Глава XXXI. Об омонимах

Homonyms are objects that have the same name but differ in definition or description. For example, dog is a homonym, for this name means both an earthly and a sea dog. But an earth dog has one definition, and a sea dog has another, since the nature of both dogs is different. Homonyms are defined as follows: homonyms are those objects that have only a common name (ονομα), but in which the concept of essence (ο λογος τησ ουσιας) related to the name is different. By concept (λογος) here we mean a definition or description. The words: “corresponding to the name” (κατα τουνομα) indicate that there is another definition of the same name, due to which homonyms are formed. For example, land and sea dogs in relation to the name: dog are homonyms. In fact, if someone wanted to define a land dog and a sea dog, since each of them is called a dog, he would give the land dog one definition, and the sea dog another. Moreover, they may have something in common both in name and in definition, for both dogs are called animals and accept the definition of animal. However, in relation to the name of the animal, they are not homonyms, but rather synonyms. In relation to homonyms, one should seek solutions to the following three questions: do known objects belong to the number of homonyms? How many objects are designated by one name? Which of the designated objects are we talking about? [According to the ancients, likeness (ὁμοιοτης) is used in four senses and refers only to quality; but, according to the newest, it concerns first of all, predominantly both substance and quality: substance, for example, when we say that people are similar (ὁμοιους) to angels, instead of: equal to them, although in terms of their qualities they are completely different from each other - in the same way we talk about horses, and swans, and so on. Since likeness in this sense sometimes has no difference at all, and sometimes has some difference, the heretics, wanting to belittle the dignity of the Son, called Him similar to the Father and, thanks to the uncertainty of the designation, led ordinary people to evil. Therefore, the great Basil says: “and I accept [the expression “similar in essence”] if it is accompanied by: “without difference.” This is similarity on the part of substance. Similarity on the part of quality does not occur in relation to only one or another quality, but in relation to any quality, i.e. figure, form, color, art, virtue and everything that fits the concept of quality. The similarity itself (ὁμοιοτης) is of four kinds: either in one form and in relation to one quality; how we call members of the same species similar to each other - for example, we call Ethiopians similar to each other with respect to the color black, and swans, in turn, with respect to white. Thus, the same objects turn out to be similar to each other in two respects: both in terms of substance and in terms of appearance, for example, in color. Or in different forms, but with respect to the same quality; for example, white pepper and black pepper are similar to each other in terms of quality. Or in the same species, but with different qualities - for example, a wild pigeon is similar to a domestic pigeon in its white, brown and black color, as well as in other respects; but the quality of both is different. The fourth similarity is the similarity between the image and the original, for example, the similarity between a drawn animal and a living one. In this sense, they say, we are like God. However, upon closer examination, [our likeness to God] is completely different [from this type of likeness], for the image and the original have nothing in common except the name and figure. Man, in reality, has something in common with God - I mean goodness, wisdom and strength - although not to the same degree: God has these properties by nature, but we have them by His will, and one - to one degree, and the other - to another. Therefore, not only are we infinitely different from God, but we are also correspondingly different from each other. So, similarity takes place both between those objects that come from the same object, and between those that stand in relation to the same object]. You might be interested in: