XIII. Письмо двенадцатое: Ревность

It seems to me that it has become undeniable that a discussion of love in general and friendship in particular, and in their concrete vitality, almost inevitably raises the question of a phenomenon closely associated with them - jealousy. That practically this issue is being pushed to the forefront in importance is hardly possible to have a dual opinion about. But, I think, most thinkers are not sufficiently aware of its theoretical importance: in philosophical literature, the concept of jealousy is driven somewhere into the margins and rarely, rarely is it given a glance. This is why I think it is necessary to delve deeper into the concept of jealousy. I believe, based on what was said at the end of the previous letter, that understanding the concept of jealousy serves, together, to clarify the very concept of friendship and love. So what is jealousy? – In common intellectual usage, jealousy is understood as a vice, or at least as an undeniable moral flaw - something shameful and worthy of ridicule. The basis of jealousy among the intelligentsia is usually seen as pride, vanity, self-love, suspicion, distrust, and suspiciousness - in a word, anything, but not any moral advantage. 797 This view of jealousy is especially characteristic of the century that was predominantly revolutionary and intelligentsia - the 18th; and jealousy is condemned especially in the place where Enlightenment rationality reigned most intolerantly - in Paris. “Pride and vanity make as many people jealous as love,” said Buast. “The love of jealous people is like hatred,” Moliere testifies. “Jealousy comes more from vanity than from love,” admits Mme de Stael. “In jealousy there is often more pride than love,” La Rochefoucauld points out. - “Rough jealousy is a distrust of a favorite object; jealousy is delicate, it is a lack of trust in oneself,” someone argues. “The most jealous of all lovers are those who love glory,” observes Truble. “Jealous, this is a child who is afraid of the monsters created in the darkness by his imagination,” Buast thinks. “A jealous person spends his life in search of a secret, the discovery of which violates his well-being,” notes Oxenstiern. This idea is expressed in a play on words by Schleiermacher or Grillparzer: “Die Eifersucht mit Eifer sucht, was Leiden schafft,” 798 i.e. “jealousy eagerly seeks what causes suffering,” or: “what is passion,” because in the pronunciation one hears “Leidenschaft”; a pun that can be conveyed approximately through: “jealousy zealously seeks what is passion.” “Of the ailments of the mind, jealousy is the one whose food is the greatest number of things, and whose medicine is the least,” defines Noel. “Jealousy has the eyes of a lynx,” Bellamy says. – Therefore, love and jealousy are incompatible. “When self-love dominates jealousy, love has lost its power,” says Lengrae. “Jealousy extinguishes love just as ashes extinguish fire,” writes the Queen of Navarre. “Strong passions are higher than jealousy,” we read from La Rochefoucauld. 799 This somewhat vague, everyday understanding of jealousy found a complete and psychologically motivated form in the precise definition of jealousy given by Baruch to Spinoza. Love, full of hatred for the beloved object and envy of another who enjoys the love of the first, is, according to Spinoza, jealousy. Spinoza here extremely successfully uses the image of the mixing of two liquids, when they, penetrating one into the other, flow and become cloudy - which is denoted by the term fluctuatio. So it is with jealousy: love and hatred, mixing, form fluctuatio, the “flow” of the soul, as a result of which consciousness becomes cloudy and becomes opaque. Jealousy, according to Spinoza, is just such a “current of the soul”, arising simultaneously from love and hatred, accompanied by the idea of another, whom the soul envies: “Hoc odium erga rem amatam Invidiae junctum Zelotypia vocatur, quae proinde nihil aliud est, quam animi fluctuatio orta ex Amore et Odio simul, concomitante idea alterius, cui invideret". 800 This is the reasoning by which Spinoza arrives at this classic definition of jealousy: Love, he says, strives for reciprocity, and, moreover, for the most perfect reciprocity. Any belittlement and any damage that we experience in this regard is felt as self-depreciation, that is, they cause extreme sorrow. The most perfect mutual love is all-consuming love; we want to fully possess it, it is our highest happiness, which we do not want to share with anyone and do not want to devote to anyone. If a beloved being loves someone else more than us, then we feel infinitely unhappy. The cause of our misfortune is the object of our hatred; therefore, we will hate the beloved because he deprives us of his reciprocity, and we will envy the one who enjoys this reciprocity. This is how love arises, which simultaneously hates and envies—jealousy. This passion is especially strong if another has taken possession of our happiness; and, the stronger the happiness was; the brighter jealousy flares up, so that if it is not tamed by some other force, it will darken our entire soul: hatred of a beloved object is stronger, the stronger the love was previously. 801 Here are the most important theorems related to this: 802 Prop. XXXV. "Si quis imaginatur rem amatam eodem vel arctiore vinculo Amititiae quo ipse eadem solus potiebatur, alium sibi jungere, Odio erga ipsam afficiebatur, et illi alteri invidebit." “If someone imagines that the thing he loves is with someone else in the same or even closer connection of friendship than that through which he owned it alone, then he is overcome by hatred of the thing he loves and envy of the other.” Prop. XXXVI. "Qui rei, quam semel delectatus est, recordatur, cupit eadem cum iisdem potiri circumstantiis, ac cum primo ipsa delectatus est." “Whoever remembers a thing from which he has once enjoyed, desires to possess it in the same circumstances as when he enjoyed it for the first time.” Prop. XXXVII. “Cupiditas, quae prae Tristitia vel Laetitia, praeque Odio vel Amore oritur, eo est major, quo affectus major est.” - “The desire that arises as a result of displeasure or pleasure, hatred or love, the stronger the greater these affects.” Prop. XXXVIII. "Si quis rem amatam odio babere inciperit, ita ut Amor plane aboleatur, eandem majors odio, ex pari causa, prosequetur, quam si ipsam nunquam amavisset, et eo majori quo Amor antea major fuerat." “If someone begins to hate the thing he loves, so that love is completely destroyed, then for the same reason he will have greater hatred for it than if he had never loved it, and the greater the greater his former love was.” According to everyday understanding, jealousy is a harmful and ugly growth of love; the causes of jealousy are alien to the essence of love, and therefore jealousy is usually recognized as removable from love. Spinoza sees a closer connection between love and jealousy; for him, jealousy is not a random companion of love, but a faithful shadow that appears on the screen of mental life every time love is illuminated by the betrayal of a loved one; or, more precisely, jealousy, according to Spinoza, is a necessary equivalent of love that arises when relationships take a turn for the worse. Love does not disappear, but is transformed into jealousy. But, nevertheless, even here, on the basis of Spinoza’s analysis, love is conceivable without jealousy, with complete reciprocity, so that jealousy, although psychologically necessary under certain conditions, receives a negative assessment in Spinoza’s eyes, as animi fluctuatio, as a darkening of consciousness, as an indomitable passion. Jealousy in love, for Spinoza, is not love; and therefore, as foreign to love, as non-love, although it is in a causal relationship with love, in relation to equivalence, jealousy is reprehensible. Thus, Spinoza, in the end, remains with the current understanding of jealousy. Why did this happen? To answer the question posed, let us remember the lifeless and material character of Spinoza’s entire philosophy. Having no category of personality, Spinoza cannot distinguish between love for a person and lust for a thing; he confuses love and lust, or, more precisely, replaces the former with the latter. Everywhere we read from him the impersonal res amata, which should be translated: “thing desired,” for a thing cannot be loved; yes, “res amata” - but nowhere is there any talk about a beloved person - about a person to whom alone the epithet “beloved” can be applied. True, in modern society one can often hear something like “favorite jam”, “I love cigars”, “I love cards”, etc., but for any healthy person it is clear that this is either a perversion and darkening of consciousness, or violence against language. “Jam,” “cigars,” “cards,” etc. cannot be loved, but can only be lusted after. But the corellat of lust is hatred with envy; That is why in Spinoza, in the original concept of love, this reprehensible moment of hatred with envy receives such emphasis. However, just as love is not lust, hatred with envy is also not jealousy, although, indeed, the latter is also related to what Spinoza means by jealousy, as true love is to lust. To understand jealousy in its own nature, we must connect it even more closely with love, introduce it into the very heart of love and, emphasizing the personal nature of love, reveal that jealousy is love itself, but in its “other being”; we need to discover that jealousy is a necessary condition and an indispensable side of love - but turned to sorrow - so that whoever wants to destroy jealousy would also destroy love. In the same way, in lust there is always hatred with envy. To show this, first of all it is necessary to remove from jealousy the moment of condemnation that hangs over it. Jealousy was so often mixed with certain inappropriate forms of its manifestation that the very words: “jealousy,” “jealous,” and “jealous,” not to mention “jealous,” became words of condemnation. And yet, to see the essence of jealousy in suspicion, petty pride, distrust, ill will, malice, hatred with envy, etc., is just as wrong as to see the essence of love in the denial of freedom, partiality, injustice, etc., or to see the essence of justice in the coldness, callousness of the heart, its hardness and cruelty. Suspicion, hatred with envy, etc. - all these are bad, undue, selfish manifestations of jealousy, born from mixing love with lust. Meanwhile, two lines of historical data hint at this reprehensibility, and not only not reprehensibility, but downright positivity, the position of jealousy. In fact, firstly, the people with the purest consciousness of God, the chosen Jewish people, more clearly than anyone who knew and understood the love of God, persistently, incessantly, without hesitation, repeats about the zeal of God. The entire Bible is saturated and permeated with the zeal of God, and it is impossible not to take this into account. And then, secondly, a people of the purest humanity, a brilliant Hellenic people, who knew and understood human love in all its forms better than anyone else, they again have the trait of jealousy in everything as their main trait, as the most characteristic and inalienable trait of them. Fr. Nietzsche, in his outline of the “meditation” “We are philologists,” among three “selected points from antiquity” intends to develop: “The ennoblement of jealousy, the Greeks are the most jealous people.” 803 And this, again, cannot be ignored. If the clearest genius and the purest faith shows us jealousy as a positive force and necessary in the essence of love, both human and Divine, then it means that it is such and, therefore, it is not at all the same as the side passions that accompany it. But what, in this case, is jealousy itself? She is one of the moments of love, the basis of love, the background of love, the primary darkness in which the ray of love shines. Love is a free choice: from many personalities, I, by an act of internal self-determination, chooses one and to her - one of many - establishes a relationship as to the only one, spiritually clinging to her. She, the ordinary one, I wants to consider as extraordinary; her, gray, like a festive one; her - everyday - as a triumph. She stands in the crowd, but I call her and lead her from the square to the tidy room of my heart. I draw an image of her on a chased gold field. 804 And - rightly so, for this image is not a caricature, which people draw in most cases; This is not even a portrait - painted by the wise. This is an image of the image of God, an icon. I, violating the “justice” of the law of identity, by a metaphysical act of self-determination, - not with reason, - with my whole being, - decides to see in the chosen one, - one of many, - a personality - exceptional, coming out from a number of others - in a word, makes himself in relation to the chosen one such that that person becomes You for him. Friendship, I repeat, is exceptional, just as marital love is exclusive. “Much” is a sign of the imperfection of the object of love, as such, a sign of the incompleteness of You, as You. Both polymarriage and poly-friendship are false by their very idea and must inevitably either turn into something personal, the first into monogamy, the second into mono-friendship, or else completely corrupt and rot, the first into relations of lust, and the second into relations of self-interest, i.e. from semi-personal to become material. “You cannot,” says Aristotle, 805, “you cannot be a friend of many, meaning perfect friendship, just as you cannot be in love with many at the same time. Such friendship seems to be perfection and, as such, can only be directed at one person. – Πολλοῖς δ’εἶναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι.” But, even if we say here that there are “many” such loved ones, You, then still, with love, everyone is treated as if they were the only one. All love, in its essence, has a selective, choosing power, is dilectio, and therefore, the beloved is always the chosen one, the chosen one, the only one. This is the personal nature of love, without which we would have to deal with material desire and with indifference in replacing the desired thing with a thing equal to it. The requirement for the numeric identity of the beloved person, at least in the absence of a generic, attribute identity, i.e., fidelity to the personality and when it changes, 806 - characterizes love and, at the same time, its violation of the law of identity, while the requirement for a generic, attribute identity of the desired thing - with indifference to the numerical identity, even with a misunderstanding of it - and, therefore, - compliance with the law of identity characterizes lust. Consciousness of uniqueness is the condition of love, even in its most imperfect manifestations; Moreover, even for the illusion of love, one needs, if not uniqueness, then at least the illusion of uniqueness, uniqueness, exclusivity - at least he, the lover, imagines the beloved being as the only one as unreasonably as every first love always imagines himself to be the only one in the world and history, how erroneously each of the “only legitimate” heirs and interpreters of Kant considers himself to be the only one, how falsely, finally, he asserts himself to be the only "The One and Only" by Stirner. Otherwise, even the illusion of love is certainly impossible, and there will only be selfishness, dirt and death in relationships. The very thought of the possibility of replacing one person with another, as based on the recognition of omiusia, that is, thinghood, is a sinful thought and leading to death. By an incomprehensible act of election, a person is made unique, called to the high, to the royal rank of You. She agreed to this election. She said “Yes” and took upon herself the crown of greatness. What does I want now? - Only one thing: what you wanted - your love. I affirms the act of my love as eternal in value and, therefore, requires its permanence, its irrevocability. This inner affirmation expresses itself as zeal or jealousy to realize in time one's eternal act of choosing the beloved Thou. I wish that You would not interfere with his love, that is, that in relation to him it would really be You. Let your beloved behave like the only one; Let him not step down from his pedestal of singularity, isolation, and chosenness. It's okay if the chosen one is the most ordinary in the crowd and for the crowd. But for the I, for the one who has chosen, it must be precisely You, and nothing but You: otherwise love itself is impossible, otherwise the very act of election cannot be embodied in time. Otherwise, the “time” of love will not be a “moving image of eternity,” 807 election. You, in relation to I, must behave like You, and not like one of many - must be wearing a royal crown, and not a nightcap. The awareness of the necessity of this from You for the very possibility of love entails the desire to realize this chosenness and, then, to affirm and protect it. All this together will be jealousy. What if you don't want this? If it persistently violates its dignity and high position, freely accepted by it? If it, having said “Yes” to the offer of a new essence to it - You - if it, through frivolity, or stubbornness, or lack of sincerity in the high lot it has accepted, shows with its life that for it I am not Me? If, wanting to be You, it does not want to recognize I as I? – Then the I cannot and should not remain without opposition. This opposition is a manifestation of jealousy - jealousy for one’s love, that is, concern for purity, for authenticity, and finally, for the preservation of one’s love. Demanding this from You in the name of the very possibility of love entails the desire to realize this chosenness, to affirm and protect it. All this, together, I repeat, will be jealousy. Just one thing. Either you must recognize this opposition to yourself, this struggle for love, this jealousy - and change, or it must renounce its dignity, recognize itself only as ordinary, return from the throne to the gray crowd, from triumph - to everyday life. For the I, it is impossible to love and not be jealous when You actually ceases to be You, that is, do not try to make it You again. Therefore, if the right and duty of jealousy are not recognized for him, then there is nothing left for him except the overthrow of You from his throne. I must forget about You, stop loving him, because only in this way can You be freed from the demand for reciprocal love. But You have grown into the Self and become a part of it. To fall out of love means to lose a part of yourself. To forget means to cut off a piece of living flesh from oneself. This is what happens when, respecting someone else’s freedom, you have to tear love out of your chest along with your very heart. Love is limitless; it is not limited to either place or time, it is universal. But this universality of love not only does not exclude, but even presupposes separateness, isolation, isolation. 808 After all, love has its root in the shrine of the soul and is possible only insofar as this shrine is alive. To protect the pearl of the soul means to protect love itself; to neglect one’s shrine means to neglect love. Love is not only universal, but also limited; not only limitless, but also closed. The word spoken by the Lord about this is now not accepted and is considered harsh and cruel; but, what is most remarkable, in the “mother of all books” - in the Gospel - it stands immediately after the word about not judging one’s neighbor and the parable of the beam and the speck in the eye. "Hypocrite! First take the plank out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to take the speck out of your brother’s eye” (Matthew 6:5). And he meets this thought antithetically, as if directed with the tip against its tip: “Do not give what is holy to dogs, and do not throw your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet and turn and tear you to pieces” (Matthew 7:6). As if to explain this saying, Rev. Seraphim of Sarov teaches us: “What is best in the heart, we should not reveal unnecessarily; Do not reveal the secrets of your heart to everyone.” 809 So, on the one hand, “do not judge,” but, on the other, “consider as dogs and swine” those to whom it is not worthy to reveal the secrets of the heart. Reveal them only to a select few, selected from the swine herd. This is an antinomy, and this antinomy is approximately equivalent to the antinomy of love and jealousy. For an approximate (albeit only approximate) explanation of what has been said, I will give another excerpt from the diary already quoted earlier. 810 This is a recording of some real or imaginary conversation with a friend. Here it is: “You behave in such and such a way. You hide, you are secretive, you desire complete independence, you are burdened by recognition, both yours and your friend’s. - Yes, but don’t you know that I always and everywhere behave like this? – Although this is not entirely correct, and you are not like this with everyone and not always and not everywhere, but even if it were so, this is not the answer for me. - “Friendship” is friendship because something is passed on to me from another and from me to another. Therefore, “relationships” are the essence of relationships, that they relate someone to someone else, that is, to another, - they take everyone out of the self-isolation of egoism and narrowness of heart - that they “expand the being” of the individual, as Spinoza said... - But if, - understand, - my nature, my nature is like this. - Well, so what? Everyone’s nature is like this – selfish and narrow. But friendship opens the way for the influx of new reality. That's what friendship is for, so that we don't "cold-hearted eunuchs" but heart skepticism is the worst of vices, the most terrible of all that can happen to a person. – And if I’m always a “sunset”... – In love, our personality ceases to be the same as “always”, as “everywhere”, as “with everyone”. Senility and decrepitude of the soul pass. The soul is renewed and rejuvenated. – But don’t we have any relationship? Let's live somehow... - That's the point - “somehow.” If there are no those relationships that I spoke about, if “relations” do not relate anyone and “connections” do not connect anyone, then they do not exist at all, and individuals are not in friendship, not in each other, but in themselves and by themselves - in self-love. If you stay with me “like everyone else” and behave towards me “as always and everywhere,” then this best proves that you know neither friendship, nor relationships, nor connections... Understand, I don’t want your love or your dislike, not friendship or enmity, but simple certainty, so that I know whether it’s worth exhausting myself and wasting energy over this field of friendship, in the hope of at least a distant harvest, or whether I must in advance give up the thought of a better future, abandon the barren, rocky field and then go about “my” business. But you are deaf: “hearing indifferently to good and evil” you remain silent. How long has it been like this?..” A heart ulcerated by a Friend cannot be healed by anything except Time and Death. But Time erases his ulcers, removing the diseased part of the heart - partially killing him - and Death destroys the whole person. Since a person is alive, therefore, his wounds from friendship are inhealable and painful. And he will walk with them to reveal them to the Eternal Judge. Look at the Lord's parable about “the called” and “the chosen” (Matthew 22:2–14; Luke 14:16–24). There is so much secret bitterness in it - endless bitterness and pain of a heart wounded in its very love. Beloved, called, those whom God himself was jealous of, to whom He did everything - which He did not do to any people... so what? They do not want to be chosen, they do not want their own salvation. Moreover, they do not even want to be simply delicate - to respond to the call of Love, which gives them His highest gift, making them His friends. They neglect Love's love. Well, then: “Go out quickly into the crossroads and the hail, and bring in the poor, the needy, the blind and the lame.” And, when there was still room left, then again: “Go out into the path and the Khalugs, and persuade them to listen, so that my house may be filled.” A feast of love that there is no one to offer - which was prepared for those dear to the heart, but turned out to be filled with crooks from the street! Do everything, do everything in friendship in order to overcome the wall between people. Spare no effort, fight for communication until sweat, until the blood of martyrdom, until death. Lay down your belly for your friends, because the first thing from which friends should be freed is from insincerity, from coldness, from self-isolation. But there is, there is a border that you cannot cross. There is a wall that you can’t break through with your forehead or with a battering ram. And when you come to this border, when you move close to this wall, then you have to leave. With the sorrow of the heart, one must tear the feeling out of oneself, at least by tearing off a piece of living flesh; one must free oneself from what is impossible - and it is impossible, namely, to show another that the impossible - that is, love - is possible. The Savior of the world Himself to God’s chosen people, when he approached this border, from which it was clearly visible that it was impossible to penetrate them with love, He Himself turned back. “Jerusalem, Jerusalem, beating the prophets, and stoning those sent to you, when your fellow children were delighted, as your chicks gather kokosh under the krill, and you did not desire it! Behold, your house is left to you empty” (Matthew 23:37–38). From the analysis of the concept of jealousy, one can see its deepest connection with overcoming the law of identity, this fundamental principle of reason. From here it is clear why jealousy, even in its purest manifestations, incurs a sidelong glance of hostility from reason, why “common sense” and its blood daughter, mockery, are so willing to talk about jealousy, even when the latter is taken in abstracto, in principle. Both love and jealousy - another love - fight with reason, breaking through with their pressure the main part of it - the law of identity. And, in this sense, jealousy is deeply unfair. If the recklessness of jealousy brings upon it intellectual condemnation as an “absurdity,” then this injustice of jealousy, in turn, causes an irritated moral assessment of it as an “immoral” phenomenon. Here is another reason for the obscurity of the concept of jealousy we have discussed. These etymological data confirm the conclusions to which the metaphysical analysis of the concept of jealousy led us. The concept of jealousy, in the Russian language, 811 in its main direction, is characterized as power, as strength, as tension, but not at all as fear, or hatred, or envy. – Rev-n-iv and the corresponding derivatives rev-n-o-va-ty, rev-n-ost are in some ways close to the Latin riv-al-is, riv-in-us - rival and with the French riv-al, riv-al-is-er, riv-al-it-é. But, if this is so, then it still remains unclear what the root meaning of this word is. The answer to this question is not difficult to give. Rev-n-iv, through its Old Slavonic form rv-n-iv, is reduced to the same root as the family of words rv-en-i-e, rev-n-ost-n-y, rev-n-i-tel-y, for for these latter the Old Slavonic derivatives will be rv-en-i-ѥ, rv-a-n-y, i.e. lucta, struggle. Jealousy, obviously, is the same as zeal, a jealous person is the same as a zealot, jealous is the same as tearing or, rather, tearing. Serbian rv-a-ti has the meaning eniti, rv-a-ti se – certare. Here there are correlations with Sanskrit: ar-v-an - swiftly running, hastening, aurva - agile, fast, horseback; with the Greek ὀρέƑοντο - they hurried, ὀ-ρού-ει - hurries, rushes; with Latin ru-i-t, with Old Saxon aru, Old Northern örr - fast, ready, mounted. Both “to have zeal” and “to have zeal”, at their root, only mean the presence of strength, power, and impetuosity. This is the opposite of lethargy, impotence, weakness. That is why, jealousy is often used in the sense of “striving for something with strength, with energy,” “to be energetic in something.” To be jealous of something or to be jealous of something means, according to V. Dahl, “to strive with all one’s might,” “to strive for something with zeal.” Thus, it is said: “I am zealous of knowledge,” “I am zealous of the kingdom of heaven,” “I am zealous of great talents.” To be jealous of someone or what matters is to compete, imitate, follow, or strive, as if in a start, without giving in. So, Lomonosov used the phrase: “be jealous of our example”; it is also precisely said: “I was always jealous of his successes,” etc. From here we can decisively conclude that jealousy first of all means, as V. Dahl points out, “ardent zeal, desire” and even, predominantly, “to the point”; in this very sense it is said: “jealousy for service,” “jealousy for service,” “jealousy not according to reason.” At the same time, zealous means “the most diligent, diligent, caring, devoted with all his soul to the work”; This is the phrase: “a zealous champion of the truth or for the truth.” 812 In the same way, the Greek ζῆλος or, in the Doric form, ζᾶλος has its own meaning of “ardor, zeal - ardeur, zèle”, 813 then “rivalry, hatred - rivalité, haine” and, finally, only “jealousy - jalousie”, i.e. jealousy, as it is usually understood in the language of the intelligentsia and as it is not at all no people understand. Accordingly, the verb ζηλόω means “to covet with ardor, to desire strongly, rechercher avec ardeur, envier.” As for the etymology of these words, there is such an abundance of different and, moreover, artificial hypotheses that it would be rash to say anything definite. 814 We can only point out that, according to Prellwitz, the word ζῆλος comes from √jâ, i.e., in fact, “to be zealous - heftig sein,” as well as the verb ζητέω - to seek, to seek. The Latin language does not give us anything new in the present case: the word zelotypia, - jealousy, - is borrowed from Greek and, therefore, comes from ζῆλος. Finally, in the Hebrew language, both zeal, Eifer, and jealousy, Eifersucht, are denoted by one word, namely קִנְאָה kin'a, derived from the common Semitic √קנא, √kn'. This three-letter root does not contain any shade of intellectual jealousy; Thus, in Arabic it means “to become very red - hochrot werden”, in Syriac it means “to be dark in color - dunkelfarbig sein”. Hence, in the Hebrew language and in other Semitic languages, √קנא, √kn’ means “to be jealous, passionate.” The very word קִנְאָה kin’a means, first of all, the passion of love with jealousy, then competition and then jealousy, God’s zeal for His glory.” 815 There is another word recognized by some 816 as equivalent to the Russian “jealousy” - this is precisely שְׁקִידָה shekida. But the word shekida, even less than kin’a, contains the concept of “jealousy”, in the specific meaning of the word. In fact, shekida comes from the common Semitic √שׁקד, √shkd, in the Phoenician language corresponding to the concept of “respecting, honoring, appreciating something - auf etwas achten”, and in the Mishnaic and Targumic languages ​​it received the meaning “to be zealous - eifrig sein”. 817 So, the general conclusion that we came to will be this: The etymology and usage of the word jealousy and its derivatives undeniably confirm the previously given metaphysical analysis of the concept of jealousy. Namely, the condemnation that weighs on it is finally removed from jealousy, and it is recognized as only a necessary expression, or, more precisely, only a necessary side of strong love. This is what makes it clear why the Word of God so often and so persistently attributes zeal to God. And it would be completely incomprehensible how a state that is reprehensible in itself can be an image of something in the Divine life. After all, sin, or lust, or lies are never attributed to God under any anthropopaphisms. If zeal is attributed to Him, then no matter how we understand this Divine zeal, we can affirm in advance that it is something holy; and therefore, human jealousy is not something in itself undue and nasty. From the explanations made here it is obvious that in such an attribution of jealousy to God one should see not strained anthropopaphism, but an exact designation of the essence of the matter. After all, jealousy is an ontological concept, not a psychological or ethical one. But not only is jealousy a necessary moment of love. She, according to the widespread interpretation of Rev. Isaac the Syrian, there is a necessary side of everything good that is in a person. In general, she is a force that fulfills good desires. “Whoever has good desires cannot be prevented from fulfilling them by resistance... This happens for the following reason. Every thought of good desire, at the beginning of its movement, will be followed by a certain jealousy, its ardor likened to fiery coals; and it usually protects this thought, and does not allow any resistance, obstacle or barrier to come close to it, because this jealousy acquires great strength and unspeakable power to protect the soul at every hour from relaxation or from fear, when all kinds of constraining circumstances are directed at it. And just as that first thought is the power of holy desire, naturally planted in the nature of the soul, so this jealousy is a thought driven by an irritable force in the soul, given to us by God for our benefit, to observe the natural limit, to express the concept of our freedom by fulfilling the natural desire found in the soul. This is a virtue, without which good things cannot be produced, and it is called jealousy, because from time to time it moves, excites, inflames and strengthens a person. Someone... called this jealousy in his words “a dog and guardian of the law of God,” that is, virtue...” 818 Next, St. The father explains that jealousy is formed from the fear of losing a good and from the desire to keep it; That is why the weakening of jealousy is a bad omen, caused either by spiritual cooling, or by arrogance and pride, i.e., the attitude towards spiritual good is no longer living and personal, but property and carnal, as if it were some kind of thing that can be put under lock and key and, without experiencing it, still own it. Thus, the desire for the Pillar and Affirmation of the Truth is realized and preserved by jealousy, this driven and despised power of our spirit for modern consciousness. Propter constantiam. For consistency. We hear typical intellectual judgments about jealousy from an intellectual among intellectuals - V. G. Belinsky. “Aleko’s heart is overcome by jealousy,” he says. – This passion is characteristic either of people who are selfish by nature, or of people who are morally undeveloped... A morally developed person loves calmly, confidently, because he respects the object of his love (love without respect is impossible for him). Cooling [the “favorite object”] will cause him to suffer, because a loving heart cannot help but suffer at the loss of a beloved heart; but he won't be jealous. To be jealous, without sufficient reason, is a disease of insignificant people who do not respect either themselves or their rights to the affection of the object they love; it expresses the petty tyranny of a creature standing on the level of animal egoism. Such jealousy is impossible for a morally developed person; but in the same way, jealousy on a sufficient basis is impossible for him: for such jealousy certainly presupposes the torment of suspicion, insult and thirst for revenge...” etc., etc. etc., and all this reasoning is sprinkled with: “if only a person”, “a morally developed being”, “human dignity”, etc. (V. G. Belinsky, - Works of A. Pushkin [about “Gypsies”]. “Oc.”, Vol. 8, p. 458 ff.). Fr. Kirchner, – Wörterbuch d. Philosophischen Grundbegriffe, 3-te Aufl., Lpz., 1897, S. 106: Eifersucht. Lead. aphor. cit. by: N. Makarov, - Encyclopedia of the mind, or a chosen dictionary. thoughts of authors of all peoples and all centuries, St. Petersburg, 1877, pp. 271–272. Spinoza, – Ethices pars prima. Prop. XXXV, Sch. (Opera Vol. 1, p. 151). id., pars III, Propp. XXXIII-XXXVIII, pp. 150–154. – B. Spinoza, – Ethics, set out in geometric order, trans. from lat. N. A. Ivantsova, M., 1892. - Wed. exposition at Kuno Fischer, – East. New Philos., T. II, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp. 444–445. Ethics, pp. 184, 186, 189. Fr. Nietzsche, Thoughts and Sketches for Untimely Reflection. We are philologists. From posthumous prod. 1874–1875 Trans. P. Rutkovsky II, 3. 103 (“Full. Collected Works,” “Moscow Book Publishing House,” T. 2, 1909, p. 302). Wed. poem. Whitman's "To you." Arist. , - This. to Nick. VII 7 (F 8), r. 1158 1–8. Wed. Plat. , – Timaeus 37d, 38a, 38b, pp. 209 16–20, 31–32, 39–43. In this desire for privacy of the object of love there is something similar to modesty Goryaev, p. 296: zeal; p. 297: jealous - Dal, T. 3, st. 1666–1667: jealous; floor. 1667: jealous. Boisacq, 4-me livr., p. 309, some are given here. from etymologies. More: Cur., 4-te Aufl. Lpz., 1873, SS. 380–381, n. 567. Prel., S. 109: ζάλη; S. 110: ζῆλος, ζητέω. Ges. Handw. , SS. 692–693. Here's a quote. and links to resp. places of St. Scripture [ABOUT. K. Steinberg], – Russian-Jewish Dictionary, St. Petersburg, 1860, ed. Min. N. Ave., p. 737. Is. Sire. , – Sl. 32. r. p., pp. 143–144. According to Greek text Sl. 61.