Глава XXX. О сущности, природе и форме; об индивиде, лице и ипостаси

Pagan philosophers, as already said, distinguished between substance (ουσια) and nature (φυσις). Namely, substance they called being in general, nature - substance, defined by its essential differences and connecting with being in general the qualitative certainty of being: rational or irrational, mortal or immortal, or, as we said, the unchangeable and immutable principle, cause, force invested in each species by the Creator for movement: for angels - for understanding and communicating their thoughts to each other, without the help of the spoken word; people - for understanding, reflection and communicating to each other, with the help of the spoken word, their inner thoughts; in irrational animals - the power of life, sensation and breathing; in plants - the ability to feed, grow and give birth; in stones - the ability to heat up and cool, as well as the ability of inanimate objects to move from place to place, under the influence of another movement. They called this nature, i.e. the lowest species (τα ειδικωτατα ειδη), for example, an angel, a man, a horse, a dog, an ox, etc. - which are distinguished by greater community than the hypostases, and embrace them, being contained in each hypostasis they embrace in an equal and unchangeable way. Thus, they called the more particular hypostasis; They called the more general and embracing hypostases nature; finally, they called existence in general substance. But the holy fathers, abandoning useless verbal debates, expressed general things about many subjects, i.e. the lower species was called substance (ουσιαν), nature (φυσιν) and form (μορφην), - for example, angel, man, dog, etc. In fact, (the word) ουσια - substance - comes from (the verb) ειναι, and φυσις - nature - from the verb πεφυκεναι, but ειναι and πεφυκεναι mean the same thing - to be, exist. Likewise, the words ειδος - species and μορφη - form - have the same meaning as the word phusis - nature. They called the individual (μερικον) an individual (ατομον), a person, a hypostasis, for example, Peter, Paul. The hypostasis must have a substance with accidents, exist in itself and be contemplated through sensation, or actually (ἐνεργείᾳ). The two hypostases cannot but differ from each other in accidents, since they differ from each other in number. It should be noted that the characteristic properties are accidents that characterize the hypostasis. “Chapters from Aristotle. Does anything exist? what exists; how it exists; for what reasons does it exist? You might be interested in: