VII. Письмо шестое: Противоречие

By the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Truth, Truth is proclaimed to creation. Here, when consciousness rises above the “double boundary of space and time” and enters eternity, here, in this moment of proclamation, the Proclaimer of the Truth and the Proclaimed Truth coincide in every possible way. In the manifestation of the Spirit of Truth, that is, in the light of Tabor, the form of Truth and the content of Truth are one. But, perceived and assimilated by the creature, the knowledge of Truth falls in time and space - during the time of personal diversity and into the space of social diversity. This breaks the immediate unity of form and content twice, and knowledge of the Truth becomes knowledge about the Truth. Knowledge about Truth is truth. There is no doubt that truth necessarily exists along with Truth, if only creation exists along with God. The existence of truth is only another expression of the very fact of the existence of creation as such, that is, as lying in personal diversity in time and social diversity in space. The presence of truth is equal to the presence of creation. But does the creature itself exist? – That’s the point: philosophically, an answer to such a question cannot be given in advance. A creature is a creature because it is not an Unconditionally Necessary Being and that, consequently, the existence of a creature cannot be deduced in any way not only from the idea of ​​Truth, this prime mover of all understanding, but even from the fact of the existence of Truth, from God. Contrary to the acosmism of Spinoza and the pantheism of most thinkers, nothing can be concluded from the nature of God about the existence of the world, for the act of peacemaking, whether we understand it as instantaneous and historically accessible, or gradual and spread over all historical time, or revealing itself in an endless temporal process, or, finally, pre-eternal, - with all the diversity of possibilities of understanding, must inevitably be thought of as free, that is, not coming from God. with necessity. 204 The existence of creation, that is, our weakness, I repeat, cannot be deduced by any, even the most sophisticated reasoning, and if thinkers still try to make this deduction, then it can be argued ahead of time that they are either performing a logical trick, or destroying the God-given creatureliness of the creature, relegating it, a person, free, although weak, from the level of God-like-creative existence to the plane of abstract being - as an attribute or mode of the Divine. So, the existence of truth is not deducible, but only shown in experience: in the experience of life we ​​recognize both our godlikeness and our weakness; Only the experience of life reveals to us our personality and our spiritual freedom. It is beyond the power of philosophy to deduce the fact of truth; but, if it has already been given to philosophy, then its business is to ask about the properties, about composition, about human nature - that is, given, although by God, but in humanity and humanity - truth. In other words, the question about the formal composition of truth, about its rational structure, is legitimate, while its content is Truth itself. Or, it is also appropriate to ask yourself, how does Divine Truth appear to the human mind? To answer the question about the logical structure of truth, one must keep in mind that truth is truth about Truth, and not about anything else, that is, it is in some kind of correspondence with Truth. The form of truth is only able to contain its content, the Truth, when it somehow, at least symbolically, has something of the Truth in itself. In other words, truth must necessarily be an emblem of some basic property of Truth. Or, finally, being here and now, it must be a symbol of Eternity. Although given in creation, truth must be the monogram of the Divine. This-sided, it should be, as it were, not-this-sided. It must paint the Unconditional with the colors of the conditional. The fragile vessel of human words must contain the ever-indestructible Adamant of the Divine. The creature is restless and whirling in the stormy gusts of Time; the truth must remain. The creature is born and dies, and generations succeed generations; truth must be incorruptible. People argue among themselves and object to each other; the truth must be indisputable and above contradiction. Men's opinions vary from country to country and from year to year; truth is everywhere and always the same, equal to itself. In a word, truth is “that which was believed everywhere, always, everything, because that only in reality and in the proper sense is universal, which, as the very meaning and meaning of the word shows; embraces everything as much as possible – quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est; hoc est etenim vere proprieque catholicum, quod ipsa vis nominis ratioque déclarât, quae omnia fere universaliter comprehendit.” 205 And this requirement can be satisfied only on the condition “if we follow universality, antiquity, agreement - si sequamur universitatem, antiquitatem, consensionem.” Every truth must be a non-conditional formula. But how is this possible? How is it possible to construct an unconditional formula of Divine Truth from the conditional material of the human mind? Knowledge is given in the form of a certain judgment, that is, as a synthesis of a certain subject S with a certain predicate R. This does not exclude an analytical judgment, even an identical judgment, because in them the subject and the predicate are in some sense different - they must first be distinguished in order to then be united. 206 But if every judgment is a synthesis of some duality, then why couldn’t there be another synthesis, a synthesis of a given subject S with another predicate, with P’? Further, why could there not be a connection of a given S with the negation of P, with not-P? It is clear that every judgment is conditional, that is, it can meet with an objection in the form of another judgment, the opposite, and even in the form of a contradictory judgment. And if until now such an objection has not yet been presented, then this does not in the least ensure the irrevocability of our judgment for further time or in other places. Life is infinitely fuller than rational definitions, and therefore no formula can contain the entire fullness of life. This means that no formula can replace life itself in its creativity, in its creation of new things every moment and everywhere. Consequently, rational definitions are always and everywhere subject to and will inevitably be subject to objections. Objections to a formula are such formulas, such counter-judgments that come from aspects of life additional to the given one, from aspects of life that are contrary and even contradictory in relation to this contested formula. A rational formula can then and only then be superior to the attacks of life if it absorbs all of life into itself, with all its diversity and with all its existing and potential contradictions. A rational formula can be truth if and only if it, so to speak, provides for all objections to itself and answers them. But in order to foresee all the objections, it is necessary to take not them specifically, but their limit. It follows from this that truth is a judgment that contains within itself the limit of all its cancellations, or, in other words, truth is a self-contradictory judgment. The unconditionality of truth from the formal side is expressed in the fact that it pre-implies and accepts its negation and responds to doubt about its truth by accepting this doubt, and even to its limit. Truth is truth because it is not afraid of any challenge; and is not afraid of them because she speaks against herself more than any denial can say; but this self-negation combines its truth with affirmation. For reason, truth is a contradiction, and this contradiction becomes obvious as soon as the truth receives verbal formulation. Each of the contradictory propositions is contained in a judgment of truth and therefore the presence of each of them is provable with the same degree of persuasiveness - with necessity. Thesis and antithesis together form an expression of truth. In other words, truth is an antinomy, and cannot but be so. 207 However, it should not be different, for it can be argued ahead of time that knowledge of the truth requires spiritual life and, therefore, is a feat. And the feat of reason is faith, that is, self-denial. The act of self-denial of reason is the statement of antinomy. And indeed, only antinomy can be trusted; any judgment that is not antinomic is simply recognized or simply rejected by reason, for it does not exceed the boundary of its egoistic isolation. If truth were non-antinomic, then reason, always revolving in its own region, would not have a point of support, would not see an object outside the rational and, therefore, would not have the impulse to begin the feat of faith. This fulcrum is dogma. Our salvation begins with dogma, for only dogma, being antinomian, does not restrict our freedom and gives full place to voluntary faith or crafty unbelief. After all, no one can be forced to believe, just as no one can be forced not to believe: according to the word of the bl. Augustine, 208 “nemo credit nisi volens - no one believes except willingly.” 209 Everything that has been said so far has been said, for the sake of simplicity, on the assumption that we proceed in logic from judgments; and then truth turned out to be the antinomy of judgments. But it is not difficult to see that from a different point of view, namely, in the logic of concepts, we would come to a similar conclusion, namely, that truth is the antinomy of concepts. Of course, both conclusions are one and the same, for the antinomy of concepts is only psychologically something different in comparison with the antinomy of judgments. After all, every concept can be converted into a corresponding judgment, and every judgment into a concept. Logically, in the understanding in general there are some elements of two conjugate kinds, and these elements are mutually convertible and therefore interchangeable in reasoning, so that their formal theory is one and the same. But what is important to us now is not that, but only the antinomian connection of certain elements in truth. Truth is antinomy. This important result of our reflections requires a more strict expression. In other words, a formal logical theory of antinomy is needed. Here is one of the convenient ways to do this. It is based on a logistic algorithm, 210 so convenient for abbreviated recording of logical operations. Therefore, before introducing our construction, it is useful to remind ourselves of the meaning of some logistics symbols. As is known, the first and most essential principle in modern symbolic methods of logic is the principle that is, the principle of implication, if p and q are understood as sentences, and of inclusion, if p and q are interpreted as classes. For the sake of certainty in the further presentation, we will understand by p and q sentences, i.e., products of the act of judgment, although we could just as rightly think of classes under these symbols. But whether "Ɔ" is a sign of implication or inclusion, or, in other words, whether by p and q sentences or classes are meant, the formula of inclusion (I) written above expresses essentially the same fact, namely; the connection between the truth of q and the truth of p, and this fact is expressed by the words “therefore”, “means”, “ergo”. p “Ɔ” q, i.e.: “p, – therefore, q”, “p, – therefore, q”, “p ergo q”. This “therefore”, this “means”, this “ergo” in expanded form expresses the meaning that “if p is true, then q is true”; "if q is false, then p is false" “p cannot be true and q cannot be false”, or, finally - the expression is most preferable in its unequivocality - that "either p is false or q is true." 211 From this last formulation, the equivalence of the inclusion operation “Ɔ” and the logical addition operation “∪” becomes clear. In fact, the combination of characters i.e., the operation of logical addition means nothing more than the alternativeness of the terms p and q: "either p is false or q is true" It is obvious from this that we can write the logical equality of two operations, namely: where the sign “¬” before p means negation, “négation” or, more precisely, negative, “negative” p; in general, in logistics, any symbol, combined with the sign “¬”, gives its own negative. 213 Let us further recall that the sign “∩” is an operator of logical multiplication, i.e., that, when placed between two symbols or groups of them, it indicates the coexistence of these symbols or groups. 214 Let us also recall, finally, that the symbol V denotes “truth”, “Veritas”, and the inverted symbol V, i.e. “Λ” - “denial of truth”, “¬V” or “falsehood”, 215 and we then have all the data for the logical definition of the antinomy Ρ and the expression of its schemes to which we strive. Our reasoning about antinomy naturally arises from the method of proof through reduction to absurdity, which was used in mathematics by Euclid to prove the 12th sentence of the IX book of the Elements, 216 and in philosophy used by dogmatists to radically overthrow skeptical arguments against the provability of truth. 217 This technique was often used subsequently by both mathematicians and philosophers, 218 and even spread throughout wide circles of society, serving the purposes of salon and home dialectics, as depicted, for example, by Turgenev in “Rudin”. 219 But, despite its prevalence in practical use, it was not recognized for a long time in the logical theory of inferences, and only about ten years ago was indicated by a supporter of logistics J. Vailati, from the Peanian school. 220 However, neither the general public, who almost unconsciously used this technique, nor the philosophers and mathematicians who half-consciously used it, nor even Vailati, who realized it theoretically, saw its insufficiency for the purposes for which it was used and its connection with the theory of antinomy. This technique in the sign position of logistics is expressed by a very simple formula: i.e. “if the negative of a sentence (or, accordingly, a class) includes this very sentence (or, accordingly, a class) that it negates, then it is true; – si négation d’une proposition implique cette proposition même, celle-ci est vraie.” 221 Logistics explains and justifies this paradoxical way of reasoning. In fact, according to formula (III) ¬ p Ɔ p . = . ¬ (¬ p ) ∪ p (III"), but, according to the principle of double negative 222 ¬ p Ɔ p . = . p ∪ p (III""), But it is clear that the alternative “p ∪ p”, i.e. “p or p” entails the immutable statement p, so that which was what needed to be proven. This is the path shown by logistics. But is it enough? In other words, is the reasoning of Euclid and others like him really rigorously demonstrative? - Of course not. To verify the latter, it is enough to denote – p by q Then it is clear that there is no reason to exclude in advance the possibility for q of everything that was said above about p, i.e., the applicability of formula (IV) to q. So, it is possible that or, making a substitution from formula (VII), ¬ (¬ p) Ɔ (¬ p) . Ɔ. ¬ p (VIII"), or, finally, by virtue of formula (V) so not only p (IV) is proven, but also not-p (IX). So, we have two equally undoubted proofs that constitute the antinomy of R. This, then, is what it is: LOGICAL DIAGRAM OF ANTINOMY Using the methods and operations of pure logic, we have shown the possibility of antinomy in the strictest sense of the word. From here, first of all, it is necessary to draw a conclusion about the insufficiency of the logical formula (IV) used to prove one or another thesis p, if the possibility of formula (IX) is not excluded; After all, the presence of a thesis in no way ensures the non-existence of the antithesis, but, at least in the realm of the spirit always, and often in other areas, presupposes the presence of the antithesis. In other words, each time it is necessary to be convinced not only of the truth of thesis p, but also to find out whether it is not half of some antinomy p. The proposed process then allows for the following symbolic definition of antinomy: to understand which it is necessary to remember that V is the sign of truth, Veritatis, and “∩” is the operator of logical multiplication, i.e., a symbol of the compatibility of the terms between which it is placed. Translating formula (X) into ordinary language, we say: “An antinomy is a proposition which, being true, contains both thesis and antithesis, so that it is inaccessible to any objection.” The addition of the symbol V, raising the antinomy above the plane of reason, is what distinguishes the antinomy P from the lie Λ (inverted V, or ¬ V), which lies on the plane of reason and is defined by the formula: But what is this factor V in the definition of antinomy? Formally, it appears as the result of some process that establishes one way or another about P that it is true, while two other processes prove that this P, by its structure, is p and, also, ¬ p. Thus, for pure logic, V, in the definition of P, there is only an indication of the position of this P, of the due relationship to it - so to speak, a finger pointing to heaven at P, but not an integral part in the composition of P itself. In its composition, P does not differ at all from the simple contradiction of Λ, and, therefore, in the sphere of the rational, only authority is the finger that marks the truth of P in comparison with Λ. This is why for Catholicism, which is immersed in the realm of the soul and, consequently, the rational, but still has as its object the spiritual and, consequently, the antinomian, - this is why for Catholicism authority is everything, and without the iron authority, without the pointing finger of the pope, a Catholic is powerless to live. In the realm of the super-sensible and, therefore, super-rational, the addition V in the definition of antinomy indicates its component feature, its spiritual unity, its super-sensible reality, and, in the Holy Spirit, this unity, this reality is directly experienced and comprehended. Formula (X), for the sake of greater clarity, can also be presented in expanded form and written like this: ¬ p Ɔ p . ∩ . p Ɔ ¬ p: Ɔ: p ∩ ¬ p. ∩. ¬ Λ = P (XII), i.e.: “if the antithesis entails the thesis, and, at the same time, the thesis entails the antithesis, then the totality of the thesis and antithesis, if it is not false, is an antinomy.” This is the formula of the antinomy. It is not difficult to see that Kant tried to fit his antinomies precisely into this scheme. With more or less clarity, all the antinomies that have been presented in philosophy are brought under the same scheme. So, truth is an antinomy. The very word “antinomy”, as a philosophical term, is of very late origin, namely, it appears no earlier than Kant, and even then only in the “Critique of Pure Reason”, i.e. in 1781. Until that time, it was a legal and, partly, theological term. But just as late as the term “antinomy” turns out to be, just as early is the very idea of ​​the necessary self-contradiction of reason, now associated with this term. One can even assume that it was originally a simple reflection of the complex and contradictory way of life that the ancient Hellenes possessed both personally and socially. “What is the advantage of the Greek mind based on?” asks one historian of Hellenic thought. “The secret of amazing success,” he answers, 223 “lies in the combination of opposites. Extraordinary wealth of creative imagination and next to it always vigilant doubt, inquisitive, not retreating from any boldness; a powerful ability to generalize, combined with acute observation, tracking down all the features of a phenomenon; a religion that fully satisfies spiritual needs and does not impose shackles on the mind that analyzes its creations. To this must be added the multiplicity of different spiritual centers competing with each other, the constant clash of forces, excluding the possibility of stagnation, and, in the end, a state structure and social structure that is strict enough to restrain the “dissolute childish aspirations” of the reckless, and free enough not to interfere with the bold impulse of outstanding minds. In this combination of gifts and circumstances one can discern the source of the predominant success that the Hellenic spirit achieved in the field of scientific research.” How does the living perception of antinomy begin? There lived in Asia Minor someone with a tragic mind and, it seems, perhaps one of the most sensitive to truth among all the philosophers of antiquity. At least he did not have the inner callousness that too often kills the soul of professional thinkers. This is why his contemporaries nicknamed him ὁ Σκοτεινός, the Dark One. His name was Heraclitus. And, as they said, he cried all his life over the tragedy of himself and the world. 224 This Heraclitus for the first time clearly sensed that God the Word exists - for the first time he discovered the highest harmony and super-peaceful unity of being. “By listening not to me, but to the Truth,” he said, “it is reasonable to recognize that everything is one”; “Wisdom is one (understand by it that mind that controls everything through everything)”; “Reason is the same for everyone...” And it was this same philosopher, reaching out to “the fearless heart of the immutable Truth,” as Parmenides put it, “it was he who kept repeating all his life about the disunity, fragmentation and antinomy of our earthly vale. Having discovered the perfect harmony of the Word, he saw with all the acuteness possible—for one who lived before Christ—the inner enmity of the world. Subsequently, this happened more than once, and even Spinoza’s spiders and Spinoza’s joy at hearing about war 225 can be attributed to the contemplation of a single Substance. Maybe even, in a purified and spiritualized form, in St. Paul expresses the same reverent and enthusiastic feeling when, in the Epistle to the Romans, he contemplates from the heights of eternity the blindness of the Jewish people. But there, among the “Christian before Christianity,” 226 this new perception of the dualism between the earthly and the above was even more acute, because it was not at all reconciled. “People should know,” he exclaims, “that war is everywhere and that truth is enmity, for everything arises and everything is destroyed thanks to enmity.” “War is the ancestor and mistress of everything...” “People (- unreasonable people! Was it not for you that the philosopher cried his life? -) - people do not understand how opposites are consistent with each other. World harmony lies in a combination of tension and relaxation, just like a bow and a lyre (the string is pulled and then released). Opposition brings people together. From opposites, perfect harmony is formed. Everything arises from enmity.” And therefore, “connect the whole and the non-whole, the consonant and the discordant, the consonant and the dissonant. All give one thing, and one thing give all.” “For God everything is beauty, goodness and justice; For people, one thing is fair, the other is not.” The world is tragically beautiful in its fragmentation. His harmony is in his disharmony, his unity is in his enmity. This is the paradoxical teaching of Heraclitus, later paradoxically developed by Friedrich Nietzsche into the theory of “tragic optimism.” And the basic tone of his moods, their juice and color are most perfectly determined by a fragment consisting of just one word - “ΑΓΧΙΒΑΣΙΗ”, “CONTRADICTION”. 227 Contradiction! I would like to repeat Heraclitus’s complaint, which remains modern today: “People do not understand this eternally existing truth until they hear about it; They don’t understand even when they hear about it for the first time. For, although everything happens in accordance with this truth, people turn out to be incomprehensible when, through experience, they find both speech and facts as I present them [read: ἀγχιβασίη], understanding each phenomenon by nature and explaining it in essence. What they do in reality eludes other people, just as they forget what they do in their dreams.” The glorious names of the Eleans should be placed after Heraclitus in the history of the idea of ​​antinomy that interests us. According to their beliefs, reason becomes entangled in invincible contradictions, since it only wants to finally cling to this egoistically fragmented world, fragmented in time and space. But what the men of the Eleatic school said is too well known to be recalled here. A great supporter of the antinomy of reason, although still not understood in this respect, was Plato himself. Most of his dialogues are nothing more than gigantic, carefully developed and artistically dramatized antinomies. Plato's very predilection for the dialogical form of presentation, that is, for the form of opposition of beliefs, already hints at the antinomian nature of his thinking; but the latter becomes even more tangible if we take into account that almost every dialogue only exacerbates the contradiction and deepens the abyss between “yes” and “no,” between thesis and antithesis, but does not in the least resolve the issue in favor of one or the other. Something one of two things: either it is a very good antinomianism, or it is a very unsuccessful philosophy of integral reason. Finally, Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa with his doctrine of coincidentia oppositorum, i.e., the coincidence of opposite definitions in God, should be counted among the deep and creatively powerful representatives of antinomianism; This teaching found a unique and significant symbolic expression in his “Application of Mathematics to Theology,” which, unfortunately, has not been studied and is almost unknown among historians of thought. 228 As for other names, such as Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, Renouvet, etc., there is hardly any need to remind them: they are quite well known. Finally, the names of modern “pragmatists” can also be inscribed on the golden plaque of the history of antinomianism. Conducting contradiction and love of contradiction, along with ancient skepticism, seems to be the highest thing that antiquity gave. We must not, we do not dare, cover up the contradiction with the test of our philosophers! Let the contradiction remain deep as it is. If the knowable world is cracked, and we cannot actually destroy its cracks, then we should not cover them up. If the cognizing mind is fragmented, if it is not a monolithic piece, if it contradicts itself, we again should not pretend that this does not exist. The powerless effort of the human mind to reconcile contradictions, the sluggish attempt to strain, is long overdue to be reflected with a cheerful recognition of inconsistency. 229 The Book of Job consists entirely of this dense experience of contradiction; it is all built on the idea of ​​antinomy. Here God “reminds us that man is not the measure of creation”, that “the universe is built according to a plan that infinitely surpasses human reason.” 230 The desires of God and the works of God are essentially incomprehensible to man, and therefore seem unreasonable to him (Job.23): “We do not comprehend Him - He does not look at any of the highly intelligent” (Job.37:23–24). “Everything is a mystery,” says F. M. Dostoevsky, “everything is the mystery of God... And as a mystery, it is even better: it is terrible to the heart and wondrous; and this fear leads to the joy of the heart... It is even more beautiful because it is a mystery...” 231 . The mystery of moral disorder amazes Job with its greatness, and his friends do not even notice it (Job 21). “Put your finger on your lips” - a gesture of silence and secrecy - the same gesture with which John the Seer is often written on icons. The secrets of religion are not secrets that should not be divulged, not conventional passwords of conspirators, but inexpressible, ineffable, indescribable experiences that cannot be put into words except in the form of a contradiction, which are both “yes” and “no.” These are “more than meaning - sacraments.” That is why, when it becomes church chant, the delight of the soul inevitably takes the form of a peculiar play of concepts. The entire church service, especially the canons and stichera, are filled with this incessantly seething wit of antithetical comparisons and antinomian statements. Contradiction! It is always the secret of the soul, the secret of prayer and love. The closer you are to God, the more pronounced the contradictions. There, in the Jerusalem above, they are not there. Here there are contradictions in everything; and they will not be eliminated by social construction or philosophical arguments. Something great, long desired and yet completely unexpected - a great Unexpected Joy - will suddenly appear, embrace the entire circle of earthly existence, shake it, like a book scroll twists the sky, wash the earth, give new strength, renew everything, transubstantiate everything, show the simplest and most everyday things in the all-blinding brilliance of radiant beauty. Then there will be no contradictions, and there will be no reason tormented by them. And now, the brighter the Truth of the Triradiant Light shines, shown by Christ and reflected in the righteous, the Light in which the contradiction of this age is overcome by love and glory, the more sharply the world’s cracks blacken. Cracks in everything! But I want to talk about cracks in the realm of speculation. There, in heaven, there is one Truth; we have many truths, fragments of Truth, incongruent with each other. In the history of the flat and boring thinking of the “new philosophy”, Kant had the audacity to pronounce the great word “antinomy”, which violated the decency of imaginary unity. For this alone he would deserve eternal glory. There is no need if his own antinomies are unsuccessful: the point is in the experience of antinomy. 232 From the point of view of dogmatism, antinomies are inevitable. If there is sin (and recognizing it is the first half of faith 233), then our entire being, as well as the whole world, is fragmented. Coming from one corner of the world or our mind, we have no reason to expect that we will get the same result as if we came from another corner. The meeting is incredible. The existence of many conflicting schemes and theories, equally conscientious, but coming from different starting points, is the best proof of the cracks in the universe. The mind itself is fragmented and split, and only the purified God-bearing mind of the holy ascetics is somewhat more whole: in it the fusion of fractures and cracks has begun, in it the illness of being is healed, the wounds of the world are healed, for it itself is the healing organ of the world. “You and your friends with whom you are used to talking,” Plato’s Hippius complains to Socrates, “you do not consider things as a whole, but you grab and crush both the beautiful and all other things, crushing them in speeches. That is why such beautiful and naturally integral bodies of essence elude you.” 234 But what the naive Hippius sees as a personal shortcoming of Socrates is in fact a necessary sign of science, as an activity of the intellect. Whatever we undertake, we inevitably fragment what we are considering, split what we study into incompatible aspects. Looking at the same thing from different sides, that is, acting on different sides of spiritual activity, we can come to antinomies, to positions that are incompatible in our mind. Only at the moment of blessed insight are these contradictions in the mind eliminated, but not rationally, but in a super-rational way. Antinomy does not say at all: “Either this or that is not true”; Nor does it say: “Neither one nor the other is true.” She only says: “Both are true, but each in its own way; reconciliation and unity are above reason.” Antinomy - from the fragmentation of being itself - including here reason, as a part of being. As an ideal limit where the contradiction is removed, we set up dogma. But for the mind it is only formal, and only in a state of grace of the soul is it filled with the juice of life and becomes a self-proving Truth. Being a regulative norm for reason, dogma for a mind purified by grace, perceiving revelation, is an intuitively given truth. For reason, dogma is nothing more than a categorical imperative, which states the requirement: “You must think in such a way that every violation of dogma in one direction is immediately nullified by a corresponding violation in the directly opposite direction; all your rational operations on dogma must be carried out in such a way that the basic antinomy of dogma is always preserved in them.” On the contrary, for a mind purified by prayer and asceticism - the ultimate example of which is the mind of a saint - dogma is a self-proving axiom, testifying: “You see both my truth and the inner necessity of being antinomic to me in reason; if now you see dimly, you will see clearly later, when you have purified yourself.” Dogma, as an object of faith, certainly includes rational antinomy. If there is no antinomy, then the position is rationally integral. And then, firstly, this is not a dogma, but a scientific position. There is nothing to believe here; there is nothing to purify oneself and perform a feat for. But it seems to me great blasphemy to think that religious truth, “sacred”, is comprehensible in any internal state, without achievement. True, it can gracefully shine upon an unclean mind in order to attract it, but it cannot be accessible to everyone. So, I repeat, this position is not a dogma. And secondly, consciousness is then incomplete, shallow, and has not peered into the inner essence of the object: after all, we cannot fully think about the essence of a religious object, unable to grasp it with reason without decomposing it. Reason cannot but limit itself to one side of the object. Limitation to one side - this is precisely the meaning of heresy. Heresy, even mystical, is rational one-sidedness, asserting itself like everyone else. Αἵρεσις – choice; election, inclination or disposition towards something, then a chosen one, a chosen way of thinking and, hence, a party, a sect, a philosophical school. 235 In a word, the word αἵρεοις contains the idea of ​​one-sidedness, some kind of straightforward concentration on one of many possible statements. 236 Orthodoxy is universal, but heresy is essentially partisan. The spirit of the sect is the resulting egoism, spiritual isolation: a one-sided position is placed on the basis of unconditional Truth, and thus this position excludes everything that is seen as an antinomic addition to this half of the antinomy, which is rationally incomprehensible. The object of religion, falling from the sky of spiritual experience into the density of the mind, inevitably splits into aspects that exclude each other. The job of the Orthodox, conciliar mind is to collect all the fragments, their completeness, and the heretical, sectarian mind is to choose the fragments that appeal to them: “you need to be many-stringed in order to play the harp of Eternity.” 237 Completeness in unity, completeness integral to the understanding, as has been said, is only postulated. But the condition for the intuitive reality of the postulate is the taming of one’s rational activity and the exit into the grace-filled thinking of the restored, purified and recreated human nature. Christ gave the germ of a new creation, “the seed of God - σπέρμα αὐτοῦ” (1 John 3:9), and a solid point of an immovable rock on which we can stand, saving ourselves from ἐποχή. But coherent completeness is only an aspiration. It will be given only by the One who will wash away all the filth from creation - the Holy Spirit. Dogmas are comprehended by the Spirit, and in Him is the fullness of understanding. In the meantime, the more acute and the more diverse the rational antinomies of faith, the more penetrating and full-bodied the experience itself. And indeed, the Holy Book is full of antinomies. Antinomistically, the judgments of not only different biblical authors intersect (in the Apostle Paul - justification by faith, in the Apostle James - by works, etc.), but also of the same one; and - not only in his different writings, but - in one and the same; and - not only in different places, but - in the same place. Antinomies stand side by side, sometimes in the same verse, and, moreover, in the most powerful places, like a swift wind shaking the soul of a believer, like lightning striking the top of the mind. Only genuine religious experience discerns antinomies and sees how their actual reconciliation is possible; but for the positivistic mind they are not visible, or their sharpness appears to be the literary manner of a paradoxical, or even sick, mind. Take the Apostle Paul. His brilliant religious dialectic consists of a number of kinks, from one affirmation to another; antinomic to him. Sometimes the antinomy is even contained in a stylistic break in the continuity of presentation - in an external asyndeton: rationally contradictory and mutually exclusive judgments are directed against each other. But for immediate perception, in these virgin blocks of “yes” and “no”, piled on top of each other, a higher religious unity is revealed, which can receive its completion in the Holy Spirit. What inner insensitivity, what religious tastelessness it would be to try to reduce all these “yes” and “no” to one plane - to consider this or that layer unimportant! Antinomies belong to the very essence of experience; they are inseparable from them, like the color of a petal from the pigment contained in it. It is like fog written in a painting, like a pattern woven into matter. Wanting to examine the picture more clearly, intending to make the matter smooth, we would in vain begin to erase the fog and pattern: along with them we would have to destroy the very substance of the picture or matter - themselves. So it is in religion. Antinomies are the constitutive elements of religion, if you think about it rationally. Thesis and antithesis, like warp and woof, weave the very fabric of religious experience. Where there is no antinomy, there is no faith: and this will only happen when both faith and hope are abolished, and love alone endures (1 Cor. 13:8). How cold and distant, how godless and callous that time of my life seems to me when I considered the antinomies of religion solvable, but not yet resolved, when in my proud madness I affirmed the logical monism of religion. Selflessness is the only thing that brings us closer to godlikeness. But self-sacrifice in general, and self-sacrifice of reason in particular, is absurdity, nonsense for reason. And it cannot be not-A. “Impossible”, but also “undoubtedly”! From the Self, love makes the non-Self, for true love lies in the renunciation of reason. Enough talking about antinomies in general. I will give you a few specific examples out of countless numbers. First of all, Pavlov's antinomies are striking, the reason for which is very simple. The depth of theosophical speculation in Paul is combined with a dialectical form, while in other sacred writers the form is somewhat aphoristic or systematic. Reason is not predisposed to expect coherence here, and therefore does not immediately notice contradictions behind the aphoristic fragmentation. But dialectical exposition trains the mind to expect coherence, and when coherence is disrupted by the “corner point” where thesis and antithesis converge, the mind involuntarily shudders: this clearly requires self-sacrifice from it. For us, the most suitable is again the most dialectical and most fiery of the Epistles - To the Romans - this explosive bomb against reason, charged with antinomies. Here, as an example, 238 is a table of some antinomies, selected, however, quite randomly and not without a conscious deviation from those of them that are intended for consideration in one of the upcoming books. Examples of dogmatic antinomies Suummet rodit. - He bites his own. The philosopher Jacobi's conviction is well known that Spinoza's pantheism is the only consistent system of rational philosophy and that, consequently, any theistic system is inevitably forced to introduce an irrational element. – Later researchers also expressed the same opinion. “Pantheism,” says one of them, “is as essentially characteristic of any consistent rational philosophy as agnosticism is of any consistent philosophy of empiricism. Strictly rational philosophy and pantheism are identical concepts” (A-ey I. Vvedensky, - Faith in God, its origin and foundation, M., 1891, p. 209). – On pantheism, see: Bogolyubov, – Theism and pantheism and their logical relationship, Nizhny Novgorod, 1899 – Jaesche, – Der Pantheismus, nach seine Hauptformen, Berlin, 1826 3 Bde. – Schuler, – Der Pantheismus, Würzburg, 1884. Vikenty Lirinsky, – First reminder, 2. – Mi lat. pr., T. 50, col. 640. – The work of Vikenty Lirinsky “Reminders” in trans. from lat. language P. Ponomareva, Kazan, 1904, pp. 3–4. – Kant’s “universality and necessity of judgments”, as a sign of their objective scientific significance, is probably nothing more than a “relic” of the church understanding of the catholic, i.e. universal, - according to the translation of Met. Moscow Philareta. (See “God. Weight”, 1912, Dec., p. 685, letter 8 to Bishop Ignatius Brianchaninov) - dogma. Cohen, Urth. d. Ident., SS. 78–87. Alb. Görland, – Index zu H. Cohens Logik d. rein. Erkenntnis, Berlin, 1907. The idea of ​​antinomianism is clearly expressed even in special disciplines - in linguistics: A. Potebnya, - Thought and Language, Kharkov, 1892, 2nd ed.; v. Humboldt. Web. die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbauens (Ges. Wer., T. 6) = W. Humboldt, - On the differences in the organisms of human language and the influence of this difference on the mental development of human language. Per. P. Bilyarsky, St. Petersburg, 1859; N. Steinthal, – Der Ursprung d. Sprache, 2-te Ausg., Berlin, 1838; V. Henry, – Antinomies linguistiques, Paris, 1896 (Bid.. de la Fac. des lettres de Paris, 2); P. I. Zhitetsky, – V. f. Humboldt in philosophical history. linguistics (Vopr. f. i ps., 1900, book 51); in mathematics: Christian Cherfils, – Un essai de religion scientifique, introduction à Wronski, Paris, 1898. pp. 49–60; A. Poincare, – Science and Method, trans. B. Koren, ed. N. A. Gezekhus, St. Petersburg, 1910, Part 2, Ch. V, § 5, pp. 154–155, and § XII, pp. 161–163; Entry article Φ. Φ. Linda to Russian lane book L. Couture, – Philos. principles of mathematics, trans. B. Korenya, St. Petersburg, 1913; I. [I.] Zhegalkin, - Transfinite numbers, M., 1907, § 440, pp. 342–345; Gerhard Hessenberg, – Grundbegriffe d. Mengenlehre, Göttingen, 1906 (= "Abh. d. Fries'schen Schule" Bd. I, Hfl. 4), Kap. XXIII-XXIV, § 93–99, SS. 621–635; Bern. Bolzano, – Paradoxien d. Unendlichen, Lpz., 1851 u. 2-te Aus., Berlin, 1889 = B. Bolzano, – Paradoxes of the Infinite, trans. edited by I. V. Sleshinsky, Odessa, 1911. Stolz, – Bern. Bolzano's Bedeutung, in d. Gesch. d. Infinitesimalrechnung (“Math. An.”, Bd. 8, 1881); in theology: the antinomies of Christianity are especially emphasized by D. S. Merezhkovsky (“Collected works”); cm. also: Kant, - Religion within the limits of reason alone, III 7; in physics and mechanics; in metaphysics (especially see the works of Renouvier); in sociology (some of it is collected in the works of Kareev); in logic; in ethics: Kant, – Kr. pr. times., V; in aesthetics: Kant, – Kr. sp. judgments, §§ 55–57, etc., etc. See [234, 237]. Fundamentally, this “velle credendi” is a super-temporal act, for the general tone of the entire character of the individual is based on it. But whether this super-temporal velle opens up in time in the form of a system of necessarily arising desires, or whether they contain breakthroughs into the world of freedom, or finally, at each moment a new, additional self-determination is not excluded - these questions are not at all significant for us now, since the position of the bl. Augustine. We find a remarkable distinction between the concepts of believing and believing in: D. [A.] Kh. [omyakov], - Orthodoxy (as an educational, everyday, personal and social principle), M., 1907, pp. 95–96: “In the Russian language there are two words that come from the same root, expressing one concept, but conveying two shades of it, which escape in all other (at least Aryan) languages, and which are of enormous importance for the precise expression of man’s relationship to the Church, visible and invisible. These words are: “I believe” and “I believe.” They correspond to the nouns faith and belief. Belonging to the Invisible Church is determined by the possession of faith; The visible Church only requires “to believe.” “I believe in one God the Father,” etc. It doesn’t say – I believe, because, in essence, a person can never say to himself that he believes.” “Only in Russian the Gospel “I believe, Lord, help my unbelief!” comes out quite clearly. The first “father” could say about himself; whereas for faith he could only pray that it would be granted to him” (id., note 1st). “The mystical Church has the true faith; The earthly, visible church has and requires only belief, because, of course, it does not have the means to judge faith, known only to God alone” (id., p. 96). On logistics: V.V. Bobynin, – Experiments in the mathematical presentation of logic. M., vol. I. – 1886, issue. II – 1894. – M. Volkov, – Logich. Calculus, St. Petersburg, 1888. - L. Liar, - Modern English. logic. M., 1902. – P. Poretsky, – From the field of mathematics. logic. M, 1902. - His own, - On methods for solving logical equalities, etc., Kazan, 1884. - L. Couture, - Algebra of Logic, trans. I. Sleshinsky, Odessa, 1909. – I. I. Yagodinsky, – Genetic method in logic, Kazan, 1909, pp. 148–156, 264–282. – S. Jevons, – Fundamentals of Science, trans. M. Antonovich, St. Petersburg, 1881 (on pp. I-XVII - an outline of the history of symbolic methods in logic and some bibliography). – A. Poincare, – Science and Method; here - not deprived. interest, but largely unfair criticism of logistics. – E. Schröder, – Vorlesungen üb. die Algebra d. Logik, Lpz., Bd. I, 1890, SS. 709–715 – bibliography; Bd. II - 1891. - A. N. Whitehead, - Universal Algebra, 1898. - Bert. Russel, – The principles of Mathematics, Vol. I, singular – Α. N. Whitehead and B. Russel, – Principia mathematics, Vol. I. Cambridge, 1910. - W. Russel-Longmans, - Philosophical Essays, London, 1910. - Works of Schroeder, Whitehead and Russel - capital; Moreover, they are arranged here in order of increasing breadth of view, namely as presentations of logistics: on the foundations of the theory of classes, the theory of relations and the theory of propositional functions. – A simpler presentation of the named books in: L. Couturat, – Les principes des mathématiques, Paris, 1905. There is a Russian. lane – H. Dufumier, – La Philosophie des Mathématiques de M. M. Russel et Whitehead (“Rev. de Metaph. et de Morale”, 20th an., 1912, No. 4, Juil., pp. 538–566). – To get acquainted with the Italian school: Formulaire des Mathématiques, publié par G. Peano, T. 2, Torino, 1899; T. 3, Paris, 1901. – C. Burali-Forti, – Sur les différentes méthodes logiques pour la définition du nombre réel (“Bid.. du Congrès intern. de philos.”, Paris, 1901, T. 3, p. 289 s.). – Couturat.Chide, – La logique avant les logiciens (“Rev. Philos.”, 31-me an., 1906, No. 8, Aüt). – A. Lalande, – Le mouvement logique (id., 32-me an., 1907, No. 3, Mars). G. H. Luquet, – Logique ration. et psycholog. (id., 31-me an., 1906, No. 12, Dec.). – A. Rey, – Ce que devient la logique (id., 29-me an., 1904, No. 6, Juin). – P. Hermant et A. van de Waele. – Hugh Mac Coll, La Logique symbol. et ses applic. (“Bid.. du congr. intern. de philos.”, 1901, T. 3, pp. 135–183). – W. E. Johnson, – Sur la theory des equation log. (id., pp. 185–199). – P. Poretskii, – Théorie des egalités à trois termes (id., pp. 201–233). – His, – Exposé élémentaire de la théorie des égalités log. à deux termes (“Rev. de Met. et de Mor.”, T. 8, 1900, Mars, p. 169s.). – His, – Sept lois fondamentales de la théorie des égalités logiques, Kazan, 1899. Couturat, – Pr. d. Math., p. 9. Euclidean began three books - trans. from Greek F. Petrushevsky, St. Petersburg. 1835, pp. 103–105, book. IX, sentence XII. Sextus Empiricus, - Feast. main., II, 185–192 and 130–133 (Sex. Em., pp. 99–101, 930–31); His own. Against mathematicians. VIII, 463–481 and 278 ff. (id., pp. 387–391 and 251). – Wed. R. Richter, p. 127. Vl systematically used this technique. Soloviev, trying to smash skepticism along the entire line: Kr. otvl. beginning, note 5th (“Collected works”, T. 2, pp. 341–346). The first clash between Pigasov and Rudin. I. S. Turgenev, – Rudin, II. - “Soch.”, M, 1880, T. 3, p. 28 and further pp. 28–31. G. Vailati, – Di un’opera dimenticata del P. Girolamo Saccheri (Logica demonstrativa, 1697) (“Rivista filosophica”, 1903, sept.–oct.). - His same. Sur une classe de raisonnements par l’absurde (“Rev. de Met”, 1904, nov.). Links no, p. 36, an. 1. Vailati. – id. – Formula – from [2I2], p. 36. T. Gompertz, – Greek thinkers, trans. from 2nd German ed. E. Gertsyk and D. Zhukovsky, T. I, St. Petersburg. 1911, Part 3, I, pp. 239–240. I use the translation of fragments, done. G. F. Tsereteli and attached. to Russian lane books: P. Tannery, - The first steps of ancient Greek science, St. Petersburg. 1902, suppl., pp. 59–66. – Text of fragments: Fr. G. A. Mullachius, – Fragmenta philosophorum graec. [T. I], Parisiis, 1875, pp. 315–329. - H. Diels, - Doxographi graeci, Berolini, 1879. - After the present book was written, a department was published. ed. from the translation phragm.: Heraclitus of Ephesus, – Fragments. Per. Vl. Nylender, ed. "Musaget", M, 1910. “Sometimes he (Spinoza) also allowed himself, as a little entertainment, to smoke a pipe of tobacco, or when he wanted to give his mind a longer rest, he caught and set off several spiders or threw flies into the web; and watching the struggle of insects gave him such pleasure that, looking at it, he burst into loud laughter" (I. Kolerus, - The Life of B. de Spinoza. - Correspondence of B. de Spinoza with a biography attached. - Translated from Latin. L. Ya. Gurevich, ed. and with notes by A. L. Volynsky, St. Petersburg 1891, p. 20). Justin Phil., – An. I 46. – Mi gr., T. 6, col. 397 C. His same, – An. II 8. – id. 457 A. The mysterious word ἀγχιβασίη, translated by Tsereteli through “contradiction,” is conveyed by Nylender through “approach,” apparently deriving it from ἄγχι = ἐγγύς, near and βαίνω – I’m going. Ancient lexicographers explain: ἀγχιβάτης· ὁ πλήσιον βαίνων and ἀγχιβατεῖν ἐγγὺς βεβηκέναι. The newest lexicographer destroys the dispute, declaring the words ἀγχιβατεῖν and ἀγχι(σ)βασίη simply for damaged readings attributed by Svido to the Ionians and Heraclitus instead of ἀμφιβατεῖν and ἀμφιρβασίην. The reason for the damage was, according to him, the writing ἀνφι vm. ἀμφι (Henr. van Herverden. Lexicon Graecum suppletorium et dialecticum. Lugduni Batavorum, 1902, p. 14). But, no matter how this complex question about the “contradiction” fragment is resolved, if such a fragment did not exist, then “il faudrait l’inventer.” Nicolaus de Cusa [Nicolaus Chrypffs, i.e. Krebs], - Opera, Parisiis, 1514, or, other ed., Basileae, 1565. - This is op. rel. by 1453 W. James, – The Universe from a Pluralistic Point of View. Per. from English B. Osipov and O. Gumera, ed. G. G. Shpeta, M., 1911. - L. Shestov. The apotheosis of groundlessness. St. Petersburg, 1905. – J.-H. Boex-Borel (J.-N. Rosny aîné), – Le pluralisme. Essai sur la discontinuité et l’étérogénéité des phénoménes (“Bibl. de philos. cont.”). Retz. in Rev. Phil.", 34-me an., 1909, No. 12 Dec. James, - Diversity, p. 68. More details in: P. Florensky. Cosmological antinomies of I. Kant. Sergiev Posad, 1909 (= “Bog. Vest.”, 1909, No. 4). A bibliography is also given there, but it needs to be completed: L. Couturat, – De l’Infini Mathém., Paris, 1896, 2nd partie, liv. IV, Chp. IV, pp. 556–580, esp. see pp. 556–580, §,§ 10–20. F. Evellin, - Infini et quantité, Paris, 1880. - G. Lechalas, - Etude sur l'éspace et le temps, Paris, 1896, chp. V. “Toute la foi consiste en Jesus Christ et en Adam; et toute la morale en la concupiscence et en la grâce" (Pensées de Pascal, ed. variorum etc., Paris. 1858, p, 354, Chp. 24.4). Plat., - Hippias the Greater. 301B; Vol., I, pp. 753–754. – Translation almost from: A. N. Gilyarov, – Review of works on history. Greek Philosopher for 1892–1896, Kyiv, 1896, p. 11. – The translation is less expressive. M. S. Solovyova (Tvor. Plat., trans. Vl. Solovyov et al., T. 2, M., 1903, p. 132). Simasiology of the word αἵρεσις and a collection of corresponding ones. for quotes, see: N. Stephanus, – Tesaurus Graecae linguae, post. ed. anglicam novi G. R. L. de Sinner et T. Fix, Parisiis, 1831, Vol. I, coll. 1025–1027: αἵρεσις – electio vel optio, δοκιμασία, κρίσις; conditio (καλῇ αἰρέσις – bonis conditionibis); γνώμη, animus, h. e. voluntas et propositum; de studio litterarum (Ἐλληνική αἵρεσις), consilium, ratio instituti, mores; studium; secta, dogma, quum de philosophis dicitur; opinio de aliquo dogmate firmatum; philosophical school; – dogma pravum de iis, quae ad christianorum religionem pertinent; dogma orthodoxae fidei non consonum. – On the concept of αἵρεσις, see also: V.V. Bolotov, – Lectures on the history of the ancient church. See ed. edited by A. Brilliantova, St. Petersburg, 1910, pp. 348–349, 163. In the article “Heresy” (“Prav. Bog. Enz., ed. ed. † A. Lopukhin”, Petrograd, 1904, T. 5, columns 489–490), the author correctly emphasizes the moment of proud isolation in the later use of αἵρεσις; but his attempt to prove that this point was always implied in the indicated is hardly sound. word. – Wed. Herzog's Real-Encykl, Bd. 5, 2-te Aufl. A. Bely, – Symbolism. M., 1910, p. 30. – If the word “understand” is understood in its rational meaning, as the subordination of what is understood - to the laws of reason - then God is something completely incomprehensible. “All our concepts about God are nothing more than idols and idols, prohibited by the ten words” (Grig. Nis., - Sl. 7th, Mi gr., T. 44, col. 729 B; Russian paragraph 2, p. 331). “Whoever, having seen God, understood what he saw, this means that he did not see Him” (id., On the Life of Moses, T. 44, col. 377 B; Russian paragraph, part I, p. 317). “The word about God is the more perfect the more incomprehensible it is” (Grig. Theologian, - Sl. Theologian. 11 21. Mi gr., T. 36, col. 53 B. - Russian p., part 3, p. 29). Etc. When compiling the table, I used in part: F.W. Farrar, - Life and Works of St. ap. Paul, trans. from XIX English ed. A.I. Lopukhina, St. Petersburg, 1887, appendix. XX, pp. 451–459. – J. Bovon, – Théologie du Nouveau Testament, T. I, Lausanne, 1893, p. 514. – Here are several randomly taken excerpts from the prayer book, in which the antinomian addition is quite clearly visible: “- we embody in an unfused connection” - (Sunday trop., ch. 4); “Rejoice, you who combined virginity and Christmas” (Akath. B.M.); “Virginity is foreign to mothers, and childbearing is strange to virgins: on You, Mother of God, the two are settled” (canon Rozhd. Bogor., Irm. 9); “Thou art high in humility, rich in poverty” (trop. Nik. Miracle), etc. The most thoughtful mystical viewers were inclined to impart an antithetical flavor to their statements. Thus, we read from the three Theologians: “There are three who testify in heaven: the Father, the Word and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one” (1 John 5:7); “God is divided, that is, inseparably, and combined separately; because there is one in three, and three are one” (Grig. God. - Creation, Part III, p. 215); “The three persons of the Divinity are one, God, who is divided inseparably according to hypostases and united inextricably according to the unity of a single nature - all one in three hypostases, and all three in coherent unity” (Simeon N.B., - Words, Issue II, p. 104).