О свободе воли

1. Evodius. So, explain to me, if possible, why God gave man free will, for if man had not received it, he, in any case, could not sin. Augustine. In this case, do you know for certain that what you do not think should be given was given to man by God? Evodius. As far as I think I understood from the previous book, we have free will and commit sins only thanks to it. Augustine. I will also remind you that this has already become obvious to us. But now I asked if you knew that what we obviously possess and thanks to which we sin was given to us by God. Evodius. I think no one else. After all, we ourselves received existence from Him, and by committing offenses and acting appropriately, we receive both punishment and reward from Him. Augustine. I also want to ask you whether you know this definitely or, under the influence of authority, willingly believe even in the unknown. Evodius. I confirm that in this matter I primarily trusted authority. But what is more similar to the truth than the point of view that all good is from God, and all justice is good, and the punishment for those who err and the reward for those who do right are just? From which it follows that God punishes those who commit sins with misfortune, and rewards those who do the right thing with happiness. 2. Augustine. I don't mind. But I ask another question: how do you know that we come from God? After all, you still haven’t explained this, but only that we receive either punishment or reward from Him. Evodius. I find that this is also obvious only because it has already been established: God punishes sins, since all justice comes from Him. For just as it is not the nature of any kindness to provide benefits to those who are strangers to it, so it is not the nature of justice to punish those who are strangers to it. From here it is obvious that we have a relationship with Him, because He is not only extremely merciful when providing benefits, but also extremely fair when punishing. Then, from what I assumed and what you agreed with - that all good comes from God - it can be understood that man also comes from God. After all, a person, to the extent that he is a person, is a certain good, since he can live righteously whenever he wants. 3. Augustine. If so, it is clear that the issue you proposed is resolved. If, in fact, a person is a certain good and cannot do the right thing unless he wants to, he must have free will, without which he cannot do the right thing. But just because sins are also committed thanks to it, of course, one should not assume that God gave it for this purpose. Therefore, since without it a person cannot live righteously, this is a sufficient reason why it should be granted. And that it was given for this purpose can also be understood from the fact that if anyone uses it to commit sins, he is punished from above. That it would be unfair if free will were given not only to live righteously, but also to sin. For how would it be fair to punish one who used the will for the purpose for which it was given? Now, when God punishes a sinner, what do you think He is saying other than: “Why didn’t you use your free will for the purpose for which it was given, that is, for righteous behavior”? - Further, since justice itself is intended to condemn sins and honor righteous deeds, it would be good if a person were deprived of freedom of expression. After all, what was not done voluntarily would be neither a sin nor a righteous act. Therefore, both punishment and reward would be unfair if a person did not have free will. However, there must be justice in both punishment and reward, since this is one of the benefits that comes from God. Thus, God had to give man free will. 4. Evodius. However, I agree that God gave it. But don’t you think, pray tell, if it is given for righteous behavior, it should not allow the possibility of turning towards committing sins, just like justice itself, which is given to a person for a worthy life? Can anyone really live viciously because of his inherent justice? Thus, no one could voluntarily sin if the will was given for righteous behavior. Augustine. I hope God will grant me the strength to answer you, or rather, so that you answer yourself in accordance with that very truth that convinces from within, which is the highest teacher of all. But I want you to briefly answer me whether you consider what I asked you about - that God gave us free will - as definite and known, or whether it should be said that what we recognize as given by God should not have been given. For if it is not determined whether He gave us free will, we rightly ask whether it was given for good, since when we discover that it was given for good, it will also be established that He gave it by Whom all good things were given to man; if, however, we discovered that it was not given for good, we would understand that it was not given by Him, Whom it is a sin to blame. If, however, it is truly determined that it was given by God Himself, we must admit that, no matter how it was given, it could not not have been given, nor could it have been given in any other way than it was. For it was given by the One whose action is justly not subject to condemnation under any conditions. 5. Evodius. Since I hold this point of view, although with unshakable faith, but still without understanding, let us begin the investigation as if nothing is certain. It is obvious to me that from the uncertainty: whether free will is given in order to do the right thing - because thanks to it we can also sin - another uncertainty arises: whether free will should be given. For if it is not determined whether it is given for righteous behavior, the obligation of this gift itself also remains uncertain, and therefore, even whether God gave it to us, since if the obligation of the gift is not determined, it is not determined whether free will was given by Him, about whom the very assumption that He gave something improper is sinful. Augustine. In any case, for you it is indisputable that God exists. Evodius. Even this remains unshakable for me not because of reflection, but because of faith. Augustine. And if one of the madmen, about whom it is written in Scripture: “The madman said in his heart: “There is no God” (Ps. 13:1, 52:2), - and he says the same thing to you and not to believe with you, what you believe in, wants, but to understand whether what you believe is true, will you leave such a person without attention or consider it necessary to somehow convince him of what you are unwaveringly committed to, especially if he strives not to stubborn resistance, but to zealous comprehension? Evodius. Your last remark sufficiently warns me that I will have to answer him. In fact, even if he were an incredible fool, he would agree with me that it is not worth discussing anything at all with a cunning and stubborn person, and especially about a subject of such significance. Having agreed to this, he will first of all take care that I believe him that he is asking the question with good intentions, and does not harbor any cunning or bias in his soul in relation to this subject. Then I would prove to him - and this, I believe, is eminently accessible to anyone - how much more fair it would be (since he wants that in regard to the secrets of his soul, which he himself knows, to be believed by another who does not know them) that he himself would draw faith in the existence of God from the books of so many men who left written evidence that they lived at the same time with the Son of God, since, according to what they described, they saw things that could never happen if God did not exist, and it would be extremely stupid for the one who wants me to believe him to blame me for believing them. So, since he will not be able to condemn me properly, he will truly not find any reason why he should not imitate me in this. Augustine. Indeed, if you believe that in the question of whether there is a God, it was enough for us to come to the conclusion that the faith of so many people cannot be accidental, why, pray tell, do you not think that in those questions that we have begun to investigate as uncertain and completely unknown, in the same way we should trust the authority of the same people, so that we no longer bother ourselves with their investigation? Evodius. But we want to know and understand what we believe. 6. Augustine. You correctly recalled what we established at the beginning of the previous discussion and which we cannot deny. After all, it is one thing to believe, and another to understand, and first we must believe in that great and divine thing that we strive to understand - and if this were not so, the words of the prophet would be in vain: “If you do not believe, you will not understand” (Isa. 7:9). And our Lord Himself, both in words and in deeds, convinced those whom He called to salvation that first they must believe, but then, announcing the gift itself that would be given to those who believe, He does not say: “This is eternal life, that they may believe in You,” but: “This,” he affirms, “is eternal life, that they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom You have sent” (John 17:3). Then He says to the believers: “Seek and you will find” (Matthew 7:7). After all, what is believed in cannot be said to be found if it is unknown, and no one is capable of finding God before he believes in what he is then going to know. That is why, obeying the instructions of the Lord, we too will seek diligently. Truly, what we, prompted by Him, seek, we will find, for He Himself will show the way - to the extent that these things can be acquired in this life by those like us. Indeed, we must believe that the best already in earthly life, and all the good and pious, undoubtedly, after it, these objects can be defined and understood in a highly obvious and perfect way - which is what we should hope for, and, despising the earthly and human, we should desire and love them in every possible way. 7. Augustine: Let us, if you please, ask questions in the following order; first, why it is obvious that God exists; then, whether everything, no matter how good it is, comes from Him; and, finally, whether free will should be considered a good. When this is established, in my opinion, it will become quite clear whether it was given to the person fairly. Therefore, to start with the most obvious, I will first ask you whether you yourself exist. Or perhaps you are afraid that this question may mislead you? Although, in any case, if you did not exist, you could not be mistaken at all. Evodius. Better move on to the next question. Augustine. So, since it is obvious that you exist, and otherwise if you did not live it would not be obvious to you, it is also obvious that you live. Do you realize that both of these statements are eminently true? Augustine. Therefore, the third position is also obvious, that is, that you understand. Augustine. Which of these three provisions seems to you the most important? Augustine. Why do you think so? Evodius. Because while there are these three states: to exist, to be, to understand, and the stone exists, and the animal lives, I, however, do not believe that the stone lives or the animal understands; on the other hand, it is extremely true that he who understands exists and lives. Therefore, I have no doubt in judging that that which has all three states is more significant than that which has two, or one is missing. After all, what lives necessarily also exists, but it does not at all follow that it also understands; such, I believe, is the life of an animal. On the other hand, if something exists, then it does not at all follow that it both lives and understands, because we can admit that corpses exist, however, no one will say that they live. Truly, that which does not live understands much less. Augustine. So, we have come to the conclusion that of these three states, a corpse lacks two, an animal has one, and a person has none. Evodius. Truly, it is so. 8. Augustine. We have also come to the conclusion that of these three states, the most significant, which a person possesses along with the other two, is understanding, due to the possession of which he exists and lives. Augustine. Also tell me if you know that you have such ordinary bodily senses as sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Augustine. What do you think has to do with the ability to see, that is, what do you think we perceive with vision? Augustine. Do we also perceive hard and soft through vision? Augustine. What has to do with the eyes themselves, what do we perceive with their help? Evodius. Taste sensations. Evodius. Soft or hard, tender or rough, and much of the same kind. Augustine. How? Don’t we perceive the shapes of bodies - large and small, square and round, and everything else of this kind - by both touch and vision, and therefore they cannot be attributed either to vision itself or to touch, but to both at the same time? Augustine. Therefore, do you understand that individual feelings have a certain area of ​​their own about which they provide information, and some have something in common? Evodius. I understand this too. Augustine. So, can we decide with the help of any of these senses what is relevant to each sense, and what all of them, or some of them, have in common with each other? Evodius. This can only be solved with the help of some internal ability. Augustine. Maybe this is the mind itself, which animals lack? For, as I believe, we comprehend these things with the help of reason and know that things are like this. Evodius. Rather, I believe that we perceive with our minds that there is a certain inner feeling to which everything from these five well-known senses is transmitted. For indeed, it is one thing with the help of which an animal sees, and another with the help of which it avoids or strives for what it perceives with sight. After all, the first sense is in the eyes, the second is inside the soul itself, due to which the animal not only what it sees, but also what it hears and what it perceives with other bodily senses, either strives and takes possession if the object is liked, or avoids and rejects if it has caused displeasure. However, this sense cannot be called either sight, or hearing, or smell, or taste, or touch, but something else that controls them all together. This is what we comprehend with the help of reason, as I said, however, we cannot call this property itself reason, because it is obviously also inherent in animals. 9. Augustine. I recognize this faculty, whatever it may be, and have no doubt in calling it an inner feeling. But what the bodily senses bring to us cannot reach consciousness unless it passes through the inner sense. After all, everything that we know, we comprehend thanks to reason. However, we know - I will keep silent about the rest - that neither colors with hearing nor voices with vision can be perceived. And although we know this, we do not possess this knowledge thanks to our eyes or ears and not to that inner feeling, which animals are not deprived of. For one should not think that they know that light is not perceived by the ears, and voice by the eyes, since we are aware of this through intelligent attention and reflection. Evodius. I can't say I understood it. Indeed, what if, with the help of this inner sense, which, you admit, animals are not lacking, they determine that it is impossible to perceive either colors with hearing or voices with vision? Augustine. Do you really think that they are able to distinguish between these moments - the color that is perceived by the eyes, and the feeling that is inherent in the eye, and this inner feeling in the soul, and the mind that separately determines and lists all this. Augustine. In this case, could this mind distinguish these four moments from each other and differentiate by means of definitions, if color were not related to it through the perception inherent in the eyes, and, on the other hand, perception itself through the inner sense that governs it, and the same inner sense through itself, unless nothing else mediates it? Evodius. I don't see how things could be different. Augustine. Then, don't you see that color is perceived by the visual sensation, but this sensation itself is not perceived by the same sensation? After all, with the sensation with which you perceive color, you also do not perceive vision itself. Augustine. In that case, try to distinguish between this. For, I suppose, you will not deny that color is one thing, and the perception of color is another, and also something else, even when color is absent, the possession of a sense by which color could be perceived if it were present. Evodius. I also see this and admit that one is different from the other. Augustine. Of these three things, do you perceive anything else with your eyes other than color? Augustine. Then tell me how you see the other two. After all, you cannot distinguish what you have not seen. Evodius. I don't know anything else; I only know that they exist, nothing more. Augustine. So, you don’t know whether it is the mind itself, or whether that life which we call the inner sense transcends all bodily senses, or something else? Augustine. However, you know that this cannot be determined otherwise than with the help of reason, and that reason cannot do this otherwise than on the basis of what is offered to it for research. Augustine. Then, whatever it is by which we can perceive everything that we know, it serves the mind, to which it represents and communicates everything with which it comes into contact, so that those things that we perceive can be distinguished by their inherent boundaries and comprehended not only by perception, but also by knowledge. Augustine. In this case, the mind itself, which distinguishes its assistants (i.e., feelings) and what they present, distinguishes from each other, and also recognizes how they differ from each other and from itself, and thereby confirms that it is more powerful than them; Unless at the same time he knows himself with the help of something other than himself, that is, reason. Or would you know in another way that you have reason, if you did not comprehend it with your reason? Evodius. This is eminently true. Augustine. Therefore, since when we perceive a color, it is not at all in the same way and not with the same sense that we also perceive the fact that we perceive, and when we hear a sound, we do not hear our own auditory perception, or when we smell a rose, our sense of smell itself does not produce any smell for us, and the perception of taste itself does not have any taste in the mouth for those who taste it, and when we touch something, we also cannot touch the sense of touch itself, It is obvious that these five senses cannot be perceived by any of them, although everything corporeal is perceived by them. 10. Augustine. I believe that it is also obvious that this inner sense perceives not only what it receives from the five bodily senses, but also these senses themselves are perceived by it. After all, otherwise an animal would not move, striving for something, or avoiding something, if it did not perceive the very fact that it perceives - not for the sake of knowledge, for this is a property of the mind, but only for the sake of movement, which in any case it does not perceive with the help of one of these five senses. If this is still not clear, it will become clear when you pay attention to what, for example, is sufficient for one sense, say, for vision. Indeed, it would be impossible to open the eyes and direct them to contemplate what they strive to see if there were not a feeling that they (the eyes) do not see when they are closed or directed in the wrong direction. If, however, when they do not see, there is a feeling that they do not see, it is necessary also that there should be a feeling that they see when they see, because when the seer does not direct his gaze in accordance with the impulse with which the non-seeer directs, this indicates that he feels both. But whether this life itself, which perceives the fact that it perceives the corporeal, perceives itself, as a result remains unclear, except that everyone who asks a question in himself discovers that every living being escapes death; since it is the opposite of life, it is necessary that life, which avoids its opposite, also perceives itself. But let’s keep silent about this if it still remains unclear, so that we do not move towards what we are striving for otherwise. than by definite and obvious evidence. After all, the following is obvious: the bodily is perceived by the bodily sense, however, this feeling itself cannot be perceived by the same sense; but the bodily through bodily perception and the bodily feeling itself are perceived by the inner sense; finally, the mind cognizes and holds in consciousness both all this and itself. Don't you think that's true? Evodius. Indeed, it seems. Augustine. Okay, now tell me how this question arose, in an effort to reach a resolution of which we have been walking this path for a long time. 11. Evodius. As far as I remember, of the three questions which a little earlier we raised to establish the order of this discussion, we are now considering the first, namely, how it can become evident, although it must be most persistently and firmly believed, that there is a God. Augustine. You understand correctly. But I also want you to thoroughly understand that when I asked you if you knew that you exist, it became obvious to us that you knew not only this, but also two other things. Evodius. I remember this too. Augustine. So, now look to which of these three points, according to your understanding, everything that concerns the bodily sense belongs, that is, in what class of things, it seems to you, should be placed everything that our sense touches through the eyes or any other bodily instrument, whether in that which only exists, or in that which also lives, or in that which also understands. Evodius. The one that only exists. Augustine. So. Which class of these three do you think the feeling itself belongs to? Evodius. To what lives. Augustine. Then which of these two do you think is better? The feeling itself or what the feeling concerns? Evodius. Of course. feeling. Evodius. Because something that also lives is better than something that only exists. 12. Augustine. So, will you doubt that this inner feeling, which, however, is lower than reason and still makes us related to animals, as we established earlier, should be placed above the feeling through which we come into contact with the body, and which, as you have already said, should be placed above the body? Evodius. I won't doubt it in any way. Augustine. I also want to hear from you why you have no doubts. After all, you cannot say that this sixth sense should be attributed to that class of these three that also has understanding, but only to that which exists and lives, although devoid of understanding; for this feeling is also inherent in animals that have no understanding. Since this is the case, I ask why you place the inner sense above that by which the bodily is perceived, when both belong to the class that lives. On the other hand, you place the feeling that is related to bodies above bodies for the reason that they (bodies) belong to the class that only exists, and it (the feeling) belongs to that which also lives; since this inner feeling is also in this class, tell me why you think it is better. For if you answer: because one (the internal sense) perceives another (the bodily sense) - I do not believe that by doing so you will discover a rule in which we can trust, that everything that perceives is better than what is perceived by it, so that perhaps from this we are not forced to conclude that everything that understands is better than what it understands. For this is a lie, because man understands wisdom, but he is no better than wisdom itself. Therefore, think about why it seemed to you that the inner sense should be preferred to the sense with which we perceive bodies. Evodius. Because I know that it is a certain leader and judge of another. For, if in the performance of its (internal sense) duties it lacks something, it, as it should, demands what is missing from the helping feeling, which we have already discussed a little earlier. After all, the feeling inherent in the eye does not see whether it sees or not, and since it does not see, it is not itself that can judge what it lacks or what is sufficient, but that inner feeling that prompts the soul of the animal and its closed eyes to open and what it feels it lacks is to be replenished. And no one doubts that the one who judges is better than the one about whom he judges. Augustine. Therefore, do you see that this bodily sense in some way judges bodies? After all, it includes pleasure and pain when the body is touched gently or roughly. Indeed, just as this inner sense judges what is lacking or what is sufficient for the sense inherent in the eyes, so the sense inherent in the eyes itself judges what is lacking or what is sufficient for flowers. In the same way, just as this inner sense judges our hearing, whether it is less strong or strong enough, so hearing itself judges voices, whether they flow smoothly or sound sharply. There is no need to explore other bodily senses. Since, as I believe, now you know what I wanted to say, namely, that this inner sense judges these bodily feelings when it checks their integrity and demands what is due, in the same way the bodily senses themselves judge bodies, accepting a gentle influence on themselves and resisting the opposite. Evodius. Indeed, I see this and agree that it is eminently true. 13. Augustine. Also think about whether the mind also judges this inner feeling. For I no longer ask whether you doubt that he is better than it (inner feeling), because I have no doubt that you think so; although, again, I believe that it is no longer necessary to ask whether the mind judges this feeling. Indeed, how could among these very things that are lower than it (the mind), that is, among bodies, bodily feelings and the innermost sense, one could be better than another and he himself was superior than them, if in the end he himself did not communicate this? Which, of course, he could not have done if he had not judged them himself. Augustine. Therefore, since that nature which only exists, but does not live and does not understand, such as an inanimate body, is surpassed by that which not only exists, but also lives, although it does not understand, such as the soul of animals, and it, in turn, is surpassed by that which at the same time exists, lives and understands, like the rational spirit in man, do you think that in us, that is, in those in whom, in order for us to be men, our nature is realized, anything higher can be found than that Among these three, we ranked third? For it is obvious that we possess both a body and a certain life by which this same body is animated and animated, which two things we also recognize in animals, and some third thing, like the head or eye of our soul, or something more suitable, if such can be said about reason or understanding, which the nature of animals does not possess. Therefore, I ask you to think if you can find anything in human nature that would be above reason. Evodius. I don't see anything better. 14. Augustine. What if we could find something that, you would have no doubt, not only exists, but even surpasses our very mind? Would you hesitate to call it God, whatever it is? Evodius. It does not follow that if I can find something that is better than what is best in my nature, I will call it God. For I do not like to call God the One Whom my understanding is inferior, but the One Whom no one surpasses. Augustine. Yes, it is clear: for He Himself gave your mind such a pious and true feeling about Himself. But tell me, please, if you discover that there is nothing above our reason except the eternal and unchangeable, will you hesitate to call it God? After all, you know that bodies are changeable, and it is also obvious that the life itself, which animates the body, is not without variability under different states (affects), and it has also been proven that the mind itself, since it sometimes strives to come to the truth, sometimes not, and sometimes it comes, sometimes it does not come to it, of course, is changeable. If he (the mind), neither through any permissible bodily instrument, nor through touch, nor through taste or smell, nor through the ears, or eyes, or some sense that is lower than him, but through himself recognizes something eternal and unchangeable and at the same time determines that he himself is lower, it should be recognized that this is his (mind's) God. Evodius. I fully admit that the One above Whom, as established, there is nothing is God. Augustine. Excellent, because for me it will be enough to show that there is something of this kind that either you admit is God, or, if there is something higher, you agree that it is God. Therefore, whether there is anything higher or not, it will be obvious that God exists, since it is with His help that I will show what I promised - there is something above reason. Evodius. Then prove what you promised. 15. Augustine. I'll do it. But first I will ask whether my bodily feeling is the same as yours, or whether my feeling is only mine, and yours is only yours. If this were not so, I could not see with my eyes anything that you did not see. Evodius. I certainly agree that although they are of the same kind, we have separate senses from each other, whether sight or hearing, or any other of the remaining ones. After all, one of the people can not only see, but also hear something that another does not hear, and everyone can perceive with any other sense something that another does not perceive. From here it is obvious that what is yours is only yours, and this is only my feeling. Augustine. Would you say the same about the inner feeling, or something else? Evodius. Of course, nothing else. After all, mine, in any case, perceives my feeling, and yours perceives yours. That is why I often hear a question from someone who sees something, whether I also see it, since only I feel whether I see or do not see, and not the one who asks. Augustine. In that case, doesn't each of us individually have a mind of our own? Because it may be that I understand something when you do not understand it, and you cannot know whether I understand, but I do. Evodius. It is obvious that each of us individually has our own intelligent spirit. 16. Augustine. Could you also say that we have separate suns that we see, or moons, morning stars, and other things of this kind, although each perceives them with his own sense? Evodius. This is what I would not say under any circumstances. Augustine. Therefore, we, many, can see one thing, while we each separately have our own senses, and thanks to all of them we perceive the one thing that we see at the same time, so that although my sense is one thing, and yours another, yet it may happen that what we see is not either mine or yours, but one can exist for each of us and be simultaneously perceived by each. Evodius. Extremely obvious. Augustine. We can also simultaneously listen to a certain voice, so that although I have one ear and you have another, the voice that we hear at the same time is not either mine or yours, or one part of it is perceived by my ear and the other by yours, but whatever sounds will exist as one and a whole for the auditory perception of both of us at the same time. 17. Augustine. Now also pay attention to the fact that we are talking about other bodily senses, for as far as this point is concerned, the situation with it is neither quite the same nor quite the same as with these two inherent in the eyes and ears. After all, since both you and I can fill our lungs with the same air and feel the state of this air thanks to the smell, and in the same way, since we can both taste one honey or any other food or drink and feel its state thanks to taste, although it (honey) is one, our senses exist separately, you have yours, and I have mine, so that although we both perceive one smell and one taste, nevertheless neither you perceive it with my sense, nor I with yours, nor with any one, which may be inherent in each of us at the same time, but certainly, I have my own feeling and you have yours, even if one smell or taste is perceived by each of us: therefore, from here it is discovered that although these senses have something the same as those two (sight and hearing); but they are different in that (as far as this is relevant to what we are now talking about) that although we both draw in the same air through our nostrils and, when we taste it, we accept the same food, nevertheless I do not draw in the same part of the air as you, and I do not take the same part of the food as you, but I am one part, and you another. And therefore, from all the air, when I breathe, I take a part that is enough for me, and you, likewise, from everything you draw in another part that is enough for you. And although one food is accepted by both, however, neither I nor you can accept it completely; so I hear the same word completely and at the same time you hear it completely, and whatever form I perceive, you perceive it at the same time; but of food or drink, of necessity, one part passes through me, and another through you. Maybe you don't understand this enough? Evodius. On the contrary, I agree that this is eminently obvious and true. 18. Augustine. Do you think that the sense of touch should be compared with the sense inherent in the eyes and ears, in the sense that is now being discussed? Because not only can we both perceive the same body by touch, but even the same part that I touch, you can also touch, so that not only the same body, but also the same part of the body can both be perceived by touch, for this is not the case with a certain given food, which neither I nor you can fully accept, when we both eat it, occurs by touching, but completely and entirely that which I I will touch it, and you can also touch it, so that we both touch it not in separate parts, but completely. Evodius. I admit that in this sense the sense of touch is eminently similar to those two higher senses. But I see that it is not similar in the sense that at once, that is, at the same time, we can see and hear something completely, but we cannot touch something completely both at the same time, but only in separate parts, and the same part only at separate intervals of time, for I cannot touch any part that you embrace with a touch unless you move. 19. Augustine. You were extremely attentive when answering. However, it is also necessary for you to consider the following: since of all that we perceive, some things are such that we perceive them both, and others are such that we perceive them separately, we actually perceive our feelings themselves, each their own, separately, so that neither I perceive your feeling, nor you mine, because of those things that we perceive through the bodily senses, that is, from bodily things, we cannot feel anything both, but separately, except what becomes ours in this way, so that we can transform and change it within us. Just as the situation is with food and drink, the part of which that I will accept, you will not be able to accept, because even if nurses give babies chewed food, however, that which then took over the taste perception and turned into the internal contents of the chewer, cannot in any way return in such a way as to again end up in the baby’s food. For when the throat savors something with pleasure, even if it is an insignificant, nevertheless irrevocable part, it appropriates it to itself and forces something to happen that is appropriate to bodily nature. Because if this were not so, no taste sensation would remain in the mouth after the chewed food would go back and be spat out. The same can be said about the parts of air that we draw in through our nostrils. After all, even if you can also inhale some of the air that I return, you will not be able to draw in what then went into my nutrition, because it cannot be returned. For doctors teach that we receive nourishment even with the help of our nostrils, which nourishment I alone can perceive by inhaling, but cannot return by exhaling, so that it, drawn in by my nostrils, will then also be perceived by you. For the rest, perceived by the senses, which although we perceive, we do not change it by spoiling it with our perception, we can both perceive it either at the same time, or in turn, in order at separate intervals of time, so that either all, or the part that I perceive, you also perceive. That there is either light, or sound, or bodies that we touch, but do not damage. Augustine. It is obvious, therefore, that what we do not change and, however, perceive with our bodily senses, has no relation to the nature of our feelings and therefore is rather something common to us, which does not turn into our supposedly personal property and does not change. Evodius. I completely agree. Augustine. Consequently, property and, as it were, personal property must be understood as something that each of us alone perceives for himself and perceives alone because it belongs to his own nature, while common and seemingly social property is something that is perceived by all senses without any disturbance or change. 20. Augustine. Now think and tell me whether there will be something that all who reason together see, each with their own mind and thinking, and when what they see is at the disposal of all and when used by those in whose possession it is, does not change, like food and drink, but remains unharmed and whole, whether they see it or not. Or do you perhaps think that nothing of this kind exists? Evodius. On the contrary, I see that there are many things of this kind, of which it is enough to recall one: that the order and truth of number exist simultaneously for all who reflect, so that everyone who counts - each thanks to his own reason and understanding - tries to comprehend it, and one can do it more easily, another more difficultly, a third cannot do it at all. Although in the end (in the end) she herself equally exposes herself to everyone capable of catching her, and when everyone perceives her, she does not turn and does not change, as if into food for the one who perceives her, nor when everyone is deceived in her, does not decrease (diminish), but while (since) she remains true and integral, he is the more (more strongly) mistaken the less he sees her. 21. Augustine. Fair enough. But I see that you discovered (discovered) what you are talking about quickly, as if you were knowledgeable (skilled) in these matters. However, if someone told you that these numbers are imprinted in our memory (consciousness) not because of their own nature, but from those things that we touch with bodily perception, like certain images of everything visible, what would you answer? Or will you think so too? Evodius. I would never think that way. For, even if numbers could be perceived by the bodily sense, as a result I could not yet perceive the method (principle) of dividing and combining numbers with the bodily sense. After all, with this light of mind I refute everyone who, when adding or subtracting when counting, reports a false amount. And whatever I touch with bodily perception, such as this sky and this earth, and any other objects on them that I perceive, I do not know how long they will exist. But seven and three are ten, and not only now, but always, and just as never and in no way were seven and three in total not ten, so it will never be that seven and three are not ten. Therefore (as a result of this) I said that this eternal truth is common to me and any reasoning (reflecting) person. 22. Augustine. I offer you no resistance when your answer is extremely true and obvious. But you will also see that these same numbers are not easily delivered through the bodily senses, if you reflect that any number is called as many as the number of times it contains one, for example, if it contains one twice, it is called “two,” if three times it contains “three,” and if it contains one ten times, then it is called “ten,” and any number in general, how many times it contains one, hence it has a name and is called so many. Indeed (indeed), anyone who reflects most thoroughly on the unit will of course discover that it cannot be perceived by the bodily senses. For whatever is touched with the help of this feeling, it is immediately discovered that it is not one, but many; After all, this body has countless parts. But so that I do not have to trace all sorts of small and even smaller divided parts, no matter how small the body may be, it undoubtedly has one right side and another left side, one part higher and another lower, or one more distant and another closer, or some extreme and another middle. Indeed, it is necessary that we recognize that this is inherent in any small measure of the body, and for this reason we will not agree that any body is truly in its pure form one, in which, however, so much could be isolated (counted) only by separately considering this one. After all, when I look for a unit in the body and have no doubt that I will not find it, I in any case (certainly) know what I am looking for there and what I will not find and what cannot be found or rather cannot be there at all. So when do I know that the body is not one? After all, if I did not know what the one is, I would not be able to count many things in the body. But wherever I have known one thing, I know that, in any case, not through the bodily sense, because through the bodily sense I know only the body, which, we have discovered, is not really one in its pure form. And moreover, if we do not perceive one thing with our bodily sense, we do not perceive any number, at least (at least) from those numbers that we distinguish by representation (intelligence), understanding, cognitive ability. For there is not one of them that is not called as many times as it contains one, the perception of which does not occur through the bodily sense. After all, half of any body, of which two the whole is composed, also has its own half; consequently, these two parts are in the body in such a way that they are no longer simply two in themselves; this is the same number that is called “two” because twice has that which is simply one, its half, that is, that which in itself is simply one, on the contrary, cannot have a half, a third or any part, because it is simple and truly one. 23. Further, since, following the order of numbers, after one we see two, which number, when compared with one, turns out to be double, twice two does not adjoin successively, the fourth number, which is twice two, follows, mediated by triple. This order through all other numbers is carried out by the most certain and immutable law, that after one, that is, after the first of the numbers, with the exception of itself, the first, which contains it double, follows two; after the second, that is, after two, with the exception of itself, there will be one that contains it twice; after two, the triple number comes first, the quadruple number comes second - the double of the second number; after the third, that is, triple, with the exception of itself, the third comes a number that is a double of this number; for after the third, that is, after the triple, the first comes the quadruple, the second the fivefold, the third the sixfold, which is the double of the threefold. And also after the fourth, the fourth number except for himself will be double from him (four); for after the fourth, that is, the fourfold, the first will be the fivefold, the second the sixfold, the third the sevenfold, the fourth the eightfold, which is the double of the fourth. And similarly for all other numbers you will find that in the first series of numbers, that is, one and two, it is discovered that each number, whatever its order from the very beginning, is so distant in order from it that the double number will be from it. So, where (how) do we realize what we recognize as unchangeable, solid and imperishable for all numbers? For no one touches all numbers with any bodily sense, since they are innumerable. Consequently, how do we know that this is common to everyone, or by what fantasy or thanks to what representation (vision) such a definite truth of number is realized so confidently for the innumerable, if not in the inner light, which the bodily sense does not know? 24. Thanks to these and many other proofs of this kind, the reasoners (researchers), to whom God has given ability (talent) and stubbornness does not cover darkness (does not overshadow), it must be recognized that the order (method) and truth of numbers are not perceived by the bodily senses and remain unchanged and genuine (pure, untouched, genuine) and common in observation for all reasoners (counters). That is why (therefore), although many other things can come across (turn out to come), which in general and as if in full view serves (is available) to the reasoners and is observed by them, the reason (thinking) and the mind of each individual cognizer (recognizer), and remains indestructible (unharmed) and unchangeable, not under compulsion, however, I accepted that this order and truth of numbers mainly come across (approach, come to mind) you when you want to answer what I ask you. It is not in vain that in the Holy Books the number is connected with wisdom, where it is said: “I have turned my heart to learn, to explore and to seek wisdom and understanding” (Eccl. 7:25). 25. However (so), tell me, what do you think should be thought about wisdom itself? Do you think that each individual person has his own separate wisdom? Or, in reality, does everyone have the same wisdom, in which the more everyone participates, the wiser he is? Evodius. I don’t yet know what you call wisdom, since what is done wisely and what is said wisely, I see, appears to people differently. After all, those who fight seem to be acting wisely, and those who, disdaining military service, apply labor and care to cultivate the land, rather approve of it and attribute it to wisdom, and those who are dexterous in inventing ways of finding money seem to themselves wise, and those who neglect all this or discard everything of this kind, which is transitory, and direct all their zeal to the study of the truth in order to know themselves, God, believe that this is the great gift (duty, lesson) of wisdom, and those who do not want to devote themselves to this leisure of seeking (seeking) and contemplating the truth, but rather are engaged in the most difficult cares and duties, so that they care about people and are engaged in the activity of just management and guidance of human affairs, believe that they are wise, and those who from all this are engaged in both, and partly live in the contemplation of truth, partly in due (zealous, obligatory), which they believe are obligatory for the human community, seem to themselves to hold the palm of wisdom. I am not talking about the countless sects, of which there is not a single one, that, putting its members (followers) above the rest, would not consider that only they are wise. That is why, since what is now being discussed between us is not what we believe should (should, befits) be answered, but what we comprehend with clear understanding, I will in no way be able to answer you to what you ask, If what I comprehend by faith, I also did not know, through contemplation and discernment by reason, what wisdom itself is. 26. Augustine. Do you believe that there is any other wisdom besides truth, in which the highest good is recognized and contained? For all those followers of the various things that you mentioned strive for good and avoid evil; but because they are committed to different things, one thing seems good to one, and another seems good to another. Consequently, everyone who strives for something that should not be strived for, although he would not strive if it did not seem good to him, is nevertheless (however) mistaken. But neither the one who strives for anything, nor the one who strives for what he should strive for, can be mistaken. So, insofar as (since) all people strive for a blessed life, they are not mistaken; but since (as far as) everyone does not adhere to the path of life that leads to bliss, although he admits and declares that he wants nothing more than to come to bliss, he is so mistaken. For an error (delusion) is when we follow something that does not lead to what we want to come to. And the more someone is mistaken on the path of life, the less prudent he is. For so much further is he removed from the truth, in which the highest good is recognized and contained. However, everyone becomes blissful by achieving and mastering the highest good, which we all undoubtedly want. Therefore, just as it is established that we want to be (blessed) happy, it is also established that we want to be wise, because without wisdom no one is blessed. For no one is happy except through the highest good, which is recognized and contained in that truth which we call wisdom. Consequently, just as before we are happy (blessed), the concepts of happiness are still imprinted on our minds, for through it (the concept) we know and say confidently and without any doubt that we want to be happy, so before we are wise, we have the concept of wisdom imprinted on our minds, thanks to which each of us, if asked whether he wants to be wise, would answer without a shadow of a doubt that he does. 27. For this reason, if it has already been established between us that there is wisdom, which you may (perhaps perhaps) explain (reveal) in words - for if you had not in any way defined (recognized) it with the soul, you would not have known that you want to be wise and should want it, which, I believe, you will not deny - now I want you to tell me whether you think that wisdom, like the order and truth of number, is (affects) common to all reasoners, or, since there are as many minds as there are people, and hence neither I understand anything about your mind, nor you about mine, you think that there is as much wisdom as there can be wise ones. Evodius. If the highest good is one for all, it also follows that the truth in which it is recognized (defined) and contained (contained), that is, wisdom, is also one common to all. Augustine. Do you doubt that the highest good, whatever it may be, is the same for all people? Evodius. Of course I doubt it; because I see that different people rejoice in different things as their highest good. Augustine. But I would like no one to have such doubts, just as no one doubts that a person can become happy (blessed) only by mastering it. But since this is a great question and perhaps requires a long conversation, let us generally consider that there are as many highest goods as there are different things that different people seek as the highest good. Therefore, doesn’t it follow that wisdom itself is also not one common to everyone, because those goods that people recognize and choose (disassemble) in it are numerous and different? For if you think so, you can also doubt in the light of the sun that it is one, because what we recognize in it is numerous and varied. From these many, each one chooses of his own free will what to use (take pleasure in) through the perception of the eyes; and one willingly (with pleasure) contemplates the height of the mountain and receives pleasure (rejoices) from this view, another - the plain of the field, the third - the hilly valleys, the fourth - the moving surface of the sea, the fifth - all this or something simultaneously beautiful from this, which contributes to the joy of contemplation. Therefore, as many and varied are the things that people see in the light of the sun and choose to receive pleasure, yet the light itself, in which the gaze of each individual contemplator sees and recognizes what it enjoys, so, even if those goods are numerous and varied, from which each one chooses what he wants and what truly and truly establishes in contemplation and understanding for his enjoyment of the highest good, nevertheless it may happen that the very light of wisdom, in which this can be seen and understood, for all the wise have one thing in common. Evodius. I admit that this can be and that nothing can prevent wisdom from being common to all, even if the highest goods are numerous and varied. But I would like to know if this is so. For just because we agree that something may be so, it does not follow that we agree that it is so. Augustine. Meanwhile (with all this) we know that there is wisdom, but whether there is one common wisdom for everyone or whether individual sages each have their own, like their own soul or their own mind, we do not yet know. 28. Augustine. And what? How do we see that we know that wisdom exists or that all people want to be wise and happy? Indeed, in any case, I would never doubt that you see this and that this is the truth. Therefore, do you see this truth as your thought, which, if you do not communicate it to me, I do not know at all? Or in such a way that you understand that this truth may be obvious to me, although you do not express it to me? Evodius. Of course, in such a way that I have no doubt that it may also be obvious to you, even against my wishes. Augustine. Consequently, one truth, which (that) we both perceive separately with our minds, is not common to each of us? Augustine. Also, I believe that you do not deny that one should be devoted to (studying) wisdom and that, do you agree that this is the truth? Evodius. I have absolutely no doubt about it. Augustine. Can we also (equally) doubt that this truth is one and that it is common to the perception of all who know it, although each individual contemplates (sees) it not with mine and not with yours, but with his own mind, since what is contemplated (seen) by all exists for all together? Augustine. Do you not recognize that in justice it should be obvious that the worse must be subordinated (submit) to the better, and equal must be compared with equal, and each must (should) give his own - that this is eminently true and exists together as much for me as for you and for all who see (perceive) it? Augustine. So. Could you deny that the unspoiled is better than the spoiled, the eternal is temporary, the indestructible is vulnerable? Augustine. Therefore, everyone can call this truth their own, when it is invariably (immutably) present (present) for the contemplation of all who are able to contemplate it? Evodius. Truly (Right) no one will say that it is his own, since it is as unique and common to everyone as it is the truth. Augustine. Also, who denies that one must turn away from corruption and turn to uncorruption, that is, not corruption, but love uncorruption? Or who, when he admits that truth exists, does not also understand that it is unchangeable, and does not see that it exists for all minds capable of seeing (contemplating) it? Evodius. Extremely true. Augustine. So. Will anyone doubt that a life that does not deviate from a true and honest view by any vicissitudes (troubles) is better than one that is easily broken and overthrown (overturned) by temporary inconveniences? Evodius. Who will doubt (will doubt) 29. Augustine. I will no longer ask questions of this kind (ask questions of this kind). After all, it is enough that you, along with me, see and agree that it is extremely true that these seeming rules and the light of virtues are true and unchangeable and either individually or all together are present for the contemplation of those who are able to see it, each with their own mind and thinking. But, of course, I will ask you: do you think this applies to wisdom? For I think it is obvious to you that he who achieves wisdom is wise. Evodius. Quite (quite) obvious. Augustine. So. Could he who lives with justice be able to live in this way if he did not see those inferior things which he subordinates to the better ones, and those equal things which he adds to each other, and those suitable things which he renders to each? Augustine. You, therefore, will not deny that he who sees wisely sees it? Augustine. So. Doesn't the one who lives prudently (judiciously) choose uncorruption and decide (understand, determine) that it should be preferred to corruption? Augustine. Therefore, when he chooses what his soul has turned to, what no one hesitates to prefer, how can one deny that he chooses wisely? Evodius. I would not deny this in any way. Augustine. Consequently, when he turns his soul to what he chooses, he undoubtedly turns wisely. Augustine. And the one who does not turn away (deviates) from what he wisely chose and what he wisely turned to by any horrors and torments, without a doubt, does wisely. Evodius. Without a doubt, definitely (definitely). Augustine. So, it is extremely obvious that all that we call the rules and lights of virtues are related to wisdom, since the more everyone uses them to guide life and conducts life according to them, the more wisely he lives and acts. But everything that is done wisely cannot justly be said to be separated from wisdom. Augustine. Therefore, just as there are true and immutable rules of numbers, the order (principle, direction) and truth of which, you said, are invariably present for everyone who understands it together, so there are true and immutable rules of wisdom, about some of them separately, when you were asked, you just answered that these are true and obvious to all those who are able to see them, and agreed that collectively they are present for contemplation. 30. Evodius. I can't doubt it. But I would very much like to know whether these two, that is, wisdom and number, are united in some one kind, because you mentioned that even in Holy Scripture they are united together, or one arises from the other, or one is in the other, as (as if) for example, number is from wisdom or in wisdom. For I would not dare to say that wisdom arises from number or is found in number. Indeed, I do not know how, since I have known many accountants, or calculators, or those who should be called by some other name, who calculate amazingly and excellently, but very few wise ones, and perhaps none, wisdom seems to me much more worthy of respect than number. Augustine. You're talking about something that usually surprises me too. For when I consider with myself the unchanging truth of numbers and its, as it were, abode and hiddenness, or some region, or what we call by some other suitable name, if we can find, as if some kind of abode and refuge of numbers, I go far from the body. And discovering, perhaps, something that I can think about, but not discovering something that I would be able to express in words, I, as if tired, return to those things of ours that I can talk about, and I talk about what is before my eyes, and as if I am accustomed to being talked about. This also appears to me when I think about wisdom, as far as I am able, in the most diligent and intense (most attentive, most diligent, most careful) manner. And as a result of this (for this reason) I greatly wonder, since these two things belong to the most secret and most certain truth, to this is also added the testimony of the Scriptures, where, as I mentioned, they are put together, but most of all I wonder, as I said, why (as a result of which) for most people number is of little value, and wisdom is dear. But what is certain is that it is one and the same thing. However, since in the Divine books about wisdom it is nevertheless said that “it spreads quickly from one end to the other and arranges everything for the benefit” (Wis. 8, 1), its power, with the help of which it spreads quickly from one end to the other, is perhaps (perhaps) called number, and truly (genuinely) that by which it arranges everything for the benefit is called wisdom in the proper sense of the word, since both belong to the same wisdom. 31. But because He gave numbers to all things, even the lowest (insignificant) and placed in the lowest things - after all, all bodies, although they exist in the last things, have their own numbers, but He did not allow wise bodies to be, nor all souls, but only rational ones, as if in them He placed for Himself a place from which He would distribute (arrange) all those, even low (insignificant) things to which He gave numbers - so (thus, as a result of this), since we can easily talk about bodies we judge things that are located below us, in which we distinguish imprinted numbers, we believe that the numbers themselves are below us and, as a result of this (and as a consequence), we consider (treat) them of little value. But when we begin to turn (turn) as if in an upward direction, we find that they even surpass our minds and remain unchanged in the truth itself. And since few can be wise, but even fools are allowed (available) to count, people are surprised (amazed) at wisdom and despise numbers. Enlightened (educated, knowledgeable, knowledgeable) and scientists, the more they are removed (distant) from earthly dishonor (stain, shame, damage), the more they see (notice, understand) with this truth, neither gold, nor silver, nor anything else that people fight for, but are devalued even in themselves. 32. Do not be surprised that numbers are little valued by people, but wisdom is dear (high) to them, because it is easier for them to count than to be wise, when you see that gold is more valuable to them than the light of a lamp, to which gold is ridiculous to compare. But a much lower thing is more revered, because even a beggar lights a lamp for himself, but few have gold. Although wisdom may be absent, so that in comparison with the number it is found lower, it is the same, although it seeks the eyes with which it can be discerned. But just as in one flame, I will say in this way, brilliance (radiance) and heat are perceived as co-essential, and cannot be separated from one another, but the heat transfers to what moves close, while the brilliance (the same) spreads further and wider, so the power of understanding (thinking), which is inherent in wisdom, the closer is inflamed (inflamed), like rational souls, the same thing, like bodies, is more distant, not comes into contact with the heat of wisdom (wisdom), but is filled with the light of numbers. Which may be unclear to you, for no likening of a visible thing to an invisible thing can be brought into conformity to complete agreement. Pay attention only to this, that for the question we have raised, it is enough, and even for such humble (modest, insignificant) minds as we are, it becomes (becomes) obvious, because although it cannot be clear to us whether number is in wisdom or from wisdom, or wisdom itself from number, or in number, or both can be shown as the name of the same thing, it is certainly obvious that both are true and unchangeable true. 33. Therefore, you probably will not deny that there is an unchangeable truth, containing everything that is unchangeably true, which you cannot call yours, or mine, or any other person, but which for all who recognize the unchangeable truths, like a mysterious common light for amazing ways, exists and is common. But everything that exists together for all those who reflect and understand, who could say, has any relation actually to the nature of any of them? For you remember, as I believe, that a little earlier we discussed (on which we agreed) about the bodily senses, namely, with which we are jointly connected (in touch) by the sense inherent in the eyes or ears, as, for example, the colors and sounds that you and I simultaneously see or hear at the same time, has no relation to the nature of our eyes or ears, but are common to us in perception. Thus, you cannot say in any way that what you and I each see with our own minds relates to the nature of the mind of either of us. For you cannot say that what the eyes of two see at the same time is the eyes of one or the other, but something third, to which the gaze of both is directed. Evodius. Extremely obvious and true (definitely). 34. Augustine. Therefore, that truth, about which we have been talking for a long time, and in which, although it is one (one), we see so much, is it more excellent than our mind, or equal to our minds, or even lower? But if it were lower, we would judge not according to it, but about it, as we judge bodies because they are lower, and say for the most part not only that they exist in this way or not in that way, but that they must exist in this way or not in that way, and about our souls (minds) we not only know that the mind (soul) exists in this way, but for the most part also that it should exist in this way. And we also judge bodies in this way when we say “less white than it should be” or “less rectangular” and much of the like; about minds (souls) “less capable than he should be,” or “less meek,” or “stronger,” as the meaning of our customs would express itself. And we judge this according to those internal rules of truth that we jointly (together) distinguish; no one judges them in any way. After all, when someone says that the eternal is better than the temporary or that seven and three are ten, no one says that this should have been so, but only knowing that this is so, it is not the examiner who corrects, but the discoverer who rejoices. If this truth were equal to our minds, it itself would also be changeable. After all, our minds sometimes see it less, sometimes more, and thereby show that they are changeable, while it, being in itself, does not grow (increase) when we see it more, and does not decrease when we see it less, but, whole and unharmed, it pleases those who turn to it with light, and punishes those who turn away with blindness. Why do we even judge our very minds according to it, when we cannot judge it in any way? After all, we say, “he understands less than he should,” or “he understands as much as he should.” The mind must understand as much as it could move closer and surrender (cling) to the unchangeable truth. Therefore, if she is neither inferior nor equal, it remains that she is superior and superior. 35. However, I promised, if you remember, that I would show you that there is something that is higher than our thinking and reason. And here is the truth itself: embrace (embrace, master) it if you can, and enjoy it and “delight yourself in the Lord, and He will fulfill the desires of your heart” (Ps. 36:4). For what more do you strive for than to be happy? And who is more blessed than he who enjoys the unshakable, unchangeable and most excellent truth? Do people truly exclaim that they are happy when they embrace the beautiful bodies of wives or even harlots with great desire, and do we doubt that we are happy in the arms of the truth? People exclaim that they are happy when, in the heat, with a parched throat, they approach a deep and saving source, or, hungry, they find food or an excellent and plentiful dinner, or we will deny that we are happy when we turn and feed (feed) on the truth. We usually hear the voices of those declaring themselves happy if they lie among roses and other flowers or even enjoy the most fragrant incense: what is more fragrant, what is more pleasant than the inspiration of truth? and will we hesitate to call ourselves happy when she inspires us? Many establish for themselves a happy life in the singing of voices, strings and flutes, and when this is lacking in them, they consider themselves unhappy, and when this is present, they are beside themselves with joy: and we, when a certain eloquent silence of truth descends on our souls without any, let’s say, noise of songs, are we looking for another happy life and not enjoying such a genuine current one? People, enjoying the light of gold and silver, the light of precious stones and other colors, or the light itself, which reaches (extends) to our eyes, either with earthly lights, or with the stars, the moon or the sun, with clarity and charm, when no hardships and no need distract them from this joy, seem to themselves happy and want to always live close to this, but in the light of truth, are we afraid to lead a happy life? 36. On the contrary, since the highest good is recognized and comprehended in truth, and this truth is wisdom, in it let us discern and comprehend the highest good and enjoy it. Blessed is he who enjoys the highest good. For this truth reveals all the goods that are true, which, to the best of their ability, understanding people, either individually or together, choose to enjoy. But in the same way (in the same way) those who, in (in) the light of the sun, choose what they willingly look at, and rejoice at this sight (spectacle) - if among them there were those endowed with very sharp, healthy and very strong eyes, they would not contemplate (anything they would look at) more willingly than the sun itself, which also illuminates everything else that weaker eyes rejoice in - so strong and sharp mental vision (vigilance), when with the right mind he surveys many true and unchanging objects, he rushes (turns) to the very truth about the rest, and in it he immediately enjoys everything together. For whatever is pleasant in other truths, in any case, the truth itself is pleasant thanks to it. 37. This is our freedom when we plunge (submit, immerse ourselves) in the truth; and our God Himself, Who frees us from death, that is, from the state (condition) of sin. For the truth itself is like a Man talking with people, saying to those who believe Him: “If you continue in My word, then you are truly My disciples, and you will know the truth, and the truth will make you free” (John 8:31-32). For the soul enjoys nothing freely except what it enjoys serenely. But no one is calm about those benefits that he can be deprived of (lose) against his will. However, no one is deprived of truth and wisdom against his will. For no one can be separated from them spatially, but what is called separation from truth and wisdom is a perverted desire (desire), thanks to which they love the lower. However, no one wants something reluctantly. So we have that which we can all enjoy equally and in common; there are no difficulties, no shortcomings in it. She accepts all her fans (adherents) without any envy towards herself and is common to everyone and holy (chaste) to everyone individually. No one says to anyone: “Stand back so that I can also come over, take your hand away so that I can also hug you.” Everyone adjoins, everyone touches this in itself. Her food is not spoiled at all, no one drinks from it what I could not. For you will not change (transform) anything from everyone’s participation in it into your own, but what you take from it remains intact (whole, untouched) for me. I do not expect that what inspires you will return from you and thus I would receive inspiration from it, for no part of it is ever the property of one or some of them, but at the same time whole and common to all. 38. Consequently, less similar to this truth is what we touch, or what we taste, or what we smell, and more so what we hear and distinguish, because every word, no matter who hears it, is fully heard by everyone and at the same time fully heard by each individual, and the sight that lies before the eyes, as much as is visible to one, is equally visible to another at the same time. But this is also similar with a very big difference, for any voice does not sound all at once, because it is extended in time and produced, and one part of it sounds earlier, and the other later, and all sorts of visible appearance seems to grow in space and the whole does not exist everywhere. And, undoubtedly (certainly, definitely), all this is removed against our will (desire), and some difficulties interfere with us so that we can enjoy (get pleasure from it). After all, even if someone’s sweet singing could be continuous (unceasing) and his zealots would race to listen, they would crowd each other and fight for places, the more of them there were, so that everyone would be closer to the singer, and in the process of listening they would not be able to keep themselves from staying with themselves, but all sorts of running voices would touch them. If I wanted, on the other hand, to even look at the sun and could do it stubbornly, and during sunset it would leave me, and it would be covered with clouds, and because of many other obstacles, contrary to my desire (will), I would lose the pleasure of contemplating it. Finally, even if sweetness were always present both for the one who sees the light and for the one who hears the voice, what great thing would come to me when it would be common to me with the beasts (animals)? The beauty of truth and wisdom, to the extent that there is a persistent (constant) will to enjoy it (the desire to enjoy it), does not densely reject (isolate) those who come in a crowd (compressed), is not exhausted by time (nor passes through time), is not (changed) by space, is not interrupted at night, is not blocked (covered) by a shadow, and is not subject to the bodily senses. From the whole world, she is close to all those who turn to her who love her, constant for everyone, not located in any place, not absent anywhere, warns from the outside, teaches from the inside, changes everyone (recognizing) her for the better, is not changed by anyone for the worse, no one judges about her, without her no one judges well. And therefore it is obvious that our minds, which individually are made wise by her alone, and you do not judge about her, but through her you can judge others, undoubtedly she is better. 39. However, you agreed that if I showed (proved) to you that there is something higher than our mind, you would admit that it is God, if there was still nothing higher. Having accepted your consent, I said that it would be enough if I prove (show) it. For if there is something more excellent, then it is rather God; if not, then truth itself is God. Whether, therefore, it exists or not, you, nevertheless, cannot deny that God exists, which is the question we have set for research and (about) reasoning. After all, if you are touched by the fact that in the sacred teaching of Christ we accept on faith that there is a Father of wisdom, remember that we also accept on faith that the Eternal Father is equal to the wisdom that was generated by Him, from where now there is no need to look for anything, but must be retained (preserved) by unshakable faith. For God exists, and is truly and indisputably (to the highest degree). Now we not only hold it certain in faith, as far as I can tell, but we also touch it with a true, although still subtle (weak) form of knowledge. For the question raised, it is sufficient (enough) that we can expand (interpret) the rest that relates to the subject, unless you have something against it that you would oppose. Evodius. I, truly, absolutely incredible and which I cannot explain to you in words, overwhelmed with joy, I accept it and proclaim that it is extremely true (certainly, definitely). Moreover (However), I proclaim with an inner voice, which I want to be heard by the truth itself and take root (unite) in it, because I agree that this is not only good, but even the highest good and bringing bliss. 40. Augustine. Absolutely (Yes, of course), I am also very happy. But tell me, are we really wise and happy now? or are we still just striving to achieve this? Evodius. I believe (I think) that we rather strive. Augustine. How, then, do you understand that which you declare to rejoice in as true and certain, and do you agree that it has to do with wisdom? or can anyone know wisdom? Evodius. As long as a fool cannot. Augustine. Therefore, are you already a wise man, or do you still not know wisdom? Evodius. Although I am not yet a sage, I would not call myself a fool either, as far as I know wisdom, because what I know is definite (reliable) and I cannot deny that it is related to wisdom. Augustine. Tell me, I ask you, do you admit that he who is not knowledgeable is ignorant, and he who is not temperate is intemperate? Or is there anything in this regard that may be in doubt? Evodius. I admit that when a man is not just, he is unjust; I would also answer this about the knowledgeable and the restrained. Augustine. Therefore, why and when is one not wise, not a fool? Evodius. This I also admit that when someone is not a wise man, he is a fool. Augustine. So which one are you now? Evodius. Call me any of them, I still do not dare to call myself wise, and from what I agreed with, I see that it follows that I do not hesitate to call myself a fool. Augustine. Therefore, a fool knows wisdom. After all, as has already been said, he would not be sure that he wants to be wise and that this should be wanted if no concept of wisdom were established (rooted) in his mind, as well as about those things about which one after another (separately) you asked, you answered, which relate to wisdom and the knowledge of which you are glad. Evodius. It's just like you say. 41. Augustine. So, what else do we do when we strive to be wise, except that with all possible ardor for what we achieve with our minds, we collect (concentrate) our entire soul in some way and place it there and steadily introduce (root, imprint) so that it no longer rejoices at its personal (private), which is intertwined with transient (passing) things, but, having abandoned all states of place and time, takes possession of what is always the same right? For just as the whole life of the body is the soul, so the happy life of the soul is God. As long as we do this, until we do this, we are on our way. And the fact that these true and certain blessings, shining on this dark path, are still (still) be that as it may, allowed to rejoice, see if this is what is written about wisdom, what it does to its adherents when they come to it and seek it. For it is said: “He appears to them favorably on the paths, and meets them with every thought” (Wis. 6:16). For wherever you turn, with certain imprints (traces) that she imprinted on her deeds, she speaks to you and you, who have slipped into the external, calls you back with the very forms of the external inward; so whatever you see, whatever admires (likes) you in the body and attracts (seduces) through the bodily senses, is calculated, and so that you explore (search) where it comes from, and go back (return) to yourself and understand that you cannot approve or disapprove of what you touch with your bodily senses, unless you have certain laws of beauty within yourself, to which you attribute everything beautiful that you perceive outside. 42. Look at the sky and the earth, the sea and everything that is on them, either above, sparkles, or below crawls, flies or swims. They have forms because they have number; take that away from them and they will be nothing. Where, therefore, do they come from, if not from number? since being is inherent in them as much as they are countable. And artists also have in the art of all corporeal forms numbers with which they coordinate their works, and for so long they set their hands and tools in motion in their production until what is formed outside is compared with the light of numbers that is inside, as far as possible, until it reaches perfection and until, through the feeling - mediator, it pleases the inner judge who sees the highest numbers. Next, ask who moves the artist’s hand; this will be a number, because it (the hand) also moves measuredly (in accordance with the number). And if you take the work out of your hands, and the idea (intention) of production from your soul, and this movement of the hands is reduced to pleasure (amusement), it will be called dancing. So, ask what gives pleasure in dancing, and the number will answer you: “Look, here I am”; look at the beauty of the formed body: the numbers are kept in place; look at the beauty of movement in the body: numbers rotate in time; penetrate into the art where they come from, look for time and place in it: it will never be, it will not be anywhere, but the number in it lives neither the region of its space, nor the time during the day. And yet, when those who want to become an artist devote themselves to the study of art, they set their body in motion through space and time, and their soul through time. Over time, they naturally (of course, of course) become more skillful. Go (turn), therefore, to the soul of the artist to see the eternal number: and immediately wisdom will shine to you from the innermost (place) of refuge and wisdom from the most secret place. If this reflects your still too weary gaze, turn your mental eye to the path where wisdom has graciously appeared. But remember that you have torn a vision that you can repeat when you are stronger and healthier. 43. Alas! those who leave you, the driver (mentor), and bypass your traces, who love your beckons (nods) instead of you and forget what you nod at, O wisdom, the sweetest light of pure mind! After all, you do not stop (cease) giving us signs of how great you are and how great you are, and your signs are the whole beauty (decoration) of creation. For the artist in some way gives a sign (nods) to the observer (spectator) of his work from the very beauty of the work, so that he does not stop there, but runs his eyes over the sight of the created body (object) so as to turn with love to the one who created it. But those who love what you do instead of you are like people who, when they hear some eloquent sage, while the excessive sweetness (pleasantness) of his voice and the arrangement of syllables successfully (expediently, harmoniously) placed greedily listen, they miss (lose) the principle of these thoughts, as if the signs of which these words sounded. Alas, those who turn away from your light and sweetly take root (indulge) in their darkness! After all, as if turning their back to you, in bodily work, as if in their shadow, they become stronger and, nevertheless, even there, what pleases (delights) them, they receive from the illumination (shine around) of your light. But the shadow, while it is loved, makes the spiritual eye weaker (tired) and powerless to bear your sight. For this reason, a person becomes more and more eclipsed (surrounded, enveloped) until he more willingly follows something that more tolerantly accepts the weaker. From here he begins to be unable to see what is above all, and to consider as evil everything that is unexpected, that deceives, or unworthy, that seduces, or achieved, that torments, since this deservedly acquires (receives) his disgust, and everything that is fair cannot be evil. 44. Therefore (So), if you look (pay attention) to something changeable, you cannot grasp it either with your bodily sense or with the consideration of the soul, unless it is held by some form of numbers, which, if taken out, turns into nothing, do not doubt that this changeable will not be stopped, but by measured movements and an ordered (definite) variety of forms, as if certain turns of time have passed, there is some eternal and unchanging form, which is neither contained nor no matter how it spreads in space, nor extends and changes in time, through which all this can be formed and fulfill relative to its kind, and carry out the numbers of space and time. 45. For it is necessary that every changeable thing be capable of taking on new forms. But just as we call that which can change mutable, so we call that which can form capable of taking on new forms. But no thing can form itself, because no thing can give itself what it does not have, and something is certainly formed in order to have a form. Therefore, if any thing has any form, it does not need to receive what it has. Thus no thing, as we have said, can form itself. But what else can we say about the variability of body and soul? After all, enough has been said above. And so it happens (it turns out) that the body and soul are formed by some unchangeable and eternally abiding form. In what form is it said: “You change them, and they will change.” But You are the same, and Your years will not end” (Ps. 101:27-28). The prophetic saying was used of years without end (decrease) instead of eternity. It is also said about this form that “being in... itself, it renews everything” (see Wisdom 7:27). From here it also becomes clear that Providence controls everything. For if everything that exists is in no way freed from form, the unchangeable form itself, through which everything that changes remains, so that it is fulfilled and directed (guided) by the numbers of its forms, is itself their Providence (Providence). For nothing would have happened if it had not been for her. Therefore, anyone who observes and considers the whole creation as a whole, directs his path towards wisdom, sees that wisdom favorably appears on his paths, and meets him with every thought. And the more vividly he lights up to walk (do) this path, because this path, which he is consumed with desire to achieve, is beautiful in itself. 46. ​​If, however, you find (would find) besides that which exists but does not live, and that which both exists and lives, but does not understand, and that which both exists, and lives, and understands, some other class of creatures, then dare (have the courage) to say that there is some good that is not from God. After all, these three can also be expressed by two names (words), if they are called body and life, because both that which only lives, but does not understand what the life of animals is, and that which understands how the life of people is eminently correctly called life. However, these two, that is, body and life, which, of course, are considered created (creatures) - for life is also called the Creator Himself and is the highest life - these two, in this case, are creations, body and life, since they are capable of taking forms, as the above shows, and are absolutely (completely) deprived of form, turning into nothing, sufficiently reveal that they are from the form that always belongs to this genus. That is why, no matter how great, no matter how small, benefits cannot exist except from God. For what in created things can be more than intelligent life, or less than body? No matter how much they lack and no matter how much they strive not to be, they retain something of the form so that they somehow exist. However, everything that is preserved from the form of any insufficient thing comes from that form that knows no lack and does not allow the very movements of insufficient or prosperous things to transgress the laws of their numbers. So, whatever is found in the nature of things that is worthy of praise (praiseworthy), whether it is considered worthy of minor or great praise, should be attributed to the most excellent and ineffable praise of the Creator - unless you have something against it. 47. Evodius. I admit that I am convinced, and in the same way it becomes obvious, since in this life and among such as we are, perhaps God is, and from God all good things come, since everything that is, either that which understands and lives and exists, or that which only lives and exists, or that which only exists, comes from God. Now we see whether the third question can be resolved (unraveled, resolved): whether free will should be counted among the goods. Once this has been proven, I will no doubt agree that God gave it to us and that it should have been given. Augustine. It’s good that you remembered the topic and vigilantly paid attention to the next, already expanded, question. But you should also have seen that this third question has already been (re)solved. That’s why you said that it seems to you that the free expression of the will should not have been given, that through it everyone sins. To your thought, when I objected that right can only be due to the free expression of the will, and also argued that it was rather for this that God gave it to us, you replied that free will should have been given to us in such a way that justice would also be given, which no one can use incorrectly. What is your answer that forced (pushed) us to go through so much walking around during the discussion, thanks to which we proved to you that both large and small blessings are from God. What cannot be revealed so clearly, unless first directed to something obvious, a reasoning about such a great thing, undertaken for the sake of our measure, against the views of criminal thoughtlessness, thanks to which “the fool said in his heart: “There is no God” (Ps. 13:1, 52:2), despite the fact that God Himself will help us on such a dangerous path. But these two propositions, namely, that God exists and that all good things come from him, although also previously accepted with unshakable faith, were interpreted in such a way that this third one too - free will should be counted among the good things - is obvious. 48. After all, it has already been discovered and established between us by the previous discussion that the nature of the body belongs to a lower level than the nature of the soul, and therefore the soul is a greater good than the body. Therefore, if in bodily goods we find something that a person cannot use righteously, however, it is not for this reason that we say that it should not have been given, since we realize that goods exist, what is surprising if there are some goods in the soul that we also cannot use righteously, but because the goods that exist could only be given by Him from Whom all goods come? After all, you see how lacking in goodness is the body that lacks hands, and yet the one who acts with them maliciously or shamefully (shamefully) uses his hands poorly. If you saw someone without legs, you would agree that the greatest good is lacking in bodily integrity, and however, you would not deny that the one who uses his legs to harm someone or to disgrace himself uses them badly. We see this light with our eyes and recognize (distinguish) the shapes of bodies, and this is the most outstanding (beautiful) in our body, from where these members are located at a certain peak of dignity, and the use of the eyes relates to the preservation (observation) of health and many other amenities of life. But the majority, for the most part, use their eyes shamefully and force them to serve lust; and you see how much goodness is lacking on the face if the eyes are missing. But when they are present, who gave them, if not the generous giver of all blessings - God? Therefore, just as you recognize (justify) this in the body and, not noticing (seeing) those who use them badly, you praise the One who gave these goods, so free will, without which no one can live righteously, should be recognized as both a good and given from above, and rather those who use this good badly should be blamed than to admit that the One who gave should not have given. 49. Evodius. So, first of all, I would like you to prove to me that free will is a certain good, and I would agree that God gave it to us, because I admit that all good comes from God. Augustine. Didn’t I prove with such tension the previous discussion, when you admitted that any kind and form of the body from the highest form of all things, that is, from truth, exists, and agreed that it is good? For the truth itself says in the Gospel that our hairs are also numbered (see Matt. 10:30). Have you forgotten what we said about the peak of the number and the force protruding from edge to edge? What, in this case, is a great strangeness (perversion) - to count our forms among the goods, although insignificant and completely insignificant, but not to find which author, if not God, the creator of all goods, because both the greatest and the least goods come from the One from Whom every good is (comes from), goods cannot be attributed, and it is impossible to doubt about free will, without which even those who live in the worst way cannot agree live righteously? And now answer me definitely, I ask, what do you think is (seems) better in us - that without which you can live righteously, or that without which you cannot live righteously? Evodius. Now have pity, please, shame on your blindness. For who doubts that that is much more excellent without which there is no righteous life? Augustine. So now you will deny that a one-eyed man can live righteously? Evodius. May there not be such incredible madness (recklessness). Augustine. Therefore, although you admit that the eye for the body is a certain benefit, the deprivation of which, however, is not an obstacle to a righteous life, free will, without which no one lives righteously, seems to you to be no benefit? After all, you see justice, which no one uses badly. It is among the blessings that exist in man himself, including all the virtues of the soul, of which a righteous and honest life itself consists. For no one uses prudence, firmness, or self-restraint badly (badly); after all, in all of them, just as in justice itself, which you recalled, righteous reason flourishes, without which virtues cannot exist. But he cannot use the righteous mind badly. 50. Therefore, these are great benefits. But you need to remember that not only great, but even the smallest blessings can only come from the One from Whom all blessings come, that is, God. For the previous discussion has convinced us of what you have so many times and so joyfully agreed with. So, the virtues, thanks to which one lives righteously, are great blessings. The sight of any kind of body, without which one can live righteously, is the least good; The potentialities of the soul, without which it is impossible to live righteously, are ordinary goods. No one uses virtues badly (badly); but other goods, that is, the average and least, can be used not only well, but just as badly by anyone. And therefore no one uses virtue badly, because the work (task, occupation) of virtue is the good use of even that which we can use even badly. But no one makes a bad use of a good thing. Therefore, the abundance and greatness (significance) of God’s kindness not only exceeds the great, but also exceeds the average and smallest goods. Kindness should be praised more in the great than in the average, and more in the average than in the least, but rather in everything than if it did not provide everything. 51. Evodius I agree. But this makes me hesitate, because there is a question about free will, and we see that it itself uses other goods well or badly, in which way it itself must be counted among what we use. Augustine. Just as everything that we comprehend for knowledge, we comprehend with reason, but also reason itself is numbered among those things that we comprehend with reason. Have you forgotten that when we examined what is comprehended by the mind, you agreed (acknowledged) that the mind is also cognized (comprehended) by the mind? Thus, do not be surprised if we use the rest thanks to free will, that we can use free will itself thanks to itself, so that in some way the will that uses the rest uses itself, since reason knows itself, which knows the rest. For memory not only embraces (concludes, comprehends) everything else that we remember, but also what we do not forget, we store in memory, memory itself in some way understands itself in us, not only about others, but also remembers about itself; or rather, we remember ourselves, and the rest, and herself thanks to her. 52. Therefore, the will, which is the average good, since (when) it is rooted in the unchangeable good and that general good, not one’s own, as if there is that truth about which we talked a lot and said nothing worthy, a person leads a happy (blessed) life; and this happy (blessed) life itself, that is, the state of the soul committed to the unchangeable good, is man’s own and first good. This also contains all the virtues, which no one can misuse. For although this is great and primary in a person, it is nevertheless each individual person’s own and not common. After all, all the wise and blessed become such by connecting with truth and wisdom, which are common to all. But one does not become happy thanks to the bliss of another, because even when he imitates being happy, he strives to become happy from there, from where he sees that he has become, that is, thanks to this unchangeable and general truth. And one does not become prudent through the prudence of someone else, or firm through firmness, or temperate through self-control, or just through the justice of another person, but by bringing the soul into conformity with those unchangeable rules and lights of the virtues, which live incorruptibly (unharmed and enduring) in the truth itself and general wisdom, with which the spirit and the one whom, endowed with these virtues, he set himself up for, agreed and strengthened. imitation. 53. Consequently, the will, committed to (adjacent to) the general and unchangeable good, achieves the first and greatest human goods, although it is itself an average good. But the will, turning away from the unchangeable and common good and turning to its own good, external or inferior, sins. You might be interested in: