence, and a necessary condition for its empirical knowledge by us, in its inner essence, however, is incomprehensible by human thought and indefinable by his word. 323 Nevertheless, we can say that time is a certain extension (quaedam distentio), 324 revealing itself in three dimensions, that is, under the category of present, past and future. It is a form of successive connection or sequential change of things and is formed from successively successive moments of movement and change, 325 so that, in the words of Augustine, “there would be no past if nothing passed, there would be no future if nothing came (arrived), and there would be no present time if there was nothing really existing.” 326 The future and the past are the boundaries or limits of the present, which arises from the former and disappears in the latter. If the present somehow suddenly stopped (stopped its constant unstoppable rush forward or stopped going into the distance of the past), then it would become limitless, i.e. it would itself turn into eternity. Because of this, time, according to Augustine, received its beginning along with movement, as an integral part of every created being, and is conditioned by the changes directly resulting from this movement of the creature. If it is true that time and eternity differ from one another in that time is in close connection with the change of creation and its prerequisite - movement, and eternity, of course, excludes all changes, 327 then it is clear that there would be no time at all if creation had not come into being, which, by its inherent movement by nature, determines changes. 328 The concepts of creation and time are therefore correlative and mutually conditioned concepts. In view of this, our world, Augustine thinks, had to be created not in time, but along with time. 329 What flows in time is posited before one and after another (moment of time), that is, after what has already passed and before what is yet to come in the future. But before the creation of the world, of course, there could be no past, because there was no creature in whose continuous and varied movements and changes time would be realized. 330 So, the world was created along with time, because the beginning of the world is at the same time the beginning of movement and change. Adhering to a more precise expression, one must say that “time began from creation,” and not vice versa – “creation received its beginning from time.” 331 In view of what has been said, according to Augustine, it would even be sheer absurdity to assert that the world was created in time, since such a statement allows the existence of time before time itself. 332 However, although time depends on movement, and movement on the existence of a creature, this does not mean that time can be identified with movement itself (non est tempus corporis motus). 333 Time is rather a measure “that serves us to measure the duration of not only the movement of bodies, but also their rest.” 334 So, time, according to Augustine, can be recognized as a measure or scale for measuring things in their dynamic as well as static state. But time could not serve as a scale for measuring all motion and rest (all finite things in general) if it itself were not, in one way or another, subject to measurement. What is the principle for measuring time or what serves as the unit of time? Time itself cannot have the value of such a principle or such a unit, since it, as we will see below, cannot be measured (in any of its constituent elements). Meanwhile, every measure must, on its part, be measured by another measure that follows it in descending order, the function of which it is. According to Augustine, this unit of measurement of time or the principle by which time itself is measured is the rational spirit of man. But how exactly does the human spirit measure time and what exactly does it measure by measuring time with itself? What in our language is called present, past and future - our spirit does not measure this. The human spirit cannot measure the so-called “present” time because it, having no duration (nullum spatium), always eludes this measurement. In the general process of unstoppable and continuous movement (world existence), the so-called “present” is only a moment, a point of transition (punctum) from the future to the past. It does not measure the spirit of the “past,” since what has already passed is also inaccessible to measurement for the simple reason that it no longer exists (jam non est). Finally, the human spirit does not measure the “future” either, because it does not yet exist (nondum est). 335 So, without measuring the present, the past, or the future, i.e., none of the three definitions of time known to us, the human spirit, however, according to Augustine’s conviction, still measures time. But only he measures time not outside himself, but within himself. 336 Augustine presents this process in this form. Things that come into the field of our vision or float to the surface of our consciousness and then disappear from it, at the same time affect the human soul (affectionem faciunt in animo), 337 that is, they make a certain impression on it, which (in the form of a mental image, which then enters the treasury of memory and is stored there), 338 remains in the soul even after the causative agent of the impression has already disappeared. 339 For this purpose, in particular, according to Augustine, the threefold activity of the human spirit is served, expressed in acts of attention (attentio), recollection (memoria) and expectation (expectatio). According to the three indicated moments of its mental life and activity, the human spirit divides time itself into the past, present and future. Memory is coordinated with the past, attention is paralleled by the present, and finally, anticipation is paralleled by the future. 340 With all this, Augustine wants to say that, by measuring time, the human spirit, in essence, measures his own internal states related to the variability of things and experienced by him only in the successive change of dates of consciousness. The consciousness of this change in our mental experiences and the changes that it introduces into our psyche (which are necessarily connected with it in our psyche) serve as the psychological basis for the emergence of time in us (both as an idea and as a form of representation of the entire finite world being). These are our changeable internal states, felt and recognized by us in the form of successive mental moments, according to the conviction of our Christian psychologist of the end of the 4th and beginning of the 5th century, and are, in the final instance, the real measure of time with its three conditional dimensions. “The subject of our expectation (expectatio),” says Bl. Augustine, in clarifying his psychological concept of time, becomes the subject of our attention (attentio), and becomes the subject of our recollection (memoria). There is no doubt that the future does not yet exist; however, in our soul there is an expectation of the future (which the human spirit measures precisely as its own expectation and in proportion to its intensity). No one will deny that the past no longer exists; however, in our soul there is a memory of the past. Finally, one cannot but agree that the present does not have extension (spatium), because it passes for us elusively (in puncto praeterit), as indivisible; but the attention of our soul, directed to it, fixes (fixes) it in the soul (perdurat attentio), thanks to which the future passes into the past. Therefore,” Augustine summarizes his psychological analysis of time, “it is not the future time, which does not yet exist, that is long-lasting, but our expectation of the future; likewise, it is not the past time, which no longer exists, that is long-lasting, but our memory of the past.” 341 Yes. arr., not existing separately or independently of the changeable things themselves, but only in our ideas and impressions related to this variability of them, 342 time is actually measured by the variability of things or, better said, by the variability of our internal states that arise and disappear in us in connection with this variability (of objects and phenomena) of the created world, already ascertained by reason. If all the numerous and varied arguments of bl. Augustine about time and issues closely related to it can be reduced to unity, then his teaching about this can be briefly formulated in a number of the following provisions. Time, according to Augustine, on the one hand, is the universal form of existence of any finite being, necessarily associated with movement and the change that accompanies it. Therefore, the beginning of time is posited by creation itself, before which and outside of which time is nothing. On the other hand, time is a measure of physical and mental movement (and rest), by which the human spirit, according to the formula of sequential relationships, measures in itself all objects and phenomena of created bodily-spiritual existence, both in their dynamics and equally in their statics. From this point of view, time can be called a subjective form of perception of the entire finite world existence, revealing itself only in a successive series of moments. As the Founder of everything, who sets the limits of time and sets the boundaries of space, God is thereby the Highest Creator and Legislator-Governor of both the entire world and the time that happened along with the world. 343 Himself Unchangeable and Immovable neither in time nor in space, He, however, is the Supreme Prime Mover of every corporeal and spiritual creature or the Absolute Beginning of all its physical and mental movement, 344 i.e. those of its constant and varied changes in which time is realized and thanks to which it is realized in our consciousness. 345 He is the Author not only of all time, but even of eternity itself, 346 which negates time and is identical with His very Being. 347 One can even say that both the whole world (as a revelation of the thought and will of the Divine), and, in particular, time (and space) are found and known by us only in God, from Whom, through Whom and in Whom are all things. 348 This is, in brief, the profound teaching of Blessed. Augustine of Ippona about time according to its essence, origin and meaning. After the preliminary brief remarks we made above regarding Augustine’s concept of time, it will be easier for us to understand his concept of eternity, the content of which is determined by its complete opposite to time. If time is characterized by movement and its correlate of change, as an integral property of every creature, and if it is unthinkable without some continuously flowing and therefore continuously changing reality, then, by contrast, eternity will be precisely that which excludes any concept of movement and the accompanying change, inevitably inherent in every creature, and to which, of course, our past (fuit) or future (erit), but only the present (tantum est), is not applicable. 349 Of course, in its essence, eternity (like time) is an insoluble riddle for man: it cannot be understood by the human mind, just as it cannot be expressed in his language. 350 Speaking figuratively (adapted to our thinking limited by the condition of time), we can say that eternity is a kind of boundless or motionless time 351 or the “present”, as if stopped in its constant and unstoppable rush forward. 352 Eternity, according to Augustine, is an unchanging, ever-present “today.” 353 That's exactly what bl. Augustine understands eternity as a property of the Divine Being, Who alone possesses it, in contrast to any other (created) being. 354 We know that everything and every created being is limited by the condition of time, so that although it will henceforth always continue its existence, however, as non-self-existent, it received the beginning of its existence from the outside, and therefore, of course, cannot be called an absolutely simple and unchangeable being. That, of course, does not constitute simple and unchangeable, that is, true being, that at least one moment could not exist (in the past), just as that being cannot be considered original, which, existing at the present moment, can ever cease to exist (in the future). The beginning and the end, according to Augustine, equally contradict the concept of Absolute Being, and therefore God, as an unchangeably original and simple and therefore true Being, is equally alien to both the beginning and the end (sine initio et sine termino est), i.e. He is eternal, 355 and as the only self-existent, unchangeable and true Being, He alone is Being is truly immortal and eternal. 356 But created being is subject to the conditions of time not only in relation to the initial moment of its existence, but also in the sense that it has a goal, which it must gradually strive to achieve throughout its entire existence and life, and together with the goal it also has a future. Moreover, those successive moments that make up the process of development of his being and the course of his life (curriculum vitae) form the past time, and what in our language is called the present is only a moment or an instant, the point of transition (in puncto praeterit) from the future to the past. 357 On the contrary, in God, as the Absolute Being and therefore truly existing, there is and cannot be any past, no future, but only the continuous present always and invariably abides. 358 Divine Being and Life, as absolutely simple and unchangeable, and eo ipso true, are always and continuously realized in the eternally and unchangeably abiding, ever-present and ever-living “today.” 359 This means that, by virtue of the absolute immutability and eternity of the Divine Being that we have characterized above, all manifestations of His spiritual and personal life (such as, for example, knowledge, will and feeling) must also be imbued and imprinted with the character of immutability and eternity. 360 So, summarizing the above line of reasoning, bl. Augustine about the eternity of God, his teaching about this ontological property of the Divine can be briefly expressed as follows. If time occurred only “in et cum creatura” and is closely connected with the variability of creation, then, consequently, God, as the absolutely unchangeable and true Creator of all world existence, as infinitely above every creature, so infinitely rises above all time determined by the creation of the world, that is, eternal (aeternus). And since God alone is absolutely simple and unchangeable, then, ergo, He alone possesses this attribute of eternity: “Deus solus aeternus est.” And since, due to absolute immutability and simplicity, all the properties of God are identical both with each other and with His very Being, then eternity, as a property of God, must also be understood substantially: “aeternitas ipsa Dei substantia est.” The final conclusion from here is that all acts of Divine knowledge, will and feeling are also invariably eternal. The second universal form of existence of world reality and a necessary condition for our empirical knowledge of it is space. 361 With the denial of the category of space in God, human thought rises to the idea of ​​Him as an immeasurable (premundane) and omnipresent (absolutely spiritual) Being. 362 Immeasurability and omnipresence, as the negative and positive sides of the same metaphysical property of God that we describe, can find different understanding and interpretation. Not only from a purely theistic, but also from a pantheistic point of view, one can talk about omnipresence or omnipresence, representing the latter in the form of some kind of infinite extension in space. But such a way of thinking, which presupposes the actual presence of a part in a part, and not the whole as a whole, not only does not exhaust the entire content of the Christian concept of omnipresence, but also represents a gross distortion of the purely Christian idea of ​​​​Divine omnipresence. The latter, on the contrary, as is known, affirms the presence of the Divine decisively in everything, and with all the fullness of His being. But such a truly Christian concept of Divine omnipresence (in connection with the idea of ​​​​the pure spirituality of God) became the property of the theological and philosophical consciousness of Blessed. Augustine not immediately, but was the fruit of his long and intense efforts to understand the idea of ​​spirit in the sense of an incorporeal essence, certainly alien to any spatiality and any material outlines. The genesis of the Augustinian concept of Divine immeasurability and omnipresence, this most important idea of ​​the theological and philosophical worldview of the bl. Augustine, clearly shows that for a long time Augustine could not realize in his mind the ideas of the pure spirituality of the Divine Being (in its church understanding) and in his view of the nature of the Divine he initially held a materialistic or pantheistic, i.e., exclusively spatial point of view. In the first half of his life, during the period of independent religious and philosophical quests, which did not always, however, lead Augustine to a strictly ecclesiastical solution to one or another problem of Christian knowledge, he believed and was convinced that there is nothing incorporeal; that it does not happen and is impossible to comprehend the idea of ​​pure spirit in its complete detachment from matter, that is, without any spatial extension, divisibility into parts, sensory-perceptible forms 363, etc. Standing on such a materialistic point of view, Augustine, together with the Manichaeans, imagined the being of God in the form of an ethereal or airy body, or otherwise the finest light matter, spilled everywhere and filling and filling everything with itself. penetrating. 364 At that time his idea of ​​the Divine omnipresence must have been distinguished by the same material character. 365 The latter at first (in the earlier period of St. Augustine’s search for God) was depicted in his imagination “as an endless extension of light substance, which is found everywhere, but at each point with one part.” It is not surprising if, with such plasticity of imagination and concreteness of thinking, Augustine then shared the conviction that the larger mass of matter in volume and density contains God in correspondingly larger sizes, and the smaller in size and compactness part of it contains Him in proportionally smaller quantities, so that, for example, in the body of an elephant there should naturally be more of God, and in the body of a sparrow - less. 366 As can be seen from the above, Augustine, in the era under consideration of his conscious religious and philosophical quests, so sincerely and so colorfully captured by him on the pages of his immortal “Confessions,” was still completely alien to the idea of ​​the absolute spirituality of the Divine Being, and due to the strength of this, the idea of ​​​​Divine omnipresence in the sense of the complete presence of God in every point of space and in every state and action of the forces of each individual being had not yet become clear to his consciousness. This is the view of Bl. Augustine became a lasting asset of his theological and philosophical thought much later, in the years of his Christian maturity, and thanks to a number of literary influences on him, in particular due to his acquaintance with the doctrine of Neoplatonism. 367 Long and concentrated reflection bl. Augustine about the nature of the principles of thinking and the norms of reasonable assessment, first of all, helped him, by analogy with the named elements of consciousness, to understand what God is, as an immaterial light. 368 This made it much easier for him to realize in his consciousness the idea of ​​the material non-extension and non-spatial nature of the Divine Being, as a purely spiritual substance, by its nature completely opposite to all matter, and in connection with this, it was no longer difficult for him to assimilate the omnipresence of God, as His presence in all His integrity at every point in space. If we systematically present the thoughts of Bl. Augustine about omnipresence as an ontological property of the Divine Being, then this point of his speculative theology should be outlined before us in the following lines. God, unlimited in His being and properties, in contrast to the created world, as has been said, is a Being unlimited by any space. On the contrary, a God who is materially extended and in one way or another limited by outside space, according to Augustine, would no longer be God. 369 Absolutely simple and unchangeable, He, according to the deep conviction of our church thinker, is great not through His presence or participation in any other magnitude (reality) in relation to Him. The latter can and should be thought and affirmed only about all finite things, for which something else means to be, and something else means to be great, and to which magnitude is inherent only as a quality and only to the extent of their participation in the Greatest God and Creator of all. But as we already know, God, according to the extreme consciousness and conviction of the bl. Augustine, has nothing greater, nothing higher and better in comparison with Himself, nothing in which He only participated and only through this participation (per participationem) would Himself be great. On the contrary, being Himself the Highest and Greatest Being, He is great only through Himself: His greatness, as Augustine repeatedly repeats, has a substantial character, that is, He is also Himself (in His essence or substance). 370 Already from all of the above, it is not difficult to understand that Augustine conceived of God as a Being, on the one hand, transcendental to the world, and on the other, as immanent to it, and both the transcendence and the immanence of the Divinity of the world (each separately) are carried out in the theological and philosophical system of Bl. Augustine is equally persistent and definite. 371 God fills, as He speaks about Himself in Holy Scripture, heaven and earth. However, Augustine continues, He fills the world with Himself not in the image of, for example, light, air or moisture. His omnipresence cannot be imagined as if He were in one part of the world with one part of Himself, and in another with another, and in a larger part of the world with a larger part of Himself, and in a smaller part with a smaller part, or, finally, in one part completely, and in another only partially. 372 On the contrary, in se ipso everywhere and always He abides entirely in everything (ubique totus, per totum totus). 373 God is great not in the physical-spatial sense, but in the spiritual-moral sense. 374 Therefore, everywhere He abides in Himself with His entire being: not excluded from anything, not included in anything, since His omnipresence is not material, but spiritual in nature (non corporalis, sed spiritalis Dei praesentia), 375 i.e. presence not by the extension of space, but by the power of His greatness (ubique praesens est non locorum spatiis, sed majestatis potentia). 376 Incomprehensible in nothing, but in everything as if extended and penetrating everything with Himself, God, according to Augustine, by no means constitutes the quality of the world (non sit qualitas mundi): He permeates everything with Himself as the creative principle of the world (substantia creatrix mundi) and as His providential principle (regens et continens mundum). 377 Giving the creation its own activity and Himself not at all in need of the latter, He, as the Creator and Provider of everything, absolutely freely, through His thought and will, governs the world as His idea, and embraces everything with Himself or contains everything in Himself without any labor or burden (sine labore regens et sine onere continens mundum). 378 Carrying in Himself all created being or the whole world (which, according to Augustine, is not only from God, but also in God), 379 He, however, is not the place (locus) of the world, since in order to be such a place, He must have the extension of space, and in order to be extended in the spatial sense, He must be corporeal. But such a God, according to Augustine, is no longer God. 380 After all, even the human soul, although she is a creature, however, her nature is different from the body; all the more so must this be said about God, Who is the Creator of soul and body 381. To clarify the true nature of the Divine omnipresence, Bl. Augustine sometimes uses some analogies, for example, the non-spatial nature of the human soul and the rules of justice. A certain independence of the soul from the bonds of space receives its visual expression in the following cases, for example: firstly, when the soul, with the help of the sense of vision, perceives things that are far from itself; secondly, when she already, through the organ of hearing, perceives sounds coming towards her from afar; thirdly, when she, as incorporeal, is completely present in her sensations and feelings throughout her body and in every part of it; finally, fourthly, when it, not being itself spatial, can accommodate in its memory many spatial objects, the greatest spaces, entire regions and countries. 382 But while partially overcoming space and relatively dominating it, the human soul, as finite in nature, is still subject to the conditions of time in its life and activity. Its Creator rises above it in the indicated respect: He is completely free not only from any boundaries of space, but also from any limits of time. 383 As another concrete example that clearly illustrates the truth of God’s complete involvement in everything, Augustine also cites the rule of justice. 384 The meaning of this analogy, according to prof. I.V. Popova, clear. “The rule of justice, for example, “give due to all,” by which we measure the moral worth of actions, is simultaneously contemplated by the minds of all people who live in accordance with it or strive for it, wherever they are. Consequently, it does not occupy any specific point in space and at the same time is present everywhere, however, not in parts, but in each place entirely, because everyone contemplates this rule in the fullness of its content. In the same way, God, without occupying any specific place, is, however, in all His integrity at every point.” 385 However, although God is present in everything, He is not present in everything in the same way. Reproducing, mutatis mutandis, the well-known cosmological concept of Neoplatonism, bl. Augustine, for his part, states the existence in the world of a gradually ascending ladder of creatures. Moreover, this gradation of creatures is determined by him precisely by the degree of their closeness or the measure of their “communion” with the Divine, as the Absolute Truth, Good and Beauty in Itself, the Source of everything true, good and beautiful in the world. 386 And the more a creature can contain God, this all-blessed and all-satisfied Source of its happiness, joy and consolation, the higher and more blessed it becomes. 387 According to the meaning of the Christian view of Bl. Augustine on God, as the Creator, and on the world, as His creation, this means that God, metaphysically inherent in everything and entirely, is not morally present in everything equally; that the character and extent of His presence are determined by His absolutely free self-determination to various kinds and types of created being and, in turn, are determined by the unequal, in the moral sense, attitude of creatures to their Creator (the unequal degree of receptivity (capacitas) of a creature to its Creator). 388 So there is another image of the gracious presence of God in heaven, under which, as is self-evident, of course, not the starry sky, but the angelic world, and another on earth; and here God is present differently in the souls of the righteous, differently in the souls of sinners 389 and, finally, even differently in the kingdom of unreasonable and unfree nature. 390 Augustine believes that under the condition of righteousness, purity and holiness and to the extent of their moral height and perfection, these “souls and souls of the righteous” become a special church of God and a special place of His dwelling. 391 And this predominant dwelling of God in them, on the other hand, is for them a source of greater bliss and joy, which is the fuller and richer, the higher and more perfect, the greater their mutual proximity (that is, the closer they are to God and the closer God is to them). The heavenly orders of angels are closest to God (magis est templum Ejus (sc. Dei) in coelis, ubi est populus Angelorum) 392 and precisely because on the part of the latter God is the subject of the greatest knowledge and love, and the highest glorification. But in close union or in living communication with this heavenly world of blessed spirits, we, people, through gradual ascent through the stages of moral perfection, must become the same church of God and a place of His special dwelling: this is our highest purpose (quod et nos ipsi esse debemus). 393 Love is that non-material medium through which we spiritually and morally approach God and enter into blissful communion with Him; and the purer our love for Him is in spiritual terms, the closer He is to us. 394 On the contrary, the beginning that separates and alienates us from God is sin. 395 But this our (sinful) separation from God is not, however, a separation from Him in terms of being itself (i.e., metaphysical or substantial), since for any being, as existing in God, there is nothing closer than God Himself. 396 This is the moral disunion of a creature with its Creator (or the egoistic removal of its free will from God), which takes place in those cases when free will, by the direction of its activity, moves away from the commandments of God and then, mired in wickedness, becomes that darkness (iniqui - tencbrae sunt), about which it is written: “The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not overcome it” (John. 1, 5). 397 Likewise, in order to restore the moral communion with God that we have interrupted, in view of the absolute spirituality of His being and the extra-spatial nature of His omnipresence, we cannot at all approach Him or move away from Him in any bodily way or spatially (per loca). 398 We approach God by turning our hearts to Him, that is, loving Him, and morally becoming like Him (becoming like Him). 399 And then we find Him within ourselves and vividly and joyfully experience His closeness to ourselves in the depths of our spirit. In the same way, we remove ourselves from God by the fact that, turning our hearts away from Him and loving untruth (iniquitatem, malum), we become morally dissimilar to Him or opposite to Him (we become dissimilar or opposite to Him). 400 Existing in everything, participating in everything, filling and penetrating everything with Himself, and containing and embracing everything with Himself and in Himself, God, on the other hand, according to the Christian conviction of Blessed. Augustine, He Himself is not encompassed by anyone or anything and in this His omnipresence is in no way bound by any external or internal necessity lying in His being. The world does not at all set any limits to the omnipresence of the Divine, which in the theological and philosophical system of the Western teacher of the Church we are studying is conceived, as has been said, as an immanent-transcendent Being and in His relations with creation absolutely free. That is why, if substantially or ontologically God is inherent in everything (the world) and is close to every being and in it to every partial state and action of force, 401 then, of course, He is also close to those who are morally completely distant from Him. 402 Augustine wants to say by this that God lives and manifests Himself in the conscience of everyone, both good and evil (man or angel), but, of course, depending on the degree of its sensitivity. 403 And if in heaven or in the heavenly world of disembodied spirits (good angels), as well as in the souls of holy people, God reveals His presence to the highest degree 404 (compared to the souls of sinners and the kingdom of nature), then on the other hand even hell itself, this sphere of the highest development of evil and the most intense fight against God, for the same reasons, as Augustine believes together with the psalmist (Ps. 139:8 ), - in the same way does not exclude the Divine presence and does not set any limits to it. 405 The church-theological teaching of Bl. was molded into such forms. Augustine about immeasurability and omnipresence as a metaphysical property of the Divine Being, and this is the genesis of this idea in the religious and philosophical consciousness of Augustine, who, as is known, came to a truly Christian understanding of the Divine only through a series of “spiritual crises.” 406 Having outlined above 407 the teachings of Bl. Augustine, bishop Ipponsky, about the metaphysical properties of the being of God, we now move on to the next section of Augustine’s treatise on the properties of God, that is, to his special teaching about the spiritual 408 properties of the Divine Being. If the metaphysical or ontological properties of the Being of God, the concept of which the human mind comes to by association of contrast with the world of creatures, deny in God that which is not in Him, that is, the features of our worldly limitations, then, on the contrary, the spiritual or spiritual-personal properties of God, which we attribute to God to the highest degree by analogy with the world of creatures (especially the highest), outline the being of God from the positive side: they positively affirm in God that which He actually possesses “per eminentiam” [even in comparison with the highest order of created beings]. If in His metaphysical properties the Divine Being opposes our world as its complete opposite and direct negation, then in His spiritual properties It, on the contrary, reveals Himself to us as a Being close to the world, closest to man. In a positive way, the content of our concept of God is revealed in a whole class of particular properties that we assimilate to God as the Highest and Most Perfect Personality or as the Living and Personal Absolute Spirit. The definition of the Divine as a Person is the highest definition to which the human mind and word can rise in their quest to comprehend and define the Incomprehensible and Indefinable. 409 So, on the positive side, as noted, we know God in His properties as a Person. The doctrine of God as a Personal Being is undoubtedly inherent in our Western Christian thinker, although not in our contemporary scientific and philosophical setting and formulation. “The entire history of the religious consciousness of mankind shows that no matter what ideas he had about the Divine, no matter how much they contained lies and various kinds of errors, all these ideas had, however, a grain of truth: they all tried to express the idea that God is an All-Perfect Being.” 410 According to the meaning of this idea, God is a Being possessing all perfections to the highest degree. He is Absolute Perfection. 411 “At all stages of development,” notes one of the most authoritative modern researchers, Bl. Augustina Prof. I.V. Popov, - a person imagines God as a Being immeasurably more powerful, great and wise than himself... The perfections attributed to the Divine Principle by different peoples are not the same, but the fact remains unchanged that everyone transfers to the gods what he himself considers best. As man rises, so does his concept of God. Therefore, one can easily agree with the blessed one. Augustine, that all religions honor in God a being, in their opinion, who is the best.” 412 This conviction of Augustine, based on his careful study of the history of religions, is fully applicable to his own religious belief and his confession of the Divine Being. We already know that bl. Augustine, this best, most sensitive and animated God-seeker of the Western intelligent society of the 4th–5th centuries, even “in his transition from one doctrine to another, in essence, sought only a deeper understanding of Christianity” [of the unconditional truth of which he was convinced in advance], according to the testimony of the “history of his soul” he outlined, he always thought of God as the Highest and Most Perfect Being, alien to any restrictions and shortcomings. 413 The recognition of God as an absolutely perfect being necessarily leads to the concept of the spiritual-personal form of His existence, which not only does not in any way contradict the idea of ​​the absolute perfection of God, but, on the contrary, is an imperative requirement of the human mind and heart. This is the point of view of modern scientific and philosophical thought, which only clarifies the patristic views on this issue. The ancient Christian thinker and bishop of the Catholic Church we are studying undoubtedly shared the common Christian belief in God as a Living Personal Being, although he did not express it in modern scientific and philosophical concepts and terms. As is known, from a modern point of view, 414 the essential, basic predicates characterizing personality are self-consciousness and self-determination or self-conscious mind and free will. These same features define Augustine’s concept of the (finite) personality, by analogy with which Augustine wants to build his concept of the Divine personality. – “Like a deep psychologist, Augustine,” according to prof. I. Chetverikova, - for the first time gave a complete and detailed definition of personality, he pointed to its main elements: self-consciousness, as a unifying principle, and free will, as the beginning of the life of an individual according to ideas a priori by reason.” 415 But a subtle and detailed psychological analysis of the individual, her attributes and laws that characterize her nature and govern her life, actually belongs to the Trinitarian theology of Bl. Augustine in the close sense of the word stands in direct connection with the essence of his attempt to construct this most mysterious object of the Christian faith in a rational way on a psychological basis. As we will see below, the basis of the rational-psychological construction of bl. Augustine lies, based on religious faith, in his deep conviction that between the Divine Spirit and the human there is the closest affinity or direct, closest analogy: the latter is a living copy or visual reflection of the First, the First is the Highest Prototype or, as it were, the realized Ideal of the latter. The psychological analysis of human self-consciousness - its tripartite elements and functions - serves in the hands of Augustine as the main means for speculative substantiation of the trinity of Persons in God. But also from the teachings of Bl. Augustine about the One God in essence or from his reasoning about God in His essence and properties, as well as from the personal religious mood of Blessed. Augustine, we will also draw a lot of data to recognize Augustine as the exponent of the Christian-theistic teaching about God as a Personal Being or as a Living, Self-Conscious Person. However, attributing Bl. Augustine's doctrine of God as a personal, self-conscious Spirit or a living, self-conscious Person, we are forced to make the following reservation here. The concept of personality in the thinking of the ancients was structured somewhat differently compared to how it is realized in modern scientific and philosophical consciousness. From a modern point of view, “soul”, “personality”, “I”, “self-awareness” are correlative and often interchangeable concepts. Meanwhile, in patristic thinking we do not encounter such a division of these concepts and such a relationship between them. In the theological and philosophical consciousness of the fathers and teachers of the church, the idea of ​​personality appears with slightly different features and is perceived from a slightly different angle. Of course, the church thinker we are studying in the 4th–5th centuries. AD - despite all its Western originality - is also no exception in this case. In his doctrine of God as a Personal Being or as an Absolute Self-Conscious Spirit, Augustine was in a sense the son of his time. And from the point of view of his era (as in general from the point of view of all Christian literature of the patristic period), the idea of ​​self-consciousness was not yet such a defining and fundamental, primary moment in the concept of personality as it is at the present time. As the works of outstanding representatives of the ancient church consciousness who were engaged in the development of triadological and christological issues show, the main determinant of the concept of personality was “being in itself” or “being for oneself,” that is, individual, independent or substantial existence. Meanwhile, from a modern scientific and philosophical point of view, such an essential and primary point in defining the concept of personality, as noted, is precisely the sign of self-consciousness. The sign of self-consciousness is such a fundamental and defining element of personality that the latter is completely inseparable from the first, and both of them, i.e., self-consciousness and personality, can be considered as equivalents or synonyms (as correlative and interchangeable concepts). “First of all, personality,” says one of the domestic apologists of the Christian religion, “is what is called I. These are terms of self-awareness.” 416 “The concept of personality is completely inseparable from the concept of consciousness.” 417 “The concept of personality is replaced by the concept of self-awareness.” 418 Summarizing the data on the issue of modern psychology that interests us, another newest scientific apologist of Christianity answers the question of what personality is and how it is characterized. “These are the characteristics of personality: self-awareness, freedom or self-determination, and moral worth. Their basis is, obviously, self-awareness, and therefore, for brevity, personality can be characterized by this one sign: personality is self-awareness." 419 – According to the fair remark of Prof. V.V. Bolotov, “personal self-awareness in the psychology of that era (i.e., patristic) was not such an essential determinant of the independence of spiritual being; in “ὐπόστασιϛ” in the foreground there is a moment of “being in itself,” “being for oneself,” and not a sign of self-consciousness.” 420 That is why, while modern scientific and theological thinking understands “hypostasis” - in the sense of independent being - as a self-conscious self, for the consciousness of the ancients “the main element in the concept of “hypostasis” [ὐπόστασιϛ, substantia], its most fundamental sign is τὸ ὑφεστάναι, being, real existence." 421 Speaking in the language of his time, and bl. Augustine thinks and calls God “being in itself” (in se) or “being for itself” (ad se), essence or substance, 422 and this, translated into the language of modern scientific psychology, will mean an independent personality, as a self-conscious “I” or as a single spiritual-personal center with the predicate of self-consciousness and self-determination. 423 We have already noted that the teaching of Bl. Augustine's idea of ​​God as a Personal Being or Self-Conscious Spirit finds its confirmation in his very rational-psychological scheme of the Trinitarian dogma, that is, in his attempt to understand the church dogma of the Trinity on a strictly psychological basis by analogy with human self-consciousness and love. But the confession of Bl. Augustine’s personal God also follows from the above-considered property of the Divine immutability and simplicity of the Divine Being: by the strength of this simplicity and uncomplicatedness of “being” for God, according to Augustine, implicite already means “to be a person” (non enim aliud Deo esse, aliud personam esse, sed omnino idem). 424 Finally, the confession of Bl. Augustine of God, as a Living Personal Being, stands in the closest and inextricable connection with the very personality of the bl. Augustine and the main direction of his spiritual life, especially in its later era. Augustine's lively, active and at the same time deeply religious nature always thirsted for the Living Personal God, to a greater or lesser extent always feeling in the depths of his soul the ineradicable need for living, direct communication with Him. Augustine's deep, inevitable need for a Living Personal Deity, reconciling and saving man, could not be satisfied in Neoplatonism with its abstract, lifeless, cold doctrine of the “One.” Neoplatonic philosophy, according to the blessed one’s own statement. Augustine, only placed him at the gates of the Church, where he actually found the true concept of God, and with it true, complete peace in God. 425 This is why Augustine abandons Neoplatonism in favor of this supreme “one true and genuine philosophy,” that is, the “venerable Christian religion.” 426 “In place of the abstract “One” of Plotinus, Augustine takes the energy of the personal self-consciousness of the Divine, which enters into dialogue with man, answering his quest: Ego sum, Qui sum.” 427 Characterizing the living, mobile nature of the bl. Augustine with her heartfelt emotions, anxious quests and fiery aspirations towards God, the Source of our blissful peace and the Highest Limit of our desires, the newest Western researcher of the moral views of Blessed. Augustine Eucken, 428 with great animation regarding his personality, says that the highly developed life of feeling was resolved in Augustine in mysticism, as evidenced by the special warmth and sincerity of his expressions. But besides mystical immersion or ecstasy, Augustine, according to his Western researcher quoted above, has another way of directly relating to God. This is a living appeal of the human personality to the Absolute, a moral and religious interaction between man and God. 429 According to Augustine, as the Western scientist mentioned above rightly states, a person enters into communication with God as I and You, and from this mutual contact, a person’s life and activity become more intense and spiritualized. 430 – At the blessed one Augustine, for whom the question of the existence of God has always been a question of paramount importance and has always had not only theoretical, but also practical, and, moreover, deeply vital significance; who solved all kinds of religious and philosophical questions and inquiries not only with his mind, but also with his heart, and on their solution left a living imprint of his extremely ardent and moving personality - we repeat - for Augustine, with such a turn of his psyche and the nature of the direction of his religious life, God should have been and indeed was nothing more than a personal Being or a living Person. To clearly see this, it is enough to read at least some pages of the famous “Confession” of Bl. Augustine, who so truthfully and so colorfully captured the history of his own soul with its eternal demands, p. her varied religious experiences; passionate yearning for the Divine Ideal and uncontrollably powerful impulses towards Him. The same impression comes from reading the strictly theological and philosophical works of Blessed. Augustine, for example, his treatise on St. Trinity. Having analyzed in great detail and very subtly the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, our Ippon bishop-philosopher, however, ends it with a prayerful and inspired direct appeal to this Highest Object of his theological and philosophical speculation, i.e., the Triune God as a Living Personal Being. 431 Living and sincere religious feeling Bl. Augustine, which so genuinely breathes in almost every page of his “Confessions” 432 and which often breaks out so powerfully in his scientific and theological treatises, among the subtleties of dialectics, seems to be the best confirmation of the validity of the thought we are proving. Such a direct and deep religious feeling of Blessed. Augustine would have been completely unthinkable without the assumption of his ineradicable faith and unshakable confidence in the existence of the Living Personal God, the idea of ​​Whom he was constantly excited, fueled and strengthened. In addition, for the benefit of Augustine, who experienced a deep religious drama in his soul and so passionately sought after this “peace in God,” who reconciled in Himself the fatal contradictions of empirical reality and the painful duality of the soul, it was now a matter of life and death to recognize the Personal God as the Almighty, All-Wise and Most Good Creator-Provider of the world and the Savior of man. This is the basic religious mood of Bl. Augustine, which permeates his immortal “Confessions” (and his other writings of a later era) and which so clearly confirms Augustine’s faith in God as a Living Personal Being, receives its most characteristic expression in his following words, addressed directly to God Himself: “You created us for Yourself, and our soul has hitherto languished, not finding peace for itself, until it rests in You.” 433 God for Augustine now becomes not only a living Being, but also that living Force or that Principle of life, through which Augustine very tangibly experienced in himself an ongoing connection or living communication with people who had already left this world. 434 Thus, vital communication or union of love with God and blissful tranquility in Him, so clearly expressed in the indicated formula of Augustine’s relationship to God and constituting the main motive and main content of Augustine’s religious life in its later era, as well as very characteristic of the very personality of our brilliant Japanese, speak quite expressively for the fact that God for Augustine and according to Augustine was a living Personal Being, a Living Person. But regardless of all this, the last assumption is quite natural regarding Augustine, as a Christian, a son of the Church and a Catholic bishop. A famous teacher of the Orthodox Church already during his lifetime and a representative of a prominent episcopal see, in his theology, 435, of course, could only develop the Christian church-theistic concept of God as a Living Personal Being, on the one hand analogous to the human person, and on the other, infinitely exceeding it with His perfections. So, the Divine Being, being the most perfect nature and life, both in general according to the patristic view, and, in particular, according to the teaching of the blessed one. Augustine, there is, at the same time and because of this, a most perfect Person. What should be understood by personal perfection? Solving the question of the perfection of the Divine Person by analogy with the perfection of a finite personality, a domestic representative of highly enlightened church consciousness, already known to us, notes: “God, as the most perfect Nature and the most perfect Personality, must be thought of as the unconditional fullness of mind, will and feelings, the boundless abyss of life, moving the entire organic world, all organic being, penetrating everything with His personal consciousness adequately to reality, perceiving everything in an unconditional light Its unity, conscious, experiencing Itself as a moral good, as absolute freedom.” 436 All these moments in the concept of perfect nature and perfect personality, ascertained by contemporary scientific-philosophical and scientific-church thought, but in their essence completely consistent with the definitions and views of the holy fathers, find their expression in the works of the famous Ippon bishop-philosopher we are studying. As the Absolute Personal Spirit, God and according to the teachings is blessed. Augustine must have reason, will and feeling with their most particular properties or specific manifestations. Only - unlike finite personalities - the Divine Being, as is self-evident, is the owner of the indicated qualities and definitions to the highest or superlative degree. As the Highest and Most Perfect Self-Conscious Spirit, God must have absolute reason, the theoretical power of which is omniscience, and the practical power of which is wisdom. But both the Divine Mind itself, and, in particular, its theoretical and practical sides, that is, knowledge and wisdom, due to the absolute simplicity and immutability of the Divine that we have already noted, are identical with His being and, like all other ontological and spiritual properties of God, have a substantial character. 437 Bl. are understood in the same substantial sense. Augustine as applied to the Supreme Being and all other particular attributes and definitions of the life of His Mind, such as, for example, truth, thought, word, light, etc. 438 We already know 439 that, according to the deep and often expressed conviction of Blessed. Augustine, for God, as an absolutely simple and unchangeable Spirit, it means nothing else to be and nothing else to live, but His highest being (summe esse) is at the same time His highest life (summe vivere), just as life in Him is identical with His being. 440 Because of this insistently affirmed by Augustine of the identity of Divine existence and life, when speaking about God, according to Augustine, it is impossible, for example, to say: He only has truth, but one should say: He Himself is the Truth itself (the substance of truth) 441 and at the same time the One Source of all truth. 442 By participating in this Highest substantial Truth (in Itself), human thinking or cognition becomes true, as well as everything that in the realm of finite existence can be called true. 443 Following the Platonists, our “Christian Platonist” - (as the ancient Christian thinker of the 4th-5th centuries, studied by us, is sometimes called in the best sense of the word in later Western European scientific literature about him) 444 - also distinguishes between “truth” and “true”. 445 The first, according to him, is superior to the latter, because the true in its being depends on the truth: the true becomes so only by participating in the Truth, and only to the extent of this participation in It is it itself more or less true. 446 Further, Augustine says that God, as the One Absolute Source and Author of everything true and good in the world, is Life, Light and Bread, like material bread, transforming into those who eat it, or better yet, on the contrary, Bread, itself transforming for the better those who perceive it into themselves. 447 Finally, according to the theological and philosophical consciousness of our Ippon church thinker, God is the Highest and Unchangeable Criterion for every true judgment 448 and at the same time the Eternal Principle or Law of knowledge and art. 449 Based on what is axiomatic in the eyes of Bl. Augustine's position that the judge (the subject) is higher than the judged (his object), but lower than that on the basis of which he judges, and that the mind is higher not only than the perceived object, but also the senses that perceive it, both external and internal, 450 Augustine comes to the conviction that God is the Eternal and Unchangeable Law, on the basis of which our mind judges everything, but which, being the highest standard of value, itself, however, is not subject to any judgment or evaluation by the human mind. The latter can only contemplate it within himself. 451 Augustine often conveys in his writings the idea, which constitutes a characteristic feature of his epistemology and ontology, that God is a spiritual unchangeable light, that is, the highest intelligible light of truth and knowledge; 452 that He is the substantial Truth or, what is the same, a set of guiding principles of thinking, 453 which, according to the deep conviction of Augustine and his era, have a super-experiential origin and the nature of immutability, universality and necessity. Here, to this region of the unchangeable and eternal, and, therefore, truly divine Being, bless. Augustine includes the laws of logic and mathematics, the principles of moral consciousness and human activity, and, finally, the norms of aesthetic assessment of things and phenomena. All this, according to the view of Augustine and his era, are categories of Divine Being, since all the designated elements of our consciousness at their basis possess the properties of eternity and immutability - these exclusive ontological predicates of Divine Nature in Its difference from all created things. Identifying the unchangeable and substantial Truth with God Himself and understanding It as a set of guiding principles of thinking and rational knowledge, Blessed. Augustine had to identify these latter with God Himself. In them, in these a priori universal and unchangeable principles of rational assessment or self-evident truths of the human mind, our outstanding Western Christian thinker of the 4th–5th centuries. saw precisely that “reality in which the real nature of God Himself is revealed to consciousness.” We move on to further analysis of the spiritual or ideal properties of the Divine Being with their most particular definitions and specific manifestations. As an absolutely spiritual Being or as an infinite and most perfect Person, God, according to the teachings of Blessed. Augustine, must have an omniscient mind, an omnipotent will and an all-blessed feeling. 454 Omniscience, as this very term shows, is knowledge of everything without exception. The bearer of this absolute property, God, is an omniscient Being. Transferring the spiritual predicates observed in the highest creation to the Divine and understanding them in their absolute meaning, we come to the concept of God as an omniscient Being. The object of omniscience is, firstly, the Divine Being himself and, secondly, the entire world created by Him. Considered in relation to the Being of God, omniscience means that God knows Himself with all-exhaustive completeness and absolute perfection; that Divine existence and life are completely adequately and completely reflected in the Divine consciousness, so that between the two there must always be a sign of absolute equality. Along with knowledge of Himself, God also has, as noted, knowledge of all reality located outside of Him, that is, of the entire world created by Him. With the same absolute completeness and as adequately as He knows Himself, God knows, unconditionally, everything that is not He Himself. No one and nothing can hide from His omniscience: the universe, both in its whole and in all the infinite variety of its parts, with everything, its past history and future destinies, and, in particular, man with all his free, even the most secret thoughts, feelings, motives and intentions - are known to God, like His own being. The above understanding of Divine omniscience is at the same time the view of Blessed himself. Augustine. In particular, the nature and method of Divine knowledge, according to Augustine, are determined, firstly, by the fact that God is the Creator of all, both spiritual and bodily existence, and, secondly, by the fact that He is absolutely simple and unchangeable both in His being and in His properties, which, as we know, are identical to His essence and are of a substantial nature. The property of Divine knowledge, as a spiritual property, can partly be understood, on the one hand, by analogy with the properties of the human personality, and on the other, by the idea of ​​​​its opposite. In its main features, the teaching of Bl. Augustine's concept of divine knowledge can be formulated as follows. Just as a person - an architect or an artist - when starting to create a well-known work, even earlier creates or prescribes in his mind its ideal plan or prototype, according to which he carries out his plan, in the same way God, the Creator of everything visible and invisible, spiritual and physical, from time immemorial contains in his mind the ideal prototypes of all things, as their creative principles, so that the creation by God of each thing separately is only a realization in time or an expression outside of His eternal and unchanging ideas-powers. 455 This creative character of Divine knowledge, i.e., His eternal ideas-forces, mainly determines the difference between Divine and human knowledge. The essence of this difference, as can be seen from here, comes down to the fact that among created rational beings, for example, angels or people, knowledge has as its object already existing things and is conditioned by them. “We cognize objects of both the material and spiritual worlds only through impressions acting on us or obtained by ourselves from outside, which, passing through a certain mental process, end with our more or less correct and complete concept or judgment about this or that object.” 456 Meanwhile, Divine knowledge, in view of the creative significance of His primordial ideas-forces, stands neither in chronological nor in causal dependence on things. God knows about things “directly by Himself and completely independently of their impressions or actions on Him.” 457 “All His creations, both spiritual and physical,” says the blessed one. Augustine, “God does not know that they exist, but because they exist because God knows them.” For (God) did not know what he had to create. So, because he knew, he created, and not vice versa: he knew because he created.” 458 That is why Augustine summarizes his reasoning about human and Divine knowledge in their relation to the world: “this world could not be known to us if it did not exist, but if it were not known to God, it could not exist at all.” 459 Due to the fact that the ideas of the Divine mind are the causes of the existence of things and, therefore, precede their creation, God sees all the objects of the created world not outside Himself, but in Himself, namely, in His eternal and unchanging ideas, as the creative principles of the world or the eternal ideal prototypes of things. “We see Your creations, Lord,” exclaims the bl. Augustine in the final lines of his deeply instructive Confessions - because they exist; but they exist because You see them, otherwise they and we would not exist. And we, since they exist, see them outside of ourselves (foris), and since they are good, we see them within ourselves (intus). You there or then (ibi) saw things already created (facta), where or when (ubi) you saw them as yet to be created (facienda).” 460 As for the “quomodo” of Divine knowledge, it is in direct connection with the properties of absolute simplicity and immutability of the Divine. The incomprehensible is completely and completely different from the way of human knowledge or thinking; it can partly be understood only in contrast to the latter, as finite and changeable. Human thinking or knowledge, due to its limitations, is discursive and therefore procedural; it is consistently directed from one object or phenomenon to another and, in view of this, necessarily flows in time. Or, using the inverse formula for the relationship of cause and action, we can say: since human knowledge and thought, as changeable by nature, are subject to the conditions of time, they must necessarily be narrow or fragmentary in nature, that is, at any given moment, a person’s consciousness turns only to one specific object or a specific circle of objects. The knowledge and thought of the Divine are not of this nature. Divine thinking, as absolutely simple and unchangeable, is always and unconditionally intuitive, and therefore with the same right one can simultaneously assert about it that it is both always instantaneous and always eternal. Divine thought, unlike a rational creature, is not divided between separate objects (nec singula cogitentur), 461 does not move in the direction from ignorance to knowledge or from one concept to another (nec ab aliis ad alia cogitando transeatur, 462 neque de cogitatione in cogitationem transit), 463 but embraces all its content at once, in a single act of pure contemplation (ipse haec omnia stabili ac sempiterna praesentia comprehendat; in ejus incorporeo contuitu simul adsunt cuncta quae novit), 464 and like all other definitions and manifestations of Divine Being and Life has in its form an ever-present and ever-living eternity. 465 The absolutely simple and unchangeable Divine Being is simple and unchangeable, in particular, in each of its properties, both ontological and spiritual. In turn, each of the indicated properties, by the force of the absolute simplicity of the Divine being, is identical both to each other and to the very essence of God. Therefore, the same properties of simplicity and immutability should be imprinted on all acts of Divine knowledge and will. "My God! - Bl. exclaims animatedly. Augustine, “You alone are immutable in Your being (es incommutabiliter), immutable in Your knowledge (scis incommutabiliter), immutable in Your will (vis incommutabiliter). And Your being (essentia) is unchangeable both in knowledge and in will; and Your knowledge (scientia) is unchangeable both in essence and in will; and Thy will (voluntas) is unchangeable both in essence and in knowledge.” 466 Therefore, nothing new is introduced into the eternally unchanging knowledge of God, in comparison with what has always already been in it, and nothing that is now in it disappears from it (non decedit aliquid vel succedit scientiae Dei). And not otherwise (nec aliter) God knows at first, and differently after: He always knows everything the same, why things after their creation are known to Him as well as before creation. 467 Since the simple and unchangeable knowledge of God, like every other manifestation of the inner life of the Divine, is realized in Him from eternity, then for it our past and future and the associated need for recollection and assumption have no meaning: for the unchangeably eternal and singularly simple Divine knowledge, only the present always exists, and therefore both remembering the past and guessing about the future are equally alien to God. 468 Being all in everything and carrying everything in Himself, 469 God eo ipso knows both Himself and the entire area of changeable and fluid world existence, always equally unchanging and always perfect, 470 having everything before His face and embracing everything together with Himself and through Himself directly, with the help of a single and integral, all-encompassing and all-penetrating contemplation (in uno Dei conspectu simul praesto sint universa). 471 In one atom of absolute consciousness, so to speak, the entire world is already contained, as is the entire region of supermundane existence. Both the first and the last are jointly and simultaneously reflected in it holistically and adequately, in all their depth and breadth, and in all their essences and manifestations. From this point of view, Divine knowledge can be specifically imagined as one continuous vision, as an unceasing vision of everything in the unchangeable and ever-present “today” or in the unsetting and unfading light of eternity. 472 This is why God, in view of the above-described nature of His knowledge, is sometimes presented as an eye that sees itself and sees everything. So, Divine knowledge is limitless in its scope and all-perfect in its quality, being eternally unchanging and therefore infinitely superior in its breadth and depth and in the way of perceiving its objects, all finite knowledge and thinking. 473 By the very course of his reasoning about Divine knowledge, in part, one can think, out of historical necessity, Blessed. Augustine had to face the question of whether it is possible for God to know the infinite, and to resolve this question one way or another. It is clear that Augustine’s original concept of God as the Most High and All-Perfect Being, above and beyond Whom nothing is or cannot be imagined, 474 itself already suggested a solution to this issue in a positive sense. To the Boundless or Boundless, the Best or the Most Perfect, no one and nothing, anywhere and can ever serve as a boundary and set any limits or generally limit His infinite perfections in any way. But the affirmative answer to the question posed above is very difficult to reconcile with the view shared by Augustine himself of knowledge as a certain limitation of the subject of this knowledge. From the point of view of such epistemology, to know something means to embrace or embrace with the mind the object of knowledge and, therefore, to limit it in one way or another 475. It follows from this that just as everything cognized is eo ipso already limited (by the mind), so on the other hand, the unlimited, the limitless cannot be cognized for the same reason. Thus, in the name of the infinity of the Divine and to save the idea of ​​​​Divine omniscience, we apparently must come to the paradoxical thought that God is inaccessible to the knowledge of His metaphysically and spiritually infinite or limitless being. How does it come out? Augustine from this difficulty? The famous Ippon theologian-philosopher, although he does not give an exhaustive solution to this problem presented to his consciousness, but, obviously bearing in mind the possibility or existence of such an objection 476 to his teaching about Divine knowledge, touches on this thesis in a few words, indicating at the same time the direction in which he wants to resolve the issue under consideration. 477 According to Augustine, with the acceptance of the above-described opinion, it would turn out that, for example, the infinity of numbers remains inaccessible to Divine knowledge, and thus the possibility of knowing number is excluded for him. It is known that number, as such, is generally infinite. True, every definite number is limited, but, according to Augustine, through doubling or multiplication it can always be increased to infinity, and then it would turn out that infinite numbers must necessarily elude Divine omniscience. Augustine considers such an opinion to be filled with deep wickedness and on the authority of the philosopher Plato and the Holy Spirit. Scripture wants to refute it by showing its inconsistency. Trying to positively resolve this perplexity, our Western Christian thinker concludes by saying: “the infinity of number, even if there is no number for infinite numbers, cannot be incomprehensible to Him Who has no number in mind. Everything that is encompassed by knowledge is limited by the consciousness of the knower; Likewise, every infinity is limited in some ineffable way in God, because it is not immense for His knowledge. Therefore, if the infinity of numbers cannot be infinite for the knowledge of God, by which it is embraced, then who are we, little people, who dare to put a limit to His knowledge, saying that if the same temporal phenomena were not repeated in the same cycles of time, then God could not foresee everything created by Him in order to create, nor know when He had already created - God, whose wisdom, simple in diversity and uniform in diversity, embraces everything immensity by its immensity of knowledge.” 478 Thus, the infinite Divine Mind, making infinite numbers the subject of its cognition, in some unknown and ineffable way for us limits this infinity, which, according to Augustine, makes it possible for the Infinite to know the infinite. That side of Divine omniscience, which has as its subject the future free actions of rational and moral creatures, is called in our human language the foreknowledge of God. However, the last name, according to the consciousness of the bl. Augustine, is inaccurate and is only adaptive to our finite thinking, limited by the conditions of time with its “past”, “present” and “future” or with its “before”, “now” and “after”. When applied to God, foreknowledge in the proper sense cannot take place. In relation to Him we can simply talk about knowledge, which is carried out only in the present and for which only the present exists in reality. Augustine asks: “What is foreknowledge (praescientia) if not knowledge of the future (scientia futurorum)? But what kind of future exists for God, who is above all times? Therefore, one can speak not of (God’s) foreknowledge (praescientia), but only of (His) knowledge” (scientia). 479 Although the question of Divine foreknowledge, from the point of view of the basic premises of the theological and philosophical system of Bl. Augustine's decision was apparently simple, but Augustine, due to the circumstances of his time, had to dwell on it in more detail. In this case, Augustine had to take into account the opinion of those who could not reconcile the foreknowledge of God with human freedom. Resolving the indicated bewilderment of some of his contemporaries, Augustine wants to reconcile Divine foreknowledge with the fact of human freedom and prove that the foreknowing God is by no means the culprit of the sin existing in the world. “How,” asks Bl. Augustine in clarifying his point of view on this subject - a number of reasons that are known to the foreknowing God can cause nothing to remain in our will, when in this very series of reasons our will occupies an important place? of this force, produces something, then completely produces it itself... Man sins not because God foresaw that he would sin, why, when he sins, he has no doubt at all that he himself is sinning, and this is because he, whose foreknowledge cannot be deceived, foresaw that neither fate (fatum), nor chance (fortuna) or anything else, but he himself would sin. He who does not want to sin does not sin, which God also foresaw, knowing that he would not want to sin.” 480 Of course, the above judgment of our Ippon thinker is not an exhaustive solution to this issue, but the latter, and according to the consciousness of Augustine himself, cannot be completely resolved in the conditions of real life. In view of this bl. Augustine, amazed and reverently bowing before the incomprehensibly and ineffably majestic image of Divine knowledge, refuses the idea of ​​understanding it, like everything connected with it. “Knowledge of everything that is future and past in the image of man,” Augustine confesses, “is unworthy of You, God, and is unusual for You, as the Highest Creator of the universe, Creator of souls and bodies. The image of Your knowledge differs infinitely from ours and is marvelous and incomprehensible to us.” 481 Only in this respect we can know and affirm with complete certainty: God knows and thinks not at all like a man or an angel, but immeasurably more excellent and infinitely more perfect than them - in accordance with the all-surpassing greatness and absolute perfection of His Divine nature. That is why the Ippon church teacher decisively declares that our knowledge, in comparison with the knowledge of God, is equivalent to ignorance (scientia nostra scientiae tuae comparata ignorantia est), 482 just as our existence in comparison with the existence of God is the same as non-existence. 483 In conclusion of his discussions about Divine knowledge and objects related to it, Bl. Augustine notes that God is the Creator of the entire universe; of everything spiritual and corporeal, visible and invisible, 484 there is a Creator and of all intelligence 485 and that our knowledge comes from God, 486 this One and Inexhaustible Source of all true knowledge for rational creatures. The active power of the Divine Mind, which reveals in itself the properties of Divine omniscience and omnipotence, is, as noted, the wisdom of God, that is, God’s most perfect knowledge of the best goals and the most skillful application of ways to achieve them. It goes without saying that, like any other property of the Divine being, wisdom has an absolute character: it is identical with the essence of God and is substantial. 487 In particular, wisdom, as a property of the being of God, is original, 488 eternal, unchangeable 489 and, with absolute simplicity, at the same time infinitely diverse. 490 Everything wise in the realm of created nature depends on this Divine wisdom, such as, for example, our soul, which acquires true wisdom only through communication with infinite and unchangeable Wisdom (participatione incommutabilis sapientiae sapiens). 491 Another general characteristic feature of a spiritually perfect being is moral-rational free will, which reveals in activity some of its most particular ontological and spiritual properties, for example, immutability, simplicity, eternity or holiness, power, goodness, etc. etc. The same metaphysical and moral features per analogiam a minori ad majus characterize the bl. Augustine will and the Absolute Personality. Like all the ontological and spiritual attributes of the Highest and Most Perfect Person that we have already considered, the will of the Divine is eternal, unconditionally unchangeable, 492 identical with both His other properties and His essence 493 and therefore has a substantial character. 494 In particular, the Divine omniscience we described above in connection with foreknowledge, as the eternally unchanging and constant knowledge of what for us is only the future conditional, serves, according to Augustine, as the basis of immutability, eternity, constancy and the Divine will with its diverse activities. An unchangeable will cannot exist and be conceived without a similar immutability of knowledge as its natural ontological and logical prerequisite. 495 Therefore, bl. Augustine brings into close connection the immutability of Divine knowledge and will. 496 In his special teaching about the properties of the will of God, Blessed. Augustine partly explains the true meaning of the biblical teaching on this matter, and partly defends the latter from its false understanding and interpretation on the part of some of his contemporaries. The absolute character of the Divine will, first of all, is revealed in its freedom and omnipotence. Like the will, the rational spirit of man is free. 497 By analogy with this, the Divine will is also free. Moreover: it has absolute freedom, excluding any shadow of any externally compulsory necessity. 498 Further: if a certain degree of strength or power is already inherent in the free will of man, then the Divine will, as absolute, must be omnipotent or omnipotent. Augustine now devotes his attention to clarifying the true meaning of the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bDivine omnipotence. The manifestation of this latter, first of all, includes God’s creation of the world out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo). According to Augustine, the creative act of Divine omnipotence cannot, however, be understood, for example, in the sense that God - like a human artist - only transformed ready-made formless matter into one that has a certain form. As an absolute force, He, by a creative act of His omnipotent and free will, called the entire world substance from non-existence to existence and put His ideas into it as its constituent principles. 499 In order to maintain his point of view of God as an absolutely simple and unchangeable being, Augustine, one might think, not without the influence of Neoplatonic philosophy, presents God’s creation of the world as a timeless act and considers God’s relationship to creation sub specie aeternitatis. 500 Blazh. Augustine was faced with the need to resolve the question of whether God's creation of the world in time does not shake the property of Divine immutability and eternity? Bearing in mind the above-mentioned bewilderment, bl. Augustine solves it as follows. The so-called external activity of God, that is, aimed at the finite world and manifesting itself in creation, management, redemption, etc., is determined by motives that are not accidental and temporary, but are affirmed on eternally unchanging grounds. We already know that God’s creation of the world, as well as the providence about it, from Augustine’s point of view, is nothing more than the implementation of one eternal and unchangeable thought of God and the fulfillment of the eternal, unchangeable determinations of the will of God. 501 God had all the decisions and plans of His will in Himself from eternity; always has them unchanged and has never existed without them. To admit that in God any new decision of His will ever appears or can appear, which was not in Him from the beginning, is the greatest absurdity, 502 because it contradicts the concept of God as an absolutely simple, unchangeable and eternal Being. 503 – Why was our world not created by God for the manifestation of His perfections from eternity, but created in time, although from eternity it was already decided by the Divine will to create it? Augustine answers this question in the sense that already in the eternal plans of God’s will it was decided to create the world in time, why the creation of the world in time, as completely consistent with these eternal and unchangeable plans of God’s will, does not in the least contradict His immutability and eternity, as well as wisdom and omnipotence. 504 If we take a look at the history of the world and man and see what changes or transformations he introduces into what He initially established here by His will, then we will see that all these changes are changes only in things outside of Him, fall exclusively on the latter and do not at all imply any preliminary change in the Divine will. 505 Further, miracles are an expression of God’s omnipotence, 506 that is, “out of the ordinary, manifestations of Divine power.” According to Augustine, “so-called miraculous actions do not disrupt the natural course of world life, but represent only the application of as yet unknown or not fully known natural forces, sometimes being only a kind of increase or acceleration of the usual processes of nature.” 507 “Their wonder, according to Augustine, lies solely in their unusualness from the point of view of everyday experience. The concept of a miracle, therefore, has only a subjective and relative meaning. For one who knows the will of God and its actions as the final cause of everything that exists, there is nothing miraculous, or better yet, all the works of God are equally miraculous.” 508 Formulating his doctrine of Divine omnipotence, Bl. Augustine establishes the true meaning of this Christian concept. If omniscience is the power or ability to know absolutely everything, then, by analogy with this, wouldn’t we have the right to define omnipotence as the power or ability to do everything without exception? Needless to say, however, that such a view of Divine omnipotence, from a truly Christian point of view, is completely false, for it fundamentally undermines the Christian concept of God as an absolute and perfect Person. That is why Augustine resolutely rebels against such a vulgar, crudely physical understanding of the idea of ​​​​Divine omnipotence. According to the meaning of his own teaching about this, the omnipotence of God, having an absolute character, for this reason and for this (eo ipso) must be determined or limited by the absolute properties of the Boundless or Infinite; it must unconditionally agree in everything with the infinite perfections of the All-Perfect. Due to its unity with the being itself, the Divine will can only want that which is in complete agreement with this being, or, to put it negatively: the Divine will cannot will everything that is opposite or that contradicts the very concept of the nature of the Divine. God cannot only do what He does not want. He does not want only that which, even in our opinion, appears as a lack, which stands in contradiction with the divine nature as such, and if it were present in Himself, God would cease to be God. His power, indeed, cannot accomplish all this, and cannot even desire it. But, as is not difficult to understand, this is why it is omnipotence, and not the other way around - weakness or powerlessness of the will, because God cannot do or want all this. So, for example, refuting the well-known, however, more sophistic than serious, objection to the omnipotence of the will of God (si Deus mori, mutari, rescare, mentiri, falli, se ipsum negare, miser fieri, vinci etc. non potest, ergo, non est omnipotens), bl. Augustine writes: “When we say that God cannot die or be deceived, this does not diminish His power. On the contrary, His power would become less if this impossible were made possible for Him. Therefore, in fact, He is omnipotent, that He can neither die nor be deceived. For it must be characteristic of the Almighty both to do what He wants and not to experience what He does not want, so that if it happened to Him, then He would not be Almighty.” 509 On the same basis, blessed. Augustine also polemicizes with another ancient saying, directed, among other things, against Divine omnipotence: “if God is omnipotent, then let Him make what was not to be.” Augustine, analyzing this sophism from the material and formal side, draws the following conclusion. The objection: “si omnipotens est Deus, faciat, ut quae facta sunt, facta non fuerint” essentially contains the demand that God, Who is Truth itself, should make the true false (faciat Deus, ut ea, quae vera sunt, eo ipso, quo vera sunt, falsa sint). 510 On the same basis [i.e. that is, that God cannot contradict Himself] is also affirmed, according to Augustine, by our faith in the truth or immutability of Divine predictions and promises. 511 Finally, in the works of Bl. Augustine we encounter the experience of decision and such bewilderment associated with the concept of the omnipotence of God. How is the existence and activity of finite will possible along with the absolute? This, according to Augustine, cannot be fully clarified. But for Augustine, who often encountered this question, there is no doubt that the absoluteness of the Divine will is not violated even if a finite being acts, apparently, contrary to this will: “and this action, being contrary to the will of God (quod etiam contra Dei voluntatem), is performed, but not apart from it (non fiat praeter ejus voluntatem).” 512 Being good, He would not allow “evil to happen if He could not, as the Almighty, make good out of evil.” 513 That is why in his work “Enchiridion”, written by Augustine already in old age 514 and representing a systematic and fairly accurate presentation of his dogmatic credo, he does not stop at the statement that although evil, as evil, is not good, but good is the fact of the existence of evil, 515 as allowed by the absolute will. 516 – Of course, one cannot help but admit that some of what God desires, despite this His desire, is not always accomplished, such as, for example, the realization of the fullness of holiness and spiritual perfection on the part of all rational and free creatures. But in this case, according to Augustine, the absolute will itself voluntarily refuses to be the only and exclusive cause of action. Here God himself allows the existence of another active factor along with himself. 517 Such a factor contributing to the Divine will exists in the person of that highest of His creatures, which He deigned to exalt to the dignity of His image. This creature, imprinting in itself the thought and will of the Divine, through free self-determination, perceives this gift of freedom given to it from above and, to the best of its ability, implements it in its life activity. 518 Thus, through this free self-determination of the rational-moral creature, the glorification of God occurs, or true reverence for God (cultus), similar to the way in which, but only according to the law of physical necessity, irrational nature glorifies or honors God. 519 - On the contrary, in those cases where God Himself wants to be the one and only cause of action and where it is necessary to demonstrate all the greatness of His power and all the fullness of His power - in contrast to what the created will produces and what He does not want on His part - there, according to the expression of Bl. Augustine, no one can resist the Almighty. 520 In the same Enchiridion, that later and authoritative statement of the profession de foi of our venerable elder bishop, he directly and decisively declares that “the will of no creature limits the action of the will of the almighty.” 521 It must be said that the question of evil has always attracted the closest attention of the bl. Augustine and was of exceptional interest to him. “The higher the concept of God, a being alien to any shortcomings and limitations, the more acutely was realized the need to solve the problem of evil in such a way that this solution would not cast any shadow on God... Augustine, no less than others, shuddered at the fact of the evil dominating the world and felt his powerlessness to explain it.” 522 Without, however, having in mind to dwell here on this problem of Augustinian theology, especially in the broad formulation and solution that Augustine himself gave it, we will briefly note only how our Ipponian philosopher-bishop in the later years of his life tries to reconcile the manifestations of evil in the world with the omnipotence and goodness of God. From the point of view of the theodicy of Bl. Augustine, God, always recognizing Himself as omnipotent, could and can allow the existence of evil in the world, which He, as we already know, foresaw even before its appearance. Since, due to the absolute simplicity and immutability of the Divine being, His omnipotence and goodness are identical with each other, then by the power of His omnipotence God, according to the teaching of the bl. Augustine, even the most evil can be used for good or directed to good consequences. Thus, evil, freely allowed into existence by the wisdom and goodness of God and then turned by omnipotence into the service of good, ultimately contributes to a more comprehensive and deeper identification and development of the latter in the world. This better achieves the highest goals of the moral world order. 523 In his speculative theology, Bl. Augustine also notes the following qualities of God's will - its holiness, or righteousness, justice, goodness, etc. According to Augustine, all these particular qualities or concrete manifestations of the Divine will, by the power of the simplicity and immutability of the Divine, must be understood substantially. 524 Willing and creating only good, unable to will or do anything evil, God eo ipso and in moral terms is the highest and most perfect, that is, we think of him and is in reality an all-holy being. 525 The desire for evil or the commission of some evil act, in the realm of created rational and moral beings, serves as a sign of their spiritual imperfection. In God, alien to any shortcomings, such facts are impossible, because they would stand in decisive contradiction with His absolute perfection and, thus, would destroy the basic concept of Him as the highest and best Being. This fullness of moral perfection in God presupposes and affirms, firstly, His infinite goodness, through which He directs everything that according to His nature He wants exclusively for the good of creation, and, secondly, infinite justice, according to which He must reward good and punish evil. 526 The goodness of God, since it is not poured out over the entire area of ​​the world’s existence, but has as its special subject its highest and most perfect class, that is, rationally conscious and morally free beings, is called the love of God. Understood in the highest and deepest sense of this word, the love of God, from the beginning of which Blessed. Augustine even tried to derive and explain the central Christian dogma - the mystery of the trinity of the Divine, 527 - which is, apparently, the most comprehensive specifically Christian definition of the Being of God. In it, in Divine love, the nature of God, who, according to the Word of God, is love itself, is revealed to us more fully and brightly. 528 However, both goodness and love of God, characterizing the most particular properties and manifestations of the Divine will, introduce us and reveal to us at the same time the life of the Divine feeling both in itself and in its relation to the world. 529 Good to everything and every creation, loving to man, most merciful and long-suffering to his sins and infirmities, the being of God, on the other hand, as all-holy and all-righteous, in relation to the sinful and evil and to the extent that they resist the Divine will, reveals itself to be an impartial justice, rewarding, in the words of Augustine, “suum cuique.” 530 Are two such apparently completely different and even opposite properties in God compatible, such as His punishing justice and merciful love, like righteousness and forgiveness? Bl. Augustine resolves this issue in the sense that the two designated properties of God, in their specific manifestations, not only do not mutually contradict or destroy each other, 531 but there is complete harmony and indissoluble organic unity between them. 532 This will become clearer and clearer if we pay attention to the ultimate goals of punishment or suffering sent down by God to people. The latter, not being an end in themselves in the hands of God, pursue exclusively the interests of the punished themselves and always have a moral, pedagogical or medical-healing character and significance. 533 According to our church teacher, “God, punishing people for violating His commandments, in this case reveals His righteous anger, but His anger is the anger of that father who, indignant at his disobedient son, resorts to various kinds of paternal and harmless punitive measures, with one thing in mind - to bring the disobedient child to reason. 534 That is why His truth is always mercy, just as His mercy is always truth, according to what was said: “all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth.” 535 That is why, if in the face of God’s justice alone, not softened by goodness and not warmed by mercy, not even a single righteous person could resist, 536 then, on the other hand, the absence in God of justice punishing sin, in the presence of only merciful and all-forgiving love, would be a sign of His moral weakness and moral indifference. But the latter, of course, would be tantamount to denying the very existence of God or God in His very being. 537 Therefore, the justice of God, which specifically manifests itself in the implementation of the principle of “suum cuique,” ​​in its essence or in its deepest basis, is nothing more than the outer expression of the inner truth of God, identical with Divine holiness. By its very nature, this highest and unchangeable Truth is such that it can love and do only good; evil or sin, fundamentally excluded by her entire being and morally impossible for her, must always serve as a subject of condemnation, denial and disgust for her. In this sense, the Truth of God is the highest objective Norm and an inexhaustible Source of both internal and external righteousness (fons justitiae) for all rationally free beings who make moral efforts to achieve spiritual self-improvement. 538 These highest, god-like beings owe their exploits and merits in the field of spiritual and moral life, first and foremost, to Their All-Good and Most Merciful Creator, Provider and Savior. And if, hating and punishing all evil or sin (malum, peccatum, iniquitas, impietas etc.), God, according to Augustine, even in the evil and wicked still loves that which has Himself as its Source and Culprit (that is, what is inherent in them by nature), 539 then, in the same way, glorifying or rewarding the righteous in the bliss of the future age their moral deeds and merits, He, according to Augustine, essentially crowns or rewards nothing more than his own grace-filled gifts (cum Deus coronat merita nostra, nihil aliud coronet quam munera sua). 540 This is, in brief, the teaching of the blessed one. Augustine about mind and will, as spiritual properties of the Divine being, with their most particular definitions and specific manifestations. Together with reason and will, “Revelation attributes to God the heart with its functions, that is, feelings.” 541 - As the absolute fullness of spiritual existence, 542 God - the Highest Creator and the Prototype of the god-like human spirit - is not only the most perfect mind with all the fullness of knowledge and truth, not only the most perfect will with the fullness of goodness and holiness, but also the most perfect feeling with the fullness of love and bliss. 543 Thus, the third component, which reveals to us the absolutely simple and unchangeable being of God and characterizes the moral traits of the Highest Spirit or the Most Perfect Personality, is the life of the Divine feeling, understood by analogy with the feeling of a limited spirit or finite personality only in the highest, most perfect sense or infinite degree. In particular, the feeling of the Divine being as absolutely spiritual, first of all, must be alien to any kind of corporeality or materiality. Refuting materialism or corporeality in the concept of the being of God, Blessed. Augustine has in mind these two types of delusions: firstly, naive, grossly sensual anthropomorphism and anthropopathism, widespread among poorly educated, “weak in conscience” members of the Christian society contemporary to Augustine, and, secondly, a more refined cosmomorphic 544 essentially idea of God of the Manichaeans, who thought of the being of God as the finest light matter, filling and penetrating infinite space. This Manichaean concept, as we already know, was shared for some time by Augustine himself, who later, however, abandoned it under the influence of Neoplatonic philosophy and the sermons of St. Ambrose. 545 From the genesis of Augustine’s idea of ​​Divine omnipresence, one could see how gradually and slowly Augustine’s idea of ​​the true nature of the Divine was cleared of the admixture of crude materialistic elements and spiritualized, and with what difficulty the idea of ​​God was realized in his theological and philosophical consciousness as a purely spiritual substance, completely alien to any spatial extension and material forms. 546 It took time, personal effort and a whole range of literary, philosophical and practical influences for Augustine to assimilate the church idea of the spirituality of God. However, even earlier, when Augustine did not yet have the strength to rise to the height of this consciousness, under the influence of the idea of ​​the immeasurable, all-surpassing greatness of the Divinity and His all-perfection, he still quite decisively eliminates from the concept of the Divine Being all kinds of plastic images and humanoid ideas, as completely unworthy of God. 547 In his later writings, dating back to the period of his Christian maturity and pursuing church and theological tasks, Bl. Augustine, citing numerous cosmomorphic, anthropomorphic and anthropopathic sayings of the Holy Scripture about God, definitely notes that all such and similar expressions, in his opinion, should be understood spiritually (puto spiritaliter intelligendum), 548 and, for his part, explains their meaning and significance in a completely God-appropriate manner. 549 According to Christian conviction, Bl. Augustine, God is Spirit. 550 If the soul of man, he argues, is already higher than the body, then all the more must God be incorporeal, Who, as the Creator of the soul, of course, infinitely rises above it. 551 So, “Deus-spiritus est.” However, God is a spirit not in the same sense as our human or generally created spirit, subject to change, not free from various kinds of shortcomings and weaknesses. 552 God is, according to Augustine, the purest and simplest Self-Existing Spirit with the predicate of absolute immutability and all-perfection, 553 the One Highest Author of all being, bodily and spiritual, visible and invisible. 554 Already as an invisible, immeasurable and omnipresent being, God, according to the teachings of the bl. Augustine, must also be the Highest Spirit. 555 However, according to some researchers of the theological system of Bl. Augustine, the spirituality of God's being, especially as it is outlined in his early writings, is characterized more on the negative side, as simply incorporeality or immateriality, and not as a positive spirituality in a strictly defined sense of the word. 556 In general, it must be said that the teaching is blessed. Augustine about the Supreme Being in an earlier era of his literary and philosophical activity was under the noticeable influence of Neoplatonism. 557 Therefore, the Divinity at this time appeared to Augustine’s theological and philosophical consciousness primarily in metaphysical terms, that is, standing in an ontological relationship to the world, as its absolute beginning and fundamental principle. The same predominance of ontological elements over spiritual ones, in particular, can be observed in the content of the feeling of God, as the third main point of the Augustinian concept of the Supreme Being. And only gradually, in the process of Christianization and churching of religious and philosophical thought, Blessed. Augustine, and his theological idea of ​​the Absolute Being is definitely personified, becoming more vital and humane. In this regard, in the Augustinian concept of God, the purely spiritual categories of knowledge, holiness, justice, love, mercy, etc. begin to gain noticeable dominance over ontological or metaphysical definitions. In these terms of a spiritual nature, the religious and moral moment of the relationship between God, as the Creator-Prototype, Provider and Savior, on the one hand, and man, as His creature, created in the image and likeness of God and being the subject of God’s special love and care, on the other, comes to the fore. This must be borne in mind for a correct understanding of the terms subject to our consideration below, with which Augustine characterizes the Divine Being and which, being essentially ontological predicates or attributes of the Divine, in the language and consciousness of Augustine of the later era of life often have a spiritual meaning and meaning, that is, they mean the moral traits of the Supreme Personality and are therefore synonymous with religious and moral definitions and the relationship of God to the world. – As we will now see, God for Augustine is not only Truth, Wisdom, Word, Light, Justice, but also His identical essences and inseparable from it Good, Bliss, Love, Form, Beauty, on the one hand, self-originating and self-sufficient, and on the other, serving as the first cause and last goal of everything similar to them in the finite world. The concept of bl. Augustine's idea of ​​God as Good follows from his philosophical and theological concept of the Divine, which we discussed above. If God is Absolute Being, then at the same time, according to Augustine, He is also the Supreme Good, since, firstly, He is the Highest and Most Perfect Being, above and better than Whom there is no one and nothing and cannot be conceived, 558 and since, secondly, being and goodness, due to the absolute simplicity and immutability of His being, really coincide in Him. 559 So, God for Augustine and according to Augustine is, first of all, Good, identical with His very essence. Moreover, He is the Supreme Good with the attributes of absolute simplicity and immutability. 560 As such, He is the only and exclusive Good - unum summum bonum et solum bonum a se. 561 As the only Original or Self-Sourcing Good, possessing all the fullness of being and life exclusively “a se ipso”, and not “reg participationem aliorum”, God is the Source of all good in the world. “God,” says Augustine, “is the Good of all good things, the Good from Whom come all good things, the Good without Whom nothing is good, the Good independent of other good things.” 562 Good by its own good, this Highest Good not only does not depend on anyone or anything, 563 but, on the contrary, it itself communicates from itself and through itself the good of everything and everyone, to the extent of their ability to perceive or contain It within themselves. Therefore, everything and everyone in the world owes their goodness entirely to This Supreme Good, through “communion” of Which, and only to the extent of this participation, everything that is good becomes good. 564 As the fullness of all and every good and perfection in their complete harmony and supreme unity, 565 God is also bliss itself, 566 The principle and Author of the true bliss of creatures. 567 But God, from Augustine’s point of view, is not only a simply good being and not only the Good Itself, organically inseparable from His essence, but at the same time He is also Good, that is, God, according to Augustine and for Augustine, is the Living Personal Carrier of this absolute good or bliss. 568 God, according to Augustine, is a living Person, possessing in Himself all the fullness of goods and therefore good and blessed both in Himself and in His relation to the world. We already know 569 that the question of the existence of God always had paramount importance for Augustine, not only theoretical, but above all, practical and deeply vital significance; that Augustine, as a deeply religious and extremely lively and ardent nature, longed for the Living Personal God, Who gives man, along with the blessings of earthly life, inner reconciliation, salvation, and tranquility. Faith in just such a God became an imperative requirement of his mind and an imperious, inevitable need of his heart, which was always flaming with ardent love and seeking reciprocal love for itself. And the history of religious life and thought clearly confirms that in order to receive the highest satisfaction, the human spirit “seeks the Living God, the Father and Author of this gift of life, strives to give itself entirely to Him, in serving Him, to find the source of internal self-exalting nobility, to have all its hope in Him, to have all its hope in faith in His goodness, as in a quiet harbour, to have peace among the storms and disasters of the sea of ​​life. Hence, the history of human quests for the highest good of life is, in essence, the history of various religious systems.” 570 This is an observation of the religious life of man and humanity, stated by one of the older contemporaries of Blessed. Augustine, 571 is quite applicable to himself - to his own theoretical and life quest for the highest good. “A major theorist, Augustine, according to one contemporary secular Russian researcher of his, 572 was not, however, a closed contemplator. How to live? To achieve this real goal, his spirit struggled to discover the ideal secret - where is the truth? The search for truth (veritas) served to find happiness (vita beata - bliss).” That is why the question of goodness or bliss and another closely related question about the meaning or ultimate goal of life always awakened in Augustine the natural philosophical inquisitiveness of his spirit and always had the most important, decisive significance both for his theoretical worldview and for his practical life direction. “Augustine,” says our newest researcher of his personality and doctrine of knowledge, 573, “loved life and found that the stronger a person’s thirst for life, the closer to him the bliss of eternity. This insatiable thirst for existence and pleasure, so characteristic of Augustine, serves as the main idea of ​​his entire life and the development of philosophy. His life is first a painful search for happiness, then a calm possession of it in anticipation of a blissful eternity. His philosophy is the teaching about the good that ensures this bliss, about the highest good and the middle and lower goods, about the knowledge of the relative value of goods, about the eternal existence of the highest good and the return to it.” “Fruitio Dei”, this final point and final goal of all philosophical quests and religious and moral aspirations of the bl. Augustine, to which the bliss of eternity actually boils down, is the most important concept of speculative theology and religious philosophy of the bl. Augustine, rich in the conclusions flowing from him and who created an entire era (der folgereiche und epochemachende Begriff) in the history of Western Christian church thought. 574 The essential points in the content of the Augustinian concept “Fruitio (Dei)” are revealed in a number of the following brief provisions. Under "Fruitio" bl. Augustine understands the undivided possession of the Divine. In a dialectical sense, the concept of “Fruitio” expresses and denotes the right and duty of total devotion or undivided self-giving, although without indicating its specific image or method. This, however, does not exhaust the scope of the analyzed Augustinian concept. That Augustine did not consider the dialectical path of constructing “Fruitio” to be the only possible one can be confirmed by a quotation, for example, from his work “De doctrina Christiana”, 575 which states that we bono studio bonisque moribus, therefore, through the medium of moral life or the process of moral purification of the spirit (purgandus animus), we successfully approach God and reach at least the threshold of pleasure (fruitio). In a mystical sense, “Fruitio” means for Augustine either the presence of God in contemplation (this is the normal meaning of the Augustinian concept under consideration), or a blissful abiding in God in a state of ecstasy. Applying the result of the dialectical and mystical analysis of “Fruitio” to the One who is “excellent and best of all,” we can say that, according to the teachings of Bl. Augustine, God revealing Himself in the Trinity is the only object of pleasure in the proper or true sense of the word. 576 According to its normal content, our feeling is love for our own good or personal bliss and its sweet experience in ourselves, and at the same time - the desire for good or happiness for others. The blessed one endows similar features per eminentiam. Augustine feeling and the Absolute Personality. 577 God is a being, firstly, all-blessed and self-blessed, all-satisfied and self-sufficient, and, secondly, as the fullness of bliss and love by nature itself, He is a most good or loving being in relation to the world, especially to man. Dependent on no one or anything, both at the beginning and in the continuation of His existence, on the contrary, possessing all the fullness of being and life solely from Himself and through Himself, not needing anyone or anything, on the contrary, good and blessed by His own goodness and bliss and Himself giving everything to everyone solely out of the excess of goodness and mercy, God according to the power of this, as Augustine teaches, – is an all-blessed and all-satisfied Being, self-blissful and self-sufficient. 578 From the usual point of view, according to Augustine, the unblessed should be considered either the one who does not have what he loves, or who has what he loves, but it is harmful, or, finally, the one who does not love what he has, even if it is the best. 579 But is any of the above applicable to God, as, firstly, a Being, the Highest and Most Perfect, superior and better than Whom there is nothing and cannot be, either in reality or in thought, and, secondly, as a Being possessing all the fullness of goods and perfections a se ipso et per se ipsum? Of course, the answer to this must be negative. Thus, God, according to Augustine, is not only the Highest, the only unchangeable and therefore the only true Good (summum bonum), the Source of all good in the world, but also the Good (Personal Bearer of Good) both in His essence and in His relation to the world freely created by Him. For His highest morally intelligent creatures, He is, moreover, the Giver of salvation, bliss, joy, consolation, delight, etc. 580 Kind and loving towards His creation, contemplated and carried by Him in His mind for centuries, God created this world, prompted to do so solely by His infinite and ineffable goodness. Not some kind of necessity, not the need for a creature and envy of it or anything like that, but exclusively boundless goodness and all-surpassing love - this, according to Augustine, is the true reason for God’s creation of the world. 581 The same love, through the action of a wise and all-powerful Providence, supports and protects the continued existence of this world, which would immediately turn into nothing again if the world-holding and world-governing Hand of God were taken away from it. 582 Love - and only love - again moved God, after the fulfillment of times, to recreate or save this world, which had fallen and perished as a result of its falling away or removal from the Highest Source of all being and life. 583 And finally, at the end of everything, the creature will again enter into an endless and blissful union with Him in a union of peace and love. 584 – Thus, all-blessed and all-satisfied in Himself, God is the Highest and Inexhaustible Source of bliss, contentment or self-satisfaction, joy, consolation, etc. for the rationally free beings created by Him, who, according to their religious and moral state, are capable of this and worthy of it. Thus, God's possession of all the fullness of absolute perfections in their highest harmonious unity fills Him with consciousness and a feeling of all-contentment and all-bliss. 585 This is the state of bl. Augustine defines it as the rest of God (Dei requies). 586 What does the above-mentioned peace mean in Augustine's theological language? Is he a state of complete inactivity, equanimity, immobility of the Divine, His lifelessness and numbness, or, on the contrary, does he want to affirm with himself the idea of ​​​​the life activity of the Absolute Being in the sense of the greatest and best activity of His consciousness and will and the highest, most complete intensity of His feeling? Blessed creations Augustine, as you might guess, should give us an answer to this in the latter sense. – How, in particular, should we understand the continuous rest of God 587 and His unchanging activity 588 in their relationship? According to Augustine, between them there is the closest and inextricable organic connection and interaction, which we do not find in the sphere of finite beings. Since in the states of His inner life God does not depend on anyone or anything, He is at rest even when He acts: the states of rest and action in Him, as the Absolute, coincide. Therefore, His peace also excludes all inertia, passivity, stagnation, etc., just as His activity is completely alien to any tension, effort or difficulty, weariness, weariness, etc. In view of this, according to Augustine, we can say about God that He is jointly and simultaneously, or better yet, timelessly, “resting, He acts and, acting, He rests.” 589 His life is everlasting and continuous action and rest, rest and action. 590 Himself abiding in eternal and blissful peace, God is the Source of serene peace and blissful tranquility for the creatures He created. Just as Augustine himself, having come to the true knowledge of God and spiritually regained his sight, found for his spirit true and blissful tranquility or peace (requies) in God, 591 in the same way, according to his conviction, all of humanity, in the person of his chosen ones, at the end of centuries will enter into the genuine, serenely joyful, spiritual and bodily peace of God 592 or into the state of eternally blissful subsistence. 593 Having listed the six centuries or periods of time that he mentally contemplated that had elapsed before the end of this world, our famous father and defender of the theocratic ideal of Western Christianity says in the concluding lines of his monumental work “On the City of God”: “after this (i.e., the sixth, now current) century, God will, as it were, rest on the seventh day, having arranged so that in Him the very seventh day will rest, which we ourselves will already be.” ". 594 With the depiction of this great and majestic eschatological picture of the future “rest in God” of His saints, Augustine, as said, concludes his philosophical and historical consideration of the final destinies of the “Kingdom of God,” so brilliantly conceived and executed by him on the pages of his grandiose work “De Civitate Dei” 595. In view of what has been said, “the peace of God,” not being, according to Augustine, a state of passive inertia, imperturbable apathy or some kind of deadness, it is obviously contrasted not with life and activity, which he does not deny at all, but with a feeling of dissatisfaction, as a result of consciousness and a feeling of some kind of lack and associated fluctuations or loss of inner peace or mental balance. From this side, “the peace of God,” as Augustine’s theological and philosophical concept, should be understood as a figurative expression of the positive idea of ​​the absolute bliss and all-contentment of the Highest and Most Perfect Person. 596 In this sense, as we have seen, the peace of God is the source of our inner self-satisfaction and bliss: partially and initially already in the present, earthly life, completely and finally - in the future bliss of eternity. It remains for us to say a few words about form or beauty (beautiful) and love or beatitude, as concepts of religious philosophy and speculative theology of blessedness. Augustine, who also characterize the life of the feeling of the Absolute Being or the Highest Personality. As the Highest Being, God is also the Highest Form or Prime Form, on which the form of all finite beings and things depends. 597 The form of everything and the unchangeable principle of every form, God is the Highest original measure, number and order. 598 The world was created by God according to these eternal and unchanging categories 599 and therefore, both in its parts and especially in its whole, it represents, although weak and imperfect, but a real reflection of the indicated categories of Absolute Being. This Supreme form forms forms or forms all changeable substances. But form, as an ontological predicate of the Divine, must be understood in a special sense in accordance with the concept of God as the Highest and Best Being. Therefore, form, as a category of the Divine order, in particular, is thought by Augustine to be spiritual and completely free from any bodily or spiritual limitations and shortcomings. 600 As the Highest Form, God is at the same time the Highest Beauty. From Augustine's point of view, form and beauty, as such, are synonymous concepts and denote one and the same reality. Thus, God is the Supreme Form and the Highest Beauty, completely and completely embodying the aesthetic ideal of unity and equality (symmetry), to which, according to Augustine, the essence of beauty is reduced. 601 God - the Highest, intelligible or ideal Beauty - is the Beginning and Prototype of all created beauty, 602 - not only physical, but also spiritual. What is the beauty of the spirit or soul? The intelligible (ultimate) spiritual beauty or beauty of our inner man (cf. 1 Peter 3:4) finds its expression in honesty 603 and justice 604 (as well as in courage and patience). 605 As the Supreme Truth and Justice, God is thereby the Supreme Beauty, the beginning and prototype of the beauty of the spirit or the beauty of “our inner man” (interioris hominis pulchritudo). 606 So, this unchangeable or ideal Supreme Beauty, being the Absolute Principle or Divine Nature Itself, is not only the First Principle and Source of everything beautiful in the world, not only the norm or criterion of any aesthetic assessment of things and phenomena, but also the highest guiding principle or living, inspiring ideal of aesthetic activity or artistic creativity of man. 607 But this Supreme Beauty, as not only an ontological, but also a spiritual principle, moreover, in the Christian consciousness of Blessed. Augustine is substantiated or hypostasized, becoming for him a Living Personality, the Creator-Artist and the Creator of all the beauty He imprinted in the world. This is Our God Himself, who immeasurably surpasses all creation in his perfections. 608 This ideal Spiritual Beauty, as a Living personal Being, embodying in Itself with absolute completeness and perfection everything that is beautiful in the material and spiritual spheres, serves for a rationally free creature as an inexhaustible source of high artistic experiences and feelings of aesthetic pleasure, and therefore imperiously attracts it to itself. The real beautiful world we contemplate, where everything is established by measure, number and weight, is, as has been said, an artistic work of this Highest or Ideal Beauty, to which the world itself silently but eloquently testifies with its expedient arrangement and harmony of its parts. Augustine, according to Prof. A. Harnack, never tires of finding “pulchrum et aptum” in creation, understanding the universe as a work of art in which the various gradations of being (from better to worse and vice versa) are as worthy of amazement as the contrasts. Everything individual and evil here disappears in the concept of beauty. After all, God Himself, according to Augustine, is an ever-ancient and ever-new, unique Beauty (Confess. X, XXVII, 38). The tormenting fire of Gehenna, the eternal condemnation of sinners, in the process of “ordinatio malorum”, are necessary and do not in any way violate the beauty of the artistic creation as a whole. 609 Indeed, from a universal point of view, bl. Augustine, with which he views the world, everything that exists in it, by its nature, must be good, that is, all nature, as such, by virtue of its origin from God, is unconditionally good. 610 Evil, as a substance, does not exist. 611 So-called physical evil is of a purely negative nature; it is nothing more than negatio, privatio boni, vitiatum bonum, corruptio boni sive naturae etc. and the pulchritudini universitatis must serve in the last instance. 612 Evil in the true sense of the word, i.e. moral evil (sin), does not come from God: it, according to Augustine, is “a matter not of nature, but of will” 613 - created and therefore prone to fall and corruption 614 - and in its essence represents the deviation or removal of the perverted, sinful will of rationally free beings from God, as an unchangeable resp. true and perfect Being, Goodness, Holiness, Truth and Beauty in the direction of everything opposite to them. 615 Apart from this moral evil or sin, everything in the world, no matter how small and insignificant it may be, must be attributed ad perfectionem universitatis. 616 Even such an apparently harmful phenomenon of the world as poisons, by its nature and in its place, is good and beautiful. 617 Evil, ugliness and ugliness, so often observed in our life, seem such to us only because we consider it too specifically and out of connection with the whole (extra ordinem). Contemplated from a broader perspective or against the background of the entire picture of the universe, they do not produce such an impression at all, since they serve the beauty and perfection of the whole. In this cosmological concept of Augustine, breathing in the spirit of Neoplatonic philosophy, evil is a necessary prerequisite (conditio, sine qua non) of good and not only does not violate the order, beauty and harmony of the cosmos, but, on the contrary, like dark dots, brighter and more prominently shading the overall light background of the picture (sicut pictura cum colore nigro), 618 serves in this case ontologically and psychologically necessary “aesthetic antithesis of good in the universe.” 619 This can be seen as his raison d'être. God allowed the existence of this evil of sin in order “to decorate a number of centuries with antitheses, as is characteristic of a beautiful poetic work, with the only difference that the beauty of the world is achieved by the opposition not of words, but of things and deeds.” 620 – These reasonings of bl. Augustine’s ideas about good and evil, about beauty and order, about love and bliss, etc., which he developed especially in his early works, represent the totality, as Prof. states. Ad. Harnack, a whole system of worldview characterized by “aesthetic optimism.” 621 “This,” notes one of our secular scholars of Augustine, agreeing with Harnack, “is the metaphysics of intellectual-aesthetic optimism, extracted from Platonism, as a theodicy (the justification of God in the question of the origin of evil).” 622 This theodicy bl. Augustine has his own specific character, which markedly distinguishes it from similar experiences of eastern church writers, for example, Origen. 623 In contrast to the latter’s theodicy, “Augustine’s theodicy is not built on the moral ideas of goodness and justice, but has as its central concept the idea of ​​beauty.” 624 Thus, from the point of view of the theodicy of Bl. Augustine, who, as we have seen, has a bright aesthetic coloring, God, always recognizing Himself as omnipotent, just and good, for known reasons and for known purposes, could and can allow evil in the world, which, as we already know, He foresees even before its appearance 625 and ultimately always directs towards good (omnia bene ordinans) 626 and the beauty of the whole. 627 Regarding “pulchritudo”, as Augustine’s predicate of the Divine, the aforementioned Western learned historian and theologian notes that, along with Augustine’s other expressions about God, “pulchritudo” has an “acosmic meaning,” but that Augustine himself, of course, put into it a deeper content. 628 The famous Protestant theologian professor we quote wants to say that with “pulchritudo”, as well as other ontological terms similar to it, Augustine actually connected the Christian concept of God as a Living Personal Being. 629 So, according to the Christian view of Bl. Augustine, to a greater or lesser extent always inherent in him, God, as the Creator-Ruler of the World, is also the Highest Artist of the world (summus artifex mundi), 630 “who determined everything in it by measure, number and weight” and “decorated a number of centuries, like some excellent verse, with a kind of antithesis.” 631 And contemplation of the beauty of everything created - created - imprinted in this world, turning our thoughts and hearts to its Creator and Creator, 632 is a source of joy and happiness for us. 633 This “unchangeably beautiful” 634 “Artist of the world, as great in the great as no less in the small,” 635 for the Christian consciousness of Bl. Augustine, especially in the second half of his life, is the All-Wise, Almighty Good Creator, Provider and Redeemer of the world, the Highest, Living and Personal Spirit. In close connection with the concepts of good, bliss, beauty, etc. stands in the life and thoughts of bl. Augustine and the idea of ​​love. Love for one’s own good or the desire for bliss, as already noted, is closely associated with our religious idea of ​​the Supreme Being as an all-blessed, all-satisfied Source and a loving, merciful Giver of all blessings and bliss to us. 636 God, as the summum bonum or as the most gracious and loving Giver of countless and great gifts of material and spiritual life, naturally becomes on the part of man the object of his mutual love, the uncontrollable impulse or attraction of his heart, the sweet longing and sighing of his soul. Therefore, God, as such a Creator, Provider and Savior of the world and man and as the Only Living Source of true joy, inner self-satisfaction and spiritual consolation, is not only Love in Himself and in His relation to the world, but at the same time the Highest Object of reciprocal grateful love on the part of the highest, i.e., rationally free creature. Bl. experienced this feeling especially intensely within himself. Augustine, who was always inflamed and touched by the contemplation of the wise and good Providence of God in the history of the world, the destinies of mankind and the paths of his own life. Most of all, the “sacredly reverent awe” of this feeling was awakened in Augustine 637 by the boundless and ineffable mercy and forgiveness of God, so strikingly and so touchingly revealed to him in his significant “conversio” in the eyes of Augustine. To be convinced of this, it is enough to recall the wonderful religious lyrics of his incomparable “Confession”, rich in poetic beauty. In blissful love for God, in complete surrender of himself to Him, as we know, Augustine, in the end, found the highest and desired peace for his “anxiously sensitive” and deeply religious spirit. It must be said that love, as such, has always been inextricably linked with the personality of the blessed one. Augustine. At various moments of his life, only the objects of love and, in connection with this, its character changed, but love itself still remained the constant companion of his life and the inevitable need of his heart. 638 “To love and be loved” (amare et amari) 639 - this is the short formula in which Augustine puts this prevailing mood of his youth, but which can also serve as an excellent epigraph to the entire story of the long, rich and extremely intense life of the blessed one. Augustine. Love, which was always the native element of Augustine’s personality and the faithful, constant companion of his life, at the same time becomes the most important moment in the religious philosophy and speculative theology of the Ippon theologian-thinker, which, as is known, is a vivid reflection of the author’s inner experiences, and here acquires a special metaphysical and epistemological significance and justification. The indicated tone of mood is blissful. Augustine and his religious and philosophical intuition, 640 characteristic of his very personality, also clearly affects his understanding or definition of God, as precisely the God of love par excellence. God, as the Christian Revelation teaches, is Love. He is essentially Love Itself or the substance of love. 641 Love is, so to speak, the Basic element of the Divine nature and life, or rather, His very nature and life, identical with Him and inseparable from Him. Love, according to Augustine's Christian teaching about God, is a properly Christian definition and the exclusive expression of the idea of ​​the Divine. And if only it were not for the fundamental assertion of ontological and moral equality and identity behind all the properties and definitions of the Divine being, sharply emphasized by Augustine, then one could say that love, according to the teachings of Blessed. Augustine, is the predominant or most important principle and term of the Divine nature and life. In view of such a vital-practical and metaphysical-theological meaning of love for Augustine and according to Augustine, he, as already mentioned above, even makes an attempt, through this category of love, to rationally understand and justify the inner trinitarian life of the Divine Spirit. “According to Augustine himself, with his broad concept of love,” says Prof. A.I. Brilliantov, his construction of the dogma of the Trinity should serve as an actual explanation of the scheme: “amans, et quod amatur, et amor.” 642 – But a more detailed consideration of this issue, as relating to Augustine’s Trinitarian theology in the proper sense of the word, constitutes the further task of this study. 643 So, in the Living Personal Divinity, as our highest, inalienable and sweetest Good, in selfless, all-consuming love for Him, in the closest, undivided unity with Him, as the complete “possession of God” and serenely blissful “rest in Him,” Augustine finally found the limit of all his religious and philosophical questions and requests, the resolution of all his theoretical and life problems and searches, and at the same time he found the desired healing or salvation from the cruel illness of the spirit that had long tormented him. On this, one might say, the whole essence of the religious and life ideal of Bl. is now concentrated. Augustine. Having “burned” what he previously so often “bowed down to,” and “bowed down” to what he had “burned” so many times before, Augustine, in this pure Christian-theistic concept of the Divine, drew for his soul what he had been looking for for so long and so ardently and what he so desperately needed: liberation from painful doubts and yearnings of the mind and heart, reconciliation of the fatal contradictions of knowledge and life, deliverance from the fiery temptations and temptations of the flesh and spirit... This is the rich, full-life and extremely fruitful theological and philosophical idea of Blessed. Augustine about God as the Absolute Personal Spirit or the Highest and Most Perfect Person, more excellent and better than Whom there is no one and nothing and cannot be imagined. As we have seen, it included and received its vivid embodiment of the very diverse and most sublime Christian concepts of Augustine, which were formulated in the religious and philosophical consciousness of our outstanding Western thinker and teacher of the church only gradually - in the very course of his life and spiritual development. Its individual constituent elements, slowly and painfully crystallized in the long and complex process of Augustine’s life and spiritual development, often served the future “father of all Western Christianity” and the precious “pearl in the multi-colored diadem of universal human genius” as a bright guiding star and anchor of salvation during “spiritual darknesses or crises” and among the numerous reefs, storms and wrecks of the sea of life, until, finally, They carried him to the safe and quiet haven of the Christian faith and the Catholic Church. And at the same time, over the course of many years of Augustine’s life, they positively inspired this multifaceted and bright personality of world history and Christian literature, filled her life with the highest content, comprehended, spiritualized it, while constituting the internal driving motive of all the religious and philosophical inquiries and life quests of our brilliant Christian-God-seeker and philosopher-bishop. III. Speculative teaching of Blessed Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, about the Holy Trinity. (Trinitarian analogies of St. Augustine) a) Cosmological trinitarian analogies of the blessed. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo “The definition of the Divine as a Person is the highest definition to which the human mind reaches when trying to define the Divine. Turning to the Christian teaching about God, we find that it recognizes an even higher definition of the Divine: together with the definition of the Divine as a Person, it affirms the Trinity of Persons in God, united by a single being. “Science, while clarifying for reason the concept of Divinity, must also clarify this highest definition of Divinity.” 644 Divine Revelation 645 and the Orthodox Church 646 teach in agreement that the One God in essence is threefold in Persons. The history of Christian theological and philosophical thought over the centuries represents many experiences - however, not of equal value - to penetrate into this innermost secret of Divine life, to bring it, if possible, closer to human consciousness, one way or another to reveal, understand and substantiate it on the principles of reason. Of course, the best, most valuable experiences in this sense are the writings of the fathers and teachers of the Church, these recognized by the Church itself as bearers of the true Christian spirit and the best exponents of its ecclesiastical reason and piety. In their numerous and varied works, which represent classic examples of Christian science and literature and have guiding significance for all subsequent generations of Orthodox Christianity, 647 receive their most perfect church-theological development and verbal formulation of all the truths of the Christian faith. Of course, in this regard, the cornerstone truth of Christianity that we are considering, i.e., the church teaching about the Holy Spirit, is no exception in this regard. The Trinity, which received the most complete and perfect theological and philosophical treatment in the triadological works of Sts. fathers and teachers of the ancient Christian Church (mainly IV-V centuries). Among the brilliant galaxy of such “classics of the Church” or “famous men” (viri illustres) of Christian antiquity, who worked hard and kindly to clarify the church consciousness on the most basic issues of Christian faith and morality and bequeathed in their works to the subsequent Christian world an entire encyclopedia of the richest scientific and theological knowledge, the bl. we are studying should rightfully be included. Augustine of Hippo, this “most profound of theologians and the most versatile of scholars” 648 of the Western Church of the era of ecumenical councils. In particular, his logically subtle, thoughtful and witty observations and speculations in the Trinitarian field, which left a major mark on the historical revelation of Christian dogma (especially in the West), should represent and, as living facts eloquently testify, indeed represent for modern church theological thought the most vibrant not only purely historical, but also positive or fundamental interest, as the authoritative voice of patristic antiquity, and its most outstanding moment known in history as the golden age of Christian science and literature. In speculative teaching, blessed. Augustine about the Holy Trinity automatically brings to the fore his famous trinitarian analogies - cosmological (or ontological), psychophysical and psychological, 649 - the consideration of which will be the task of the next lines. Augustine's merit in this regard lies in the fact that he, together with others - the most outstanding Christian theologians and teachers of the Church - comprehensively and deeply used, as the highest earthly analogy of the Divine trinity, the human soul - its tripartite structure and the Trinitarian functions of its life. In Western ancient church literature, like no one before him, he broadly posed and illuminated the question of analogical knowledge of God, thoughtfully and in detail elucidating why such an analogy (of the Divine in the created) must be sought primarily in the human spirit, and accurately defined its ecclesiastical theological meaning. 650 On the basis of the biblical patristic idea of ​​man as the image and likeness of God, Augustine built and developed a whole theory of the analogical method of knowledge of God and systematically carried it out in his writings (first and foremost, of course, in his special study “De Trinitate Dei libri XV”). According to the remark of the famous learned historian of the ancient Church and theologian Ad. Harnack, “the strength of Augustine and the significance of his work De Trinitate lies, among other things, in his attempt to substantiate the Trinitarian doctrine with the help of analogies.” 651 – Under trinitarian analogies bl. Augustine, - cosmological (physical), psychophysical and psychological - in the language of Augustine and his later scientific commentators mean those reflections or those traces of the Divine Trinity that Augustine found in the world, in man and in man’s relationship to the world. Moreover, in the trinitarian researches of our Ippon theologian-thinker, many of his very valuable considerations from the field of psychology, epistemology, metaphysics, etc., are applied, on which (considerations), according to Harnack, the subsequent centuries could be educated philosophically. 652 The basis for drawing analogies between the Divine and created natures lies, according to Augustine’s Christian conviction, in the so-called representationalism of the creature, i.e. the ability of the latter to reflect in itself the properties and actions of Its Divine Creator. The world created by God represents, from this point of view, not only His creation, but also the revelation of the properties and perfections of His Divine nature, as far as the latter can be judged by His activity manifested in this world. Therefore, one can know God not only through Divine Scripture, or written Revelation, but also through the study of nature, both external and internal, especially the spiritual nature of man. “By the grace of mercy,” Augustine exclaims, “I will not be lazy or careless in seeking the essence of God, either through His Scriptures or through His creations. Both the Scriptures and the creations are offered to us for the study of the One who revealed them and created them.” 653 Just like Augustine, notes the Catholic scholar Th. Gangauf, 654 - in his definition of the being of God, according to Ap. Pavel and the Writer Prince. The Wisdom of Solomon, based creation as a revelation of the power and greatness of God, and by denying the properties belonging to it, as finite, in created being, he applied necessarily those belonging to the infinite, as such, corresponding and feasible for human language, in the same way he proceeded from the conviction that if creation is a common unified thought and a common unified work of the Triune God, then things reveal the Triune God in themselves as their own The culprit is that already in the very unity of their being they discover a certain triplicity in which they exist, in which they act and of which they consist. Augustine, according to the quoted Western theologian, proceeds from faith in the Divine Trinity, as an objectively given undoubted truth, and therefore the truth of faith itself serves him as a prerequisite for finding traces of the Trinity in creation. And although these traces, due to the finitude of created existence, are far from the Divine Trinity reflected in them, they nevertheless serve to certify and confirm the content of our faith in the Holy Trinity and facilitate our partial and relative understanding of the latter. 655 This path of analogical knowledge, which Augustine is now embarking on, is, of course, not new for contemporary Christian literature. Even before him, the fathers of the Greek-Eastern Church chose this path, wanting, if possible, to bring the Christian teaching of faith closer to human understanding. But his research in this area, which belongs to Augustine, is distinguished by its undeniable profundity, wit, remarkable subtlety and flexibility of thought, completeness and completeness, as well as the extraordinary richness of the conclusions flowing from them, and is not without a certain originality and novelty, especially from the point of view of Augustine’s predecessor and contemporary Western theology. Leaving aside for now the general characteristics of the rational-psychological structure of the teachings of Bl. Augustine on the Holy Trinity, we proceed directly to the review and analysis of the Trinitarian analogies of Bl. Augustine, which for convenience of consideration can be divided, as said, into three classes. The first class of Augustine's trinitarian analogies consists of his cosmological or ontological analogies, drawn by Augustine from the sphere of inorganic and organic (material) nature or finite being in general. Augustine directs his all-searching gaze first of all to the lower sensory-empirical region of created existence and then gradually ascends to the human spirit, in the conviction that the latter, as a creation, about which it is primarily said that it was created in the image and likeness of God, is therefore closer in nature to the essence of God than any other creature on earth, most clearly imprinting in itself the image of God, which in it is still infinitely far from His own. Divine Prototype. 656 Augustine, with more persistence and constancy than anyone else, pursues this idea about the creature’s reflection of the Creator and about the predominant proximity of the god-like human soul to God among other earthly creatures in many of his creations, especially in his special work “De Trinitate Dei”. So,” he says in the fifteenth book of his treatise, 657, “we here again remind you that in what God has created, the Creator Himself is known through creation. Confirming the stated provisions with a reference to the words of Holy Scripture, 658 Augustine further notes: “I quoted this from the Book of Wisdom for the purpose of preventing any of the faithful from thinking that I, through the consideration of certain triplicities in creation, gradually ascending to the spirit or mind (ad mentem) of man, am vainly and in vain looking for traces of that Most High Trinity, which we seek when we seek God." 659 In another of his extensive treatise “De Civitate Dei” Augustine says the following on this matter: “And we ourselves recognize in ourselves the image of God, that is, this Most High Trinity - an image, it is true, unequal, even far different, non-coeternal, and to put it briefly - not all of the same essence as God - although in the things created by Him, it is closest in nature to God.” 660 In his philosophical work “De quantitate animae” Augustine also notes about the same thing: “You have heard how great the power and essence of the soul is. To put it briefly: if it must be admitted that the human soul is not what God is, then it must also be concluded that of all created things there is nothing closer to God.” 661 Based on this thesis about the representationalism of creation, which he based on the Word of God and accepted on faith, Augustine cites a number of analogies from objects and phenomena of the finite world in the order of their relative dignity, recognizing, however, that these are only analogies. “In the vague mirror of our earthly reality,” says Prof. Evg. N. Trubetskoy, 662 regarding trinitarian analogies of bl. Augustine, - we can find the image of the Triune God. All creatures, according to Augustine, even those standing lower than man, because they are Creation, and together with the revelation of God, bear the revelation of the Triune God (as we have already seen from De Trin. XV, II, 2-3). It is all creatures, first of all, that show in themselves some a) unity, b) form and c) order.” We turn to the direct voice of Augustine. “So, everything that is created by divine art,” says the latter, “shows in itself a certain unity (unitas), species (species) and order (ordo). For everything that exists is a certain unity, such as, for example, the nature of bodies and the innate qualities or properties of souls; then it has a certain appearance or image, namely - in the physical sphere - a figure or quality, in the spiritual sphere - science and art; finally, everything that exists either only strives, or already contains within itself a certain order (ordinem aliquem petit aut tenet), like the weight or figure of the body, and the love or pleasure of the soul. 663 Therefore, contemplating the Creator in His creation, one must enter into an understanding of the Trinity, traces of which are found in creation, since the latter is worthy of it. In this Trinity is the highest principle (origo) of all things, the most perfect beauty (pulchritudo) and the most blessed delight (delectatio).” 664 The Trinity can be seen in all corporeal beings, insofar as they all have measure (mensura), number (numerus) and weight (pondus). 665 Elsewhere in his writings, Augustine somewhat modifies this analogy of his, replacing the concept of unity (unitas) with the concept of being (esse), but he does this because being (esse) and a single being (unum esse) for him are identical concepts. 666 “Having known this Trinity,” he says in this case, “as far as it is given to us to know this in this life, we, without the least hesitation, admit that every rational, spiritual and physical creature, insofar as it exists, receives its being and its form from this Creative Trinity and is governed by It in the most perfect order. For every thing, whether we call it substance, or essence, or nature, or some other term, simultaneously has in itself both this, that, and the third, so that it is something unified and differs from the rest in its appearance, and does not stand out from the order of things.” 667 Augustine varies this trinitarian analogy from external nature several more times. “We, Orthodox (catholici) Christians,” says Augustine, “worship God, from whom is every measure (omnis modus), great and small; every species (omnis species) and every order (omnis ordo), great and small. So, these three: modus, species et ordo - if we are silent about the countless things that manifest themselves in relation to these three - these three principles, as the main goods, exist in things created by God, both spiritual and physical.” 668 When looking at the things of nature, which constitute only concrete manifestations of its existence, as a single and general whole, Augustine defines the trinity inherent in nature as follows: a) every being exists (sit, esse, in general as substance from substance); b) exists as this or that (hoc vel illud, as the isolation of the general into a specific image cast from the formative principle) and c) remains (manet) what it is, insofar as this is possible for it (manet, quantum potest). 669 Augustine adds - because he can - because each taken separately is subject to all kinds of changes and, finally, even disappears, but has its substantial - enduring and unchangeable - basis in general existence. In all that exists: a) being in general, b) being in particular, and c) the quality that separates it, constitute, according to Augustine, a new image of the Divine Trinity in the finite world. In every being, says Augustine in another place, three things can be distinguished: a) that of which it consists (being or substance in general); b) how it differs (this one thing in comparison with that other); and c) that by the power of which this multiple and distinct being is again resolved into unity. “Everything that exists,” says Augustine in this place, “is something different in the respect of which it consists (quo constat), and something different in that in which it differs (quo discernitur), and, finally, something different in what it agrees with (quo congruit). 670 Thus, nature is revealed to us as a) something unified and general, and b) as a triplicity clearly manifested in its individual objects with the unity of its being. The author of their being and existence is the Triune God, and their purpose on earth is to broadcast about the greatness of God. Thus, Divine existence, with His unity, must be Trinity [of course, not in the final sense, but, in view of His absoluteness, must also be an absolute trinity].” 671 In his extensive treatise “De Civitate Dei” Augustine says the following about this: “If Divine goodness is nothing other than holiness, then it will be a direct logical conclusion, and not a bold assumption, to think that in the narrative of God’s creations, when it comes to who created this or that creature, through what he created, for what he created, in some mysterious way of expression it is given to us to understand the same Trinity. It is, of course, the Father of the Word, Who said: “Let it be.” And what was created when He spoke was undoubtedly created through the Word. The expression “God saw that it was good” sufficiently shows that God, without any necessity, without any consideration of any personal benefit, but out of His goodness alone, created what was created, that is, He created because it is good. If this goodness rightly means the Holy Spirit, then the whole Trinity is revealed to us in God’s creations.” 672 We will allow ourselves to conclude with a review of the Trinitarian analogies of Bl. Augustine, borrowed by him from material nature, with the remark that the scientist Ritter makes about them (in his Geschichte der Philosophie). 673 To the analogies we cited above, to which Bl. referred. Augustine, for the clarification and proof of the Christian Trinity, the named German scientist is very critical. In his opinion, “these analogies (Vergleichungen) lead to knowledge of the creature rather than the Creator.” 674 “But this remark,” the Catholic scholar Gangauf rightly objects to the above words of Ritter, 675, “is true only in the sense that these analogies do not achieve understanding of the inner life of the Divine Trinity, as it is offered by Revelation for our faith. But that they achieve a certain goal is not difficult to prove by the fact that without the assumption of trinity, which created being reflects in itself, according to which it exists and in which it proves the presence in itself of truth, goodness and beauty, always participating in it to the extent of its dignity, which even in the case of moral fall it cannot completely lose, being, finally, in a state of moral death, participating in them to the extent of its being - we repeat - without the assumption of such a trinity in God, as being, it is impossible to rationally rise to Absolute Being and Life, Absolute Truth, Goodness and Beauty, the Source of all created truth, goodness and beauty. But in order to clearly prove the trinity in general, as the trinity manifested in the very unity of God’s being, for this, however, the above-mentioned analogies are insufficient. But Augustine himself did not claim their greater significance, and therefore did not develop them further. A closer and more expressive image of the Divine Trinity - not only similitudo (likeness), as an image in general, but a reflection (imago), i.e., an imprint or a copy closer to the original - he expects to find in the highest created being and life, namely the human soul, which is mainly spoken of in the Holy Scriptures. Scripture that she was created in the image and likeness of God.” Therefore, it is fair that Ritter 676 himself speaks of the class of trinitarian analogies we discussed above. Augustine, gleaned from the physical world, notes: “this most general way of searching for the image of the Trinity in each individual creature for Augustine still has only a secondary and only propaedeutic significance. Based on the conviction that the soul is higher than the body, the inner man is higher than the outer, and that the higher the creature, the more clearly it imprints the Divine (beginning) in itself, Augustine turns in this thought to finding traces of the Trinity primarily in the sphere of the spiritual-intelligent creature.” Showing the results of Augustine's research in this last area will be our immediate task. b) Psychophysical trinitarian analogies of the blessed. Augustine or the so-called analogies from the “outer man” (homo exterior) The second - comparatively higher - class, or category, of the Trinitarian analogies of Blessed Augustine, drawn by him from the finite world, are, as noted above, analogies from the “external man”. By “external man” (exterior homo) Augustine means that complex psychophysical organization of man, on one side of which the latter belongs to the purely physical nature of being, and on the other side it comes into contact with the area of ​​psychophysiological functions of his bodily organism and the purely mental experiences associated with them. 677 Blessed Augustine devotes the 11th book of his extensive treatise “On the Trinity” to a detailed presentation and thorough analysis of the Trinity analogies from the sphere of human existence and life indicated by us, connecting with it the 12th book immediately following it with a remark about the similarities and differences between the “external man” and the world of unreasonable creatures. Changing individual members of this analogy, Augustine touches on it in other books of his treatise. 678 Before making the human spirit as such, or in Augustine's terminology the "inner man" in his pure being (interior homo ad se), the subject of his research, Augustine, according to Prof. Th. Gangauf'a, 679 enters first into the consideration of the external man, who appears among created beings as a synthesis of body and spirit; in the body (he) is a particle of externally material nature, in his own bodily feelings (he) is a certain psychophysical center of his complex organism. Here are the reasonings of bl. Augustine on this matter. Already starting from its lowest stages and ending with man, nature allows us to recognize in its being a certain trinity, in the composition of which it exists: therefore, Augustine wants to show the trinity in external man, who stands above nature because his spirit, despite the complexity of its composition (the multiplicity of spiritual forces and the variety of phenomena of mental life), nevertheless represents a living organic unity. Ho imago, or comparatively the most accurate image of the Divine Trinity, this trinity noticed in external man does not yet reveal itself, because in this analogy the spirit of man is contrasted, on the one hand, with a sensory object, as an object of an essence different from it, and on the other hand, its image in the soul is also not the same with the object of nature. 680 In order to show the image of the Divine Trinity in external man, Augustine, first of all, chooses for this purpose the sense of vision, as a sense that, according to him, is the most perfect (maxime excellit) and at the same time most related to the functions of purely spiritual contemplation (visioni mentis). 681 The essence of this Augustinian analogy, borrowed from our organ of vision, boils down to the following: in sensory perception, according to Augustine, we see: 1) the object itself; 2) its reflection in the organ of vision and 3) the activity of the will that connects them. 682 “When a person looks at a known object,” says N. Ostroumov, touching on this analogy of Augustine, “then the object at which he is looking is usually in front of him; then the image of the object is imprinted on the eye at this time; when attention from the will is drawn to this image, a sensation is formed that combines both the object and the image into one. This is how the Trinity turns out - an object, an image of an object and a certain sensation.” 683 This is how the Protestant scholar Böhringer presents this analogy from the external man in more detail. “No likeness (analogy),” he says, “can, according to Augustine, show the features of similarity and difference with Her so truly, so worthy and so close to the essence of the Trinity, as the essence of man. It is man - and this is the main reason for Augustine - who is the image and likeness of God, that is, the image and likeness of the Trinity; he is created in the image of the Triune God. If God created man only in the image of the Son, then the difference between Father and Son would follow. Therefore, in the being of a person, first of all, traces of the Divine Trinity must be reflected. Obviously, Augustine follows the path that Gregory of Nyssa had already chosen before him, but only shows even more diversity in this case. At the same time, he follows the named path (Trinitarian analogies) gradually, heading from one area of ​​man to another, from external to internal, as the main focus in which all the rays of the Divine Image are collected. For Augustine, the external point of departure is the external man, who already bears the imprint of the Trinity within himself. Although he does not represent the image of God in that higher sense as an internal man, it is not in vain that he is called a man if the likeness of the internal is inherent in him.” 684 Unlike the inner man, the outer man does not represent the image of God in itself, but through the inner man, which reflects itself in the outer. What Augustine thinks here is not the external man in the objective sense, but a sensory view, which is composed of three elements: - 1) the object of contemplation, that is, the body that we see; 2) the sensation with which we contemplate it, or even vision itself, as if generated by the object; and 3) the will, by which we determine ourselves to an object [or the activity that connects the sensation of sight with the object]. Of course, this analogy reveals a substantial difference in each of its three individual elements: 1) the object of view is a sensory object; 2) the view itself (is) a spiritual act of the contemplating subject, but at the same time not only spiritual, but also sensual in the sense that it occurs with the help of the bodily organ of vision; on the contrary, the 3rd moment - tension (intentio) - is a purely spiritual act and therefore must constitute in this trinity, so to speak, the personality of the rational spirit. 685 Thus, this psychophysical trinitarian analogy from the sense of vision, the most perfect sense of all our external senses, in itself is still far from imperfect, both because its various components are not of the same nature, and also because its first moment - an external object - makes an impression on the sense of vision only as long as it is present, and with its disappearance the impression ceases. Augustine corrects the shortcomings of this analogy and its incompleteness and makes up for it with the following analogy, in which the place of an external object is replaced by its mental image stored in our memory. This is how Prof. already known to us. Th. Gangauf 686 presents this analogy based on an analysis of many passages from Op. Augustine "De Trinitate Dei". Even if the image of an object eludes the senses, the object itself is not yet completely lost to the spirit, but from the moment of the latter’s perception it enters the realm of memory, and in the new trinity formed as a result of this process, the image in memory takes the place of the external object. Now the mind directs its gaze to the internal object, and the new product of this process becomes the “inner vision” (interna visio), again produced by the power of thought. The connection or mediator between the inner vision and the image of the object is again the active force (voluntas) of the spirit, already known from the previous trinity, and in a similar way closes with itself (as the third factor) this trinity. 688 From this connection - cogere, coagere - thinking received its name in Latin - cogitatio. In this new trinity 689 there is no longer that difference of natures (naturae diversitas) that we saw in the previous analogy (an external object and its image in the human eye). 690 In this last ternarium, the internal object (similitudo corporis, quam memoria tenet) and its work or thought (visio cogitantis) form the same unity as in the previous analogy of trinity the real image of the external object was one with its image in the sense of sight, so that their difference remains only in consciousness. 691 “This unity seems to our Augustine to be real in the sense that it persists even if the body that produces the sensory impression is no longer present (that is, if the external object has already disappeared from our field of vision). After all, the image remains in the memory of the soul, and the will can thus direct internal vision to it, so that now, when an object is reproduced in our memory, an “internal contemplation” occurs, similar to that obtained through a sensory impression from an external object. Thus, “in the outer man” this new trinity arises: 1) from recollection (memory); 2) internal vision and 3) will, leading both to unity, that is, something whole arises, the unity of which also exists in thought alone.” 692 And now “in these three separate moments of the trinity under consideration,” there is no longer any difference in nature. What the body in space was for the bodily sense, now means for the inner vision the image of memory, and what the sensual view meant now constitutes the spiritual view, which is directed towards the image of memory, and, finally, the will. “Thus, it happens that the process from external turns into internal, unity no longer consists of three substantially different moments, but from one and the same substance, because all this now takes place inside, in the same single soul.” 693 Despite this, Augustine also does not find the true image of the Divine Trinity in this trinity, although the first shows some similarities with the second. Therefore, from the immediate external (sensory) one should move on to the internal, since the ternarium, which is found in the external side of a person, can better be proven in the internal person, i.e. in his spiritual nature: after all, nothing is known to the spirit more than what is near it, and nothing is closer to the spirit than itself. If there can be any key to understanding the trinity, then such a key, according to Böhringer, Augustine finds in the nature of the spirit. Since man, as such, represents the image of the Triune God, then in nothing is he closer to God than in the way in which man differs from all earthly creatures - that is, in his spiritual nature. The latter is a reflection, a mirror of the Trinity. Therefore, Augustine tries to gather all the rays that are reflected in this mirror together, to prove the essence of God in His Trinity, so that after that he can ascend even higher from it - to the Trinity Itself. 694 Having established this possible trinity in three types in the external man, Augustine then proceeds to show in the first two ternariums, in which the real image objectifies itself in external reality, both their similarity and difference from the Divine Trinity. 695 After a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the ternarium in the external man, Augustine shows a certain correspondence that exists between this trinity he examined and that which exists in external material nature, and, intending to then move on to the consideration of the internal man, explains in it what he wanted to find in it - namely, the image of God. By comparing the triplicities already discussed above, imprinted in the things of the lower man of external nature, with the triplicity he states in the external man, Augustine establishes the following parallel between the individual moments of both: measure (mensura) corresponds to memory (memoria), number (numerus) - vision (visio); the will is like weight (voluntas vero ponded similis est). The external man, according to Augustine, does not contain any exceptional property at all, which in a certain respect would not also be inherent in the animal. With these remarks, Augustine introduces the reader to the consideration of the 12th book of the treatise under study “On the Trinity,” thereby logically connecting the content of this new book of his with his thoughts from the previous one. In the first four chapters of the 12th book of his work under consideration, Augustine draws a parallel between animals and humans and shows the undoubted superiority of the latter over the former. 696 From the analysis performed, it is clear that the animal has a living body with its sense organs, through which it perceives external objects, has the ability of representations, with the help of which it perceives an external phenomenon as an internal image (idea); The animal is no less endowed with the power of recollection and, which constitutes an internal mediating force, also has the ability to want, which manifests itself in its actions, both positive and negative: positively in the desire for the useful (“appetere conducibilia”), negatively in avoidance, or aversion, from the harmful (“fugere incommoda”) 697. But what, even from the outside, distinguishes a person from an unreasonable animal is the vertical position of the human body, which in itself reminds the rational spirit residing in it to direct its gaze to “mountain” 698 and, in contrast to the unreasonable animal, to place its purpose within the limits not of its lower material nature, but in the realm of the supersensible, premium. And in mental activity, as it reveals itself in the outer man, one cannot help but recognize the significant difference between man and the irrational animal. This includes, first of all, the internal process of processing material that entered the soul from the external world, since such a process is carried out in a person by the power of his imagination and fantasy. Further, through the indicated powers of the soul, a person leaves the ground of empirical reality and creates in the soul an image of an object, constituting a real unity with the object. All this is no longer characteristic of an irrational animal and in fact presupposes in a person, already in order to explain the given possibility of such a process, another force, standing above everything sensually given. Then a person judges external objects, their relationships and forms according to principles that, despite the insignificance or continuous fluidity of these objects, are not themselves subject to the conditions of frailty and destructibility, but always remain unchanged. The presence in the human soul of these eternal and unchangeable principles and the ability to think according to them, which is not characteristic of the animal soul and through which the human soul rises above the latter, is nothing other than the rational spirit in its highest essence (in se) or rationalis substantia, and, like such a force, has a need for pure and unchangeable truth and is in its essence reason. This inner man, as a rational being, as a rationalis substantia, already created from the beginning in the image and likeness of God, reveals to us in himself not only the ternarium in general, which has been considered until now, [in the lower material nature of man and in the external man], but the trinity, which is the image of the Divine Trinity (Trinitas Dei). As we noted above, Augustine devoted the first four chapters of his 12th book “On the Trinity” to reasoning about this. 699 However, Augustine here does not immediately enter into consideration of the “inner man,” but first touches upon that false view, widespread in his time, according to which a father, mother and their child can serve in the human sphere as an image of the Worldly or Divine Trinity. 700 Since between the three Divine Persons the Father and the Son have their own distinctly expressed name, it seemed possible, according to this imaginary analogy, to assign to the Holy Spirit in the Divine Trinity the place of the wife (mulier), from whom the Person, called the Father, gives birth to another Person, called the Son. In confirmation of this, they even referred to Holy Scripture, where the Holy Spirit appears to come from the Father, without being called His Son. To this were also added the stories of creation, when Eve was taken from the side of Adam, thus coming from himself, being a person (in se) and a helper like him, not being called the daughter of Adam, but being, however, his wife. Based on similar considerations, they constructed an imaginary analogy of the Divine Trinity. – Augustine’s own judgments regarding this analogy are as follows. The share of truth that this analogy contains and which is completely consistent with Holy Scripture is that not everything that exists as a person receives its existence through the act of birth, but that one person can (originate) from another person, so that the concept of (origin) cannot and should not necessarily presuppose the concept of birth. What has been said is fully applicable to the origin of the Holy Spirit, as the third Divine Hypostasis: that is, the Holy Spirit, coming from God the Father and being the same Person as He, however, does not receive His existence from Him through birth. Yet everything else in this quasi-analogy, such as, for example, the fact that the Holy Spirit could be the wife of God the Father and the mother of God the Son, is so absurd and false that it does not even deserve refutation. 701 It is impossible to assume an earthly - marital - relationship where it is necessary and possible to think and talk exclusively about the spiritual. For the pure,” says Augustine along with the Apostle, “everything is pure; on the contrary, the unclean and wicked, whose thoughts and feelings are dirty, even in the birth of Christ from the Virgin find a stumbling block and temptation for themselves. On the contrary, one must cultivate in oneself the skill of looking for the image of the spiritual in the physical, so that in this way, with the help of reason, one can rise from the lower through the higher to the highest - to the pure and unchanging Truth by which everything was created; only it is impossible to attribute to Absolute Being, or God, that which is characteristic only of the finite, as finite, and, moreover, still corrupted by sin. In God, the purest, unchangeable, whole and uncorrupted being, no temporary process is possible, no temporary birth is permissible, no gradual formation from any original formless state is conceivable. Therefore, any such idea of ​​the marriage of God with Himself, even the purest, even the most blameless, would inevitably lead to the most dangerous delusions. 702 The very idea (assumption) that the Father, mother and child only together constitute a single image of the Divine Trinity seems, according to the teaching of Holy Scripture, to be decidedly false. Adam was not created in the image of any one of the Three Divine Persons alone, but in the image of the Triune God. God, when creating the first man, said in the plural: “Let us make man in Our image and like Ours.” Thus, He spoke as the Triune, 703 and what was said about image and likeness pointed to man as a person, and expresses not that man has an affinity with the external nature below him, but what exactly he rises above it and what constitutes in him his rational soul. In her rational soul, woman, as such, is, equally with man, the image of God, and the godlikeness of a woman, just like the godlikeness of a man, is restored in the sacrament of rebirth. Since the husband at the beginning (before the creation of his wife and the birth of their first son) by the mouth of God is already called the image of the Divine Trinity, then, therefore, not only the husband, wife and child, as three persons taken only together, construct the image of the Divine Trinity, but also each individual finite person an sich, in its spiritual and rational essence, according to which only every person represents a single-trinity personality, also constitutes the image of the Triune Absolute Personal God. 704 With the solution to this question, having already cleared the way for this in the analysis of the “external man” (homo exterior), Augustine turns in conclusion to the “inner man” (homo interior), so that in this latter, in the same way, he can find and show the image of the Divine Trinity. 705 c) Psychological trinitarian analogies of the blessed. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, or the so-called analogies from the “inner man” (homo interior) in connection with the general characteristics of the rational-psychological structure of the teachings of the blessed. Augustine about the Holy Trinity and an assessment of its church and theological significance The analogies of Blessed Augustine, which he draws from the “inner man,” that is, from the very essence of the God-like human spirit, considered in its complete detachment from all sensory being, from everything external and transitory, are of particular importance in the series of his Trinitarian analogies that we have considered, because they introduce us to the very essence of man, according to which the latter stands closest to His Creator of all earthly creatures and is brighter than all of them. reflects the rays of His Divine Prototype. Therefore, this class of Trinitarian analogies gives us the closest and most accurate knowledge of the Trinitarian Deity. In the IX book. The treatise we are studying by St. Augustine “De Trinitate Dei”, which is very important for understanding his psychological construction of the dogma of the Holy Trinity, Augustine enters for this purpose into the consideration of the “inner man” (homo interior). But the rational spirit of man, before proceeding to consider absolute love, for the sake of his weakness, must first understand something akin to the absolute Spirit in himself and more familiar to him from his own inner life - namely, the image that exists in himself and which, although not completely adequate to His Divine Prototype, is nevertheless His real image. Here we are forced to make a few preliminary remarks about the speculative psychological construction of bl. Augustine in general and its methodological significance, which it receives in relation to Augustine’s theology. 706 Based on the accepted position on faith that all created nature reveals in itself the image of its Creator and that man in his soul bears the brightest traces of the reflection of the Divine, Augustine now directs all the power of his psychological analysis to this last area. The idea of ​​man as the image of God, which was extremely important for Augustine himself, becomes the main thought of his entire theological speculation, developed on a psychological basis. It is the central idea of ​​his positive or cataphatic theology. It also completely determines the subjective psychological method of his theology. But this biblical and philosophical idea is of particular importance for Augustine’s rational understanding and justification of the church dogma of the Holy Trinity. His entire rational construction of this subject of Christian faith is based on this idea, which receives its specific expression from Augustine. As has already been noted, from the point of view of the idea under consideration, in the vague mirror of our earthly reality, bright images of the Triune God appear to our dull eyes, loudly telling us about Him as their absolute cause and goal. Therefore, the immediate task that seemed to Augustine on this partly already traversed path of his Trinitarian studies was to establish and discover in the long ascending ladder of earthly Trinitarian analogies or images - the most perfect reflection of the Divine Trinity and in this reflection to also determine its, so to speak, “main focus”, in which the rays of his Divine Prototype collected in it would shine most convexly and brightly. Augustine finally finds such a perfect reflection on earth of creation of its Trinitarian Creator in the godlike spirit of man. To this end, the great Western teacher strives with all his might to cognize and explore the human soul in all its recesses and bends, in order to then rise from it to the Absolute Spirit. 707 “Know what you are” (cognosce, quod es). 708 “Don’t lose your temper. Enter into yourself” (intra te), he repeats insistently. 709 Descend into the depths of your soul and there in your inner man you will be encouraged to become like God: in your image you will recognize His Author (Confession). God is in our soul, and therefore true knowledge of the soul is inextricably linked with the knowledge of God: “noverim me, noverim Te.” (Soliloqu. II, I, 1. Migne, t. 32, col. 885; p. II, 259). If man is the image of God, then, according to St. Augustine, we can therefore conclude that what we find in the human soul, one way or another, must also be in God: through the knowledge of the soul, therefore, we can come to the knowledge of God. This is why Augustine decisively declares: “I desire to know God and the soul. And nothing more. Yes, nothing." (Migne, t. 32. col. 872. Solil. I, II, 7; p. p. II, 233; M. t. 32, col. 883 op. cit. I, XV, 27; p. p. II, 256. M. t. 32, col. 898 op. cit. II, XV, 27; p. p. II, 286). “God and the soul,” says Prof. A. Harnack, - from a theoretical-cognitive point of view, Augustine stood in an internal inextricable connection with each other, and this connection strengthened in his eyes their metaphysical kinship.” (Lehrbuch d. DG. Fr. im Br. 1890. Bd. III, S. 100). “The study of the soul,” continues the Western learned theologian we quote, “became a theological necessity for Augustine. No other study was so important in his eyes. From every study he tried to extract some knowledge about God.” (Ibidem). “Γνῶϑι σεαυτόν” - became for him the path to God. Therefore, any success in the analysis of psychological states and in knowledge becomes for Augustine at the same time a success in the knowledge of God and vice versa.” (Ibid. S. 100). “Success in the knowledge of evil and one’s own soul is the highest pleasure for Augustine,” notes another German researcher of Augustine, H. Schöler. 710 Bearing in mind this organic connection between the psychology of the great theologian of the Western Church and his theology, Prof. Harnack assigns the flattering title of “psychological genius of the patristic period” to the Western father we are studying, precisely because he was a “theological genius.” 711 Characterizing the results of his deep and witty psychological research, the above-mentioned luminary of contemporary historical theology in the Protestant West says of Augustine that he “discovered a whole new world inside his “I”, in the depths of his spirit.” 712 But his psychological analysis, we repeat, is always involved in the service of theology: the psychologist in Augustine is inseparable from the theologian, for the knowledge of the soul, according to his thought, should ultimately lead to the knowledge of God. 713 This is precisely the monument to the aspirations of Blessed. Augustine “to know God and the soul” and represents his most extensive work, “De Trinitate Dei libri XV”, which we are studying, this hard work of 16 years of life. Based on the data of psychological analysis, Augustine wants to apply the subjective psychological method to achieve the goal he set for himself in the named essay. The author himself clearly indicates this goal in this essay. It consists, as we already know, in proving (ratione demonstrare) the most mysterious dogma of the Christian Trinity by means of reasoning. Augustine was already moving towards this goal when he revealed and showed above that the whole world, as the creation of God and the revelation of His perfections, eloquently speaks about its Triune Creator; that objects, even those standing below man, and man himself in the lower sensory-material side of his nature forcibly “impose” on us the idea of ​​the Trinity of the Divine. To show this in relation to the highest side of his complex organization or in relation to his spirit, taken, moreover, in his pure being, detached from everything sensory and extraneous to him, is now the task of Blessed Augustine. It is precisely on this side that man represents the highest and most perfect reflection of the Creator in creation. The essence of St. Augustine’s psychological attempt to construct the dogma of the Holy Trinity in a rational way comes down to the search and definition of this most perfect image in the highest earthly being. So, what did Augustine believe in this image of the Absolute Spirit in the finite spirit of man? When deciding the question of what exactly should be the similarity between the Divine Spirit and the human spirit, Blessed Augustine, with his psychological point of view, wants to start from specific phenomena of inner life and look for this similarity in what constitutes the essence and basis of this life. First of all, Augustine was faced with the task of determining, through empirical analysis of the phenomena of mental life, what expresses “the enduring constitution of the nature of the soul or that unchanging basis that is hidden behind the constant change of phenomena of mental life, as the general law of this life,” 715 since by this only side of its nature the finite spirit can serve as a reflection of the Infinite and Unchanging Spirit. Representative of the “metaphysics of inner experience” 716 and the outstanding “psychological genius of the patristic era” 717 - bl. Augustine now goes deeper into the analysis of the existing content of a person’s mental life in order to, through empirical analysis of constantly changing mental phenomena, make a kind of “selection” and “selection” of all the external and random elements that come into it over time. It is as if he wants to find in the indicated way that “blank slate” (tabula rasa) of the soul, on which, according to Locke, the experience of life has not yet drawn a single line and which constitutes its static substrate, which underlies the entire mobile and changeable content of our psyche as its ideal constitution or general law. This side of the human god-like spirit represents that immaterial center in which the Infinite with the finite, the Divine with the human, the Creator with his creature, the finite image with his Infinite Prototype seem to come into contact with each other. “So,” says Augustine, “it is not that trinity, which now does not yet exist, that will constitute the image of God; and not this trinity, which can ever disappear, but the trinity reflected in the human soul (in anima) is the truest image of God; that is, in other words, in the rational (rationali sive intellectuali) side of the soul - we must seek the image of the Creator, the image that is always inherent in its immortal nature” (De Trinit. Dei XIV, IV, 6. Migne, t. 42, col. 1040). “Augustine,” according to Professor A.I. Brilliantov, “wants to make a kind of “criticism of the pure” nature of the soul, eliminating all empirical elements that come from outside and over time.” 718 This psychological analysis of mental life, which extends to phenomena of a lower order, such as acts of sensory perception and reproduction, states that the main process of the life of the human spirit, hidden under the constant change and variety of mental phenomena, consists in the objectification by the spirit of its inner content. This internal mental process of objectification of the human spirit, arising from the ability of self-consciousness that is always inherent in the human soul, finds its expression “in the soul’s constant presentation of its own content to itself, as a product of its own activity.” 719 The soul, from the point of view of this view, is a being that always “represents”, putting itself before itself, or otherwise, objectifying its own content. In the process of this self-objectification of the rational spirit, the basic essence of mental life, the unchanging basis of the soul, is revealed. However, the soul itself may be in ignorance or delusion regarding the true constitution of its nature and the real essence of its life. Thus, she may take as the very substrate of her activity that which de facto constitutes only her product (for example, her ideas or even their real symbols). (Migne, t. 42, col. 981‒982. De Trinit. X, X, 16). The result of this self-objectification of the rational spirit or this setting before itself of its content is, as its generation (proles), the “inner word” (interius, verbum intus etc. M. t. 42, col, 967. De Trin. IX, VII, 12). Pronounced in the tongue, it becomes external. “At the same time, empirically, in voluntary reflection,” notes Prof. A.I. Brilliantov, “the staging of one or another part of the content of mental life in consciousness is preceded by some desire, as an act of will, and only after this staging is it possible to evaluate the content by feeling” 720 (see M. t. 42. col. 1078. De Trin. XV, XV, 25; - col. 1094. De Tr. XV, XXVI, 47). But in the internal process, will and feeling, according to Augustine, are, as it were, one force, manifested in different ways only 721 (voluntas = amor. M. t. 42, col. 972; IX, XII, 18; - col. 1089. De Trin. XV, XXI, 41). The process of self-consciousness, based on objectification (mens, amor sui, notitia sui) by the spirit of the content contained in it, is revealed in these very facts of voluntary reflection. So, having discovered in the constant process of objectification the essence of the life of the finite spirit and having extended this process as a law to the entire realm of being, Augustine now wants to apply the construction thus obtained to the being and life of the Absolute. Concluding in this relation from the finite spirit to the Infinite Spirit, with which the former is similar in its very essence, Augustine, thus, a minori ad majus, comes to the concept of a threefold God in Persons, deriving His Trinity from the absolute process of Divine self-consciousness and love, similar to the said process in the human soul, but only freed from its finitude and limitation. This constituted the further task of his psychological structure. Let's see how Augustine fulfilled the task he set for himself in its first half, i.e., in what and how he found the most accurate and vivid reflection of the Trinity God in the human soul. That sphere in the inner life of the rational spirit in which the process of self-objectification of the spirit receives its most vivid expression and in which, therefore, the image of the Divine Trinity is imprinted with the greatest strength and clarity is, according to Augustine, love (amor, dilectio, charitas), understood by him, as we know, in the broad sense of the word. In view of this, the analysis of the love of the human spirit acquires for the bl. Augustine is especially important. In love, the very nature of our triune self-consciousness, reflecting in itself the image of the Divine Trinity, is most clearly revealed; here the essence of our spirit is revealed, bringing it closer to the inner immanent life of the Trinitarian Deity. In the love of the human spirit, its very nature is revealed, as is the always inherent ability of self-consciousness, which is based on the objectification by the human soul of its content as a product of its activity. And therefore, in love, Augustine states, as a result of the soul’s objectification of its content, three main points corresponding to the three Persons of the Divine. In love, Augustine distinguishes: the one who loves (the subject of love); that which is loved (object of love); and love itself (the feeling or process of love). This character and significance of love in the nature of the human spirit should be determined, according to Augustine, by the fact that the mystery of the Christian Trinity is, in essence, the mystery of Divine love. God, as Revelation teaches, is love (1 John 4:16), that is, God is love by His very nature. In love itself, as it has been said, the secret of the Divine Trinity is hidden, i.e. in the origin and in the mutual relations of the Divine Persons the infinite love of the Absolute is realized. That is why Augustine says: “vides Trinitatem, si vides chritatem,” that is, “you see the Trinity if you see love.” 722 Commenting on Augustine's detailed and subtle analysis of ultimate love, as an analogy of the Divine Trinity, in the VIIIth book of his special work on the Trinity, the Catholic scholar Th. Gangauf notes: “Augustine in this place seems to say this: if I love, then I am the one who loves, and I love something, and there is love with which I love. Love therefore presupposes the existence of a subject and an object: a subject from which it emanates, and an object to which it directs itself in order to bind them together. And if I love something other than myself, then the same thing happens that happens when I love myself, that is, when I am both subject and object.” 723 Thus, the process of objectification, which lies at the basis of mental life and is revealed to consciousness in acts of voluntary reflection, is revealed with particular strength and clarity, according to Augustine, precisely in love, by which the human spirit is closest to God and through which it can only truly know Him. In view of such a particularly important metaphysical and epistemological meaning of love in the eyes of Blessed. Augustine - and his entire rational-psychological construction of the Trinitarian dogma can be reduced, in essence, to the disclosure and justification of the formula already known to us: “amans, quod amatur et amor.” 724 The human spirit, as the most vivid image of the Divine Trinity, finds in itself, according to Augustine, three sides or three definitions corresponding to the three Persons of the Divine, namely: a) being, b) consciousness and c) love. This Trinitarian analogy of Augustine from the “inner man”, thanks to the remarkable flexibility and mobility of the speculative thought of Bl. Augustine, is often modified by him, as can be seen in some of the examples below. “We already exist,” says Augustine, “and we know that we exist, and we love this being and knowledge of ours. For just as I know that I exist, I also know that I know. since I love these two things, then to these two things that I know, I add this very love, as a third equal in dignity.” 725 In his other extensive treatise - On the Trinity - Augustine expresses, among other things, three undoubted truths, as an analogy of the Divine Trinity. “If,” he says here, “I know that I exist, then I also know that I have this very consciousness; and if the spirit seeks itself in order to know itself and is inflamed by the search, then, therefore, it loves itself. So, we exist, we love our being and the consciousness of this being.” 726 Bl. Augustine, who himself attached great importance to self-deepening and self-knowledge, always tried to guide others to this. 727 This is what he says about this on the pages of his Confession. “I would like those who compete with each other, instead of useless debates of words, to delve deeper into themselves, to pay attention to this - to the triplicity in themselves, namely: to their being, their mind and their will (vellem, ut cogitarent in se ipsis haec tria: esse, nosso, voile). Thus, I exist, I know, and I have free will: I exist, I am the one that I know and that I have free will; and I know that I exist and have a will; and I, the same one, desire both to exist and to know. From these three acts, separating and differing from each other, we have one and the same life, in which these actions are expressed as much, on the one hand, unfused, as much, on the other, and inseparably.” 728 Next. Every consciousness presupposes, firstly, thought as a subject; secondly, the idea, the awareness of this thinking subject about itself and, finally, thirdly, the act of love, inextricably linked with the idea of ​​\u200b\u200boneself, in other words, the act of the will by which thought affirms itself, wants. 729 All these three elements, on the other hand, constitute an inextricable unity in our consciousness. 730 Love, says Augustine, offering a new subtle logical combination, contains and embraces its generation that pleases it (prolem), that is, knowledge (notitia), and connects it with the one that gives birth (gignenti conjungit). And from here we get a certain image (imago) of the Trinity: a) reason itself (mens); b) his knowledge (notitia ejus), which constitutes his generation or product (proles), and his word (verbum), born from himself; and c) love (amor). And these three are one and the essence of a single substance. And the work is no less, because the mind knows it as it is; no less love, because he loves himself as he knows and as he is. 731 Also, says Augustine, varying the above analogy, a certain trinity is sought, that is, reason (mens) and knowledge by which he knows himself (notitia, qua se novit), and love with which he loves himself and his knowledge (amor, quo se notitiamque suam diligit); and these three are equal to each other and of equal essence. 732 The same being and life organically connected with each other represent the following three sides or basic definitions of our human being, corresponding, according to Augustine, to the three Persons of the Divinity: memoria, intelligentia et dilectio sive voluntas. 733 Moreover, in the language of Augustine’s metaphysical psychology, as the Western scientist Kirn notes, memoria means the immediate content of consciousness; intelligentia – a logical act by which it (the content of consciousness) is cognized; voluntas is nothing more than the active relation of both moments to each other. These three moments, concludes the Protestant theologian we quote, in their unity construct self-awareness. 734 – Concerning the above three points of the analogy we are considering “from the inner man”, 6l. Augustine makes a reservation: “this is not three lives, but one life; not three spirits, but one spirit; not three substances, but one substance. I remember that I have memory, reason (understanding) and will; and I understand that I understand, desire and remember, and want to desire, remember and understand; - and I remember all my memory and all my understanding and will together (simul memini)” 735, etc. These are the comparatively highest and most perfect reflections in which, according to Augustine, we can contemplate the Divine Trinity in the godlike spirit of man. This is how the trinitarian structure and trinitarian functions of the human spirit are presented in the metaphysical psychology of the bl. Augustine, which had only propaedeutic and auxiliary meaning for him and ultimately pursued purely theological goals. – The further task of the Trinitarian metaphysics of Blessed. Augustine’s goal was to, standing on the basis of the doctrine of “representationism,” determine the relationship of the Trinitarian analogy obtained in this way to the teaching of Revelation about the Triune God. In an attempt to understand the inner life of the Trinitarian Deity by analogy with the life of the human spirit, similar in its very essence to the Absolute Spirit, it seemed quite possible to transfer the self-consciousness of the human spirit, determined by the process of objectification, as the basis of its nature and life, according to the formula “a minori ad majus” to the Absolute Spirit. At the same time, on the one hand, the data of the epistemological analysis of self-consciousness, obtained through this subjective-epistemological way, when applied to the absolute sphere of being, according to Augustine, acquires objective-metaphysical significance. On the other hand, of course, in God, as an Absolute Being, and this process of self-objectification should be represented as taking place with absolute energy, that is, with the elimination from it of all predicates of finitude that characterize the designated process in the human soul. – Thus, the basic principles of a person’s spiritual and moral life - truth, goodness, beauty and bliss - are innate to the human spirit not in a ready-made form, but in the form of only regulative ideas, or otherwise - in the form of only a goal to which a person must strive and in the relative implementation of which he must place the content of his spiritual life. In God, however, there always and invariably exists the absolute fullness of the content of spiritual life [the ideals of truth, goodness and beauty exist in Him really and are realized from eternity], and therefore truth, goodness and beauty are in God, philosophically speaking, not regulative, but constitutive principles of the Divine Person, Who creates from Himself at every single moment the entire content of His inner life. Therefore, the process of “presenting oneself” or objectifying one’s content takes place in God with absolute energy, completely alien to any features of finitude, limitation, or complexity. The holistic (ontological and moral) fullness of the content of Divine life is in the absolute process of self-consciousness and love and objectifies itself with the absolute energy of self-consciousness and the absolute intensity of will. There is therefore no inequality or division here that constitutes the fundamental disease (aegritudo animi, monstrum) of the human personality, as finite and sinful. There is also no temporal sequence of moments (the process of gradual comprehension of oneself) or the relative predominance of one moment over another. Here, on the contrary, there is absolute harmony and absolute completeness of all three moments of this absolute process (Divine self-objectification), timeless and transcendental. This is the essence of the rational-psychological trinitarian construction of the bl. Augustine, who establishes and clarifies, from the point of view of creature representationism, the analogy of the Infinite and finite Spirit. This is its second task, and it can be said to exhaust the positive meaning of the philosophical and theological speculation of Bl. that we have considered above. Augustine. But the main or final goal of this trinitarian construction, which, as noted, had only methodological and auxiliary significance for Augustine, was, through it and from it, to derive and understand the actual church dogma of the trinity of Persons of the Divine. Applying the established point of view to the church teaching about the Divine Persons of the Holy Trinity and Their relationships, in the Absolute Subject of Divine self-consciousness and love or the real object of human knowledge, reflected in our cognitive ability, Blessed. Augustine assumes the First Hypostasis of the Holy Trinity - the Father, begetting the Son from Himself and giving birth to the Holy Spirit. In the absolute Object of Divine consciousness and love (the Word of God) or in the very act of human knowledge, more or less in agreement with the general church concept of the Gospel Logos, Augustine sees the Second Person of the Holy Trinity - the Son of God, pre-eternally born from the being of God the Father. The third analogical moment of his trinitarian formula is will or love, in which the first two are united with each other and in which the very essence of the trinitarian process is expressed, the bl. Augustine with the Holy Spirit as the Third Hypostasis of the Divine Trinity. “Principaliter”, that is, initially or primarily emanating from the Father, the Holy Spirit, from the point of view of the rational-psychological trinitarian construction of our Western bishop-philosopher, must at the same time emanate from the Son, the basis of which is the substantial unity of the Son with the Father, the timeless nature of the Trinitarian process, excluding any chronological sequence of moments and, finally, the mediating position in this process of the Holy Spirit as a mutual connection or the love of the Father and the Son. 736 In indicating the first two points of the psychological analogy discussed above, Bl. Augustine "was not entirely original." On the contrary, already Philo and Plotinus, as well as (albeit, mutatis mutandis) Augustine’s Christian predecessors in the literary field, used this analogy in elucidating the inner life of the Divine per analogiam with the self-consciousness of man. “But bl. Augustine had no predecessors in indicating the third moment of knowledge, corresponding to the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit.” 737 None of them, not excluding the Christian thinkers who preceded Augustine, who theologically elucidated the meaning of the Holy Spirit in the inner life of the Divine by analogy with human self-consciousness, “independently succeeded in discovering the third element in self-consciousness. Therefore, they did not have a psychological analogy for the Holy Spirit. Augustine filled this gap." 738 Having deepened the analysis of the cognitive process in all its forms and, thus, having the opportunity to draw an analogy for all moments of the cognitive act, bl. Augustine, in the words of his newest domestic researcher, who analyzes in detail and subtly the Augustinian psychology of cognition, “tried to discover an element in the processes of cognition that would serve as the principle of connecting the knowable and the knower, the object of cognition with the ability of cognition, and found it in the activity of the will, directing the ability of cognition to the object of cognition and connecting them with each other.” 739 – In what has been said lies the indisputable priority and undoubted merit of Bl. Augustine in the history of Christian theological thought. On the other hand, a very significant - from a church-dogmatic point of view - drawback 740 of the Trinitarian analogy discussed above. Augustine “from the inner man” is that when applied consistently, without any restrictions or reservations, to theological purposes, it can incline our thought towards the “Filioque”. Carrying out the clarification of the church dogma of the Trinity with all straightforwardness and on all its sides, this psychological analogy of Bl. Augustine postulates the procession of the Holy Spirit not only from God the Father, but also from God the Son, since love or will, which symbolizes the Holy Spirit in this analogy, connecting or uniting self-consciousness and thinking or lover and beloved, corresponding in the present case to the Father and the Son, must, in view of this, be sent from both, i.e., proceed together from the Father and from the Son. The noted defect of this analogy quite transparently and persistently manifests itself already in Augustine himself, 741 considering the dogma of the Holy Trinity as a subject of philosophical speculation. With all the obviousness and straightforwardness, this filioquistic view is blessed. Augustine is carried out in the writings of representatives of later Western theology, which, as is known, was strongly influenced by our famous Ipponian thinker and his Trinitarian views. 742 We have now become acquainted with the analogies of Bl. Augustine, with the help of which he tried to rationally construct the church dogma of the Holy Trinity, this most mysterious and incomprehensible object of the Christian faith. We have seen how numerous and varied these analogies are. At the same time, we also could not help but notice that with all their multiplicity and with all their diversity, they are united by one common idea and, representing a harmonious and completely completed development of this underlying idea, are directed towards one specific goal. They embrace all spheres of sensory-spiritual existence, ascending gradually and consistently from the consideration of objects and phenomena of the lower man and nature external to him and ending with the highest and most perfect form of earthly existence - the rational, god-like spirit of man, taken in his pure, detached from everything external and extraneous being. – Such widespread use by Augustine of these Trinitarian analogies and the apparently important significance that they had both for Augustine himself in the implementation of his attempt, and for the further history of Trinitarian dogma in the West, which was strongly influenced by Augustine and Augustinianism, gives reason to ask, what significance do analogies have in the matter of our understanding the truths of faith? Does the analogical method of proof used by the fathers and teachers of the church and, in particular, such a famous theologian and scientist as Bl. seems to us, have any significance at all for the theologian and theological science? Augustine? Does this method of knowledge of God correspond to the essence of the matter itself, that is, can any evidentiary or real-objective meaning be attributed to it? 743 It goes without saying that the answer to the question posed must be given in the affirmative, since it is fully justified by the very essence of the matter. In the matter of our knowledge of God, or the revelation of the positive content of our inherent idea of ​​God, as we know, only one positive method is available and possible for us (if we do not mean the negative, consisting in the mere denial of what is not in God), this is the method of knowledge through the analogy of our spirit, or the analogical method. “We can only know something positive about God,” says the Most Reverend Sylvester, “that, guided by the idea of ​​the Divine inherent in us, we can consider and recognize its image in our own spirit. Without this, we, despite the fact that much has been communicated to us by Revelation itself, could not know anything definite about it, because we would not be able to understand and comprehend anything from what is revealed to us.” 744 In fact, if we did not have our own mind or will or heart, then we would not understand anything of what Divine Revelation tells us about the mind of the Supreme Being or His will or feeling. This real-objective significance of analogies in the matter of our knowledge of God has a deep basis in the view, consistent with Revelation, that man is the image and likeness of God, and, as such, is capable of reflecting in himself the properties of his Divine Prototype. Consequently, as the image of God, imprinting in the nature and life of his spirit the features of being and life of the Divine, man can, by analogy with his spirit, form a concept and idea of ​​his Divine Prototype. 745 By analogy with our spirit, which bears the imprint of the image of God, we can form the concept of the Highest Spirit; By finding a certain trinity, which clearly demonstrates itself in the powers of our spirit and in the forms of its existence, one can obtain a somewhat definite and clear idea of ​​the Trinity itself. “But if, by the analogy of our spirit, imprinted with the image of God, we can judge and conclude about the Highest Spirit of God, this does not at all mean that our knowledge in this case is completely equal to its highest object of knowledge.” 746 This follows from the fact that the human spirit is not of the same being or nature with God, but is only an image, although a real and essential image, and even the most perfect of all earthly images, but still an image, and not one being with Him. Therefore, his Divine Prototype is incomparably and even infinitely higher and more perfect than how it is reflected in our personal spirit and than how we see and observe it. What has been said determines both the nature and measure of our knowledge of the Divine Trinity, and together the true value of all earthly analogies of the Divine Trinity. We can contemplate the Divine Trinity partially and approximately only in our God-like spirit, in which we notice a kind of triplicity in its three powers and three ways of expressing its personal existence. And this inner contemplation of ours in our spirit of the Divine Trinity is a necessary condition for our knowledge and our understanding of the revealed teaching about it, which without this condition would have to remain completely outside of any understanding and representation on our part, as standing outside and above our reason and experience. “But if we,” says Rev. Sylvester, - by the image of the Divine Trinity inherent in us, we can partly judge the Prototype itself, this does not mean at all that we, having established ourselves on this basis, could rise to the knowledge of the Triune God in Himself - it does not even mean that we ourselves could achieve any kind of knowledge about this if nothing was revealed to us in advance. 747 Noting in our spirit the features of His Triune Prototype reflected on it and from them concluding to the Divine Trinity, we contemplate Her here on earth, in the human spirit, as a weak and dark shadow falling on it from Her Divine Face, partially and fortune-telling, or, as if through a dark glass (1 Cor. 13:12). Since there is and cannot be a complete correspondence between the image of the Trinity in the human spirit and Her Divine Prototype, and they are incomparably, even infinitely different from each other, then, of course, our knowledge of the Divine Trinity, as finite and relative, is far from exhausting the highest and infinite subject of our knowledge. Between one and the other there must remain the same distance and such a difference as can exist between the Creator and the creature, between the Infinite and the finite, between heaven and earth, and, due to the power of this, human knowledge, as finite, about this object, as the Infinite, can relate to the latter only as a weak and dark shadow. Therefore, the main organ of perception of the truth about the Divine Trinity, in the conditions of earthly reality, is not knowledge itself, but faith, which, once in blissful communion with God in the other life, resolves into knowledge, “into seeing face to face” (1 Cor. 13:12). 748 All these thoughts, in agreement with the very essence of the matter, contained in Divine Revelation and confirmed by patristic teaching, are at the same time views and bl. Augustine, often and variously expressed by him in many places of his treatise “On the Trinity” and his other works that we are studying. And, according to bl. Augustine, - as we have already seen, - all beings, even the lowest of man, by the very fact that they constitute creation, and with this the Revelation of God, bear on themselves some traces of the Trinity. 749 This, according to Augustine, gives a person the opportunity to contemplate something of what is in itself invisible. 750 Man, exalted above all earthly creatures, not only has a resemblance to the Divine (aliquo modo similis Deo), but is also His image (imago). 751 Therefore, he carries within himself a more complete and brighter reflection of the Divine Trinity. Bl. is dedicated to the disclosure of the doctrine of the analogical way of knowing the Holy Trinity. Augustine, as we know, the last seven books (IX–XV) of his extensive work “De Trinitate Dei”. Concerns bliss. Augustine addresses this issue in his other writings. We have already seen in what Augustine sees this reflection and how he explains it from his various analogies, drawn by Augustine from the external man 752 and the internal man. 753 But searching and finding with care and wit the analogy of the Infinite Trinity in the finite human spirit, Augustine never loses sight of the fact that this is only an analogy and that between the human trinity and the Divine Trinity, despite some similarity (aliquo modo similis), there still remains a great difference (magna distantia). 754 The human spirit is only an image of the Divine nature, and is not homogeneous with God in its essence. There is nothing and cannot be conceived higher and more perfect than this infinite nature. 755 This image, as Augustine notes about the ternarium in the spirit of man, although the highest and most excellent of all, 756 is far from equal to His Prototype (impar imago). 757 This is because, explains Augustine, that the other is the Divine Trinity in Itself (re ipsa), and the other is Her image in another thing, in another nature (aliud imago Trinitatis in re alia). 758 And if so, then it is impossible to transfer everything noticeable in the created human spirit entirely to the Divine Trinity, not allowing in Her anything other than what is in our spirit. Because of this, our spirit is far from completely able to contain the Divine Trinity: both our limited knowledge and our poor language, therefore, are absolutely powerless to embrace or understand Her with our thoughts and express or express Her in our words. 759 This confession of the powerlessness of the human mind to comprehend the nature and mode of existence of the Divine Trinity resulted from Augustine in his following animated exclamation: “what strength and power of reason, what liveliness of mind and insightfulness of consideration will show us... how the Trinity exists! 760 What She is is indescribable; even the language of angels, much less human, cannot explain it!” 761 In particular, the difference between the Divine Trinity and the trinity existing in the human spirit comes down, according to the blessed one. Augustine, on to the next one. Although man is created in the image of God and in the process of self-awareness most clearly reveals this trinity in himself; but this process of self-consciousness takes place in him and exists for him only in one of the constituent parts of his complex mental organization, precisely in his soul and even in it receives its primary revelation only in its internal being taken in itself (ad se), according to which the soul, rising above its other lower forces, appears as a rational spirit (mens). Meanwhile, man himself, considered in the entire volume and content of his being, exists as an aggregate of material nature and spirit, as a synthesis of body and soul. Then, the human triplicity, existing only in man, is something belonging to or relating to man, and not man himself (an Sich). 762 On the contrary, about God, as absolute, as unchangeable or the simplest Being, it cannot be said that something belongs to His nature that is not at the same time His Trinity Itself, or that His Trinity is only in God, and is not at the same time God Himself. About God, according to the consciousness and recognition of Bl. Augustine, one must think and say that He “wholly (totus) is His Trinity Himself and His Trinity is entirely (totaliter) Himself, and the Three Persons, completely consubstantial, constitute the One Absolute Being, the essence of the One God.” 763 “So,” says Augustine, “in man we find trinity, that is, the rational spirit (mens), and knowledge (notitia), with which he knows himself, and love (amor), with which he loves himself and his knowledge. But these three exist and manifest themselves in man in such a way that they do not constitute man himself; they only belong to man as properties or qualities, but are not man himself in his substance. 764 The same Supreme Trinity, the image of which is man, wholly and wholly (tota) is nothing other than God and everything taken as a whole is nothing other than the Trinity. And nothing relates to the nature of God that would not also relate to this Trinity: and the three Persons are of the same essence, but not in the same way as every person, with the trinity of powers, is one person.” 765 In the same way, the other three definitions or three aspects of the spirit, given by Augustine as the main trinitarian analogy, for example, memory or consciousness (memoria), reason or thinking (intelligentia) and love or will (dilectio, amor, caritas, voluntas), although they belong to one person, are in him, but are not one with this person. If we take, Augustine continues, memoria, intelligentia, dilectio, as the trinity of the created spirit, then, with all the brightness of the testimony of the Trinity of this image, the latter is not equal to its Prototype, because each of the mentioned three moments of the image does not constitute in itself (ad se) a personality, but only a force, the force of the subject, a force that the subject, as a personality, has, but which is not the personality itself. On the contrary, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are not in God, but are God Himself. In the same way, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are not in one person, but they are persons, and as three persons, they exist in an inseparable unity, incomparably closer and inseparable than the trinity of the above-mentioned powers of the human spirit in itself. 766 So, for example, memory, reason and love are different from each other and separated from each other: memory, for example, is something other than reason, and memory and reason are other than love, 767 and besides, they all have meaning no more than certain moments in the life of our spirit. In the simplest and highest nature of God, although there is One God, however, in Him there are three independent and separate Persons 768 and in each Person all these three moments are concentrated together: memory, reason and love. 769 Therefore, one cannot think that the Father, for example, knows Himself only through the Son and loves only through the Holy Spirit, etc. Each of the Divine Hypostases, possessing in its entirety all three of these powers, remembers (cognizes), thinks (cognizes) and wills or loves in itself and through itself. Further, in the trinity of the human spirit, one force can prevail over another or others, the other two together can surpass any third in the liveliness and intensity of their manifestation. On the contrary, between the individual Divine Hypostases in Their relation to each other and in the relation of any one of Them to two others, as well as two together to one third, there is an unchanging and indissoluble unity, equality and harmony. 770 These three definitions we indicate or three forms of manifestation of the finite spirit: memory, reason and love, according to the thought of Bl. Augustine, differ from each other in another respect. Memory represents only a store or treasury of immediate knowledge, and what it contains only in the mind receives clear awareness and qualitative certainty, and love is already a consequence or fruit of knowledge, linking into one or leading to unity memory and reason. In the Divine Trinity, the Father not only already knows everything that the Son knows and how, but also the Son, in whom the Father fully reveals himself, as in His inner word, knows because knowledge, like everything else, does not come from Himself, but from the Father. In the same way, although love is primarily assimilated by the Holy Spirit, love is an inseparable property of the Father and the Son together, and, moreover, the Spirit Himself has it from where it comes from. 771 As the Catholic Church teaches us to believe, each of the three Divine Persons contains within Himself the entire Divine being and possesses it entirely. As a Person, each of Them individually, from Himself knowing Himself and others, from Himself knowing and loving Himself and others, is in se the True God, and all together - only one wisdom, one love, One God 772 (“et simul omnes non tres, sed una sapientia, una charitas..."). So infinitely great, according to the deep consciousness and repeated recognition of the blessedness. Augustine, the distance between the finite spirit of man and the Absolute Spirit and between the trinity, which is imprinted in the powers and manifestations of the human spirit, and that Trinity, which is God Himself! And due to the strength of this, the finite and, moreover, still darkened by sin human mind cannot understand and express in its word the unsearchable depth of the mystery of the Divine Trinity. With this confession of the powerlessness of the natural human mind to independently construct the Christian dogma of the Trinity of Divine Persons, the blessed one ends. Augustine traversed the rational-psychological path of Trinitarian research. This is the frank confession of Bl. Augustine's weakness of human thought and speech in the matter of understanding and defining the Divine Trinity, so often, so sincerely and so expressively repeated by him, is extremely important for the correct understanding and proper assessment of his positive church-dogmatic teaching about the Holy. Trinity, and only in its light is such understanding and appreciation possible. IV. Speculative teaching of Blessed Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, about the Holy Trinity. (The process of self-objectification of the Divine Person or the pre-eternal birth of God the Son from the being of God the Father) 773 The path of trinitarian analogies traversed by Augustine and their gradual gradation from the lowest material sphere of existence to the very essence of the human spirit, in the most hidden depths of which he discovers the most perfect analogy of the Divine Spirit, are already known to us from the previous pages of our work. – The task of Augustine’s Trinitarian construction in its first half was thus completed: it now remained to apply the data of the ontological and psychological analysis of the Trinitarian structure of finite objects and their Trinitarian functions to the disclosure and clarification of the particular content of the church dogma about the Holy Trinity. This is what Augustine is doing now. From “ternarium”, as a finite image, Augustine’s theological thought now ascends to “Trinitas”, as its infinite Prototype. We now move on to an exposition of this special part of his Trinitarian attempt. Augustine begins the exposition and disclosure of the greatest mystery of the Divine Trinity, unknown to the created mind, as, however, it is understandable from his main point of view, with a confession of the powerlessness of the human mind (volumus nec valemus) to comprehend the Highest Trinity, which is God himself. 774 We already know how blessed. Augustine, with the help of a psychological analogy, establishes the following undoubted position for him: God, as a self-conscious, personal being, must be threefold (Trinitas), since never and in no case can the absolute Spirit lack what the spirit of a person already makes a spirit, namely, self-consciousness, self-knowledge and love. 776 As absolute reason, God must know himself (self-awareness) and in this knowledge of himself (self-awareness) He must be both subject and object at the same time. As a subject, He must, in this self-contemplation (self-awareness), have himself before himself as his object, that is, objectify himself. Further, it is also completely impossible that in His knowledge of Himself (self-consciousness) He would contemplate Himself as different in comparison with what He really is, or that He in His self-contemplation would contemplate Himself in any other way in comparison with what He is as a real subject. To think about the absolute Being in this way means to introduce limitation and deficiency into the concept of Him. On the contrary, in Divine self-contemplation (self-consciousness) the being of God is reflected with absolute completeness and perfection: and there is not and cannot be a shadow of any error or insufficiency in God, Who, according to Augustine, is Absolute Truth or Truth in itself. Therefore, God “represents” or objectifies himself with the absolute energy of self-consciousness and will, as the highest reality of being and the absolute energy of life. As precisely this fullness of being and life, He represents or objectifies Himself with absolute perfection (adequately), so that as His own object He is completely equal to Himself as a subject. The difference between the limited, created and limitless, Divine process of self-objectification can be sought and found only in the fact that the Absolute Spirit, as a subject, in Itself is at the same time a real and absolute object of Itself, moreover, having substantial existence. Further, as a subject, He stands to Himself as an object, and back, as an object, to Himself as a subject, in a really necessary relation (relatio) and, by the force of this, contains within itself the principle or moment of some real difference. But in this exclusive process of objectification, God not only contemplates (consciously) himself as and in the manner in which and how He exists, and contains within Himself such an image which is absolutely necessarily identical with Himself, but, as an infinite Spirit, in this self-contemplation (self-consciousness) He at the same time, in an incomprehensible way, speaks or pronounces Himself in all the boundless fullness of His being, as a result of which, as an object, He is also an image (imago). yours and your word (verbum). This word (verbum) of Him, as the realized or objectified fullness of the Divine content, is His generation (proles), which is completely identical with Him, the Parent. Thus, considered from the point of view of self-objectification (“objectification of the subject”), the divine Being, as a subject, reveals itself under the category of the Father, and as an object of itself - in the image of the Son, and by virtue of His eternal and unchangeable equality with Himself or absolute self-identity 777 there must always be only one and always the same and this His image or His Word, or (expressed in church-theological language) His Son, the only and only begotten (Ejus Filius, unicus et unigenitus). On the basis that the divine Being, as an absolute being, cannot be accessible to any change, and the act of His self-objectification should be considered not as finite (temporary), but as absolute, as eternally occurring and equally eternally real: God, as the absolute Spirit, always recognizes Himself as a subject, always has Himself in Himself as its object. And by the power of this, God the Father never existed without his image or Word, without his only begotten Son, but, eternally conscious of Himself, is an eternally “representing” or objectifying person (the Eternal Self-Conscious Spirit). But from the fact that the process of His self-objectification is absolute in nature, it follows further that the internal image of God in Him does not exist in the same way as the mental image of the finite spirit in this latter. As a non-self-existent, finite spirit, in the process of its objectification, can contemplate itself not in its very substance, but only in the external manifestations of its activity or manifestations of its existence “ad se”, and therefore its image has only formal existence. The image of the Absolute in Himself is not, according to Augustine, only a vision from a vision (visio de visione) and His word in Him is not only a formal concept, only knowledge from knowledge (scientia de scientia), but a being from an essence (essentia de essentia), because God, as a self-existent being, necessarily contemplates Himself in His substance, that is, He always objectifies Himself substantially. Just as all substance is the object of Himself, so His image, in which He objectifies Himself, i.e. His Word, in which He, as it were, encloses and speaks Himself, the Son, is substantially, completely and completely He Himself, “God from God.” And since the object of Divine self-objectification is the same (with the subject) absolute being, the same absolute life, the same absolute reason, etc. etc., taken separately, as something integral and independent in its substantial relation to the subject, then by itself He is also a person; but not in the sense of simple individuality alone or only some subordinate being: with such a concept, a single absolute being - which by its very concept can only be thought of as one and which also, according to the very idea of ​​the Absolute, cannot even be imagined as divisible - we repeat, this single absolute Being in such a case would have to be split into many gods and thereby even destroy It completely. However, as the process of finite human self-consciousness, analogous to the Divine, already shows, the absolute Spirit in its self-objectification has itself as its object not by virtue of any special act of will, since if we were to assume that He, as a subject, could precede Himself as an object, this would mean introducing into the concept of God the beginning of time (limitedness) and making the Father a person before the Son. On the contrary, the above-mentioned act of absolute self-objectification, as simultaneous and joint, is the same beginning or foundation of the personality of the Father as of the personality of the Son. As the principle of personification of the Absolute Triune, as the hypostatizing Deity beginning, this act of Divine self-consciousness, by its nature eternal and exclusive, is blessed by theological consciousness. Augustine himself is immediately hypostasized or personified and from the abstract position of God before Himself in the depths of absolute consciousness is thus transformed into a living Divine hypostasis. But this act in the Divine occurs eternally and in a completely exceptional way, and therefore, the Absolute Spirit, as subject and object, is one absolute Spirit, one absolute being, or otherwise, one God (Unus Deus est). This is the general conclusion obtained if the process of self-objectification inherent in the human spirit and laid down by Augustine as the basis of spiritual life is applied to the Highest Spirit. We already know the basis for such an application: it consists, in the opinion of Bl. Augustine, in the so-called “representationism” of creation, especially the highest creature on earth – the godlike human soul. That through such a view of the finite creation, as the image of the Triune Infinite, the Divine Trinity comes somewhat closer to human knowledge is indisputable, but that on the basis of this it is by no means possible to say that this Highest Trinity can already be understood by man, this is often and expressively confessed by Augustine himself. 778 As we will see below, in his dialectical criticism of Arianism, aimed at defending the church dogma of consubstantiality, Augustine with particular force and detail shows and proves the coexistence (coevitas, coaeternitas, aequalitas temporis) and co-essence (consubstantiality - consubstantialitas, unius substantiae, aequalitas naturae) of the Son with the Father. The essence of Augustine’s anti-Arian polemic mainly comes down to the defense of these two positions (the truth of the co-eternity and consubstantiality of the Son of God with God the Father). This main point of Augustine’s anti-Arian polemic, which he conducts simultaneously on a philosophical basis and therefore is inevitably forced to use philosophical terms, means, first of all and mainly, to substantiate, in the language of Augustine’s sublime philosophical and theological speculation, consubstantiality or co-essentiality (ontological parallelism) and synchronicity or coexistence (chronological parallelism) of the First and Second Beginnings of the Divine Trinity (Father and Son). It goes without saying that synchronicity as applied to God must be understood “mutatis mutandis” and, like everything in God, is of an exclusively absolute nature. In order to present as convincingly and clearly as possible the proof and justification of the trinitarian construction established for the designated church goals, Augustine draws a parallel between the final and absolute process of self-objectification. The conclusions he draws from this comparison boil down to the following. In the process of final self-consciousness, one can state the difference, on the one hand, between knowledge in the sense that it is immediate (has the character of immediacy), and between thinking, on the other hand, since the rational spirit, through thinking or reflection, recognizes its knowledge. The finite spirit (mind) can know something without necessarily making it the subject of its thinking. Thus, the process of his cognition consists of a number of moments, since his self-knowledge is limited, and he knows about others as well as about himself, about his being, life and knowledge, even if he does not always think about himself. But in general, he can produce a word from himself only with the help of thought, thinking something else about another; and therefore a person produces his inner word only in those cases if he makes himself the object of his thinking. Of course, objectively the word already exists in general indefinite knowledge and, at the beginning of its existence, is contemporary with it. But still unformed or having only a potential form, 779 the word in its immediacy still appears very vague and indefinite and, only having a tendency to later put on a form, it strives to accept or realize its form precisely through thinking. If a person’s reflective thought ceases to address his knowledge, then the latter again returns to its primitive state, that is, it again acquires the character of immediacy or general and immediate knowledge, which has only one potential form. Divine self-consciousness has a completely different character. In God, as in simple or “pure” being, there is no change, no change. We cannot at all transfer to Him the concept of our thinking as a mediating, i.e., processually cognizing activity of the mind, since such mediation presupposes something that needs mediation, that must be transferred from an unbalanced state to a static state, from a formless state to a state strictly defined by forms. The knowledge of God is not at first general, indefinite, and only later recognized or realized with the help of thought (mediated by thinking or reflective knowledge), but it is simply existing and, as simply existing, is always realized. Just as the divine Being is being “ad se” (i.e., original being), so His self-consciousness per se is simple and absolute. This absolutely simple consciousness consists in the eternal living relation of being to itself, and in this relation to itself it reveals itself as a subject, precisely as an eternal subject; and since this relation is at the same time an immanent relation (i.e., to Oneself) and, moreover, an eternal relation to Oneself, then it necessarily postulates at the same time its internal object, namely, an eternally conscious and eternally conscious object. Therefore, according to Augustine, there is nothing more obvious, nothing more necessary, than that the Word in which God contemplates and speaks Himself and, as it were, in His own idea, as a subject-object, confronts Himself within Himself, so that this very Word of His is not only potentially eternal (as a human idea or as a human word), but also really eternal. 780 In the same way, this Divine Word is not like in man his idea (concept of himself), which at a certain moment gives way to some other idea and disappears, then again arises in consciousness and seems new, but in God His thought (idea) of Himself exists simply and, as simply existing, exists invariably. 781 Therefore God, as self-existent wisdom, is always the Father, because he was never without his Only Begotten Son, without his Word, without his absolute idea; and God the Son, as an object in the absolute process of Divine self-objectification, is also beginningless, like the Father, and always abides with the Father. 782 This co-eternity with God the Father of God the Son is expressed by God the Father in the following way through the psalmist: “Today I have given birth to Thee,” and the “day” of the Eternal is nothing other than the continuous “today,” which has no “yesterday” behind it, as well as no “tomorrow” before it. 783 For the Divine being, the act of birth is equally eternally present, as eternally occurring, because the process of Divine self-objectification, as simply existing, as it never begins, never ceases. 784 This is the philosophical concept of the Second Principle of the Divine Trinity, developed by Augustine according to the Neoplatonic scheme. This sublime idealistic concept of Neoplatonism gave Augustine all the necessary data for the philosophical substantiation and defense of the church dogma of the consubstantiality of the Son, which was disputed in his time mainly by the Arians. Augustine, as we shall see, made extensive use of it for ecclesiastical purposes, and his philosophical criticism of Arian dogmatics rests on this sublime speculation of Neoplatonism. – A subtle dialectical analysis of the internal inconsistency of the Arian doctrine and its hopeless contradictions is carried out by Augustine also according to this idealistic philosophical scheme from the point of view of the absolute process of divine self-objectification. Augustine applies the same scale to the measurement of church-dogmatic illegality and other non-church (anti-trinitarian) forms of consciousness (Sabellianism), and equally applies it in the case when the Orthodox, for their zealous defense of consubstantiality, were accused by the Arians of Sabellianism. In essence, this rational-psychological scheme can serve in the hands of any Orthodox theologian as an excellent philosophical criterion that determines the lies of many later distortions of the church teaching about the Holy Trinity by various kinds of philosophical rationalistic and mystical systems and views, often only resurrecting the heresies of Sabellianism, Arianism, etc., long condemned by the church. The Arians denied the co-eternity of the Son to the Father and, based on the external self-revelation of God, i.e., creation, referred to natural birth in support of their thought, where the one who gives birth (parent) must already exist before the one born (child), i.e., the father must precede the Son in time. By analogy with the world of creatures, 785 the Arians admitted the idea that the Son, by whom, according to the saying of Holy Scripture, everything was created, although a creature, nevertheless must exist before all time. 786 But to this Augustine rightly objects to them that by the proposition just given they themselves assume the co-eternity of the Son with the Father. Since all time occurred only together with creation, then before creation there was no time. Creation presupposes time, but at the same time time presupposes creation. Therefore, time is posited by creation itself: outside of the created, time is nothing. 787 Thus, in God between the Father and the Son no “before” (prius) and no “after” (posterius) can be allowed, since otherwise such an assumption would presuppose the existence of time before time, in clear contradiction with the position that all time received its beginning only with creation. 788 Against the comparison of God the Father and God the Son with the human father and son, Augustine quite rightly and thoughtfully objects: any such comparison in its very basis should be recognized as not achieving the goal, because the object compared with the one on which it is supposed to shed light (that is, which it is supposed to explain by itself) and precisely at the point that should actually clarify the matter does not at all contain the required similarity. “You want to prove,” Augustine addresses the Arians, “that God, as the eternal Father, produced (gave birth to) the temporal, i.e. limited by the condition of time, the Son, and borrow to confirm your thought an example from the sphere of created existence, where a father living in the conditions of time produces (gives birth to) the same Son, subject to the law of time. But that the father, limited by the limits of time, gives birth to the same son, conditioned by time, or that between the earthly father and son in relation to their existence there is a temporal difference (i.e., chronological sequence), this is clear, and from here it necessarily follows that created being, by its very nature and in the entire direction of its life, develops only in time and only in parallel to time, therefore the earthly father himself is also subject to limitation by time, i.e., received the beginning of his existence, and that he, as himself limited condition of time, for its part produces (gives birth) only the temporary - all this is quite natural. But you want,” continues the blessed one. Augustine, - through comparison with created being, prove that God, as the eternal Father, gave birth to (produced) a Son subject to the law of time, and for this you must indicate in the sphere of created being the eternal father, who, as eternal, would have given birth to (produced) a son who is temporal in nature. But show me the eternal father among created beings, and then I, for my part, will also prove to you; the eternity of his son. In the realm of creatures, there is not a single one born who could be coeternal with his parent, because among the creatures subordinate to God there is not a single parent who is eternal. The only thing in the kingdom of created being, in which, as in an image, one can seek to understand the eternal birth (origin) of God the Son from the being of God the Father, this is precisely co-eternity (“coaevitas” = modernity, chronological parallelism) between the parent (giving birth) and his offspring (born). Coevitas (coaevitas) leads in this case to the conclusion that if the parent must be eternal, then, of course, the one born by Him must also be eternal. 789 The same is true in the Divine sphere. You (sc. ariani), says Augustine, affirm the antecedent (i.e., the previous premise - the eternity of the Father) in application to God, but, having admitted the antecedent (concesso antecedente), it is necessary to logically assume the subsequent (concedendum est et consequens), namely, the co-eternity of the Son. In such images or comparisons, Augustine continues further, precisely in his word to the people, there is essentially no shortage in the created realm. So, for example, we must think about light: Holy Scripture itself points to this image when it calls God the Son the radiance of God the Father. At the very moment when the earthly light receives the beginning of its existence, it gives birth to its brilliance (radiance), and between it, as the producer-parent, and the brilliance-radiance, as its product-generation, there is no “before” (prius, antecedens) and no “after” (posterius, sequens). Show me (oh, ariane!), exclaims Augustine, 790, light without radiance, and then I, too, will believe you that the eternal Father, like the eternal Light, at some moment could be without the Son; but since you cannot deny before me the contemporaneity (coaevitas) of an earthly work to its producer, then you, in view of the eternity of divine existence, believe in the coeternity of God the Son with God the Father. Another biblical name for the Son of God is His definition as Imago Dei Patris. As the image of God, the Son is co-eternal with God the Father. In the area of ​​created being, it is also possible to point out some analogy to the above. This analogy clearly illustrates to us how an object, from the very moment of its origin, produces before itself its own image, and if the object itself were eternal, then this image of it would also be coeternal with it. This is the fact pointed out by Augustine. When a person looks at himself in a mirror, then simultaneously with his looking, the image of the beholder appears in the mirror, 791 but this image or mirror image does not coincide at the beginning of being with its prototype: it arises only with the person’s looking in the mirror, while the very being “ad se” of the looking subject, independently of all this, exists before and after the said looking. At the lowest level of existence, a similar analogy is presented to us by a water plant, inseparable from its reflection. This analogy consists in the simultaneous coexistence of this plant and its image in the smooth surface of the water. With the appearance of this plant, its image reflected in the water also appears simultaneously, so that if the plant itself did not exist, then there would be no image of it coexisting simultaneously with it. - God, as being, is eternal, and the image in which He contemplates Himself and has Himself as His image is inseparable from Him, because He, as absolute reason, is His own image - “a mirror without blemish” (speculum sine macula), as Holy Scripture says - and therefore His image is co-eternal with Him, the Eternal. An objection can be made here, and Augustine himself immediately formulates it as follows. These two above images, if applied to God, result in nothing more than a representation of the co-eternity alone, but not the consubstantiality (co-essence) of God the Son (to the Father). 792 The reflection of a plant in the mirror surface of water is, however, a fairly accurate image, but not the plant itself, not its very substance; and the image of the brilliance (radiance) of fire is, however, a close image of the manifestation of the substance of fire, but still not fire itself; on the contrary, revealed faith teaches us about substantiality, about the perfect consubstantiality of God the Son with God the Father. Of course, Augustine agrees, these images have the above-mentioned drawback (id est, non habent omnimodam aequalitatem), but in the created realm there is not a single being at all that would adequately represent or even could only represent an adequate image of the Creator. 793 You, Arians, indicate the image of the origin of the Son of God in the human father and son, and this image represents a real similarity in the sense that from it a natural equality (aequalitas naturae) is revealed between the Father and the Son; but its disadvantage is that it does not express the idea of ​​co-eternity (coaeternitas) of the Father to the Son. Thus, we are dealing with a lack both here and there, as well as vice versa: in both the first and second cases there are real features of close resemblance. Just as in the last image the real correspondence is contained in identity by nature, so in the first image the identical elements consist of coeternity (the element of identity expresses coeternity). Thus, in order to complete this image, it is necessary to combine together what exactly each of these images better reflects its prototype (jungamus ambo genera, sc. similitudinum). 794 In this way it will be possible to eliminate to some extent the shortcomings encountered in both cases, since in God, the most perfect Being, there is not and cannot be even a shadow of any kind of lack. Such a union of them will be all the more natural and legitimate because creatures, due to their finitude, have their goodness and the measure of their perfection only separately and partially, and moreover, they received them only from Their Creator. Therefore, in the Creator Himself this very goodness and perfection must already exist before that and exist not in a finite form, but in that infinitely high degree to which the Creator rises above His creation. Contemporaneity with each other and mutual identity by nature exist between the parent and the born in the sphere of finite beings only separately from each other, but taken, on the contrary, in their totality allow us to recognize in the Son of God His co-eternity and co-substantiality or co-naturality with God the Father. Therefore, this co-substantiality or co-naturality (unity in essence) should not be understood as you (sc. ariani) understand it, namely in the sense of separation: “ex partibus singulis et rebus singulis,” 795 just as in the realm of creatures father and son exist separately as two ad se special people from each other (homo et homo; duo homines sunt), but this substantial identity must be understood in the sense unity (totum ergo ibi simul), by virtue of which God the Father and God the Son are one (ibi Pater et Filius - Unus Deus), because both God the Father and God the Son are one absolute Being in its absolute relation to Himself (relatio ad se ipsum) as subject and object. 796 Thus, this sublime metaphysical concept of the Trinitarian dogma, establishing coordination and eliminating the subordination of the Trinity Persons, served for Augustine as an excellent scheme or basis for constructing and clarifying the church teaching about the complete equality of the Son with the Father. It quite clearly reveals that the objectification by the Father (subject) of the “Logos” (the absolute object of Divine consciousness), as reality “other” from the Father, is not an internal division of Their essence (Arianism), but only the isolation and difference of Their mutual relations (relatio, relative ad invicem). It was shown above how Augustine revealed the natural coeternity of God the Son with God the Father. The task of the following lines is to present, based on the previous one, the speculative proof proposed by Augustine of the cosubstantiality or co-essentiality (consubstantialitas) of the Son of God to God the Father. For this purpose, Augustine again draws on the analogy of the human spirit in the process of its self-objectification. The finite spirit, as was said above, produces (gives birth) in itself in the process of its self-objectification its internal image, which, if its knowledge is perfect, is perfect and equal to it, the producing one. Since now in God, as the absolute Spirit, as the most perfect Being, the perfection of knowledge should already be assumed a priori: then in divine self-objectification the image that God produces (gives birth) in Himself and from Himself and in which He objectifies Himself cannot at all be in any respect (ipsa similitudo nullo modo ex aliqua parte potest esse dissimilis) 797 dissimilar To Him, the Producer (Giver). After all, something that has a resemblance to something else only through participation in this latter, along with the similarity with it, also has features of difference, because it, as soon as it participates in something, in itself represents something different in comparison with that of which it is a participant. In divine self-objectification, the object (the Son) is not, like man, “creatura ad imaginem”, but “ipse imago” (i.e. not a creation in the image, but the image itself), and therefore He is the divine personality, taken in the fullness of its absolute content and considered in this exclusive process of absolute objectification. Consequently, the object of divine self-objectification is an absolutely complete similarity to His absolute subject: he is, in Augustine’s expression, “ipsa similitudo.” 798 Further, just as the finite spirit, in its self-objectification with its thought, embraces the whole of itself from the side of its content or gives birth to its word from itself, so that it, both with the help of its self-contemplation in its image, and by the power of its thinking in its inner word, objectively confronts itself, and it, if its thought is perfect, thinks of itself neither more nor less, but entirely, with what it is, so, by analogy with this, in God, the absolute and most perfect Spirit, 799 His own inner content or thought about Himself, - otherwise the Word - in which He, in the process of His objectification, expresses Himself in all the infinite fullness of His being and in which within Himself eternally opposes Himself to Himself, can exist only in an absolutely perfect form. Thus, the above process of Divine self-objectification, as Divine, is carried out with absolute energy and has the predicate of absolute immutability. 800 But here again there must be noted in the act of divine self-objectification a moment of very significant difference in comparison with a similar process in the finite spirit of man. This difference, however, is easily explained by the very nature of the objects being compared. Namely, the image that the finite spirit within itself gives birth to from itself, even in the case when it is completely equal to it, the giver, still has only a formal existence, is nothing more than a representation from a representation (visio de visione), that is, a representation arising from inner vision or contemplation. The word, as a product of the rational spirit of man, even if it expresses itself completely in this word, is still only a formal concept, knowledge from knowledge (scientia de scientia), but not a being from a being (essentia de essentia). 801 Meanwhile, when we are talking about the Divine image in which God objectifies Himself, that is, about the Word in which God speaks Himself and, self-conscious, contrasts Himself within Himself with Himself, then it is substantial existence that is affirmed here. The reason why our image or our word, born from ourselves, has only formal existence is that in us being is not at the same time thinking, and thinking is not identical with being. 802 The Being of God, due to His absoluteness, as we already know, is absolutely simple and, in view of His absolute simplicity, for Him it means nothing else to be and nothing else to think, but thought and being with Him are one and the same. 803 Therefore, divine self-objectification is substantial in nature. God in His inner content, which He has or produces exclusively from Himself (in His idea, born from within Himself) or, in other words, in His Word, objectifies Himself necessarily substantially, 804 - namely, He represents Himself in it as a substance completely identical to Himself, because the indicated act is an act of self-objectification (objectification of the Divine “I”), i.e., an act in which He contemplates, He represents Himself, and not anything else, and this idea of His or this Word of His is the idea of Himself, His own Word. 805 The act of divine self-objectification is an internal (immanent) act of spiritual birth. It is already known, as a law of nature, put into created existence by God Himself, the Creator of all things, that those beings who give birth give birth to their own kind. 806 Therefore, the very concept of born being directly denies in relation to God the Son or God, as an object in the process of His self-objectification, any other nature, thereby affirming in this case the unconditional substantial identity (consubstantiality) of the Begetter with the Begotten. 807 In his dispute with the Arians, Augustine develops and proves this idea with strictly logical consistency. 808 Only all suffering, 809 as this, however, is self-evident, excludes Augustine from the act of divine self-objectification. Without the assumption of this consubstantiality, God the Son would not be a Son in the proper sense of the word, would not be a Son by nature (natura), but a Son in an improper sense, by grace (gratia), through adoption (adoptio), just as we humans are called the sons of God. 810 And because of this, He would be a creature, if not in the likeness of other creatures, then still a creature created from nothing (si creatura est, condita et facta est). 811 But that He is the Son in the proper sense and cannot at all be a creature follows from the fact that, as He Himself wrote, “all things were, and without Him nothing came into being” (John 1:3). Namely, if the Son were a creature, then He Himself would be contained in the latter, and therefore He would be both existing and simultaneously non-existent, or, in other words, He would have received being earlier and at the same time later than Himself: He would have been previously existing in order to create, and at the same time He would have been a later being in order that, as a non-existent at first, He would come to existence by itself, which constitutes absurdity and contains an internal contradiction, just as it stands in clear contradiction with the Gospel. 812 The Arians agreed to admit that the Son of God had existence before the creation of the world, but they admitted the idea that this created world received the beginning of its existence through Him, only as through a mediating being (Mediator). 813 This, from their point of view, obliged them to admit that the Son Himself does not have its being from the substance of the world, because, as it is said, He received the beginning of its existence from God before the creation of the world. By this they believed that they were able to prevent or deflect the accusation that they imagined their son to be a creature, and if a creature, then eo ipso, and created from nothing (ex nihilo). True, they still did not refuse to admit that the Son was from God, but since they denied His identity by nature with the Father, they, of course, placed Him directly and necessarily on an equal footing with creation and, if on a par with creation, then, therefore, on a par with those created from nothing, because God alone is a self-existent Being, and every other being outside of Him does not exist independently, but is only a creation, created by Him as absolute power, wisdom and goodness, and limited in all respects. The Son, - Augustine objects to the Arians, 814 - must be conceived as originating from the essence of the Father, not as if He is the divine being itself, and not as if He represents only the divine idea, in which God dwells otherwise than in Himself. In other words, the Son should not be conceivable as a being that is different from the Father in essence (inexistent with Him), and which, becoming a substance with the help of the absolute creative power of God the Father, thereby receives the beginning of its being or existence. In the first case, He is, as the divine being itself, the Son in the proper sense; in the latter, he would have already appeared as a creature. Since you (sc. ariani), 815 – addressed to bl. Augustine to his dogmatic opponents - now you reject the co-essence (one-in-existence) of Him with the Father, then, obviously, you deny the first (i.e., the position that the Son is a Divine being) and are inclined to the latter (i.e., the Son is a creature). But since you yourself do not recognize the latter, that is, that the Son was created from nothing, then, therefore, recognize the first (that is, that the Son must be co-essential with the Father or consubstantial with the Father). Since the Arians did not recognize the Son as Son by nature, then, of course, they had to deny His equality with the Father and - because of His origin from the Father - they had to consider Him less than the Father. But even in the case when some of the Arians, prompted by the above alternative, agreed that the Son must be both co-eternal with God the Father and co-essential with Him, they still introduced in God, in contradiction to the absolute identity of His being, the finite relationship that exists between earthly father and son, and from here they concluded that God the Father, as the Begetter, must stand in being and dignity above the Son, as begotten - a consequence, the decisive inadmissibility and obvious absurdity of which Augustine also proves thoughtfully and wittily. Let us dwell, as an example, in a little more detail on this point of Augustine’s dialectical criticism of Arianism. If we accept the indicated Arian analogy, - Augustine develops his thought, - then the human son in relation to the human father will be in a better position than the Son of God in relation to God the Father, for, growing, the human son may someday reach the measure of the age of his father, but the Son of God never. What kind of True Son is He then? (Quomodo verus Filius?), - Augustine asks his opponents in fair bewilderment. 817 Son “non aequalis factus, sed aequalis natus,” says our witty denouncer of Western Arianism, correcting the false point of view of the Arians. 818 Based on the same philosophical concept of the Son as the image of God (Dei forma) with the Arians, and then moving on to the basis of the church understanding of this teaching, Augustine now asks his church-dogmatic opponents, who are in solidarity with him on this issue in the philosophical sphere: “Si confiteris Dei formam (sc. Dei Filium), cur non aperte Dei Filium Deo confiteris aequalem?” 819 The inconsistency of the Arian, as a man of church faith, and the Arian, as a rationalist philosopher, is here exposed by Augustine quite convincingly and clearly. The Arians' false fear of humiliating the dignity of the Father by recognizing the possible equality with Him in essence of the Son, in reality humiliating the Son, led them at the same time to the actual humiliation of the dignity of God the Father. This Arian “jealousy beyond reason” is now demonstrated by Augustine with obviousness that is palpable to everyone. “You thereby offend both the Son (facis injuriam),” says Augustine, addressing his Arian interlocutor, “and the Father Himself, in whose honor (in Cujus honorem) you want to insult or humiliate the Son (vis contumeliam facere Filio).” 820 Logically proving the complete inadmissibility of the Arian inequality of the Son of God (with the Father), Augustine refutes this error of the Arians with the help of the dilemma “aut non potuit, aut noluit”: God, if he could not give birth to a Son equal to Himself, then He is powerless (infirmus); if he didn’t want to, it means He is envious (invidus). The concept of God as an Absolute being (the highest omnipotence of the will of God and its most perfect holiness) does not allow us to accept both equally. 821 In their polemics with Augustine, the Arians often indulged in dishonest sophistical play with words and concepts, often without even taking into account the contradictions that logically followed from their assumptions and statements. By the power of his dialectical wit, Augustine reveals both to them - both the dishonesty of their logical methods and the lies or inconsistency of their conclusions. 822 Emphasizing the unscrupulous tricks of his dishonest opponents, 823 Augustine calls on them directly and openly, without circumlocutions or omissions, to express what is hidden behind their words or maliciously not stated and what, in essence, is prompted by their hidden inclinations and desires of the heart. With remarkably subtle logical analysis and rare dialectical wit, Augustine unravels the intricacies of Arian thought, clearly demonstrating either the formal inconsistency of their conclusions or the material fallacy of their premises. The procedural falsehood of the Aryan conclusions and the logical inconsistency of their theses, often brought to immediate obviousness with the help of “reductio ad absurdum,” now appear before the reader’s eyes in their true light. – Since the Arians declined to recognize the complete equality (of nature) between the Father and the Son, their confession of co-essence (consubstantiality), according to the judgment of Augustine, is both insincere and untrue. If they really recognized the Son of God as a Son in the proper sense, or as a Son by nature, then they would have no need to defend the position “Filius minor est Patre”, since in the being of God there is no - as in the being of man - temporary development, and therefore the Son, as a substantial object in the process of Divine self-objectification, can only be absolutely equal to the Father, as His eternal subject. 824 Therefore, Augustine, first of all, emphasizes the hypocrisy of the Arians’ confession of their imaginary consubstantiality. And those passages of Holy Scripture to which the Arians referred to in support of their view that the Father is higher than the Son, Augustine now considers in their true light, giving them the proper Church-Orthodox explanation. 825 The act of divine self-objectification, eternal or simple as the divine nature itself, also does not allow that the equality of the Son with the Father can be recognized at the cost of any damage or deprivation on the part of the Son. Such deprivation in relation to the subject does not occur even in the process of self-objectification of the finite spirit. If the finite spirit within itself gives birth to its idea - the word (verbum, or reproduces its own content), and - if its thought is perfect - produces its perfect idea, in which it objectifies itself in the entire fullness of its being and life: then due to this circumstance, as a subject, it truly loses nothing from its essence. On the contrary, the fullness of his being and life remains the same afterward as before, without any damage or change. Moreover, therefore, about God, as absolute Being, it is necessary to say that He is eternal - to the extent that He, as a subject, is His own object through His absolute idea (the Word of God), 826 - in the process of His self-objectification in relation to His being, as His own subject, does not suffer absolutely any damage (nec dando amisit ille quod habuit), 827 but as a subject He is entirely the same infinite fullness of being, as which He has Himself within Himself as its object. But even as an object, He represents exactly the same infinite fullness of being, because His act is an act of self-objectification (objectification of the subject), and thus He, as a subject with Himself, the object, and as an object with Himself, the subject, is completely identical. 828 As the infinite fullness of the divine being, completely identical with God the Father (subject), the Son, as an object in the process of Divine self-objectification, is the same God as the Father. 829 Both the Father and the Son are different from each other only in one thing (which at the same time constitutes the distinctive [hypostatic] property of each of them) that the Father is the Father, and not the Son, and the Son is the Son, and not the Father. God the Father is precisely the beginning that gives birth in his eternal self-consciousness to his absolute Word (idea), and the Son is present in this absolute Word (idea) born from himself in the process of divine self-consciousness; Father and Son, therefore, are definitions that - not as the Arians believed - mean a special or separate separate being of God (non ad se ipsum dicitur), that is, they are different from each other not in relation to essence, but express the immanent relation of the one and only Divine being to Himself (relative ad invicem), 830 because this being, as an absolute subject, At the same time, there is, in an absolute sense, a substantial (ontological) object of Itself and, as a subject, within itself it differs from Itself as an object, and vice versa, as an object, it is really necessarily different from Itself as a subject. This necessary distinctive property of God (proprium), associated with the same necessary coexistence (consubstantialitas), allows us to understand the above-characterized object in the process of Divine self-objectification - or otherwise the divine Word - to understand the idea, in contrast to the word (idea) in human self-consciousness, as a living personality. This is precisely the understanding we find in Bl. Augustine. In Augustine’s theological and philosophical view, both the subject of Divine consciousness is objectified, and vice versa, the object of Divine self-consciousness, in this process of His absolute self-objectification, in turn, so to speak, “subjectivized.” Thus, a peculiar correlative process of objectification of the subject and then “subjectivization of the object” occurs (the first and second moments in the timeless process of absolute self-consciousness). That is why the object of Divine self-consciousness in the process of His self-objectification, due to the absolute nature of this process, which presupposes in God the real identity of being and thought, for the Christian consciousness of Augustine immediately immediately after this is revived and from the simple abstract position of God Himself before Himself in Himself is hypostasized or personified (i.e. personified) into a living self-conscious personality (Person), into the Divine Logos, into His Eternal Word. Augustine's living, fiery nature, which sought the Living Personal God and, in living personal communication with Him, longed to find satisfaction in its sincere and animated search for God, could not stop at this Trinitarian Neoplatonic formula with its three abstract points. The latter comes to life in him, receiving its highest Christian meaning and therefore a deeply vital character. Further, Augustine tries to more accurately outline or define the Divine Person or Hypostasis and goes to this goal partly “via negationis” (eliminating from the concept of God only some predicates of finite objects), and partly “via assertationis sive eminentiae” (raising others to the absolute degree). Of a personality in the final sense of the word, which for its part exists outside and along with others (personalities) and, attached to God, could make two gods out of the Father and the Son - of such, so to speak, individuality, as the result of a real relation to Himself of the Absolute, it goes without saying that there can be no talk: a personality in this sense is already excluded by the very concept of the Absolute from the essentially absolute process of Divine self-objectification. The idea of ​​individuality, which in our language we necessarily borrow from the sphere of the finite and in our language, which again defines only the finite, we associate with the word “personality” (persona), 831 due to everything that has been said, we must completely eliminate in this case. In our idea of ​​the Absolute Personality, we must be guided by what our concept of person (personality) requires in a strict sense, which, however, we apply at the same time (in part) to simple finite beings. The Divine Hypostasis, presupposed by the concept of personality in the strict sense of the word, is being and life: namely, self-existent being and life, characterized by a mind capable of thinking about itself and knowing itself, and a will capable of self-consciously and freely determining itself and acting from itself. All these necessary data are present and in the object of divine self-objectification and, moreover, to an absolute degree. What is a word as an object of Absolute consciousness (Divine Spirit)? In view of the above established concept of personal being, as a living carrier of thought and knowledge, will and activity, which characterize the divine Word, or an object in the process of divine self-objectification, otherwise the Son, the latter must be recognized as a person in the full sense of the word. 832 In divine self-consciousness He (the Son) is “alius”, but since in this self-consciousness He is at the same time this consciousness itself, therefore He does not constitute “aliud” in comparison with it. But as an object, He represents only another immanent personal relation (relatio) of the One Absolute, as a Subject-Object, or the One Absolute, considered in the process of His self-objectification. In this internal process, the One Absolute, as the object of its consciousness, puts Itself in a kind of self-conscious - personal relationship to Itself, as the Subject of this consciousness. The Son is “alius” 833 not in the sense of any separation, since absolute Being by its very idea would cease to be what it is, that is, absolute, if it were susceptible of division; and divided (divisae personae) in this way, the persons together would constitute as many beings as there are gods, while God, as the Absolute, is and can, of course, only be One. He is “alius”, as a principle or moment of a certain self-difference (or internal difference) in God, as a result of His immanent relationship to Himself (a certain, so to speak, “immanent self-relation”). But even that which, in the process of divine self-objectification, is defined by us as a subject (i.e., the Father), can be distinguished as such a subject only in comparison with the object (i.e., the Son). Thus, the process of the birth of the Son has for the Father the significance of an individualizing or hypostatizing factor, i.e. the ontological principle of existence of the Father’s hypostasis (as precisely the “Father’s” hypostasis). To allow the existence of the Father as a person before the existence of the Son means to represent Him as an individual, it means to transfer the differences of persons (personal difference) to substances (being) and to make many gods from the One God. 834 This would be tantamount to deducing the act of birth from the personal will (of the Father) or - which is the same thing - attributing creatureliness to the Son. Whereas in fact the Son is not the Son of the will (and therefore a creature from nothing), but the Son of the eternally begetting Father (and therefore Himself the Creator of the ages). Here, for example, is an example of Augustine’s criticism of Arianism by dialectically exposing its logical inconsistency or internal self-contradiction. This refers to the Omian and Anomian currents in Arianism. The very concept of God, as a most real being, already speaks for the fact that God is a certain substance (Deus est quaedam substantia), for what is not substance is generally nothing or does not exist at all. So, substance is a certain being (aliquid esse). 835 Therefore, the Catholic Church, rejecting the deadly poison of heretical false teachings, teaches to confess the one substance or one being of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit (unius esse substantiae). 836 What does the formula “unius substantiae” mean? It means that everything that belongs to the Divinity of the Father also applies to the Son and the Holy Spirit. When one speaks of God the Father as a Father, or of the Father as such, then in this case what is meant is not the substance or being (substantia, essentia) of God (cum autem Pater est, non aliud est, quod est), for when the Father is spoken of, it is not “ad se” that is said, but “ad Filium”; on the contrary, He is called God “ad se” (Ad se autem Deus dicitur). 837 So, due to the fact that the Father is God, He is thereby also a substance (essence), and since the Son is one substance (essence) with Him, then the Son, without a doubt, is also God. And since by the fact that He is the Father, it is not signified by the name of the substance, but (namely) that He relates to the Son (sed refertur ad Filium), then we do not call the Son Father, just as we call Him (the Son) God. To the question what is (sit) the Father, one should answer: God (Deus). You also need to answer about the Son, and equally about the Father and the Son taken together, that is, “non deos, sed Deus.” Moreover, this answer is not given by analogy with the human relations of fatherhood and sonship: it cannot be said about Abraham, Isaac and Jacob that they are “homo”, but “homines” (due to the individuality of their being). The matter is different in the Divine sphere (non sic in divinis). Here the community of substance (substantiae societas) asserts equality (aequalitas) and eliminates plurality (pluralitas). If,” notes the bl. Augustine, - they will object to you: “from your words that the being of the Son is the same as the being of the Father, it obviously follows that the Son is the Father - answer: this is said in relation to substance (secundum substantiam), and not in relation to what is said “ad aliud”. 838 Ad se enim Deus dicitur, ad Patrem Filius dicitur, i.e., in relation to Himself He is called God, in relation to the Father he is called Son, and vice versa: the Father in relation to Himself (ad se) is called God (Deus dicitur), in relation to the Son (ad Filium) - Father (Pater dicitur). If it is called Father ad Filium, it is not the Son; if called the Son ad Patrem, he is not the Father; what is called ad se Father and ad se Son is already (est) Father and (et) Son, that is, God." 839 In order to transfer the hypostatic difference of persons to the substance or being of God, the Arians (the Anomian faction of Arianism) constructed the following syllogism, with the help of which they wanted to argue their main thesis about the non-existence of the Son. 840 Everything that is said or thought about God is stated or understood not in the sense of accident, but in the sense of substance (non secundum accidens, sed secundum substantiam dicitur). If now it is said of the Father that He is “ingenitus,” and of the Son that He is “genitus,” then, therefore, it is said “secundum substantiam.” The being of “ingenitus” and “genitus” is different from one another: ergo, the substance of the Father and the Son is also different. 841 Augustine calls the above Arian argument “callidissimum machinamentum” (the most cunning fabrication or logical intricacy). 842 The first or greater premise of this false syllogism, however, contains, in general, a true statement. For example, the entire teaching about the properties of God (which are actually inseparable from the very essence of God) is based on it. It is true that the pure, inaccessible to any change or changeability and absolutely simple being of God, in which “habere” and “esse” constitute a real identity, certainly excludes any thought of accident. It is equally true that the Divine Hypostases also cannot be understood in the sense of accident.... But as a subtle logistician and skillful dialectician, Augustine turns the power of the Arian argument being analyzed against the enemy himself and says: “if everything that is said about God must be understood (from your Arian point of view) “secundum substantiam,” then in the same exact sense the following saying of the Holy Father should be understood. Scripture: “Ego et Pater unum sumus” (John 10:30), and you are logically forced to admit that “una est igitur substantia Patris et Filii.” 843 If you do not accept this conclusion, which logically follows from your first premise, then you also take away from the first premise all evidentiary power for its “ingenitus” and “genitus”, and therefore we no longer undertake to understand the terms “ingenitus” and “genitus” exclusively as “secundum substantiam”. There is also a category (tertius terminus), in the sphere and in the light of which, according to Augustine, the indicated terms (ingenitus and genitus) should be considered and understood. This category, in which Augustine finds for himself a way out of the indicated situation, hopeless for the Arians, is the category of relationship (r el atio), which exists in God and determines the existence and properties of the Divine Hypostases. 844 This is the path of dogmatic polemics of the blessed one. Augustine, who refuted the main Anomian basis for the inferior position of the Son in the Divine Trinity compared to the Father. Based on the already well-known formula of the Arian (Anomian) confession, Bl. analyzes the same destructive conclusions for it. Augustine and another biblical saying that speaks of the equality of the Son to the Father. (Filius non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo – Philippians II, 6). Augustine poses the question: “secundum quid aequalis”? An alternative is presented: if the Son is equal to the Father “secundum substantiam”, then, consequently, this affirms the Orthodox consubstantiality and rejects the Arian non-essence (inequality of natures); if aequalis is not “secundum substantiam,” then, therefore, it is allowed to assert something about God that is not “secundum substantiam,” again contrary to the categorical statement of the Arians that everything attributed to God is attributed to Him exclusively only “secundum substantiam.” But since the Arians (anomies), based on their main premise, cannot now accept this second position (i.e., that something can be asserted about God and not secundum substantiam), then they must, if they want to be logically consistent, admit on the basis of the larger premise of the syllogism being analyzed that the Son is equal to God the Father also in relation to substance (secundum substantiam Filius aequalis est Deo Patri). 845 However, Augustine continues, establishing a genuine point of view on this subject, free from the indicated logical contradictions of Arianism, “indeed, not everything that is expressed about God must be understood as a definition of His essence, but in the very unity and identity of His essence there is still a certain relative moment, that is, a certain “relationship” in God, which is expressed by the names of the hypostases. “Relatio diversa est, non natura, 846 i.e. it is the relationship in God that is different, not the nature,” says Augustine in refutation and clarification of the above Anomian thesis. – This mystery of Divine life has an analogy in the spiritual nature of people, who, however, do not represent the identity of a being, but are only individuals or species having the unity of their nature. The Divine Hypostases are not the same as persons in the human sense, that is, they are not species or individuals (indivisible), having only generic unity, but they constitute or, so to speak, organize from themselves a single indivisible Divine being, and since God is One by nature, therefore the Hypostases also have a numerically singular or numeric unity of being. Inferring from the lesser to the greater, Augustine says: “Who is not able to understand that these expressions do not indicate the nature (of the Divinity) (non in se ipsis demonstrare naturas), but denote persons “alterius ad alterumu”? The above expressions in no way introduce any division or dissolution into the one being of God. They express only the idea that in God there is some kind of difference in His divine Being, real in Himself, which occurs and is revealed in His living real relationship to Himself. The constant definitions of the Divine Hypostases (Father, Son), as personal definitions, have the peculiarity that none of them can serve as a predicate of the other. As for, in particular, the terms “ingenitus” and “genitus”, in which the Arians laid the beginning of their substantial difference and from which they wanted to prove the alien (diversa natura) of the Son with the Father, Augustine objects to them in this sense. 847 If “genitus” can still be a synonym for “Filius,” then “ingenitus” is in no case a synonym for “Pater”: for because the Son is begotten, and in the way in which he was begotten, he is certainly a Son in relation to him who begat him (ideo quippe Filius quia genitus, et quia Filius utique genitus). On the contrary, a different relationship exists between the terms “ingenitus” and “Pater”: for it is not (one can say) unbegotten that (one can say) the Father, since even if He had not begot the Son (which, however, can only be assumed presumably, since the Son is not the Son of the will, but the Son by nature or the Son of the Father who begets from His being), then nothing would prevent Him from being called “ingenitus”. And everyone (in the world of people) if he gives birth to a son, does not therefore become unborn, since people who give birth to some people (children) were themselves previously born to others (parents). Therefore, between the concept terms “ingenitus” and “genitus” there is no positive relational connection similar to that which exists between “genitor” and “genitus”. Namely: “genitor” is a synonym for “pater”, just as “genitus” is equivalent to “filius”. 848 In any case, the “ingenitus” applied to the Father is a negative or negative attribute, showing “non quid est, sed quod non sit” in the Father. Therefore, any relationship is denied by this term, and not affirmed. 849 Such is Augustine’s deductive-philosophical criticism of Arian terms-formulas and those false premises and false conclusions that the Arians usually cited as proof of their non-existence. In this rational way, Augustine establishes his speculative doctrine of God the Son in his polemic with Arianism, but at the same time he establishes a point of view from which almost every type of anti-trinitarianism can easily be refuted, such as, for example, the idea that the Son must be precisely the wisdom of the Father, by virtue of which the Father is wise not “ad se”, not through himself, but only through the Son, as his wisdom. By such a conception the Son, as Son in the proper sense or as a person, is completely destroyed and resolved into the simple quality of the Father. 850 On the other hand, this kind of quality attributed to the Divine Being leads the thought that it is not the Son who is the Father, but, on the contrary, the Father must owe His existence to the Son. Even some members of the church (nonnulli nostri) in their polemics with the Arians were inclined to represent the Son as a simple quality. Refuting the Arian position “Erat tempus, quando non erat Filius” (“there was a time when there was no Son”), they looked at fire with its radiance as an analogy and, from the simultaneity or synchronicity that exists between one and the other, they incorrectly explained the coeternity between God the Father and the Son, but at the same time they lost sight of the fact that what is at stake here is not only coevitas, but also coessence (consubstantialitas) of the Father and the Son, and this analogy, while satisfactory for clarifying the first fact (co-eternity), does not, however, clarify the second fact (co-essentiality). As an explanatory means, this analogy affirms the former, while the latter, on the contrary, rather eliminates and inclines thought to the idea of ​​the Son only as a simple quality of the Father. But if the Son is understood in this exact sense (i.e. as a simple quality of the Father), then neither He (the Son) is God in Himself, because in this case He is not the divine being itself, but only a quality of being or a potential form of being; nor is the Father “ad et in Se” God, since, from this point of view, the Father only in what is called the Son has (receives) its essentially integral and Self-replenishing moment or its completion (complementum). 851 Such a definition of the relationship between the Father and the Son destroys the personal hypostatic distinction between Them and again presents God as a single and individual being. Only this false thought, depriving the Divine Hypostases of Their independent and personal existence, is introduced into consciousness in a slightly different way than it was expressed by Sabellius and his predecessors - Praxeus and Noetius. 852 Among Sabellius and his followers (patripassiani), Father, Son and Holy Spirit were the only names that designate the individual divine being depending on the mode (modus) of His activity. 853 Compared with the Sabellians, who in defense of their modalistic monarchianism also referred to the sayings of Holy Scripture (see Sabellian theses and Augustine's Orthodox antitheses), 854 the Arians represented a decisive contrast to them. Those, that is, the Sabellians, did not find any distinction of persons in the unity of the divine being (nomina diversa, unam vero esse personam), these, i.e. The Arians, in personal difference, did not recognize the unity of the being: an opposition, 855 which, as Augustine clearly proved to both opposing parties, 856 is completely destroyed or reconciled only in the Orthodox teaching, which affirms the unity of the being and in this latter recognizes at the same time personal difference, since it is revealed in the real living relationship of God to Himself. And since, further, this relationship is an immanent relationship of the Absolute to Itself and is realized within the limits of the uniquely existing Divine essence, then all Persons together are a single divine being, they are the One God. 857 In the extreme opposition in which both religious parties (heresies) oppose each other, they are both equally rejected 858 by the Orthodox Church. But the Son, as this again inevitably follows from the process of absolute self-objectification, is and can be One and only One. Indeed, already in our final process of self-objectification, our word (the content of our “I”), which our rational spirit produces from itself with the help of its thought and in which it objectively opposes itself as its “I” (that is, which it objectifies within itself), is always only one - and if it is true and perfect - then it is always objectively identical to itself. Of course, since in ourselves we do not constitute an absolute, pure, simple and unchanging being, we can be carried away and captured by some other concepts and ideas, and, moreover, to such an extent that these latter can be primarily fixed in our consciousness before all others, and thus the content of our intellectual “I” (or our inner word) is therefore pushed into the background by them and, as it were, obscured. But it (i.e. our inner word or objectified “I”) is present in them identically and synchronistically, because we only know about the other that we know about ourselves, and we distinguish ourselves from the other and the other from ourselves; and this is an immanent prerequisite that determines the possibility of our further thinking. And if we (i.e. this is our “I”, our inner word) with the help of a new special psychological act (reproduction) again extract it from the recesses of our spirit to the surface of consciousness, then it will not be anything else, but the same thing. The self-consciousness of God, as an absolute being, by its very idea, necessarily excludes any change and changeability: therefore, God, as a subject, is always present as an object of Himself in the objectified content of His Own “I”, i.e. in His eternal Word, and because of His inherent absolute unity and identity, and the inner content of His Own “I” or His Word is eternally only one and eternally one and the same. It never disappears and is never renewed, since God, as the Absolute Spirit, can never help but think of Himself; and never exists differently or otherwise, because God never thinks of Himself differently and never otherwise, and, in view of His absolute perfection, He can never think of Himself differently or otherwise. 859 Even those who consider the Son not a person, but, as previously mentioned, only a quality of the Father, cannot still speak of many sons in God (according to the number of definitions of His essence), because in the simple being of God all properties or qualities are identical both with each other and with the essence itself. 860 Augustine now had to answer the question why the Son, for his part, does not continue to give birth from Himself to those such as He Himself is born from the Father. The Arians gave him the reason to answer such a question. The latter from their main thesis that the Father begot the Son from Himself as a creature (i.e. such, through whom everything had to be created), considered for themselves the only possible conclusion that the Father is more powerful than the Son, since this latter Himself can no longer give birth from Himself (in the future). Augustine's answer to this objection is, first of all, this: the reason why the process of generation is not continued further by the Son, i.e., why the Son does not continue on his part, by analogy with the Father, His work of generation, is not in impotence, or lack of strength and power, not in the fact that the Son “could not,” but in the fact that he “should not,” i.e., give birth (neque enim non potuit, sed non oportuit). 861 The further continuation of the birth, from the indicated point of view, would have to be successively repeated from the Son (also) in the grandson and in the great-grandson, if these latter, on their part, did not want to remain powerless. But in this case an endless series would result, which (if only the Son alone were not enough) in the end no one could conclude. 862 But “This One” (i.e. The Son) is sufficient and, moreover, completely dominant, because in Him God, as a subject, is at the same time (in all the infinite fullness of His being) both as an object of Himself and, as an object of Himself in this process of self-objectification, is, on the other hand, completely different (alius) compared to Himself as a subject. The mentioned “should not” (“non oportuit”) is substantiated in greater depth and in more detail by Augustine from his further reasoning on this issue. Since the process of divine birth is precisely the process of self-objectification (objectification of the subject, as Augustine understands it) and since personal difference consists in the internal relation (relatio) or otherwise in the substantial relation of God to Himself, then the Son, in order to be a person, does not need any other relation (alia relatio), for example, as “alius ad alium”, i.e., in other words, should not yet give birth on his part (non oportuit gignere). He already carries out His relation (relatio), namely, to the Father, and His relation consists in the fact that in the process of divine self-objectification He serves as an object, and this relation, as one of the moments of the inner Trinitarian life of the Divine, is eternal and unchangeable. Videre Patrem illi [sc. Filio] est = esse = natum esse = permanere = non mutari = sine initio et sine fine persistere etc. 863 Finally, the Son, as a person, due to His complete consubstantiality with the Father, is not only wholly the same God as the Father, but as an object in the process of divine self-objectification, he is at the same time the One God. 864 All this is because the one Divine being, as self-conscious, is necessarily, as a subject, at the same time the object of Itself, in Itself representing the subject and together the object in the indivisible unity of Their being and life. __________________________________________________________ V. Church and theological teaching of Blessed Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, about the Holy Trinity. (Traditionally symbolic and actually Augustinian elements) On the previous pages of this work, we introduced our reader to the rational-philosophical construction of the teaching of the blessed. Augustine on the Holy Trinity. But the dogma of the Holy Trinity or the church-theological trinitarian teaching of Augustine is considered by him in his writings not only as an object of theological-philosophical speculation or speculative research, but also as the subject of his religious-church faith and its symbolic-dogmatic confession. “Undoubtedly,” says the well-known luminary of contemporary church-historical and theological science in the Protestant West, A. Harnack, 865, “on the issue of the Holy Trinity, the theological thinking of Blessed. Augustine, both on the positive and negative sides, was determined and directed by Neoplatonism (Plotinus, Porphyry). Negatively - in the sense that Augustine in Neoplatonic philosophy, in a ready-made form, was offered the doctrine of the Trinity, through emanation descending into the world; positive - in the sense that Augustine borrowed from Plotinus the idea of ​​the absolute simplicity of the Divine and tried to seriously substantiate it (with the help of data from philosophy, epistemology and psychology).” This philosophical “construction of the Trinitarian teaching for Augustine, as a philosopher, is quite self-explanatory.” 866 “Even more so, Augustine,” according to the Berlin prof. Harnack, “had to make an effort to construct the actual Christian doctrine of the Trinity (moreover, in its church understanding).” 867 To the presentation and analysis of the church-confessional or traditional-dogmatic side of the Trinitarian teaching of Blessed. Augustine, i.e. Augustine’s teaching about the Holy Trinity, as the subject of his religious contemplation and church confession, we proceed directly. Moving on to the consideration of the Trinitarian, actually church-dogmatic teaching of Blessed. Augustine about the Holy Trinity, we must note in its composition two kinds of elements: a) traditional, church-wide, adopted by Augustine from the teachers of the Church who preceded him 868 and b) in a certain sense, new, specifically Augustinian. 869 Let's consider both separately, starting with the first. – Analysis of Augustine’s true views on the Holy Trinity in his famous special work “De Trinitate Dei libri XV”, in his other classic work “De Civitate Dei libri XXII”, as well as in the whole cycle of his other polemical (mainly anti-Arian), apologetic, some exegetical and dogmatic-philosophical works and commenting on them in the works of his competent foreign and Russian researchers 870 accordingly indicate that the initial point of view of the trinitarian construction of bl. Augustine, its general meaning or background, as well as its ultimate goals, ultimately imbued entirely with church interests, are established by him in full agreement with the previously developed symbolic formula for the general church confession of this dogma. In the monumental work of Bl. Augustine's "De Civitate Dei", dating back to the later years of his episcopal ministry (413-427), we find a fairly complete and accurate expression of his church confession of symbolic faith in the Holy Trinity. In the 24th chapter. XIth book. of the named work, interpreting “On the Divine Trinity, Which scattered the signs of its trinity throughout all creation,” bl. Augustine solemnly declares: “we believe, unwaveringly maintain and sincerely preach that the Father begat the Word, that is, Wisdom, through whom all things were created, the Only Begotten Son, the One - the One, the Eternal Co-Eternal, the most Highly Good - equally Good; and that the Holy Spirit there is together the Spirit of both the Father and the Son, and He Himself is consubstantial and coeternal with both; and that all this is a Trinity according to the property of Persons, and one God according to the indivisible Divinity, as well as one Almighty according to the indivisible omnipotence; but so, however, that when asked about one of Them, we say in response that each of Them is both God and the Almighty, and when about all together, then not three Gods or three Almighties, but One Almighty God: such is the indivisible unity in the three, and so it should be confessed.” 871 This is the general belief of Bl. Augustine on the Holy Trinity, confessed by him on behalf of all the faithful sons of the Catholic Church. But if the general background or meaning of the Trinitarian teaching of Bl. Augustine can be called Orthodox, expressing the general church teaching on this subject, then, apparently, this cannot be said regarding some of Augustine’s “private opinions” included in the content of the Christian dogma about the Holy Trinity. Justice requires us to note here that in revealing some particular points of this dogma (about the Holy Spirit) 872 Augustine - as far as, however, the current state of the sources gives grounds for concluding this - it seems that he did not always adhere to the generally accepted point of view, expressing something new and original on this issue in comparison with the general church traditional understanding of it. General Church Teaching Bl. Augustine about the Holy Trinity, formulated by him, one might think, not without the influence of the ideas of Neoplatonic philosophy 873 and the principles of Cappadocian (New Nicene) theology, 874 is expressed by the following formula already known to the Church (Eastern Nicene fathers: Athanasius of Alexandria and, especially, the three Great Cappadocians), given by him as in Greek “μία οὐσία – τρεῖς ὐποστάσεις”, and in Latin: “una essentia – tres substantiae sive personae”. 875 This formula is in the theological language of Blessed. Augustine 876 means that the one essence of God is manifested in three Persons, distinguished among themselves “non secundum substantiam” (that is, not by substance), but by “relative ad invicem” (that is, by mutual relationship): the Father gives birth, the Son is born, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. 877 As stated, in his Trinitarian dogmatics, Bl. Augustine, generally speaking, adheres to the Trinitarian teaching of the Nicene Eastern Fathers (in modern terminology - “Old and New Nicene”, 878 namely: St. Athanasius of Alexandria and, especially, the three great Cappadocians - Basil the Great, Gregory the Theologian and Gregory of Nyssa and reproduces their thoughts and formulas as a general church, devoted teaching (“fides catholica”). Sharing the trinitarian scheme of the Eastern (New) Niceneans, Augustine clearly and definitely affirms in God one essence (substantia sive essentia) and three Persons (substantiae, personae), recognizes the equality and unity of the Divine Hypostases in relation to the essence, as well as their difference and trinity in the image of Their existence, placing the basis of the Trinitarian existence of the Divine in the internal laws of the immanent life of the Triune God (self-awareness and love). 879 From here, three points or three sides are naturally outlined, from the point of view of which, according to the German historian of dogma R. Seeberg, it seems most convenient to consider and present Augustine’s church teaching about the Holy Trinity: 1) the unity of the Trinity God; 2) the trinity of the One God; and 3) the foundation of trinity on unity and unity on trinity. 880 In these relations, bliss. Augustine only reproduces or repeats the Trinitarian concepts of the Nicene Church Fathers, already known to his time, in particular Athanasius Alex., and the three Vel. Cappadocians. But in the understanding of the indicated points or particular theses of the Trinitarian dogma, in the way of their disclosure and interpretation, Augustine sometimes introduces some of his own, specifically Augustinian, features, which are very characteristic of him as a Western writer-theologian, and also very important in the sense of their enormous influence on Western theological thought of subsequent times. That is why both Western and Eastern researchers of Augustine quite rightly believe that in their teaching about the Holy Trinity, Blessed. Augustine appears before us, first of all, with the typical features of a Western theologian. 881 “Not Greek theology and, in fact, not even the Nicene symbol,” notes the German author of the history of dogmas Reinh in this regard. Seeberg, “were of decisive importance for Augustine (in the construction of his church teaching about the Holy Trinity), but the authority of Holy Scripture, which he tried to rationally substantiate, and the catholic faith (fides catholica).” 882 That is why, partly differing from the Eastern (Cappadocia) fathers, but not contradicting them, and also in agreement with the church-theological tradition of the West, although somewhat different from it, Bl. Augustine accepts with absolute certainty the church teaching about the unity of the Divine essence and the trinity of Persons, while noticeably highlighting the idea of ​​the unity of the three Persons in God. 883 So, the point of departure of the church, in the proper sense of the Trinitarian dogmatics of the bl. Augustine, serves the Nicene formula of confession, already known to the Church and the church-theological literature of his time (fides catholica), that the One God in essence is threefold in Persons. “One God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit: the Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Father and is not the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is neither Father nor Son, but all together are One God.” 884 These and similar expressions are blessed. Augustine clearly point to the deep thought that each of the Persons of the Holy Trinity is God entirely and all three Persons (essence) are no more God than each of Them, conceived separately. All these thoughts are brought to unity by Augustine in his following brief but expressive formula: “Trinitas - unus Deus est.” 885 It briefly, but quite clearly, accurately and energetically defines both the main theses of the Orthodox Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity, that is, both the idea of ​​the hypostatic trinity or the separateness of the Divine Persons, and the moment of Their natural unity or identity in essence. With this trinitarian formula, bl. Augustine, often cited by him in various combinations, defines with sufficient force the immanent character of Augustine’s Christian Trinity. He understands and defines God or the Divine Being, in the words of his German commentator, trinitarianly (trinitarisch). 886 This means that the One God is the Trinity for Augustine, which, according to Augustine, is exactly the same as St. Ambrose of Milan, whose powerful influence our church teacher experienced, God “is trinitarian in Persons not due to the need to reveal Himself in the world, but trinity is determined by the very essence of the Divine nature, and the concept of it (trinity) is analytically derived from the very concept of God.” 887 Thus, this formula we have given above is bl. Augustine acquires from him that deep meaning, the exact expression of which we have not yet found in the church writers of the pre-Nicene era and which constitutes the dogmatic result of the entire previous development of theological thought, belonging to the final moment in the history of Trinitarian dogma. We noted above that in his teaching about the Holy Trinity, Bl. Augustine noticeably highlights the moment of the unity of the essence of the Divine Persons or the side of Their indivisible existence. This circumstance distinguishes the Trinitarian speculation of Bl. Augustine from the Eastern Nicene triadology. The eastern representatives of the so-called New Nicene theology (the Holy Cappadocian Fathers), due to their historical position (as the heirs of the scientific and theological traditions of Origen and as always standing in the face of the formidable specter of Sabellianism), when developing the Trinitarian dogma, with particular force put forward the fact of the hypostatic separateness of the Divine Persons or the truth of the reality of the three Hypostases. In this sense, we can say that “for the Neo-Niceans (Cappadocian fathers), the actual problem in the Trinitarian dogma was how the three Hypostases conceived one inseparable essence,” 888 while for Bl. Augustine, on the contrary, the problem of his Trinitarian dogmatics was the question of how the real difference of the three Divine Hypostases should be thought of in a single absolutely simple essence. 889 Having established the relation of the single Divine essence to the three Hypostases in the Divinity as the relation of the general to the particular, (“ϰοινόν” and “ἲδιον”) by analogy with the teaching of Aristotle about “substantia abstracta” and “substantia concreta”, the Cappadocian fathers (led by Basil the Great) in their theological teaching about the Holy Trinity defined the essence Divine as a general or generic concept, and the Divine Hypostases were understood in the sense of individual characteristics. In other words, the essence in the Divine is, from the point of view of the Trinitarian theology of the Cappadocians, “a set of common characteristics that necessarily belong to a certain group of homogeneous (όμογενεῖς) objects.” Hypostasis, from this point of view, is nothing more than “a concrete object that has real existence.” 890 In drawing a strict logical line between the main trinitarian terms “οὐσία” (essence) and “ὐποστάσεις” (hypostasis), in the precise differentiation between these central concepts of the central Christian dogma, lies, as is known, the main merit of Cappadocian triadology, which represents the final stage in the history of Trinitarian disputes of the first 4 centuries and at the same time the final completion in the East of church-Trinitarian dogmatics (in its formal logical concept). 891 But this also implies a weak or insufficient in formal-logical sense side of the Trinitarian theology of the Cappadocians, which does not sufficiently ensure the real existence and numeric unity of the essence of the Divine Persons. In this regard, finally, the accusation of St. Cappadocians (of course, unfairly) in tritheism and even in tetradism. 892 Blazh. Augustine, unlike the Cappadocians, apparently stood outside the literary influences of Origen's theology. In addition, he did not have his main dogmatic opponent in the person of Sabellianism... On the contrary. The subject of his literary and theological polemics was the opposite pole of anti-trinitarian dogmatics to Sabellianism - Arianism (in the form of Homianism), which introduced division into the single being of God. And it was not the Eastern, but rather the Western tradition that determined his theology in the sphere of Trinitarian dogma. 893 It is also known that the Homies, denying the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son and thereby dividing the one and indivisible being of God, gave Augustine grounds to accuse them of polytheism (ditheism) and persistently encouraged him to contrast their polytheism with his teaching about the unity of God. 894 Due to this, bl. Augustine, as an Orthodox polemicist, had to focus his attention, in contrast to his ideological opponents the Homies, on the idea of ​​the consubstantiality of the Divine Persons or their equality in essence. 895 It is not without reason that the literary and theological tradition of the West, as far as Western pre-Augustinian church writing allows us to judge this (Tertullian, Dionysius of Rome, Hilary, Ambrose, etc.), usually placed greater emphasis on the unity and inseparability of the Divine Hypostases. That's why for bl. Augustine, as a son of the West and as a Western writer who imprinted in his writings the distinctive features of Western theological thinking, “the unity of God is completely clear, while the trinity is something problematic.” 896 Although, of course, the Trinity, as well as the unity of the Divine, as data in the church symbolic formula (“fides catholica”), was reliably known and absolutely obligatory for him, despite the fact that the main tendency of the theological and philosophical thinking of Bl. Augustine, according to the German historian-theologian Seeberg, did not necessarily lead him to the concept of trinity. 897 All these circumstances could not, of course, not leave their mark on the trinitarian concepts of the Western Christian thinker and church writer we are studying - Blessed. Augustine of Ippona. Therefore, the basic Trinitarian terms “essentia, οὐσία” and “persona, ὐπόστασις” sometimes receive from Augustine a meaning somewhat different from the Eastern (Cappadocia) understanding of them. 898 If we turn our attention to this first of the most important concepts of Augustine’s Trinitarian dogmatics that we have indicated and try more deeply to understand its true meaning, then we will be convinced that the Divine essence (essentia), according to Augustine, is, firstly, a certain reality, and, secondly, an integral being, uniquely existing and in the complete and undivided possession of all three Persons Deities. This understanding of Bl. Augustine’s “essentia”, when applied to the essence of the Triune Divinity, brings it closer to the theological concept of St. Athanasius of Alexandria (οὐσία = substantia concreta of Aristotle), and on the other hand defines and explains its difference at this point (of course, only from a theological and philosophical point of view) from Cappadocian theology (according to St. Basil, οὐσία = a set of general or generic characteristics = substantia abstracta of Aristotle). Hence Augustine’s polemic against the understanding of the essence of God that St. offers. Vasily Vel. 899 How did Augustine imagine the relationship of this one being of God to his threefold Hypostases? Church writers who preceded Augustine and even St. The Cappadocians, in parallel with Aristotle’s teaching about “substantia abstracta” and “substantia concreta,” imagined the relation in God of three Persons to a single being as the relation of the particular to the general: individuals to the species, species to the genus, or, finally, three separate concrete objects to their common nature or material. 900 Bl. Augustine resolutely speaks out against establishing a logical scheme of the relationship between the Divine Hypostases and Their essence, as the relationship of the particular to the general (as individuals to their species or species to the genus). The names of Divine Persons and Their personal properties must be attributed to Them as individual Persons of a single essence, and not just as having a single essence. All such analogies of general or generic unity and species or individual trinity, according to Bl. Augustine, do not at all express the real relationship between the unity of being and the trinity Persons, which relationship in God is infinitely higher than all generic or species relationships known to us in the field of finite beings. Augustine wants to say by this that in God the essence is not only a logical or general concept, not an abstract concept of a genus (a set of general or generic characteristics that characterize a certain class of homogeneous objects), but is a specific or singularly existing reality: it resides in God really, concretely and is expressed in the same unity with Him of the Hypostases that each of Them has with Himself (i.e. in a unity as real as the unity of an individual person). 901 The highest analogy of this unity in the finite world, as is known, is for the bl. Augustine is not the unity of the race or nature of human individuals, but the personal and specific unity of an individual person, revealing in himself (in the very essence of his God-like spirit) a certain trinity, as a constitutive moment of his nature and life. For this reason, bl. Augustine very energetically rejects the analogy of generic unity and species or individual differences. Such a representation of this relationship in God would inevitably lead us, according to Augustine, to tritheism or even tetratheism. 902 Indeed. If the Divine essence is implicite already contained in Persons, like the generic or general qualities of horses (inherent in a horse in general) in each individual specific horse, then, confessing in God three Persons that exist in essence, as a particular in the general, we naturally inevitably come to the need to recognize in God three independent and separate entities from each other (by analogy with three horses, separately and independently existing). In view of this blessed Augustine, when applied to the one Divine essence and its three Hypostases, considers unacceptable the expression: “tres equi – unum animal.” 903 In his opinion, in this case, that is, in application to the Triune God, it would be more correct to say: “tres equi - tria animalia.” 904 Equally rejects bl. Augustine and that analogy of generic unity, according to which the Divine essence corresponds to man in general (humanity, man as such): “homo”, and to the three Hypostases of the Divine - a specific individual, a specific personality: “hic homo” or “Abraham, velut Isaac, velut Jacob”. 905 The incorrectness and unsuitability of this trinitarian analogy, as well as the previous one (3 equi - 1 animal), lies, according to Augustine, in the fact that three separate specific individuals (Abraham, Isaac, Jacob) are at the same time three people or three souls, while in the Divinity the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one God. Because of this, Augustine corrects this analogy, like the previous one, in the sense that “as they say: Abraham, Isaac, Jacob are three individuals, so (it should be said that they) are three people and three souls (and not one person or one soul”). 906 If we further imagine the matter in such a way that the essence in God relates to the Hypostases, as the genus relates to individuals, and the genus is thought of as something special in relation to individuals and standing outside them (i.e., essentia is outside or beyond the personae), then in this case we come to the recognition of as many as four independent principles located next to each other (subordinate) in God: one essence and three Hypostases. 907 The distinction of the three Persons must take place precisely within the boundaries of a single and singular essence. And bl. Augustine, according to his German Protestant commentator A. Dorner, comes closer and deeper into the definition of this difference when he asserts that in God there must necessarily (and only can) exist three Persons and only three, no more and no less. With the proclamation of this thesis, it is necessary to further prove why exactly in God there can be only three Persons. And this, in turn, postulates a closer relationship of the three Persons among themselves, precisely their relationship to each other, which is necessary by nature. 908 In connection with this bl. Augustine also rejects another, at first glance more successful, trinitarian analogy, namely, the analogy of the relationship in God of the three Persons to Their one essence with the relationship of three golden statues to the material common to them (gold) from which they are made. This comparison, apparently more successful than the previous one, is, however, far from expressing the actual relationships in God and is generally inadequate to the essence of the objects being compared. This is because from the same material (gold) an arbitrarily larger or smaller number of statues can be made at will, while in God only three Hypostases are necessarily thought of and exist, no more and no less. Likewise, the analogy under consideration is also insufficient because neither the concept of gold is necessarily associated with the idea of ​​statues, nor the idea of ​​the latter (statues) in our consciousness is necessarily associated with the concept of the former (gold). 909 General sentence bl. Augustine’s understanding of all these Trinitarian analogies is self-explanatory: not one of them can give a completely complete and completely accurate understanding of the relationship that exists between the unity of the Divine essence and the trinity of Persons in God. So, based on everything that has been said about understanding Bl. Augustine of the Divine Essence in its relation to the three Hypostases, it is not difficult to obtain a fairly definite concept of it. “Essentia” or the essence of the three Divine Hypostases, from the point of view of Bl. Augustine, this is a real concrete being (esse), within or within which there are three Divine Hypostases, jointly possessing it completely and completely and manifesting themselves in it in three ways. 910 From precisely this understanding of the Divine essence, a number of the following provisions result. The Persons of the Holy Trinity, possessing the same essence, cannot differ from each other in what relates to the essence and its attributes: in this respect They are completely equal, both quantitatively, 911 and qualitatively. 912 Persons, of course, cannot differ among themselves from a quantitative point of view (under the category of quantity): the truth (veritas) of the Father or the goodness (bonitas) of the Father is no greater, for example, than the goodness or truth of the Son, just as the essence of all three Persons is realized (manifested) no more intensely and in no greater volume than the essence of each Person taken separately. 913 This thought by bl. Augustine persistently emphasizes and energetically emphasizes many times. God is Spirit, due to which, according to Bl. Augustine, the Divine essence, identical in all three Persons, cannot be divided and fragmented in different Persons in different ways and to different degrees. In the same way, there is no qualitative difference between the Persons of the Holy Trinity, or in other words: all three Persons are completely equal to each other in qualitative terms. It cannot be allowed that any one Hypostasis could have properties (essential) that another does not have. 915 This is because the essence and properties in God, according to Augustine, are identical, and the former cannot be separated from the latter. If in God the essence and properties coincide to the point of complete identity (identical), and if all three Hypostases have the same essence, within the limits of which They themselves only have Their existence, then it is clear that all three Hypostases have the same properties, which, as has been said, are not separable and indistinguishable from their common numerically single and concrete essence. The above judgments of bl. Augustine's ideas about the difference in God constitute a rather characteristic feature of Augustinian Trinitarian theology. The second main thesis of the Orthodox Christian Trinitarian dogma is the recognition in God, with the unity of His being, of the trinity of Hypostases. 916 Bl. Augustine, of course, fully accepts this point of church dogma about the Holy Trinity, as we have already seen above from many of Augustine’s expressions about the Holy Trinity, and expresses it with all clarity and certainty many times in his writings. Moreover, the three Hypostases existing in the one Godhead, according to Augustine, in no way violate or destroy His unity in essence in re and do not contradict it in intellectu. What are Divine Hypostases or Persons, according to the consciousness and teaching of our famous teacher of the Church, what associations did he have with this concept and term? How to understand these Persons or Hypostases of Augustinian Trinitarian dogmatics, which, without introducing any division into the one being of God, on the other hand, introduce some difference into the inner immanent region of Divine Being? What, according to Augustine, can, without violating the unity (ταυτότης) of the being of God, determine the difference in it, which should serve as the principle of difference (ἑτερότης) within the inner and most intimate life of the Divine? We will first resolve the question of how, according to Augustine, the Divine Hypostases cannot differ from each other, what difference is impossible, according to Augustine, in the Divinity. Of course, the Divine Persons cannot differ from each other by their essence, which is common, identical and numerically the same for all of them. Therefore, the Persons of the Holy Trinity in no case - neither quantitatively nor qualitatively - can differ from each other in the attributes or properties of this essence: there are and cannot be any quantitative or qualitative differences between Them. Moreover, of course, the difference between Divine Persons cannot be determined by accidents, because the Divine being, as absolutely simple and unchangeable, excludes in relation to itself not only any accident, but also substance, as a concept correlative with the concept of accident. 917 If, therefore, the difference in God cannot be reduced either to essence, or to qualities, or to accidents, and cannot be explained by any of the above, then, obviously, the Divine Persons can differ among themselves by nothing other than their mutual relation or their relation to the creature. The principle of difference in God is thus the beginning of the relationship (of Persons to each other and to the creature). 918 But for the possibility of any real relationship, it is necessary that between realities that stand in a certain relation to each other, there must necessarily exist both something common that unites or generalizes them (with each other), and something different that separates or separates them (from one another). This “conditio, sine qua non” relationship between all quantities, when applied to the Divine Hypostases, is also given to the face. What, so to speak, serves as the “punctum intercommunionis” of the Divine Persons? What concept has a general or generic meaning for the Persons of the Holy Trinity? An essence (essentia) cannot be so common or generic in relation to the Divine Hypostases, through which They enter into a relationship with each other (relative ad invicem), for all three Hypostases realize this relationship within or within the same (numerically unified) essence. Therefore, the common (commune) or generic (generale), into which category the Father, Son and Holy Spirit fit, will not be an essence, as the Eastern Neo-Nicenes or the Younger Nicenes (the Holy Cappadocian Fathers) believed, but a Person or Hypostasis. Consequently, the concept of person is what serves as a general concept in relation to all three Persons of the Holy Trinity. What all three Hypostases have in common is that they are all Persons and that Each of Them is a Person. 919 But what de facto determines the personal difference of the Hypostases, what are the specific signs of Each of Them, distinguishing one Hypostasis from the other (what is the specific sign of Each of the Hypostases, distinguishing one Hypostasis from the other two and not communicated to the other two)? What is Augustine's "relatio" in itself, as a term of his Trinitarian speculation? What, by what predicates, is it characterized, in the opinion of our Ippon theologian, especially if it is compared with “ὐπόστασις” as a term of Greek-Eastern dogmatics? “If we ask,” notes the German prof. Ad. Dorner, - what, according to Augustine, characterizes personal existence, we will not get any other answer except that a person, a personality, is nothing more than an activity, a function. 920 In exactly the same way, according to Bl. Augustine, such a distinctive feature of the Divine Person, defining Him and serving as the principle of distinguishing Him from other Persons, is the different image or different nature of the manifestation of a given Person, in other words, the peculiarity or originality of His activity (since the life of any personality in general and its character is revealed in one or another of its activities). If now activity, function serves as a general or generic concept for Divine Persons, then the originality, peculiarity, specificity of this activity should serve as a principle of difference for Each of Them individually. Therefore, although the Divinity is one in the strictest sense of the word, that is, not only in relation to His essence, but also in His knowledge and actions or activity, but this activity, both internal and external, with its unity, conceals within itself the moment of some differences, as a result of these internal hypostatic differences in God or His immanent relationships. These three Persons of the Divine Trinity, defined by Bl. Augustine, in the name of relationships or actions, according to the general meaning of the entire church teaching of our ancient Christian writer, are modes of existence (τρόποι ὐπάρξεως, μορφαἰ ὐπάρξεως) or modes of manifestation (modi essendi, modi subsistendi) of the same the essence of God (essentia, quam Graeci οὐσία vocant) and therefore do not introduce any division into it. 921 But on the other hand, they do not allow any fusion or confusion in God and do not deny the reality of personal difference in Him. 922 The indicated images or modes of Divine Being or, in Augustine’s terminology, the relationship of respective activities with their characteristic features for the theological consciousness of the Western father are not just simple names, not abstract attributes or accidents, not impersonal moments of Divine Being, merging with His essence and not only inseparable, but also indistinguishable from the latter. The above-mentioned relationships or special activities in God for our Ippon theologian are nothing more than the three special focal points or self-conscious centers underlying these “images” or “modes” of the Divine Being in the immanent life of the spiritual-personal Deity, “from eternity appearing in the first of them as ungenerated and productive being, and in the last two as derivative being – begotten and proceeding.” 923 Divine Faces b. Augustine, as said, characterizes the Trinitarian dogma in his speculative theological speculation with philosophical definitions of “relations”, “functions” 924, etc. But for Augustine, in his church consciousness, these are hypostatized eternal and unchanging relationships or actions occurring in the same (numerically single) being of God 925 and revealing in themselves the spiritual and personal life of the One Trinitarian Deity. 926 Therefore, the general teaching of Bl. Augustine about the Holy Trinity or about God, one in His being and trinitarian in His Hypostases, according to its basic spirit, general content and ultimate tasks, should be called not only theistic, but also orthodox (Church Orthodox). According to the strength of what was said by Bl. Augustine, in his teaching on the Holy Trinity, should rightfully be recognized as an outstanding scientific apologist for the central Christian dogma and a zealous defender of its ecclesiastical understanding against the heretics of his time. “These various activities or functions, by which only the Hypostases differ from each other, through which They stand in a necessary relationship to each other and, as it were, form one closed circle, Augustine, according to Prof. A. Dorner, describes, first of all, in accordance with the Western church symbolic formula of the confession of the Trinitarian dogma: Pater gignit, Filius genitus est a Patre, Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Patre et a Filio." 927 In other words, special specific activities or peculiar relative functions in the Divine, hypostasized in the theological consciousness of St. Augustine, and according to him are three Persons with Their distinctive features that are incommunicable to each other and not reducible to one another (unbornness, birth, originality) or three Persons in Their internal relationship resp. We can therefore say that specific Augustinian relations, as a moment of difference in the Divine, as a definition of the idea of ἑτερότης in Him, are nothing more than the “personae” of Blessed Augustine’s church teaching about. St. Trinity, so that relatio on the one hand and persona on the other are synonymous designations of the same facts and relations of the trinitarian life of the Triune Divinity, these are only different terms of the theological-philosophical and symbolic-dogmatic language (teachings) of the bl. Augustine about the Holy Trinity, which essentially express the same concepts. All researchers and commentators on the teachings of Bl. Augustine about the Triune God agrees that Augustine thinks of the One God “trinitarianly” and considers the trinity in God under the category of unity and derives it from the latter. We have already noted that Augustine understands the Trinity as unity in plurality and plurality in unity, or as uniformity in diversity and diversity in uniformity, i.e., the one being of God immanently contains the trinity, 928 which is, therefore, a single harmonious whole. But still, Augustine’s primary attention and his theological and philosophical interest are focused on the moment of unity in the Divine. According to, for example, R. Seeberg, the starting point of Augustine’s teaching about the Holy Trinity is his teaching about the unity of God. 929 And not the Divine substance or the Father, declares another learned German historian of the ancient Christian Church A. Harnack, - there is, according to Augustine, a monarchical principle in God, but the Trinity itself is the One God (and vice versa). Therefore, - rightly concludes Harnack, - the identity and unity of the Divine were understood by Augustine much more strictly than by the Cappadocians. 930 Indeed, this idea of ​​the unity of the Three Persons of the Divine was carried out by Bl. Augustine is much more consistent and persistent than that of the Cappadocians, and is expressed by him much more energetically and brightly. Not only in the teachings of Bl. Augustine about the essence of God, but also in his special teaching about the Holy Trinity, the moment of the unity of God runs through him everywhere and noticeably prevails, the root idea of ​​the One God - One in His essence, One in His properties, One in the Trinity, i.e. in Three Hypostases, possessing not only the unity of essence, but also the unity of spiritual qualities - knowledge, will, feelings and activity, both internal, premium, and external, directed towards the world (creative, providential, economic, etc.). German Catholic commentator Bl. Augustina Prof. Th. Gangauf, 931 considering his speculative doctrine of the Trinitarian life of the Deity from the point of view of the process of objectification of the Divine Person or the immanent relation of the Absolute Spirit to Himself, speaks on this subject. The Persons of the Holy Trinity, according to the view of the famous Ippon theologian-philosopher, are one indivisible and indivisible Divine Being Himself (in His self-revelation, i.e. Father, Son and Holy Spirit) or One God in His living absolute relation to Himself. Therefore, if in St. Scripture speaks of God in general, then in such cases, of course, the Triune, because God is one, but this One an Sich is the Triune and as the Triune is the One True God. 932 And if one of the Persons is ascribed something special from the others, then this Person must not be thought of separately from the other two Persons. There is no difference between Them, not only in relation to Their being, in which respect They are one, but They constitute the same unity in Their knowledge and will, 933 and therefore They represent a complete or perfect unity. They would never constitute a perfect unity if They were not at the same time one in relation to knowledge and will. The difference in this case would fall directly on the being itself, and between Them there would then not be that absolute identity of the being, which, however, necessarily already exists in Divine self-objectification, as necessarily absolute. The beginning (principium) is the Father, the beginning is the Son, the beginning is the Holy Spirit. The Father is the beginning for the Son, but at the same time in such a way that the Son Himself is the beginning. The Father and the Son together are the beginning for the Holy Spirit, and again in such a way that the Holy Spirit Himself is the beginning, and since all three of them are the One Absolute, they also together constitute the single beginning for created being. 934 According to the force of what has been said, the activity of the Divine Persons, even if in this latter one of the Persons appears (manifests) especially, in accordance with its hypostatic property, should be considered as a common action or common activity of all three Persons of the Holy Trinity. 935 In relation to the act of peacemaking, 936 this community or unity of activity of the three Divine Persons clearly appears to us already in the Mosaic narrative about this event (i.e., the creation of the world). Next. Although the Son takes upon Himself the work of redemption by virtue of His property (hypostatic) and takes it upon Himself in accordance with His eternal decision about that, but in this action of the Son, for their part, both the Father and the Holy Spirit take part, as co-operators with Him. 937 Exactly the same thing took place in the mission of the Son, in the preparation of His human body in the womb of the Blessed Virgin Mary, etc. Equal arr. the same must be said about every action of the Son, when He in forma servi (in the form of a servant) turned here on earth, since His incarnation was not a separation from the Father, but He, as the Only Begotten Word, always abided in the Father. It is absolutely necessary to think and affirm exactly the same about the embassy of the Holy Spirit (to the world by the Son or through the Son from the Father) and about His activity in the Church. This Holy Spirit, who even earlier, at the creation of the world, hovered over the waters in order to, for its part, assist the Son in the formation and development of the world substance, was also sent after the Son performed the act of redemption in order to make individuals participants in it and to be poured out on them. And just as the Father does not act without the Son and the Holy Spirit, but only together with Them, and just as the Son does not act without the Father and the Holy Spirit, but with Both, so the Holy Spirit does not exist separately from the Father and the Son, wills and acts, but in each individual act of His activity the Father and the Son invariably assist Him. 938 This community or this unity of Their external, i.e., activity directed towards the external world, is a necessary consequence of Their perfect internal intercommunication. And this, in turn, is a direct consequence of the indisputable fact that the Faces of St. The Trinity, each individually different from each other, all together, however, are only the One Absolute in His absolute real and living relation to Himself. 939 Regarding the above-mentioned church-theological teaching of Bl. Augustine about the Holy Trinity - his teaching about the unity of essence and trinity of the Divine Persons in their relationship - in Western, mainly Protestant, theological literature dedicated to Augustine, one can often read various kinds of bewilderment, objections, refutations, etc. 940 Representatives of negative Augustinian criticism, welcoming the rational-psychological trinitarian construction of the bl. Augustine, they attribute to him in this regard all kinds of heresies and logical absurdities, from which Bl. Augustine, de facto, was, of course, far away, or various kinds of non-ecclesiastical conclusions are imposed on him (from his rational-philosophical constructions of the Trinitarian dogma), which Augustine himself, of course, could not and did not want to do and in fact did not do, on the contrary, he himself warned others against them. So understood by bl. Augustine, in the strictest and most precise sense of the word, the unity of the essence of the Divine Hypostases (the real, numerical unity of a specific essence, and not the general or logical concept of generic unity), and as a result of this, the trinity of Hypostases analytically deduced by Augustine from the unity of essence, further - Augustine’s view of the Old Testament theophanies (theophany), as manifestations of the entire Trinity, and not just the Son of God, finally, undertaken and so widely Augustine's experience of using the forces and phenomena of mental life as analogies of the Divine Trinity - give the aforementioned Protestant rationalist theologians a reason to accuse Augustine of a purely Sabellian fusion of Hypostases, or at least of an inclination (perhaps unconscious and involuntary) in his direction. So, our modern Prof. University of Berlin, which we have already quoted many times Ad. Harnack, as is known, is skeptical about church dogma and denies it in principle; in such expressions, for example, he speaks of the Trinitarian teaching of Bl. Augustine. “In the West, Augustine, in general agreement with the ancient Western tendency (to highlight the unity in the Trinity), destroyed the last remnant of subordinationism (in understanding the relationship of the Trinity Hypostases), but because of this he came closer to modalism.” 941 Elsewhere, the same author declares on this occasion that Augustine manages to rise above modalism only by his statement about his reluctance to be a modalist, and also thanks to his purely virtuoso logical operations (logical divisions and distinctions of concepts). 942 And Reuter, 943 whose opinion is completely shared by Harnack, 944 speaks about this in the same sense, believing that Augustine in his teaching about St. The Trinity had little regard (used) either with the Nicene symbol or with any dogmatic formulas in general, and that the basis of his Trinitarian doctrine is rather “a well-known series of thoughts”, like the church teaching about the Trinity, Reuter continues. The West has never been as dependent on the Nicene confession as the East. The West, in the writings of Tertullian, Dionysius of Rome and others, had the aforementioned “series of thoughts” with which it was completely satisfied and which still contained a remnant of that “ἒν πρόσωπον”, which Pope Callistus affirmed (Philos. IX, 12) and which still slips into the Augustinian expression “non ut illud diceretur” (scil. "tres personae"). Seeberg is expressed in approximately the same way in this case. “The whole trinitarian construction of Augustine,” he says, 945, “becomes only a simple logical exercise (nur ein logisches Exerzitium), when the Persons of the Trinity are resolved into simple relations (relations) and when the Trinity, in the end, is nothing more than the contemplation of the One God from various points of view.” The above view of German Protestant theologians is also shared by the relatively more moderate French researcher of the Neoplatonic element in the speculative views of Bl. Augustine L. Grandgeorge. 946 Noting the generally Orthodox character of the Trinitarian concept of Bl. Augustine and, in particular, his connection with the ternary formula of St. Athanasius the Great, the named French author reveals the insurmountable difficulties with which Augustine was confronted by the doctrine he had adopted. Like all learned theologians who have ever attempted to give a speculative justification for the Trinitarian dogma, “and Augustine, if he wanted for his part to offer a rational interpretation of it, had to lean towards either tritheism or modalism. It was to this latter, irresistibly carried away by the basic desire of his spirit for unity, that Augustine had to inevitably lean. Indeed, and this is the point that most noticeably separates him from Plotinus, Augustine has a modalism, more or less Sabellian, of which Augustine himself was very likely not even aware of it, but which, nevertheless, is rooted in the depths of his doctrine. 948 It is true that Augustine himself verbally dissociates or protects himself from Sabellianism, that he directly rejects the heresy of Sabellius, that he does not want to simultaneously admit that the unity of the Divine essence is the unity of the Person, but the analogies from which he proceeds (from which he sets out in his rational-psychological explanation of the doctrine of the Trinity) sufficiently prove to us, in the opinion of Grandgeorge, that Augustine was not hostile to those teachings that replaced the Persons (of the Holy Trinity) with simple images (modes) of being and action” 949 (these analogies are further listed by the French author). 950 We encounter exactly the same tendentious understanding and false conclusions among some rationalist theologians in relation to Augustine’s Trinitarian term “relatio” or even “personae,” a term by which Augustine designated the Divine Persons. According to the aforementioned scientists of the theological-rationalistic trend, Augustine did not recognize the real difference in God of three Persons on the grounds that he defined this difference with the abstract term “relation” (relatio), and even used the church name of Persons personae as if hesitantly and with reservations like the following: “if only They (the Divine Hypostases) can be called so, (i.e., Persons)” 951 or “they say three Faces are not there to say anything, but not to remain silent.” 952 Regarding Augustine's last expression, 953 Prof. A. Harnack notes: “whoever could write – dictum est “tres personae” non ut illud diceretur, sed non taceretur – he, of course, did not find three Persons in a single substance (Deity).” 954 Meanwhile, the true meaning of this expression in Augustine is that no human word, no term is able to adequately define the facts and relations of the inner life of the Trinitarian Deity, although these very facts and relations are higher and beyond any doubt in their unconditionally reliable reality. And although they cannot be expressed or depicted in any word, and although God, who surpasses every mind and every language, would be most worthy of being honored with silence, 955 but since the heretics with their false teachings about this create temptation in the Church, Augustine, for his part, decides to speak about these highest and completely (in their essence) incomprehensible objects (dares to enclose them in terms - the concepts of our meager human language and our poor human thought). Another of the expressions we cited above, 956 bl., has the same meaning. Augustine. Using in application to the Persons of St. The Trinity term “personae”, Augustine, as already noted, makes the following restrictive clause: “if only one can call Them Persons” (si ita dicendae sunt). The meaning of this expression is that the properties of our limited personality and the concept of Person in relation to the Triune God cannot be completely transferred to the Divine Person - only analogous and therefore only relative. Any other understanding of the meaning of these and similar expressions is bl. Augustine about the Persons of the Holy Trinity is unacceptable and impossible. Yes indeed. Could Augustine, this most educated church teacher of his time and the most authoritative bishop of the Catholic Church, think and teach in this case in disagreement and contrary to Orthodox consciousness? 957 Could he have held to a pantheistic-Sabellian understanding of the basic and central tenet of the Christian faith? Of course not! From the long and painful history of religious and philosophical quests of Bl. Augustine, so truthfully and so colorfully depicted by him in his Confessions, as well as from his other numerous literary works, we know how much Augustine longed for the Living Personal God and close, direct communication with Him. We also know that the idea of ​​a Living Personal God was the most dear idea for Augustine, the absence of which in Neoplatonism pushed him away from the latter and which he, of course, would never sacrifice to the philosophical interests of his rational-trinitarian construction. 958 From a comparison of the Trinitarian speculation of Bl. Augustine and the Trinitarian metaphysics of Plotinus 959, one can clearly see that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are for the church-theological consciousness of the bl. Augustine is not a trinity of mere abstract forms or impersonal moments in the Divinity, but in the church sense of the word, the Holy Trinity of Divine Persons, the Living and Life-Giving Trinity. To this Highest and Most Perfect Trinity, as a Personal Being, the Most Real and Life-Giving, he repeatedly turns with heartfelt prayer, offering Her an inspired song of praise and thanksgiving. With the same solemn prayer hymn in honor of the Holy Trinity, Blessed. Augustine also completes his special work about Her, “De Trinitate Dei.” 960 Therefore, our Russian dogmatist, His Eminence Bishop, quite rightly notes. Sylvester 961 regarding all kinds of accusations from Bl. Augustine in Sabellianism: “too hastily and indiscriminately,” he says, “those of the Protestant theologians act who, on the basis of what Augustine called the Trinitarian Hypostases as the relations of God, directly attribute to him an inclination towards Sabellianism. In support of their judgment, in addition, they also point out that Augustine was the first of the teachers to teach about numerical unity in God, while the Nicene fathers only allowed for tribal unity. But what is meant by numerical unity? If we understand it in the monarchian sense, that is, in the sense of the individual, then such unity was not allowed not only by the Nicene fathers, but also by Augustine. But if we understand by numerical unity in God the unity of His essence, then in this respect he does not differ significantly from the Nicene fathers. If the latter turned to the analogy of generic unity to explain the trinity of Persons in God, with the unity of the being, then they did not at all think of transferring it entirely to the being of God, always recognizing its weakness and insufficiency. Augustine “held this same view, but expressed it more directly and clearly.” Western European theologians of the rationalist school, seeing in the thoughts of Bl. Augustine about the unity of the essence of the three Hypostases, hidden modalistic tendencies, as one of the proofs of the validity of these statements, also refer to the fact that Augustine assimilated all the Old Testament theophanies (theophanies) 962 not only to the Son of God, but to the entire Trinity and generally saw in them the revelation of all three Persons of the Holy Trinity, and not only Her second Hypostasis. It's true that bl. Augustine (as well as some other teachers of the Church) expressed the view that in the so-called theophanies or theophany of the Old Testament, not only the Son of God, but equally all three Persons of the Divine Trinity, accepted the teaching. 963 It is also true that Bl. Augustine, who defended this opinion against the false conclusions of the Arians of his time, according to the Right Reverend Sylvester, “at the same time himself allowed a kind of extreme.” 964 He precisely began to “affirm not only that the Old Testament theophany, as the kind of phenomena that occurred through created images, did not contain anything essentially belonging to an incorporeal Being, but served only as a means to His bodily detection, but also that all such phenomena, for example, the appearances to Adam in paradise, to Jacob, Moses, etc., had the same nature of detection The Deities are external, and therefore must be indifferently attributed to all three Persons of the Divine.” 965 But the conclusion that rationalist theologians draw from here is unfair, asserting on this basis some kind of Sabellian merging of the Divine Hypostases by Augustine or Augustine’s inclination towards such a merging. The above-mentioned certain extremeness of Augustine in this view is explained by his polemical tendencies. Augustine contrasted his thoughts about the participation in the Old Testament feophanies of all three Divine Persons, and not just the Son of God, with that false position and the false conclusion based on it (who did not recognize the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son) of the Arians, “that invisibility constitutes an essential property of God the Father, while visibility is an essential property of the Son, and therefore (de) the Father and the Son are essentially different.” 966 How right are the rationalist theologians in this case when, on the basis given above, they cast the shadow of Sabellianism on the Trinitarian dogmatics of the bl. Augustine, it is quite obvious already from what has been said, especially if we keep in mind that “although Augustine allowed a certain kind of extreme in his view of the Old Testament theophany, he nevertheless firmly supported that understanding of the appearance of God to Abraham at the oak of Mamre, which assumed here the appearance of God in the form of a three-person. 967 Thus, Augustine clearly and definitely speaks about this theophany in literally the following expressions: “Abraham meets three, but worships the One. Having seen the three, he understood the mystery of the Trinity, and having worshiped, as it were, the One, he confessed the One God in three persons. It remains for us to consider one more reason given by Western rationalist theologians in favor of Augustine’s Sabellian or modalistic understanding of the unity of the essence of the three Divine Persons. We are talking specifically about the famous analogies of Bl. Augustine, which he drew in such abundance and with such skill from the powers and functions of the human soul and which he later used with such success to clarify and substantiate the trinity in God. Indeed, the Trinitarian analogies of Bl. Augustine, even the highest - psychological ones - borrowed from the natural organization and functions of the human spirit, do not logically lead to the church understanding of the doctrine of the unity of essence and trinity of Persons in God, but only to the trinity of moments in the life of the One-Person Divine Spirit. Trinity, from the point of view of the rational-psychological construction of bl. Augustine, only exists or is in God, and is not God Himself. Insufficiently distinguishing and demarcating among themselves the traditional confessional or general church, on the one hand, and the rational-philosophical or strictly Augustinian (theological), on the other hand, elements in the trinitarian views of the bl. Augustine, the aforementioned rationalist theologians, data and logical conclusions from the speculative theological speculation of Bl. They want to transfer Augustine about the Holy Trinity entirely and without a trace into the immanent life of the Trinitarian Divinity. Naturally, with such an attitude to the matter, they are forced to impose a prominent and clearly defined teaching of the bl. Augustine about the unity of God (a teaching that is strictly ecclesiastical in its origin, main meaning and ultimate goals) is not only anti-church, but even anti-Christian in nature (pantheistic monarchist modalism). 970 In this regard, we can note here, first of all, the general position that “comparatio non est approbatio.” And it must be said that this rule had special significance when applied to Augustine’s trinitarian analogies, as being especially characteristic of Augustine’s own understanding and assessment of these analogies. Then the objection of Protestant rationalists under consideration should lose ground if we remember how clearly Augustine realized and how often and energetically he expressed the idea of ​​​​the decisive inconsistency of all the Trinitarian analogies or images he cited, borrowed from the created world, with their Absolute Prototype. The distances and differences here, in all these analogies, ultimately, according to Augustine’s consciousness and recognition, are greater than similarities or similarities, not to mention sameness or complete equality. It must also be borne in mind that the direct or logically following from the Trinitarian analogies of the bl. Augustine not only did not draw conclusions in relation to the church teaching about the Holy Trinity himself, but on the contrary, he himself even denied their possibility and legality, warning for his part and others against such conclusions. However, the rationalist theologians themselves are aware and note that Augustine did not attach completely decisive importance to his analogies, considering them far from sufficient for the purpose for which he used them. So, for example, the German Protestant theologian R. See b erg consideration of the Trinitarian teaching of Bl. Augustine concludes with the following remark: “Augustine did not renounce the living consciousness that all his experiments in the field of Trinitarian dogma were in fact insufficient.” 971 So, the conclusion from all the thoughts and statements of Bl. Augustine is very clear and definite on this issue: no analogy can be given completely decisive importance in the matter of knowledge of God; one cannot dwell on any of them in one’s thoughts entirely, but it is necessary to rise in thought from the finite image higher to His Infinite Prototype, infinitely rising above everything finite. According to Augustine, in the sphere of human thinking only one side always prevails: either essential unity, but without personal difference, or this last, but then without the first. 972 Augustine repeatedly and in a wide variety of expressions notes that our thought is powerless to understand, and our language is even more powerless to express in words those highest and most incomprehensible relationships that exist in the Divinity. 973 Terms-formulas, according to the consciousness of bl. Augustine, originated and are used not in order to fully express the inner life of the Absolute Divinity, but then in order not to remain silent about the unity and trinity in God against heretics. 974 Therefore, according to Augustine, Trinitarian formulas have only a negative meaning, preventing false ideas about the Holy Trinity. 975 These are a kind of protective definitions with which the Church wants to protect and protect our shaky and weak mind from all sorts of reefs or pitfalls that inevitably encounter it on the path of its Trinitarian research. “Clearly aware of his powerlessness to say satisfactorily anything positive about the Trinity,” notes the Most Reverend Sylvester, 976 touching on the indicated point of view of the Western father we are studying, “Augustine with the same clarity outlines the negative side of the subject, namely those, so to speak, pitfalls in the doctrine of the Trinity, over which he considered it dangerous to stumble both for others and, above all, for himself, and which, of course, he always tried to avoid.” A classic place that defines the said point of view. Augustine on the subject under discussion and on the negative tasks of his discussion, says: “If our thoughts and words are powerless to understand and designate the relationship that exists in the Divinity between one and three, then we are obliged to at least know and express with certainty what is contrary to pious faith and what must be avoided so as not to fall into error. Thus, one cannot say that there are three essences in the Trinity, lest (like the Arians) one introduce division into what constitutes unconditional equality. It is also impossible to say that there are not even three in the Divinity, as Sabellius said, who thereby fell into error. It is necessary to say this: in the Divinity there is one being, and there are three Hypostases or Persons, three not in the sense of their division, but their isolation.” 977 This is the true voice of the teachings of Blessed. Augustine about the Holy Trinity, a doctrine that he precisely and separately formulated from the positive and negative sides. The established (negative or by association of contrast) formula of church teaching of Bl. Augustine on the Holy Trinity, the very point of view on the subject, which assigns to faith the dominant importance in this matter and instills an extreme degree of caution for the activity of reason, clearly shows us that the Augustinian concept of the Trinitarian dogma decisively denies both the materialistic (naturalistic) division of the being (Arianism) and the pantheistic (modalistic) fusion of Hypostases (Sabellianism). Both are extremes, equally alien to the truth, which lies in the middle. Our learned defender of Orthodoxy went to her along the middle or royal path. We have already noted 978 that in his attempt to rationally construct the dogma of the Holy Trinity, Augustine proceeds from religious faith and its symbolic confession. Faith in the church dogma of the Holy Trinity - this is the precedent for his entire trinitarian speculation. His warning remarks about the incomprehensibility of the way of existence of the Divine Trinity, 979 about Her endless elevation above everything finite, about our complete powerlessness in this case, putting forward faith in its place as the main element of knowledge of God, and finally, his own extreme caution in applying his research to the general church, symbolic confession of this teaching - greatly limit even in his own eyes the meaning of his rational construction of the dogma of the Holy Trinity. This circumstance, extremely important for the correct understanding and assessment of the Augustinian church teaching on the Holy Trinity, is, apparently, not sufficiently appreciated by Western Protestant rationalist theologians and Ultramontane Catholic scientists. Thanks to this, the first see in the theological system of Bl. Augustine has the most diverse, to the point of complete opposite, elements from acosmic pantheism to cosmic monism (naturalism), between which, moreover, in their opinion, deistic and, finally, theistic data (currents) also find a place for themselves. The second (Catholic theologians) want at all costs, one might think, for confessional purposes, the church-dogmatic teaching of the bl. Augustine about the Holy Trinity, both in its whole and in its parts, must certainly be inserted into the exact boundaries or narrow framework of the rational-psychological construction of the Trinitarian dogma established by Augustine, contrary to the clear and repeated testimony of Augustine himself about the distant inconsistency between them. 980 To do this in this case means, contrary to Augustine himself, to recognize the finite, natural reason and the results of its research as having a decisive significance in the matter of cognition of the Infinite, Supernatural being. That is why, if we consider the church teaching of Bl. Augustine about the Holy Trinity only within the framework of his rationally constructed philosophical scheme of Trinitarian dogma, then it will be necessary to impose on Augustine not only the completely theistic “Filioque” 981 of the later Roman Catholic doctrine, but also a completely pantheistic concept of the Divine Hypostases, as simple moments or impersonal modes in the life of a strictly One Deity, 982 as, indeed, theologians do in this case rationalist direction. 983 How fair, or rather unfair, both orthodox Catholics and rationalist Protestants are in allowing such methods of explaining Augustinian views, unacceptable from a church-theological point of view, is self-evidently clear to every true Catholic, alien in his understanding of Augustine to the extremes of confessionalism. We have in mind the predominantly Christian, especially church-hierarchical period of his life. G. R. Derzhavin. Ode "God". Ad. Dorner. Augustinus. Sein theologisches System und seine religionsphilosophische Anschauung. Berlin. 1873. S. 2. Ibid. S. 3 Wed. SS. 323–324. Migne. Patrol. curs. compl., ser. lat., t. 32, col. 872. Soliloqu. lib. I, cap. II, no. 7; Russian translation (ed. Kyiv Spiritual Academy) part II, p. 233 cfr. Migne, t. 32, col. 898. Soliloqu. 1. II, p. XV, no. 27; Russian lane II, 286. M. t. 32, col. 883. Soliloqu. I, XV, 27; Russian lane II, 256. Migne, t. 32, col. 1017. De ordine 1. II, p. XVIII, no. 47; p. lane II, 218. Prof. Ad. Harnack. Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte. Freib. im Br. 1890. Bd. III, S. 98. Cf. K. Scipio. Des Aurelius Augustinus Metaphysic. Leipzig. 1886. S. 14 ffgg. Ad. Harnack. Op. cit. S. 100. Ritter. Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie. Bd. II, S. 203. cf. H. Schöler. Augustins Verhältnis zu Plato in genetischer Entwicklung. Jena. 1897. S. 57. Dr. J. Storz. Die Philosophie des heiligen Augustinus. Freib. im Br. 1882. S. 23 ff. Migne, t. 34, col. 22.De doctr. christ. I, VII, 7; Russian lane (non-academic edition 1835) p. 21. M. t. 32, col. 1077–1078. De quant, anim. XXXIV, 77; p. lane II, 413–414. M.t. 32, col. 1355. De mor. Man. II, XI, 24. M. t. 32, col. 1248. De lib. arbitr. II, VI, 14. |M. t. 38, col. 670. Serm. CXVII, X, 15. M. t. 34. col. 133. De ver. relig. With. XIII; p. lane VII, 22. M i gne, t. 32, col. 665. Confessions. 1. I, p. VI, no. 10; p. nep.I, 9. Migne, t. 42, col. 931. De Trinitate Dei. 1. VI, p. X, n. 11. Migne, t. 34, col. 32.De doctr. christ. I, XXXII, 35; Russian lane (non-academic ed. 1835) p. 53. Migne, t. 32, col. 742. Confess. VII, X, 16; p. lane I, 181. Ibid, col. 745; op. cit. VII, XVIII, 24; p. lane I, 188, etc. "Substantia", vel si melius appellatur, "essentia", quam Graeci "ούσίαν" vocant. Migne, t. 42, col. 912. De Trinit. D. V, II, 3. Migne, t. 42, col. 943. De Trinit. D. VII, VI, 11 cnfr. col. 945. Prof. Th. Gangauf. Des heiligen Augustinus speculatire Lehre von Gott dem Dreieinigen. Augsburg. 1865. S. 128. Migne, t. 36, col. 844. Enarr in psalm. LXVIII, sermo I, n. 5. Migne, t. 32, col. 871. Solil. I, I, 4; Russian lane II, 230. Migne, t. 42, col. 912. De Trinit. Dei V, II, 3. Migne, t. 34, col. 134. De ver. relig. XIV, 28; p. lane VII, 24 and many more. etc. Migne, t. 32, col. 871 (cnfr. col. 870). Solil. I, I, 4; p. lane II, 231 (cf. 229) and many more. dr. M. t. 32, col. 667. Confess. I, IX, 14; p. lane I, 13 (cf. 39, 40). M.t. 32, col. 1078. De quant. anim. With. XXXIV, no. 77; p. lane II, 414. Migne, t. 42, col. 627–628. Contra adversar. leg. et prophet. I, XX, 40. M. t. 37, col. 1090. Enarr. in p.s. LXXXV, 12. M. t. 41, col. 270. De Civit. D. IX, ХVI, 1; Russian lane IV, 88. Migne, t. 32, col. 1015; p. lane II, 215. De Ordine II, XVI, 44. M. t. 32, col. 1017; p. lane II, 219. De Ord. II, XVIII, 47. Migne, t. 42, col. 939. De Trinit. D. VII, IV, 7. Migne, t. 37, col. 1090. Enarr. in p.s. LXXXV Serm. a, n. 12. M. t. 34, col. 21; p. lane (non-academic ed.), page 20 De doctr. Christ, I. 6. M. t. 35, col. 1588. In Joann. evang. tract. XXIII, p. V, n. 9. M.t. 42, col. 948. De Trinit. D. VIII, II, 3. Migne, t. 32, col. 704–705; p. lane I, 92–93. Confess. IV, XVI, 28–29. Migne, t. 42, col. 912. De Trinit. D. V, I, 2. Migne, t. 32, col. 871; p. lane II, 231. Soliloqu. I, I, 4. See note. 157 and approx. 170. Migne, t. 34, col. 21.De doctr. christ. I, VI, 6; p. lane (non-academic) p. 21. Migne, t. 34, col. 134. De ver. relig. XIV, 28; p. lane VII, 24. Migne, t. 42, col. 931. De Trinit. D. VI, X, 11. Substantia creatrix mundi. Migne, t. 33, col. 837. Epist. 187 ad Dardan. With. IV, no. 17. Creator et animae et corporis. M.t. 33, col. 517. Epist. 137 ad Volus. c. 2, no. n. 5. 6. Migne, t. 41, col. 220; p. lane III, 385. De Civit. D. VII, 30: administrator omnia, quae creavit. ubique totus esse. Migne, t. 33, col. 517. Epist. ad Volus. c. 11, no. 4. ubique praesens. M.t. 34, col. 1277. De Serm. Domini in monte II, V, 18. Deus unus creator. Migne, t. 42, col. 878. De Trinit. D. III, IX, 18. Deus solus verus Creator – Migne, t. 34, col. 603.Quest. 1. II, qu. XXI and many more etc. Deus ex factura intelligitur, qualis sit. Migne, t. 40, col. 662. De symb. ad catechum. c. 2, no. 2 and many more etc. Migne, t. 32, col. 745. Confess. VII, XVIII, 23; p. lane I, 187 and many more. etc. See the Xth book about this. op. Augustine "Confession" and others. Migne, t. 32, col. 779–810; r. lane I, 268–321 and many others. etc. Migne, t. 36, col. 944. Enarr. in p.s. LXXIII, n. 25. M. t. 44, col. 211–212. De Spirit, et litter, p. XII, no. 19. M. t. 40 col. 662. De symb. ad catech. c. 2, no. 2. M.t. 32, col. 745. Confess. VII, XVII, 23: p. lane 1, 187 Wed. 192 and many more etc. Statement and solution of bl. Augustine's truth of the existence of the Supreme Being makes it possible for his later scientific researchers to reveal in his varied and thoughtful judgments on this issue the presence of those elements from which the currently known so-called cosmological (etiological and teleological aspects) and especially anthropological (psychological, moral) proofs of the existence of God are constructed (although, perhaps, in a slightly different form). For details, see S. v. Endert. Der Gottesbeweis in der paristischen Zeit mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Augustins. Freib. im. Br. 1869. SS. 71–202. Th. Gangauf. Des heiligen Augustinus speculative Lehre von Gott dem Dreieinigen. Augsburg. 1865.SS. 35–128. “If we consider Augustine’s speculative theology as a whole,” says N. Schöler, who attempted to genetically trace some points of the speculative theology of Bl. Augustine in his relation to the philosophy of Plato, we will find that he tries less to prove the existence of God than to depict His being.” (Op. cit., S. 55 vrgl. S. 58). “In the latter respect it is more thorough and detailed than in the former.” (Ibid. S. 58). Migne, t. 32, col. 662; p. lane I, 3. Confess. I, IV, 4. About Dei natura qualis - see Migne, t. 35, col. 1876 ​​and many more etc. About quomodo Deus cogitandus – Migne, t. 35, col. 2035 and many more etc. Migne, t. 32. col. 1015; r. lane II, 215. De ord. II, XVI, 44. Migne, t. 32, col. 1017; p. lane II, 219. De ord. II, XVIII, 47. Migne, t. 42, col. 1057. De Trinit. D. XV, 1, 1. M. t. 34, col. 790.Quest. in Heptateuch. 1. VI, p. XXIX and many more etc. Migne, t. 38, col. 665. Serm. CXVII, V, 7. M. t. 34, col. 21; p. p. (non-academic) p. 20. De doctr. christ. 1. I, p. VI, no. 6. M.t. 34, col. 333; p. lane VIII, 24. De Genes. ad litt. V, XVI, 34. M. t. 37, col. 1090. Enarr. in p.s. LXXXV, 12. Migne, t. 34, col. 21; p. lane (non-academic) page 20. De doctr. christ. I, VI, 6 cnfr. M.t. 42, col. 627. Contr. advers. leg. et prophet. I, XX, 40. Ibidem. Cnfr. Migne, t. 42, col. 142. Contra Adim. Manich. discip. 1. II, p. XI. M.t. 38, col. 665. Serm. CXVII, V, 7. That God in the present life is semper quaerendus sit and quaerendus est inveniendus, see Migne, t. 35, col. 1804. Tract. 63 in Joann. ev. n. 1. For this purpose, man was created rational (Migne, t. 42, col. 1058. De Trinit. D. XI, II, 2) and verbal (Migne, t. 34, col. 21. De dooctr. christ. I, VI, 6). Prof. A.I. Brilliantov. The influence of Eastern theology on Western in the works of John Scotus Erigena. St. Petersburg. 1898. p. 106. Th. Gangauf. Des hl. Augustinus specul. Lehre....SS. 129–130. Cm . Migne, t. 33, col. 459. Epist. 120 ad Consent, p. III, no. 13. F. Bohringer. Aurelius Augustinus, Bischof von Hippo. Stuttgart. 1877. Bd. II, p. 276. Migne, t. 42, col. 1057–1058. De Trinit. D. XV, II, 2. Migne, t. 32, col. 721; r. lane I, 130. Confess. VI, III, 4. What Deum existimare corporeum nefas est – Migne, t. 33, col. 622–623. Epist. CXLVIII. With. 1, nn. 1–3. That Deus – spiritus incommutabilis – M. t. 35, col. 1588. Tract. 23 in Joann. ev. n. 9. M.t. 42, col. 1062. De Trinit. XV, V, 7. M. t. 42, col. 551.De nat. boni contr. Man. With. 1.M.t. 32, col. 811. Confess. XI, IV, 6; Russian lane I, 329. M. t. 37, col. 1623. Enarr. in p.s. 121, no. 6. M.t. 41, col. 231. De civit. D. VIII, VI; p. lane IV, 14. M. t. 34, col. 137. De ver. relig. c. 18, no. 35; p. lane VII, 30. In his apophatic theology, Bl. Augustine quite persistently pursues the idea of ​​the complete inadequacy and incommensurability of God and the world and their irreducibility to each other, both in their essence and in their properties (that is, he affirms the idea not only of their qualitative difference or dissimilarity in their essence, but also of their complete opposition to each other in this case). In this regard, he establishes the difference between the concepts of "creage" and "gignere", as ways of the origin of being from God, and teaches about the origin of the world ex nihilo precisely through the Divine "cgeatio", i.e., the free creative act of the Will of God. Migne, t. 42, col. 547–548. De act. cum Fel. Man. II, 18. M. t. 32, col. 1224. De lib. arbitr. I, II, 5. M. t. 32, col. 1224. De anim. et ejus orig. II, 3, 5. cnfr. De natur boni contr. Manich. cap. 27; De act. cum Fel. II, 17. 20. 21. M. t. 42, col. 580 Contra Second. Man. With. IV. M.t. 42, col. 191 Contra ep. Man. With. XXV, n. 27. M. t. 41, col. 350 De Civ. D. XII, II; p. lane IV, 236. Quotes in previous note 206. Migne, t. 32, col. 1354. De mor. Manich. II, XI, 20. M. t. 32, col. 811. Confess. XI, IV, 6; p. lane I, 329. M. t. 35, col. 1588. Tract. 23 in Joann. ev., n. 9. M.t. 34, col. 333. De Genes ad litter. V, XVI, 34; p. lane VIII, 24. The possibility of any change is tantamount to the possibility of non-existence - Migne, t. 42, col. 912. De Trinit. D. V, II, 3, etc. Migne, t. 32, col. 735–736; p. lane I, 164. Confess. VII, IV, 6. Bl. Augustine with particular insistence emphasizes immutability in the being of God as its central predicate and its correlate is absolute simplicity or uncomplicatedness. The logical and vital-psychological reasons for this are revealed and explained from the entire long and complex history of the life and thought of the famous Ipponian philosopher-theologian. See about this in our printed work: “Plotinus and Bl. Augustine in their attitude to the Trinitarian problem. Kazan. 1911", pp. 13–14,18–20, 21–22. There will be a special speech about this to come. Migne, t. 35, col. 1385. Tract. 1 in Joann. evang. With. 1, n. 8. M.t. 34, col. 362. De Genes. ad litt. VII, XI, 17; p. lane VIII, 80. M. t. 42, col. 518. Contr. Faust. XXXIII, 9. M. t. 34, col. 23.De doctr. christ. I, IX, 9. M. t. 32, col. 745. Confess. VII, 17, 23; p. trans. I, 187–188 cnfr. ibid. col. 735–736; p. lane I, 164, op. cit. VII, IV, 6. Nihil aliud dicam esse (compared to Plato), nisi idipsum esse. Migne, t. 32, col. 1321. De mor. Eccles. cathol. I, XIV, 24. cnfr. M.t. 35, col. 1548 Tract. 19 in Joann. ev. With. V, n. 11. M.t. 32, col. 665. Confess. I, VI, 10; p. lane I, 9. Est prima et summa vita, cui non est aliud vivere et aliud esse, sed idem est esse et vivere. Migne, t 42, col. 931. De Trinit. D. VI, X, 11 cnfr. op. cit. XV, V, 7. col. 1062 and many more etc. Migne, t. 33, col. 575. Epist. 140 ad Honor. c. 35, no. 81. M.t. 32, col. 828; p. lane I, 375. Confess. XII, VII, 7. M. t. 39, col. 1621–1622. Enarr. in p.s. 121, no. 5. M.t. 32, col. 1345. De morib. Man. II, I. 1. M. t. 38, col. 986. Serm. 182, p. III, no. 3. cnfr. M.t. 34, col. 357. De Genes, ad litt. VII, II, 3; p. lane VIII, 70. M. t. 33, col. 439. Epist. 118 ad Diosc. n. 15. ...quia verum esse, incommutabile esse est, quod ille (sc. Deus) solus est Migne, t. 37, col. 1741. Enarr. in ps CXXXIV, n. 4. cnfr. M.t. 42, col. 942. De Trin. VII, V, 10. M. t. 36, col. 430. Enarr. in p.s. XXXVIII, no. 22 cnfr. M.t. 37, col. 1300–1301. n. 10. M. t. 32. col. 742. Confess. VII, XI, 17; p. lane I, 181. ut in Ejus comparatione ea, quae facta sunt, non sint – Migne. t. 37, col. 1741. Enarr. in p.s. CXXXIV, no. 4 cnfr. M.t. 32, col. 811. Confess. XI, IV, 6; p. lane I, 273. Cum enim quaereret (Moyses) nomen Dei, hoe dictum est: “Ego sum, Qui sum.” Haec dices filiis Israel: “Qui est” misit me ad vos. Quid est “Est”?.. Quia maneo in aeternum, quia mutari non possum. Migne, t. 38, col. 61. Serm. VI, III, 4. M. t. 36, col. 122. Enarr. in p.s. IX, n. 11. M.t. 37, col. 1311. Serm. II, no. 10. Ibid. col. 1740–1741 et 1742–1743, n. n. 4. 6. M. t. 34, col. 32.De doctr. christ. With. XXXII, no. 35. M. t. 42, col. 912 et 942. De Trinit. D. V, II, 3 et VII, V, 10. Migne, t. 35, col. 1685. Tract. 39 in Joann. ev. With. VIII, no. 8. Migne, t. 38, col. 66. Serm. VII, 7. Migne, t. 42, col. 931. De Trinit. D. VI, X, 11. Migne, t. 32. col. 736. Confess. VII, IV, 6; Russian lane (extremely inaccurate) I, 165. Deus, omnium rerum, quae sunt, incommutabile principium est Migne, t. 32, col. 1077. De quant. anim. c. XXXIV, no. 77; p. lane II, 413 and many more. etc. About that qualis est Dei pulchritudo – Migne, t. 37, col. 1075. Enarr. in LXXXIV ps. n. 9. M.t. 32, col. 666. Confess. I, VII, 12; p. lane I, 11 and many more. etc. M. t. 34, col. 131 (Deus-omnis concordiae caput). De ver. relig. With. XI, no. 21; p. lane VII, 19 and many more. etc. Deus-bonum et pulchrum, in quo et a quo et per quem bona et pulchra sunt, quae bona et pulchra sunt omnia – M. t. 32, col. 870. Solil. I, I, 3; p. lane II, 229. Deus summum et optimum bonum – Migne, t. 32, col. 735. Confess. VII, IV, 6; p. lane I, 164. Unum summum et verum bonum – M. t. 32, col. 834. Conf. XII, XVI, 23; p. lane I, 390. Boni et bonorum bonum – M. t. 37, col. 1742. Enarr. in 134 ps., n. 6. Deus solus a se ipso bonus, a quo caetera bona - on this see Migne, t. 38, col. 119. Serm. XVI, p. V, n. 5.cnfr. col. 185. Serm. XXIX, p. l, n. 1 and col. 559. Serm. XC, n. 2. Deus – beatitudo, in quo et a quo et per quem beatata sunt omnia. Migne, t. 32, col. 870. Solil. I, I, 3; p. lane II, 229. Ex plenitudine bonitatis tuae creatura tua subsistit. M.t. 32, col. 845. Confess. XIII, II, 2; p. lane I, 420. Adhaerere Deo, participate Deo-totum bonum, nihil melius est etc. Migne, t. 36, col. 928. Enarr in LXXII ps. n. 34.cnfr. M.t. 34, col. 132. De ver. relig. XI, 20; p. lane VII, 20 and many more. etc. Deus – “source of joy” and our eternal “peace” - M. t. 32, col. 752. Confess. VIII, III, 8; r. lane I, 206 cnfr. X, XXII, 32, col. 793; p. lane 294 and many more dr. M. t. 32, col. 601. Confess. I, I, 1; p. lane I, 1 cnfr. col. 868. Confess. XV, XXXVI, 51; r. paragraph I, 471 and many others. etc. Sunt alii aliis sanctiores... abundantius habendo habitatorem Deum. Quod Deus ubique sit totus, quando in aliis est amplius, in aliis minus? In se ipso esse ubique totum. Non ergo in eis (sc. hominibus); quia alii plus eum capiunt, alii minus – Migne, t. 33, col. 838. Epist. CLXXXVII, n. 17 cnfr. col. 839. op. cit. With. VI, no. 19: Deus in quibus habitat, habeant eum pro suae capacitatis diversitate, alii-amplius, alii-minus; cnfr. Ibid. n. 20. However, this Platonic idea of ​​the “communion” of the creature with God the Creator (adhaerere Deo, participatio) in the speculative theology of Bl. Augustine, in the general, basic sense of his Christian views, is alien to the pantheistic character that it has in the philosophy of Plato and Plotinus. Migne, t. 33, col. 319. Epist. 92 ad Ital. n. 3. M.t. 38, col. 542. Serm. 88, 6, 6. Migne, t. 42, col. 1067: per imaginem hanc, quod nos sumus videremus utcumque a quo facti sumus, tamquam per speculum. De Trinit. D. XV, VIII, 14. Migne, t. 42, col. 957. De Trinit. D. VIII, VIII, 12. cnfr. col. 1063–1064; op. cit. XV, VI, 10. Migne, t. 34, col. 333. De Genes, ad litt. V, XVI, 34; p. lane VIII. 24–25. Ibid. col. 391; op. cit. VIII, XXVI, 48; p. lane VIII, 139. M.t. 36, col. 952. Enarr. in p.s. LXXIV, 9: Quem (sc. Deum) nemo permittitur ignorare. Migne, t. 38, col. 670. Serm. CXVII, X, 15: vis Illum (sc. Deum) mente contingere? Purga mentem, purga cor tuum... Mundum fac oculum cordis: beati enim mundi corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt. Sani sint oculi, et erit lux illa gaudium; non sint oculi sani, erit lux illa tormentum – Migne, t. 38, col. 366. Serm. LIII, p. VI, no. 6. See quotes above, approx. 227. Migne, t. 32, col. 1161. De musica VI, I, 1. M. t. 32, col. 807. Confess. X, XL, 65; p. lane I, 318; ibid. col. 807, op. cit. X, XLI, 66; p. lane I, 318. M. t. 34, col. 479. De Genes. ad litt. XII, XXXI, 59; p. lane VIII, 306. M. t. 35, col. 1517. Tract. 15 in Joann. ev. With. IV, no. 19.cnfr. M.t. 32, col. 877. Soliloqu. I, VIII, 15; p. lane II, 243. M. t. 36, col. 893. Enarr. in p.s. LXX. Serm. 2, no. 3. M.t. 41, col. 232. De Civit. D. VIII, c. 7; p. lane IV, 16. M. t. 32, col. 742. Confess. VII, X, 16; p. lane I, 180. oculus animae, oculus cordis. M.t. 41, col. 799. De Civ. D. XXII, 29, 3. capere ex eo (Deo) aliquid possumus, Deum tamen totum capere non possumus. Migne, t. 37, col. 1872. Enarr. in p.s. 144, no. 6. comprehensio, - understanding, concept, understanding, comprehension - Migne, t. 33, col. 606. Epist. 147 ad Paul. With. IX, n 21. Migne, t. 38, col. 155, 366. Serm. XXIII, p. 1.n. 1 and LIII, VI, 6. Migne, M. 40, col. 71: Merces enim cognitionis meritis redditur; credendo autem meritum comparatur. De divers. quaest. LXVIII, n. 3. Migne, t. 33, col. 607. 608. t. 33, col. 618. 620. 621. Migne, t. 36, col. 928. Enarr. in 77 ps. n. 34. For example, St. Athanasius of Alexandria, the Great Cappadocian Fathers, etc. Migne, t. 38, col. 663–664. Serm. CXVII, p. III, no. 5. Ibid. col. 542. Serm. LXXXVIII, p. With. V–VI, n. n. 5–6. M.t. 40, col. 14.83Quest. qu. 12. M. t. 34, col. 23.De doctr. christ. I, X, 10; col. 40, II, VII, 11; p. lane (non-academic) pp. 25 and 73. M. t. 38, col. 1481. Enarr. in p.s. 113. Serm. 2, no. 1.M.t. 38, col. 663. Sermon 117, p. Ill, n. 5 cnfr. 53. 6.6: col. 366 and many more Friend. For the reason for this, see J. Storz, op. cit., S. 92. Quaerite faciem Ejus (Dei) semper – Migne, t. 42, col. 1057. De Trin. XV, II, 2. cnfr. M.t. 35, col. 1804. Tract. 63 in Joann. ev. n. 1. Migne, t. 42, col. 971. De Trinit. X, I, 1; ibid. col. 951. De Trin. VIII, IV, 6; ibid. col. 957–9, VIII, VIII, 12. M. t. 32, col. 742. VII, X, 16; p. lane I, 181 cnfr. ibid. col. 661. Confess. I, I, 1; p. lane I, 2, etc. Migne, t. 35, col. 1804. Tract. 63 in Joann. ev. from XIII, n. 1. Migne, t. 42, col. 951. De Trinit. D. VIII, IV, 6 cnfr. col. 957–958; VIII, VIII, 12, etc. For quotes, see notes. 225 and 226. Migne, t. 32, col. 697. Confess. IV, V, 10; p. lane I, 76; cnfr. col. 836; XII, XVIII, 27; p. lane I, 394 and many more. etc. Migne, t. 42, col. 957–959. De Trinit. VIII, VIII, 12 and many more. etc. Migne, t. 42, col. 965–966. De Trinit. D. IX, VI, 9; M.t. 32, col. 745. Confess. VII, XVII, 23; p. lane I, 187–188 and many more. etc. For quotes, see notes. 157 and 170. We will talk about this in more detail later. Wed. Migne, t. 32, col. 686. Confess. III, IV, 8; p. lane I, 51. Migne, t. 32, col. 661. Confess. I, I, 1; p. lane I, 1. See above, Part 1. Section 1. The teaching of the blessed. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, about God in His being: God is an absolute spiritual-personal Being. (Prof.) V. I. Nesmelov. The dogmatic system of St. Gregory of Nyssa. Kazan. 1887. Page 156. Confess. V, 20. Prof. I. V. Popov. Personality bl. Augustine. ,Theology Vestn. 1915 February. Page 362. (Prof.) V. I. Nesmelov. Quote cit., p. 123. Si enim comprehendis, non est Deus. Serm. CXVII, p. III, no. 5. Migne, t. 38 col. 663. De Trinitate Dei XV, II, 2. Migne, t. 42. col. 1057–1058. F. Bohringer. Aurelius Augustinus. Stuttgart. 1877. Bd. II, s. 294. De Civitate Dei XI, X, I. Migne, t. 41, col. 325; Russian translation IV, 189 cf. col. 326; p. paragraph IV, 192. The idea of ​​Divine immutability is realized with special force in the theological and philosophical consciousness of Blessed. Augustine and more often than other properties of God are stated by Augustine in his reasoning about the Infinite and Supreme Being. However, we consider it necessary to make a reservation here that although Divine immutability and its correlate - simplicity, apparently occupy a central position among other properties of the Divine Being and the idea of it is the most important integral of his apophatic concept of God, however, this simplicity - immutability, as a property of the Divine Being, according to Augustine, cannot at all be considered as more important, more essential and therefore more valuable, in comparison with others, property of God: all the properties of God, as we will see below, according to Augustine’s deep conviction, are equal and equivalent. Both will also be discussed further below. See Th. Gangauf, Des heil. Augustinus speculative Lehre von Gott dem Dreieinigen. Augsburg. 1865.SS. 150. 151. Creatura quoquealis, sicut est anima, est quidem in corporis comparatione simplicior: sine comparatione autem corporis multiplex est, etiam ipsa non simple spiritx. DeTrinit. D. VI, VI, 8. Migne, t. 42. col. 929. Wed. above col. 928. Tract. XLVIII in John. Ev. n. 6. Migne, t. 35, col. 1743. De Trinit. D. VI, VI, 8. M. t. 42, col. 929. See also Th. Gangauf, op. cit. SS. 150 etc. Wed. His own. Metaphysische Psychologie des heiligen Augustinus. Augsburg 1852. SS. 178–182. De Trinit. D. VI, IV, 6. Migne, t.42, col. 927. Tract. 48 in John. Ev. n. 6. M.t. 35, col. 1743. De Trinit. D. VIII, II, 3. Migne, t. 42, col. 948.cnfr. VI, VI, 8; col. 928. De lib. arbitr. II, VI, 14. M. t. 32, col. 1248. Enarr. in p.s. CXXXIV, no. 4. M.t. 37, col. 1741. De Trinit. D. II, XII, 2. Migne, t. 42, col. 768. Mutatio est nonnulla mors. Contra Maxim, ar. er. II, XII, 2. Migne, t. 42, col. 768. Tract. 38 in John. Ev. Therefore, Augustine calls the current earthly existence “mortal life” or “vital death”. Confess. 1, VI, 7; Migne, t. 32, col, 663; p. paragraph 1, 6. De Civit. D. XI, X, 2. Migne, t, 41, col. 326; p. paragraph IV, 190. De Civit. Dei XI, X, 1. Migne, t. 41, col. 325; p. paragraph IV, 189. Ibid., p. paragraph IV, 190: ideo simplex dicitur, quoniam quod habet, hoc est. non aliud est (sc. in Deo) qualitas, aliud substantia. De Civit. D. XI, X, 3. Migne, t. 41, col. 326; p. paragraph IV, 192. cnfr. De Trinit. D. XV, V, 8. M. t. 42, col. 1062. Prof. A. Harnack. Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte. Freib. im Br. 1890. Bd. III. S. 108. Anm. 4. De Trinit. D. VII, V, 10. Migne, t. 42, col. 942. De Trinit. D. V, II, 3. Migne, t. 42, col. 912 cnfr. V, VIII, 9 col. 917 etc. De Trinit. D. VI, IV, 6. Migne, t. 42, col. 927. De Trinit. D. XV, V, 8. Migne, t. 42, col. 1062. Tract. 48 in John. Ev., n. 6. Migne, t. 35, col. 1743: sic habet sapientiam, ut ipse sit sapientia, faciatqae sapientes: sic habet vitam, ut sit ipse vita, faciatque viventes. Situs vero, et habitus, et loca, et tempora; non proprie, sed translate ac per similitudines dicuntur in Deo. De Trinit. D. V, VIII, 9. Migne, t. 42, col. 917. De Trinit. D. V, V, 6. Migne, t. 42, col. 913–914, etc. De Civit. Dei XI, X, 3. Migne, t. 41, col. 326, p. paragraph IV, 192. cnfr. “non aliorum participatione” ibid, col. 327; p. paragraph IV, 192. Migne, t. 35, col. 1743. Tract. 48 in John. Ev., n. 6. De Trinit. D. XV, V, 8. Migne, t. 42. col. 1062. De Trinit. D. XV, V, 8. Migne, 42, col. 1062 etc. Dr. A. Dorner. Augustinus. Sein theologisches System und seine religionsphilosophische Anschauung. Berlin. 1873. SS. 21–22. “All the properties of the Divine Being,” says this Western researcher of the theological system and religious-philosophical worldview, Blessed. Augustine, - must be recognized as equally constitutive elements of His being, they are all of equal value. Otherwise, if they were of unequal dignity with each other, then the more valuable of them would at the same time be more significant, since the more important would be closer to the essence” Op. cit., S. 20 Wed. also Storz. Die Philosophic des hl. Augustinus. Freib. im Br. 1882. S. 183. De Civit. D. XI, X, 3. Migne, t. 41, col. 326–327; p. paragraph IV, 192. See, for example, prof. I. V. Popov. Life and development of Bl. Augustine before his baptism. Theologian Vestn. 1915, April, pp. 718. 730. Die letztere Tendenz (sc. ad simplicitatem Dei), - say A. Dorner, - stammt ohne Zweifel aus seinem Gegensatz gegen die Manichäer und seinem Anschluss an die Neoplatoniker. Op. cit., S. 18. De Trinit. Dei V, II, 3. Migne, t. 42, col. 912.cnfr. De Genes, ad litt. V, XVI, 34. M. t. 34, col. 333; p. paragraph VIII, 24. Confessions. I. VI, 9. Migne, t. 32, col. 664; p. item I, 8 cp. De Civit. Dei XI, X, 3. M. t. 41, col. 327; p. paragraph IV, 192. De ver. relig. With. X. Migne, t. 34, col. 130; p. paragraph VII, 17. Deus est immutabilis solus. Migne, t. 42, col. 768. Contra Maximin. Ar. II, XII, 2. Est bonum solum simplex et ob hoc solum incommutabile, quod est Deus. Migne, t. 41, col. 325. De Civit. D. XI, X, 1; p. paragraph IV, 129. Omnis autem creatura – mutabilis – De Trinit. D. VI, VI 8. Migne, t. 42, col. 929. Ab hoc bono (sc. solo incommutabili) creata sunt omnia bona, sed non simplicia et ob hoc mutabilia. De Civit. D. XI, X, 1. Migne, t. 41, col. 325; p. paragraph IV, 189. See Storz. op. cit., S. 185. Enarr. in p.s. CXXXIV, no. 4. Migne, t. 37, col. 1741.cnfr. De Civit. D. VIII, XI, col. 236; p. paragraph IV, 23. Confess. XI, IV, 6, M. t. 32, col. 811; p. paragraph I, 329 and many more. etc. De Civit. D. XI, X, 1. De Trinit. IV, 18. See Dorner, op. cit. SS. 18–19. Quote op. Theologian Vestn. 1915 Month. July – Aug. Page 508. Serm. VII, 7. Migne, t. 38, col. 66. De Trinit. D. VII, V, 10. M t. 42, col. 942. Enarr. in p.s. CXXXIV, no. 6. M.t. 37, col. 1743. Confess. VII, XI, 17. M. t. 32, col. 742; p. clause 1, 181 cp. 192. XIII, XVI, 19. M. t. 32, col. 853; p. paragraph 1, 439. The noted nature of the influence of Neoplatonic philosophy on the formation of the Augustinian concept of Divine simplicity and immutability is noted in agreement by both foreign and domestic researchers Bl. Augustine. See, for example, A. Dorner, op. cit. S. 18 J. Storz, op. cit. S. 182 vrgl. S. 178. G. Loesche. De Augustino plotinizante in doctrina de Deo disserenda. Ienae. MDCCCLXXX. p.p. 36–37. L. Grandgeorge. Saint Augustin et le nèo-platonisme. Paris. 1896. p. 151. 156 etc. Prof. Evg. N. Trubetskoy. The religious and social ideal of Western Christianity in the 5th century. Part 1. Worldview bl. Augustine. Moscow. 1892. (passim). Prof. I. V. Popov. Quote op. God. Vestn. 1915, II, 508, etc. Prof. Evg. N. Trubetskoy, cit. cit., pp. 26. 30. 37, etc. De Trinit. D. VI, VI, 8. Migne, t. 42, col. 928.cnfr. col. 927.929.936. (Dei) sapientia simpliciter multiplex et uniformiter multiformis. De Civit. D. XII, XVIII, 2. Migne, t. 41, col. 368; p. paragraph IV, 270. for example, the supertemporality or eternity of manifestations of the spiritual life of the Divine. These are: leading – Tract. 38 in John. Ev., n. 10. Migne, t. 35, col. 1680, etc. Wed. Th. Gangauf. Metaphysics Psychologie des hl. Augustinus. Augsburg. 1852. S. 180. Anmerk. 32; will and its activities – De Genes. ad litt. 1, IX, 17. Migne, t. 34, col. 252; p. paragraph VII, 164–165. De Civit. Dei XII, XVII, 2. M. t. 41, col. 367; p. paragraph IV, 268, etc. De Genes. ad litt. V, XVI, 34. Migne, t. 34, col. 333; Russian lane VIII, 24 Wed. ibid. VIII, XXII, 43. M. t. 34, col. 389; p. paragraph VIII, 134. Vera aeternitas est, ubi temporis nihil est – Tract. XXIII in Joann Ev., n. 9. Migne, t. 35, col. 1588. Since the question of time relates, strictly speaking, to the speculative philosophy of Bl. Augustine or his metaphysical psychology and in the present case has only an introductory and auxiliary meaning, we do not at all mean here to give an exhaustive solution to this issue and touch on it only insofar as this can serve our main goal - a better clarification of the Augustinian concepts of eternity or originality (resp. immutability) analyzed by us, as ontological properties of the Divine Being. Teaching bl. Augustine briefly outlines time: Th. Gangauf. Metaphysische Psychologie des heiligen Augustinus. Augsburg. 1852.SS. 105–109 (cp. Günther. Vorschule I. Abth. S. 185 ffgg.); J. Storz. Die Philosophic des hl. Augustinus. Fr. im Br. 1882. SS. 214–217. See also Dr. R. Eisler. Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe. Berlin. 1910. Bd. III. SS. 1883–1884 (Art. "Zeit") and Bd. I. S. 170 (Art. “Bewegung”). Confess. XI, XIV, 17. Migne, t. 32, col. 816; p. item I, 340 cp. ibid. XI, XXV, 32. M. t. 32, col. 822; p. paragraph I, 357. However, despite this keen interest of Bl. Augustine to this subject, not everything in it was completely and finally clarified by Bl. Augustine, and not everything received a sufficiently precise verbal formulation from him. Hence the difficulty of understanding and presenting this point of Christian metaphysics. Augustine. “Classical”, in the words of Prof. Evg. N. Trubetskoy (The religious and social ideal of Western Christianity in the 5th century. Part I. The worldview of St. Augustine. Moscow. 1892. P. 66, note 5), for place and time, see next. op. Augustine Confess, lib. XI, cap. X–XXXI, as well as De Civit. Dei lib. XI, cap. VI (cf. also De Civit. D. XII, XV, 1–3; Migne, t. 41, col. 363–365; pp. IV, 260–264. De Genes. ad litter. V, V, 12. M. t. 34, col. 325; pp. VIII, 9–10, etc.). Confess. XI, XVII, 22. Migne, t. 32, col. 818; p. paragraph I, 346 cp. XI, XXV, 32; M.t. 32, col. 822; p. paragraph I, 357, etc. Confess. XI, XXIII, 29. Migne, t. 32, col. 821; p. paragraph I, 355 cnfr. XI, XXVI, 33; col. 822; p. paragraph I, 358. De Civit. Dei XI, VI. Migne, t. 41, col. 321; p. paragraph IV, 183. Confess. XI, XIV, 17. Migne, t. 32, col. 816; p. paragraph I, 340 cnfr. De Civit. Dei XI, VI. M.t. 41, col. 321–322; p. p. IV, 182–183. De Civit. Dei XI, VI. Migne, t. 41, col. 321; p. paragraph IV, 182. Ibid.; p. paragraph IV, 183. cnfr. XII, XV, 2; col. 364; p. paragraph IV, 263. procul dubio non est mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore. Ibid. Potius tempus a creatura, quam creatura coepit a tempore; utrumque autem ex Deo. Ex ipso enim, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia (Rom. XI, 36). De Genes. ad litt. V, V, 12. Migne, t. 34, col. 325; p. paragraph VIII, 10. De Civit. Dei XII, XV, 2. Migne, t. 41, col. 364; p. Section IV, 262–263. Reasoning about this bl. Augustine, see Confess. XI, XXIV, 31. Migne, t. 32, col. 822; p. paragraph I, 357. Confess. XI, XXIII–XXIV, 29–31. M.t. 32, col. 820–822; p. paragraph I, 353–357. Confess. XI, XXIV, 31. Migne, t. 32, col. 822; p. paragraph I, 357. Bl.'s reasoning Augustine on this, see Confess. XI, XXVI–XXVII, 33–36, Migne, t. 32, col. 822–824; r. paragraph I, 357–363. Confess. XI, XXVII, 36. Migne, t. 32, col. 823–824; p. n. I, 362. Confess. XI, XXVII, 35–36. Migne, t. 32, col. 823; p. paragraph I, 361–362; Wed X, VIII, 12–15, col. 784–785; p. p. I, 277–279. In te, anime meus. tempora metior.... affectionem quam res praetereuntes in te faciant, et cum illae praeterierint, manet, ipsam metior praesentem, non eas, quae praeterierunt ut fieret: ipsam metior, cum tempora metior. Confess. XI, XXVII, 36. Migne, t. 32, col. 823–824; p. paragraph I, 362. Confess. XI, XXVIII, 37. Migne, t. 32, col. 824; p. paragraph I, 363, etc. Confess. XI, XXVIII, 37. Migne, t. 32, col. 824; p. paragraph I, 363 cf. ibid. XI, XX, 26; col. 319; p. paragraph I, 349. See above, note. 336, cf. more Confess. XI, XXIII, 29. Migne, t. 32, col. 821; p. p. I, 355–356: video igitur tempus quamdam esse distentionem. Sed video, an videre mini videor? Tu demonstrabis, Lux, Veritas. Confess. XI, XXIII, 29. Migne, t. 32, col. 821; p. paragraph I, 355–356. Inde mihi visum est, nihil esse aliud tempus quam distentionem: sed cujus rei, nescio; et mirum si non ipsius animi. Confess. XI, XXVI, 33. M. t. 32, col. 822; p. paragraph I, 358. Utrumque (sc. et creatura et tempus) – ex Deo. De Genes. ad litt. V, V, 12. Migne, t. 34, col. 355; p. paragraph VIII, 10. Deus-aeternus creator omnium temporum. Confess. XI, XXX, 40. M. t. 32, col. 826; p. p. I, 366. Deus.... creator sit temporum et ordinator. De Civit. Dei XI, VI. M.t. 41, col. 321; p. p. IV, 183. Tu (Deus) sis operator omnium temporum. Confess. XI, XIII, 15. M. t. 32, col. 815; p. paragraph I, 338. Ipsum tempus Tu (Deus) feceras Conf. XI, XIV, 17. M. t 32, col. 815; p. paragraph I, 339 (cf. above p. 338). “The highest and unchanging substance itself does not move either in time or in space. Just as a body is moved in time and space by the created spirit, which itself moves only in time, so the created spirit is moved in time by the Creator Spirit, which Himself does not move either in time or in space. The created spirit moves itself in time, the body - in time and space; The Spirit, the Creator of Himself, moves in addition to time and space, the created spirit moves in time in addition to space, and the body moves in time and space.” De Genes. ad litt. VIII, XX, 39. Migne, t. 34, col. 388; p. paragraph VIII, 132; cnfr. col. 389, p. paragraph VIII, 134; col. 391–392, p. paragraph VIII, 138–139, etc. tempus sine aliqua mobili mutabilitate (vel mobilitate) non est. De Civit. D. XI, VI. Migne, t. 41, col. 321; p. p. IV, 182. Ubi nulla creatura est, cujus mutabilibus motibus tempora peragantur, tempora omnino esse non possunt. De Civit. Dei XII, XV, 2. M. t. 41, col. 364; p. paragraph IV, 263. De Genes. ad litt. V, V, 12. M. t. 34, col. 325; p. paragraph VIII, 10. Tu (Deus) sis omnium saeculorum auctor et conditor. Confess. XI, XIII, 15. Migne, t. 32, col. 815; p. paragraph I, 338, etc. aeternitas – ipsa Dei substantia est. Enarr. in p.s. CI, serm. 2, no. 10. Migne, t. 37, col. 1311 cnfr. Enarr. in IX ps., n. 11. M.t. 36, col. 122. Serm. CCXV, no. 2. M.t. 39, col. 1073. In Dei natura... est tantum id, quod est, et ipsa est aeternitas. Enarr. in p.s. IX, n. 11. M.t. 36, col. 122. From the panentheistic (πᾶν ἐν ϑεῷ) point of view, bl. Augustine, which will be discussed below, only in God himself, as the unchangeable foundation (incommutabile principium) of all things (De quant. anim. p. XXXIV, n. 77. Migne, t. 32, col. 1077; pp. II, 413–414), and the highest, unchangeable, spiritual light (lux, lumen), internal to man and immaterial illuminating him (De ver. relig. p. LV, n. 113. Migne, t. 34, col. 172; p. p. VII, 101. Confess. VII, X, 16. M. t. 32, col. 742; p. p. I, 180; ibid. VII, XX, 26; col. 746; p. p. I, 192; IX, IV, 768; p. I, 243; X, XXXIV, 52; p. I, 307, etc.), and the principle of its explanation. Augustine says: “utrumque (sc. et creatura et tempus) – ex Deo. Ex ipso enim et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia.” (De Genes. ad litt. V, V, 12. Migne, t. 34, col. 325; pp. VIII, 10); “eo tempore ac loco, cujus ratio in ipso Deo vita est sine tempore ac loco” (ibid. VIII, XXVI, 48; col. 391; pp. VIII, 138 cnfr. Confess. XI, XXIII, 30; M. t 32, col. 821; pp. I, 356; XI, XIX, 25; p. I, 348; col. I, 351; See note. 326 and 327. Enarr. in p.s. LXXXIX, no. 3. Migne, t. 37, col. 1142.cnfr. Enarr. in p.s. IX, n. 11. M.t. 36, col. 122. Serm. CCXV, no. 2. Migne, t. 39, col. 1073: manet apud se et in se plena et perfecta aeternitas, quam nec comprehendere humana cogitatio potest, nec lingua narrare. Cnfr. Confess. XI, XI, 13. M. t. 32, col. 814; p. item I, 337. Enarr. in p.s. CI, serm. 2, no. 10. M. t. 37, col. 1311 and Enarr. in p.s. IX, n. 11. M.t. 36, col. 122. However, this logically conceivable, but really non-existent time cannot at all be understood as consisting of an innumerable number of parts, successively following one after another. The fact of the existence of “limitless time” (as well as “limitless space”), representing some kind of contradictio in adjecto, is resolutely denied by Augustine. Confess. XI, XI, 13. Migne, t. 32, col. 814; p. paragraph I, 337 cnfr. XI, XIV, 17; col. 816; p. paragraph I, 340. Confess. XI, XIII, 16. Migne, t. 32, col. 815; p. paragraph I, 339 cnfr. I, VI, 10. M. t. 32, col. 665; p. paragraph I, 9. Serm. XXXIII, p. IV, 4. 3. Migne, t. 38, col. 208. Enarr. in p.s. CXXXIV, no. 6. Migne, t. 37, col. 1743. Contra duas epist. Pelag. II, I, 1. M. t. 44, col. 571. De quan. anim. XXXIV, 77. M. t. 32, col. 1077; p. p. II, 413–414. Serm. VII, n. 7. M.t. 38, col. 66. Enarr. in p.s. LXXXIX, no. 3. M.t. 37, col. 1142. Contra Maximin. ar. er. II, XII, 2. Migne, t. 42, col. 768.cnfr. col. 563. De Genes. ad litt. VIII, XIX, 38. M. t. 34, col. 387; p. paragraph VIII, 130. Serm. XXXIII, p. IV, no. 3. M.t. 38, col. 208. Tract. XXIII in Joann. Ev. With. V, n. 9. M.t. 35, col. 1588. Enarr. in p.s. IX, n. 11. Migne, t. 36, col. 122. Tract. XXXVIII in Joann. Ev. With. VIII, no. 10. M. t. 35, col. 1680. Enarr. in p.s. CI, serm. II, no. 10. M. t. 37, col. 1310–1311. Confess. XI, XXVII, 35. M. t. 32, col. 823; p. p. I, 359–360 cf. XI, XXVIII, 37; col. 824; p. paragraph I, 363. In Dei natura... non erit... aut fuit, sed est tantum id, quod est. Enarr. in p.s. IX, n. 11. Migne, t. 36, col. 122. Omne praesens est apud Deum – De divers. Quest. qu. XVII. M.t. 40, col. 15. Solum praesens in Deo. Tract. 38 in Joann. Ev. With. VIII, no. 10. M. t. 35, col. 1680. Anni tui – dies unus; et dies tuus non quotidie, sed hodie. Hodiernus tuus – aeternitas. Confess. XI, VIII, 16. Migne, t. 32, col. 815; p. paragraph I, 339 cnfr. I, VI, 10. M. t. 32, col. 665; p. paragraph I, 9. With substantial unity and identity in God of being and life (esse = vivere = persona esse), with individuality and personality in Him of essence, reason and will (De Trinit. Dei VI, X, 11. Migne, t. 42, col. 931; Confess. VII, IV, 6. M. t. 32, col. 736; p. p. I, 165. De Trinit. D. VII, VI, 11. M. t. 42, col. 943, etc.) and with His absolute immutability in being, knowledge and will (Confess. XIII, XVI, 19. Migne, t. 32, col. 853; p. p. I, 439), Augustine quite consistently thinks and affirms the eternity of the Divine mind (Confess. XI, XXI, 41; Migne, t. 32, col. 826; pp. I, 369, etc.) and knowledge (De Civit. Dei XI, XXI; M. t. 41, col. 334; pp. IV, 206–207. Tract. XXXVIII in Joann. Ev. pp. VIII, n. 10. M. t. 35, col. 1680, etc.); eternity in the God of truth (De Trinit. Dei IV, Proëm. n. 1; Migne, t. 42, col. 887); the eternity of His wisdom (De Trinit. D. II, V, 9. Migne, t. 42, col. 850); the eternity of the ideas or thoughts of God (Confess. I, VI, 9. Migne, t. 32, col. 664; pp. I, 8); further - the eternity of the will (De Civit. Dei XII, XVII, 2; Migne, t. 41, col. 367; p. p. IV, 268) and the activity of the Divine (Confess. XIII, XXXVII, 52. M. t. 32, col. 868; p. p. I, 472); supertemporality of the creative act – Confess. VII, XV, 21; M.t. 32, col. 744; p. paragraph I, 185. De Genes. ad litt. I, ix, 17. Migne, t. 34, col. 252; p. paragraph VII, 164, etc.); finally, the eternity of the feeling of God (for example, love - De Trinit. Dei IV, Proëm. n. 1. Migne, t. 42, col. 887; Serm. XXXIII, p. IV. M. t. 38, col. 208, etc.). About the essence of space, as well as some other forms of existence and manifestation of created being and life, notes the German scientist Th. Gangauf (Metaphysiche Psychologie des heil. Augustinus. Augsburg. 1852. S. 117. Anmerk. 62), - we do not find in the writings of Augustine his studies as detailed and scientifically profound as on the issue of the essence of time. But for him it is certain that, like time, space did not exist before creation, and that only the latter, that is, creation, posits the beginning of both time and space (De Civit. Dei XI, V). Augustine considers the idea of ​​some people (inanes cogitationes hominum) absurd, who imagine some kind of infinite spaces (infinita loca), whereas in reality, as Augustine himself thinks, there is no space outside the world (locus nullus sit praeter mundum), just as there is no time before the world (nullum tempus sit ante mundum) (ibid.). Therefore, as time, so is space, according to the deep conviction of Bl. Augustine, have their final foundation (or primary foundation) in God Himself (namely in the creative act of the will of God), Who is the One Supreme Founder of both the whole world and, in particular, time and space, these two universal forms of existence of all finite world existence and its subjective perception by us. “According to Augustine,” says Dr. R. Eisler, – (Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe. Berlin. 1910. Bd. II. S. 1127. Art. “Raum”), “there is no extra-worldly empty space, since everything has its measure in God.” But such a sublime Christian-theistic view of Blessed. Augustine on space, its essence and origin, is a conquest of Augustine’s religious and philosophical thought only in the later era of his life and was most closely due to his acquaintance with Neoplatonism, as we will see from the genesis of the idea of ​​​​Divine omnipresence in the system of theological and philosophical worldview of the Western Christian thinker we are studying. In addition to the correlation of time and space, the human mind can also come to the idea of ​​​​Divine immeasurability and omnipresence in another way, for example, based on an analysis of the concepts of spirituality and the omniperfection of the Divine. We also encounter precisely this correlation of the named concepts in the works of Bl. Augustine. Confess. VI, III, 4. Migne, t. 32, col. 721; p. paragraph I, 130; VII, V, 7, col. 736; p. paragraph I, 165; VII, I, 1; col. 733; p. paragraph I, 159; VII, I, 2; col. 733; p. paragraph I, 160. Confess. VII, V, 7. Migne, t. 32, col. 736; p. paragraph I, 165–166 cnfr. VII, I, 2; col. 733; p. paragraph I, 160; IV, XVI, 31, col. 706; p. paragraph I, 95. “Very picturesque,” ​​notes Prof. I.V. Popov in his newest work devoted to depicting the life and development of bl. Augustine, he describes how his fantasy depicted the infinity of the Divine substance and its coexistence with the world. Before his imagination stretched a space boundless in all directions, filled with light matter, which he identified with the very nature of God, and in it the world, like a certain mass of a huge, but definite and finite size. The world, like a sponge in the sea, floats in the ocean of divine light. The divine substance penetrates it, just as the sea penetrates a sponge floating in it or a ray of the sun - the air surrounding the earth, but it itself does not lose its continuity because the world is completely transparent to it and, therefore, cannot serve as any limitation. (See Divine. Vestn. 1915. July - August. P. 496). Confess. VII, I, 2. Migne, t. 32, col. 734; p. paragraph I, 160–161. Confess. Ill, VII, 12: Migne, t. 32, col. 688; p. paragraph I, 56. Confess. VII, X, 16; M.t. 32, col. 742; p. paragraph I, 180. Wed. Prof. I. V. Popov, Life and development of bl. Augustine before his baptism. Theologian Vestn. 1915 July - August. Page 503–508. Serm. XXIII, V, 5. Migne, t. 38, col. 157. Enarr. in p.s. 74, n. 9. M.t. 36, col. 953; cnfr. De divers. quaest. LXXXIII, p. XX. M.t. 40, col. 15. De quant. anim. XXXIV, 77. M. t. 32, col. 1077; p. item II, 414. Serm. CCLXXVII, p. XIX, n. 18. M. t. 38, col. 1268. De Trinit. Dei V, X, 11. Migne, t. 42, col. 918: Deo autem non est aliquid majus: ea igitur magnitudine magnus est, qua ipse est eadem magnitudo... quia non participatione magnitudinis Deus magnus est, sed de ipso magno magnus est; Quia ipse sua est magnitudo. De Genes. ad litt. VIII, XXVI, 48: non illo opere quo naturas creat, sed in illo intrinsecus creatas etiam extrinsecus administrat, cum sit ipse... et interior omni re, quia in ipso sunt omnia, et exterior omni re, quia ipse est super omnia. Migne, t. 34, col. 391; p. Section VIII, 138–139. Confess. VI, III, 4; M.t. 32, col. 721; p. paragraph I, 130, etc. Epist. ad Volus. With. II, no. 4: novit (Deus) ubique totus esse et nullo continere loco. Migne, t. 33, col. 517.cnfr. De Civit. Dei X, III, 2 M. t. 41, col. 280; p. p. IV, 107–108. Serm. LII, V, 15. M. t. 38, col. 360; Serm. CCLXXVII, xiii, 13; Ib. col. 1264. Contr. epist. Manich. With. XV, no. 20 et p. XVI. M.t. 42, col. 184–185. Epist. ad Dardan. 187, p. IV, no. 14. Migne, t. 33, col. 837.cnfr. 1. c. cap. VI, nn. 18–20. Like immutability, eternity, greatness and other Divine properties, omnipresence is also one with the very Being of God and is therefore inextricably linked with all manifestations of the spiritual-personal life and activity of the Divine. – Confess. X, XXVI, 37. Migne, t. 32, col. 795; p. paragraph I, 297. Tract. in Joann. Ev. XXXV, p. VIII, no. 4. M.t. 35, col. 1659. Epist. CXVIII ad Diosc. With. IV, no. 23. M. t. 33, col. 443 (the omnipresent truths and wisdom of God and their substantial character). Neque enim mole, sed virtute magnus est Deus. Epist. 137 ad Volusian. With. II, no. 8. Migne, t. 33, col. 519. See note above. 372 and Enarr. in LXXXI ps. n. 2 Migne, t. 37, col. 1047. De Serm. Domini in monte II, V, 18. Migne, 34, col. 1277 cnfr. De Civit. Dei VII, XXX. M.t. 41, col. 220; p. paragraph III, 385. Epist. 187 ad Dardan. With. IV, no. 14. Migne, t. 33, col. 837. Ibid. Confr. De Civit. Dei VIII, XXX. Migne, t. 41. col. 220; p. paragraph III, 385. Confess. VI, III. 4. M.t. 32, col. 721; p. paragraph I, 130. In his judgments of this kind, Bl. Augustine often takes the point of view of that philosophical trend, which is now known under the name “panentheism,” that is, the doctrine of the existence or location of everything in God (πᾶν ἐν ϑεῷ). Panentheism, according to Eisler (Wörterbuch der philosophischen Bergriffe. Bd. II, S. 970), is a synthesis of theism and pantheism. Moreover, the identity of God and the world in the panentheistic concept is denied, and a view is taken of the Divine being as immanent-transcendent. Although one can discern pantheistic elements in the philosophical construction of panentheism, the “pantheism” of the analyzed concept of our Western teacher of the church is of a completely special kind, since this view of the bl. Augustine is associated with the recognition of God as the Absolute Self-Conscious Spirit, Creator and Provider of the world, and since Augustine wants to give this view of his a biblical-Christian justification (For example, Rom. 11, 36; Acts 17, 28 - De ver. relig. p. LV, n. 113. Migne, t. 34, col. 172: p. VII, 102. De Genes. V, V, 34, col. VIII, 10, 333; It is known that from the point of view of the theistic-Christian teaching about the relationship between God and the world, not only God is in the world, but also the world is in God, to Whom, as His Absolute Creator and All-Wise Provider, he owes his entire existence and without Whom he would immediately again turn into non-existence (nothing). This world, existing in God, is cognized by rational beings also in God. This is the same meaning of Augustinian panentheism (see, for example, De quan. anim. p. 34, n. 77. Migne, t. 32. col. 1077; p p. II, 413–414, where God, as “creator omnium,” is called incommutabile principium, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia... cum quo esse non omnes possunt, et sine quo esse nemo potest; in God are contained the eternal and unchanging ideas of all things, as the creative principles of the world: apud te rerum omnium instabilium stant causae, et rerum omnium mutabilium immutabiles manent origines, et omnium irrationabilium et temporalium sempiternae vivunt rationes. Confess. I, VI, 9. M. t. 32 col. 664; p. п. I, 8. De divers. quaest. LXXXIII, qu. XX. M. t. 40, col. 15–16: in illo (Deo) sunt omnia, nec tamen ita in illo, ut ipse sit locus . Cnfr. Solil. I. I, n. n. 3–4. M. t. 32, col. 870–871; p. п. II, 229–231. Confess. I, II, 9. M. t. 32, col. 661–662; p. п. I, 2–3: Sine te non esset quidquid est... Non ergo essem, nisi esses in me. An potius non essem, ex quo omnia, in quo omnia (Rom. XI, 36)? eras, et tecum non eram. Ea me tenebant longe a te, quae si in te non essent, non essent. cnfr. IV, XII, 18; col. 700; p. п. I, 84. Мир, как и сам человек, познается в Боге. Confess. X, XXVI, 37; М. t. 32, col. 795; р. p., I, 297 cf. 464–472, etc.; in the same way, the angels know God, creation and themselves in God. Thus, panentheism in the theological and philosophical system of our Western teacher is built and developed on a biblical-church basis and from the point of view of his Christian-theistic view of God as the Absolute Person, as the Almighty, Wise and Good Creator and Provider of the world, and about the world as His free, final creation. Some imbalance in the theological and philosophical thought of Bl. Augustine, when defining the moment of transcendence and immanence of the Divine in their relationship, strongly and tendentiously emphasized by Western, Protestant researchers, gives them reason, from their point of view, to see in this teaching of Augustine the most diverse to the complete opposite and mutual contradiction of his views (from “acosmic pantheism” up to “cosmic monism”, with which he also combines deistic ideas - A. Dorner . Augustinus. Sein theologisches System und seine religionsphilosophische Anschauung. Berlin. 1873. S. 110–112 etc. cnfr. Pr. A. Harnack. Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte. Fr. im. Br. 1891. Bd. III, SS. 102–103. См. Проф. A. И. Diamonds. The influence of Eastern theology on Western in the works of John Scotus Erigena. St. Petersburg, 1898. p. 105). Of course, some expressions of bl. Augustine about the relationship between God and the world, especially understood in their direct, verbal meaning and without connection with Augustine’s entire system of Christian views, may have a materialistic or pantheistic character, but considered in the light of the fundamental elements of the theological and philosophical worldview of Bl. Augustine (especially the later era of his life) they receive a purely Christian meaning. In our opinion, to this category of panentheistic expressions we are considering, bl. Augustine can be partially applied to the point of view of J. Huber (Philosophie der Kirchenväter. München. 1859. S. IX) on the “very special kind of pantheism” of the speculative theological views of John Scotus Erigena, who, as is known, was under the powerful influence of Augustine. “The well-known provisions of Erigena are pantheistic in nature; but we are dealing in this case with a completely unique form of pantheism, since the Divinity, which contains the world and exceeds it, is recognized here as a self-conscious subject (SS. 171 ffgg.). Actually, such a view, according to which there is only one being, and namely the Divine, but it exists in the form of spirit, should not be called pantheism; this is the true knowledge of the Absolute, philosophical theism, by which pantheism in the more precise sense of the word (pancosmism, the doctrine of the immanence of the Divine to the world) is included as a moment” (SS. 180 ff. See Prof. A.I. Brilliantov, op. cit., pp. XXIV–XXV). Duality of views of bl. Augustine in this regard and the possibility of drawing extreme conclusions from them (although not in the Protestant sense and meaning of this fact) is also recognized by some authoritative Russian theologians. (Prof. A.I. Brilliantov, op. cit., pp. 103–105. I. Chetverikov. About God as a Personal Being. Kiev. 1903. P. 325, etc.). De divers. quaest. LXXXIII, qu. XX. Migne, t. 40, col. 15–16. Epist. 137 ad Volus. With. II, no. 4. Migne, t. 33, col. 517. De Civit. Dei VIII, V. M. t. 41, col. 230; p. paragraph IV, 12. Epist. 137 ad Volus. With. II, no. n. 5–6. Migne, t. 33, col. 517–518. De Genes. ad litt. VIII, XX, 39. Migne, t. 34, col. 388; p. paragraph VIII, 131–132. Serm. IV, VI, 7. Migne, t. 38, col. 36. Prof. I. V. Popov Quoted. op. Theologian Vestn. 1915 July–Aug. p. 505. De lib. arbitr. II, III, 7. Migne, t. 32. col. 1243–1244 etc. Beatus erit, qui.... de ipsa per quam vera sunt omnia, sola veritate gaudebit. Confess. X, XXIII, 34. Migne, t. 32, col. 794; p. p. I, 296. Te. invoco, Deus veritas, in quo et a quo et per quem vera sunt, quae vera sunt omnia. Deus sapientia,.,. vera et summa, vita... beatitudo.... bonum et pulchrum... intelligibilis lux, in quo et a quo et per quem intelligibiliter lucent, quae intelligibiliter lucent omnia etc. Solil. I, I, 3. M. t. 32, col. 870; p. paragraph II, 229. Deus nullo indiget bono, ipse est summum bonum, et ab ipso est omne bonum. Enarr. in p.s. LXX serm. II, no. 6. Migne, t. 36, col. 896 and many more etc. Deus – bonum et pulchrum, in quo et a quo et per quem bona et pulchra sunt, quae bona et pulchra sunt omnia. Solil. I, I, 3; M.t. 32, col. 870; p. paragraph II, 229 and many others. etc. Confess. VIII, Ш, 8. Migne, t. 32, col. 752; r. paragraph I, 206; XIII, II, 2; M.t. 32, col. 845; p. p. I, 420. Adhaerere Deo, participatio Dei – totum bonum, nihil melius est etc. Enarr. in p.s. LXXII, no. 34. M.t. 36, col. 928. Cum Deus ubique sit totus, non tamen in omnibus habitat. Epist. LXXXVII, V, 16. Migne, t. 33, col. 837. Fatendum est ubique esse Deum per divinitatis praesentiam, sed non ubique per habitationis gratiam. Ibid. col. 837–838. Sunt alii aliis sanctiores.... abundantius habendo habitatorem Deum. Quod Deus ubique sit totus, quando in aliis est amplius, in aliis-minus? In se ipso esse ubique totum. Non ergo in eis (sc. hominibus), quia alii plus eum capiunt, alii minus. Epist. LXXXVII, V, 17. Migne, t. 33, col. 838 cnfr. op. cit p. VI, no. 19: totus adesse rebus omnibus potest, et singulis totus, quamvis in quibus habitat, habeant eum pro suae capacitatis diversitate, alii-amplius, alii-minus. col. 839 cnfr. n. 20. And even in the souls of the pious themselves, the character of the Divine presence diversifies. Epist. LXXXVII, p. V, n. n. 16–17. Migne, t. 33, col. 838. Ibid. cnfr. Epist. CXX ad Consent. With. V, n. 14. Migne, t. 33, col. 838. De Serm. Domin. in monte II, V, 10 and II, VI, 20–22. M.t. 34, col. 1278–1279. Epist. CLV ad Maced. With. IV, no. 13. Migne, t. 33, col. 672. Pravitate nostra a rectitudine Dei longe sumus. Ibid. De Genes. ad litt. V, XVI, 34. Migne, t. 34. col. 333; p. paragraph VIII, 24. Confess. V, II, 2; M.t. 32, col. 707; p. paragraph I, 97 cnfr. De quan. anim. XXXIV. 77. M.t. 32, col. 1077–1078; p. p. II, 413–414. Tract. II in Joann. Ev.n. 8. Migne, t. 35, col. 1392 cnfr. tract. XXXV, n. 4, col. 1659. De divers. quaest. LXXXIII, qu. 12. M. t. 40, col. 14. Enarr. in p.s. XXXIV, serm. II, no. 6. Migne, t. 36, col. 337. Propinquare illi (sc. Deo) – est similem illi fieri; recedere ab illo, dissimilem illi fieri.... Si ergo vis appropinquare-similis esto. Ibid. Homo amando Deum accedit ad Deum et amando iniquitatem recedit a Deo: nusquam pedes movet, et tamen potest et accedere et recedere. Pedes enim nostri in hoc itinere, affectus nostri sunt. Enarr. in p.s. XCIV, no. 2. Migne, t. 37, col. 1217.cnfr. Enarr. in p.s. LXXIV, no. 11. M.t. 36, col. 954. Confess. V, II, 2. M. t. 32, col. 707; p. p. I, 97. Apparently, in this case, Bl. Augustine, like some other church writers of the patristic era, “the predominance of ontological predicates in the concept of God also influences the idea of ​​moral likeness to God” (See Prof. I.V. Popov. The idea of ​​deification in the ancient Eastern Church. Moscow. 1909. p. 30). Ille (sc. Deus) corde tuo interior est etc. Enarr. in p.s. LXXIV, no. 9. Migne, t. 36, col. 952–953. Solus es (sc. Deus) praesens etiam eis, qui longe fiunt a Te. Confess. V, II, 2. Migne, t. 32, col. 707; p. paragraph I, 97. Numquid enim Deus continetur loco, quem praesentem habet omnis angelica et humana conscientia, non solum bonorum, sed etiam malorum? Verum hoc interest, quod bonis conscientiis adest ut pater, malis ut judex. Serm. XII, p. III, no. 3. Migne, t. 38, col. 101. Ille (Deus) tecum est talis, qualis fueris. Enarr. in p.s. LXXIV, no. 9. M.t. 36, col. ,952. Epist. ad Dardan. CLXXXVII, c. V, n. n. 16–17. Migne, t. 33, col. 837–838. Confess. I, II, 2. Migne, t. 32, col. 661; p. p. I, 2. Epist. ad Dardan. CLXXXVII, p. IV, no. 14. M. t. 33, col. 837. Serm. XII, p. VI, no. 6. M.t. 38, col. 103. Confess. VI, I, 1. Migne, t. 32, col. 719; p. paragraph I, 126. See above, note page. 267–277. Of course, the classification and terminology of the properties of the Divine Being that we have adopted is conditional. The properties of God, which are separated and distinguished by us only in logical analysis, in reality, in God himself, represent a single and inseparable, living whole, and both all together and each individually holistically express the being of God. Wed. Archim. (+ Ep.) Mikhail Gribanovsky. Lectures on introduction to theological sciences. Kazan. 1899. Pp. 94. “In ancient philosophy,” says the aforementioned representative of Russian church apologetic science, who made an attempt to clarify some patristic terms (οὐσία, ὐπόστασιϛ, φὐσιϛ, πρόσωπον; essentia, substantia, natura, persona) from a modern scientific point of view - the concept of personality was little analyzed, because its intrinsic value was little recognized. Only Christ declared personality to be an end in itself, and only since His teaching began to penetrate into the consciousness of people did personality begin to be valued in itself and analyzed.” Quote cit., p. 129 cf. 92. Although the ancients imagined the Deity as existing, but since they had not yet “clearly developed the concept of personality, the name of the Deity as Existing among the ancients did not coincide with the definition of Him as a person.” Priest N. Vinogradov. Grounds for recognizing God as a personal being. Faith and Reason. 1913, No. XIII, p. 73. Cf. Prof. V. D. Kudryavtsev. Collection his composition. T. II, issue. 3rd. Serg. Posad. 1893. pp. 190–191. The question of the existence of God in the creations of Blessed. Augustine. “Christ. Thought". 1916. VII–VIII books. page 104. The modern scientific and philosophical concept of personality is given, for example. Dr.Fr. Kirchner. Wörterbuch der philosophischen Grundbegriffe. Heidelberg. 1890. Art. "Person". S. 287. Dr. R. Eisler. Wörterbuch der philosophischen Bergriffe. Berlin. 1909. Bd. II. Art. "Person". SS. 989–993. For an explanation of the patristic teaching about personality and about God as a personal being, in connection with our contemporary views on this, see, for example, Dr. S. Braun. Der Begriff "Person" in seiner Anwendung auf die Lehre von der Trinität und Incarnation. Mainz. 1876. K. Eichhorn. Die Persönlichkeit Gottes. Eine religionsphilosophische Untersuchung. Leipzig. 1883. J. Tixeront. Essais et Notices (Des concepts de “nature” et de “personne” dans les pères et les écrivains ecclésiastiques des V-e et VI-e siêcles). Révue d'histoire et de littérature religieuses. Ann. et torn. VIII. Paris. 1903. I. Chetverikov. About God as a personal Being (Theological and philosophical study). Kyiv. 1904. Archimandrite. (+ Ep.) Mikhail Gribanovsky. Lectures on introduction to the circle of theological sciences. Kazan. 1899. Priest-prof. N. V. Petrov About the Holy Trinity (Experience in interpreting dogma with the help of analogies from the material world and from the nature of humanity and man). Actual speech. Kazan. 1912. etc. Quote cit., p. 319 cf. page 322. Archim. (+ Ep.) Mikhail Gribanovsky. Quote cit., p. 129. Prof.-Priest N. V. Petrov. Quote op. (Act speech), pp. 20–21 Wed. 23 pp. Prof. V.V. Bolotov. Lectures on the history of the ancient church. (History of the Church during the period of ecumenical councils. Section III [continued printed]. History of theological thought). Page 294. Prof. V.V. Bolotov. Ibid., p. 229. See “Orthodox. Social security." 1915 Month. September. Page 118–119. In addition to the terms essentia and substantia, Augustine uses the even more ancient term “natura” to define the essence of God. All the designated terms and concepts in the theological and philosophical consciousness of Bl. Augustine, with some shades of difference between themselves, express the idea of ​​​​a separate independent existence or a real, existing existence in itself. Wed. Th. Gangauf. Des heil. Augustinus speculative Lehre von Gott dem Dreieinigen. Augsburg. 1865. Ss. 128–129. Dr. C. Braun. Der Begriff "Person" in seiner Anwendung auf die Lehre von der Trinität und Incarnation. Mainz. 1876. § 8, n. n. 1–3. Ss. 40–45. Generally speaking, one cannot but agree with the deeply truthful remark of our famous church historian, Prof. V.V. Bolotova that “given the state of philosophical thought in which it can be represented in the 5th century, a completely scientific debate about such abstract issues as the unity of personality and what should be represented by it, how the unity of personality relates to the unity of consciousness and self-awareness was impossible. We have to be content with only more or less clear instructions in this direction.” Lectures on the history of the ancient church. (History of the Church during the period of ecumenical councils). Dept. III. History of Theological Thought, p. 184. – Wed. previously expressed, in connection with this, called by our church historian his desiderata in “Christ. Readings” for 1892, part 2, pp. 93–94, 95–96. Review of the essay (by prof.) N. N. Glubokovsky: Blessed Theodoret, bishop. Kirrsky. His life and literary activity. I–II. Moscow 1890. (and departments). De Trinitate Dei, VII, VI, 11. Migne, t. 42, col. 943, cnfr. 945. Confess. I, I, 1. Migne, t. 32, col. 661; Russian lane I, 1. That is why even the independent Eug. Trubetskoy, stating in his brilliant monograph on Augustine (The religious and social ideal of Western Christianity in the 5th century. Part I. Worldview of St. Augustine. Moscow. 1892. pp. 42–43. Note) the personal, human element of his views about God, although with reservations, is still forced to admit that this is the teaching of the bl. Augustine, “without any doubt, incomparably more humane than Neoplatonism.” De Ordine, II, V, 16. Migne, t. 32, col. 1002; Russian lane II, 188. Contra Julian. Pelag. IV, XIV, 72. Migne, t. 44, col. 714. Prof. Evg. N. Trubetskoy. Quote cit., p. 42. Prof. Rud. Eucken. Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker. Leipzig. 1890. S. 266. De Trinit. Dei XV, XXVIII, 31. Migne, t. 42, col. 1097–1098. Domine Deus Noster, credimus in Te Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum sanctum. Neque enim diceret veritas: ite, baptizate omnes gentes in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti (Matth. XXVIII, 19), nisi Trinitas esses etc. Wed. Also very expressive in this respect, the reverently animated prayer of Blessed. Augustine, with which he prefaces one of his earliest philosophical works, namely the “Monologues,” written at the moment of greatest penetration of Augustine’s genius by Platonism. Solil. I, I, 2–6. Migne, t. 32, col. 869–872; p. p. II, 228–233. That is why we can say that “Confession” is blessed. Augustine is an inspired hymn to the Almighty, Wise and Good Creator and Provider of the world and the Savior of man, or an animated, reverent song of gratitude and praise to God for His love, merciful and saving the sinner, and for His immeasurable forgiveness or ineffable mercy for the sins and infirmities of the human soul. Confess. I, I, 1. Migne, t. 32, col. 661; p. item I, 1 cnfr. Ibid. IX. IV, 11. M. t. 32, col. 768; p. p. I, 244. XIII, XXXVIII, 53, col. 868; p. p. II, X, 18, col. 682; p. paragraph I, 44. Serm. XXXIII, IV, 3. Migne, t. 38, col. 208. Confess. IX, III, 6. Migne, t. 32, col. 765–766; p. paragraph I, 238–239. Especially in his extremely versatile and fruitful scientific and literary polemics with representatives of his contemporary non-Christian and non-church religious consciousness. Archim. (+ Ep.) Mikhail Gribanovsky. Lectures on introduction to theological sciences. Kazan. 1899. Pp. 136. Sic habet (Deus) sapientiam, ut ipse sit sapientia, faciatque sapientes. Tract. 48 in Joann. Ev. n. 6. Migne, t. 35, col. 1743. De Trinit. D. XV, V, 7. M. t. 42, col. 1062: itemque cum dicitur, vivens, et intelligences, quod est utique sapiens, hoc idem dicitur. Non enim percepit sapientiam, qua esset sapiens, sed ipse sapientia est. Deo autem hoc est esse, quod est fortem esse aut justum esse, aut sapientem esse, et si quid de illa simplici multiciplitate, vel multiplici simplicitate dixeris, quo substantia ejus significetur. De Trinit. D. VI, IV, 6. Migne, t. 42, col. 927. Confess. VII, X, 16. Migne, t. 32, col. 742; p. p. I, 180–181 cnfr. X, XLI, 66. M. t. 32, col, 807; r. paragraph I, 318. Confess. VII, XVIII, 24; M.t. 32, col. 745; p. pp. 188–189. De ver. relig. With. XXXI, nn. 57–58. Migne, t. 34, col. 147–148; p. paragraph VII, 51–52. Enarr. in XXXIII ps. Serm. II, no. 6. M.t. 36, col. 310–311. Tract. XLI in Joann. Ev. n. 1.M.t. 35, col. 1692. De Trinit. Dei VI, X, 11. Migne, t. 42, col. 931, etc. Confess. I, V, 6. Migne, t, 32, col. 663; p. p. I, 5. Cnfr. Ibid. III, VI, 10, cnfr. 687; p. paragraph I, 52–53. IV, V, 10, col. 697; p. p. I, 76. IV, IX, 14, col. 699; p. paragraph 1, 81 and many others. etc. Si quid autem homo habet veritatis atque justitiae, ab illo fonte est Tract. 5 in Joann. Ev. n. 1. Migne, t.35, col. 1414.cnfr. Tract. XXXV no. 6; M.t. 35, col. 1660. Enarr. in p.s. LXXXVIII, serm. 1, n. 2. M.t. 37, col. 1120. De beata vita, n. 35; M.t. 32, col. 976; p. paragraph II, 137. Te invoco, Deus veritas, in quo et a quo et per quem vera sunt quae vera sunt omnia. Deus sapientia, in quo et a quo et per quem sapiunt, quae sapiunt omnia etc. Solil. I, I, 3. Migne, t. 32, col. 870; p. p. II, 229. Ecce Unum Deum colo, Unum omnium Principium et sapientiam qua sapiens est quaecumque anima sapiens est. De ver. relig. with LV, n. 112. M. t. 34, col. 171; p. paragraph VII, 100–101. See, for example, L. Grandgeorge. Saint Augustin et le neoplatonisme. Paris. 1896. P. 155. H. A. Nawill. Saint Augustin. Genewe. 1872. Sec. part., where it is at 67–124 pp. expounds "la philosophie platonicochrétienne d'Augustin". Prof. O. Bardenhewer. Patrologie. Freib. im Br. 1910. Aufl. 3. S. 434, etc. Augustine speaks in a language close to Neoplatonic philosophy: “one thing is purity, and another thing is pure; so exactly, I think, something else is truth, and something else is what is called true.” Solil. I, XXV, 27. Migne, t. 32, col. 883: r. paragraph II, 256. “what is true is true because it is true.” Ibid. Wed Solil. II, II, 2. Migne, t. 32, col. 886; r. item II, 261. De ver. relig. XXXIX, 73. M. t. 34, col. 155; p. paragraph VII, 67. According to Augustine, God is the Highest Truth, superior (supereminens) to all reason - Enarr. in XXXIII ps. Serm. II, no. 6. Migne, t. 36, col. 311; Truth, always inherent in the pure eye - De Trin. XV, VI, 10. M. t. 42, col. 1063–1064. Enarr. in XXX ps. Serm. II, no. 2. M.t. 36, col. 234.cnfr. De util. credend. XVI, 34. M. t. 42, col. 89–90; Truth that serves for the good of all or serves for the good of all - Confess. XII, XXV, 34. M. t. 32, col. 840; r. item I, 404. Enarr. in LXXV ps., n. 17; Truth, One in Itself and only varied in the degree of its assimilation by rational spirits - Enarr. in XI ps., n. 2. M. t. 36, col. 138. De Genes. ad litt. (op. imperf.) p. XVI, no. 60. M. t.34, col. 243. Tract. XXXV in Joann. Ev. n. 3. Migne, t. 35, col. 1658. Confess. X, XXIII, 33. M. t. 32, col. 793; p. p. I, 294. cnfr. VII, X, 16; M.t. 32, col. 742; p. p. I, 180–181: “supra mentem meam lux incommutabilis... superior, quia ipsa fecit me, et ego interior, quia factus sum ab ea.. Tu es Deus meus!” Enchirid. With. XVII n. 5. M.t. 40, col. 239–240; r. paragraph XI, 13–14. Tract. XLI in Joann. Ev. n. 1.M.t. 35, col. 1692: veritas incommutabilis est. Veritas panis est, mentes deficit, non deficit. De lib. arbitr. I, XIV, 38. Migne, t. 32, col. 1262. Confr. Tract XLI in Joann. Ev. n. 1.M.t. 35, col. 1692. Enarr. in XXXIII ps. serm. II, no. 6. M.t. 36, col. 310. “For ancient philosophy,” says Prof. I. V. Popov in his excellent in many respects scientific study “The Idea of ​​Deification in the Ancient Eastern Church. Moscow. 1909,” p. 42, “the creative nature of human knowledge was still completely unclear. She always considered the cognitive activity of the mind as its perception of the object of knowledge. According to the epistemology of Blessed. Augustine, ideas, that is, the laws of logic and mathematics, the norms of aesthetic and moral judgments, are not simple ways of thinking, but, existing outside consciousness and independently of it, are perceived by the intellect in the same way as light is perceived by the eye. Therefore, in patristic literature, knowledge is always compared with the nourishment of the soul. About the knowledge of God, Augustine says: “It seemed to me as if I heard Your voice speaking to me from on high: I am Bread for those who are ripened in age; grow and eat Me; but it is not you who will turn Me into yourself, like food into your flesh, but you who will turn into Me.” Confessions, VII, 10; r. paragraph I, 199" (180–181). In the same sense and on the same basis, in our opinion, blessed. Augustine also represents God under the image of the Inexhaustible and Blessed Source of our drink. Confess. IX, III, 6. Migne, t. 32, col. 765–766; p. paragraph I, 238. Quaerens enim unde approbarem pulchritudinem corporum sive coelestium, sive terrestium, et quid mihi praesto esset integre de mutabilibus judicanti et dicenti: Hoc ita esse debet, illud non ita. Hoc ergo quaerens unde judicarem, cum ita judicarem, inveneram incommutabilem et veram veritatis aeternitatem, supra mentem meam commutabilem. Confess. VII, XVII, 23. Migne, t. 32, col. 745; p. paragraph I, 187. Nullus de illa judicat, nullus sine illa judicat bene – De lib. arbitr. II, XIV, 38. M. t. 32, col. 1262. De Trinit. D. IX, VI, 9. M. t. 42, col. 966. Nam haec (sc. prima sapientia, identical with prima vita et prima essentia) est iqcommutabilis veritas, quae lex omnium artium recte dicitur, et ars omnipotentis artificis. De ver. relig. With. XXXI, n. 57. Migne, t. 34, col. 147; p. paragraph VII, 51. De ver. relig. With. XXIX, no. 53. Migne, t. 34, col. 145; p. paragraph VII, 47. Cnfr. Ibid. XXXI, 57–58. M.t. 34, col. 147–148; p. paragraph VII, 51–52. De Civit. D. XI, XXVII, 2. M. t. 41, col. 341; p. p. IV, 219–220. De ver. relig. c. LV, nn. 110–112; Migne, t. 34, col. 170–172; p. paragraph VII, 98–101. Solil. I, I, 2–3. Migne, t. 32, col. 870; p. p. II, 228–229. De ver. relig. c. LV, n 113. M. t. 34, col. 172; p. paragraph VII, 101. Confess. IV, XV, 25. M. t. 32, col. 703; p. paragraph I, 91. Cnfr. Ibid. VII, IX, 13; col. 740; p. paragraph I, 176–177. VII, X, 16, col. 742; p. paragraph I, 180–181; VII, XX, 26, col.746; p. p. I, 192. IX, IV, 10, col. 768; p. p. I, 243. X, XXXIV, 52, col. 801; p. p. I, 307. XIII, VI, 7, col. 847; p. paragraph I, 425, etc. De Civit. Dei XI, XXVII, 2. M. t. 41, col. 341; p. paragraph IV, 219 and many others. etc. Confess. VII, X, 16. Migne, t. 32, col. 742; p. paragraph I, 180–181. Cnfr. Ibid. X, XL–XLI, 65–66; col. 806–807; p. paragraph I, 317–319. De lib. arb. 1. II, cc. XIV–XV, nn. 38–39. M.t. 32, col. 1261–1262. In Joann. Ev. Tract. V, n. 1.M.t. 35, col. 1414. De divers. quaest. LXXXIII. qu. XXX. M.t. 40, col. 19–20. De ver. relig. XXXI, 58. M. t. 32, col. 147–148; p. paragraph VII, 51–52. – A more detailed explanation of this kind of thoughts is blessed. Augustine is given by our contemporary domestic researcher, Prof. I. V. Popov in a number of scientific essays devoted to depicting the process of spiritual development of the blessed. Augustine and his doctrine of knowledge. See “Theology.” Vestn." 1915 July–Aug., pp. 501–507 Wed. “Christ. Thought" 1916 Book. VII–VIII, pp. 117 et al. “Question. Philosopher and psychol.” 1916 March - April May – June. Book 132–133. Page 195 and gave. “Absolutely perfect reason,” says our famous theologian-philosopher Prof. V.D. Kudryavtsev, “there is an omniscient mind, an absolutely perfect will in the range of its actions is omnipotent, in their quality it is all-good and holy: the consciousness of oneself absolutely possessing all one’s perfections gives the concept of God as an all-blessed being.” Full collection his op. Serg. Posad. 1892. T. 2nd. (Research and Articles on Natural Theology). Vol. 3rd, pp. 197–198. “una sapientia est, in qua sunt immensi quidam atque infiniti thesauri rerum intelligibilium, in quibus sunt omnes invisibiles atque incommutabiles rationes rerum, etiam visibilium et mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt. Quoniam Deus non aliquid nesciens fecit, quod nec de quolibet homine artifice recte dici potest: porro, si sciens fecit omnia, ea utique fecit quae noverat.” De Civit. D. XI, X, 3. Migne, t. 41, col. 327; p. p. IV, 192. Cogitatio ejus (sc. Dei) et recogitatio mutandarum rerum est immutabilis ratio. De Civ. D. XV, XXV. M.t. 41, col. 472; p. paragraph V, 129. Cnfr. Tu autem, Domine, qui et semper vivis, et nihil moritur in te, quoniam ante primordia saeculorum, et ante omne, quod vel ante dici potest, tu es et Deus esDominusque omnium quae creasti: et apud te rerum omnium instabilium stant causae: et rerum omnium mutabilium immutabiles manent origines; et omnium irrationabilium et temporalium sempiternae vivunt rationes. Confess. I, VI, 9. M. t. 32, col 664; p. paragraph I, 8. Ep. Sylvester. Experience of Orthodox dogmatic theology. Kyiv. 1885. T. 2nd, p. 138. Ep. Sylvester, op. op. page 138. De Trinit. Dei XV, XIII, 22. Migne, t. 42, col. 1076.Cnfr. VI, X, 11; Ibid. col. 931–932. De Civit. Dei XI, X. 3. M. t. 41, col. 327; p. paragraph IV, 192. Confess. VII, IV, 6; M.t. 32, col. 736; p. paragraph I, 165, etc. De Civit. Dei XI, X. 3. Migne, t. 41. col. 327; p. paragraph I, 192. Confess. XIII, XXXVIII, 53. Migne, t. 32, col. 868; rus. lane I, 472. Cnfr. De Trtnit. Dei XV, XIII, 22. M. t. 42, col. 1076: Nec aliter ea scivit (Deus) creata quam creanda. De Trinit. Dei XV, VII, 13. Migne, t. 42, col. 1066. De Civit. Dei XI, XXI. Migne, t. 41, col. 334; p. paragraph IV, 206. Confess. XIII, XVI, 19. Migne, t. 32, col. 853; p. paragraph I, 439. Cnfr. De Civit. Dei XI, XXI. M.t. 41, col. 334; p. paragraph IV, 206. De Trinit. Dei IV, Proëm. 1.M.t. 42, col. 887. Nam tu semper idem, qui ea, quae non semper nec eodem modo sunt, eodem modo semper nosti omnia. Confess. VIII, 3, 6. Migne, t. 32, col. 751–752; p. paragraph I, 204. Ibi novit omnia Deus quae fecit per ipsam, et ideo cum decedant et succedant tempora, non decedit aliquid vel succedit scientiae Dei. Non enim haec quae creata sunt, ideo sciuntur a Deo, quia facta sunt: ​​ac non potius ideo facta sunt vel mutabilia, quia iramutabiliter ab eo sciuntur. De Trinit. Dei VI, X, 11. M. t. 42, col. 931–932. ,Cnfr. Nec aliter ea scivit creata quam creanda. Non enim ejus sapientiae aliquid accessit ex eis, sed illis existentibus, sicut oportebat et quando oportebat, illa mansit, ut erat. XV, XIII, 22; col. 1076.Cnfr. Confess. XIII, XXXVIII, 53. M. t. 32, col. 868; p. paragraph I, 472. De Trinit. Dei XV, VIII, 13. Migne, t. 42, col. 1006. De Civit. Dei XI, XXI. M.t. 41, col. 334; p. paragraph IV, 206. See above, note. 376–379, 397–400, etc. Confess. VIII, 3, 6. Migne, t. 32, col. 751–752; p. lane I, 204. De Trinit. D. VI, X, 11. M. t. 42, col. 931–932. De Trinit. Dei XV, VII, 13. Migne, t. 42, col. 1066.Cnfr. De Civit. Dei XI, XXI. M. t 41, col. 334; p. paragraph IV, 206. Quite a detailed and complete depiction of the Divine knowledge of Bl. Augustine gives in the XIth book. Chapter 21 of his monumental work “On the City of God,” where he literally says the following on this matter: “The knowledge of God does not have such diversity that it represents differently what is not yet present, differently what already is, and differently what will be. For God sees the future, looks at the present and looks at the past not in our way, but in some other way, far different from the ordinary way of our thinking. Without changing his thoughts from one to another, He sees, but in a completely unchanging way. From what happens in time, the future, for example, does not yet exist; the present just exists; the past no longer exists; but He embraces all this in a constant and eternal present. And He does not contemplate differently with the eyes, and differently with the mind: because He does not consist of soul and body; not otherwise now, not otherwise before, and not otherwise after: because His knowledge does not change, like ours, according to the difference of time - present, past and future. With Him there is no change or change (James 1:17). The intention of Him does not pass from thought to thought, in whose incorporeal contemplation everything that He knows exists simultaneously together.” De Civit. Dei XI, XXI. Migne, t. 41, col. 334; Russian lane IV, 206. De doctr. christ. I, VII, 7. Migne, t. 34, col. 22; p. p. (non-academic ed.) pp. 21–22. Confess. VII, IV, 6. M. t. 32, col. 735; p. paragraph I, 164. Quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis comprehensione finitur. De Civit. Dei XII, XVIII. Migne, t. 41, col. 368; p. paragraph IV, 269. In all likelihood, on the part of Western Origenists. De Civit. Dei XII, XVIII. Migne, t. 41, col. 367–368; p. lane IV, 268–270. De Civit. Dei XII, XVIII. Migne, t. 41, col. 368; p. p. IV, 269–270. De divers. Quest. ad Simple. 1. II, qu. 2.n. 2. Migne, t.40, col. 138. De Civit. Dei V, ix, 4. Migne, t. 41, col. 151–152; p. n. 251–254. V, X 2; col. 153; p. Section III, 256–257. Wed. Ep. Sylvester. Experience of Orthodox dogmatic theology. Kyiv. 1885. T. 2, p. 145. Confess. XI, XXI, 41. Migne, t. 32, col. 826; p. p. I, 368. Cnfr. quis hominum comprehendit istam (sc. Dei) sapientiam, eamdemque prudentiam, eamdemque scientiam; Quandoquidem a nobis nec nostra comprehenditur? De Trinit. Dei XV, VII, 13. M. t. 42, col. 1066. Et putamus nos, utrum Dei providentia eadem sit quae memoria et intelligentia, qui non singula cogitando aspicit, sed una, aeterna et immutabili atque ineffabili visione complectitur cuncta, qnae novit, tanta mentis infirmitate posse comprehendere? In hac igitur difficultate et angustiis libet exclamare ad Deum vivum: Mirificata est scientia tua ex me; invaluit, et non potero ad illam (Psal. CXXXVIII, 6). Ex me quippe intelligo quam sit mirabilis et incomprehensibilis scientia tua, qua me fecisti; Quando nec me ipsum comprehendere valeo quem fecisti. Ibid., col. 1067.Cnfr. Ibid. col. 1076. Quomodo (Deus) congnovit?... non sic ipse novit, ut dat nosse bomini. Alia est notitia Dei; alia hominis: sicut alia possessio Dei, alia hominis. Enarr. in XLIX ps., n. 18. Migne, t. 36, col. 576 cnfr. col. 577. Confess. XI, IV, 6. Migne, t. 32, col. 811; p. p. I, 329. In another place in his works, but for the same reason, Augustine figuratively calls our knowledge in comparison with the knowledge of God “dim twilight,” which brightens and turns into “morning” only in the light of the Wisdom of God. De Civit. D. XI, VII. Migne, t. 41, col. 322–323; p. p. IV, 184–185. De Civit. Dei VIII, XI. Migne, t. 41, col. 236; p. paragraph IV, 23, etc. Confess. XI, XXI, 41. Deus-conditor universitatis, conditor animarum et corporum. Migne, t. 32, col. 826; p. paragraph I, 368. Cp. De Civit. Dei V, XI. M.t. 41, col. 153; p. paragraph III, 257: Deus unus omnipotens, creator et factor omnis animae atque omnis corporis. Contra advers. Leg. et Prophet. I, IV, 6. Migne, t 42, col. 606: Dominus Deus et coelestia et terrestia condidit. De Genes. ad litter. (lib. imperf.) p. IV, no. 18. M. t. 34, col. 227: omnium rerum quae ortae sunt, quae videntur, et quae non videntur... Deum esse auctorem et conditorem credendium est. De catech. rud. With. XVIII, no. 29. M. t. 40, col. 332. De symb. ad catechum. With. I, n. 2. M.t. 40, col. 627–628. Deus-vere aeternus Creator mentium. Confess. XI, XXI, 41. Migne, t. 32, col. 826; p. paragraph I, 369. De Civit. Dei VII, XXX. Migne, t. 41, col. 220; r. paragraph III, 385. Tract. 48 in Joann. Ev. n. 6. Migne, t. 35, col. 1743. De Trinit. D. VI, IV, 6. M. t. 42, col. 927; op. cit. XV, V, 7. Ibid. col. 1062. XV, XIII, 22; col. 1076. De divers. Quest. qu. XXIII. Migne, t. 40, col. 16. De Trinit. Dei XV, VII, 13. Migne, t. 42, col. 1066–1067. Dei sapientia simplieiter multiplex et uniformiter multiformis. De Civit. Dei XII, XVIII. Migne, t. 41, col. 368; r. paragraph IV, 270. De Civit. Dei XI, X. 2. Migne, t. 41, col. 326; p. paragraph IV, 191. Confess. XIII, XVI, 19. Migne, t. 32, col. 859; p. paragraph I, 439. De Trinit. D. IV, proëm. – 1; M.t. 42, col. 887. Sempiterna et incommutabilis Dei voluntas – De Civit. Dei XII, XVII, 2; M.t. 41, col. 367; p. paragraph IV, 268. Tract. XX in Joann. Ev. n. 4. Migne, t. 35, col. 1558. Voluntas et potentia Dei Deus ipse est. Confess. VII, IV, 6. Migne, t. 32, col. 736; p. pp. 164–165. Deus autem cui non est alia substantia ut sit, et alia potestas ut possit, sed consubstantiale illi est quidquid ejus est. Tract. XX in Joann. Ev. n. 4. Migne, t. 35, col. 1558. De Civit. Dei XII, XX, 4. Migne, t. 31, col. 371; p. paragraph IV, 276. Sicut ergo nosti (sc. Tu, Deus,) in principio coelum et terram sine varietate tuae, ita fecisti in principio coelum et terram sine distentione actionis tuae. Confess. XI, XXI, 41. Migne, t. 32, col. 826; p. paragraph I, 369. Dr. J. Storz. Die Philosophie des hl. Augustinus. Freib. im Br. 1882. S. 190. Cp. De Civit. Dei V, X, n. 1. Migne, t. 41, col. 152; p. paragraph III, 255. Naes omnia... fecit (Deus) non ex aliqua materie, quam ipse non fecit. Non enim aliena formavit, sed ipse quod formaret instituit. Qui enim dicit quod aliquod facere de nihilо non potuerit, quomodo credit, quod omnipotens fecerit? Sine dubio quippe negat omnipotentem, qui dicit quod mundum Deus facere non posset, si unde faceret non haberet.... Non eam (materiem) Deus velut sibi coaeternam, unde mundum fabricaret, invenit: sed eam ipse ex omnino nihilo, cum rebus quas de illa fecit, instituit. Serm CCXIV, n. 2. Migne, t. 38, col. 1066. Deus solus verus creator est, qui causas ipsas et rationes seminarias rebus inseruit. Quest. in Heptateuchum, lib. II (in Exod.), XXI. M.t. 34, col. 603. Confess. I, VI, 9. Migne, t. 32, col. 664; p. p. I, 8. Quaest. 83, qu. 46, 2, M., t. 40, col. 30. De Genes. ad litt. II, VI, 12. M. t. 34, col. 268; p. paragraph VII, 196. Cp. Dr. J. Storz, Op. cit. §23. Die Ewigkeit des Schöpfungsaktes. Ss. 211–224. De Civit. Dei XI, IV, 2. Migne, t 41, col. 320; p. paragraph IV, 180, etc. In Deo enim novum exstitisse consilium, ne dicam impium, ineptissimum est dicere. De Ordine II, XVII, 46. Migne, t. 32, col. 1016; p. paragraph II, 217. De Civit. Dei XI, IV, 2. M. t. 41, col. 320; p. paragraph IV, 180. Cnfr. op. cit. XI, V, 2; ibid. col. 321; p. paragraph IV, 182 Op. cit. XII, XIV, 2; ibid. col. 362; p. item IV, 260. Op. cit. XII, XVII, 2; ibid. col. 367; p. paragraph IV, 268. Confess. XII, XV. 18. Migne, t. 32. col. 832; p. p. I, 385–386. De Civit. Dei XII, XVII, 2. M. t. 41, col. 367; p. item IV, 268. Op. cit. XII, XX, 4; ibid. col. 371; p. paragraph IV, 276. De Civit. Dei XI, IV, 2. Migne, t. 41, col. 320. p. paragraph IV, 180. Confess. XI, XXXI, 41. M. t. 32, col. 826; p. p. I, 368–369. De Genes. ad litter. IV, V, 12. Migne, t. 34, col 300–301; p. paragraph VII, 259. Cnfr. op. cit. I, II, 6; ibid. col. 248; p. paragraph VII, 156–157. De Civit. Dei X, XII. M.t. 41, col. 291; p. paragraph IV, 128. Op. cit. XV, XXV. Ibid. col. 472; p. paragraph V, 129; cogitatio ejus (Dei) et recogitatio mutandarum rerum immutabilis ratio est. Epist. ad Volus. 137, p. II, no. 8. Migne, t. 33, col. 519: in tallibus rebus tota ratio facti est potentia facientis. Cnfr. Contra Faust. Manich. 1. XXVI, c.c. I–IV. M.t. 42, col. 479–481. Tract. in Joann. Ev., n. 1.M.t. 35, col. 1593 etc. De Trinit. Dei III, ix, 16. Migne, t. 42, col. 877–878: (in its inner essence or in its basis) originaliter ac primordialiter in quadam textura elementorum cuncta jam creata sunt; sed acceptis opportuniatibus prodeunt. Nam sicut matres gravidae sunt fetibus, sic ipse mundus gravidus est causis nascentium: quae in illo non creantur, nisi ab illa summa essentia, ubi nec oritur, nec moritur aliquid, nec incipit esse, nec desinit. Cnfr. III, VIII, 14; col. 876–877: creationem rerum visibilium Deus interius operatur; exteriores vero operationes – ita rerum naturae adhibet in qua creat omnia, quemadmodum terrae agriculturam. Tract. in Joann. Ev. II, no. 10. Migne, t. 35, col. 1393: Deus-mundo infusus fabricat, ubique positus fabricat, et non recedit aliquo, non extrinsecus quasi versat molem quam fabricat. Prof. A.I. Brilliantov. The influence of Eastern theology on Western theology in the works of John Scotus Erigena. St. Petersburg 1898. Pp. 108–110. De Civit. Dei V, X, 1. Migne, t. 41, col. 152; p. paragraph III, 255. Cnfr. Contra Faust. Manich. 1. XXII, p. XXII; M.t. 42, col. 412–416. Non potest (Deus) mori, non potest peccare, non potest mentiri, non potest falli. Tanta non potest: quae si posset, non esset omnipotens. Serm. CCXIII, p. I, n. 1. Migne, t. 38, col. 1061. Further proving the position “omnipotens id solum non potest, quod non vult,” bl. Augustine says: sed quoniam dixi hoc solum omnipotentem non posse, quod non vult: ne quis me temere dixisse arbitretur aliquid omnipotentem non posse; hoc et beatus Apostolus dixit. Si non credimus, ille qui fidelis permanet, negare se ipsum non potest (2 Tim. II, 13). Sed quia non vult, non potest; Quia et velle non potest. Non enim potest justitia velle facere quod injustum est, aut sapientia velle quod stultum est, aut veritas velle quod falsum est. Unde admonemur Deum omnipotentem non hoc solum quod ait Apostolus, Negare se ipsum non potest, sed multa non posse... Deus omnipotens non potest mori, non potest mutari, non potest falli, non potest miser fieri, non potest vinci. Haec atque hujusmodi absit ut possit omnipotens. Ac per hoc non solum ostendit veritas omnipotentem esse, quod ista non possit; Sed etiam cogit veritas omnipotentem non esse, qui haec possit. Serm. CCXIV, no. 4. Migne, t. 38, col. 1067–1068. De Symb. ad catech. With. II, no. 3. M, t. 40, col. 629. Contra Faust Manich. 1. XXVI, p. 5. Migne, t. 42, col. 481–482. De Civit. Dei XXII, XXV. Migne, t. 41, col. 793; p. paragraph VI, 415: Si volunt invenire quod omnipotens non potest, habent prorsus: ego dicam, Mentiri non potest. Credamus ergo quod potest, non credendo quod non potest. Non itaque credentes quod mentiri possit, credant esse facturum quod se facturum esse promisit. Enchirid. With. C. Migne, t. 40, col. 279; p. paragraph XI, 77. “Enchiridion ad Laurentium sive de fide, spe et charitate” liber unus (Migne, t. 40, col. 231–290; pp. XI, 1–92) written by Blessed. Augustine, as we know, in 421, therefore, 9 years before his death - See above Introduction to this work, pp. .... bonum est, ut etiam sint et mala. Enchir. c. XCVI. Migne, t. 40, col. 276; p. paragraph XI, 72. quia non fieret (sc. malum), si non (sc. Deus) sineret nec utique nolens sinit, sed volens. Enchirid. With. C, n. 26. Migne, t. 40, col. . 279; p. paragraph XI, 77. De Civit. Dei XXII, II, 2. Migne, t. 41, col. 753; p. paragraph VI, 345: Multa enim volunt fieri sancti ejus ab illo inspirata sancta voluntate, nec fiunt; sicut orant pro quibusdam pie sancteque, et quod orant non facit, cum ipse in eis hanc orandi voluntatem sancto Spiritu suo fecerit. Ac per hoc, quando secundum Deum volunt et orant sancti, ut quisque sit salvus, possumus illo modo locutionis dicere, Vult Deus et non facit; ut ipsum dicamus velle, qui ut velint isti facit. De catechizandis rudibus p. ХVШ, n.n. 29. 30. Migne, t. 40, col. 332–333: Deus fecit... et hominem ad imaginem suam, ut quemadmodum ipse per omnipotentiam suam praeest universae creaturae, sic homo per intelligentiam, qua etiam creatorem suum cognoscit et colit, praeesset omnibus terrenis animalibus. Qui (sc. Deus) enim hominibus dedit liberum arbitrium, ut non servili necessitate, sed ingenua voluntate Deum colerent, dedit etiam Angelis. De ver. relig. With. XIV, no. 27. M. t. 34, col. 134; p. p. V1I, 23–24: Tales (sc. gifted liberum voluntatis arbitrium) enim servos suos meliores esse Deus judicavit, si ei servirent liberaliter, quod nullo modo fieri posset, si non voluntate, sed necessitate servirent. Cnfr. De lib. arbitr. II, I, 2. M. t 32, col. 1240. Contra duas epist. Pelag. I, XVIII, 36. M. t. 44, col. 567. De catechiz. rud. With. XVIII, n.n. 29. 30. Migne, t. 40, col. 332. 333. De ver. relig. With. XIV, no. 27. M. t. 34, col. 134; p. paragraph VII, 23–24. De symb. ad catechum. With. I, n. 2. Migne, t 40. col. 627: Nemo resistit omnipotenti, ut non, quod vult, faciat. Enchirid. c. XCVI. Migne, t. 40, col. 276; p. paragraph XI, 72. Prof. I. V. Popov. Life and development of blessed. Augustine before his baptism. Theologian Vestn. 1915 T. I, p. 724. Enchirid. With. C, n. 26. Quia non fieret (sc. quod etiam contra ejufr fit voluntatem), si non sineret: nec utique nolens sinit (as, for example, a person is sometimes involuntarily forced to evil by the force of things and cannot resist it), sed volens (since He already had the decisions of His will related here from eternity); nec sineret bonus, fieri male, nisi omnipotens et de malo facere posset bene. Migne, t. 40. col 279; p. paragraph XI, 77. Cnfr. op. cit. With. XXVII. n. 8: Melius enim judicavit (sc. Deus) de malis bene facere, quam mala nulla esse permittere. Ibid. col. 245; p. paragraph XI, 23. De continentia p. VI, no. 15. M. t. 40, col. 358–359. Enarr. in CIV Ps. n. 17. M. t. 37, col. 1398. Epist. CXL ad Honorat. With. II, no. 4. M.t. 33, col. 539. Epist. CLXVI ad Hieron. c. III, no. 15. M. t. 33, col. 727. Tract. XXVII in Joann. Ev. n. 10. M. t. 35, col. 1620. Serm. CCXIV, no. 3. M. t.38, col. 1067. De Trinit. Dei XV, V, n.n. 7–8. Migne, t. 42, col 1061–1063: Bonitas etiam atque justitia, numquid inter se in natura Dei, sicut in ejus operibus distant, tanquam duae diversae sint qualitates Dei; una, bonitas; alia, justitia? Non utique: sed quae justitia, ipsa bonitas. – Quidquid enim secundum qualitates illic dici videtur, secundum substantiam vel essentiam est intelligendum. Absit enim ut spiritus secundum substantiam dicatur Deus, et bonus secundum qualitatem: sed utrumque secundum substantiam. For Deus justus and Dei justitia, see De lib. arbitr. III, XX, 55. M. t. 32, col. 1297. Contra Julian. Pelag. II, VII, 21. M. t. 44, col. 688. Oper. imperf. contra Julian. I.1, p. C.M.t. 44, col. 1116. That Dei voluntas bona est – Enchirid. With. CI, n. 26. M. t. 40. col. 279; p. paragraph XI, 77, etc. Dr. J. Storz. Op. cit. S. 191. (Prof.) Al. Belyaev. Love Divine. Moscow. 1884. Ed. 2nd. Page 25 Wed. 44 and other pages. In contrast to man, in whom love is only a simple property or force, in God love has a personal or substantial character. A person says about himself: Ego memini ego intelligo, ego diligo; nec memoria sum, nec intelligentia, nec dilectio, sed habeo. De Trinit. XV, XXII, n. 42. Migne, t. 42, col. 1090. On the other hand, the nature of absolute Being exists like this, ut in illa simplici summaque natura non sit aliud substantia, et aliud charitas; sed substantia ipsa sit charitas, et charitas ipsa sit substantia. XV, XVII, 29; col. 1081. Ecce: Deus dilectio est. VIII, VII, 11; col. 957. Ecce jam potest notiorem Deum habere quam fratrem... Amplectere dilectionem Deum, et dilectione amplectere Deum. Ipsa est dilectio, quae omnes bonos Angelos, et omnes Dei servos consociat vinculo sanctitatis.... et quo nisi Deo plenus est, qui plenus est dilectione? At enim charitatem video, et quantum possum eam mente conspicio, et credo Scripturae dicenti, quoniam Deus charitas est, et qui manet in charitate, in Deo manet (1 Joann. IV, 16): sed cum illam video, non in ea video Trinitatem. Imo verо vides Trinitatem, si charitatem vides. VIII, VIII, 12; col. 957–958. Cnfr. XV, XVII, 31; col. 1082 etc. The discovery in the world, partly of the will, partly of the feeling of the Absolute Personality, should also include God’s communication to man of grace (gratia), this supernatural and mysterious power for the internal justification and salvation of man, and the restoration of his communion with God, as well as that long-suffering (patientia), by which the Lord allows the very existence of sin and provides him with time for repentance. Serm. XLIV, n. 8. Migne, t 36, col. 262. – A detailed consideration of these very important questions, as belonging rather to the anthropological than to the speculative department of Augustinian theology, is not within the scope of our tasks. De Ordin. II, VII, 22. Migne, t 32, col. 1004; p. p. II, 193. Cnfr. I, VII, 19; col. 986; p. paragraph II, 156. Enarr. in CXLIII Ps., n. 8: Non ei (sc. Deo) tollit misericordia justitiam, nec justitia misericordiam. Migne, t. 37, col. 1861. Cnfr. Enarr. in XLIV Ps. n. 18. M. t. 36, col. 504–505. De ver. relig. XV, 29: Et est justitiae pulchritudo cum benignitatis gratia concordans... Migne, t. 34, col. 134; p. paragraph VII, 24–25, etc. Enarr. in LV Ps., n. 13: A te ira videtur, sed paterna. Irascitur pater filio contemptori praeceptorum suorum: iratus ei eum colaphizat, caedit, aurem vellit, manu trahit, ad scholam ducit. Migne, t 36, col. 655. Enarr. in L Ps., n. 11: Inde est vox illa Domini, Ego percutiam, et ego sanabo. Percutit puterdinem facinoris, sanat dolorem vulneris. Faciunt medici cum secant, percutiunt et sanant; armant her ut feriant, ferrum gestant et curare venhint. Migne, t. 36, col. 593. Cp. Enarr. in LV Ps., n. 13. Migne, t. 36, col. 655. Quest. in Heptateuchum. Lib. I in Genes. qu. CLXL Migne, t. 34, col. 591–592. Enarr. in CXLVII Ps., n. 13, M. t. 37, col. 1922–1923. Epist. CXXXVIII, p. II, no. 11. M.t. 33, col. 529–530. Wed. Bishop Sylvester, Op. op. vol. 2, p. 173. Enarr. in CXXIX Ps., n. 3. Migne, t. 37, col. 1697–1698. Cnfr. n. 5; col. 1699–1700, etc. Enarr. in LII Ps., n. 2: Si enim Des est, justus est; si justus est, displicet ei injustitia, displicet iniquitas. Tu autem cum putas ei placere iniquitatem, negas Deum... Cum dicis in corde tuo, Favet Deus iniquitatibus meis, nihil aliud dicis quam, Non est Deus. Migne, t. 36, col. 614. Serm. CCCXLIV, n. 4. Migne, t. 39, col. 1515. Cnfr. Serm. SKhSh, p. II, no. 2. M.t. 38, col. 648–649. Enarr. in LXI Ps., n. 21. M. t. 36, col. 714. Epist. CLXXXV ad Bonifac. With. IX, n.n. 37 et 38. M. t. 33, col. 809–810. De divers. Quest. ad Simple. I, qu. II, no. 18: Omnis autem creatura Dei bona est, et omnis homo in quantum homo est, creatura est, non in quantum peccator est... Nihil enim odit (Deus) eorum, quae fecit... nec odit in homine nisi peccatum. Odit Deus impietatem. Itaque in aliis eam punit per damnationem, in aliis adimit per justificationem... Odit enim in eis (sc. impiis hominibus) impietatem, quam ipse non fecit. Sicut enim judex in homine odit furtum, sed non odit quod datur ad metallum; illud enim fur, hoc judex facit. Migne, t. 40, col. 122–123. Cnfr. Op. impert. contra Julian, lib. IV, cap. CXXIV. M.t. 45, col. 1422. Epist. CXCIV ad Sixt., n.n. 18–19. Migne, t. 33, col. 880–881. Cnfr. De Trinit. Dei XIII, X, 14. M. t. 42, col. 1024–1025. XIV, XV, 21; col. 1051–1052. Ep. Sylvester. Experience of Orthodox dogmatic theology. Kyiv. 1885. T. 2, p. 162. Summa plenitudo, summa vita, ubi nihil deest, nihil redundat. Solil. I, I, 4. Migne, t. 32, col. 871; p. paragraph II, 231. Wed. Ep. Sylvester, op. op. page 176. Cosmomorphism is the representation of God “in the form of some element or force of nature, for example, light.” Prof. V. D. Kudryavtsev. Full collection his op. Serg. Pos. 1893. T. II, p. 202. Confess. 1. VII, p. 1, n. n. 1–2. Migne, t. 32, col. 733–734; r. paragraph I, 159–161. Cnfr. VII, VII, 11. Migne, t. 32, col. 739–740; p. paragraph I, 173–175. Ibidem, cnfr. Confess. V, X, 19. Migne, t. 32, col. 715; Russian lane I, 116–117. Epist. CXLVIII ad Fortunatum p. IV, no. 13. Migne, t. 33, col. 628, De Trinitate Dei, 1. 1, p. 1, n. n. 1–2. Migne, t. 42, col. 819–821. For Augustine it is certain that nihil terrenum, nihil igneum, nihil denique quod corporis sensus adtingit, pro Deo colendum esse, ad quem solo intellectti ambiendum est. De utilit. cred. With. XVII, no. 35. Migne, t. 42, col. 90. De consensu Evangel. I, 23, n. 31; p. paragraph X, 26, where Augustine has in mind the Platonists, who recognized God as spirit, and the Stoics, who attributed corporeality to the Divinity. Therefore, Augustine resolutely takes up arms against those who imagine God under the image of corpus igneum, candor lucis, etc. – De ver. relig. c. XLIX, no. 96. Migne, t. 34, col. 164–165; p. paragraph VII, 88. Cnfr. Epist. CXLVII ad Paulin. With. XXI, no. 49. M.t. 33, col. 619 (according to the teachings of the Stoics, everything that is not “corpus” is not “substantia”). Augustine also directs his Epist against Tertullian. CXC ad Optat. With. IV, no. 14. M. t. 33, col. 861.Cnfr. De Genes. ad litt. X, XXV, 41. M. t.34, col. 427; r. paragraph VIII, 205, etc. – See also the explanations of bl. Augustine, from the point of view he established above, about what they mean in application to God as an incorporeal Spirit, for example, face (facies) - De Ordin. I, VIII, 23. Migne, t 32, col. 988 cnfr. De Civit. D. XXII, XXIX. M.t. 41, col. 797; p. paragraph VI, 422. Enarr. in X Ps., n. 11. M.t. 36, col. 137. Epist. CXLVIII ad Fortun. With. IV, no. 13. M. t. 33, col. 628; ears (aures) – Enarr. in IX Ps., n. 33. M.t. 36, col. 130; eye and ear (oculus et auris) – De divers quaest. LXXXIII, qu. LII. M, t. 40, col. 34; hand, hands, fingers, muscle (manus, digiti, brachium) – Enarr. in LXXIV Ps., n. 11. M.t. 36, col. 954 cnfr. Enarr. in CI Ps., serm. II, no. 12. M. t. 37, col. 1313. Contra serm. arian. With. XII. M.t. 42, col. 692. Enarr. in CXVIII Ps. serm, XVIII, n. 1.M.t. 37, col. 1551. – Enarr. in VIII Ps, n. 7. M.t. 36, col. 111–112 et in XLIII Ps., n. 4. M.t. 36, col. 484 et in LXX Ps. serm. II, no. 4. M.t. 36, col. 894 (appended to Christ and the Holy Spirit); right hand, shuytsa (dextra, sinistra) – De fide et symb. With. VII, n. 14. M. t. 40, col. 188. Cnfr. Contra serm. arian. With. XII. M.t. 42, col. 692; wing (alae) – Epist. CXLVIII ad Fortun. With. IV, no. n. 13 et 14. M. t. 33, col. 628; hands, feet, eyes, face (manus, pedes, oculi, fades) – Ibidem. – See further what, according to Augustine, the soul (anima) is – Quaest in Heptateuch. Lib. Ill in Levit. With. HSS. Migne, t. 34, col. 716 – and its various states in application to the spiritual being of God, such as, for example, repentance (poenitentia) – De divers, quaest. ad Simple. II, 2, n. 4. Migne, t. 40, col. 141 cnfr. n. 2, col. 138 et De divers quaest. LXXXIII, qu. LII, M.t. 40, col. 34. De Civit. D. XV, XXV. M.t. 41, col. 472; p. paragraph V, 129; anger (ira) and vengeance (vindicta) – Quaest. in Heptateuch. Lib. I in Genes. With. XXXIX. M.t. 34, col. 558; cnfr. Quest. in Hept. Lib. II in Exod., p. X.M.t. 34, col. 599. De Civit. D. IX, 5. M. t, 41, col. 261; p. paragraph IV, 71. De Trinit. XIII, XVI, 21. M. t. 42, col. 1030. De LXXXIII quaest. qu. LII. M.t. 40, col. 34. Enarr. in Ps. II, no. 4. M.t. 34, col. 70. De Civit. D. XV, XXV. M.t. 41, col. 472; p. paragraph V, 129. cnfr. Contra Faust. XXII, 21. M. t. 42, col. 412; jealousy (zelus) – Quaest in Heptat., Lib. II in Exod., c. CLVIII. M. t.34, col. 651.Cnfr. De LXXXIII quaest., qu. LII. M.t. 40, col. 34. Contra Faust. XXII, 21. M. t. 42, col. 412. De divers. quaest. ad Simple. II, 2, n. 3. M.t. 40, col. 140–141; compassion or mercy (misericordia) – Ibidem; long-suffering (patientia) – De patientia, p. 1, n. 1.M.t. 40, col. 611 and many more others - According to Augustine, all these bodily images - in particular, the members of the human body and the affects of the human soul - when applied to God mean in the language of the Holy. The Scriptures are nothing other than the various dispassionate actions of the Divine (effectus, non affectus – De Civit. D. IX, V. M. t. 41, col. 261; p. p. IV, 71. De Trinit. D. XIII, XVI, n. 21. M. t. 42, col. 1030; these are only various types of Divine activity, not at all accompanied by any suffering (sine ulla passione – De patientia p. 1. M. t. 40, col. 611 cnfr. De Civit. Dei IX, V. M. t. 41, col. 261; p. p. IV, 71), and are used by the Word of God adaptively to our human understanding and language - De LXXXIII divers. quaest., qu. LII. Migne, t. 40, col. 34. In Joann. Ev. tr. XXIII, n. 9. Nam fateor, et fatendum est, quia Evangelium loquitur, Deus spiritus est. Migne, t. 35. col. 1588. Cnfr. De-Trinit. D. XV, V, 7: Incorporalis autem vel incorporeus ideo. dicitur Deus, ut. spiritus credatur vel intelligatur esse, non corpus. Migne, t. 42, col. 1062. De Civit. Dei VIII, V: Si noster animus corpus non est, quomodo Deus creator animi corpus est? Migne, t. 41, col. 230; r. paragraph IV, 12. De Genes. ad litt. VIII, XX, 39. M: t. 34, col. 388; r. paragraph VIII, 131–132. In Joann, Ev. XXIII, n. 9. Migne, t, 35, col. 1588. Non est Deus mutabilis spiritus... Quidquid ergo et a meliore deterius, et a deteriore in melius moritur, non est hoc Deus: quia neque in, melius ire potest summa bonitas, neque in deterius vera aeternitas, Ibid. – Wed. above, p. .... See above, p. …. –Confess. XI, XXI, 41. Migne, t. 32, col. 826; p. p. I, 368. Cf. De Civit. D. V, XI. M.t. 41, col. 153; p. paragraph III, 257. Contra advers. Leg. et Prophet. I, IV, 6. M. t. 42, col. 606. De Genes. ad litt., (lib. imperf.) p. IV, no. 18. M. t. 34, 227. De catech. rud. from XVIII, n. 29. M. t. 40, col. 332. De symb. ad catechum. With. 1, n. 2. M.t. 40, col. 627–628, etc. Wed. J. Storz. Die Philosophic des heil. Augustinus. Fr. im Br. 1882. S. 183. – Epist. CXLVII ad Paulin. With. XX, n. 48. Migne, t. 33, col. 618. In Joann. Ev. tr. XCVI, no. 4. M.t. 35, col. 1876. Quaest. in Heptateuch., lib. II (in Exod.), qu. 151. M.t. 34, col. 647. Confess. VI, III, 4. M. t. 32, col. 721; p. paragraph I, 130. Serm. LII, p. V, n. 15. M. t. 36, col. 360 etc. Dr. A. Dorner. Augustinus. Sein theologisches System und seine religionsphilosophische Anschauung. Berlin. 1873. S. 22. G. Loesche. De Augustino plotinizante in doctrina de Deo disserenda. Jenae. 1880. L. Grandgeorge. Saint Augustin et le néo-platonisme. Paris. 1896. H. Schöler. Augustins Verhältnis zu Plato in genetischer Entwicklung. Jena. 1897. P. Vereshchatsky. Plotinus and Bla. Augustine in their attitude to the Trinitarian problem. Kazan. 1911. De doctr. Christ. I, VII, 7. Migne, t. 34, col. 22; p. p. (non-academic ed.), pp. 21–22. Confess. VII, IV, 6. M. t 32, col. 735; p. paragraph I, 164. De quant. De Trinitate Dei – 1. XV, p. With. V–VI, n. n. 7–8. Migne, t. 42, col 1061–1062 etc. – See above, p. …. De Civitate Dei XI, X, 1. Migne, t. 41, col. 325; p. paragraph IV, 189. See above, note. 224 and 225. Bonum omnium bonorum, bonum, a quo sunt omnia bona, bonum sine quo nihil est bonum, et bonum quod sine caeteris bonum est. Enarr. in Ps. CXXXIV, no. 6. Migne, t. 37, col. 1742. Cnfr. CII, n. 8. M.t. 37, col. 1322–1323. Tu autem bonum nullo indigenous bono. Confess. XIII, XXXVIII, 53. Migne, t. 32, col. 868; p. paragraph I, 472. Deus bonum et pulchrum, in quo et a quo et per quem bona et pulchra sunt, quae bona et pulchra sunt omnia. Solil. I, I, 3. Migne, t. 32, col. 870; p. paragraph II, 229, – See above, p. …. Solil. I, I, 4. Migne, t. 32, col. 871; p. paragraph II, 231. Solil. I, I, 3. Deus beatitudo, in quo et a quo et per quem beatata sunt, quae beatata sunt omnia. Migne, t. 32, col. 870; p. paragraph II, 229. Interpreting the teachings of Bl. Augustine about God as Good and Love (Gott als das Gute und als die Liebe), Prof. Ad. Harnack remarks: “das summum esse ist der höchste Gute; er ist Person.” Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte. Fr. im Br. 1890. Bd III, S. 106 cp. Ss. 108–109. (Prof.) A. P. Orlov. Trinitarian views of Hilary of Pictavia. Serg. Posad. 1908. Pp. 299. St. Hilary of Pictavia (+ 366). O. Bardenhewer. Patrologie-Aufl. 3. Freib. im Br. 1910. S. 350. – See his De Trinit. I, 3. Wed. A.P. Orlov, cit. cit., p. 299. Iv. Graves. New Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus-Efron. St. Petersburg Art. "Augustine". T. I, p. 129. Cf. Encyclopedic Dictionary compiled by Russian scientists and writers. St. Petersburg 1861. T. I. Page. 161, 177. Art. P. L. "Augustine Aurelius". Prof. Iv. V. Popov. The personality of St. Augustine. Theologian Vestn. 1915, month. February. Page 356. H. Scholz. Glaube und Unglaube in der Weltgeschichte (Ein Kommentar zu Augustins De Civitate Dei mit einem Exkurs: “"Fruitio Dei”, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Mystik), Leipzig. 1911. S. 212. De doctr. Christ. I, X, 10. Migne, t. 34, col. 23; p. p. (non-academic ed. 1835) pp. 24–25. Res igitur quibus fruendum est, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, eademque Trinitas, una quaedam summa res, communisque omnibus fruentibus ea. De doctr. Christ. I, V, 5. Migne, t. 34, col. 21; p. paragraph 19 page Cnfr. I, X, 10. M. t. 34, col. 23; p. pp. 24–25. Through communion or “communion” (participatione) with this Divine Trinity, the angels are also blessed. De Civit. D. IX, XV, 2. M. t. 41, col. 269; p. p. IV, 87. Wed. X, XXVI; col. 304; p. p. IV, 151: angeli Ipsi (Deo) adhaerendo beati sunt. “An essential feature in the life of our feeling spirit,” says Bishop Sylvester (Experience.... vol. 2, pp. 163–164, 164–165), “is its inner attraction or love for good and the sweet sensation of this good, as it is possessed. Both must be conceivable in God, but only with the consciousness of the infinite difference that exists in this case between our finite spirit and the infinite Spirit of God.” “Being in itself love for our own good, our feeling, if only it is revealed correctly, lawfully, expresses itself outwardly in no other way than in a similar love for the good of others. A heart full of love for true good and possessing it to a greater or lesser extent cannot help but desire that others should participate in it and share it. Likewise, the feeling of God, being in its essence the highest love and the same bliss, reveals itself outwardly in nothing other than its inexpressible love for creatures, which directs everything towards the achievement of possible and intended benefits for them. But even in this respect there is an infinite difference between our, even the most pure and sublime, feelings of love towards others and the love of God.” Tu autem bonum nullo indigenes bono, semper quietus es, quoniam tua quies tu ipse es. Confess. XIII, XXXVIII, 53. Migne, t. 32, col. 868; p. paragraph I, 472. Intelligas proprie bonum, a quo sunt caetera bona. Ille (Deus-Creator omnium) bono suo bonus est, non aliunde participato bono: ille se ipso bono bonus est, non adhaerendo alteri bono. Mihi autem adhaerere Deo bonum est (Psal. LXXII, 28), qui non eguit a quo fieret bonus; Sed eguerunt illo caetera ut fierent bona. Enarr. in CXXXIV Ps., n. 3. Migne, t. 37, col. 1740. Neque enim operibus suis non egendo requievisset, prius quam essent, quibus nec perfectis eguisset; et quia eis omnino nunquam eguit, nec ista beatitudo qua non eis eget, tanquam proficiendo perficietur. De Genes. ad litt. IV, XIX, 36. Migne, t. 34, col. 310; p. paragraph VII, 277. Deus nullo indiget bono, ipse est summum bonum, et ab ipso est omne bonum. Enarr. in Ps. LXX, serm. II, no. 6. M.t. 36, col. 896. De morib. eccles. et manich. I, III, 4. Migne, t. 32, col. 1312. Cp. Bishop Sylvester, op. cit., p. 167. Confess. VII, IV, 6. Migne, t. 32, col. 735; p. paragraph I, 164. Cnfr. XII, XVI, 23, col. 834; p. item I, 390. Enarr. in CXXXIV Ps., n. 6. M.t. 37, col. 1742. De Civit. D. XI, X, 1. M. t. 41, col. 325; p. paragraph IV, 189. Solil. I, I, 2. M. t. 32, col. 870; p. item II, 229. De ver. relig. With. XIV, no. 28.M:t. 34, col. 134; p. paragraph VII, 24 and many more. etc. Deus bonitate fecit (omnia), nullo quod fecit, eguit. Enarr. in CXXXIV Ps., n. 10. Migne, t. 37, col. 1745 cnfr. n. 3, col. 1740. Conditor... non eguit (rebus) ad augendam beatitudinem suam. Contra advers. Leg. et Proph. I, IV, 6. M. t. 42, col. 606.Cnfr. De Genes. ad litt. IV, XIX. M.t. 34, col. 310; p. paragraph VII, 277 and many others. etc. Duo quippe sunt propter quae amat Deus creaturam suam: ut sit, et ut maneat. De Genes. ad litt. I, VIII, 14. Migne, t. 34, col. 251; p. paragraph VII, 162. Confess. VII, XV, 21. M. t. 32, col. 744; p. paragraph I, 184–185. IV, XII, 18; col. 700; p. paragraph I, 84, etc. About the fact that Deus solus creator et reparator creaturarum - see De Genes. ad litt. IX, XVIII, 35. Migne, t. 34, col. 408; p. paragraph VIII, 168. De ver. relig. With. XVI, no. n. 30–32. M.t. 34, col. 134–136; p. paragraph VII, 25–27. Confess. VII, XVI, 22. M. t. 32, col. 744; p. paragraph I, 185. See Confessiones, De Civitate Dei, and other works of Augustine. – More about this below. Wed. Archim. (+ Ep.) Mikhail Gribanovsky: “The whole nature of God is a manifestation of Divine perfection; hence the feeling of infinite bliss, infinite contentment appears in the deity.” Lectures on introduction to theological sciences. Kazan. 1899. Pp. 158. Confess. I, I, 1. Migne, t. 32, col. 661; p. item I, 1. Cnfr. II, X, 18, col. 682; p. p. I, 44. VI, XVI, 26, col. 732; p. p. I, 157. IX, III, 5, col. 765; p. p. I, 237. IX, IV, 11, col. 768; p. p. I, 244. XIII, XXXVIII, 53, col. 868; p. item I, 472. Serm. XXXIII, IV, 3. Migne, t. 38, col. 208 cnfr. Serm. IX, V, 6, col. 80. De Civit. Dei X, III, 2. Migne, t. 41, col. 280–281; p. paragraph IV, 108 cnfr. XI, VIII, col. 323; p. p. IV, 185: “The peace of God means the peace of those who rest in God. So the joy of the house means the joy of those having fun in the house, even if it was not the house itself that made them happy, but something else.” De Civ. D. XI, XXXI, col. 345; p. p. IV, 226: This number, that is, seven, also denotes the peace of God, with which man also rests in God. For in the whole, that is, in complete perfection there is peace (in toto quippe, id est in plena perfectione requies), and in the part there is labor (in parte autem labor). XXII, XXX, n. n. 1–5, col. 801–804; p. p. VI, 428–434, etc. – It must be said that Augustine distinguishes the peace of God, in the sense of the cessation of the six-day creation of the Divine, i.e., as an expression of His external, transcendental relations, and as the internal state of the infinite bliss of God, i.e., as an act of His internal, immanent life. The peace of God in the first sense, having a beginning, has no end; peace in the latter sense is beginningless and endless (sine initio et sine termino). However, both are in close connection with each other. – About that, Dei requies ab operibus suis quomodo accipienda – see De Genes. ad litt. IV, XIX, 36. Migne, t. 34, col. 310; p. paragraph VII, 277 cnfr. M.t. 34, col. 304, 320, 336, 338. Serm. IX, V, 6. M. t. 38, col. 80 etc. Dei requies sempiterna, sine initio et sine termino, sabbatum perpetuum etc. Dei operatio incommutabilis, aeterna etc. Wed. H. Schöler. Augustins Verhältnis zu Plato in genetischer Entwicklung. Jena. 1897. S. 64. Tu autem Domine semper operaris et semper requiescis.... nec requiescis ad tempus. Confess. XIII, XXXVII, 52. Migne, t. 32, col. 868; p. paragraph I, 472. (Deus) sine cessatione operatur, simul et requiescens et operans. De Genes. ad litt. V, XXXIII, 46. Migne, t. 34, col. 338; p. paragraph VIII, 34 cnfr. VIII, XXIII. 44; col. 390; p. Section VIII, 134–135. Confess. I, I, 1. Migne, t. 32, col. 661; p. paragraph I, 1 and many more. etc. aeterna non solum spiritus, verum etiam corporis requies – De Civit. Dei XXII, XXX, 5. Migne, t. 41, col. 804; p. paragraph VI, 434. quod erit vere maximum sabbatum, non habens vesperam – De Civit. Dei XXII, XXX, 4. Migne, t 41, col. 803 cnfr. col. 804; p. paragraph VI, 432 cp. 433. De Civit. Dei XXII, XXX, 5. Migne, t. 41, col. 804; p. paragraph VI, 434. De Civitate Dei XXII, XXX, 1–5. Migne, t. 41, col. 801–804; p. paragraph VI, 428–434. – With a similar picture of the eternal peace of God, into whose sanctuary we have no time to enter and which God Himself, as the Highest Good and Bliss, enjoys without beginning and endlessly, our Western “creator of a new type of religiosity and the ruler of hearts seeking peace in God,” ends another most important work - his immortal “Confession” (Confess. 1. XIII, pp. XXXV–XXXVIII, n. 50–53. vol. 867–868; It should be noted that Bl. Augustine often understands “the rest of God” (Dei requies) in a substantial sense, identifying it, on the one hand, with the personality of God Himself, and on the other, with the personalities of His chosen ones who have to enter this rest of God. “Tua quies,” says Augustine, addressing God as a Living Personal Being, “tu ipse es.” Confess. XIII, XXXVIII, 53. Migne, t. 32, col. 868; p. paragraph I, 472 and many more. etc. Post hanc (aetatem), says bl. Augustine, in the conclusion of his eschatological intuition, tanquam in die septimo requiecet Deus, cum eundem septimum diem, quod nos erimus, in se ipso Deo faciet requiescere. De Civitate Dei XXII. XXX, 5. Migne, t. 41, col. 804; p. paragraph VI, 434. Cnfr. Dies enim septimus etiam nos ipsi erimus, quando ejus fuerimus benedictione et sanctificatione pleni atque refecti. Ibid. col. 803; p. paragraph VI, 432–433. XI, VIII; col. 323; p. paragraph IV, 185, etc. De ver. relig. XI, 21. Migne, t. 34, col. 131–132; p. paragraph VII, 19. De nat. boni contr. Manich. With. XXI. Migne, t. 42, col. 557. Contra Faust. Manich. XXI, VI. M.t. 42, col. 392. De Trinit. D. III, IX, 18. M. t. 42, col. 878. ... sub Deo, qui omnia in mensura et in numero et pondere disposuit (Sap. XI, 21). De natur. boni c. Man. XXI. Migne, t 42, col. 557. For example, free from space-time restrictions – De ver. relig. XLIII, 81. Migne, t 34, col. 159; p. paragraph VII, 76, invisible – De divers.quaest. LXXXIII, qu. XXX. M.t. 40, col. 19. See Prof. Iv. V. Popov. The teaching of the blessed Augustine on knowledge Question. Phil. and psychol. 1915. Book. 130. November – Dec. Page 540–562. Solil. I, I, 3. Deus bonum et pulchrum, in quo et a quo et per quem bona et pulchra sunt, quae bona et pulchra sunt omnia. Migne, t. 32, col. 870; p. paragraph II, 229. Honestatem voco intelligibilem pulchritudinem, quam spiritualem nos proprie dicimus. De divers. quaest. LXXXIII, qu. XXX. Migne, t. 40, col. 19. Quid est autem aliud justitia, cum in nobis est, quam interioris hominis pulchritudo? Epist. CXX, p. IV, no. 20. Migne, t. 33, col. 462. Cp. De Civit. Dei XI, XXVII, 2. Migne, t. 41, col. 341; p. paragraph IV, 220. Wed. Prof. AND . IN . Popov. Blessed personality Augustine. Theologian Vestn. 1915. Feb. Page 348–349, etc. Epist. CXX, paragraph 20. Migne, t. 33, col. 462. “The totality of all the highest aesthetic principles is intelligible beauty, through the participation of which everything becomes beautiful. De ver. relig. 42. Russian. lane VII, 33–34. De lib. arb. II, 41–44." “The intelligible principles of beauty serve not only as a criterion for assessing the aesthetic dignity of bodies and movements, but also as a guiding principle for artistic activity.” Prof. Iv. V. Popov. Teaching bl. Augustine on knowledge. Question Philosopher and psycho. 1915. November - December. Book 130, p. 562. Confess. IV, XI, 17. Migne, t. 32. col. 700; p. paragraph I, 83–84, etc. Prof. A. Harnack. Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte. Fr. im Br. 1890. Bd III, S. 102. Confess. 1. VII, p. With. XII–XIII, no. n. 18–19. Migne, t. 32, col. 743–744; p. pp. 182–183. Cnfr. VII, V, 7; col. 736; p. paragraph I, 166. Enchir. With. XIII. M.t. 40, col. 237–238; p. paragraph XI, 9–10. Malum illud quod quaerebam unde esset, non est substantia; Quia si substantia esset, bonum esset. Confess. VII, XII, 18. Migne, t. 32, col. 743; p. paragraph I, 182. De ver. relig. With. XXIII, n. 44. M.t. 34, col. 141; p. paragraph VII, 38. See Enchirid. With. With. X–XIII. Migne, t. 40, col. 236–238; p. paragraph XI, 7–10. Cnfr. De Civit. Dei XI, XXII. Mt. 41, col. 333; p. paragraph IV, 208. non naturae, sed voluntatis. De Civit. D. XI, XIX. Migne, t. 41, col. 335; p. paragraph IV, 204. De Civit. Dei XI, XXII. Migne, t. 41, col. 336; p. paragraph IV, 209. Confess. VII, XVI, 22. Migne, t. 32, col. 744; p. paragraph I, 185. De ver. relig. With. XX, n. 38. M.t. 34, col. 138; p. paragraph VII, 32, etc. De lib. arbitr. Ill, IX, 25. Migne, t. 32, col. 1283. De Civit. D. XI, XXII. Migne, t. 41, col. 335; p. clause IV. 208. De Civit. Dei XI, XXIII. Migne, t. 41, col. 336; p. paragraph IV, 211. Cp. Enchir. With. XI. Migne, t. 40, col. 236; p. paragraph XI, 7. De Civit. D.XXVIII. Migne, t. 41, col. 332; p. paragraph IV, 203. De Ordin. I, VII, 18. M. t. 32, col. 986; p. p. II, 155. See Prof. Evg N. Trubetskoy. The religious and social ideal of Western Christianity in the 5th century. M. 1892. Pp. 77. Wed. Knr. Scipio. Des Aurelius Augustinus Metaphysik im Rahmen seiner Lehre vom Übel. Leipzig. 1886. Ss. 87–88. Prof. Iv. V. Popov. Blessed personality Augustine. Theologian Vestn. 1915. Feb. Page 348. Prof. Ad. Harnack. DG., Bd III, S. 103. Prof. Iv. M. Grevs. New Encyclic. Brockhaus-Efron Dictionary. St. Petersburg T. I, p. 136. See De Civitate Dei XI, XXIII. Migne, t. 41, col. 336–337; p. Section IV, 210–211. Prof. Iv. V. Popov. Quote cit., Theologian. Vestn. 1915 Feb., p. 347. De Civit. D. XI, XXIII. Migne, t. 41, col. 336; p. paragraph IV, 211. Prof. Ad. Harnack. Op. cit. S. 103. Anmerk. 1. Cnfr. Ibidem, Ss. 106, 108–109 etc. Serm. CXCVIII, n. 2. Migne, t. 38, col. 1023. De ver. relig. With. XXI, no. 57. M.t. 34, col. 147; p. paragraph VII, 51 et p. XXXIX, no. 72: quid igitur restat, unde non possit anima recordari primam pulchritudinem quam reliquit, quando de ipsis suis vitiis potest? Ita enim Sapientia Dei pertendit a fine usque ad finem foriter (Sap. VIII, 1). Ita per hanc summus ille artifex opera sua in unum finem decoris ordinata contexuit. Ita illa bonitas a summo usque ad extremum nulli puchritudini, quae ab ipso solo esse posset, invidit. M.t. 34, col. 154; p. paragraph VII, 65. De Civit. Dei XI, XVIII. Migne, t. 41, col. 332; p. p. IV, 203. De Ordine I, VII, 18. M. t. 32, col. 986; p. paragraph II, 155. Tanquam deficientes in ejus magnitudine, ut reficiamur ejus bonitate, ad opera respiciamus, et de operibus laudemus operantem, de conditis Conditorem, de creatura Creatorem. Ergo quantum nota sunt nobis opera ejus, laudemus eum per opera ejus. Invisibilia enim ejus, a constitutione mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. (Rom. I, 20). Enarr. in CXLIV Ps., n. 6. Migne, t. 37, col. 1872. Cp. De Civit. D. X, XVI. Migne, t. 41, col. 293–294; p. paragraph IV, 132. Pulchritudo eorum (sc. terrae, maris, coeli, siderum, solis, animae etc.). confessio eorum. Ista pulchra mutabilia quis fecit, nisi incommutabilis pulcher? Serm. CCXLI, p. II, no. 2. Migne, t. 38, col. 1134. Deus autem ita est artifex magnus in magnis, ut minor non sit in parvis. De Civit. Dei XI, XXII. Migne, t. 41, col. 335; p. paragraph IV, 208. Wed. Prof. A.P. Orlov, cit. cit., p. 299. Confess. IX, IV, 9. Migne, t. 32, col. 767; p. p. I, 241. IX, II, 3. M. t. 32, col. 764: p. paragraph I, 235 and many others, etc. It is not without reason that in Western European plastic art (in the monuments of Western plastic art) Augustine’s mystical attribute is usually a pierced by an arrow and a flaming heart - a symbol of his fiery love, fiery temptations and sincere, sincere repentance. – Wed. F. W. Farrar. The life and works of the holy fathers and teachers of the Church. (Translation from English by Prof. A.P. Lopukhin). Ed. 2nd. Petrograd. 1903. T. 2nd, p. 430 Amare et amari dulce mihi erat. Confess. III, I. 1. Migne, t. 32, col. 683: p. paragraph I, 45. Rapimur amore indagandae veritatis (De Trinit. D. I, V, 8. Migne, t. 42, col. 825), - Augustine declares, as the internal guiding motive for his theological study of the Christian Trinity, - Deus meus, et decus meum, - Augustine repeatedly exclaims with genuine animation of the heart in his Confessions, - ab illa pulchritudine (Dei), veniunt quae super animas est, cui suspirat anima mea die ac nocte. Confess. X, XXXIV, 53. M. t. 32, col. 801; p. p. 1, 308. Sero te amavi, - with the same sincere bitterness of heart the blessed one confesses to God. Augustine on the pages of his same work – pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam nova! Sero te amavi! Confess. X. XXV, 38. M. t. 32, col.795; p. p. I, 297. “Essentially or entirely,” as Augustine repeatedly repeats, “one should love only the truly self-valuable and therefore indestructible and inalienable good of us, that is, God; Man and everything else must be loved only in God and only for God’s sake. Only in this way can a person who loves God and his neighbor be called truly invincible, since he is no longer afraid of anyone or anything, and since he can no longer lose anyone or anything. De ver. relig. With. With. XLV–XLVII, n. n. 83–92 etc. Migne, t. 34. col. 159–163; p. p. VII, 77–86, etc. And only the one who loves God truly loves himself, and he must love God until he forgets himself. Love for God, for its part, demanding from us love for our neighbor, is therefore a necessary ontological and psychological (gnoseological) postulate of our love for everything and everyone. “Don’t love,” as Bl. persistently repeats. Augustine said the Apostle of love: “I do not know God, for God is loving” (1 John 4:8). De Trinitate Dei VIII, X, 14. Migne, t. 42, col. 960. XV, VI, 10; col. 1064 and many more etc. Even the most insignificant thing or deed, however, requires from us, according to Augustine, an indispensable love for it (or from a modern point of view, interest), as a “conditio sine qua non” or as a necessary guarantee of its success. De Trinit. D. lib. IX. Migne, t. 42, col. 959–972 etc. – With that holy love (sancto amore), the fire of which burned the ardent spirit of Augustine, in the Christian period of his life already purified in the crucible of all earthly temptations and worldly temptations of youth, according to Augustine, the angels always burn towards the unchangeable and ineffable Beauty (De Civitate Dei, IX, XXII. Migne, t. 41, col. 274; p. p. IV, 96), which in the language and consciousness of Augustine is usually most closely associated with Divine Beauty or with God as the Beautiful. (Cf. H. Scholz, op. cit. S. 211. Vrgl. Harnack, DG, III 4, 1910. S. 118. Loofs, DG 3, 1906. S. 354). This circumstance, according to Augustine, determines the greater and better, compared with ours, bliss and knowledge of disembodied spirits (De Civit. D. IX, XXII. M. t. 41, col. 274; pp. IV, 96). Ecce: Deus dilectio est. De Trinit. D. VIII, VII, 11. Migne, t 12, col. 957.Cnfr. VIII, VIII, 12; col. 957–958. In illa simplici summaque natura... substantia ipsa sit charitas, et charitas ipsa sit substantia. De Trinit. D. XV, XVII, 29; col. 1081. De Trinit. D. VIII, VIII, 12. M. t. 42, col. 958 cnfr. XV, XVII. 31; col. 1082. – See above, p. …. Prof. A.I. Brilliantov. Quote op. Page 102, pr. 1. Wed. Prof. D. Belyaev. Love Divine. Moscow. 1884. Ed. 2nd. Page 25, 44, etc. In Western European, predominantly Protestant, (some of it also domestic) scientific literature devoted to the inheritance of Augustine’s theological views, a special question is sometimes raised about the relationship of the properties of God to essence or the question about the real-objective meaning of the ascribed Bl. Augustine to the Divine Being of particular properties and definitions. – Baur. Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit in ihrer geschichtlicihen Entwickelung. Tubingen. 1841. I, S. 880. A. Dorner. Augustinus. Sein theologisches System und seine religionsphilosophische Anschauung. Berlin. 1873. S.s. 16–22. etc. Ep. Sylvester. Experience of Orthodox dogmatic theology. Kyiv. 1885. pp.42–45. Without going into the details of the matter, we will limit ourselves here to the following remark on this matter. If, according to Augustine, the individual or most particular properties of God (each in its own way) characterize the absolutely simple and individual being of God, nevertheless, in God himself they exist not separately and plurally, but holistically and individually, constituting one and the same thing both in comparison with His essence and with each other. The properties of God are inseparable or indistinguishable both from the essence and mutually among themselves and in our thoughts. Although Augustine dwells in some detail on the properties of the Divine being, he always accompanies the statement of each property with the statement that in God it is not a different property and a different being, but one and the same thing. - This thought bl. Augustine's idea of ​​the inseparable existence or identification of the properties of the Divine with His essence, as well as one property with another, can be partly explained by an analogy with the physical phenomenon known in modern science under the name of light scattering, the decomposition of the solar spectrum in a prism, or with the ratio of sunlight to colors. From this point of view, the single and absolutely simple being of God in its essence and properties, passing through the prism of our limited consciousness, is crushed in it or differentiated in a whole series of diverse properties, like a ray of light in cut crystal. But only partially conditioned by the limitations of our consciousness, the plurality and diversity of our ideas about the Divine being, which receive their expression in the doctrine of the properties of God, on the other hand, do not at all exclude the real-objective meaning of these properties attributed to God by our finite mind. In the very essence of God, according to Augustine, plural in its simplicity and simple in its plurality (cf. De Trinit. Dei VI, VI, 8. Migne, t. 42, col. 928 cnfr. col. 927, 929, 936 etc.), there is something real and corresponding to all these intelligible properties of God. – This thought of Augustine can be clearly explained by comparing the Divine Being with sunlight, and our many different ideas about him with the numerous and varied colors or shades that bodies acquire from the action of sunlight on them. (Cf. Serm. CCCXLI, p. V, n. 8. Migne, t. 39, col. 1497–1498). “From the point of view of Augustine,” says the Most Reverend Sylvester in clarification of this analogy (see his Experience of Orthodox-Dogmatic Theology, vol. II, p. 45), “different colors in bodies are not formed by themselves and not as a result of the bodies’ own individual qualities alone, but when exposed to sunlight, which here constitutes the first and most necessary condition. Consequently, although the multiplicity and fragmentation of the properties of God that we mentally imagine, according to Augustine, actually depends on the limitations of our nature, nevertheless they are not created out of nothing by our personal mind, but arise in it no other way than through the interaction of the very being of God, revealing itself in the world, on it, so that if this had not happened, then there would not have been in our minds various ideas about the properties of God, just as there could not be different colors in bodies, if not sunlight revealed its effect on them.” Archim. (+ Ep.) Mikhail Gribanovsky. Quote cit., p. 94. “The truth of the trinity of Persons in God, with the unity of being,” says our famous Russian dogmatist Met. Macarius (Orthodox-Dogmatic Theology. St. Petersburg. 1851. T. I, p. 211), - was clearly revealed in the New Testament, but to some extent was also known in the Old. See, for example, book. Life I, 26; III, 22; XI, 6.7; XVIII, 1–3. Number VI, 24–26; Psalm. XXXII, 6; Is. VI, 3. Ps.II.7; Ps. CIX, 1; Is. XI, 2. 3; Is. XLVIII, 16; Is. LXI, 1 and others. Ev. John. Ch. XIV–XVI; Matt. XXVIII, 19; 1 John V, 7; Ev. John. XII, 40. 41 and Acts. XXVIII, 25–27 (cf. Isa. VI ch.); John. X, 30 and many more. etc. – A more detailed list of biblical passages containing either a hidden indication or a clearly expressed teaching of the Holy Spirit. The reader can find the writings of the V. and N. Testaments about the Triune God in the systems of Dogmatic Theology of Met. Macarius (op. cit. vol. I, pp. 211–245); Ep. Sylvester, (Experience of Orthodoxy. Dogma. Theology. Kyiv. 1885. T. 2nd, pp. 207–257); Prot. Malinovsky, (Orthodox. Dogma. Theology. Kharkov. 1895. Part I, pp. 235–255), etc. The teaching of the Orthodox Church about the Holy Trinity finds its brief but precise expression in its ancient creeds, of which the symbols of St. Gregory the Wonderworker and Nicene-Constantinograd, as well as the creed known with the name of St. Afanasia Vel. The last symbol, in which the church teaching about the trinity of Persons in God and the unity of Their being is set out with the greatest completeness and separateness, begins with these exact words: “This Catholic Faith is: let us honor the One God in Trinity and the Trinity in Unity, below merging the Hypostases, below dividing the being...” (For details, see the above-mentioned systems of Dogma. Theology). Wed. Prof. N.I. Sagarda. Ancient church theological science in the Greek East in its heyday (IV–V centuries). St. Petersburg 1910. Pp. 2. Wed. Prof. V.V. Bolotov. Lectures on the history of the ancient Church. III. History of the Church during the period of ecumenical councils. (Posthumous edition edited by Prof. A.I. Brilliantov). St. Petersburg 1913. Pp. 3. The principle of such a classification of trinitarian analogies bl. Augustine and partly their terminology, which has data for itself in the very works of the Bishop of Ipponia, as well as the systematization of original texts related to the first two classes of Augustine’s analyzed analogies, we borrowed mainly from the work of the German Catholic prof. Th. Gangauf'a, Des heiligen Augustinus speculative Lehre von Gott dem Dreieinigen. Augsburg. 1865. IL Th. I Abschn. Die Ternare am und im creatürlichen Sein als Hinweisungen auf eine göttliche Trinität. § 1. Analogien aus der Natur. Ss. 209–220. § 2. Analogien aus dem aüsseren Menschen. Ss. 220–240. “This thought bl. Augustine was adopted by later theology, and primarily they turn to her, that is, to similarities from our personal spiritual life, in order to, if possible, understand the dogma of the Trinity, revealing this similarity in one way or another.” - Cm . Prot. N. Malinovsky. Orthodox dogma. theology. Kharkov. 1895. Part I, Page. 344. – The latest (not excluding those contemporary to us) experiments in the rational-psychological understanding and substantiation of the church dogma of the Holy Trinity essentially reproduce the Augustinian trinitarian-psychological construction, representing its further development and addition with the help of the latest data from the theory of knowledge and psychology. Ad. Harnack. Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte. Fr. im Br. 1888. Bd II, S. 296. Anmerk. ... gratiâ miserecordiae suae, non ero segnis ad inquirendam substantiam Dei, sive per scripturas Ejus, sive per creaturam. Quae utraque nobis ad hoc proponitur intuenda, ut ipse quaeratur, ipse diligatur [al. intelligatur], qui et illam inspiravit, et istam creavit. De Trinit. Dei VI, proëm.–n. 1. Migne, t. 42, col. 845. Prof. Th. Gangauf. Op. cit. S. 209. Propter visibilium etiam unitatem corporalia exempla data sunt, ut intelligeretur fieri posse, ut aliqua tria non tantum singillatim, sed etiam simul unum singulare nomen obtineant; nec quisquam miretur et absurdum putet, quod Deum dicimus Patrem, DeumFilium, Deum Spiritum Sanctum, nec tamen tres deos in ista Trinitate, sed unum Deum, unamque substantiam. De fide et symb. With. IX, n. 17. Migne, t. 40, col. 190 v. et supra col. 189–190. Gangauf, op. cit. S. 210–211. De Trinitate Dei, XV, II, 3. Migne, t. 42, col. 1058. Rom. 1, 20. Prem. Straw. 13, 1–5. De Trinit. D. XV, II, 3: “Haes de libro Sapientiae propterea posui, ne me fidelium quispiam frustra et inaniter existimet in creatura prius per quasdam sui generis trinitates quodam modo gradatim, donec ad mentem hominis pervenirem, quaesisse indicia Summae illius Trinitatis, quam quaerimus, cum Deum quaerimus." Migne, t. 42, col. 1058. De Civit. D. XI, XXVI. Migne, t. 41, col. 339; r. lane IV, 216. De quant. anim. With. XXXIV. n. 77. Migne, t. 32, col. 1077; p. item II, 413. De Trin. D. XV, XX, 39. M. t. 42, col. 1088. Book Evg. N. Trubetskoy. The religious and social ideal of Western Christianity in the 5th century. Part 1. Worldview bl. Augustine. Moscow. 1892. Pp. 232. De Trinit. D. VI, X, 12. Migne, t. 42, col. 932. – These judgments of Augustine about life and the gradually ascending ladder of organic and inorganic being (ordo, species, modus etc.) acquired, according to A. Harnack (DG, I, S. 102, Anmerk), very important significance for later philosophy and theology and, in particular, influenced medieval mysticism. De Trinit. D. VI, X, 12: Oportet, igitur, ut Creatorem per ea, quae facta sunt, intellectum conspicientes, Trinitatem intelligamus, cujus in creature quomodo dignum est apparet vestigium. In illa enim Trinitate Summa origo est rerum omnium et perfectissima pulchritudo, et beatissima delectatio. Migne, t. 42, col. 932. De Trinit. D. XI, XI, 18:... haec tria – mensuram, numerum, pondus, etiam in caeteris omnibus animadvertenda praelibaverim. In the spiritual sphere, the third member of this trinitarian analogy (pondus) will correspond to the will (voluntas). Migne, t. 42, col. 998. Nihil est autem esse, quam unum esse. De mor. Manich. II, VI, 8. Migne, t. 32, col. 1348. De ver religion. c. VII, n. 13: Qua Trinitate, quantum in hac vita datum est, cognita, omnis intellectualis et animalis et corporalis creatura, ab eadem Trinitate Creatrice esse inquantum est, et speciem suam habere et ordinatissime administrari, sine ulla dubitatione perspicitur etc. Migne, t. 34, col. 128–129; p. lane VII, 13–14. De natura boni contra Manich. With. III. Migne, t. 42, col. 553.Cnfr. op. cit. With. XXII et XXIII, col. 558. Epist. XI ad Nebrid. n. 3: Nulla natura est, et omnino nulla substantia, quae non in se habeat haec tria, et prae se gerat: primo ut sit, deinde, ut hoc vel illud sit, tertio ut in eo, quod est maneat quantum potest. Primum illud causam ipsam naturae ostendat, ex qua sunt omnia; alterum speciem, per quam fabricantur, et quodammodo formantur omnia; tertium manentiam quamdam, ut ita dicam, in qua sunt omnia. Migne, t. 33, col. 76. Omne quod est, aliud est, quo constat, aliud quo discernitur, aliud quo congruit. De diversis quaest. LXXXIII, qu. ХVIII. Migne, t. 40, col 15. Universa igitur creatura si et est quoquo modo, et ab eo, quod omnino nihil est plurimum disstat, et suis partibus sibimet congruit, causam quoque ejus trinam esse oportet, qua sit, qua hoc sit, qua sibi arnica sit. Creaturae autem causam, id est, auctorem Deum dicimus: oportet ergo esse Trinitatem, qua nihil praestantius, intelligentius et beatius invenire perfecta ratio potest. Ibid. De Civit. Dei XI, XXIV. Migne, t. 41, col. 338; p. lane IV, 213. Ritter. Geschichte der Philosophie Bd VI, Ss. 299301. See about this in Gangauf, op. cit. S. 219 vrgl. S. 212. Anmerk. Ibid. See Gangauf, op. cit., S. 219. Ritter, op. cit. S. 301 cf. Gangauf, op. cit. S. 220. See De Trinit. D. XII, I. 1. Migne, t. 42, col. 997999. Homo exterior et interior qualis. De Trinit. D. libri XI et XII. Migne, t. 42, col. 9831012. (Cnfr. Op. cit. XIII et XV lib., col. 10131036, 10571098). Th. Gangauf, op. cit. S. 220. De Trinit. D. XI, I. 1. Migne, t. 42, col. 983985; XI, II, 2, col. 986. Potissimum testimonio utamur oculorum. Is enim sensus corporis maxime excellit, et est visioni mentis pro sui generis diversitate vicinior. De Trinit. D. XI, I, 1. Migne, t. 42, col. 985. Cum igitur aliquod corpus videmus, haec tria... consideranda sunt et dignoscenda. Primo ipsa res, quam videmus, quod utique jam esse poterat, et antequam videretur: deinde visio, quae non erat, priusquam rem illam objectam sensui sentiremus: tertio quod in ea re quae videtur, quamdiu videtur sensum detinet oculorum, id est, animae intentio. Haec igitur tria, says 6l. Augustine, in the conclusion of the 2nd section (n.) of the 2nd chapter of the XIth book, which we quote. his op. “De Trinitate,” – corpus, quod videtur, et ipsa visio, et quae utrumque conjungit intentio, manifesta sunt ad dignoscendum, non solum propter propria singulorum, verum etiam propter difterentiam naturarum. De Trinit. D. XI, II, 2. Migne, t. 42, col. 985986. N. Ostroumov. Analogies and their significance in clarifying the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, according to the judgment of Blessed. Augustine. Kazan. 1904. Pp. 67. Böhringer. Aurelius Augustinus, Bischof v. Hippo. Stuttgart. 1878. II. S. 283. See Böhringer, op. cit. Bd II, S. 284. Th. Gangauf, op. cit. S. 225. Voluntas ergo illa, quae ibi conjungit ea, quae memoriâ tenebantur, et ea, quae inde in acie cogitationis impressa sunt, implet quidem aliquam trinitatem, cùm ipsa sit tertia. De Trinit. D. XIII, XX, 26. Migne, t. 42, col. 1036. Moreover, the will (voluntas) in a certain way correlates the mental image of an object with an absent external object and asserts their identity, thereby testifying to the real-objective meaning of the image as an internal object. Atquae ita fit, illa trinitas ex memoria, et interna visione, et quae utrumque copulat voluntate. De Trinit. D. XI, III, 6. Migne, t. 42. col. 988. De Trinit. D. XI, IV, 7. Migne, t. 42, col. 990; cnfr. De Trinit. XIV, VIII, 11, col. 1044–1045. De Trin. XIV, X, 13, col. 1047. De Trinit. D. XI, III, 6. Migne, t. 42, col. 989. Böhringer, op. cit. Bd II, S. 285. De Trinit. D. XI, V, 9–XI, VII, 12. Migne, t. 42, col. 991–994. Cnfr. XI, IX, 16. M. t. 42, col. 997. De Trinit. D. lib. XII, cap. I–IV, num. 1–4. Migne, t. 42, col. 997–1000. De Trinit. Dei XII, II, 2. Migne, t. 42, col. 999. Wed. the Greek word ᾰνϑρωπος (man), derived from ᾰνω (up) and τρέπω (turn). De Trinit. D. XII, p. With. I–IV, n. n. 1–4. Migne, t. 42, col. 997–1000. Wed. Gangauf, op. cit. Ss. 235–236. See De Trinit. D. XII, V, 5. Migne, t. 42, col. 1000–1001, where Augustine expounds the opinio shared by some of his contemporary believers, fingens imaginem Trinitatis in conjugio masculi et feminae ac eorum prole. In the next VIth chapter. Augustine explains the same book about the Holy Trinity: cur ilia opinio respuenda. De Trinit. D. XII, VI, 6–8. M., t. 42, col. 1001–1003. Cp. Gangauf, op. cit. Ss. 236–238. De Trinit. D. XII, V, 5. Migne, t. 42, col. 1000–1001; XI, VI, 6, col. 1001. Dixit enim Deus, Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, Paulo post autem dictum est, Et fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei. Nostram certe, quia pluralis est numerus, non recte diceretur, si homo ad unius personae imaginem fieret, sive Patris, sive Filii, sive Spiritus Sancti. Sed quia fiebat ad imaginem Trinitatis, propterea dictum est, ad imaginem nostram. Rursus autem ne in Trinitate credendos arbitraremur tres deos, cum sit eadem Trinitas unus Deus, Et fecit, inquit, Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei: pro eo ac si diceret, ad imaginem suam. De Trinit. D. XII, VI, 6 Migne, t. 42, col. 1001. For a detailed development and justification of these thoughts, see De Trin. Dei 1. XII, p. VI, no. n. 7–8; With. VII, n. n. 9–12; With. VIII, no. 13. Migne, t. 42, col. 1001–1005. Wed. Th. Gavgauf, op cit. Ss. 238–239. ) De Trinit. D. XII, XV, 25. Migne, t. 42, col. 1012.cnfr. De Trinit. Dei XIV, IV, 6; M., t. 42, col. 1040. De Trinit. Dei XV, I, 1. M. t. 42, col. 1057. Cp. Th. Gangauf, op. cit. S. 240. A brief description of it can be read in op. (Prof.) A. I. Brilliantova. The influence of Eastern theology on Western in the works of John Scotus Erigena. St. Petersburg 1898. Pp. 96–106. (Prof.) P. P. Sokolova. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity in modern idealistic philosophy. Faith and Raz. 1893 pp. 377–379. Dept. philosopher (Prof.) I. Chetverikova. About God as a personal Being. Kyiv. 1904. Pp. 315–323. Archim. (+ Ep.) Mikhail Gribanovsky. Lectures on introduction to theological sciences. Kazan. 1899. Pp. 99. Prof. I. V. Popova. Teaching bl. Augustine on knowledge. Question Philosopher and psychol. 1915 Sept. – Oct. pp. 432–434. Man usually knows God by analogy with his own spirit, but this analogy is based on objective truth, since the human spirit is the image of God. Consequently, the psychological process that takes place inside our spirit and gives us the concept of the life of the Absolute Spirit has a real objective meaning. Serm. CXXXVII, cap. IV, num. 4. Migne, t. 38, col. 756. Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas; et si tuam naturam mutabilem inveneris, transcende et te ipsum... Illuc ergo tende, unde ipsum lumen rationis accenditur. De ver. relig. cap. XXXIX, no. 72. Migne, t. 34, col. 154; Russian lane VII, 66. Cnfr. Transcende corpus et sape animum: transcende et animum et sape Deum.... Tu si in animo es, in medio es: si infra attendis, corpus est: si supra attendis, Deus est. Tr. XX in Joann. Ev. n. 11. Migne, t. 35, col. 1562. H. Schöler. Augustins Verhältnis zu Plato etc. Jena. 1897. S. 119. Harnack, op. cit. Bd. III, S. 95. “Through my very soul I will ascend to God” - Confess. X, VII, 11. Migne, t. 32, col. 784; p. lane I, 276. De Trinit. D. XV, I, 1. Migne, t. 42, col. 1057. Prof. Diamonds. The influence of Eastern theology on Western in the works of John Scotus Erigena. St. Petersburg 1898. Pp. 98. Windelband. History of ancient philosophy (with an appendix - Augustine and the Middle Ages). St. Petersburg 1893. Pp. 321‒351. A. Harnack, Op. cit. Bd. III, S. 95. Quote op. p. 98. Wed. I. Chetverikov. About God as a Personal Being. Kyiv. 1904. Pp. 317. Prof. A.I. Brilliantov. Quote cit., p. 99. De Trinit. Dei VIII, VIII, 12. Migne, t. 42, col. 958 and many more etc. Prof. Th. Gangauf, Des heil. Augustinus speculative Lehre von Gott dem Dreieinigen. Augsburg. 1865. S. 243. De Trinit. D. VIII, X, 14. Migne, t. 42, col. 960.Cnfr. XV, VI, 10. col. 1064. See (Prof.) A.I. Brilliantov, cit. cit., p. 102. Note. 1. Wed. also (Prof.) A. Belyaev. Divine Love (The experience of revealing the most important Christian dogmas from the beginning of Divine love). Moscow. 1884. Pp. 75‒96 and 12‒74. De Civitate Dei XI, XXV. Migne, t. 43, col. 339‒340; r. paragraph IV, 216‒217. Wed. XI, XXVII, col. 341; p. paragraph IV, 220. De Trinit. D. X, III, 5. Migne, t. 42, col. 975‒976. Cnfr. XV, XII, 21, col. 1074. N. Ostroumov. Analogies and their significance in clarifying the doctrine of the Holy Trinity according to the judgment of the blessed one. Augustine. Kazan. 1904. Pp. 8. Confess. XIII, XI, 12. Migne, t. 32, col. 849; p. paragraph I, 430‒431. (Prof) P.P. Sokolov paraphrases this psychological analogy of the bl. Augustine. “I am,” says Augustine, “this means: I am the knower and the willer, that is, my being, as a form, already contains knowledge and will as its content. I know - namely, I know what I am and want, that is, my knowledge, as a form, contains my being and will, as its ideal content. I want - it is I who want to be and know, that is, my will contains within itself my being and knowledge as its content and goal.” Quote op., Vera and Raz. 1893 Dept. philosophical, p. 378. De Trinit. D. IX, XII, 18. Migne, t. 42, col. 970‒971. Cnfr IX, IV, 4; col 963. De Trinit. D. IX. XII, 17‒18. Migne, t. 42, col. 970‒971. De Trinit. D. XV, III, 5. Migne, t 42. col. 1089.Cnfr. XV, VI, 10; col. 1093. De Trinit. D. X, XI, 17‒18. Migne, t. 42, col. 982‒984. Real-Encyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche v. Hezog-Hauck. Aufl. 3. Bd. XX, S. 116. De Trinit. D. X, XI, 18. Migne, t. 42, col. 983. De Trinit. D. XV, XVI, 29. Migne, t.42, col. 1081; XV, XXVI, 47; col. 1094. – “The principle of rational being in the human spirit (mens, essentia, memoria),” notes (Prof.) P. P. Sokolov, explaining the relationship of Augustine’s trinitarian psychological structure to the teaching of Revelation and the Christian Church about the Triune God, “is the likeness of God the Father (similitudo Patris); the principle of knowledge and self-knowledge (notitia, intelligentia) is the likeness of the Son (similitudo Filii); the principle of will and love (voluntas, amor) is the likeness of the Holy Spirit (Similitudo Spiritus Sancti). - De Trinit. D. XV, XXIII, 43. Migne, t. 42, col. 1117. Thus, God the Father, according to Augustine, can be thought of as the subject of Divine self-knowledge; The Son of God is this self-knowledge and at the same time the content of self-knowledge - the Divine subject, as a represented and cognizable object; The Holy Spirit is presented as an internal motive of Divine life, making the absolute subject the object of absolute self-knowledge.” Quote cit., V. and R. 1893 Dept. Phil., pp. 378–379. Prof. I. V. Popov. The teaching of the blessed Augustine on knowledge. Question Philosopher and psychol. 1915, St. – Oct. Page 433. However, none of the likenesses of the Divine found by man in the realm of the created is free from one or another deficiency. . Wed. St. Gregory the Theologian lyrics. XXXI (about theology V-oe). Creation St. Gregory the Bogosl. in Russian lane Moscow. 1844 Part III, pp. 131, 133. For more details on this, see Part 2 of this study, dedicated to the special development of the teachings of Bl. Augustine on the Holy Spirit. See Introduction to this essay, pp. …. On this matter, see the excellent and thoughtful thoughts of Prof. V.V. Bolotov “about those images through which St. the fathers bring the mystery of the existence of the Holy Spirit closer to human understanding” - Thesen über das Filioque. Internat. theolog. Zeitschr. 1898. 24 Heft. Ss. 687–694: Russian. lane Xp. Read 1913, pp. 586–594; dept. brochure pp. 42–50, etc. Bishop Sylvester. Experience Rights Dogma. Theologian vol. 2, pp. 615–616. “It is inevitable in theological thinking about objects of faith,” says one of the competent domestic theologians, Prof. A.I. Brilliantov, is the use of analogies. But analogies, by their very essence, can never claim to be in full compliance with the objects they explain, and the desire to carry them out with complete consistency usually results in only extreme and incorrect conclusions. The Bible, pointing to the creation of man in the image of God (Gen. 1:26, 27; 9:6; James 3:9), directly establishes not only the possibility, but also the necessity of using the analogy of human nature in understanding the mystery of the Divine Trinity life. However, here too this application immediately encounters seemingly insurmountable difficulties. – Obviously, based on the analogy of the individual human spirit and trying to rise to the concept of the Divine Spirit, one can come to the concept of nothing more than the same individual Spirit and certain moments of His personal life, instead of actual Hypostases. If, in one way or another, the starting point is made of the multiplicity of individuals in whom the human nature that is identical in all people is actually manifested, then in this case the real unity of the Divine Spirit does not result, and only from the point of view of Platonic realism can an analogy of this kind be convincing. The first way is Bl. Augustine in his famous construction of the dogma of the Trinity and the Western theology that follows him. The second method of presentation was used by Eastern theologians, although they recognized the full significance of the analogy of the first kind. Both methods are combined, for example, in Anastasia Sinaita.” Prof. A.I. Brilliantov. The origin of Monophysitism. St. Petersburg 1906. Pp. 5–6. Wed. Prof.-Priest N. V. Petrov. About the Holy Trinity (Experience in interpreting dogma with the help of analogies from the material World and from the nature of humanity and man). (Act speech). Kazan. 1912. Pp. 4–10. The Reverend Sylvester, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 616. Wed. Confess. X, V, 7. Migne, t. 32, col. 782; r. paragraph I, 273. “Dogmatic disputes in the ancient Eastern Church,” notes the professor-historian A.I. Brilliantov, quoted above, “focused on questions about the trinity of persons in the Divinity and the God-manhood of Christ. Both dogmas, in which the solution of these questions was expressed by the ancient church consciousness, must be postulated to faith, since they affirm provisions that exceed the realm of empirical, directly observable reality. In the dogma of the Trinity, in relation to the absolute Spirit, the trinity of Hypostases is affirmed, and the Hypostasis is naturally conceived in human understanding more or less by analogy with the human person. But for human consciousness only the individual form of existence of the spirit is directly known and imaginable. On the other hand, the form of personal existence is usually recognized as inseparable from the nature of the human spirit. Meanwhile, in another dogma about the God-manhood of Christ, in relation to the God-Man, the unity of His only Divine Hypostasis is affirmed, along with the confession of an integral human nature in Him.” Ibid., pp. 3–4. De Trinit. D.XV. II, 3. Migne, t. 42, col. 1058. De Trinit. D. XV, VI, 10. Migne, t. 42, col. 1064. De Trinit. D. XI, V, 8. Migne, t. 42, col. 991. Enarr. in Psalm. XLVIII, serm. II, no. 11; LIV, no. 3. M.t. 36, col. 564; 629. De Symb. ad catechum. I, 1, 2. M. t. 40, col. 629–630. De Trin. XV, VII, 12. Migne, t. 42. col. 1065. Supra mentem Deus. De Trinit. XV, I,1. Migne. t. 42. col. 1057. De Trin. XIV, VIII, 11; col. 1044. De Trin X, xii, 19; col. 984. De Trin. XV, XXIII, 43; col. 1090. De Trin. VII, IV, 7; col. 939. De Trin. XV, VI, 9; col. 1063. De Symb. ad catech. c. 9; Migne, t. 40, col. 659. Haec tria (see above De Trin. D. XV, VI, 10. Migne, t. 42, col. 1065) ita sunt in homine, ut non ipsa sint homo. Quisque homo alphabet illa tria in mente. De Trinit. D. XV, VII, 11. Migne, t. 42, col. 1065. Trinitas vera illa... nihil aliud est tota, quam Deus, nihil est aliud tota quam Trinitas. Nec aliquid ad naturam Dei pertinet quod ad illam non pertineat Trinitatem. De Trin. XV, VII, 11; col. 1065. Nec in uno Deo sit illa (summa) Trinitas, sed unus Deus. De Trinit. D. XV, XXIII, 43. Migne, t. 42, col. 1090. Ac per hoc illa tria non homo sunt, sed hominis sunt, vel in homine sunt (Ibid.). De Trinit. Dei XV, VII, 11. Migne, t. 42, col. 1065. De Trinitate XV, XXII, 42. Migne, t. 42, col. 1089–1090; XV, XXIII, 43; col. 1090. De Trin. XV, XVII, 28. Migne, t. 42, col. 1080–1081. In iliis vero Summae simplicitate naturae, quae Deus est, quamvis unus sit Deus, tres tamen personae sunt: ​​Pater, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus. De Trin. XV, XXII, 42. Migne, t. 42, col. 1090. De Trin. XV, VII, 12. Migne, t. 42. col. 1065–1066. Incommutabiliter inter se ac semper aequalis – De Trinitate XV, XXIII, 43. Migne, t. 42, col. 1090. De Trin. ХV, XXII–XXIV, 42–44. Migne, t. 42, col. 1089–1091; cnfr. XV, XIV, 23; col. 1076–1077; - With. XXI, no. n. 40–41; With. XVII, no. n. 28 and 29; With. VII, n. 12 etc. De Trin. XV, VII, 12. Migne, t. 42, col. 1065–1066; cnfr. XV, XVII, 28. col. 1081: Sic enim et Pater Deus et Filius Deus et Spiritus Sanctus Deus, et simul omnes – Unus Deus. This chapter was compiled by the author based on the work of Prof. Th. Gangauf'a (Des heil. Augustinus speculative Lehre von Gott dem Dreieinigen. Augsburg. 1865. II. Th. II. Abschn. Die göttliche Subject-Objectivirung. § 1. Erzeugung Gottes des Sohnes aus dem Wesen Gottes des Vaters. S. s. 295–363) with some abbreviations and additions by the author. De Trinit. D. XV, VI, 10. Migne, s. 1., t. 42, col. 1064. Cnfr.Serm. CXVII contra Arian. With. III, no. 5. M.t. 38, col. 663: Sit pia confessio ignorantiae magis, quam temeraria professio scientiae. Attingere aliquantum mente Deum, magna beatitudo est: comprehendere autem, omnino impossibile. De Trinit. D. VII, VI, 11. Migne, t. 42, col. 943: non enim aliud est Deo esse, aliud personam esse, sed omnino idem. An haec sapientia quae Deus dicitur, non se intelligit, non se diligit? Quis hoc dixerit?... Aut vero putandum est, sapientiam quae Deus est, scire alia et nescire se ipsam, vel diligere alia nec diligere se ipsam? De Trinit. Dei XV, VI, 10. Migne, t. 42. col. 1064–1065. since the existence of God, as the Absolute, is completely unchangeable and since in this exclusive process of His objectification His inner image or Word contains within itself all the infinite fullness of the Divine being. Serm. CXVII, p. III, no. 5. Migne, t 38, col. 663: De Deo loquimur, quid mirum si non comprehendis? Si enim comprehendis, non est Deus etc. hoc.. (scilicet verbum nostrum) formabile nondumque formatum. De Trinit. D. XV, XV, 25. Migne, t 42, col. 1078. De Trinit. D. XV, XV, 25. Migne, t.42, col. 1878 cnfr. cap. XVI, col. 1079. Confess. IX, X, 24. Migne, t. 32, col. 774; Russian lane I, 257. De Genes, ad litt. (lib. imperf.) p. V, n. 19. Migne, t. 34, col. 227; r.p. VII, 116. De fid. et symb. With. III, no. 3. M.t. 40, col. 183. Tract. II in Joann. ev. n. 2; M.t. 35, col. 1389.Cnfr. De fide et symb. With. IV, no. 5. M.t. 40, col. 185. Contra Maximin. arian. er. II, XIV, 4. Migne, t. 42, col. 773. Serm. CXL, n. 5. M.t. 38, col. 775.cnfr. Serm. CXCVI, I, 1, col. 1019. Serm. CCXLIV, n. 4, col. 1151. De cant. novo s. VII. M.t. 40, col. 684. Epist. CLXX ad Maxim. med. n. 8. M.t. 33, col. 751. De divers, quaest, LXXXIII. qu. XVI. M.t. 40, col. 15. Desymb. ad catechum. With. III, no. 8. M.t. 40, col. 631. Confess. XI, XIII, 16. Migne, t. 32, col. 815; Russian lane I, 339. Enarr. in Ps. II, no. 6. M.t. 36, col. 71. Epist. ad Pascent. With. IV, no. 24. Migne, t. 33, col. 1047.Cnfr. Serm. CXXVII, p. IV, no. 4. M.t. 38, col 708. See these similitudines de natura (homo, equus, ovis) - Serm. CXVII, p. V, n. 8. Migne, t. 38, col. 666. ..."non ex tempore coepisse Filium Dei" – De Trinit. D. VI, I, 1. Migne, t. 42, col. 923. Serm. CXXXV, p. III, n. 4. M. t. 38, col. 747. Confess. 1. XI, p. s. X–XXXI. Migne, t. 32, col. 814–826; r. paragraph I, 336–369. De Civit. D. XI, VI. M.t. 41, col. 321–322; p. paragraph IV, 183. Contra serm. arian. s. I, n. 1. Migne, t. 42, col. 684.Cnfr. – p. XXXIV, no. 32; col. 706. Serm. CXVII, p. VI, no. 10; s. VII. Migne, t. 38, col. 666–667. Serm. CXVII, p. VIII, no. 11. Migne, t. 38, col. 667. De symb. c. III, no. 8. M.t. 40, col. 631.Cnfr. Epist. ad Maxim. CLXX, no. 4. M.t. 33, col. 749. Contra Advers. leg. et prophet. I, XI, 4. M. t. 42, col. 610. Contra serm. arian. XXXIV, 32. M. t. 42, col. 706. Contra Maximin., arian. episc. II, XIV, 6. M. t. 42, col. 773. Serm. CXVII, cap. IX, num. 12. Migne, t. 38, col. 667–668. Serm. CXVII, p. X, n. 13. Migne, t. 38, col. 668–669: Habent ista similitudinem sed non habent omnimodam aequalitatem, quare non videntur esse ejusdem substantiae. In God there is aequalitas omnimoda est. Ait (Apostolus): “non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo”... (Philipp. II, 6), quia illud est rapina, quod alienum est. Serm. CXVII, VI, 9: Omnia per Deum hic sunt: ​​et quid tamen comparandum est Deo? Migne, t. 38, col. 666. Serm. CXVII, p. X, n. 14. Migne, t. 38, col. 669. Serm. CXVII, X, 14. Migne, t. 38, col. 670. De LXXXIII quaest. qu. XXIII. Migne, t. 40, col. 16. Tractat. LXX in Joann. Ev. n. 2. M.t. 35, col. 1819. Ibid. Cnfr. LXXXIII quaest. qu. LI, n. 4. Migne, t. 40, col. 33 and its correction Retract. I, XXVI. M.t. 32, col. 626. De Trinit. D. VI, X, 11. M. t. 42, col. 931. Contra serm. arian. With. XXVI, no. 22. M. t. 42, col. 701. De ver. relig. c. XLIII, n. 81. M.t. 34, col. 159; p. lane VII, 76. Contra Maximin. arian. er. I, V. M. t. 42, col. 747–748. De fide et symb. With. IX, n. 18. M. t. 40, col. 190–191. Confess. XIII, XVI, 19. Migne, t. 32, col. 853; p. lane I, 439. De Trinit. Dei XV, XIV, 23. Migne, t. 42, col. 1076–1077: Tamquam se ipsum dicens Pater genuit Verbum, sibi aequale per omnia. Non enim se ipsum integre perfecteque dixisset, si aliquid minus aut amplius esset in ejus Verbo, quam in ipso. Ibi summe illud agnoscitur. Est, est, Non, non. – Novit itaque omnia Deus Pater in se ipso, novit in Filio: sed in se ipso tamquam Se ipsum (i.e., as an Absolute subject), in Filio tamquam Verbum Suum, quod est de his omnibus, quae sunt in Se ipso (i.e., the same subject only in the absolute process of His objectification). Cnfr. VII, I,1; col. 931–933. Omnia quae habet Pater, dedit... Filio: ille gignendo, accepit iste nascendo (see above – accepit sicut genitus a gignente). Contra Maximin. arian. er. II, XIV, 7. M. t. 42, col. 774. Cnfr Serm. CXL, n. 2. M.t. 38, col. 773–774. To the Arian Elpidius, who said to Augustine: “noli dicere aequalem,” the latter objects: “cur non dicam, quod dicit Apostolus? Non rapinam, inquit, arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo” (Philipp. II, 6). Epist. CCXLII, no. 4. M.t. 33, col. 1054. De Trinit. D. XV, XXI, 40. Migne, t. 42, col. 1088. De Trinit. D. XV, XXI, 40. Migne, t. 42, col. 1088; XV, XV, 24, col. 1078; Cnfr. Tract. XCIX in Joann. Ev. n. 4. M.t. 35, col. 1887–1888. De Trinit. D. XV, XIII, 22. Migne, t. 42, col. 1076.Cnfr. VII, I,1; col. 935–936. De Trinit. D. XV, XIV, 23. M. t. 42, col. 1076 De Trinit. D. XV, XIII, 22. Migne, t. 42, col. 1076.Cnfr. VII, I,1; col. 935–936. De Trinit. D. XV, XIV, 23. M. t. 42, col. 1076. Verbum Dei, quod natum est de Patris essentia. De Trinit. D. XV, XIII, 22. Migne, t. 42, col. 1076. Pater et Filius omnia habent substantialiter, – De Trinit. D. XV, XXI, 40. M. t. 42, col. 1088. De Trinit. D. VI, II, 3. Migne, t. 42, col. 926: Ego et Pater unum sumus. Unum sumus enim dictum est, Quod ille, hoc et ego secundum essentiam, non secundum relativum. Hoc genuit Pater quod ipse est. Si aliud genuit Pater, quam quod est ipse, non verum genuit Filium. Serm. CXXXV, p. III, no. 4. Migne, t. 38, col. 748. Contra Maximarian. er. II, XV, 1–2. Migne, t.,42, col. 777–779. Collat. cum Maxim. arian. n. 14. M. t. 42, col. 719–724. Contra Maxim. ar. episc. I, V–VI. Migne, t. 42, col. 746–749. Collatio cum Maxim. arian. n. 14. M. t. 42, col. 719–724. Deus autem sine passione genuit Filium. Epist. CLXX ad Maxim. n. 8. Migne, t. 33, col. 751.Cnfr. Contra serm. arian. With. XXVIII, no. 26. M. t. 42, col. 703. Contra Maxim. Arian. II, XIV, 2. M. t. 42, col. 771. Epist. CLXX ad Maxim. n. 4. Migne, t. 33,:col. 749. Contra Maximin. arian. episc. II, XIV, 4. M. t. 42, col. 773; II, XXIII, 7, col. 802. Contra serm. arian. XXXVI, 34. M. t. 42, col. 707. Serm. CLXXXIII, p. IV, no. 5. M.t. 38, col. 990: Filius unigenitus, non adoptatus. Epist. ad Honorat. With. IV, no. 10. M. t. 33, col. 541–542. De fide et symb. With. IV, no. 5. Migne, t. 40, col. 184. Serm. CLXXXIII, p. III, paragraph 4. Migne, t. 38, col. 989–990. Cnfr. Epist. ad Maxim. n. 4. M.t. 33, col. 749. De fide et symb. With. IV, no. 5. M.t. 40, col. 184. De Trinit. D. I, VI, 9. M. t. 42, col. 825. Contra serm. arian. With. II, no. 3. M.t. 42, col. 685. Epist. ad Elpid. n. 3. M.t. 33, col. 1053. ... "dicunt. (sc. ariani): jubente Patre creasse omnia Filium", as a result of which they admitted “aliquos duos” in God. Contr. serm. ar. c. 3, n. 4. Migne, t. 42, col. 685. Contra Maximin. arian. episc. II, XIV, 2. Migne, t. 42, col. 771; II, XIV, 3. Ib. col. 772; II, XIV, 4, col. 772–773; De Trinit. D. I, VI, 9. M. t. 42, col. 825.Cnfr. I, VI, 12, col. 827. Epist. ad Maxim. CLXX, no. 4. M.t. 33, col. 749 Contra Maximin. arian. episc. II, XIV, 2. Migne, t. 42, col. 771; II, XIV, 3. Ib. col. 772; II, XIV, 4, col. 772–773; De Trinit. D. I, VI, 9. M. t. 42, col. 825.Cnfr. I, VI, 12, col. 827. Epist. ad Maxim. CLXX, no. 4. M.t. 33, col. 749. Contra Maximin. arian. episc. II, XIV, 6. Migne, t. 42, col. 773. Collat. cum Maximin. arian. episc. n. 14. Migne, t. 42, col. 721. Serm. CXL, n. 5. Migne, t. 38, col. 775. Contra Maximin. ag. er. I, V. Migne, t. 42, col. 747. Serm. CXXXIX, IV, 5. Migne, t. 38, col. 772 cnfr. col. 748–749. Contra Maximin. ar. episc. II, VII. Migne, t. 42, col. 762.Cnfr. Op. cit. II, XV, 1, col. 777. LXXXIII Quaest. qu. 50. M. t. 40, col. 31–32. Epist. CCXXVIII ad Pascent. s. IV, no. 25. M. t. 33, col. 1048. Contra Maxim. ar. II, XV, 5. Migne, t. 42, col. 780.Cnfr. cap. XXV, col. 803. Contra Maximin. arian. episc. II, VII. Migne, t. 42, col. 762. Ibid. – II, XIV, 4, col. 772–773. – II, XV, 1. Ibid. col. 777. Contra serm. arian. s. I, n. 1.M.t. 42, col. 683–685. Collat. cum Maximin. n. 11. M, t. 42, col. 729. In view of this bl. Augustine insists with particular force on the actual recognition by the Arians of the true consubstantiality (i.e., co-essence) of the Son with the Father. Serm. CXXXIX, p. II, no. 3. Migne, t. 38, col. 770–771. Epist. CLXX, no. 8 (ad Maxim). M.t. 33, col. 751. Contra Maxim. ar. er. I, V. M. t. 42, col. 746–747. Ibid. II, XV, 3. col. 779. De fide et symb. With. IV, no. 5. M.t. 40, col. 184. Quite a detailed list of those places from the works of Bl. Augustine, in which he offers a dogmatic anti-Arian analysis of the above-mentioned biblical quotations (the so-called derogatory remarks about the Son of God), see Th. Gangauf'a, op. cit. S.s. 335–342. Anmerk. 41. De Trinit D. VII, I, l. Migne, t. 42, col. 933: Verbo aequali sibi semper atque incommutabiliter dicit se ipsum. De Trinit. D. VII, III, 4. M. t. 42, col. 937: Pater enim (sc. sapientiam) dicit, ut Verbum ejus sit. De Trinit. D. II, V, 9. M. t. 42, col. 850: Dei autem Verbum (objectified completeness of the intellectual content of God the Father) – et ipse Dei Filius. Contra Maxim. arian. episc. II, XIV, 7. Migne, t. 42, col. 774.Cnfr. Ibid. II, XXIII, 7; col. 801–802. Epist. CLXX ad Maxim. n. 5. Migne, t. 33, col. 750: Neque enim Pater, ut haberet Filium de se ipso, minuit se ipsum, sed ita genuit de se alterum se, ut totus maneret in se, etesset in Filio tantus, quantus et solus. Contra Maxim. ar. episc. II, XIV, 9. M. t. 42, col. 776–777. Nam et filio genito integer manet. De anima et ejus orig. II, V, 9. M. t. 44, col. 500. Enarr. in Ps. LXVIII, Serm. I, n. 5. Migne, t. 36, col. 845: quia ejusdem substantiae. Filius, procul dubio et Filius Deus. In general, everything that was stated above about the properties of God applies, in particular, to the Son of God: Quidquid de Deo dicitur quod substantiam ejus indicet, nonnisi de ambobus simul immo de ipsa simul Trinitate dicitur. De Trinit. VI, IV, 6. Migne, t. 42, col. 927.Cnfr. I, XII, 26. Ibid. col. 838–839; – II, II, 4; col. 847. The given bl. Augustine facts in support of the Divine properties of the Son - see Th. Gangauf, op. cit. S.s. 343–344, Anmerk. 44. De Trinit. D. VII, II, 3. Migne, t. 42, col. 936.Cnfr. op. cit.V, I, n. 1–2. Ibid. col. 931–936. Op. cit. VII, VI, 12. Ibid. col. 945–946; – VII, III, 4. Ibid. col. 973; – VI, II, 3, col. 925; – XV, XIV, 23. Ibid. col. 1076. The Greek triadological term “ύπόστασις”, due to the possibility of misunderstandings associated with its translation in Latin (substantia, subsistentia, esse, essentia), bl. Augustine prefers the Latin word "persona". The Divine Word, according to Augustine, is absolute personal Being and Life in their absolute identity, characterized by their internal unity both with each other and with the mind-will of the Father. – Tract. XL in Joann. Ev. With. VIII, no. 5. Migne, t. 35, col. 1689. De Trinit. D. VII, III, 4. M. t. 42, col. 937. Contra serm.arian. With. XXVI, no. 22. M. t. 42, col. 701. De Trinit. D. XV, XIV, 23. M. t. 42, col. 1077. De Genes. ad litter. I, V, 10. M. t. 34, col. 249; p. lane VII, 159. Cnfr. Enarr. in Ps. CXVIII, serm. XXII, n. 3. M.t. 37, col. 1564. Tract. XVIII in Joann. Ev. With. V, n. 9. M.t. 35, col. 1541. Contra serm. ar. With. XVII. M.t. 42, col. 696. De Trinit. D. II, I, 3. M. t. 42, col. 846–847 (On the identity of being and life in the Word the Son and His mind or self-consciousness). Tract. XIX in Joann. Ev. With. V, n. 5. M.t. 35, col. 1545. Contra serm. ar. With. XV. M.t. 42, col. 694. De Trinit. D. II, I, 3. M.t.42, col. 846. De Trin. D. XV, XIX, 23. M. t. 42, col. 1076–1077. (On the will and power of the Son the Word). Contra Maximin. arian. episc. II, XV, 1. Migne, t. 42, col. 777. Tract. XXXVI in Joann. Ev., n. 9. M.t. 35, col. 1668. De anim. et ejus origin. II, V, 9. M. t. 44, col. 500: Alius est quidem Verbum Dei Filius, sed non est aliud: hoc est, alia persona est, sed non diversa natura. Cnfr. De Trinit. D. VII, VI, 12. M. t. 42, col. 945–946. The Arians believed: Pater praescius erat se unigeniti Dei Patrem futurum. For Augustine's witty refutation of this Arian assumption, see Contra serm. arian. With. XXXV, n. 33. Migne, t. 42, col. 707. Enarr. LXVIII in Ps. serm. I, n. 5. Migne, t. 36. col. 844.Cnfr. De Civit. D. XI, X, 1. M. t. 41, col. 325; Russian lane IV, 189–190. De Trinit. D. VII, I, 2. M. t. 42. col. 934–936. una est substantia Patris et Filii. De Trinit. D. V, III, 4. Migne, t. 42, col. 913. Enarr. LXVIII in Ps. serm. I, n. 5. Migne, t. 36, col. 845. Enarr. in LXVIII Ps. serm. I, n. 5. Migne, t. 36, col. 845.Cnfr. De Civit. Dei XI, X, 1. M. t. 41, col. 325; p. p. IV, 189–190. De Trinit. D. VII, I, 2. M. t. 42. col. 934–935. De Trinit. D. V, III, 4. Migne, t. 42, col. 913. De Trinit. D. V, III, 4. Migne, t. 42, col. 913. Epist. CLXX ad Maxim. n. 6. Migne, t. 33, col. 750. Cp. De Trinit. D. V, III, 4. Migne, t. 42, col. 913. De Trinit. Dei V, VI, 7. Migne, t. 42, col. 914–915. De Trinit. D. V, VI, 7. Migne, t. 42, col. 915. ...qualitas Ejus (sc. Patris) est Filius, non proles Ejus. Quid enim insanius? De Trin. VII, I, 2. Migne, t. 42, col. 935–936.....et singulus Pater sapientia et singulus Filius sapientia. De Trinit. D. VII, III, 4. M. t. 42, col. 937.Cnfr. De Trinit. D. XV, VII, 12–13. M.t. 42, col. 1065–1067. For a detailed argumentation of this thesis, according to which Deus Pater non est ipsa sapientia, sed tantum genitor sapientiae, and its refutation by Augustine, see De Trinit. D. VI, I–II, n. n. 1–3. Migne, t. 42, col. 923–926. ...hi [sc. sabelliani] dicunt ipsum esse Patrem, qui est Filius; nomina diversa, unam vero esse personam. Cum vult, Pater est, inquiunt; cum vult, Filius: tamen unus est. Tract. XXXVII in Joann. Ev. n. 6. Migne, t. 35, col. 1672. Dixerunt, ipse est Pater, ipse est Filius: duo sunt nomina sed res una. Tract. XL in Joann. Ev. n. 3. M.t. 35, col. 1687. Cnfr. op. cit. n. 7, col. 1689. Sola est ista nominis Trinitas sine subsistentia personarum, sicut sabelliani haeretici putaverunt. De Civit. D. XI, X, 1; Migne, t. 41, col. 325; p. lane IV, 190. Cnfr. X, XXIV, col. 301; p. lane IV, 145–146. Tract. in Joann. Ev. LXXI, n.2. Migne, t. 35, col. 1819. Tr. LXXI in Joann Ev. With. XIV, no. 2. M.t. 35, col. 1821. Tract. XXXVI in Joann. Ev. n. 9, col. 1668. Tract. LIII in Joann. Ev. n. 3, col. 1775. Cnfr. n. 2, col. 1775. Tr. XLVIII in Joann. Ev. n. 7, col. 1744. “Sabelliani... dicunt: ipse est Pater, qui Filius; Ariani... dicunt: Aliud est Pater, aliud est Filius, quasi non sint ejusdem substantiae Pater et Filius.” Tract. XLVII in Joann. Ev. n. 9. Migne, t. 35, col. 1737. Cnfr. Tr. XXXVII in Joann. Ev. n. 6, col. 1672. In previous treatises or conversations on ev. from John, Augustine compares both of the indicated errors of the Sabellians and Arians standing at two opposite poles with Scylla and Charybdis and, pointing out between them the middle or royal path leading to the saving truth, says: “in medio naviga, utrumque periculosum latus evita.” Tract in Joann. Ev. n. 9. M.t. 35, col. 1668. And the Arians refuted Sabellianism on the basis of Holy Scripture. Contra serm. arian. With. XXXIV, n, 32. Migne, t. 42, col. 705–706. Contra Maximin. arian. episc. I, XIII. M.t. 42, col. 754.Cnfr. With. II, praefat. col. 759. Tract. XXXVII in Joann. Ev., n. 6. Migne, t. 35, col. 1672–1673. Cnfr. tract. LXXI, no. 2, col. 1820–1821. De fide et symb. with IV, n. 5. Migne, t. 40, col. 184. Cnfr. Tract. XXXVI in Joann. Ev. n. 6. M.t. 35, col. 1666. De Trinit. D. VII, I, 1. Migne, t. 42, col. 933: Verbo aequali sibi, quo semper aique incommutabiliter dicit se ipsum. De Trinit. D. II, V, 9. M. t. 42, col 850: Dei autem Verbum est ipse Dei Filius. Enarr. in LXI Ps. n. 18. M. t. 36, col. 742: Apud se semel Deus locutus est, quia unum Verbum genuit Deus. Contra epist. Manich. With. XXXVII, n. 42. M.t. 42, col. 202. Enarr. in Ps. XLIV, n. 5. M.t. 36, col. 497. De fide et symb. With. IV, no. 6. M.t. 40, col. 185. – As the Son of God, Christ the God-Man “unicus Patri”; like the son of man - “unicus matri”. As the Son of God, He was “de Patre sine matre,” and likewise, as the Son of Man, He must be “de Matre sine Patre.” De Trinit. D. VI, I, 2. Migne, t. 42, col. 924 etc. Contra Maxim. arian. episc. II, XII, 3. Migne, t. 42, col. 768–769. Contra Maximin. ar. episc. II, XII, 3. Migne, t. 42, col. 768–769. Tract. XXI in Joann. Ev. n. 4. Migne, t. 35, col. 1566.Cnfr. Tract. XX, n. 8, col. 1560. Serm. CCCXLI. With. VI, no. 8. M.t. 39, col. 1498. De Trinit. D. I, VI, 9. Migne, t. 42 col. 825. Contra Maxim. ar. I. 1, M. t. 42, col. 743–744. Cnfr. Epist. CCXXVIII, p. II, no. 12. M. t. 33, col. 1042. – n. 13, col. 1043. De Trinit. D. VI, IV, 6. M. t. 42, col. 927. Prof. A. Harnack. Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte Freib. im. Br. 1888–90. .2 Aufl. Bd II, S. 297. Anm. See Dr. A. Dorner. Augustinus. Sein theoiogisches System und seine religionsphilosophische Anschauung. Berlin. 1873. S. 28–29. However, just as the former do not deny the latter, so the latter, apparently, do not contradict, or at least do not intend to contradict, the former. See the works of Gangauf'a, Böhringer'a, Bindemann'a, Domer'a, Nibér'a, Storz'a, Loësche, Grandgeorge'a, Schöler'a, Harnack'a, Loofs'a, Seeberg'a, which we reviewed above in the review of foreign and Russian Augustinian literature. Schwane; Reverend Sylvester, Prof. Bolotova, Brilliantova and others - See Preface to this work, pp. .... De Civit. Dei XI, XXIV. Migne, t. 41, col. 337; p. lane IV. 212. Wed. a rather complete definition of the "Triune God" or "worshipful Trinity" in De doctr. christ. I, V, 5. M. t. 34, col. 21:p. p. (non-ac. ed.) pp. 19–20. See the 2nd part of our essay, dedicated to the detailed development of this point of the Trinitarian dogmatics of Bl. Augustine. Lo ë sche, Grandgeorge, Harnack, Dorner etc. “The final significance of Cappadocian theology (the doctrine of the One God in essence and His three Hypostases) in the field of Trinitarian disputes,” says the author of the newest major work on the history of Trinitarian dogma, Prof. A. A. Spassky, - (History of dogmatic movements in the era of ecumenical councils. Vol. 1. Trinitarian question. History of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. Serg. Posad. 1906. P. 646 et al.), - is especially clearly visible in the fact that it not only became established in Eastern theology, but also penetrated the West, and here it achieved final dominance, putting an end to the previous misunderstandings." The works of Hilary, Ambrose, and the translation activities of Rufinus and Jerome bear noticeable traces of the influence of Cappadocian theology. “But even more clearly (than on the mentioned Western church writers), the principles of Cappadocian theology were reflected on Augustine, despite all his Western originality. He, like the Cappadocians, builds his teaching about God in His being on Neoplatonic soil and directly uses, in Greek, their basic formula “μία οὐσία, τρεῖς ὐποστάσεις” (De Trin. V, VIII, 10; t. 42. col. A brief expression of the theology created by the Cappadocians and transplanted into Western theology, mainly by Augustine, was the so-called Quicumque symbol, which arose in the 5th century in Southern Gaul and then gradually came into use throughout the Western Church (For the text, see Hahn § 150, S. s. 174–177 cf. A Harnack, op. cit. Bd II [3 Aufl.] S. 297. Anm). The name of Athansius of Alexandria, by which it was known in the West, falsely attributed to this symbol, actually pointed to the historical source of the teaching set forth in it.” (Prof. A. Spassky, op. cit., pp. 646–647. Note 3). However, all these judgments of their author, who is undoubtedly competent in the matter, on the other hand, can be contrasted with observations and facts of an opposite nature, noted in German Protestant (partly Russian) literature about Augustine in his relation to the East (see op. cit. Harnack 'a, Reuter'a, Seeberg'a, Dorner'a, etc.). So, for example, according to the Protestant theologian N. Reuter, whose opinion on this issue is shared by A. Harnack, “Greek writers were little used by Augustine not because. that due to insufficient familiarity with their language, he could not use them, but because at that time it was difficult to acquire the corresponding manuscripts, as he himself says about this; and also because Augustine did not feel a particularly strong need to use (for his own purposes) these literary works (Reuter. Augustinische Studien. Gotha. 1887. S. 192 cf. Harnack, DG, II, 296 ffgg). But Augustine, according to the same Reuter, drew little from Latin works devoted to the Trinitarian question. His work in the development of Trinitarian dogma, according to the quoted German theologian, is creative work! His special work on the Holy Trinity, built on original thoughts, if, of course, we keep in mind their theological nature, is almost independent of the Catholic East, but nevertheless is in agreement with the material content of the basic principles of that teaching, which we should call Nicene-Athanasian” (op. cit. S. 192). In any case, one should not lose sight of the fact that it is quite difficult to establish a connection or attitude of Augustine to Eastern theology on historical grounds, and this is not particularly important if we keep in mind all the originality - from a Western point of view - of Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity in its entirety and its main elements. Wed. Prof. A.I. Brilliantov. The influence of Eastern theology on Western in the works of John Scotus Erigena St. Petersburg. 1898. Pp. 97. De Trinitate D. V, VIII, 10. Migne, t. 42, col. 917;–VII, VI, II, col. 943. The following are important for Augustinian Trinitarian terminology. places. Augustine translates the Greek formula “μίαν οὐσίαν, τρεῖς ὐποστάσεις” into Latin. language (consciously adhering to Greek philosophy - VII, 4,8) with the expression: “una essentia, tres substantiae”; but further leans towards this method of expression: “una essentia vel substantia, tres autem personae”; Wed VII, 5, 10, where with reference to Ex. 3, 24 he prefers the term “essentia” to the expression “substantia”; Wed also V, VIII, 9 (con.), where “substantia” (in the sense of essentia, gr. οὐσία, is called “usitatior”. See Seeberg, op. cit, Bd II, S. 147. Anmerk. 2. De Trin. VII, IV, 9. Migne, X. 42, col 941–942. De Trinitate VII, IV, 7; Migne, t. 42, col. 939–940; Trinit. D. V, XIV, 15. M. t. 42, col. 920–921. Wed. Prof. A. A. Spassky, cit. cit., p. 647. Fr. Loofs. Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte. Halle. 1993. See, for example, § 32 Altnicänische Orthodoxie. Ahtanasius. § 34, Jüngeren Nicäner (oder Neu-nicäner). Cp. also Dr. Joh. Werner. Dogmengeschichtliche Tabellen. Cotha. 1898. This terminology also finds recognition in Russian theological literature (see the above-cited works of academic professors: A. A. Spassky, A. P. Orlov, I. V. Popov, A. I. Brilliantov, etc.). The famous German taxonomist of theology Bl. Augustine Ad. Dorper says in this regard: “As for, first of all, formal-logical definitions, with the help of which Augustine seeks to clarify the Trinitarian relationship (in God), then, it must be said, they are not new at all, since most of them are already found among the Cappadocian fathers. That, by analogy, the relation individuum ad genus Persons in the Divine relate not to the concept of essence, but to the concept of Person (i.e., the general generic concept for Persons will not be essence, but person); that the three Hypostases do not exist by chance (in God), but stand in a necessary relationship to each other; that Their difference cannot be quantitative, since there can be no divisibility in God, just as it cannot be qualitative in the sense that it is expressed in different properties, since all three Hypostases have a divine nature; that further, the three images of the existence of God (τρόποι ὐπάρξεως) belong to a single divine being, which the Divine Persons reveal by themselves - all this was already expressed earlier (by Augustine) by the Cappadocians. As for the construction of trinity on the basis of Divine self-consciousness, then in this regard, Bl. Augustine has as his predecessor St. Athanasius, who looked at the Son as an image of the Father’s radiance. And Hilary, this “Athanasius of the West,” as he is commonly called, reveals the same idea in his books on the Holy Trinity” (op. cit., S. s. 28–29). R. Seeberg. Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte. Leipzig. 1910. 2 Aufl. Bd II. S. 144. Seeberg, op. cit., Bd II, S. 143 cf. 8.s. 141. 149. 150–151. Ibid. S. 143. Eg. epist. Aug. 120, 17; In Joh. tract. 74, 1; 98, 7; 18, 2; 37, 9; De doctr. chr. III, 1. See more detailed judgments about Augustine's attitude to the Eastern Trinitarian teaching in Reuter'a, op., cit., Stud. IV, S. s. 153–228 und VII, 479–516 and Zeitschrf. f. K. G. V. S. 375 ff.; VI. S. 155 ff. Cp. A. Harnack, op. cit., II, S. s. 296–297. Among Russian theologians, see Prof. V.V. Bolotov. Thesen über das Filioque. Internat. theol. Zeitschr. S. 687 and Russian. lane Xp. Read 1913 May, p. 584 and approx. 1st. Prof. A.I. Brilliantov. The influence of Eastern theology on Western in the works of John Scotus Erigena. St. Petersburg 1898. Pp. 97. Note 3rd According to Seeberg (Op. cit, II, 149), the starting point of Augustine’s Trinitarian doctrine is his doctrine of the unity of God: when considering Augustine’s teaching on the Trinity, everyone sees how strongly the feeling (Empfinden) of the unity of the Divine, so characteristic of the ancient West, penetrates him. It is the One God, as the Subject, who acts individually outwardly - this is Augustine’s starting point, which he never loses sight of. Moreover, the very trinity of Persons is considered and explained by them in the same way exclusively in the interests of the unity of the Divine Being (Ibid.). Epist. CCXXXIX, no. 3. Migne, t 33, col. 1050. De Trinitate Dei V, 4, 7; M.t. 42, col. 824 cnfr. De Civitate D. XI, 24; M.t. 41, col. 337–338; p. nep. IV, 212. De Trinitate Dei V, xi, 12; Migne, t. 42, col. 919; V, VIII, 9; col. 917.Cnfr. Contra Maxim. II, XXVI, 14; col. 814; Confess. 1. XII, c. 7. M.t. 32, col. 828; Russian lane I, 376: “Deus una Trinitas, et trina Unitas” cfr. "Unus est Deus, sed tamen Trinitas" ib., col. 932 and many more etc. Böhringer, op. cit. II, S. 291 vrgl. S. 278 cf. Herzog-Hauck. RE. Bd. XX, S. 116. Kirn. Trinität: God, according to Augustine, implicite is the Trinity (Trin. V, 9). I. I. Adamov. The doctrine of the Trinity of St. Ambrose of Milan. Theologian Vestn. 1910. June. Page 347 et seq. page 10. Wed. His same. St. Ambrose of Milan. Serg. Pos. 1915. Pp. 246–247 Wed. 237, etc. Prof. A. A. Orlov. Trinitarian views of St. Hilary of Pictavia. Serg. Posad. 1903. Page 272. Wed. Prof. Harnack, Op. cit. II, S. 252. Prof. Dr. R. Seeberg, DG., Bd. II, S. 147 cnfr. 149. – It should, however, be noted that both the single Divine essence among the Neo-Nicenes and the trinity of Hypostases among Augustine are a problem only for their theological and philosophical consciousness or in their theological speculation of the church dogma of the Holy Trinity. For their church-dogmatic consciousness, both of the two named main points of the Trinitarian dogma were unconditionally reliable and stood above all doubt, as indisputable data of Divine Revelation and general church tradition. Prof. A. A. Spassky. History of dogmatic movements in the era of ecumenical councils (in connection with the philosophical teachings of that time). T. 1st. Trinitarian question. Sergiev Posad. 1906. pp. 494–495. “New Nicene theology, presented in the works of the three Great Cappadocians,” says (Prof.) A.P. Orlov on this occasion, “is the final moment in the disclosure of the Eastern Trinitarian dogma.” See his Trinitarian Views of Hilary of Pictavia, pp. 254 cf. 276. Wed. also Prof. A. Spassky, op. op. pp. 492. 511–512. 518–519. 520. and Prof. N.I. Sagarda. Ancient church theological science in the Greek east during its heyday (IV–V centuries) – its main directions and characteristic features. Christ. Read 1910 April. Page 473–476 et seq. pp. 31–34. This accusation of the Cappadocians was brought against them during their lifetime, so that, for example, St. Gregory of Nyssa, in defense of himself and refuting this accusation, had to write a special essay: “To Aulavius ​​about the fact that there are not three Gods.” And “Gregory the Theologian touches on this point in almost every speech of theological content.” See Prof. A. A. Cnaccsky. cit. cit., p. 503. Note. 4. According to the same Prof. A. A. Spassky, “these accusations continue to this day.” Ibid., p. 503, note. 5th. (Cf. Prof. A. Orlov, op. cit.) - However, what was said about the shortcomings of the Trinitarian system of St. The Cappadocian fathers should be attributed specifically to the theological side of their teaching about the Holy Trinity or to its theological and philosophical construction undertaken by the Cappadocians (like St. Augustine) with the help of the forms and concepts of ancient philosophy. The church-dogmatic meaning of this doctrine of the Cappadocians was completely church-Orthodox and as such was in full agreement with the basic meaning of the Nicene Creed. – For a more visual conviction of this and for a better highlighting of the features of the teachings of Bl. Augustine below gives us a brief synthesis of the Trinitarian dogmatics of the three Great Cappadocians. The essence of the teaching of the Great Cappadocian Fathers about the Triune God can be expressed by the formula: “God is one in essence and threefold in Hypostases” (see Lopukhin-Glubokovsky. Right. Theological Encyclopedia, Vol. III, p. 193 cf. Vol. IV, pp. 621 and 639). According to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Confession, “οὐσία” in the Trinitarian theology of the Cappadocians should denote the thought of the one and individual being of God or that which is common to all three Persons of the Divine. “Οὐσία” is not only a general concept, an abstract concept of a kind that has only a logical existence, but must be recognized as a really and concretely existing basis for the existence of three independent and self-conscious Subjects. The latter, equally and completely possessing this being or nature, have all, without exception, the properties of this being or nature. Hypostases are not only simple properties (ἲδια, ίδιώματα, ίδιότητες) of the real and numerically united Divine essence, but “self-existent” (ϰαϑ’ έαυτό or οὐσιωδώς ὐφεστωτες), self-conscious and rationally free perfect carriers of this essence (Υποστάσεις). “Each Person of the Holy Trinity has equally Divine predicates of uncreatedness, incomprehensibility, omniscience, omnipotence, conceivable in the concept of God. Therefore They are one in essence." (Orthodox. Theological. Encycl., T. III, 192–193). But Each of Them is at the same time a separate Hypostasis, because, along with the general properties of the Divine nature, it also has predicates that are incommunicable to other Persons and distinguish Him from Each other Person. Their difference is determined by the different “way of Their existence” (τρόπος ὐπάρξεως), which is closely connected with Their internal relations to each other. These distinctive features of Each Person, which are in close connection with Their mutual relations and pointing to the method of Their origin or the image of Their being, are: unbornness, birth and procession (άγεννησία, γεννησία, ἑϰπόρευσις). The Father is the beginningless producing cause of the existence of the Son and the Holy Spirit, the Son and the Spirit are derivative (in the form of birth and procession) being (Πατὴρ – αἰτία, Ὑιός ϰαἰ Πνεδμα Αγιον – τά αιτιατά). The Father, not having in anyone else the reason for His existence, gives birth to the Son from Himself and brings out the Holy Spirit from Himself: The Son is born from the Father, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, but is known in His (manifestation) through the Son. “This formula of the term “Hypostasis” in its main features remains unshakable in church theology to this day” (See Prof. A. Spassky, op. cit. p. 498) - This is the main points or main features of the Trinitarian theology of the younger Nicenes or Neo-Niceans (the three Great Cappadocians). She happily achieved the golden mean between two polar points or opposite extremes of Trinitarian dogma: Sabellianism and Arianism, between Judaism and paganism. Having happily avoided Scylla, the Sabellian fusion of Persons and Charybdis, Their Arian division, or what is the same as Jewish monotheism and pagan polytheism, the Cappadocians understood the Holy Trinity “as unity in difference (ταυτότης έν έτερότητι), and difference in unity (έτερότης έν ταυτότητι)” (Prof. A. Spassky, op. cit., p. 519), i.e., as something single or triune harmonic whole. The above-stated church concept of Trinitarian dogma, “full of deep philosophical and theological meaning,” represents, as it was noted, “an undoubted and major step forward in the history of dogmatics, leaving far behind not only all previous pre-Nicene theology, but also Athanasius himself” (A. Spassky, 512 pp.), and therefore, in all fairness, should be considered “as the final result not only trinitarian disputes of the 4th century, but also all the experiences of resolving this issue during the first three centuries of Christianity” (ibid., p. 519). And the evidence of the subsequent history of Trinitarian dogma, which adopted the triadological concepts of the Cappadocians and retained their universally binding meaning in the Church even to this day, is the most eloquent and most indisputable proof of this! Seeberg, op. cit. (passim). See B. Samuilov. History of Arianism in the Latin West. St. Petersburg 1890. Page 183. 186. Augustine was also inclined towards the same tendency by philosophical influences, mainly Neoplatonism with the doctrine of the “One” that permeated it. Thus, the Protestant systematizer of Augustinian theology A. Dorner explains Augustine’s primary attention to the question of the single essence of the Divine in comparison with the doctrine of the trinity of Hypostases by the influence of Neoplatonism on him and the natural reaction of his religious-theological consciousness against Manichaeism. (Op. cit., S. 32). Seeberg. Op. cit. S. 147 vrgl. 149. See about trinitarian terminology bl. Augustine – R. Seeberg, op. cit., Bd II, S. 147. Anmerk. 2. See Augustinian criticism of the teachings of Basil Vel. about the relationship between the unity of essence and the trinity of Hypostases - De Trinit. Dei VIII, VI, 11. Migne, t. 42, col. 943–944, etc. Prof. A. Spassky, op. op. 492 and gave. Prof. A. Orlov, cit. cit., 258–259; 267 pp. and gave. Orthodox Theologian Encyclopedia of Lopukhin-Glubokovsky. T. III, 193 et ​​al., vol. IV. 621 and gave. V. Samuilov, op. cit., pp. 181 et al. Wed. Cappadocian theology: Prof. A. A. Spassky, cit. cit., pp. 492–495, 504–505. De Trinit. D. VIII, VI, 11. Migne, t. 42, col. 943–945 Wed. Epist. CXX, p. II, no. 7 and p. III. n. 13. Migne, t. 33. col. 455 and 458 Augustine's denial of "alicujus quartae divinitatis". De Trinit. D. VIII, VI, 11. Migne, t. 42, col. 943: Nam si genus est essentia, species autem substantia sive persona, ut nonnuli sentiunt, omitto iliud quod jam dixi, opporteri appellare tres essentias, ut appellantur tres substantiae vel personae, sicut appellantur tres aequi, eademque animalia tria, cum sit species equus, animal-genus. De Trinit. D. VIII, VI, 11. Migne, t. 42, col. 943–944. Tract, in Joh. Ev. XXXIX, no. 2. Migne, t. 35, col. 1682. Cnfr. XCI, n. 4. M.t. 35, col. 1862. Ibid., M. t. 42, col. 944: Sicut enim dicuntur Abraham, Isaac et Jacob – tria individua, ita tres homines et tres animae. Augustine's denial of tetradism - see Epist. CXX. n. n 7. 13. Migne, t. 33, col. 455–456. 458. Prof. A. Dorner. Op. cit., S. 6. Meanwhile, in God, His essence is inseparable from the Hypostases (as well as the latter from the essence): the Divine Hypostases exist at the root or on the basis of this one and only essence of theirs and reveal it only in three ways. Therefore, we can say that “essentia, quam Graeci ούσίαν vocant,” (De Trinit. D. V, II, 3. Migne, M. t. 42, col. 912), according to bl. Augustine, as well as according to St. According to the Cappadocian Fathers, there is a designation of the Divine being, which is actually present in absolutely equal measure to all three Hypostases directly and undividedly, so that between the essence of God, which exists concretely and individually, and the Hypostases in which it manifests itself, there is no division (section or crushing), nothing intermediary or inserted, nothing independent, different and extraneous to the Divine. Wed. understanding of God essence of the Faces of St. Trinity among the Cappadocians. See Prof. A. Spassky, cit. cit., pp. 503–504 and 519–520. De Trinit. D. VII, VI, 11; Migne, t. 42, col. 943–5; VIII, no. 1.Proem.; col. 946–947. Cnfr. VIII, VI, 11; col. 945: “non enim major essentia est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus simul, quam solus Pater aut solus Filius; sed tres simul illae substantiae sive personae... aequales sunt singulis.” "Nec plus aliquid sint duae, quam una." – De Trinitate Dei VI, 10, 12. Migne, t. 42, col. 932 etc. De Trinit. D. VIII, n. 1.Proëm. Migne, col. 946–947. See Dorner, op. cit, S. 6. See at least only the anti-Arian works of Blessed. Augustine. Migne, t. 42, col. 683–814, etc. De Trinit. D. XV, XVII, 28. Migne, t. 42, col. 1080–81. In the 4th century, the usual or most widespread formula of the Trinitarian dogma, which received its final formulation at this time, was this: “in God there is one being in three Persons.” See Prot. N. Malinovsky. Orthodox Dogmatic Theology. Kharkov. 1895. Part 1, p. 305. De Trinit. D. V, IV, 5; V, V, 6; Migne, t. 42, col. 913–914. cfr. col. 912–917. Böhringer, op. cit., II, S. 279. Seeberg, op. cit., II; S.s. 145–146. Harnack, op. cit., Bd III, S. 108. Anmerk. 4. Quamvis diversum sit Patrem esse et Filium esse, non est tamen diversa substantia; quia hoc non secundum substantiam dicuntur, sed secundum relativum; quod tamen relativum non est accidens, quia non est mutable. De Trin. D. V, V, 6; Migne, t.42, col. 914.DeTrin. V, III, 4. M., col. 913; cfr. Ibid. col. 943–945. Si enim tres personae, commune est eis, quod persona est... Nam persona generale nomen est. De Trinit. D. VII, IV, 7. Migne, t. 42, col. 940.Cnfr. ibid. n. 8, col. 940–941. VII, VI, 11; col. 943 etc. Dorner, op. cit., S. 7. Dorner, op. cit., S. 7. – In patristic literature one can often read that the element that determines a personality, its fundamental attribute, is its self-mobility, that is, its ability to self-determination, free will, independently managing its free actions or its activities, hence this latter as well. Personality, according to patristic reason, “is not a simple individuality, but a rationally volitional, self-conscious and free principle. Since the time of Origen, it has been established that the central point of personality is that unifying principle, that Self, in which all the basic elements of personality are united: truth, goodness and love. It produces a unification of inner life not through self-consciousness (Gregor. Naz. Orat. XLII, n. 76, col. 477) only, but also through a special way of discovering all personal properties (that is, through a special activity, which, thus serving as the principle of unification, is at the same time the principle of difference). Therefore, the Divine Personality is not just an individuality and not a formal unification in consciousness, but a living and concrete principle that delimits with its characterizing features what is common in the Divinity; this beginning is the source of life and activity in God.” “The whole inner life of the Deity takes place in the very essence of the Deity (Greg. Naz. Or. III, 63) and is an eternal, continuous act.” I. Chetverikov. About God as a personal being. Kyiv. 1904. Pp. 342 and 343. See A. Dorner, op. cit. S. 22: Personal being (personality) is the “way of being” of the essence (das Personsein ist eine Seinsweise der Essenz). According to Augustine, in relation to the Divinity it is dangerous “dicere tres essentias, ne intelligeretur in illa summa aequalitate ulla diversitas. Rursus non esse tria quaedam, non poterat dicere, quod Sabellius quia dixit, in haeresim lapsus est.” De Trin. VII, IV, 9. Migne, t. 42, col. 941. Ep. Sylvester. Experience.... T. 2nd, p. 498. In relation to Augustinian Trinitarian terminology, Hypostasis, in the theological-speculative Trinitarian concept of Bl. Augustine, there will be nothing more than a hypostasized function of the Divinity (the absolute being of God) or a personified modification of the single activity of the all-one Divine being, and the Trinity of Divine Persons itself is nothing more than a known relationship (correlate) of these hypostasized functions of the Divine, occurring (having their deepest basis) in the inner life of the Divine and expressing themselves accordingly outside. Placed in perspective towards each other or projected into the world of creatures, these hypostatic energies or hypostatic acts of the Divine essence are correspondingly realized and manifest their special activity, but in such a way that the action of each or each of them separately finds in the other two its co-agent, that is, its co-agent. This participation or assistance of each of the designated three forces-energies in the actions or actions of each other is based on the natural internal Their mutual communication or interaction, as its necessary ontological prerequisite. This same internal immanent relationship or interaction of the named hypostasized actualities also serves as a necessary metaphysical postulate for Their activity, united in its difference and diverse in its unity, and external, transcendental, i.e., activity addressed to the created world. And, therefore, and vice versa: the unity or community (with some difference and diversity) of this last activity (directed to the external world of creatures) of the hypostatic forces-energies under consideration is a logical consequence and a direct imprint of Their internal premium intercommunication and unity, which at the same time contains within itself the beginning of a certain difference. And so, in his theological speculation, Bl. Augustine thought and understood the Trinity of Divine Persons as uniformity in diversity and as diversity in uniformity, as unity in plurality and plurality in unity, as identity in difference and difference in identity - that is, as identity and difference or as unity and trinity in their highest (absolute), now completely unknown to us, but real and living harmonious synthesis! Assessing “relatio, relative ad invicem” of our Western Christian thinker as a trinitarian term - concept, researchers and commentators of Blessed. Augustine, even those who are not in favor of his rational-psychological construction of the Trinitarian dogma and are critical of it in its entirety, however, attach great importance to this Augustinian concept of the Divine Persons of the Holy Trinity. “What is common to all three Persons (Divinity),” says, for example, A. Donner, commenting on the indicated point of the trinitarian doctrine of the famous Ippon theologian, “is activity, function (Thätigkeit, Function): that by which They differ from each other, through which They enter into different relationships among themselves, these are different functions (actions) that necessarily belong to each Person in His relation to two other Persons. This, concludes the Protestant systematizer of the teachings of Bl. Augustine, - constitutes one of the most important points of his trinitarian dogma, i.e. the position that the Persons in the Divinity differ from each other not by essence, but by functions or by their relationship and interaction. At the same time, hidden in this thesis is the idea that on the basis of the difference in God of the three Persons, life and vitality in the Divine (the living and vital character of the Trinitarian process in God) is rooted and determined.” Op. cit. S.s. 7–8. This inspires the idea that the inner life of the Trinitarian Deity is not absolute peace, deathly stagnation, or inertia, but that, on the contrary, it is a living life, a vital process, some kind of incessant “spiritual movement”, some higher, now unknown to us in its internal basis, “stationary movement” or better to say “ever-flowing movement” (some kind of “stationary and at the same time ever-flowing movement"). According to the fair expression of the Russian Christian philosopher, relying in this case on the biblical and patristic understanding of the Absolute Person, “the entire inner life of the Divine takes place in the very essence of the Divine (Greg. Naz. Orat. III, 63) and is an eternal, continuous act.” Chetverikov, op. cit., p. 343. – Protestant historian of Christian dogma Dr. R. Seeberg, who generally shares Garnakovskaya, i.e. negative, point of view on the trinitarian speculation of the blessed one. Augustine, as a dogmatic construction that does not reach the goal, nevertheless calls “relatio”, as his concept of the Divine Hypostasis, with flattering epithets “das epochemachende” and “das massgebende” (Op. cit., II, 147). He speaks on this matter. “In this new Augustinian construction of the Trinitarian teaching, the concept of “relatio” introduced by Augustine creates an entire era (epochemachende). This concept had decisive or determining (massgebende) significance for Western dogmatics of later times. This is the thinnest and most delicate line or the thinnest and most subtle stroke that could be found to determine some difference in the Divine Being without any violation of His unity by some ponderous category” (Ibid.). De Trin. XV, III, 5. Migne, t. 42, col. 1059.... By “relatio” in the mutual relations of the Triune Godhead and in His relation to the world, Augustine means “a completely Divine, absolute and therefore completely exclusive relation.” Böhringer, op. cit. II, 281. The true meaning of the underlined expression is clarified in detail by us in the second part of this work, devoted to the development of the teachings of Bl. Augustine on the procession of the Holy Spirit. Confess. XII, VII, 7: Deus una Trinitas, et trina Unitas. Migne, t. 32. col. 828: p. paragraph I. 376. Seeberg, op. cit., Bd. II, 149. Harnack, op. cit, Bd. II, 295. Anmerk. Prof. Th. Gangauf. Des heiligen Augustinus speculative Lehre von Gott dem Dreienigen. Augsburg. 1865. S. 407 ffgg. De Trinit. Dei I, VI, 10: Unus et solus et verus Deus ipsa Trinitas. Migne, t. 42, col. 826. non separatis intelliguntur – De Trin. I, IX, n. 19. Migne, t. 42, col. 834.cfr. With. XII, no. n. 25, 26; col. 838–839; VI, 9, 10, col. 930. Contra Maxim. Arian. II, XV, 4; M.t. 42, col. 760 et II, XVII, n. n. 1–3; col. 783–784. Unum sunt, et summe unum sunt, ubi nulla naturarum, nulla est diversitas voluntatum. Contra Maxim. II, 10, 2; col. 765. De Trin. VI, III, 4. M. t. 42, col. 926. “The Father is the beginning for the Son: the Father and the Son together, as unus Deus, are one beginning for the Holy Spirit; finally, all three together – the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit – are one principle in relation to creation, as its One Creator and its One Lord.” De Trinitate Dei, V, xiii, 14; Migne, t. 42, col. 920.Cnfr. V, XIV, 15, col. 923–924. Contra Maximin. arian. episc. II, XVII, 4. M. t. 42, col. 784–785. Pr. A. Harnack, from his rationalistic (adogmatic) point of view, being critical of all kinds of dogmatic formulas and not seeing in them anything other than empty play on words and contradictions (DG., Bd. II, S. s. 294–297), says regarding this above Augustinian formula of trinitarian relations: “According to Augustine, the Father is Himself only a relative principle; The Son and the Holy Spirit can also be called principles with equal right; yet together They (also) are a single beginning.” De Trin. V, 13. Hence, according to Augustine: “one should confess that the Father and the Son are the beginning of the Holy Spirit, (but) not two principles.” “But it is noteworthy, according to Harnack, that Augustine here (De Trin. V, 14) rejects the idea that the Son is also born of the Holy Spirit.” – (DG, Bd II, S. 297. Anmerk.). In hac Trinitate... nulla operum separatio. Serm. CCXIV, no. 10. Migne, t. 38, col. 1071. Cooperatos esse (sc. Patri) Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, etc. Ita singulorum quoque in Trinitate opera Trinitas operatur, unicuique operanti cooperantibus duobus, conveniente in tribus agendi concordia, non in uno deficiente efficacia peragendi. Serm. LXXI, c. 16, no. 27. M., t. 38, col. 460.Cfr. De Trinit. Dei I. IV, 7: M. t. 42, col. 824. p. V, n. 8: p. VI, no. 12; col. 827. p. IX, n. 19. col. 834 and many more etc. De cant. novo c. VII, n. 8. Migne, t. 40, col. 554.Cnfr. Serm. 126, p. 9, no. 11; Contra Serm. arian. c. 3, n. 4. Contra Maxim. Ar. II, 26, 2. De Trin. D. II, V. 9. Migne, t. 42, col. 850, etc. Contra Serm. arian. With. XXXII, paragraph 30. Migne, t. 42, col. 705.Cnfr. With. XIX, col. 697–698. De praedest. Sanct. c. VIII, no. 13. M. t. 44, col. 970. De Trinit. D. XV, XVIII, 32. M. t. 42, col. 1083. Serm. LXXI, p. XVI, no. 20. M. t. 38, col. 459: “Inseparabilis intelligatur operatio Trinitatis, ita ut cum operatio Patris dicitur, non earn sine Filio et Spiritu S. intelligatur operari; et cum operatio Filii, non sine Patre et Spiritu S.; et cum operatio Spiritus Sancti, non sine Patre et Filio.” Cnfr. n. 27; col. 460. "Et singula sunt in singulis, et omnia in singulis et singula in omnibus, et omnia in omnibus, et unum omnia... Quoniam unus est Deus, sed tamen Trinitas." De Trinit. Dei VI, X, 12. Migne, t. 42, col. 932. For example, according to the rationalist theologians, Augustine so strongly emphasizes the moment of unity in the Divine that this circumstance does not give him the opportunity to properly construct either the teachings about the properties of God, or his teachings about the Persons of the Holy Trinity. Moreover, theologians of this direction, sometimes artificially exaggerating the difficulties of the agreement of Augustinian views on unity and trinity, with greater care and persistence seek out and note all kinds of contradictions between the indicated points of the speculative theology of the bl. Augustine. According to Dorner, for example, Augustine’s teaching about the Holy Trinity (as well as about the properties of the Divine being) destroys his teaching about the absolute simplicity of the Divine essence, and his last teaching makes it impossible to correctly state his Trinitarian teaching. (Dorner, op. cit., S. 22 ffgg.). The same Protestant A. Dorner reproaches the Catholic Th. Gangauf’y that the latter, when presenting Augustine’s doctrine, does not take into account at all the difficulties that underlie the reconciliation of Augustine’s teaching about the unity of essence and the trinity of Persons in God (Dorner, op. cit., S. 28 Anmerk. 1). – We find the same attitude in this case in A. Harnack (DG., Bd. III, S. 109. Anm.), who on this occasion, among other things, says: “Diese Schwierigkeit (i.e., to coordinate in God the moment ταυτότης with the moment έτέροτης) potenzirt sich noch für ihn, wo er die Speculation über das Wesen Gottes mit der Speculation über die Trinität verbindet.” Cfr. Harnack, op. cit. B.II, S.s. 294–297. Seeberg, op. cit. V. II, S. 147. 149. Baur. Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit in ihrer geschichtlicher Entwickelung. Tubingen. 1841. I. S. 800. J. Loofs. Leitfaden zum Studium der DG. Halle. 1893. S s. 201 fgg. L. Grandgeorge. Saint Augustin et le neoplatonisme. Paris. 1896. p. p. 97–99 etc. Prof. A. Harnack. Op. cit., Bd II, S. 294: “Im Abendlande tilgte Augustin, einer alten abendländisehen Tendenz folgend, den letzten Rest des Subordinationismus, näherte sich aber eben desshalb dem Modalismus.” Reuters. Ztschr. f. K.G.V.S. 375 fg. VI. S. 155. ff. cp. Augustinische Studien. Gotha. 1887. Stud. IV. Augustin und der katholische Orient. S.s. 153–230. Harnack. DG., Bd II, pp. 296–297. L. Grandgeorge. Saint Augustin et le neoplatonisme. Paris. 1896. p. p. 97–98. See De Civit. Dei XI, 24. Migne, t. 44, col. 337; r. paragraph IV, 212. "... un modalisme plus on moins sabellien, dont lui-même, très probablement ne se rendait pas compte, mais qui n'en existe pas moins au fond de sa doctrine." Op. cit., p. 97. "... mais les analogies dont il se sert nous montrent bien qu'il n'était pas hostile aux doctrines qui remplacaient les personnes par les modes d'être et d'action." (Op. cit., pp. 97–98). “substantiae sive personae, si ita dicendae sunt” – De Trinit VIII, VI, 11. Migne, t. 42, col. 945. “Dictum est tamen, Tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur” –De Trinit. D. V, IX, 10. Migne, t. 42, col. 918.Cnfr. V, X, 11; col. 918 (end); VII, VI, 11; col. 943 etc. De Trinit. D. V, IX, 10. Migne, t. 42, col. 918. Op. cit., Bd II, S. 296. Anm. – R thinks the same thing. Seeberg: Op. cit., Bd. II, S. 147. Although R. Seeberg, apparently, shares the opinion that the subtlest Augustinian concept of “relatio”, which introduces the principle of some difference in God, does not violate the principle of unity in Him, however, he immediately continues regarding this Augustinian concept of “relatio”: “but it is also clear that Augustine himself only slowly and only not without some hesitation decides to recognize the generally accepted (church) formula “persona” as an expression of his own view on this subject (i.e., cognate with his “relatio”), as can be seen from the following words of Augustine: tamen cum quaeritur: quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres personae non ut diceretur, sed ne taceretur.” De Trin. V, IX, 10; Migne, t. 42, col. 918; VII, IV, 7; col. 939–940; VII, VI, 11; col. 943. – See Seeberg, Op. cit. II, 147. Contra ep. Man. With. XIX, n. 21. Migne, t. 42, col. 186; cnfr. Contra Adim. Manich. With. XI; M.t. 42, col. 142, etc. De Trinit. Dei VIII, vi, 11; Migne, t. 42, col. 945. That everything in general is the dogmatic teaching of Bl. Augustine is imbued with church interests, pursues church tasks and goals, and does not at all intend to contradict church dogma - this can be seen from many expressions of Blessed. Augustine. So, for example, having outlined the biblical patristic (devoted) teaching of the Catholic Church about the unity and trinity of God, our blessed teacher remarks: Haec et t ea fides est, quando haec est catholica fides. De Trinit. D. I, IV, 7. Migne, t. 42, col. 824. At the same time, one should not lose sight of the fact that as a Christian teacher and bishop of the Orthodox Church, Blessed. Augustine is by no means inclined to accept those positions and conclusions, to which, however, he was sometimes logically carried away as a theoretician thinker. See our printed work “Plotinus and Bl. Augustine in their attitude to the Trinitarian problem." Kazan. 1911. Migne, t 42, col. 1097–1098. Bishop Sylvester. Experience of Orthodox dogmatic theology. Kyiv. 1885. T. II, pp. 500–501. Seeberg, op. cit. Bd II, S. 144: “Das geht so weit, dass auch die Theophanien des alten Bundes nicht ausschliesslich auf den Sonn bezogen werden.” De Trin. II, 15 ff. De Trinitate D. II, XVII, 32; Migne, t. 42, col. 866. Wed. With. XVIII, no. 35, col. 868. About the appearances of God in the Old. For the covenant see De Trin. II, IX, 15–XVIII, 35, col. 854–868. Ep. Sylvester. Experience... T. 2nd, p. 216. Ep. Sylvester. Experience, T. 2nd, p. 216 cf. ibid., p. 501. Ep. Sylvester. Experience, vol. 2, p. 501. De tempore. Serm. 70 (al. append. I. 5), n. 4. ed. Paris. 1683. T. V, p. 2 (append, col. 12). Quote taken from Bp. Sylvester, Experience .. II, 217. Note. Thus, the French follower of theological speculation Bl. Augustine on the Holy Trinity in its connection with the Trinitarian speculation of Neoplatonism L. Grandgeorge says on this matter: “the analogies from which Augustine proceeds (in his rational-psychological interpretation of the Trinitarian teaching of the Church) sufficiently prove to us that Augustine was not hostile to those teachings that replaced the Persons (of the Holy Trinity) with simple images (modes) of being and action.” Having further listed these trinitarian analogies of Augustine, which supposedly with logical necessity must postulate Augustine’s Sabellian modalism, the French scientist we quote concludes: “These difficulties with which St. Augustine inevitably met in his explanation of the dogma of the Holy Trinity, however, they survived him. The struggle between tritheism and modalism continued throughout the Middle Ages with varying success. Let us at least mention the names of de Bérenger, as a representative of tritheism, and d'Abé lard, who, apparently, was disposed rather in favor of modalism. But what is especially interesting to state here is that in this struggle the influence of St. continued to continuously reveal itself. Augustine and that he was not ignored by many of those who were accused of Sabellianism in the Middle Ages." L. Grandgeorge, op. cit, p. 99. The German rationalist theologian Prof. asserts the same thing. A. Harnack, who literally says the following: “Where Augustine’s work “De Trinitate” was studied and explored, subtle modalism penetrated everywhere (for example, in Anselm and the Victorians, especially in Richard, who repeated and developed Augustine’s Trinitarian analogies, drawn from the forces of the human soul); and for anyone who wanted to accuse someone of heresy, it was easy for his opponent, who was under the influence of Augustine, to reproach his opponent with Sabellianism.” (DG, Bd III, S. 447). Seeberg, DG, Bd II, S. 149. Böhringer. Aurelius Augustinus, Bischof v. Hippo. Stuttgart. 1877. Bd II, S. 282. For example, De Trinitate 1. VII, p. IV, no. 7. Migne, t. 42, col. 939: Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam dicitur, et verius est quam cogitatur. Cp. Tract. XCIX in Joann. Ev. I, n. 4. Migne, t. 35, col. 1888: Augustine’s remark that “it is impossible to comprehend in thought, much less to express in language, the difference between nasci and procedere in God, no matter how talented the teacher, no matter how diligent the student.” Böhringer, op. cit., Bd II, S. 281. Ep. Sylvester. Experience.... II, 499. De Trinitate Dei VII, IV, 9. Migne, t. 42, col. 941–942. Wed. Introduction to this study, pp.... “What kind of reasoning, what strength and power of reason, what liveliness and insight of mind and considerations... will show us how the Trinity exists!” De Trinit. D. XV, VI, 9. Migne, t. 42, col. 1063. “Aliud est trinitas res ipsa, aliud imago trinitatis in re alia” De Trinit. D. XV, XXIII, 43; Migne, t. 42, col. 1090; ibid. XIV, VIII, 11; M.t. 42, col. 1044–1045; ibid. X, XII, 19; M.t. 42, col. 984 (“impar imago”) etc. which, therefore, as the subject of Augustine’s church faith, by the very essence of the matter cannot and should not be associated with the essence of his rational construction, which indeed postulates the Augustinian Filioque. by analogy with the three impersonal moments or three forces of the singularly existing human soul. e.g., Baur, Na rn and ck, Dorner, Kirn and many others. Friend.