IV. Письмо третье: Триединство

“The Trinity is consubstantial and inseparable, the unit is trinitarian and co-essential” - this is the only scheme that promises to resolve ἐποχή, if only the question of skepticism can be satisfied at all. Only Pyrrhonism would not have melted it if it had met it realized in experience. If there can be Truth at all, then this is the way to it, and the only one. But whether it is actually passable, whether it is not only a requirement of reason, although necessary and inevitable for reason, is not clear. The only possible idea of ​​truth for reason has been found; However, don’t we risk being left with only one idea - that’s the question. The truth is undoubtedly what we said about it; but whether it exists at all, we don’t know. This question is next in line. But, before moving forward in the study of our present question, I will explain the idea of ​​the Trinitarian God, which we have hitherto spoken of in philosophical terms, in the language of theology. The idea of ​​consubstantiality, as is known, is expressed by the term ὁμοούσιος, homoousios. Around him and because of him, in essence, all Trinitarian disputes took place. To look closely at the history of these debates means to survey all the colors and all the shades with which the idea of ​​consubstantiality was painted. But I can spare myself the trouble by referring to the History of Dogmatic Controversies. 55 As is known, neither secular pagan writing nor pre-Nicene church writing knew the difference between the words οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, which were subsequently regarded as termini technici; in philosophical usage, οὐσία was certainly equated with ὑπόστασις. This was the case even in the 5th century. according to R. X. There is every reason to think that the fathers of the First Ecumenical Council accepted the words “hypostasis” and “essence” as equivalent and did not at all have in mind the difference between them that was introduced by later thought. St. Athanasius the Great uses them as equivalent and, even 35 years after the Council of Nicaea, he decisively asserts in one of his letters that “hypostasis is essence and designates nothing other than the essence itself.” The old generation of Nicenes stood on the same ground as Athanasius. 56 And at the end of the 4th century bl. Jerome, in a letter to Pope Damasus, definitely says that “the school of secular sciences does not know any other meaning of the word hypostasis than essence (usian).” 57 But it is also known that in later theology, both terms began to be distinguished. Distinguishable - yes, but are they different in content? Undoubtedly, they are distinguished in relation to each other, just as “right” is distinguished in relation to “left”; and “left” - with “right”, but, I ask, are their contents different, regardless of themselves? Is it correct to say that one term (hypostasis, ὑπόστασις) means the individual, while the other (essence, οὐσία) means the general? – Here the answer, first of all, can be the fact that a pair of words was chosen that coincide in every possible way in content. Why is this so? - Only because what they designate logically differs from each other only relatively, mutually, but not in itself, not about itself. If we allow ourselves a rough comparison, the contents of the terms under consideration relate to each other, like an object and its mirror image, like a hand and its friend, like a right-handed crystal and a left-handed crystal, etc. In all these cases, the essential difference of one object from another is perceived quite clearly, but logically cannot be characterized otherwise than through a reference to another object: in perception the same thing is not given, but when we are asked in what way, namely, difference, then we cannot actually help but identify what differs and are formally forced to recognize identity. 58 So it is with regard to the terms “hypostasis” and “essence”. After all, “being one” means the concrete unity of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, but not a nominal unity; ὁμοούσιος among Athanasius and the older Niceneans is directly equivalent to ἐκ οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός. But if so, then ὑπόστασις, so to speak, the personal essence of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, since each of them is considered separately from the others, without merging in the least with the other ὑπόστασις, at the same time inseparable from it. If terminologically, formally, the word ὑπόστασις has become fundamentally different from οὐσία, then meaningfully, in its logical meaning, ὑπόστασις remains resolutely the same as οὐσία. This is where the immeasurable greatness of the Nicene fathers was expressed, that they dared to use sayings that were completely identical in meaning, having conquered reason by faith, and, thanks to a bold takeoff, gaining the power to express even with pure verbal clarity the inexpressible mystery of the Trinity. From here it is clear that any attempts to distinguish between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, to give each of them an independent logical position, not inter-relative, outside the context of dogma, inevitably had to lead and in fact led to the rationalization of dogma, to the “section of the Insectless”, 59 to the so-called tritheism or tri-divine heresy. Since ancient times, the accusation of tritheism has hung over the heads of the Cappadocians. Of course it is unfair; but it is deeply significant. The Omiusians marked themselves with an even greater bias towards rationalism. Ὁμοούσιος, omiusios or ὅμοιος κατ’ οὐσίαν means “of the same essence”, “with the same essence”, and even if it was given the meaning ὅμοιος κατὰ πάντα, “the same in everything” - everything is one - it can never mean numeric, that is, numerical and concrete unity, which ὁμοούσιος indicates. The entire power of the mysterious dogma is established at once by a single word ὁμοούσιος, sovereignly pronounced at the Council of 318, because in it, in this word, there is an indication of both real unity and real difference. It is impossible to remember without reverent trembling and sacred horror that endlessly significant and unique moment of philosophical and dogmatic importance when the thunder “Ὁμοούσιος” first rumbled over the City of Victory. Here it was not a question of a special theological issue, but of the fundamental self-determination of the Church of Christ. And in a single word “ὁμοούσιος” not only the Christological dogma was expressed, but also the spiritual assessment of the rational laws of thinking. Here reason was struck to death. Here, urbi et orbi, a new beginning of the activity of the mind was first announced. Let us remember, in fact, what is the whole Christian life-understanding? – Development of a musical theme, which is a system of dogmas, dogmatics. What is dogmatics? – Dismembered Creed. What is the Creed? - Yes, nothing more than an overgrown baptismal formula - “In the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.” Well, the latter is undoubtedly an expansion of the word ὁμοούσιος. Considering the branched and wide-shaded mustard tree of the Christian understanding of life as an overgrown grain of the idea of ​​“consistency” is not only a logical possibility. No, historically this is exactly how it was. The term ὁμοούσιος expresses this antinomic grain of the Christian understanding of life, this single name (“in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit”, and not “in the names” 60) of the Three Hypostases. 61 The locus of Omyusian rationalization was largely philosophical aspirations. That is why, the ascetic and spiritual ascetic Athanasius the Great, who, moreover, perhaps by definition from above, did not receive a philosophical education and, in any case, internally broke with everything that was not of faith, was able to mathematically accurately express what eluded even in a later era an exact expression for the minds of the intelligentsia. And it is remarkable how much effort the Cappadocians had to expend - they were proud of their university years! - to resist the philosophical terminology that pulled them towards trithesim. “The community of nature (κοινωνία), according to the meaning of all the terminology of the Cappadocians,” states A. A. Spassky, 62, “does not yet speak of the real existence of the essence and does not guarantee its numerical unity. Nature in the Divinity and in people may be one, but it finds its concrete fulfillment in the hypostases.” Despite this tritheistic tone of their writings, the Cappadocians were completely Orthodox at heart and it is clear that their inner understanding went immeasurably beyond imprecise words. As if correcting himself, in the 38th letter, Basil the Great declares: “Do not be surprised if we say that the same thing is both united and divided, and if we imagine mentally, as if in fortune-telling, some new and extraordinary division united, and unity divided” 63 . And Gregory of Nyssa in his “Great Catechetical Instruction” decisively rises above reason: “Whoever delves into the depths of the sacrament with precision, although he embraces some modest in its incomprehensibility concept of divine knowledge, he cannot, however, understand in words this ineffable depth of the sacrament: how one and the same thing is numerable and avoids counting, and is visibly divided and is contained in one, and is distinguishable in hypostasis and not divisible in the subject" 64 . Thus, the last formula of “one essence” and “three hypostases” is acceptable only insofar as it simultaneously identifies and distinguishes the terms “hypostasis” and “essence”, that is, insofar as it again leads to the purely mystical, super-logical teaching of the old Nicenes or to the word ὁμοούσιος. And on the contrary, any attempt to rationally interpret the indicated formula by investing in the terms οὐσία and ὑπόστασις of different content inevitably leads either to Sabellianism or to tritheism. Pre-Athanasian theology - the theology of apologists who relied on ancient philosophy, fell into the error of the first kind (various types of monarchianism), placing disproportionate weight in the unity of the Divine essence and thereby depriving the hypostases of their own existence. It either subordinated the Son and the Holy Spirit to the Father, or merged the hypostases. Post-Athanasian theology, which also bound itself to ancient terms, sinned in the opposite direction, since, in contrast to apologetic monarchianism, it overly insisted on the independence of hypostases and thereby fell into tritheism. If the first tended to turn into visibility the hypostatic plurality of the Divine, then the second undoubtedly tended to destroy His essential unity. The balance of both principles is found in Athanasius. His theology is the point where the error, before the doctrine moves from “-” to “+”, becomes strictly zero. And therefore Athanasius the Great, one might say, is the exceptional bearer of church consciousness regarding what is being considered - the dogma of the Trinity. Perhaps after him theology was improved in particular matters, but which of the later fathers in the era of the Councils had such a mathematically precise balance of the two principles and who more clearly demonstrated the super-logicality of the dogma than this champion of consubstantiality, the saint, the most Orthodox of the Orthodox. “Among the defenders of the Council of Nicea,” says A. A. Spassky, 65, “Athanasius took an exceptional place; he was not only their leader, but also an indicator of their position in the church. All intrigues directed against the Nicene symbol usually began with Athanasius; the expulsion was a clear symptom of the increasing reaction; its triumph was the triumph of the Council of Nicea and its doctrine. We can say that Athanasius carried the Nicene symbol on his shoulders from the storm of doubts it caused in the East. It is not for nothing that the later generation of Nicene people called him the savior of the church and the pillar of Orthodoxy.” It is not without reason, I will add, that Gregory the Theologian does not find words strong enough to praise the Great Alexandrian. He is “a blessed man, truly a man of God, and a great trumpet of truth,” he “has put an end to the malaise” of the Church, he is a “courageous champion of the Word” and a “builder of souls.” It is not without reason that “the ascetics considered it to be the greatest acquisition for their wisdom to endure something very difficult for Athanasius; they considered it much more pleasing to God and above long fasts, reclining on the bare ground and other hard sufferings in which they always delight” 66 . “The most holy eye of the universe, the bishop of the priests, the mentor in confession, this great voice, the pillar of faith, this - so to speak - second lamp and forerunner of Christ, who died in a good old age, full of noble days, after slander, after exploits, after much rumor about the hand, after the living dead, the Trinity, for which he lived, and for which suffered adversity." “I am sure,” adds Gregory the Theologian, “that by this description everyone will recognize Athanasius.” 67 And indeed, he was always on guard. When they tried to counterfeit the ὁμοούσιος in a very subtly rationalistic way, Athanasius hastens to warn Jovian about those who “pretend to profess the Nicene faith, but deny it in the very truth, reinterpreting the phrase “consubstantial”,” and without hesitation calls them Arians. And here’s why: he understands, as Gregory the Theologian said, that “together with the syllables, the ends of the universe will fall apart,” that there cannot be a small deviation here, that any seemingly subtle rationalization of a dogma makes it salt, that one cannot talk about the distortion of a dogma when the eternal Pillar of Truth is replaced by dust carried in the wind along the roads. “The Nicene fathers,” Athanasius himself wrote, “must be respected, otherwise those who do not accept the symbol should be recognized rather by everyone, but not by Christians.” The whole meaning of the dogma is in the Athanasian establishment of ὁμοούσιος, and outside of “consistency” is only the vanity of human, restless opinions. That is why rude Rome also did not give in to any tricks, and all the flattering, wise speeches of the Eastern Semi-Arians, like noisy waves, crashed against the stone of faith - about Rome’s adamant demand to return to the Nicene symbol. Let me return to the question of skepticism. In order for the law of identity to be given not only as a dull root of reason, but in order to get rid of the empiricism of reason, which is in no way better than the empiricity of sensibility, it would be necessary to go beyond the limits of reason, to enter the region where reason with all its norms is rooted. This means that it would be necessary to carry out in experience a synthesis of the irrelatable and the relation, the first and the inferential, rest and motion, unity and infinity, etc. Reason does not accept these combinations. Where every A is A and only A, the desired synthesis is absolutely impossible. If it is possible at all, then only beyond the limits of the mind, and for the mind the synthesis once obtained will be thought of as the ideal limit of the mind, as an otherworldly, transcendental, transcendental formation for it - as a regulatory principle. But, when trying to embrace this synthesis, reason, by its very structure, cannot perceive its integrity and inevitably decomposes it into incompatible, opposing terms. Coincidentia oppositorum uncontrollably disintegrates and disintegrates into mutually exclusive opposita. And if so, then it will be hopeless for the mind either to eliminate one of the terms in favor of the other, or to rhythmically alternate them - a struggle similar to the struggle of multi-colored visual fields in a stereoscope. One or the other, but not synthesis! By the way, the victory of one term over another will correspond to one or another heresy, and the alternation of fields will correspond to the rational “Orthodoxy” of textbooks, which in reality is false Orthodoxy, which is a bouquet of incompatible heresies. In our search for authenticity, we came across a combination of terms that does not and cannot have meaning for reason. “Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity” does not mean anything to the mind, if only we take this expression with its true content, which does not pander to reason; this is a kind of √2. And, nevertheless, the very existing norm of reason, i.e., the law of identity and the law of sufficient reason, leads us to such a combination, demands that it have its own meaning, that it be the starting point of all knowledge. Condemning itself, reason demands the Trinity in Unity, but cannot contain It. And in order to experience this requirement, this postulate of reason (if it can be experienced at all!), reason must think about it, must build itself a new norm. For the latter, it is necessary to overcome reason - the only thing we have, although not justified: Divine wisdom and human wisdom collided. Therefore, reason on its own would never have come to the possibility of such a combination. Only the authority of “He Who Has Power” can be a reference point for efforts. 68 Having trusted and believed that here, in this effort, there is Truth, the mind must renounce its limitations within the limits of reason, abandon the isolation of rational constructs and turn to a new norm - become a “new” mind. This is where free feat is required. Free: for the mind can make an effort and rise to the better, or it may not make it, remaining with the finite, conditional and “good” that it already has. Feat: for it requires effort, tension, self-denial, throwing off the “old Adam” from oneself, and at this time everything given – “natural”, finite, familiar, conditional – pulls towards itself. You need self-overcoming, you need faith. If the “fearless Heart of immutable Truth – ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμές ἦτορ”, for which Parmenides yearned, 69 is achievable at all, then the path to Him will not avoid the Gethsemane feat faith. Arians and Orthodox Christians are a typical case when two positions are clearly opposed to each other. “While the Orthodox,” writes one researcher 70, “posed the question of whether it is necessary to think in God three actual Persons, three indivisible unities of the Divine Essence, and answered this question with a categorical statement, the Arians asked: is it possible to think of the trinity of the Divine Persons, with the indivisible unity of their essence, and answered no, it is impossible.” When performing the feat of faith, the Orthodox were looking for what was due, the highest; The Arians, internally protecting themselves, prudently asked: “Will the Truth require sacrifice from us?” and, seeing the garden of Gethsemane, they backed away: Both of them made a free choice; however, the Arians used their freedom to serve themselves as slaves, and the Orthodox used their freedom to free themselves from the captivity of carnal limitations. “You dare to teach and think the impossible,” wrote Eunomius to Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa about the Christological dogma. 71 This is the cry of carnality, the cry of reason, walking through the elements of the world and selfishly trembling for its integrity - reason, satisfied with itself, despite its complete internal decay, reason, in its boundless fear of the slightest pain, daring to adapt the Truth itself to itself, to its blind and senseless standards. But for animal fear for oneself there is only one remedy - a scourge. “He who has authority” raised him above his corrupt mind: “Truly, truly, I say to you: Unless a grain of wheat falls into the ground and dies, it remains alone; and if he dies, he will bear much fruit; He who loves his life will lose it, but he who hates his life in this world will keep it to eternal life” (John 12:24, 25). Those who do not want to destroy their soul, let them remain in Gehenna, in the unquenchable fire ἐποχή, “where their worm does not die, and their fire is not quenched.” So, the starting point is complete trust and complete volitional victory over the attraction to carnality, over the hesitations that keep us from rising upward, from captivating the mind into obedience to faith. While bleeding, I will say in tension: “Credo, quia absurdum est. I don’t want anything, I don’t want anything of my own, I don’t even want reason, You alone, Only You. Die animae meae: salus tua Ego sum! However, not mine, but Your will be done. Trinity One, have mercy on me!” 72 This necessary stage of personal development is typically represented in the history of the Church by the 2nd century and is involuntarily associated with the name of Tertullian, who with his fiery personality expressed in purity the first stage of faith: Credo quia absurdum. 73 I believe despite the groans of reason, I believe precisely because in the very hostility of reason to my faith I see the guarantee of something new, something unheard of and higher. I will not descend into the depths of reason, no matter what fears it intimidates me with. I have already seen that, while remaining sane, I perish in ἐποχή; I want to be reckless now. And in response to his flattering assurances, I will shout: “You’re lying! I’ve heard it a thousand times already!” and then let the merciless scourge whistle. Blessed is he who still preserves the sign the customs of the fathers, their dark traditions, responded with a tear to the singing of a psalm; who, by will, tearing away the doubts of the mind, reads the Holy Bible with tenderness, and, listening to the church bells, in the night, with reverence, lit it with prayer before the holy image the treasured candle, and wept before him. Then, having risen to a new level, ensuring that I cannot slip onto the rational plane, I say to myself: Now I believe and hope to understand what I believe. Now I will not transform the infinite and eternal into the finite and temporary, the highest unity will not disintegrate into incompatible moments. Now I see that my faith is the source of higher understanding, and that in it reason receives depth.” And, resting from the difficulty I have experienced, I calmly repeat after Anselm of Canterbury: “Credo ut intelligam. At first I thought I “knew” something; After the fracture, I began to “believe.” Now I know because I believe.” It took 9 centuries for humanity to reach this state. And having said this, I move on to the third stage. I understand my faith. I see that it is the worship of the “Known God,” 74 which I not only believe, but also know. The boundaries of knowledge and faith merge. Intellectual barriers melt and flow; the whole mind is transformed into a new essence. And I, joyful, cry out; “Intelligo ut credam! Thank God for everything. “Now we see, as if through a dark glass, fortune-telling, but then - face to face; Now I know in part, but then I will know just as I knew myself 75 (1 Cor. 13:12).” – Humanity needed another 9 centuries to rise to this level. These are the three stages of faith, both in phylogenesis and ontogenesis. But in describing them, I got ahead of myself. It is necessary to turn around and reveal what the last stage of faith in the Holy Trinity consists of - in other words, how the truth of the dogma is actually experienced, how ἐποχή is resolved. By the feat of faith, the rational “absurdity” of dogma was overcome, defeated and overthrown. It is realized that there is a source of knowledge in it. But the ultimate goal is its givenness. The latter has, in the conditions of earthly life, two stages: symbolic knowledge and direct knowledge, although not complete. The feat of faith is to move from the given assertoric truth of the world to the apodictic, but not yet given, Truth of dogma, to prefer the doubtful, although present, “here” to the reliable, but not yet present, “there.” The law of identity and its highest form are understood by us in their possibility. The requirement to perceive the reality of this possibility means the need to move out of the realm of concepts into the realm of living experience. Reasonable intuition would be the last all-resolving link in the chain of conclusions. Without it, we revolve in the area of ​​postulates and prerequisites for reliable knowledge - inevitable, it is true, but we do not see whether they are satisfied. The entire chain, thrown towards the sky, hung in the air for a moment, and for a moment hardened in a standing position. But if it doesn’t catch on “there”, then with an ominous clang and roar it will fall back on our head. Or perhaps there is no Truth at all? – Then all reality turns into an absolutely senseless and insane nightmare, and we are forced from a reasonable, but painful ἐποχή to move on to an insane and ultimately painful agony, forever suffocating, forever dying without Truth. One way or another, there is a tertium non datur between the Triune Christian God and dying in madness. Please note: I am not writing this exaggeratedly, but to the point of precision; I don’t even have enough words to express myself even more sharply. There is no gap, not even a hair's breadth, between eternal life in the depths of the Trinity and the second eternal death. Either one or the other. In fact: reason, in its constitutive logical norms, is either completely absurd, insane to its finest structure, composed of unsubstantiated and therefore completely random elements, or it has its basis in the super-logical. One thing: either it is necessary to accept the fundamental contingency of the laws of logic, or it is inevitable to recognize the super-logical basis of these norms - a basis, from the point of view of reason itself, postulatively necessary, but thereby having an antinomian temperament for reason. Both of these take us beyond the limits of reason. But the first corrupts reason, introducing eternally insane agony into consciousness, and the second strengthens it with the feat of self-overcoming - the cross, which for reason is an absurd rejection of itself from itself. Faith, by which we are saved, is the beginning and end of the cross and co-crucifixion with Christ. But faith - what is called “reasonable” - that is, “with evidence from reason”, faith according to Tolstoy’s formula: “I want to understand in such a way that every inexplicable situation appears to me as a necessity of reason”, 76 - such faith is a callous, evil, hard and stony growth in the heart that does not allow it to God - sedition against God, a monstrous creation of human egoism, which wants to subjugate God to yourself. There are many types of atheism, but the worst of them is the so-called “reasonable,” or, more precisely, rational faith. The worst, because in addition to non-recognition of the object of faith (“invisible things”), it also reveals hypocrisy in itself, recognizes God in order to reject His very essence - “invisibility”, i.e. super-rationality. “What is “reasonable faith”?” – I ask myself. I answer: ““Reasonable faith” is vileness and stench before God.” You will not believe it until you deny yourself, your law. And “reasonable faith” precisely does not want to reject the self, and in addition claims that it knows the Truth. But without denying herself, she can only have herself. Truth is known through oneself, no other way; in order to know the Truth, you must have it, and for this you must stop being only yourself and partake of the Truth itself. “Reasonable faith” is the beginning of devilish pride, the desire not to accept God into oneself, but to present oneself as God - imposture and self-will. Refusal for God from monism in thinking is the beginning of faith. Monistic continuity is the banner of the seditious reason of the creature, torn away from its Beginning and Root and crumbling into the dust of self-affirmation and self-destruction. Dualistic discontinuity is the banner of reason, which destroys itself for the sake of its Origin and, in unity with It, receives its renewal and its strength. 77 In the opposition of the two passwords there is the opposition of a creature that dares to desire to take the place of the Creator and inevitably falls from Him into the agony of eternal destruction, and a creature that humbly accepts eternal deification from the Truth: “Behold the handmaid of the Lord, let it be done to me according to Your word.” But - so, if the Truth exists. The last condition, like an outpost at a bridge, stands at the transition to the region of Truth. Between the already traversed area of ​​knowledge in concepts, knowledge of Truth (postulative, and therefore presumptive) and the assumed, required area of ​​knowledge in intuition, knowledge of Truth (essential, including its justification, and therefore absolute) lies an abyss that cannot be bypassed by any detours, over which there is no strength to jump by any effort. After all, we need to step onto a completely new land, of which we have no mention. We don’t even know whether this new earth actually exists - we don’t know, for the spiritual blessings that we seek lie outside the realm of carnal knowledge: they are “what eye has not seen, and ear has not heard, and what has not entered into the heart of man” (1 Cor. 2:9; cf. Is. 64:4). But the bridge leading somewhere, perhaps to that supposed edge of the abyss, to the Eden of unfading spiritual joys, and perhaps leading nowhere, is faith. We must either die in agony on our edge of the abyss, or go at random and look for a “new land” on which “Truth dwells” (2 Pet. 3:13). We are free to choose, but we must decide on one or the other. Either searching for the Trinity, or dying in madness. Choose, worm and nonentity: tertium non datur! Perhaps it was in contemplating the inevitability of such a choice that Blaise Pascal came up with the idea of ​​betting on God 78 . On the one hand, everything is, but not yet true; on the other hand, something that seems like something to a fool, but for someone who knows its true value, it becomes absolutely nothing without it and everything, if it is found. In the most obvious form, the idea of ​​such a bet was expressed by one shopkeeper: he hung a lot of lamps, icons, crosses and all kinds of shrines. When some “intellectual” began to express his skepticism about this, the shopkeeper put it this way: “Eh, master! All this costs me fifty rubles a year - it’s just nothing for me. Well, how will it go to work! – Of course, this formulation of “Pascal’s wager” sounds rude, even cynical. Of course, even Pascal himself may seem too calculating. And, nevertheless, the general meaning of this bet, always equal to itself, is undoubted: it is worth exchanging the true nothingness for the incorrect Infinity, especially since in the latter the exchanger can again receive his nothingness, but as something: however, if for an abstract thought the benefit of such an exchange is immediately clear, then it is not immediately possible to translate this thought into the area of ​​concrete mental life: like a wounded animal, the caught self defends itself. Self-affirming pagan reason has long interpreted that the promises of Christ are unprovable, since they relate to future benefits. But to this Arnobius replies that of two unreliable things, the one that gives us hope should always be preferred to the one that does not give it to us. 79 A thinking person has already realized that he has nothing on this shore. But stepping onto a bridge and walking across it requires effort, an expenditure of strength. What if this expense is useless? Wouldn't it be better to be in the throes of death right there, by the bridge? Or walk across the bridge - maybe walk all your life, forever waiting for the other side? What is better: to die forever - in view, perhaps, of the promised land - to freeze in the icy cold of absolute nothingness and burn in the eternal fire of the pyrrhonic ἐποχή; or exhaust your last efforts, perhaps for the sake of a chimera, for the sake of a mirage that will recede as the traveler makes an effort to get closer? - I'm staying, I'm staying here. But painful melancholy and sudden hope do not even allow me to breathe peacefully. Then I jump up and run quickly. But the cold of equally sudden despair weakens my legs, endless fear takes possession of my soul. I run, quickly run back. To go and not go, to seek and not to seek, to hope and despair, to be afraid of wasting one’s last strength and, because of this fear, to waste it tenfold, running back and forth. Where is the exit? Where is the refuge? To whom, to what, should we rush for help? “Lord, Lord, if You exist, help the crazy soul, Come Yourself, bring me to Yourself! Whether I want it or not, save me. 80 As you can and as you know, let me see You. Attract me with strength and suffering!” In this cry of utmost despair is the beginning of a new stage of philosophizing, the beginning of living faith. I don't know whether there is Truth or not. But I feel with all my heart that I can’t live without her. And I know that if she exists, then she is everything to me: reason, goodness, strength, life, and happiness. Maybe she doesn't exist; but I love her - I love her more than everything that exists. I already treat her as if she exists, and she, perhaps not existing, I love with all my soul and with all my thoughts. For her I give up everything, even my questions and my doubts. I, the doubter, behave with her as if I were not doubting. I, standing on the edge of nothingness, walk as if I were already on the other edge, in the land of reality, justification and knowledge. Through the triple feat of faith, hope and love, the inertia of the law of identity is overcome. I cease to be I, my thought ceases to be my thought; By an incomprehensible act I renounce the self-affirmation “I=I”. Something or Someone is helping me get out of my self-isolation. This, according to St. Macarius the Great, - “The Truth itself encourages a person to seek the Truth - ἐπιζητεῖν." 81 Something or Someone extinguishes in me the idea that I am the center of philosophical quests, and I put in this place the idea of ​​Truth itself. Being nothing but the only one given to me, I, given to myself, incomprehensibly for myself, renounce this only property of mine, I bring to the Truth that only sacrifice that is given to me, but I bring this again not with my own strength, but with the power of the Truth itself; just as previously the sinful self put itself in the place of God, so now, with the help of God, I put myself in the place of God, not yet known to me, but desired and loved. I give up the fearful fear of what will happen to me, and with a decisive stroke I perform the operation on myself. I leave the edge of the abyss and with a firm step run onto the bridge, which, perhaps, will collapse under me. I entrust my destiny, my mind, the very soul of the entire quest - the demand for authenticity - into the hands of Truth itself. For her sake, I refuse proof. This is the difficulty of the feat, that you sacrifice the most cherished thing - the last - and you know that if this also deceives, if this sacrifice turns out to be in vain, then there is nowhere to go. After all, she is the last resort. If the Triune Truth itself does not exist, then where can one look for it? And, upon entering the bridge of faith, a new depth is revealed in the words of the Epistle to the Hebrews: “Faith is the substance of things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen” (Heb. 11:4), - in those very words that were previously so unacceptably contradictory for reason. To make the presentation more specific, let us briefly consider what are the main directions in the understanding of faith, which are captured by the very etymology of the word “faith” in various languages. The Russian “believe” means, in fact, to trust, i.e. it contains an indication of the moral connection of the one who believes with the one whom he believes. Somewhat similar to this is the German glauben to believe, as well as the root words: erlauben to allow, loben to praise, geloben to vow, lieben to love and the English believe to believe in, to believe in, coming from √lib (cf. our √love in the word “to love”) and originally meant to honor, trust and also approve. The Greek πιστεύειν is associated with πείθεσθαι to obey, and actually to allow oneself to be persuaded, “to be convinced,” but also refers to the person himself: “to give with confidence,” “to trust.” In this case, the proportion can be written: πίστις : πιστός = faith: faithful. The Hebrew האמין ge'emin, from the verb אמן 'āman to prop up, means the firmness of a person or thing when you rely on them and, at the same time - which is extremely important - it turns out to be rooted with the word אמת 'emēt truth. Consequently, if the Russian believe and the German glauben point to the subjective moment of faith, namely “belief”, as the moral activity of relationship with Some Person, then the Hebrew האמין ge’emin notes the nature of this Person as the nature of Truth and points to faith - as truth, as being in the Truth, understood, of course, in Hebrew. Further, the Latin fides, like the Greek πίστις, means honoring with trust and trust itself; and the verb credere comes from the Sanskrit šraddhā, i.e. “to place one’s heart on (God)”, so, according to Latin custom, it has a sacred meaning 82. Inflammatur. I'm burning, but I'm not exhausted. A. A. Spassky, – History of dogmatic movements in the era of ecumenical councils. T. 1, Sergiev Posad, 1906 A. P. Lebedev, – History of Ecumenical Councils, part. I and II (“Collected Church Historical Works”, TT. III and IV, St. Petersburg, 1904). B. [V.] Bolotov, - Origen’s teaching about the Holy Trinity. St. Petersburg, 1879. V. P. Vinogradov, – On the literary monuments of “semi-Arianism”. Sergiev Posad, 1912. (="Theological Bulletin", 1911) L'Abbé H. Couget, - La Sainte Trinité et les doctrines antitrinitaires. Paris, 1905, 2 vol. (from the series “Science et Religion”). F. Ternovsky, – The Greek-Eastern Church during the period of ecumenical councils. Kiev, 1883. Ep. John, - History of Ecumenical Councils, 1896 Harnack, – Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 4-te Aufl. B. Samuilov, – History of Arianism in the Latin West. St. Petersburg, 1890. E. Revillout, – Le concile de Necée d’aprfès les textes coptes et les diverses collections canoniques. Paris, 1881 et 1899. 2 volumes. A. A. Spassky, - cit. cit., pp. 228–231. Bl. Jerome of Stridon, - Letter 15, to Pope Damasus, 4 (Migne. Patrol. ser. lat., T. 22, col. 457 A): “Tota saecularium litterarum schola nihil aliud hypostasim, nisi usian novit.” This letter was written near the end of the year 376. This whole letter from Bl. Jerome is extremely instructive. Even for an Orthodox teacher of the Church, the super-rationality of the formula of three hypostases with the unity of essence was too acute; The boldness of this formula, incredible in the entire history of thought, turned the heads of minds accustomed to super-rationality. “Now, oh the trouble! - Bl. complains. Jerome. – After the Nicene symbol, after the Alexandrian definition, the Kampens, the branch of the Arians, demand from me a new name: three hypostases. Which apostles, they ask, betrayed this way? What new Paul, teacher of languages, taught this? I ask: how, in their opinion, can hypostases be understood? They answer: three co-present persons – tres personas subsistentes. I say in response that we believe so, but for them unity in the meaning is not enough, they require unity in the name itself: I don’t know what kind of poison can be contained in sounds. We declare: Whoever does not believe in three hypostases, as tria enhypostata, that is, three coexistent persons - tres subsistentes personas - let him be anathema. But since we are not accustomed to using these terms, we are condemned as heretics. But if anyone by the word hypostasis understands the essence - usian, and does not recognize one hypostasis in the three persons, he is excommunicated from Christ: in this case, you and I will be marked with the stigma of Sabellianism - Unionis. – Make, I beg you, if you find it necessary, a definition, and then I will not be afraid to name the three hypostases. If you order, let a new creed be formed after the Nicene one; Let us, the Orthodox, pronounce the same confession as the Arians. The school of secular sciences does not know any other meaning of the word: hypostasis - hypostasin, just as essence is usian. Who, I ask, will speak with blasphemous lips about three substances - substantias? In God there is one and only nature, precisely that which really exists - una est Dei et sola natura, quae vere est. - But since there is one Divine nature and since one Divinity is co-existing in three persons - in tribus personis Deitas una subsistit, which exists truly and is one nature; then everyone, under the guise of piety, names three, i.e. three hypostases, like three essences, - attempts to introduce three natures - quisquis tria esse hoc est, tres esse hypostases, id est usias, dicit, sub nomine pietatis, tres naturas conatur asserere. If this is so, then why are we separated by walls from Arius, being bound by our own infidelity? – It is enough for us to name one substance and three persons, co-existing, perfect, co-eternal. Let him, if you like, remain silent about the three hypostases and keep one. – Let the above-mentioned belief be sufficient for us. If you consider it correct for us to name the three hypostases with our own interpretation, then we do not refuse. But believe me, there is poison underneath the honey; Satan's angel turns into an angel of light (2 Cor. 11:14). The Campens interpret the word hypostasis well, but when I say that I contain a dogma in accordance with their explanation, they condemn me as a heretic. Why do they hold on to one word so painfully? What are they hiding under ambiguous speech? If they believe as they interpret, then I do not blame them. If I believe as much as they (perhaps feignedly) profess to be wise, then let them allow me to express my thoughts in my own words. Therefore, by the Crucified Salvation of the world, the Trinity of one essence, I conjure your beatitude to give me a significant written answer according to your authority about whether one should remain silent about the hypostases, or call them...)” (id., 3–4 – Migne, Patr. ser. lat., T. 22, coll. 356–358. – Works of Jerome of Stridon. Ch. I, Kiev, 1879, pp. 45–47). Kant's great merit was to indicate that there can be objects that are in no way different from each other in the concept, for the understanding, but nevertheless different, so that the difference between them is comprehended only by visual comparison. Such objects turn out to be, for example, the right and left hand, or the right and left glove, symmetrical relative to the center and equal to each other, spherical triangles, etc. See: I. Kant, – Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegendenim Raum [1768]. (Imm. Kant’s Kleine Schriften zur Logik und Metaphysik, herausgegeben von Kirchmann, Bd. 33 (5), 3-te Abth., SS. 124–130). I. Kant, – De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis [1770], § 15 c (=I. Kant, – On the form and principles of the sensory and intelligible world, trans. N. Lossky, St. Petersburg, 1910, Proceedings of the St. Petersburg Phil. Island, Issue VI, pp. 20–21). Im. Kants Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können [1783]. 4-te Auflage. Herausgegeben… von Karl Vorländer. Lpz., 1905 (Philosophische Bibliothek, Bd. 40), § 13, SS. 39–41. This critically reviewed edition of the Prolegomena is the best. = Immanuel Kant, – Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that may arise in the sense of science. Translation by Vlad. Solovyova. Ed. 3rd, M. 1905. § 3, pp. 46–48. The translation is excellent, but the edition is very careless, and even typos from the first editions are repeated. I. Kant, – Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft. [1786], Cap. L, I, Def. II, Scholia III. True, Kant first drew the conclusion from this fact that space is not a concept, but a reality independent of reason; and then - that space is not a concept, but a form of contemplation. But, one way or another, the presence of facts discovered by Kant proves that there can be objects that are obviously different, but such that the difference between them is absolutely not formulated by reason, that is, they differ from one another not by one or another attribute, but ipsa re, directly. It is not in the signs of being, but in its very depths that the beginning of difference is contained, and, for reason, objects can be different only through each other. – As is known, this Kantian discovery, applied to chemistry for the first time by Pasteur (see: Pasteur, - Tartaric acid and its significance for the doctrine of the structure of matter. On the asymmetry of organic compounds. St. Petersburg, 1894), became the basis of all stereochemistry, and at the same time spread to many other scientific disciplines. Famous saying of Archpriest Avvakum. Here, for an example, is one of the reflections of Rev. Avvakum, in his letter to Deacon Ignatius: “See, Ignatius Solovyanin, and believe the triessential Trinity. The being is one and divided equally into three: the source of the deity flows into three. According to Arius, not three beings are unequal, but three equal beings are good, or natures. Don't move anymore. The uncut one, I suppose, by equality, is one into three beings, or natures. There is special graying for everyone: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Three heavenly kings sit without hiding: like Peter and Paul and John the Theologian, three separated, and it is also fitting for the divine three to be divided" (P. Smirnov. Dogmatic disputes in the schism of the Old Believers. "Orthodox Encyclopedia", edited by A.P. Lopukhin. Petrograd, 1893, Vol. 4, column 1154. - See. also column 1050, pp.). – In such monstrous false teachings one can hardly see the mere verbal error of an insufficiently educated dissenter. His tritheism is an unconscious expression of the general rationalistic spirit generally characteristic of schism. – Bishop [then Archimandrite] Porfiry Uspensky is inclined to see even a historical influence in this Arianism. Describing the church in the name of the Dormition of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the Palestinian monastery of St. James the Persian, he saw there a picture of the seven ecumenical councils. “At the very bottom of the picture, in the middle, are the heresiarchs: Arius, Macedonius, etc., and next to them a group of monks. It is remarkable that all the heretical monks are depicted wearing the same hoods that our Old Believer monks wear. (Weren’t the ancient Russians infected with the Arian heresy? And the Orthodox have Greek hoods, low, similar in shape to ours.” (Bishop Porfiry Uspensky, - The Book of My Genesis. November 29, 1843 T. I, edited by P. A. Syrku. St. Petersburg, 1894, p. 307). « – βαπίζοντες – εἰς τὸ ὄνομὰ τοῦ Πατρός καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος" (Matthew 28:19), - compare with this. in the Liturgy of John Chrysostom about: “And grant us to glorify and glorify Your most honorable and magnificent name, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit - δοξάζειν καὶ ἀνυμνείν τὸ "" Likewise, St. Ambrose of Milan, discussing Matthew 28:19, says: “They point out that He [the Savior] said: in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. But at the same time they do not take into account what He preceded this by saying in the name. He pointed to three Persons - tres personas, but gave one name of the Trinity." “So, there is one God, one name, one deity, one greatness -” (Ambrose of Milan, - On the education of a virgin 10 67, 68 - Migne, - Patrol ser. lat. pr., T. 16, col. 322). N. Ch. Cheltsov, - Ancient forms of the Creed of the Orthodox Church or the so-called apostolic symbols. St. Petersburg, 1869. A. A. Spassky, - Quoted. op. T. I, p. 500. About the fact that Basil the Great was proud of his learning, see id., p. 484. - “He,” his younger brother, Gregory of Nyssa, testifies to Basil B., “he thought extremely much about his eloquence, despising all virtues and extolled his importance above eminent nobles.” (Gregory of Nyssa, - About the life of Macrina. - Migne, - Patrol. ser. gr. T. 46, col. 965) Basil the Great, - Letter 38. (Migne, - Patrolog. ser. gr., T. 32, col. 333 A). Gregory of Nyssa, – Great Catechetical Teaching, 3 (Migne. Patrolog. ser. gr. T. 45, col. 17 C-D.) A. A. Spassky, - Quoted. cit., T. I, p. 267. Gregory the Theologian, – Homily 20. – Migne. Patrol. ser. gr., T. 35. Gregory the Theologian, – Sermon 25. id., id. The question arises of how exactly the idea of ​​the authority of Christ arises - how the mysterious rebirth of the soul occurs. Without leaving the boundaries of my work, which has as its subject theodicy, and not anthropodicy, I could not deal with this issue. But I consider it my duty to emphasize that there is a gap here, which I propose to fill in the long-planned work “On the Increase of Types.” Without taking into account this essential gap, the reader would expose the author to the risk of being called a Christian without Christ. It is also easy to notice that in my schematic presentation I omit the discussion of the path of asceticism. Theophrastus, – Phys. opin. fr. 6 a (Laert Diog. IX, 21, 22) (Diels. Doxogr. graeci, 483). V. Nesmelov, – Dogmatic system of Gregory of Nyssa, Kazan, 1889, p. 168. Quoted from Gregory Nis., Against Eun., book. 5 (Migne, Patrol. ser. gr., T. 45, col. 688 A). The last words are from the Great Canon of Andrew of Crete (Thursday of the 1st Week of Great Lent, Compline, Hymn 8, Trinitarian). The famous “Credo, quia absurdum” schematically conveys only Tertullian’s thought. The real saying reads: “Mortuus est Dei filius, credibile est, quia inseptum est; et sepultus revixit, certum est quia impossibile est - that the Son of God died, this is certain, because it is absurd; that He, buried, rose again, undoubtedly, because this is impossible.” Tertullian, – On the flesh of Christ (Migne, – Patr. ser. lat. pr., T. 2). TO THE KNOWN GOD - this is the inscription on the pediment of the western entrance to the Assumption Cathedral of the Holy Trinity Sergius Lavra. Since this porch was built, instead of the porch that was here, in 1781 (see E. [E.] Golubinsky, - St. Sergius of Radonezh and the Trinity Lavra created by him, 2nd ed., M. 1909, p. 207), then we must assume that the thoughtful inscription that interests us was made by order of the then Archbishop of Moscow Platon Levshin. Obviously, it expresses his inner understanding of the relationship in which faith and knowledge exist. – Another, no less authoritative saint, Archbishop of Kherson Innokenty Borisovza, remarks wittily: “The short-sighted philosophy of the past [i.e. e. of the 18th century, she dreamed of temporarily dissolving this sacred union and forced knowledge to dig a coffin for faith, but what came out of this mother-killing attempt? Holy faith, revered by self-forgetting reason, hid in the inaccessible depths of the heart, and false knowledge itself remained in the grave dug from it with its sophisms” (Innocent, Archbishop. Kherson, – Works, ed. Wolf, T. 4, p. 275). “True philosophy can only exist in union with heaven, for true knowledge lives and is nourished not by earth, but by heaven” (id., Vol. 10). “We are used to saying: the circle of sciences, the circle of knowledge and separating it from the circle of faith; but strictly speaking: there is not and cannot be a circle of sciences, but there is one boundless circle of faith, the interior of which is shared between the sciences. Knowledge without faith is the middle without beginning and end, therefore whoever is looking not for soulless fragments, but for a living, rational whole, must necessarily combine knowledge with faith” (id., Vol. 4, p. 274). “True knowledge, what is it anyway, if not the natural daughter of faith? True faith, what is it if not the natural end and crown of all solid knowledge” (id., Vol. 4, p. 156). The translation given in the text differs from the usual one and has been corrected according to the research of my respected teacher Prof. M. D. Muretova, see: M. D. Muretov, – Partial knowledge and self-knowledge (“Theological Bulletin”). L.N. Tolstoy, - Confession. M., 1907, ed. “The Mediator”, page 74. – The complete opposite of this Tolstoyan self-will of the mind is the beginning of obedience and crucification of the mind, put forward by K. N. Leontyev. “I submit to Orthodoxy – completely,” he says. I recognize not only what is convincing in it for my mind and heart, but also what is abhorrent to me... Credo, quia absurdum - I will express myself differently: I also believe that, due to the weakness of man in general and my mind in particular, seems absurd to me. It is not absurd, let’s say, in itself, but for me it seems absurd... However, I believe and obey. - This is the best kind of faith. - We can accept advice that seems reasonable to us from any smart man, for example. Someone else's thought struck our mind with its truth. What a wonder it is to accept it? You obey her involuntarily and only wonder how she didn’t come to mind earlier. But, believing in spiritual authority, submitting to it against your reason and against tastes brought up by long years of another life, subordinating yourself arbitrarily and forcibly, despite a whole storm of internal protests, it seems to me that this is real faith” (K. N. Leontiev, - Father Clement Zederholm, 2nd ed., M., 1882, p. 99). There is no such footnote in the original. About Pascal’s “bet on God,” where the bet is the illusory pleasures of earthly life, and the winnings are eternal bliss, see: V. Pascal, - Pensées, Χ, 1 (many editions of the original text and translations in all languages). An analysis of such a bet and criticism of Pascal’s idea can be read, in addition to general works on Pascal, in special articles: Sully Prudhomme, – Le sens et la portée du pari de Pascal. (“Revue des deux Mondes”, 15 nov. 1890, pp. 285–304). L. Dugas et Ch. Riquier, – Le pari de Pascal (“Revue Philosophique”, 25-me an., T. 50, 1900, septembre, pp. 224–245). Ch. Riquier, – A propos du paris de Pascal (id., décembre, pp. 650–651). J. Lachelier, – Sur le pari de Pascal (id., 26-me an., T. 51, 1901, juin). P. S. de Laplace, – Essai philosophique sur les probabilités. – As an introduction to his Théorie analytique des probabilités, Paris 1812 (1814, 1820) = Oeuvres, T. 7, Paris 1886. – Russian translation: Laplace, – Experience in the Philosophy of Probability Theory. Translation by A. I. V., edited by A. K. Vlasov. M., 1908, pp. 117, 122. – Here is the actual criticism of the mathematical form of the Pascal bet, invented by the English mathematician Craig. The reasoning of Laplace and, probably, Craig is guilty of a gross misunderstanding of the idea of ​​eternity. An idea similar to Pascal's was expressed before Pascal (1623–1662) by Arnobius (†304 r.), who argues as follows: “Non credimus, inquitis, vera esse quae (Christus) dicit. Quid enim, quae vos negatis vera esse, apud vos liquent, cum imminentia, et nondum cassa, nullis possint rationibus refutari? Sed et ipse quae pollicetur, non probat. Ita est. Nulla enim, ut dixi, futurorum potest existere comprobatio. Cum ergo haec sit conditio futurorum, ut teneri et comprehendi nullius possint anticipationis attactu: nonne purior ratio est, ex ducibus incertis et in ambigua expectatione pendentibus, id potius credere, quod aliquas spes ferat, quam omnino quod nullas? In illo enim periculi nihil est, si quod dicitur imminere, cassum fiat et vacuum: in hoc damnum est maximum, id est salutis amissio, si cum tempus advenerit, aperiatur non fuisse mendacium.” (Anobius, – Against the pagans, II 4 (Migne, – Patrol. ser. lat., T. 5, coll. 815 B – 816 A) and Raymond of Sabunda (late 14th century – 1437) in his “Theologia naturalis sive liber creaturarum. (1487). (See V. Droz, – Le skepticisme de Pascal, p. 71, note), Renouvier (Philosophie analytique de l’histoire, T. IV, p. 65 et suiv.) saw in this idea a summary or even the starting point of a deep philosophy. Indeed, it was used, in a modified and cheaper version, by W. James, first in his lecture “The Will to Believe” (William James, - The dependence of faith on the will and other experiments in popular philosophy. Translation from English by S. I. Tsereteli. St. Petersburg, 1904), and then formed the basis of a philosophical movement known as “pragmatism.” It is not difficult to see a certain similarity of this latter with the Tutiorism of the Jansenites; tragedy and heroism and is so comfortable that it has already managed to creep into the hearts of the public, asking only for convenient doctrines. I provide brief bibliographical information regarding works in Russian that discuss pragmatism: Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science. Per. from 2nd English ed. V. Bazarov and P. Yushkevich. St. Petersburg, [1911], ed. "Rose hip". V. James, – Pragmatism. Translation by P. Yushkevich. St. Petersburg, 1910, ed. "Rosehip". L. M. Lopatin, – The present and future of philosophy. (L. M. Lopatin, - Philosophical characteristics and speeches. M., 1911, ed. “The Path” = “Questions of Philosophy and Psychology,” book 103). V. F. Ern, – Reflections on pragmatism (Vladimir Ern, – Struggle for Logos. M., 1911, pp. 1–25 = “Moscow Weekly”, 1910, nos. 17–18). Al. Balaban, - “Pragmatism” (“Issues of Phil. and Psych.”, 1909, book 99 (IV), September-October, pp. 574–618). Here, on pp. 574–575 and 598, information on the literature of pragmatism is also provided. S. S. Glagolev, – A new type of philosophy. (Pragmatism or meliorism). (“Theological Bulletin”, XVIII, 1909, December, pp. 578–616). P. S. Strakhov, - Pragmatism in science and religion (about the book by W. James: “The Variety of Religious Experience”). (“Theological Bulletin”, XIX, 1910, May, pp. 112–131; id., June, pp. 295–314). Lazarev, - Pragmatism (“Russian Thought”, 1909, October). M. Hebert, – Pragmatism. Exploring its various forms. Per. 3. A. Vvedenskaya, ed. M. A. Likhareva, with prev. prof. Al-dra Iv. Vvedensky. St. Petersburg, 1911. Ya. A. Berman, – The essence of pragmatism. New trends in the science of thinking. M., 1911. XII+240 pp. As for the very extensive foreign literature on pragmatism, indications of it can be found in the already mentioned book by James, in the article by Al. Balaban, etc. Let us also mention separately: André Lalande, – Pragmatisme et pragmaticisme (“Revue Philosophique” 31-me an., T. 61, 1906, Février, pp. 121–56). (Code of the most important teachings of pragmatism). J. Bourdeau, – Pragmatisme et Modernisme, Paris, 1909 (“Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine”, F. Alcan). P. Hermant et A. Van de Waele, – Les principales théories de la logique contemporaine. Paris, 1909 (“Bibl. de philos. cont.”, F. Alcan), pp. 207–230 – about pragmatism. Fr. Paulan, – Antipragmatisme et Hyperpragmatisme. (“Revue Philosophique”, 34-me an., T. 67, pp. 611–625). A. Schinz, – Antipragmatisme. Examen des droits respectifs de Paristoçratie intellectuelle et de la démocratie (“Bibliothèque de philos. contempor.”, F. Alcan), Paris, 1909. Wed. the exclamation of one girl on her way to God: “Lord! If You exist, show me what the truth is, and give me the opportunity to know it” (see: P. Florensky, - Questions of religious self-knowledge, Sergiev Posad, 1907, letter II, p. 17 = “Christian”, 1907). - Again: “Either I want, save me, or I don’t want, Christ my Savior! foresee soon, I will soon perish” (8th morning prayer, to our Lord Jesus Christ). Macarius the Great, – Conversation 7 3 (Migne, – Patrolog. ser. gr., T. 34; col. 525). Herzog und Hauck, – Realencyclopädie für protestantliche Theologie. 3-te Auflage, Bd. 6, Lpz., 1899, SS. 674 und ff., Artikel "Glaube". For linguistic and philological considerations regarding the word “faith”, “believe”, see also in the book: A. [I.] Strunnikov, - Faith as confidence according to the teachings of Orthodoxy, Samara, 1887, pp. 35–58, but keeping in mind the author’s inclination to bring the concept of “faith”, “believe” closer to the concepts of “knowledge”, “know”. –