«Опровержение Евномия»

The polemic with the Arian Eunomius, written by Gregory in defense of his late brother Basil, is Gregory’s largest and most serious work. Today it is customary to divide it into four books: three books of the Refutation of Eunomius (Contra Einomiat), and one book of the Refutation of the Confession of Eunomius 914; in ancient times the nomenclature was different 915. To grasp the essence of the controversy at least in general terms, it is necessary to briefly recall the wide range of dogmatic disputes of the 4th century. In this case, we can proceed from the first anathematism of the First Council of Constantinople (381), which lists individual heterodox groups who, for various reasons, rejected the main member of the Nicene Creed, i.e. consubstantial of the Son with the Father 916. As we already know, Gregory took part in this council and read the first two books of his Refutation of Eunomius 917 to Gregory of Nazianzus and Jerome. The "Eunomians" or Anomeans, today also called "Neo-Arians" or "Radical Arians", are listed first in the anathematism mentioned 918. This group originates from the teacher Eunomius Aetius, who, from about the second half of the 4th century, defended the most radical formulations of Arius. The nickname “anomea” (ὁμοῖος or ὅμοιος = similar) indicates that this teaching denied the similarity of the Father and the Son, since the Son here was considered the first creation of the Father, and the Spirit - the first creation of the Son, i.e. a consistent subordination of the Divine hypostases was assumed, as it was stated, for example, in Neoplatonism. Eunomius (died about 395), the leading thinker of this group, was briefly bishop of Cyzicus (360–362), but a schism soon arose between his adherents and the followers of bishops Eudoxius and Euzoius, the so-called. "omiyas" (who taught about some vague similarity between the Father and the Son). Also, the so-called Eunomius group (already in 358) was sharply opposed. “Omiusians” (who taught about the similarity, but not about the identity of the Father and the Son in essence), united around Basil of Ancyra and Eustathius of Sebastia. Another of the Arian groups anathematized by the council are the already mentioned “Eudoxians” or “Homii”, and in 358 they gained the favor of Constantine, and in 359 at the council in Seleucia they imposed a compromise formulation about “the likeness of the Son with the Father according to Scripture.” Under Emperor Valens (364–377), they turned out to be even the strongest church party. They were headed by the mentioned bishops Eudoxius of Constantinople and Euzoos of Antioch, as well as Akakios of Caesarea. It was this group that achieved the expulsion of Gregory in 375/6. “Semi-Arians” or “Pneumatomachians” was the name given in anathematism to a group from approximately 363–367. separated from the “Omiusians” (united around Basil of Ancyra and Gregory of Laodicea) and rejected the divine nature of the Spirit at the Council of Antioch in 325. This group, led by Eustathius of Sebastia and Eleusius of Cysis, was very influential in the provinces of Asia, the Hellespont, Lydia and the Greek islands. Their representatives - Eleusius of Cysis and Marcian of Lampsacus - were invited to the debate of the Council of Constantinople, but no agreement was reached and the representatives of the “pneumatomachians” soon left the council, which adopted the indicated anathematism against them. As is known, Basil of Caesarea was also influenced by Eustathius of Sebastia, who also belonged to the Homiusians for some time, but during the 60s he took the Nicene side, and subsequently (373–375) separated from his teacher Eustathius on pneumatological issues 919. As bishop of Caesarea (from 370), Basil managed to attract part of the Omiusians from the circle of Bishop Meletius to the Nicene confession. The Council also condemned the “Sabellians”, “Marcellians” and “Photinians”. Marcellus of Ancyra, in devout fidelity to the Nicene formulation, reached monarchism (in which the unity of the essence of the Father and the Son almost eliminates the differences between Them), and therefore was the object of criticism from the Omiusians (Eusebius of Caesarea). Athanasius of Alexandria, on the contrary, at first (until about 346) defended Marcellus, as did the Western bishops (only in 366 did Liberius agree with the condemnation of Marcellus by the Homiusians). Basil of Caesarea (unlike Gregory 920) rather avoided the Homiusians. Photinus, deacon of Marcellus, and later bishop of Sirmium, in his monarchianism reached the point of adoptionism 921, for which he was condemned many times, but during the Council of Constantinople his teaching did not yet pose a serious threat to orthodox dogma. The last group to be condemned were the “Apollinarians,” named after Apollinaris of Laodicea. They also supported the Nicene formulation, and Apollinaris was friends for many years with Athanasius and with Basil of Caesarea (361–364), who dissociated himself from his teaching only in 377. But Apollinarian Christology reduced Christ's humanity exclusively to corporeality, united into one person with the Divine Logos (λόγος-σάρξ), and subsequently caused discontent both in the West of the empire (377/8) and in its East (379). At the Council of Constantinople itself, the majority were the Omiusian bishops, gathered around Meletius of Antioch, whom Basil (by then deceased) had convinced of the Nicene formulation. Gregory also belonged to the same group, who pronounced the funeral oration 922 over Meletius, who died during the council. From this quick review we see that on the eve and during the Council of Constantinople, Eunomius represented the most radical (though politically not the most powerful) party refuting the Nicene faith. The exchange of polemical writings took place as follows: in 360 (apparently in connection with the Council of Constantinople in January of that year) Eunomius wrote his Apology (Ἀπολογία 923), addressed to the Arian Homians. Basil (probably also took part in the Council of Constantinople) in 363–364. responded with three polemical books (Ἀνατρεπτικός or Adversus Einotiit 924). In 377 Eunomius responded with the Apology of the Apology, the first two books of which were directed against the first of Basil's three books. In the spring of 381, Gregory responded to this work in place of his deceased brother with the first two books of the Refutation of Eunomius. However, Ennomius was simultaneously working on a continuation of his Apology Apology (ϓπὲρ τῆς ἀπολογίας ἀπολογία 925), the third book of which (c. 381) responded to the second book of Basil's original polemic. Gregory immediately (between 381 and 383) responded to this work with his third book, Refutations of Eunomius. Eunomius, in the summer of 383, published his Confession of Faith (Ἔκθεσις πίστεως 926), and Gregory responded in the same year with a Refutation. Ennomius probably did not react directly to any of Gregory's writings, but in the third and fourth books of his Apology Apology responded to the last of the three books of Basil (the timing of this last part of the whole controversy, however, is in doubt 927). The core of the dispute was Christological-Trinitarian: contrary to the neo-Platonizing idea of ​​Eunomius about the rigid subordination of the three Divine Hypostases, conditioned by their origin, the Cappadocian fathers proclaimed faith in the Son and the Spirit, consubstantial with the Father, but not merging with Him in one Hypostasis. For our topic, Gregory's polemic with Eunomius is of key importance, since for Gregory it was an opportunity to more systematically develop his doctrine of the infinity of God. It would be interesting to dwell on their different understanding of linguistic issues, which occupies a fairly significant place in the polemics 928 and was developed in more detail by Gregory in the second book of the Refutation of Eunomius. Eunomius' teaching on the ungeneracy of God The main argument advanced by Eunomius against the divinity of the Son is the concept of "unbegotten/non-originating" (ἀγεννησία 929), applied to the Father as the only adequate statement about the Divine essence 930 or nature 931. After all, the Divinity is not composite; therefore, according to Eunomius, there can only be one single statement 932 that is completely adequate to His nature: “Divinity is nothing other than ungeneracy itself” 933. If something contrary to ungeneracy is said about the Only Begotten, then - according to Eunomius - He cannot be God 934. This argument is based on two premises: first, on the concept of ἀγεννησία, which is ambiguous from a theological point of view; secondly, on the understanding of a word as a statement about an essence. The Greek expression γεν[ν]ητός in pre-Christian and early Christian Greek means “begotten” / “arisen”, respectively, ἀγέν[ν]ητος – “unborn” / “non-arisen”. Although one can etymologically distinguish between γενητός, “arisen” (from γί[γ]νεσθαι), and γεννητός, “born” (from γεννᾶσθαι), both terms are used more or less interchangeably 935 . Only from the 4th century, during the anti-Arian polemics, theologians began to consistently distinguish between γενητός (“emerged,” i.e., “created”) and γεννητός (“generated,” “born”), as well as ἀγένητος (“unarisen,” i.e., “uncreated”) and ἀγέννητος (“ungenerated”, “unborn” 936). Thanks to this differentiation, the Son, born of the Father, as the Second Hypostasis of the Divinity, can be called simultaneously both γεννητός (“begotten”) and ἀγένητος (“ungenerated,” i.e., “uncreated”), which was something unheard of for Arian theologians 937 . As for the understanding of language 938, Eunomius is convinced that the origin of words lies in the things that they mean 939, and, ultimately, in God, who created names along with things 940. Indeed, in the Book of Genesis, God Himself calls light “day” and darkness “night” (see Genesis 1:5) 941. Thanks to their divine origin, words are able to express the essence of things 942. Therefore, according to Eunomius, man does not invent words, he can only learn them and repeat them; at the same time, words invented by man are just concepts of human thinking, which in reality have no answer (for example, the names of fantastic creatures such as giants, gnomes or monstrous hybrids of different animals 943). The naming of God “unborn,” according to Eunomius, is not a human invention (κατ' ἐπίνοιαν), not an “empty phrase,” but an expression of the very essence 944: God was unborn before man called Him so, and completely independently of man 945. In Gregory's extensive response to Eunomius (beginning with an unpleasant transition to personalities), one can detect three main points: a new theory of language, an emphasis on God's incomprehensibility, and another key statement about God! infinity instead of unbornness. Gregory, like Basil before him 946 and unlike Eunomius, does not believe that words are of divine origin and can express the essence of things. According to the saint, names “do not come from the nature of things, but are attached to things as concepts of human thinking” 947. Creating names and assigning names to things according to their nature (προσφυῶς 948), according to Gregory, is a purely human property. God left it to man to give names to things, 949 - and there is nothing strange in this, as Eunomius apparently finds. The faculty of speech as such is truly the work of God, the Creator of human nature, but individual words are invented and assigned to things by man himself 950 . According to the Book of Genesis, God Himself brings animals to man, allowing him to name them (see Gen. 2:19 and below 951). God does not speak in some special language that reveals the true essence of things; when we read in the Book of Genesis that “God said” or “God called” - these, according to Gregory, are just anthropomorphisms (ἀνθρωπικῶς 952). For Gregory, speech necessarily presupposes a potential listener, which God did not have before the creation of man. The saint rejects the idea of ​​intradivine communication between the Father, Son and Spirit with the help of human speech as inappropriate 953. According to Gregory, speech is associated with human corporeality, which does not allow our movements of the mind to manifest themselves directly and requires the external expression of thoughts through the bodily senses. Being corporeal beings 954, we are forced to give names to thoughts, signs (σημεῖα 955) of these purely mental movements in order to convey them to other corporeal beings. We try to interpret the content of our thoughts to the best of our ability, and, obviously, we can make mistakes both in the thoughts themselves and in their expression 956. If individual words were the work of God Himself, such as, for example, the cosmic elements, Gregory further points out, all people would use the same words and the difference in human languages ​​957 could not arise. During the construction of the Tower of Babel (Genesis 11), God did not create many human languages, as one might think, but mixed the original single human language into an immense multitude of languages. However, this does not say anything about the origin of individual words in different languages, the invention of which God left - and provided from the very beginning - to man 958. This does not at all mean that the words of human speech arose from an arbitrary agreement, which in no way corresponds to the nature of things. The names that a person assigns to things, according to Gregory, tend, as some kind of reflections or “shadows,” to become similar to the “movements of the things themselves” 959. Gregory’s “reduction” of language to the level of human or interhuman activity does not in the least detract from its significance, rather the opposite. For Eunomius, language presupposes nothing more than concepts created by human thinking (ἐπίνοια 960) that are not related to reality. The word, based on nature itself, according to Eunomius, is not a human concept, but a Divine expression of the essence itself. Gregory believed that this is an “arrogant mockery” 961 of human thinking, which appears senseless and incapable of describing reality, turns out to be a simple shake of the air 962. For the saint, ἐπίνοια is, on the contrary, a kind of “heuristic scheme” 963, i.e. an attempt by human thinking to capture in words a thing that without a person has no name (naturally, a concept cannot express the very essence of what is understood, which exists without a person). Moreover, naming is the basis of any human knowledge, both theoretical and practical. With the help of names we discover unknown things, and also, with the help of concepts, we move step by step from the initial impression to further discoveries along the path where our research leads us, be it in the field of mathematics or philosophy, agriculture or navigation 964 . This process of finding and clarifying concepts, which organizes human thinking and forms the basis of human culture, obviously does not exist at all for Eunomius 965. God himself assigns names to the things he creates, and man can only repeat them, or create an imaginary world of non-existent chimeras. It is useful to trace what role ancient ideas about language play in the dispute between Eunomius and the Cappadocian theologians about the nature of human speech. Gregory reproaches his opponent that Plato's dialogue Cratylus is more important to him than the teachings of the Church 967, while simultaneously accusing him of an Aristotelian understanding of language - while Eunomius denounced Basil for Epicureanism in addition to Aristotelianism 968 (in response to severe criticism from Basil for excessive reliance on Aristotle's Categories 969). Epicurus's doctrine of atoms moving randomly and randomly grouping in the void into separate things 970 reminds Eunomius of the Cappadocian doctrine of the “random” creation of concepts. Under the influence of Aristotle, Cappadocian theologians, they say, remove the creation of concepts from Divine Providence as a purely earthly matter. Eunomius's conviction that names are not a matter of agreement, but express the very essence of things, indeed recalls the argument from the dialogue Cratylus 971. On the other hand, Gregory himself approaches it, believing that human concepts are trying to become like the nature of the things themselves (cf. the places where Gregory - sometimes in a very original way - explains the etymology of some Hebrew names 972, or where he derives the names θεός, “God” from θεᾶσθαι, “to see” 973). Aristotle's idea of ​​words as an agreement 974 is, in essence, alien to both opponents, although each of them has his own reason for this: Eunomius sees in speech the divine expression of the essence, but Gregory does not deny the correlation of the name with the character of what is expressed. However, from the point of view of the saint, it is not God, but man, who is responsible for this correlation. At the same time, Eunomius’s reduction of human words to an empty sound or fictitious name is consonant with the very Epicureanism that Eunomius attributes to Basil 975. It is surprising that the Stoic theory of language, to which the Cappadocian view of this issue comes closest, remains behind the scenes of this discussion 976. The Stoics, apparently for the first time in the history of Western thought, showed a consistent interest in “what is signified by speech” - τὸ λεκτόν or σημαινόμενον. They distinguished this “signified”, on the one hand, from sound as a “signifier” (τὸ σημαῖνον), on the other hand, from extra-speech objects or events to which the signified refers (τὸ τυγχάνον 977). Among the Stoics, ἐπίνοια also played a constitutive and creative role as a kind of container for sensory perception 978. For this reason, Jean Daniélou's attempt to find in Eunomius' theory of language the Neoplatonic influence of the disciple of Iamblichus and their supposed comments on Cratylus 979 cannot be considered entirely justified 980 (although the author's remark about the similarity of the understanding of language in Eunomius and Origen is worthy of interest 981). Both Eunomius and the Cappadocians very convincingly appealed to the “philosophical koine” of the fourth century of the Christian era, in which each of the opponents found accents close to their own. It is difficult to decide whether different concepts of language actually caused the difference in their theological positions 982 or, on the contrary, the difference in theological views influenced the philosophical orientation. At least with regard to Gregory, the second seems more plausible: his understanding of language is more a consequence than a prerequisite of his idea of ​​​​man's ability to know God. The theory of language, according to which words are actually just products of human thinking, is needed by Gregory (like Vasily before him) primarily in order to show that the name “unborn” / “non-emerged” is nothing more than a human attempt to comprehend the incomprehensible Deity. If our words cannot express the essence of created things, then how can they express the Divinity, asks Gregory. If sensory light “goes beyond the boundaries of human knowledge” 983, how can we comprehend the disembodied Creator? We cannot say with certainty what our own soul is (whether it is material or not, whether it is absolutely incorporeal or contains something corporeal, how it arises, how it is connected to the body, whether it is simple or composite in its various functions, etc.); we don’t know what our body is (what will remain if we take away its qualities, etc.). How then can we describe the Deity 984? If Eunomius understands "ungeneracy/non-emergence" as a statement about nature itself, then he actually wants to "confine unlimited nature to a single expression" 985 . According to Gregory, it is impossible that “this word contains all the greatness of the Divine” 986. Words are powerless to express the essence of things, much less they are unable to “express the inexpressible nature” 987, which man, by his nature, is able to cognize even less than the created world 988. A created rational being cannot comprehend unlimited nature with its mind (τὴν ἀόριστον φύσιν 989), since between created and uncreated nature there is “a huge and insurmountable mediastinum” 990; one is limited, the other has no boundaries 991. One is limited in size, by the will of its Creator, while the measure of the second is infinity 992. One is limited by a certain gap (interval, diastema), contained in time and place, the second exceeds any idea of ​​an interval 993. The life of one has a beginning and an end 994, while the other has neither a beginning nor an end, but is eternal, and therefore it is in itself, not connected either with a diastema or with the transition from one object to another 995. Striving to know the unlimited God and express Him by any name is like trying to cover the whole sea with a handful 996! And yet, despite this insurmountable difference between diastematic and adiastematic essences, we can in some way cognize the uncreated God from His actions and creations, as the Creator of the Mirz visible to us, without, however, cognizing “His essence” 997. In a similar way, we perceive the movements of the celestial bodies and the life of nature, without grasping “the essence of each individual thing” 998 or its principle (ἀρχή 999). The names we apply to God, in the interpretation of Gregory, do not express His inexplicable nature, but only His actions towards us 1000. With this conviction, Gregory declares a theological method that is clearly different from Eunomius. If the neo-Arian theologian tries to talk about God on the basis of a name expressing the essence, then Gregory is inclined to proceed from the Divine action, which is evidenced by God's creations. Eunomius also knew this method 1001, but already in his first Apology he notes that such a method is not so convincing and is decidedly not self-sufficient: the results of Divine action, i.e. The created world, and God’s interventions in it, obviously are not beginningless and endless (ἄναρχον καὶ ἀτελεύτητον), and therefore God’s action that created them is not such either. It would therefore be erroneous to assume, Eunomius concludes, that the Divine essence itself is limited by the beginning and the end 1002. Gregory, on the contrary, his understanding of speech as a human attempt to describe incomprehensible things, based on his experience of dealing with them, allows or even forces, based on divine actions, to look for ever new names of the Divine, insufficient and complementary, although incapable of expressing God’s essence 1003. Scripture also honors God with different names, each of which expresses something about God (for example, that God is strong, that He is indestructible, has no cause, is not limited by boundaries, etc.), but none of them conveys the very essence of God, which the mind cannot comprehend, and the word cannot express, which can only be honored by silence. Divine names have their own function: each individual concept (νόημα 1006) - strength, goodness, non-productivity, unlimitedness, etc. - according to Gregory, should become the “starting point of ascent,” “the basis of the next step” in a movement that, “starting from what is found, strives for the further” 1007. At the same time, we must always consider everything that we find less than what we are looking for, and therefore always overcome it, always leave behind us any idea received about the Divine on the basis of the name found 1008. Only in this constant abandonment of found ideas and overcoming acquired concepts, following the example of Abraham, who was ready to leave his own land, is born correct reflection (λογισμός 1009) about God, namely the belief that God is greater and higher than any meaning accessible to our knowledge 1010. Only such faith, Gregory believes, can lead us closer to God 1011. This faith, however, is not the basis of some special type of knowledge; it is in its own sense the basis not of knowledge, but of hope 1012, as Scripture says (Heb. 11:1). Despite this, Gregory obviously does not intend to create any system of apophatic theology based solely on negative statements, 1013 as the Arians tried to do. The saint clearly rejects the “technology” of negative statements of Eunomius as meaningless 1014 and argues that positive statements, in general, take precedence over negative ones 1015. Instead of the neo-Arian single concept expressing the essence, Gregory uses not only the assertion of the unknowability of God and not even apophatic theology, but also a series of positive and negative expressions that seek to express the ineffable 1016. Positive concepts express what relates 1017 to the Divine (for example, “fair”), and negative concepts exclude inappropriate qualities 1018 (for example, “immutable”). Often the same thing can be expressed by both affirmation and denial 1019 - for example, that God is the beginning of everything (πάντων ἀρχή 1020) and that He is without beginning (ἄναρχον 1021); that He is unborn and that He is eternal. All these revolutions are equivalent and equivalent to 1022. Moreover, none of these expressions can express the essence of God: negative statements express only what God is not, and leave without explanation what He is; positive ones do not indicate what God is, but only indicate how He reveals himself to the seeking knowledge 1023. If we apply different names to God, combining various definitions 1024, then this, according to Gregory, is not an accident or any inconsistency. Precisely because it is impossible to find a single name that would express God’s nature, we help ourselves with various names, each of which could express something 1025. It is precisely because there is no single path to God 1026 and no single concept of Him that we can never see clearly what we seek, and we are left to approach the ineffable nature of the Divine through many thoughts, many ways and many points of view 1027 . From the variety and variety of meanings of individual names we can receive certain sparks of knowledge of what we are looking for 1028. We have already encountered the motive of the infinity of God and its significance for Gregory’s theory of the Divine names above: unlimited nature cannot be grasped by human words, the immeasurable infinity of God is incomprehensible to the human mind, limited by a diastema. Then the infinity of God has the meaning of unlimitedness or indefinability. Gregory points out quite clearly that things are defined by their difference from other things, which at the same time set boundaries for them 1029; the unlimited is not unlimited in relation to something else, but only in itself, therefore it is alien to any boundaries 1030. In the Refutation of Eunomius, the doctrine of God's infinity is developed much more deeply. After all, Basil already in the initial polemic about the concept of “unborn” 1031 indicates that we call God not only “unborn” (ἀγέννητον), since He is “inaccessible to any restrictions” 1032 from the past, but also “immortal” (or “incorruptible”, ἄφθαρτον) in view of His “infinity, infinity and unlimitedness by any edge” 1033 from the side of the future. Elsewhere in the polemic, Basil speaks of God’s “incompleteness” (ἀτελεύτητος), complementing His “unbornness” 1034. Eunomius sees in these somewhat anthropomorphic expressions an inappropriate “splitting of eternity” into the past and the future 1035. Gregory explains that the eternity of God is in reality devoid of perspectives, it is “the same from everywhere” and cannot be measured by any interval 1036; the life of God is one and whole, infinite and eternal, in no way limited by a limit, and therefore extends into infinity 1037. Our own life is contained in a certain interval, goes from beginning to end and is divided into past and future, hope and memory 1038. Our thinking cannot escape from this perspective, and therefore in an improper sense (ἐκ καταχρήσεως 1039) we also talk about the eternity of God, as if it were extended between the past and the future, although, of course, no “past creates obstacles in the movement of thought towards infinity, unlimitedness, and what is in front of it does not declare that it has encountered some kind of infinite boundary life" 1040. If we try to go through all the ages of God's eternity, we will see a kind of “boundless sea” 1041 that has no beginning. Man, in view of his diastematic character, which determines a certain “a priori form” of his thinking, is able to conceive of the infinity of God, devoid of diastema and perspective, only as an infinite interval that cannot be overcome. Scripture also speaks of the eternity of God as if in a temporal dimension, since it is impossible otherwise: David sings of the Kingdom of God, which is “before the world” (Ps. 54:20 O') 1042, while Moses says that “The Lord reigns forever, and forever, and yet” (Ex. 15:18 O') 1043. Both mean that God's eternity includes every conceivable interval, surrounded on all sides by an all-encompassing infinity 1044, and that God's unlimited power contains all ages and everything that happens in them 1045. Our knowledge can understand and imagine only things limited either by a time period, or by a place or boundaries of beginning and end, separating existing from non-existent, or by the body as a synthesis of qualities 1046. In accordance with such possibilities of knowledge, the human mind also develops an idea of ​​God, although He, as not limited in any sense, cannot be grasped in this way. The unlimited cannot be understood 1047, and what we have not understood we are not able to express 1048. Gregory also recognizes a certain infinity for spiritual entities, i.e. souls, archangels and angels, and even beyond the fallen angels, since the life of these creatures, due to their immortality, “lasts indefinitely” 1049. However, it is obvious that here we are not talking about the absolute, adiastematic integrity of God’s eternity itself, but about a diastema, although rushing into infinity, but limited by the beginning, which is the very act of creation 1050. The infinity of God, as can be seen from the statement in the first book of the Refutation of Eunomius, is deduced by Gregory from the reflection that perfect good, immutable and in no sense allowing for opposition (which would limit it, as it always happens in our earthly life), is a good that is boundless, and therefore infinite 1051. This thought of Gregory became the subject of a very interesting discussion among interpreters. Ekkegaard Muhlenberg, author of a monograph on the concept of infinity in Gregory, sees in these reflections a kind of “proof of the infinity of God on the basis of immutability”: the first (“logical”) premise states that goodness, power, wisdom, etc. can only be limited by their opposites. The second (“metaphysical”) premise states that the nature of God is unchangeable. According to Muhlenberg, Gregory's thinking can be divided schematically into four steps. (1) Since God is unchangeable, there is no opposition to His being. (2) If God is exalted above the region of opposites, in which non-existence and evil also meet, then He is completely good. (3) Since God cannot be limited in the sense of the first opposition, He is not limited in His goodness. (4) Unlimitedness is the same as infinity 1052. If we abstract from the question of the persuasiveness of this evidence, 1053 it is necessary to ask whether Gregory really thought in the way described. The broader context of the saint's thoughts indicates that the proof of the infinity of God is more of an intermediate step than a goal within the framework of his anti-Arian triadological argument. Therefore, V. Ullman reconstructs Gregory’s thoughts as follows: the main premise indicates that where there is the highest level of being, there is no longer any ascension through levels, nor advance. That is, the saint says that the life of God the Father represents the highest level of existence. The second premise, in accordance with the Trinitarian dogma, states that both the Son and the Spirit participate equally in this level of being, 1054 therefore the main premise applies to Them as well. The essence of the proof is this: if we are talking about good at the highest level of being, then talking about any limit to this good is pointless, since there is no place for opposites at all. Any change at this level of being would mean a limitation to the opposite, since, according to the first premise, any ascent through the levels of good is excluded. It follows from this that good does not have any boundaries and, therefore, any description. Where there are no boundaries, there is unlimitedness. Unlimitedness is the same as infinity. And where there is infinity, any increase or decrease and, accordingly, any advance are excluded, which is what needed to be proven 1055. The key advantage of the idea of ​​infinity, compared with the idea of ​​beginninglessness, is that it can be applied to all Divine Persons equally, without at all implying its qualitative change 1056: tripling infinity, according to Gregory, does not lead to its diminishment or even the slightest change. Although the Son comes from the Father, between Them, according to Gregory, there is neither existential difference nor temporal diastema, since God's unlimitedness and infinity does not become diastematic in the birth of the Son 1057. Secondary nature and succession in time and the diastematic character inherent in all creation arise only because of the “insurmountable chasm” that separates the created from the uncreated. The birth of the Son does not lead to the appearance of a diastema; and if time has not yet arisen, then there is no point in talking about “before” and “after” either in the temporal or ontological sense 1058. Gregory compares the adiastematic existence of God with a circle, the line of which also has neither beginning nor end, and therefore is unlimited (ἀόριστον 1059). On the contrary, Gregory’s opponents exclude from existence everything that does not have an end, although they consider everything that has no beginning to exist 1060. Here Gregory notices - a little childishly, as he himself admits 1061 - that the future, into which all his expectations are directed, interests a person more than the past, and therefore being unlimited by an end should be considered more valuable than the absence of a beginning 1062. This “childish” example is clearly not entirely appropriate when we are talking about Divine eternity, where, of course, it is impossible to indicate the direction of the flow of time. There is no past or future here 1063, or more precisely, both the past, the present, and the future are present simultaneously 1064. But in this example we see how important infinity towards the future is for Gregory of God. This is a welcome addition to the originlessness that his one-sided opponents insist on. At the same time, God - the true and only adequate goal of man - always directs him into the future, thereby granting him immortality. Gregory speaks about this in the first book of his polemic: ... in no way will the desire for more cease, but with the always intense desire for what has not yet been received, that which has less will desire more and more, always change into the highest and will never achieve perfection, because it will not find a limit by which, having taken it, it could stop in its ascent. Since the first good is by nature unlimited (ἄπειρον), then the participation of the one enjoying the good will also be necessarily unlimited (ἅπειρος), since it always embraces more than before and each time finds an immense excess, and can never be compared with it, because what is shared has no limit, and that which increases from communion does not cease to increase 1065. These words contain Gregory’s thesis about the infinite God and the incomplete human participation in Him, which has the character of growth, progress, a path without end. We are, in fact, talking about two infinities: next to God’s eternity, whole and present at the same time in its entirety, the human path is, although endless, but a consistent increase that will never reach perfect completeness. Next to the “wide sea” of Divine life, in which there is no perspective, since everything is given in it at once, human life moves from the past to the future, towards which man is invariably directed. Next to the endless line of a circle without beginning or end, which clearly depicts the Divine life, the human path can be indicated by a ray directed into the future, endless, but having a beginning. From the point of view of immutable human diastematicity, God’s adiastematic infinity appears, first of all, as the absence of an end (which Basil initially called “immortality”), although infinity itself is the absence of both an end and a beginning. In his extended polemic with the Arian Eunomius, Gregory's idea of ​​an infinite God and an infinite human path acquires a thoughtful speculative basis. God, unlimited, infinite and eternal, through the creation of the universe - and not through the birth of the Son, as the Arians hold - allows something different from Himself to come into being, and therefore gives place to real difference in the diastema. Creation, limited by the non-existence that precedes it, has the character of an interval, a distance, which in the case of spiritual entities extends to infinity. However, the temporal diastema is oriented as a movement from the past towards the future. Infinity in this case does not mean any kind of eternal presence of everything at once, but a gradual, never-ending growth towards infinity, thus acquiring the character of the future. The movement of endless growth also has a cognitive dimension of progressive knowledge - both gradually improving knowledge of the world and deepening knowledge of God. At the same time, for Gregory, knowledge is closely connected with naming, finding concepts: what we intuitively understand, we try to formulate in words and thus convey to others, and what has been transmitted, we cognize and clarify further. Likewise, man’s knowledge of God is accompanied by a search for Divine names. But due to the fact that the limitless can neither be understood nor known, we can only express our experience of communicating with it, i.e. his actions towards us, as far as we are able to perceive him. This already presupposes the plurality of Divine names, since any attempt at expression, like any knowledge, is only partial. Gregory, who, by his own testimony, was not a supporter of systematic apophatic theology, develops several parallel lines of argumentation, taking into account and reflecting, as far as possible, the incomprehensibility of Divine reality. W. Jaeger published these books under the title κοίμησιν τοῦ ἁγίου Βασιλείου ἀντιρρητικὸς εἰς τὸν πρῶτον λόγον (I), Πρὸς τὸν Εὐνομίου δεύτερον λόγον (II), Κατὰ Εὐνομίου τοῦ τρίτου λόγου τόμος ά-ί (III), Λόγος ἀντιρρητικὸς πρὸς τὴν Εὐνομίου ἔκθεσιν (Refut.). Previously, the current third book of the Refutation of Eunomius was divided into ten independent books, S. Eun. III-XII; the second book was distributed separately, and under its title in the corpus was a Refutation of the Confession of Eunomius, answering the second book of Eunomius (C. Eun. XII Century or XIII). This is the order in PG 45. See about this above, ch. Editions of Gregory's works. See Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta, ed. J. Alberigo E. A., Bologna 3 1973, p. 31, lines 4–15 (about this A. M. Ritter, Das Konzil p. 121 ff). In this vein, the historical context of the polemic with Eunomius is presented by W. Studer, “Der geschichtliche Hintergrund des ersten Buches Contra Eunomium Gregors von Nyssa” // L.F. Mateo-Seco – J.L. Bastero (ed.), El "Contra Eunomium I" en la producción literaria de Gregorio de Nisa (VI Coloquio Internacional sobre Gregorio de Nisa), Pamplona 1988, p. 139–171, which I continue to adhere to. On Arian theology and anti-Arian polemics, see also M. Simonetti, La crisi ariana nel IV secolo, Roma 1975. See above, ch. Life and works of Gregory. On this group, see also T. A. Kopecek, History of Neo-arianism, I–II, Philadelphia 1979 (this work often gives dates that differ from the generally accepted ones). See about this J. Gribomont, Eustathe. See Vasily, Er. 100 a 125.1. On this see G. May, Gregor von Nyssa und die Kirchenpolitik, c. 107ff; R. Hübner, Gregor von Nyssa und Markell von Ankyra, c. 201–205. See also about this above, chap. Life and works of Gregory. Adoptionism (from the Latin adoptio - adoption) is a heretical doctrine about the nature of Jesus Christ, according to which He was not God, but only a man “adopted” by God the Father. – Approx. ed. Ed. R. R. Vaggione, Eunomius, The Extant Works. Text and Translation, Oxford 1987, p. 33–75. Ed. B. Sesboüé – G. M. Durand – L. Doutreleau, Basile de Césaréc, Contre Eunome, SC 299 a 305, Paris 1982–1983. See Μ about this. V. Anastos, “Basil’s Κατὰ Εὐνομίου. A Critical Analysis" // P. J. Fedwick (ed.), Basil of Caesarea: Christian Humanist, Ascetic. A Sixteen-Hundredth Anniversary Symposium, Toronto 1981, c. 66–136. This work is preserved only in quotations from Gregory in S. Eun. Ed. R. P. Vaggione, The Extant Works, c. 149–159. On this see J.-A. Röder, Gregor von Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, 1–146 (eingeleitet, übersetzt und kommentiert), Frankfurt a. M. etc. 1993, p. 40–72. Th. rightly draws attention to the breadth of this controversy. Kobusch, “Name und Sein. Zu den sprachlichphilosophischen Grundlagen in der Schrift Contra Eunomium des Gregor von Nyssa” // L. F. Mateo-Seco – J. L. Bastero (ed.), El “Contra Eunomium I”, p. 247–268. S. Eun. I1.15: GNO1.231, 19. ... οὐσίαν τὴν ἀγεννησίαν ὁρίζονται (S. Eun. II, 21: GNO I, 232, 29 ff). See also Eunomius, Apol. 8: Vaggione 42.17 ff. ... τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα τὸ ἀγέννητον (S. Eun. II, 23: GNO I, 233, 15 ff). See S. Eun. II, 23: GNO I, 233, 11–17; also Eunomius, Apol. 19: Vaggione 58.16 ff. … (S. Eun. II, 62: GNO I, 244.1 ff). See S. Eun. II, 60: GNO I, 243, 18 ff; also Eunomius, Apol. 11: Vaggione 46.13 ff. On this see P. Stiegele, Der Agennesiebegriff in der griechischen Theologie des vierten Jahrhunderts. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der trinitarischen Terminologie, Freiburg i. B. 1913, p. 1–24. On this see P. Stiegele, Der Agennesiebegriff, G. L. Prestige, “Ἀγέν[ν] ητος and Cognate Words in Athanasius,” Journal of Theological Studies, 34, 1933, p. 258–265; Th. A. Kopecek, A History of Neo-Arianism, I, p. 242–266. See Eunomius, Apol. 13: Vaggione 48.1 – 50.1. The way of thinking attributed by Gregory to his opponent, of course, does not necessarily have to be completely appropriate. However, some of its motives can be found already in the first Apology of Eunomius. On Eunomius's understanding of theological language, see K.-N. Uthemann, Die Sprache. The author tries to partially defend Eunomius from accusations of sophistical method (see, for example, E. Vandenbussche, “La part de la dialectique dans la théologie d’Eunomius “le technologue”” // Revue d’historie ecclésiastique, 40, 1944/45, pp. 47–72). See Eunomius, Apol. 18: Vaggione 54, 7 – 56, 9. See S. Eun. II, 196: GNO I,282, 5 ff. See S. Eun. II, 269: GNO I, 305.7 ff. See Eunomius, Apol. 12: Vaggione 46, 7 ff. See S. Eun. II, 179: GNO I,276,22–29; cp., Apol. 8: Vaggione 42.3 ff. This theory of naming by means of logical fantasy (ἐπίνοια) on the basis of sensory perception through similarity, increase, decrease or juxtaposition (including examples) is of Stoic origin, see Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. VIII, 56 ff; Diogenes Laertius VII, 52 (= SVF II, 87 ff). On this see J. M. Rist, Basil’s “Neoplatonismus”, p. 187 ff. See S. Ein. II, 44: GNO I, 238, 26–29. Also S. Ein. II, 125: GNO I,262.27 ff. (? εἶναι παραστατικόν). See S. Eun. II, 159: GNO I, 271, 20 ff. Vasily deals primarily with the problems of naming names and concepts in general in Adv. Eun. I,5–6: SC 299,180–188; II, 4; II, 9: SC 305, 18–22; 36–38. ... τῶν ὀνομάτων ... οὐκ ἐκ φύσεως ὄντων, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν ἐπικειμένων τοῖς πράγμασι (C. Eun. II, 125: GNO I,262,22 ff). C. Eun. II, 148: GNO I,268,19. ... τῆς τοιαύτης ὀνοματοποιΐας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι κυρίους (C. Eun. II, 148: GNO I, 268.18 ff). C. Eun. II, 237: GNO I, 295,23–27. See C. Eun. II, 402: GNO I, 343.25 – 344, 3. This episode is often referred to by Philo, who also considers the names of things to be the competence of the (first) man (see De opif. mundi 148; Leg. alleg. II, 14 ff; Mut. nom. 63 ff; Decal. 23). On Philo’s presentation of the origin of language, which, according to the Alexandrian scientist, does not lose connection with the essences of things, see M. Šedina, “Jazyk stvoření Vznik Septuaginty podle Filóna Alexandrijského” // Reflexe, 18, 1998, p. 4/1–4/15. C. Eun. II, 265: GNO I, 304.4. Cm. C. Eun. II, 212–214; II, 218: GNO I, 287.4–29; 289.1–9. ... διὰ τὸ τῇ σαρκίνῃ περιβολῇ τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν περιείργεσθαι (C. Eun. II, 391: GNO I, 340, 24 ff). C. Eun. II, 391: GNO I, 340, 26. See C. Eun. II, 575: GNO I, 394.10 ff. Cm. C. Eun. II, 251–252: GNO I, 299, 20 – 300.1. Cm. C. Eun. II, 252–254: GNO I, 300.1–26. ... ?? τὰς κινήσεις τῶν ὑφεστώτων σχηματιζόμεναι (C. Eun. II, 150: GNO I, 269, 11–14). K.-N. Uthemann understands the expression ἐπίνοια as the “creative ability” of man, based on discursive and practical thinking and on sensory representations, as the human ability to search and invent in the broadest sense (see K.-N. Uthemann, “Die Sprachtheorie des Eunomios von Kyzikos und Severianos von Gabala. Theologie im Reflex kirchlicher Predigt” // Studia patristica, 24, 1993, pp. 336–344, zejm. Th. Dams emphasizes the dual meaning of this expression, which can mean “a mental act and its result, i.e. νόημα in us” (Th. Dams, La controverse eunoméenne, unpublished dissertation in Institut Catholique, Paris 1955, p. 150; cited no SC 299, p. 182, note 2). Thus, already E. S. Owen distinguished the dual meaning of the term ἐπίνοια among the Cappadocians: it is both “a concept, an idea” and “the ability to create a given concept.” In both cases, according to Owen, we are talking about secondary, retrospective thinking, reflection (see E. S. Owen, “Ἐπινοέω, ἐπίνοια and Allied Words” // Journal of Theological Studies, 35, 1934, pp. 368–376). ... σεμνῶς... αὐτό διακῳμωδεῖ τῆς ἐπινοίας τὸ ὄνομα (S. Eun. II, 179: GNO I, 276.20 ff). Basil already points out that if ἐπίνοια were only an empty sound, as Eunomius represents it, it would rather be παράνοια (madness), see Adv. Eun. I, 6: SC 299, 182, 4. Ἔστι γὰρ ... ἡ ἐπίνοια ἔφοδος εὑρετικὴ τῶν ἀγνοουμένων, διὰ ? νοήσει τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἐξευρίσκουσα. νοήσαντες γάρ τι περὶ τοῦ ζητουμένου τῇ ἀρχῇ τοῦ ληφθέντος διὰ τῶν ἐφευρισκομένων νοημάτων συναρμόζοντες τὸ κόλουθον (C. Eun. II, 182: GNO I, 277, 20–26). See S. Eun. II, 181–182: GNO I, 277, 7–26. Vasily represents the growth of human knowledge through the clarification of concepts in the same way as Gregory, Adv. Eun. I,6: SC 299,184–188. ... ἕτερον ἑτέρου καὶ ἀκριβέστερον, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι, φησί, χώραν τὸ κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν (S. Eun. II, 344: GNO I, 326, 19–22). On this see G. S. Stead, “Logic and the Application of Names to God” // L.F. Mateo-Seco – J. L. Bastero, El “Contra Eunomium I”, c. 303–320. [The Russian-speaking reader may be interested in the monograph by A. L. Berlinsky, Ancient teachings on the origin of language. – St. Petersburg: Faculty of Philology of St. Petersburg State University; St. Petersburg State University Publishing House, 2006. – 412 p. – Approx. trans.] See S. Eun. II, 404–405: GNO I, 344, 13–25. In the teacher Eunomius Aetius we find the statement that a name represents the essence of a thing (οὐσίας ἐστι δηλωτικόν, Syntagmation 16: Wickham 542), which is reminiscent of Crat. 393d or 422d (on this see L. R. Wickham, “The Syntagmation of Aetius the Anomoean,” Journal of Theological Studies, 19,1968, pp. 532–569, esp. 560). See S. Eun. II, 410–411: GNO I, 345, 25–346, 15. Basil specifically accuses Eunomius of the fact that the “technology” of negation he uses (see Adv. Eun. I,9: SC 299,200,30–202,31) is based on Aristotle’s calculations regarding ἕξις and στέρησις (see Aristotle, Cat. 10:12a26–31), see S. Eun. I,9: SC 299,200.8 ff. However, Basil himself uses the Aristotelian categories τί ἐστιν (οὐσία) and ὅπως ἐστίν (ποιόν) - see Aristotle, Cat. 4: lb26 – when he reflects on what type the statement about the ungeneracy of God belongs to (Adv. Eun. I,15: SC 299,224,1–4). ... τῆς ἐπινοίας δηλούμενον (S. Eun. II, 410: GNO I, 345, 27 ff). See Plato, Crat., in various places. However, the opinion that a name expresses the essence of a thing (see Crat. 393d) is refuted in the dialogue. Gregory, for example, produces the name of Moses, based on Ex. 2:10, from the Egyptian name for water, and the name Perez from the story that happened at his birth, described in Gen. 38:29. At the same time, he emphasizes that names are given by people, and not by God (see C. Eun. II, 285: GNO I, 310.11 - 311.17). See S. Eun. II, 585: GNO I, 397, 8–23. See Aristotle, De interpret. 2:16a26–29. A name does not receive its meaning “naturally,” but only by agreement as a “symbol.” According to Sextus Empiricus (Adv. math. VIII, 258), the Epicureans, opposing the Stoics, denied the existence of the “implied” (λεκτόν), speaking only of the signifying sound and the thing itself, independent of thinking (see also Plutarch, Adv. Colotem 22: 1119f-1120a). See Th about this. Kobusch, Sein und Sprache. Historische Begründung einer Ontologie der Sprache, Leiden 1987,25–35 a 52–58. See SVFII, 166 (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. VIII, 11). See, for example, SVF II, 88 (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. VIII, 56); II, 89 (Galen, Defin. medicae 126: XIX, 381). See J. Daniélou, “Eunome l'Arien et l'exégèse néoplatonicienne du Cratyle,” Revue des Études Grecques, 69, 1956, p. 412–432. Here the author hypothesizes that Eunomius could have been familiar with the Neoplatonism of the students of Iamblichus through his teacher Aetius. See J. M. Rist, Basils "Neoplatonismus", p. 185–188. L. R. Wickham locates the origin of the neo-Arian understanding of speech rather in biblical exegesis (see L. R. Wickham, The Syntagmation, p. 558). However, Th. Böhm, citing J. Daniélou, points out that the Eunomius understanding of speech does contain some Neoplatonic "implications", without asserting a direct influence (see Th. Böhm, Theoria, pp. 179-186). See J. Daniélou, Eunome, p. 422 ff. So says, for example, A. Viciano, “Algunas leyes lógicas del lenguaje, segùn Gregorio de Nisa: A próposito de dos pasajes de “Contra Eunomium I” // L. F. Mateo-Seco – J. L. Bastero (ed.), El “Contra Eunomium I”, pp. 321–327. ... (S. Eun. I,79: GNO I,250,3–6). See C. Eun. II, 106–117: GNO I, 257, 26 – 2 60, 13. A similar argument is already found in Basil: we cannot even fully comprehend the essence of the earth, see Adv. Eun. I,12–13: SC 299, 214–218. ... προσηγορίᾳ μιᾷ τὴν ἀόριστον φύσιν περιμετροῦσι (C. Eun. II, 125: GNO I, 262.18). ... (C. Eun. II, 62: GNO I,244, 3 ff). ... τὴν ἄφραστον φύσιν ἐξαγγελθῆναι (C. Eun. II, 61: GNO I,243,23). Οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει δύναμις εἰς ἀκριβῆ κατανόησιν οὐσίας θεοῦ (C. Eun. II, 67: GNO I,245,19 ff). C. Eun. II, 67: GNO I,245, 24. Πολὺ γὰρ τὸ μέσον καὶ ἀδιεξίτητον, ᾧ πρὸς τὴν κτιστὴν οὐσίαν ἡ ἄκτιστος φύσις διατετείχισται (C. Eun. II, 69: GNO I,246,14 ff). ... πέρας οὐκ ἔχει (C. Eun. II, 70: GNO I,246,16). ... ἐμπεριείληπται, τῆς δὲ μέτρον ἡ ἀπειρία ἐστίν (S. Eun. I, 70: GNO I,246,17 ff). Αὕτη διαστηματικῇ τινι παρατάσει συμπαρεκτείνεται, καὶ χρόνῳ τόπῳ περιειργομένη, ἐκείνη ὑπερεκπίπτει πᾶσαν διαστήματος ἔννοιαν (C. Eun. ΙΕ 70: GNO I,246,19 ff). ... ἀρχὴν ... καὶ τέλος (C. Eun. II, 70: GNO I,246,23). ... ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσα καὶ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς βεβηκυῖα, οὐ διαστηματικῶς ἔκ τινος εἴς τι τῇ ζωῇ διοδεύουσα (C. Eun. II, 70: GNO I,246,26 ff). See S. Eun. III, 5, 761: GNO II, 180, 7–10. ... τὸν ... τῆς οὐσίας λόγον (C. Eun. II, 71: GNO I, 248.2). ... οὐσίας.. λόγον ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων (C. Eun. II, 71: GNO I,247,29). S. Eun. II, 71: GNO I, 247, 30. ... ὐστιν ἐνεργεῖν τι περὶ τὴν ζωὴν ἡμῶν πεπίστευται τὰς ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει (C. Eun. II, 149: GNO I,268,27 ff). A similar opinion was held by Vasily, Adv. Eun. I,8: SC 299,194–196. See Eunomius, Apol. 20: Vaggione 58, 5–10. Eunomius here distinguishes two methods of theological research: either on the basis of the study of the essence itself (οὐσία), or on the basis of action (ἐνέργεια). See about this K.-N. Uthemann, Die Sprache, p. 145–149. See Eunomius, Apol. 23: Vaggione 62.4 – 64.16. Already Basil mentions various New Testament Christological Titles (eg light, vine, way, shepherd), reflecting different aspects of Christ's activity (see Adv. Eun. I, 7: SC 299, 188–190). Basil, in the same vein, is inclined to perceive the term ἀγέννητος as one of the possible names of God (see Adv. Eun. I, 7: SC 299,192). ... τὸ μὴ εἰς περιγραφὴν τέλους ἔρχεσθαι (S. Eun. II, 105: GNO I, 257.19). ... διανοίᾳ τινὶ χωρητὴν οὔτε λόγῳ (C. Eun. II, 105: GNO I,257, 21–25). C. Eun. II, 89: GNO I, 253, 4. C. Eun. II, 89: GNO I, 253, 5 ff. ... ζητουμένου μικρότερον ὑπερβαίνων ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν ἐν ταῖς περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ὑπολήψεσι τὴν ἐξ ὀνόματος γινομένην τῆς φύσεως εἰκασίαν παρέδραμεν (C. Eun. II, 89: GNO I, 253.9–12). C. Eun. II, 89: GNO I,253,12 ff. ... θεὸν εἶναι πιστεῦσαι (C. Eun. II, 89: GNO I, 253.16 ff). ... προσεγγίσαι θεῷ (C. Eun. II, 91: GNO I, 253, 26). ... ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐλπιζομένων ἐστὶν ὑπόστασις (C. Eun. II, 93: GNO I, 254, 5 ff). ... στερητικὰ ἢ ἀφαιρετικά (C. Eun. II, 580: GNO I, 395.25 ff). ... κατανοήσαντας (C. Eun. II, 563: GNO I, 391, 9 ff). Like Vasily, see above, approx. 55. See also Adv. Eun. I,10: SC 299,206,37 ff, where Basil, distancing himself, mentions attempts to distinguish between ἀφαιρετικόν, ἀπαγορευτικόν and ἀρνητικόν. However, K.-N. Uthemann points out that it is not entirely clear whether Eunomius shared the same love for apophatic theology that the older Arians enjoyed (see K.-N. Uthemann, Die Sprache, p. 161). Eunomius emphatically denies that ἀγεννησία is an apophatic statement in the sense of the overthrow of any quality (see Apol. 8: Vaggione 42, 5–10), as his teacher Aetius already did (see Syntagmation 19–25: Wickham 542 ff). See S. Eun. I,648–649: GNO I, 212,28 – 213, 11. Vasily already has something similar, Adv. Eun. I,10: SC 299, 204–206. ... τὰ μὲν [ὀνόματα] τῶν προσόντων τῷ θεῷ (C. Eun. II, 131: GNO I,263, 27 ff). ... τὰ δὲ τῶν ἀποπεφυκότων ἔχει τὴν ἔμφασιν (C. Eun. II, 131: GNO I, 263, 28 ff). ... τὸ μὲν θέσιν τὸ δὲ ἀναίρεσίν τινος ἔχειν (C. Eun. II, 135: GNO I, 264, 23). S. Eun. II, 135: GNOI, 264, 24. With Eun. II, 135: GNO I, 264, 24 ff. ... ἰσοστάσια ... κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν σημαινομένων (S. Eun. II, 137: GNO I, 265,19 ff). ... τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν εὐσεβῶς θεωρούμενων τὴν ἔνδειξιν ἔχει (S. Eun. II, 582: GNO I,396,15 ff). ... πολλαῖς καὶ ποικίλαις ἐπωνυμίαις ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ κεχρήμεθα, κατὰ τὴν (S. Eun. II, 144: GNO I,267,19 ff). Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἓν οὐδὲν ὄνομα περιληπτικὸν τῆς θείας ἐξεύρηται διὰ τοῦτο πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι, ἑκάστου κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς ἰδιάζουσάν τινα περὶ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἔννοιαν ποιουμένου, τὸ θεῖον προσαγορεύομεν (S. Eun. II, 145: GNO I, 267,21–26). ... μία τις ἔφοδος (S. Eun. II, 476: GNO I, 365, 8 ff). ... ἐννοίαις τῆς ἀφράστου φύσεως πολυτρόπως καὶ πολυμερῶς ἐπορέγεται, οὐ κατὰ μίαν τινὰ διάνοιαν τὸ κεκρυμμένον θηρεύουσα (S. Eun. II, 475: GNO I, 365.4–8). ... (S. Eun. II, 145: GNO I, 267, 26 ff). S. Eun. I, 168: GNO I, 77, 7–13. ... τὸ δὲ ἀόριστον οὐ τῇ πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσει τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ νοούμενον ἐκφεύγει τὸν ὅρον (S. Eun. I, 236: GNO I, 95.26 – 96.2). See Vasily, Adv. Eun. I, 7: SC 299, 192. Gregory quotes S. Eun. II, 446: GNO I, 356, 30 – 357, 7. ... ὑπερεκπίπτουσαν πάσης περιγραφῆς (S. Eun. II, 446: GNO I,357,3). ... τὸ ἁοριστον καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ οὐδενὶ τέλει καταληπτόν (S. Eun. II, 446: GNO I, 357, 5 ff; see Basil, Adv. Eun. 7: SC 299,192,41). See Vasily, Adv. Eun. I,16: SC 299,228, 5. ... διχοτομεῖσθαι ... τοὺς αἰῶνας (S. Eun. II, 457: GNO I, 360, 3 ff). ... ? διαστήματι μετρουμένην (S. Eun. II, 458: GNO I, 360.14 ff). ... μία ἐστὶ καὶ συνεχὴς αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡ θεία ζωή, ἄπειρός τε καὶ ἀΐδιος καὶ οὐδαμόθεν οὐδενὶ πέρατι κωλυομένη πρὸς τὸ ἀόριστον (C. Eun. II, 469: GNO I, 363.20 ff). ... εἴς τι τέλος προϊοῦσα διέξεισι καὶ μεμέρισται πρὸς τὸ (S. Eun. II, 459: GNOI, 360,17–21). C. Eun. II, 459: GNO I, 360.24. ... μήτε τὸ κατόπιν περικόπτῂ ἀορίστου τὴν ἔννοιαν, μήτε τὸ ἔμπροσθεν σύστασίν τινα καὶ ὅρον τῆς ἀπείρου ζωῆς ἐπαγγέλληται (C. Eun. II, 459: GNO I, 361.1 ff). It looks like S. Eun. III, 6, 8: GNO II, 188, 18–22. ... τι πέλαγος ἀχανές (C. Eun. I, 364: GNO I,134,19). This phrase also comes from Basil, who speaks of “the wide sea of ​​the endless life of God,” see Adv. Eun. I, 16: SC 299,228,8. ... πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων (C. Eun. II, 460: GNO I, 361, 7). ... τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ ἐπ’ αἰῶνα καὶ ἔτι (C. Eun. II, 460–461: GNO I,361, 14). ... πᾶν διατικὸν νόημα ἐντὸς τῆς θείας φύσεως περιείληπται, τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ τοῦ τὸ πᾶν περιέχοντος ἁπανταχόθεν ἐμπερατούμενον (C. Eun. II, 460: GNO I, 361, 10 ff). ... ἐν ἑαυτῇ τοὺς αἰῶνας καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἔχουσα κτίσιν (C. Eun. III, 6, 68: GNO II, 210, 12 ff). ... τοπικοῦ χωρήματος παρέχειν τὴν ἔννοιαν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον εἶναι καταλαμβάνεται, ἢ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος ?? (C. Eun. II, 578: GNO I, 395, 3–14). ... τὸ δὲ ἀόριστον περιληφθῆναι οὐ δύναται (C. Eun. III, 1, 104: GNO II, 38, 28). (C. Eun. III, 1,104: GNO II, 39, 2 ff). ... διὰ τῆς ἀθανασίας πρόεισιν ἡ ζωὴ πρὸς τὸ ἄπειρον (C. Eun. II, 539: GNO I, 384, 12ff). See C. Eun. III, 6, 73: GNO II, 211, 28 – 212.1. ... ἀπείρῳ ταὐτόν ἐστιν (C. Eun. I,169: GNO I,77,19 ff). See E. Mühlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit, p. 118–122. Based on C. Eun. I, 233–235: GNO I, 95, the author reconstructs a similar proof based on the simplicity of God, which can also take over the role of a “metaphysical” premise (see pp. 122 – 126 and 133 ff). The following chain of thoughts emerges: the logical premise states that the boundary of each thing is determined by the presence of its opposite. The metaphysical premise is the simplicity of the essence of God. The proof is carried out in four steps. (1) If God is simple in Himself, then He is good in Himself, and not because of participation in good. (2) Since the essence of God is not associated with opposite qualities - after all, God is simple - the presence of evil as the opposite of good is excluded. (3) From the logical premise it follows that God's magnitude in good is unlimited. (4) From this it follows that God is infinitely good, i.e. infinite. W. Ullmann objects, pointing out that without the following it is impossible to combine premises of a logical and metaphysical nature, further that the bearer of unlimitedness or infinity in these reflections is not God’s nature, but His quality - good (see W. Ullmann, Der logische und der theologische Sinn, p. 158 ff). According to the second of the objections, it can be pointed out that it is probably necessary to combine both of Mühlenberg’s proofs into one so that it becomes obvious that, thanks to the simplicity of God, a statement about any of His qualities is also a statement about His essence (although Gregory did not make this explicit). However, in another place Gregory clearly “transfers” infinity from God’s qualities to the Divinity itself: αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος κατ’ οὐσίαν ὅ τι ποτὲ καὶ ἐστὶν [sic!] οὐδενὶ ὅρῳ κατ οὐδὲν μέρος διαλαμβάνεται (C. Eun. III, 1.104: GNO II, 38.24 ff). Th. rightly protests against Ullmann’s not entirely successful term “participation,” which actually implies inequality. Böhm, Theoria, p. 131 ff. As W. Ullmann further points out, this proof is valid only if we understand unlimitedness as uncertainty, and infinity as Aristotelian potential infinity. Moreover, unlimitedness is applied only to the qualities of an entity at the highest degree of being, and not to itself. If such an entity exists, the question of the number of such entities remains open, which can be any (see W. Ullmann, Der logische und der theologische Sinn, p. 160 ff). Th rightly protests against the identification of infinity and uncertainty in this passage and against the understanding of infinity in the sense of Aristotle’s potential. Böhm, Theoria, p. 133 ff. See S. Eun. I, 169: GNO I, 77, 20 ff; similar in I, 236: GNO I, 96, 2 ff. Elsewhere Gregory points out that trying to compare God the Father with His Son is the same as comparing the infinite with the infinite (πῶς συμπαρατείνει τῷ ἀπείρῳ τὸ ἄπειρον, C. Eun. III, 2, 20: GNO II, 58, 22 ff). See also Refut. 31: GNO II, 324, 15–21. A certain contrast to Gregory’s reflection on infinity, which provides the opportunity to think about the extra-level simultaneity of the three Divine Hypostases, is the apologetic interpretation presented in the introduction to Or. cat. (GNO III/4, 6.21 – 8.9). Here Gregory, on the contrary, on the basis of the concept of perfection (τελειότης) shows that the Divinity must be one: although here he works with the exception of opposition and differentiation, the direction of the argument is opposite to that used in the polemic with Eunomius (a different opinion is shared by R. J. Kees, Die Lehre von der Oikonomia Gottes in der Oratio catechetica Gregors von Nyssa, Leiden 1995, pp. 9 ff, 16, note 55, which considers both arguments to be parallel). See S. Eun. III, 2, 20: GNO II, 58, 26 ff. The Son has the same endless life as the Father, which also has no beginning in time, although it is a life originating from the Father, see P. Eun. III, 6.11: GNO II, 189.26 – 190.1. The diastema between the Father and the Son is already refuted by Basil (see Adv. Eun. II, 13: SC 305, 48), who claims that the Son, not being beginningless (His beginning is in the Father), nevertheless precedes time, and therefore He is eternal (see Adv. Eun. II, 17: SC 305, 68–70). The diasteme of time for Vasily is co-continuous with the existence of the world (see Adv. Eun. I,21: SC 299,248,28 ff). See S. Eun. III, 2, 118; III, 7, 23: GNO II, 91,11–20; 223, 7–10. On this see D. L. Balás, Eternity. C. Eun. II, 667: GNO I, 218, 2. ... τὸ μὲν ἀρχὴν μὴ ἔχειν ἐν οὐσίᾳ τίθεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τέλος μὴ ἔχείας ἀποποιεῖσθαι (C. Eun. I,671: GNO I,219, 14 ff). See C. Eun. I,673: GNO I, 220, 3 ff. ... ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ... πᾶσα δὲ ἡ σπουδὴ τοῖς ζῶσι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον προσδοκώμενον γίνεται, τιμιώτερον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνάρχου τὸ ἀτελεύτητον (C. Eun. I, 673: GNO I, 220, 6 ff). ... πάντα κατὰ τὸ ἐνεστὸς ἀεὶ πάρεστιν ἐπίσης (C. Eun. I,372: GNO I,136, 25). ... ἐπὶ θεοῦ γὰρ ὃ ὧν, καὶ ἐστὶ καὶ ἔσται (C. Eun. III, 1, 79: GNO II, 31.27 ff). C. Eun. I,290–291: GNO I, 112, 9–20.