«О душе и воскресении»

The next work of Gregory, his famous dialogue On the Soul and Resurrection (Περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ἀναστάσεως ὁ λόγος 808) is meaningful and probably chronologically close to the work on the structure of man. This “Christian Phaedo” 809 represents a conversation between Gregory and his beloved sister Macrina shortly before her death (cf. Life of Macrina, where Gregory talks about this visit 810). Platonov's Phaedo is a conversation about death face to face with death, a conversation between Socrates and his students who visited their beloved teacher in prison before his execution. So Gregory, still mourning the recent death of his brother Vasily, talks here with his older sister shortly before her death on the topics of death and eternal life 811. Gregory expresses the feeling (πάθος) that covers a person in the face of death (the death of his neighbor 812). The dying Macrina, on the contrary, rejects this feeling as an unreasonable passion 813, presenting instead a rational, consoling argument (λόγος 814). Thus, Macrina plays the role of a teacher 815, while Gregory himself only questions and voices the mutual arguments of the opponents 816. Just as before Vasily, Gregory shows reverence before his sister as before a saint and seer. (By contrast - although clearly not without rhetorical stylization - he conveys to us Macrina’s condescending opinion of himself, his younger brother, who in her eyes is far from achieving the virtues of Vasily 817). The entire dialogue can be divided into six main parts 818: (1) proof of the immaterial nature of the soul and the continuation of its life beyond the grave 819; (2) conversation about passions 820: (3) description of the fate of the soul after death 821 and (4) the afterlife purification of the soul 822: (5) eschatology of the soul 823 and (6) eschatology of the body 824. To develop our topic, it is enough to describe Macrina's argument in general terms and focus mainly on the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthe eschatological movement of love. The main nerve of Plato's argument in the Phaedo is the soul's access to the world of ideas, opened and developed by logos, which imparts immortality to the soul 825. (Regardless of the assessment of the dialogue by Plato himself and his readers, one should pay tribute to this remarkable proof of the immortality of the soul, which does not allow death and disappearance, since its very essence is life 826). A necessary intermediate step is to prove the existence of the ideas themselves. Gregory (or Macrina), in turn, as an intermediate step, tries to prove the existence of a spiritual Creator of the material world. From here follows a transition to a parallel thesis that, although man is “a certain small world containing the same elements with which the Universe is filled” 827, in his body the mysterious action of an immaterial and god-like soul is still revealed, to which eternity belongs 828. The existence of a single “artistic and wise power of God, revealed in beings and penetrating everything” 829, Gregory, together with Macrina, learns from the harmony of the universe. Opposite elements in a mysterious relationship are directed towards a single goal, and each of them is a necessary part of the whole, the opposites do not destroy each other, but, on the contrary, by common efforts maintain cosmic balance: the heat of the sun, naturally directed upward, descends into the depths to help the moist, heavy and downward elements to rise upward; etheric fire approaches the earth so that it does not lack warmth; moisture from the air pours onto the ground, irrigating it and promoting the growth of all kinds of vegetation; the stars move rhythmically in their circular orbits; the parts adapt to the whole, which is perfect in them 830. To prove the presence of an immaterial soul in a material body, Gregory analyzes sensory perception, which always conveys to us knowledge about things only in conjunction with “a certain rational force” 831 that explains to us the meaning of what is perceived (that is, with thinking, διάνοια 832). He speaks of human arts, in which “some kind of intelligent ability” (τις ... νοῦς 833) is expressed to perceive a work before it is embodied in the material 834. Gregory's identification of the soul with this mental power shows that he understands the soul in fact as Aristotle's νοῦς ποιητικός [creative mind] 835 . This force present in the body is undoubtedly not identical to the material elements, but this does not mean that it does not exist at all 836. To assume something like this, that is, that the soul, “giving life to the bodily composition,” itself belongs to the material elements, actually means to consider our “life (...) as nothing other than dead” 837, i.e. assert that there is no difference between a living and a dead body. In a similar way, one can imagine that the spiritual Creator does not exist only because he is not related to the body of the cosmos 838. The key to Gregory’s “proof” of the immortality of the soul is, therefore, the analogy between the cosmos and man (“microcosm”), more precisely, the analogy of the relationship between the world and its Creator on the one hand, and the body and soul on the other 839. Since Gregory insists on the existence of an immaterial, transcendent Life-Giver of the cosmos, he also speaks of the existence of an immaterial soul that gives life to the body and exists independently of it, that is, after death. Moreover, according to Macrina’s definition, the soul is “a created essence, a living, intelligent, organic and sensitive body imparting vital and receptive sensual power until the nature capable of receiving turns out to be consistent” 840. The soul, in its immaterial character, is similar (ὅμοιον) to God, but is not identical with Him (ταὐτόν 841). Just as the entire sun can be reflected in a small fragment, although they are by no means identical, so the soul is an image of the Divine prototype, without being equal to Him 842. The similarity of both lies precisely in their “smart” nature (νοητὴ οὐσία 843), although God is “invisible and most pure”, and the soul is “small and temporary” 844. The divine nature is present in everything, but at the same time it is different from everything and exists independently. Likewise, the “mental and unextended” soul 845 is present in the body that animates, being very different from it in nature. This form of presence (“mixing” 846), however, is incomprehensible 847 and, according to Gregory (Macrina), in some way continues after death, just as the soul can be connected with many distant things that it explores, without being separated 848. However, if in its mind the soul bears the image of God, Gregory continues, its “animal” components - lust (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) and anger (τὸ θυμοειδές) 849, as they are called in Plato’s psychological theory 850 - are not may refer to its definition 851. The role of these components of the soul remains ambiguous, because they can rush both in the right direction and in the wrong: towards real good and real valor, or just towards their appearance 852. This ambiguity entered the world - as we already know from the essay On the Structure of Man 853 - when man, contrary to the divine prohibition, ate the fruit of the tree in which evil was mixed with good (cf. Gen. 3) 854. Thus, human life was “divided into two parts” (διχῆ μερίσας), into the current corporeal existence and the future incorporeal life, the duration (diasthena) of which varies greatly: the local existence is “limited to a very short certain limit of time,” while incorporeal life “extends into eternity” 855, lasts “in endless centuries, whose limit is eternity" (ὧν πέρας ἡ ἀπειρία). Now a person is forced to choose between them (which he should not have done initially): he seeks bliss in either one or the other, that is, he chooses either time or eternity 856. The huge difference between the two possibilities is shown, according to Macrina, by the “chasm” (τὸ χάσμα 857) in the Gospel parable of the rich man and Lazarus (cf. Luke 16:26) 858. The desired state for the abstinent soul is called in this parable “Abraham’s bosom” (Luke 16:22), since Abraham was the first of those who “exchanged the enjoyment of the present for the hope of future benefits” 859. Ὁ κόλπος (“womb”) is a Greek word, recalls Gregory 860, in a figurative sense also means “harbour” as a stay in the sea of ​​“immeasurable blessings” 861 acquired by a continent soul. The soul of the rich man, on the contrary, was united with life “in flesh and blood” even after death, as shown - at least according to the interpretation of Macrina 862 - by his concern for his relatives (Gregory recalls Plato’s reasoning about the posthumous pairing of the earthly soul with the body, forcing the shadows of the dead to return to the graves where their bodies rest 863). Both Plato and Gregory talk about the necessary maximum possible detachment of the soul from bodily life 864 so that after death nothing binds the soul, and its “flow towards good (...) becomes easy and free” 865. If the soul failed to get rid of the connection with the body during earthly life, it will have to get rid of it after death, in a painful fiery transition 866. Only if the soul becomes a pure mirror will it be able to see the Divine prototype 867 in its own beauty. Endless movement of love For the development of our topic, Gregory’s remark that a soul that has been cleansed from the movement of lust (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν 868) will no longer thirst for the good itself is of particular interest. Macrina replies that even in the purified soul the ability to look and reason remains, which relates to the image of God (τὸ θεωρητικόν τε καὶ διακριτικὸν) in it. There will obviously be no need for the movement of lust 870, since the soul will have unlimited participation 871 in the good, will be similar to it (ὁμοίωσις 872). However, this does not mean that there will no longer be any movement in the soul. According to Gregory (Macrina), movement belongs to the soul as such. In this, the dialogue on the soul and resurrection is no different from the corresponding ideas of Plato 873, although the saint does not present the posthumous movement of the soul as an unchanging circle of incarnations 874. In earthly life, Macrina argues, our soul is constantly moving towards the good that it still lacks 875. We call this state lust 876: it is a constant movement directed by the impulses of our will, 877 always striving for good, either real or imaginary. However, with the achievement of a partial goal (real or imaginary good), the movement of lust does not stop, since it chooses subsequent and subsequent goals. At the same time, we treat the goal that lies before us differently than what we have already achieved 878: forward movement is driven by hope (ἐλπίς), and backward movement, memory (μνήμη), is attached to it as a feeling of either joy or shame, depending on whether hope and memories are in harmony in the soul, or they do not get along. Unlike man, who invariably and first of all moves towards good (real or imaginary), God is the fullness of good (τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ πλήρωμα 879), He lacks nothing, and therefore in Him there is no movement towards good: no movement of hope (ἐλπιστικὴ κίνησις) 880 - since hope moves exclusively towards what is not yet 881 (cf. Rom 8:24) - nor the movement of remembrance, since God contemplates everything at once, forgetting nothing. Everything that exists is in God; outside of God there is nothing except evil, which is a lack of being 882. Likewise, a soul that has become like God is deprived of the movements of hope and memory, since it already has what it hoped for and is completely occupied with, and it does not remember anything. Gregory, following Macrina, calls this state of conversion and attachment to the good “the disposition of love” (ἡ ἀγαπητική διάθεσις 883). At the same time, he also understands love as a movement (ἡ ἀγαπητή κίνησις 884), which constantly acquires a simple and immaterial good 885, to which 886 is likened. The movement of love, according to Gregory, never ends, “has no boundaries” (μόνης δὲ τῆς ἀγάπης οὐχ εὑρὼν τὸν ὅρον 887). However, this movement differs from the movement of concupiscence (ἐπιθυμητικὴ κίνησις καὶ διάθεσις 888), which is always directed towards what we do not have, and from the movement of hope and faith, for which the same is true (cf. 1 Cor. 13:8 ). So, love, as one might assume, is a kind of paradoxical constant movement towards what we already have, an increase in what we have already (partly) achieved 889. The life of the Divine nature is also love, since “the beautiful is certainly kind to those who know it,” and the Divinity obviously knows Itself 890. Self-knowledge of the beautiful, therefore, is love (ἡ δὲ γνῶσις ἀγάπη γίνεται), which, however, will never turn into satiety (κόρος 891), for it would stop love. Divine life therefore “will always be accomplished by love” (ἀεὶ ἡ θεία ζωὴ δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργηθήσεται) 892 . Intradivine love has no boundaries, since the divine good itself also has no boundaries that its opposite would set for it 893. Since this good cannot suffer any diminution or damage, it continues indefinitely 894. Those who have been granted communion with the divine good can never comprehend it entirely. Moreover, their own “greatness” through participation in unlimited good constantly increases 895, and this growth never stops 896: since the source of good is inexhaustible, the growth of its recipient constantly increases, without reaching the limit 897. However, this growth of the soul is only qualitative; for Gregory, the idea of ​​​​an endless multiplication of souls is completely unacceptable: their predetermined number 898, the originally conceived pleroma, must once be finally achieved, as we already know from the essay On the Structure of Man 899. The soul, akin to God and similar to Him, is attracted to Him with greater ease, the more decisively it has freed itself from the bonds of matter, that is, corporeality. However, Gregory, unlike Plato, has hope for those who still retain attachment to the body and who are “saddened by the severance of the connection with their loved one” 900. Within the framework of the Platonic universe, this characteristically Christian motif appears as a blatant inconsistency, which, of course, does not contribute to the coherence of Gregory’s interpretation. Here Gregory (through the mouth of Macrina) suddenly moves from the desire to be freed from bodily bonds to the hope of bodily resurrection. Some researchers see in this turn a sincere, albeit very imperfect attempt by Gregory to Christianize 901 the Platonic universe, while others consider the introduction of Christian ideas about the resurrection into the Platonizing dialogue to be opportunism (“disguise”) of Gregory or even a misunderstanding 902 . In any case, it is undeniable that already in that part of the dialogue, which is dedicated to the soul, Gregory emphasized the connection of the immaterial soul with the elements of the decomposed body, as if initially hinting not only at the immortality of the soul, but also at bodily resurrection 903. Of the motives associated with the idea of resurrection, probably the most interesting is Gregory’s remark that the human body is a constant flow and constant change 904, and therefore the body after the resurrection should have appeared as a whole crowd of people (δῆμος τις ἀνθρώπων 905), corresponding to the individual phases of the temporary flow of human life 906 . Macrina replies that resurrection means a return to the original state 907, where there was no flow of time, and therefore there was no changing body. Constant change is characteristic only of the present “spiritual body” (σῶμα ψυχικόν), but not for the eschatological “spiritual body” (σῶμα πνευματικόν), as the apostle distinguishes them (cf. 1 Cor. 25:44) 908. Does this mean that Gregory abandons his previous idea of ​​​​the constant connection of the soul with the elements of the decomposed body as a guarantee of the future identification of bodily elements 909? Does the soul remain associated with all the elements of the changing body, which must be collected into the “spiritual body” with its glorification? It seems that now we are talking about a complete spiritualization of the resurrected body, which implies nothing more than the preservation of personal individuality 910. Be that as it may, this idea of ​​the eschatological “spiritual body” as a return to its original timeless state uniquely develops the idea of ​​the human pleroma, already voiced in the treatise On the Structure of Man. We are talking about human beings in their corporeality, but a timeless corporeality, not related to the flow of matter. In this “spiritual” corporeality one sees a certain analogy of the intelligible qualities of matters that have not yet “come together” in order to create temporal-spatial matter. In Gregory's Platonizing dialogue, the intelligible pleroma is clearly given preference over the Stoic pleroma, which is a mixture of elements that have not yet been isolated, and over the Aristotelian pleroma as pure potency. In the context of our topic, the dialogue On the Soul and Resurrection presents an interesting description of the endless growth of man, clearly understood eschatologically and called here the “movement of love.” Unlike the movements of lust, hope and faith, love does not strive for what it does not yet have, but is constantly filled with what it already “has a part” in, in which it is already involved. However, since the divine good is not limited by any opposition and cannot suffer the slightest damage, that is, does not allow any limits, the movement of love is also endless. Her movement is not limited by the forces of her perceiver, which Gregory considers in principle unlimited. It is precisely in view of the unlimited good in which human love is involved, and in view of its unlimited and constant increase, that love cannot reach boundaries, which would mean the final achievement and implementation of the pleroma. Since divine life is unlimited love, accomplished in God's Self-knowledge as the knowledge of beauty, human unlimited love means unlimited growth. The afterlife, which Gregory considers life in a spiritual body or even without a body, appears to him as an interval, a diastema, but an infinite interval, lasting indefinitely. In the Platonizing dialogue of Gregory, we thus find a kind of proof of the infinity of God, or more precisely, the unlimitedness of divine good, which, as researchers note, was used in the polemic with Eunomius 911: God is a perfect good, not limited by any opposite, thereby inaccessible to derogation and damage, and therefore God is an unlimited good. In the dialogue On the Soul and Resurrection, this argument, however, does not yet serve as proof of the equality of the divine Hypostases, as it will be used in polemics with the Arians, but represents a link in Gregory’s interpretation of the endless movement of human love. God knows Himself through love as unlimited good, therefore love in God is not limited, it will never reach satiety. Human participation in this good is also expressed as a movement of unquenchable love. (It is noteworthy that Plotinus also uses a similar argument: “this love [for the One] is limitless, since its object is infinite, because it surpasses all beauty” 912. However, Plotinus here does not use this idea as an intermediate logical link, although this line of thought is also familiar to him 913). The background of Gregory’s argument is most likely a polemic with the idea of ​​satiety (κόρος): since in God, in Whom all good is present at the same time, there is no satiety, the soul will not be subject to satiety, which, moreover, always has only an incomplete part in this good. An interesting question is also the relationship between the given idea of ​​intra-divine love and Gregory’s concept of God. We learn that God knows Himself as good, and therefore loves Himself. So, Gregory assumes reflection in God as a method of self-knowledge, identical to love. However, at the same time he ascribes unlimitedness to God as a perfect good, not limited by the opposite, which, due to its infinity, is incomprehensible to man. Unlimitedness or infinity do not here characterize the Divine essence itself, being rather some quantitative and qualitative definitions of the Divine good. So, it is impossible to say with certainty whether Gregory experienced the philosophical difficulties indicated by Origen related to the problem of Self-Knowledge of an infinite Being. Gregory, of course, does not want to say that God does not fully understand Himself, in the sense in which man is unable to comprehend Him in thought. Rather, he wants to express that in God, unlike man, love does not mean movement towards good or growth in it, but a full stay in all good at the same time, which, however, does not cause satiety and does not lead to disappointment. Intradivine love is a fully realized self-relationship of unlimited good, which is not exhausted and “does not cause rejection.” Gregory, unfortunately, no longer returns to thinking about the relationship between limitlessness and its reflection. PG 46, 11–159. On the dialogical form, which was clearly not chosen here by chance, see H. M. Meissner, Rhetorik und Theologie. Der Dialog Gregors von Nyssa De anima et resurrectione, Frankturt a. M. – Bern – New York – Paris 1991, p. 61 and below. In this definition, researchers usually refer to F. Böhringer, who presented the dialogue of Gregory as “a continuation of Plato’s Phaedo in the Christian-ecclesiastical context of that era” (see F. Böhringer - R. Böhringer, Die Kirche Christi und ihre Zeugen, VIII, Stuttgart 2 1876, p. 43 (cited by H. Meissner, Rhetorik, c. 2, note 2; A. Le Boulluec, La condition finale des ressuscités selon Grégoire de Nysse, in: Augustinianum, 35, pp. 307–326, esp. 307). manuscript tradition (Paris, gr. 1001) considers Gregory's dialogue to be a Christian continuation of Plato's Phaedo (as J. Terrieux points out in his unpublished dissertation Le De anima et resurrectione de Grégoire de Nysse. Introduction, traduction et note, Paris IV 1981, Introduction, no. 1, note 1, cited by H. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, c. 2, note 2). See Vita Macr.: GNO VIII/1, 386.22 – 399, 22. This comparison is made by H. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, p. 23–34. This dialogue, therefore, can be considered the first Christian composition of the consolatio mortis genre, popular in antiquity (see about this N. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, pp. 47 and below, 57 and below; the author understands the definition of the genre as the key to the entire dialogue, see p. 1 and below). S. J. Denning-Bolle draws attention to the similarities between Gregory’s dialogue and Boethius’s Consolatio philosophiae (see S. J. Denning-Bolle, Gregory of Nyssa: The Soul in Mystical Flighty in: Greek Orthodox Theological Review, 34, 1989, pp. 97–116, esp. 99). Cp. Gregory's grief over the death of Vasily in the introduction to the dialogue and the subsequent shock - the inevitably approaching death of his sister (PG 46.12a). See De an. et res.: PG 46.14a. On the polarity πάθος/λόγος, which both in Plato’s Phaedo and here in Gregory occupies an important place, see Η. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, p. 47–57. Also Ch. Apostolopoulos emphasizes the polarity between “natural” behavior (the fear of death is something natural, see De an. et res.: PG 46,13b) and “morally correct” behavior (κατόρθωμα), guided by reason (see Ch. Apostolopoulos, Phaedo Christianus, p. 157). On the unexpectedness of the female image of a teacher and mystagogue in Christian literature, see N. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, p. 34–42. On the role of Gregory as “advocatus diaboli” and the significance of this role in the construction of the dialogue, see Η. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, p. 119 and below. Ch. Apostolopoulos sees in this dialogue, where Gregory puts forward “pagan” arguments to his pious sister, a kind of “psychogram” of the internal dispute taking place in Gregory’s soul between Greek philosophy and Christian orthodoxy (see Ch. Apostolopoulos, Phaedo Christianus, p. 117). Here Macrina, in the transmission of Gregory, says: “You are known to cities, and national assemblies, and entire regions; you are sent and called by the Church for help and correction. Don't you see the grace of God? Do you really not know the reason for such great blessings that the prayers of your parents raise you to such a height, you, not at all or little prepared for this task at home? (Vita Macr.: GNO VIII/1, 394,14–20). I borrowed this division from H. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, p. 64 and below. Dean. et res.: PG 46,20b-48c. Dean. et res.: PG 46, 48c-68a. Dean. et res.: PG 46, 68a-88c. Dean. et res.: PG 46, 88c-108a. Dean. et res.: PG 46,108a-128c. Dean. et res.: PG 146,129a-160c. The existentialist commentator on Plato, Jan Patočka, sees the basis of his doctrine of the immortality of the soul in the experience of the self-movement of oikonomia (see J. Patočka, Vom Ursprung und Sinn des Unsterblichkeitsgedankens bei Plato, in: H. Pfeiffer, ed., Denken und Umdenken. Zu Werk und Wirkung von Werner Heisenberg, München – Zürich 1977, pp. 102–115). See Plato, Phaedo, 105c-106e. ... μικρός τις εἶναι κόσμος ό ἄνθρωπος (De an. et res.: PG 46, 28b). The analogy of man and the cosmos, apparently based on Democritus, is clearly not accidentally included in the “anti-materialist” context of the dialogue. Macrina starts from the assumption accepted by her opponent in order to refute his main ideas (see also H. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, pp. 211 and below). N. M. Meissner describes Macrina's proof as follows: 1. 20b-24c - description of the opponents' position (only material existence exists - therefore the soul is material; if it is immaterial, it cannot be permanently connected to the body; revealing this position as “materialistic”, i.e. Epicurean); 2. 25a-44a – premise of the proof: the soul can be immaterial (conclusion by analogy from the activity of God in the world; empirical evidence; the absurdity of the statement about the materiality of souls; despite their immateriality, souls differ from the uncreated Deity); 3. 44a-48c - completion of the proof: the soul and its connection with the body continue after death (due to its immateriality, the soul can be present in all members of the body, both before death and after). See Η. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, p. 181 and below. Dean. et res.: PG 46, 28a; rus. lane - With. 172 (hereinafter the translation of the dialogue On the Soul and Resurrection is given according to the edition of A. Gumerov: Moscow, 2007). See De an. et res.: PG 46, 25b-28a. For this cosmological psychogogy of Macrina, directed against the Epicurean antagonist and based primarily on Stoic material, see Ch. Apostolopoulos, Phaedo Christianus, p. 204 and below; H. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, p. 207–210. In general, the key point of the argument is that we are talking about immaterial force (see De an. et res.: PG 46, 28c). ... τις δύναμις ... νοητή (De an. et res.: PG 46, 32a; Russian translation – p. 175). Dean. et res.: PG 46, 32b. Macrina gives several examples from the fields of medicine, astronomy and mathematics: determining a diagnosis based on symptoms; determining the size of the Sun, which appears smaller due to distance; changing moon phases; geometric proofs (see De an. et res.: PG 46,29b-33c); see about this H. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, p. 219–229. Dean. et res.: PG 46, 37b. Cm. Dean. et res.: PG 46, 36b-40a. See also H. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, p. 234–239. See also Ch. Apostolopoulos, Phaedo Christianus, c. 211 and 229. About this “materialistic”, epicurean alternative and its ridicule – “human life is like a bubble of air” (πομφόλυγος δίκην, De an. et res.: PG 46, 21b) – see. Ch. Apostolopoulos, Phaedo Christianus, c. 215, approx. 3. The “bubble” metaphor in Gregory’s work is dealt with by H.-D. Saffrey, who points out that an air bubble rising uncontrollably from the depths of the water to the surface can also (v In Cant. 11: GNO VI, 334, 9 – 335, 1) be an image of epectasis (see H.-D. Saffrey, Homo bulla. Une image épicurienne chez Grégoire de Nysse, in: J. Fontaine – Ch. Kannengiesser, ed., Epektasis, pp. 533–544). Dean. et res.: PG 46.24b; pyc. nep. – c. 170. Cm. Dean. et res.: PG 46, 24bc. See also Ch. Apostolopoulos, Phaedo Christianus, c. 179 and below. Ψυχή ἐστιν οὐσία γεν[ν]ητὴ, οὐσία ζῶσα, νοερὰ, σώματι ὀργανικῷ καὶ αἰσθητικῷ, δύναμιν ζωτικὴν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀντιληπτικὴν δι’ ἑαυτῆς ἐνιοῦσα [ἐνιεῖσα], ἕως ἂν ἡ δεκτικὴ τούτων συνέστηκε φύσις (De an. et res.: PG 46, 29b; pyc. nep. – p. 174). For this definition, see J. P. Cavarnos, Gregory of Nyssa on the Nature of the Soul, in: Greek Orthodox Theological Review, 1,1955, p. 133–141; H. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, c. 216–219. Ch. Apostolopoulos emphasizes the peripatetic features of this definition, perhaps indicating the influence on Gregory of Themistius’s comments on Aristotle’s treatise De anima, which he became familiar with in 345–355. (see Ch. Apostolopoulos, Phaedo Christianus, pp. 208 ff.). Dean. et res.: PG 46, 41bc. For this important clarification of the previous description of the soul in the sense of a “smart” essence (νοῦς), see Η. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, p. 244 and below. See De an. et res.: PG 46.41s. Dean. et res.: PG 46.44a. ... μηδ’ αὖ πάλιν εἰς ἶσον ἄγειν τῇ ἀορίστῳ τε καὶ ἀκηράτῳ φύσει, τὴν μικρὰν καὶ ἐπίκηρον (De an. et res.: PG 46.44a; Russian translation - p. 184). ... νοητόν τε καὶ ἀδιάστατον (De an. et res.: PG 46, 45c; Russian translation p. 147). In this place, Gregory calls the soul “adiastematic,” devoid of extension (more about speculative creation - De an. et res.: PG 46, 124b). He literally says the following: “compression and stretching [eaten, spilled] is characteristic only of the body” (σωμάτων γὰρ ἴδιον συστολὴ καὶ διάχυσις, ibid.). As we have seen, later his point of view changed, but not in relation to spatial diastematicity, but in relation to extension in time, see above, chapter Interpretation of Ecclesiastes, approx. 63. According to the Stoics, the soul is mixed with the body, just as metal is combined with fire in a piece of red-hot iron: both penetrate each other, while maintaining their specific properties (see Chrysippus in the presentation of Alexander of Aphrodisias, De mixtione 217, 33 = SVF II, 155). See about this Ch. Apostolopoulos, Phaedo Christianus, p. 176 and below. ... τινὶ κρείττονι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης κατανοήσεως ἀνακραθεῖσαν (De an. et res.: PG 46,44c). See De an. et res.: PG 46, 45c-48a. On possible Platonic reminiscences (Theaet. 173e) in the last thesis, see M. Pellegrino, Il Platonismo di San Gregorio Nisseno nel dialogo “Intorno all’anima e alla risurrezione”, in: Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 30, 1938, p. 437–474, and in particular 450. For all the above-mentioned argumentation (conclusio of Macrina’s proof), see H. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, p. 247–259. Dean. et res.: PG 46.49b. See Plato, Resp. 436a9 et seq. Gregory literally repeats Plato’s metaphor of a pair of teams, where the rational part of the soul, like a driver, controls lust and anger (see De an. et res.: PG 49c). Thus, Gregory combines Plato's idea of ​​the tripartite division of the soul (Resp. 436a9 and below) with the image of the paired team from the dialogue Phaedo (Phaedr. 246ab). And yet Gregory does not want to be guided by pagan philosophy in understanding the soul and adopts from it only what he considers compatible with the testimony of Scripture (see about this H. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, pp. 265–283). See De an. et res.: PG 46, 52c-53b. See De an. et res.: PG 46, 64c-65a. See above, ch. About the structure of man, approx. 136. See De an. et res.: PG 46, 81b. Dean. et res.: PG 46.81c; rus. lane – c. 215–6. See about this Ch. Apostolopoulos, Phaedo Christianus, p. 135 and below. As the author emphasizes, only in the case of choosing infinity does a person, according to Gregory, become what he already is, i.e. spirit (see ibid., p. 268). Dean. et res.: PG 46, 84b. For Gregory's interpretation of this parable, see M. Alexandre, L'interprétation de Luc 16, 19–31, chez Grégoire de Nysse, in: J. Fontaine – Ch. Kannengieser (ed.), Epektasis, c. 425–441. ... ἀνταλλαξάμενος (De an. et res.: PG 46, 84bc; Russian translation - p. 217). See De an. et res.: PG 46, 84 p. ... ἀμετρήτων ἐκείνων ἀγαθῶν (De an. et res.: PG 46.84c; Russian translation - p. 217). See De an. et res. 85d-88a (Russian translation – pp. 219–221). Dean. et res.: PG 46, 88bc. See Plato, Phaedo 81b-e. This idea is more often found in ancient literature (a review in this regard is given by H. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, p. 306). ... χωρίζεσθαί πως καὶ ἀπολύεοθαι (De an. et res.: PG 46, 88a). See Plato, Phaedo 67a, 67de, 82d-83b. About Plato's understanding of philosophy as the separation of the soul from the body, i.e. anticipation of death, see F. Karfik, Platonský pojem smrti podle dialogu Faidon, in: Souvislosti, 1/1991, p. 43–51. ... κοῦφος αὐτῇ καὶ ἄνετος ὁ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν γένηται δρόμος (De an. et res.: PG 46, 88a; Russian lane – p. See De an. et res.: PG 46,152ab (similar to 89b with note 68). ... τὸ ἀρχέτυπον βλέπουσα (De an. et res.: PG 46,89c). Dean. et res.: PG 46, 89a. ... τὴν ὄρεξιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπεγείροντος (De an. et res.: PG 46, 89ab). ... τῆς κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν κινήσεως (De an. et res.: PG 46, 89c). ... οὐδεμία τις ἔσται... ζημία πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετουσίαν (De an. et res.: PG 46, 89c). Dean. et res.: PG 46, 89d. See Plato, Phaedr. 245s. See Macrina's refutation of the doctrine of transmigration, De an. et res.: PG 46.109b-121a. ... ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐνδέον ἴεται (De an. et res.: PG 46,92c). ... ἡ ἐπιθυμητικὴ ... διάθεσις (De an. et res.: PG 46, 92c). ... ἡ ὁρμὴ τῆς προαιρέσεως (De an. et res.: PG 46,92a). ... ὁμοίως τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτῆς ... καὶ τὸ ὀπίσω διακειμένης (De an. et res.: PG 46.92a). Dean. et res.: PG 46, 92 p. Dean. et res.: PG 46, 93a. (De an. et res.: PC 46, 93a). ... τοῦ ὄντος στέρησις (De an. et res.: PG 46.93b). Dean. et res.: PG 46, 93c; rus. lane – c. 224. Dean. et res.: PG 46.93c. ... ἁπλοῦν τε καὶ ἄϋλον ἀγαθόν (De an. et res.: PG 46, 93c). ... διὰ τῆς ἀγαπητῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ ἐνεργείας, πρὸς τὸ ἀεὶ (De an. et res.: PG 46, 93c). Dean. et res.: PG 46, 93c. Dean. et res.: PG 46, 96a. S. P. Roth compares Macrina, who talks about the endless movement of love, with Diotima, who talks about the ascent to beauty, in Plato’s Symposium 210a-212a. But if Diotima describes the ascent as a constant movement of thirsty love (ἔρως), then Macrina suggests a gap between the movement of έπιθυμία or έλπίς, on the one hand, and the movement of ἀγάπη, on the other; Along with the Platonic ascent to beauty (τὸ καλόν), Macrina also speaks of participation in the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν), see S. R. Roth, Platonic and Pauline Elements in the Ascent of the Soul in Gregory of Nyssas Dialogue On the Soul and Resurrection, in: Vigiliae Christianae, 46, 1992, p. 20–30, in part. 23–27. Ch. Apostolopoulos, on the contrary, considers the movement of ἀγάπη to be a movement of thirsty love, a kind of deadly Dionysian thirst for the unlimited and infinite (see Ch. Apostolopoulos, Phaedo Christianus, pp. 16 ff, 244 ff, 268 ff, and also pp. 321–366). Ἥ τε γὰρ ζωὴ τῆς ἄνω φύσεως ἀγάπη ἐστὶν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ καλὸν ἀγαπητὸν πάντως ἐστι τοῖς γινώσκουσι γινώσκει δὲ αὑτὸ τὸ Θεῖον (De an. et res.: PG 46, 96c; Russian translation - p. 226). Dean. et res.: PG 46, 96c; rus. lane - With. 226. Gregory’s understanding of love for God (ἀγάπη) as love for Self, i.e. in line with “Plotinus autoeroticism”, Ch. Apostolopoulos considers the most significant evidence of Gregory's deviation from the biblical concept of God (see Ch. Apostolopoulos, Phaedu Christianus, pp. 286 ff., 326 ff.). ... τοῦ καλοῦ τι πέρας καταλαμβάνεται, ὡς συναπολήγειν τῷ πέρατι τοῦ (De an. et res: PG 46, 97a). ... οὗ δὲ ἡ φύσις ἀνεπίδεκτός ἐστι τοῦ χείρονος, πρὸς τὸ (De an. et res.: PG 46, 97a). ... εἰσχεομένου μεῖζον γινόμενον (De an. et res.: PG 46,105ab). ... μὴ λήγειν ποτὲ τῆς αὐξήσεως (De an. et res.: PG 46,105b). ... ὅρος οὐδεὶς ἐπικόπτει τὴν αὔξησιν (De an. et res.: PG 46,105c). … τὸ ἀνθρώπινον εἰς πέρας ἐλθεῖν (De an. et res.: PG 46,128b). See above, ch. About the structure of man, section Man - the image of God and his current suffering. Εἰ δὲ σοί τις καὶ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο σχέσις ἐστὶ, καὶ λυπεῖ σε ἡ τοῦ ἠγαπημένου διάζευξις, μηδὲ τοῦτό σοι ἀπ’ ἐλπίδος ἔσται (De an. et res.: PG 46,105d-108a; Russian translation - p. 233). See H. F. Cherniss, The Platonism, p. 62 and below. See Ch. Apostolopoulos, Phaedo Christianus, p. 129, 326, 337 and other places. In this sense, the unity of the entire dialogue is indicated by H. M. Meissner, Rhetorik, p. 371–382. ... θάνατον ἀεὶ διά τινος κινήσεως προϊοῦσα... Ή δὲ κίνησις αὕτη οὐ τοπική τίς ἐστι μετάστασις ..., ἀλλά δι’ ἀλλοιώσεως ἔχει πρόοδον (De an. et res.: PG 46.141a). Dean. et res.: PG 46, 141c. M. Pellegrino compares this passage with Plato's Symposium 207de, which also deals with the preservation of the identity of the soul in an ever-changing body, and with other passages in Plato's dialogues (See M. Pellegrino, Il Platonismo, pp. 448 and below). ... ἀποκατάστασις (De an. et res.: PG 46,148a). See De an. et res.: PG 46.156ab. See similar things already in De hom. opif. 27: PG 44, 225bc. Some attempt to harmonize interpretations is made by J. P. Cavarnos, St Gregory of Nyssa on the Origin and Destiny of the Soul, Belmont (Mass.) 1956. In this sense, apparently correct, Gregory’s eschatology is interpreted by A. Le Boulluec, Corporéité. See below, chap. Refutation of Eunomius, section The Infinity of God. " ἅπειρος ἂν εἴη ὁ τούτου ἔρως (Enn. VI, 7 [38], 32). See Plotinus, Enn. VI, 8 [39], 15.1.