Dispute with Pyrrhus

“Dispute with Pyrrhus” (645) is one of the fundamental works of St. Maximus the Confessor, who played a decisive role in the refutation of the Monothelite heresy. The debate took place in Carthage, where the former Patriarch of Constantinople Pyrrhus fled after his exile, and where St. Maxim. It became a public theological controversy, as a result of which Pyrrhus publicly renounced his errors and even went to Rome to announce his repentance. Although Pyrrhus subsequently returned to monothelitism, the dispute itself became an important step towards the condemnation of monothelitism at the VIth Ecumenical Council. Main arguments and topics raised in the debate: 1. Two natures - two wills. St. Maxim turns to the Chalcedonian dogma of two natures in Christ, unmerged, unchanging, inseparably, inseparably united in the One Person (Hypostasis) of God the Word. He consistently proves that each nature has its own natural will, for will is an integral property of rational nature. Consequently, in Christ there are two natural wills - Divine and human. 2. Harmony of wills. The monk explains that the human will of Christ is always in complete agreement and submission to the Divine will, without losing its independence or freedom. He cites the example of the Gethsemane prayer (Matthew 26:39), where the human will of the Savior is clearly manifested, submitting to the will of the Father. 3. The danger of monothelitism. St. Maxim proves that the affirmation of one will in Christ denies the fullness of human nature, devalues ​​redemption (accomplished through Christ's voluntary acceptance of suffering and death), leads to monophysitism and contradicts the Holy Scriptures and the teachings of the Holy Fathers. 4. Distinguishing between “own” and “subordinate” will. The monk explains that the human will of Christ was not “own” in the sense of self-will, opposition to the Divine will, but was “subordinate” and “consistent” with the Divine will. 5. The role of energies (actions). Like wills, St. Maxim proves that each nature has its own energy (action). Consequently, in Christ there were two energies - Divine and human, acting in the unity of the Person. Thus, the work gives a deep and clear understanding of the Orthodox teaching about the Face of Christ, about His two natures and two wills. The dispute between [venerable] Maximus and Pyrrhus, [former Patriarch of Constantinople], took place in the [province] Africa. Record of the discussion of controversial issues in church dogmas that took place between Pyrrhus, the former Patriarch of Constantinople, and the most reverent monk Maximus in the month of July of the third indictment in the presence of the most pious patrician Gregory and the most reverend bishops and other God-loving and glorious men who were with him, and Pyrrhus defended the innovation introduced by him and his predecessor in Byzantium, that is, one will, and Maxim stood for the paternal and apostolic teaching that has come down to us since ancient times. The aforementioned excellent husband Gregory, the all-honorable patrician, brought the aforementioned husbands, that is, Pyrrhus and Maximus, face to face. Pyrrhus began the conversation with Maximus by saying: PIRR. What harm have we done to you, Cyrus Abba Maxim, me and my predecessor, that you revile us so everywhere, instilling in everyone the opinion of us as heretics? But who has ever revered and respected you as much as we do, without even knowing you personally? MAXIM. That’s why, God knows, no one, to use your own words, revered and respected me as much as you. But when you have now rejected Christian dogma, I considered it dangerous to prefer favor to me to the truth. P. By what opinion did we reject the Christian way of thinking? M. The opinion that the humanity of Christ and His Divinity have one will. And not only by opinion, but also by the fact that you set it out in the new “Ekphesis” to the destruction of the entire body of the Holy Church. P. So, do you think that he who recognizes one will in Christ deviates from Christian teaching? M. Absolutely right. After all, what could be more wicked than to say that One and the Same One, by one and the same will, before His incarnation, created everything from non-existent, and supports, and providentially cares for, and guides savingly, and after His incarnation wants to eat and drink, moves from place to place and does everything else that is beyond reproach and blame, through which He showed the economy pure from all false appearances? P. Is Christ alone, or not? P. So, if Christ is one, then He, of course, willed as one, and if He desired as one, then He, of course, had one will, and not two. M. To say something without distinguishing between the meanings of what is being said is nothing more than to confuse everything and try to leave the subject of research unclear, which is unusual for learned men. Therefore tell me this: Christ, being one, is only man or only God, or both together, both God and man? P. It’s clear that both God and man are together. M. So, Christ, being by nature God and man, desired as one and the same God and man, or only as Christ? But if, by premise, Christ willed as God and man, it is clear that He, being one, willed in a dual and not a singular manner. For if Christ is not something other than His natures, of which and in which He is, then it is obvious that He, being One and the same, willed and acted in accordance with His natures, that is, as is inherent in each of them, since none of them is devoid of will or action. If Christ desired and acted in accordance with His natures, that is, in the way that is inherent in each of them, and He has two natures, then, of course, He has two natural wills, and essential actions equivalent to them. For just as the number of the natures of the One and the same Christ, thought and expressed piously, does not divide Christ, but represents the difference of natures as being preserved even in union, so also the number of wills and actions essentially inherent in His natures (for, as it is said, He, the One and the same, was able to will and act for our salvation with both of His natures) does not introduce division in any case, but shows their preservation and persistence even in union, and nothing more. P. It is impossible that the owners of wills should not be introduced along with the wills. M. You declared this absurdity in your message, driven not by reason, but by arbitrariness, having received Heraclius as your ally, because you also agreed with his unlawful and lawless confusion and approved it with a blessing. After all, if we assume that along with wills the owners of wills are also introduced, then the opposite is also true: together with the owners of wills, wills will also be introduced. And it turns out, in your opinion, that the most essential and most good and blessed Deity, because He has one will, also has one hypostasis, according to Sabellius; and due to the fact that He has three Persons, there are also three wills, and therefore three natures, according to Arius, since, according to paternal definitions and rules, the difference of wills also introduces a difference of natures. P. It is impossible for two wills to coexist in one person without conflict. M. If it is impossible for there to be two wills in one and the same person without confrontation, then, in your opinion, it is possible with confrontation. And if so, then you have so far admitted that there are two of them, and you are not arguing about the number, but only about the opposition. So, all that remains is to look for the reason leading to the struggle. So what do you think is the reason? Is it a desire in accordance with nature, or a sin? But if you name a desire that is in accordance with nature, then we know that its cause is none other than God. So, in your opinion, God is the creator of struggle. If sin [leads to struggle], then “He did not create sin,” and the incarnate God did not have any confrontation between His natural wills. After all, if there is no cause, then it is obvious that there will be no effect. P. So, desiring is a matter of nature? P. If desiring is a matter of nature, and the most famous fathers said that God and the saints have one will, then the saints and God will also have one nature. M. It has already been said before that when speaking about truth, it is necessary to distinguish between the meanings of what is expressed because of the misconceptions that occur as a result of the same name. I myself will ask you in response: did the saints who said that God and the saints have one will say this, meaning the essential and creative will of God or the object of the will? For the will of the one who desires and the object of the will are not the same thing, as the vision of the seer and the visible, because one is inherent in him essentially, and the other is external. But if they said this with the essential in mind, they will turn out to be not only introducing the saints as co-natural with God and creators along with Him, but also contradicting themselves, since they assert that those who are different in essence cannot have a common will. If the object of the will [is meant], then, therefore, the fathers called what was desired will, as a derivative through a cause, or, as some like to say, in a figurative sense, and no absurdity will follow if it is determined that simply wanting is a matter of nature. P. If we differ in our wills within ourselves and with each other, sometimes wanting something, sometimes not wanting the same thing, and this is a matter of nature and the determination that characterizes it, then we will find ourselves not only differing from each other in nature, but also changing it many times over. M. It is not the same thing to desire and to desire in some [certain] way, as to see and to see in some [certain] way. After all, to desire, as well as to see, is a matter of nature and is inherent in all those who are co-natural and only-begotten, and to desire in this way, as well as to see in a certain way, that is, to want to walk and look to the right or to the left, or up or down, or for lust, or for understanding the principles of existence, is a way of using desire and vision, inherent only to the user and separating him from others, according to the usually implied distinction. If we have such evidence from nature: to want to eat or not to want to eat, to want to walk or not to want to walk, then this destroys not the natural property of wanting, but a certain desire, that is, this is the emergence and disappearance of objects of desire. After all, if we assume that the things that came from God, being objects of His desire, will disappear, then along with them neither His essential nor creative will, conceived before them, will disappear. P. If you are talking about natural will, and what is natural is inevitable and forced, then wouldn’t it be necessary, when speaking about natural wills in Christ, to deny from Him any voluntary movement? M. Not only in the Divine and uncreated nature nothing natural is forced, but even in the created and thinking. After all, that which is rational by nature has a rational aspiration as a natural ability, which is called the will of the thinking soul, through which we, desiring, think, and, thinking and desiring, we want. And desiring, we search, consider and consult, and judge, and tune in, and prefer, and see, and use. And the rational desire, as it has been said, that is, to desire and think, to consult and seek, and consider, and want, and judge, and tune in, and choose, and strive, and use, is inherent in us by nature, which means that the natural [movements] of thinking beings are not forced. But even if we admit this, how can such a premise not turn out to be more absurd than any absurdity? After all, if, according to it, the natural is necessarily forced, and God is God by nature, by nature Good, by nature the Creator, then God will be both God, and Good, and the Creator by necessity, which even to think, let alone say, is the ultimate blasphemy. For who applies coercion? Consider, dear one, if you will, the blasphemy of this premise in this way: if he who speaks of two natural wills in Christ, in your opinion, denies in Him any voluntary movement, it is necessary that those who desire by nature have involuntary movement, and those who do not desire by nature have voluntary movement. This means that not only with God, Who is above all things, but also with all thinking and rational beings, by nature capable of desiring, the movement will be involuntary, but for the soulless, incapable of desiring, the movement will be voluntary. However, Blessed Cyril in the third chapter of “Objections to Theodorite’s censures” saved us from unnecessary work by directly stating: “Nothing natural in thinking nature is against the will.” And whoever wants to can be convinced of this by having this chapter in his hands. P. Since the truth revealed by investigation should be favorably accepted, and reasoning has shown with great clarity that the wills in Christ are natural, it is possible, just as we speak of something complex from two natures, to speak of a certain complex will from two natural [wills], so that those who affirm two wills (due to the natural difference of natures in Christ) and those who affirm one (due to the perfect union) do not argue with each other over simple words since, as the great theologist Gregory says, “for us the truth is not in names, but in deeds.” M. You see, hence your error, since you are completely unaware that additions occur with that which exists hypostatically, but not with that which is contemplated in something else, and not as something independent. And this is the general opinion of both external philosophers and the God-wise secret leaders of the Church. If you claim the addition of wills, you will be forced to talk about the addition of other natural properties (if you want to show the construction of your own dogma as consistent), that is, created and uncreated, infinite and finite, indefinable and definite, mortal and immortal, corruptible and incorruptible, and you will reach absurd views. And how will what comes out of wills be called will? After all, it is impossible for something added to be named after the names of its components. Or then that which consists of natures will begin to be called nature, according to the ancient heretics. Moreover, you again separate Him from the Father by your wills, by characterizing a complex nature through a complex will, and nothing more. P. Does this mean that natural properties, like their natures, had nothing in common? M. Nothing but the hypostasis of those very natures. For One and the Same One was inextricably the hypostasis of the same natural properties. P. Why then did the fathers, whose word is the law and rule of the Church, not call both glory and reproach common? After all, according to them, that from which there is a community of glory is one thing, and that from which reproach is another. M. Having said this, the holy fathers meant mutual exchange. But it is clear that interchange does not happen with one, but with two unequals, when the natural properties of each of the parts of Christ alternately, thanks to an ineffable connection, become the properties of the other, without transforming one part into another or mixing them by natural definition. Therefore, if you talk about will, implying mutual exchange, then you will end up with not one, but two wills, and your wisdom has again returned to what you tried to escape from. P. So, did not the flesh move at the behest of the Word united with it? M. You divide Christ by saying this. After all, at His behest, both Moses and David moved, and all who, thanks to the laying aside of human and carnal qualities, became capable of receiving the Divine action. In this, as in everything, following the Holy Fathers, we affirm that the “God of all” Himself, without transformation, becoming a man, not only as God willed in accordance with His Divinity, but also as a man, in accordance with His humanity. After all, if a being, having arisen from a non-existent, has the power of gravitating towards the existing, and not towards the non-existent - and that force by nature tends to strive towards the sustaining and to turn away from the destructive - then, consequently, the all-essential Word, having been humanly realized, had the power to gravitate towards the existing, the desire and aversion of which (force) He voluntarily showed by action: the desire - by what was natural and blameless. so much so that the infidels are not considered God, and disgust - in the hour of suffering - because he voluntarily grieved in the face of death. So what absurd thing did the Church of God do when it recognized in Him without exception, together with His human and created nature and the determinations He creatively put into it, without which there can be no nature? P. If timidity is inherent in us by nature, and it is from reprehensible things, then in your opinion, it means that reprehensible things are inherent in us by nature, that is, sin. M. Again, with the same name you are deceiving yourself, not the truth. After all, there is timidity that is in accordance with nature and contrary to nature. And timidity, in accordance with nature, is a force of attraction to existence, [manifesting itself] in depression, and [timidity] contrary to nature is unreasonable depression. So, the one that is against nature, since it comes from the betrayal of thoughts, He did not allow to Himself at all, but the one that is in accordance with nature, He voluntarily accepted for our sake, as Good, since it manifested the force existing in nature, fighting for being. For natural properties in the Lord do not precede desire, as in us, but just as when He actually experienced hunger and thirst, He experienced them not in the same way as we do, but in a manner superior to us (for it was voluntary), and truly timid, He became timid not like us, but above us. In a word, everything natural in Christ has a supernatural image, coupled with His own definition, so that both the nature is verified through the definition, and the economy through the image. P. So, in order to avoid these subtle and incomprehensible to most intricacies, evading everything else, we recognize One and the Same as perfect God and perfect man, because perfection itself includes natural properties. M. If calling Christ natures without the peculiarities inherent in each of them, or perfect God and perfect man without signs of perfection, in your opinion, is the limit of piety, then let anathema be to the councils, and before them to the fathers, who made it law for us to confess not only natures, but also the characteristics of each of them, and also [to confess] not only the same [Christ] as perfect God and perfect man, but also the signs of this perfection, that is, to call One and The same is visible and invisible, mortal and immortal, corruptible and incorruptible, tangible and intangible, created and uncreated. And according to the same pious concept, they piously taught about two wills in One and the Same, not only through the specific number “two,” but also through the pronouns “one and the other,” and by means of what they spoke about the human [will] by analogy with the divine. For the nature of number is not limited to just one way [of expression]. P. If it is impossible to use these expressions due to the machinations of heretics, we will be satisfied only with what has been said collectively and will not affirm one or two wills. M. If you need to confess what was said at the council, and only, then you should not talk about the incarnate nature of God the Word, which contains all the piety of the sacrament, since it was not proclaimed at the council. However, you will also be forced to confess wills along with natures and their properties. After all, if you say that what is naturally inherent in Christ’s natures is their properties, and to desire is inherent in the nature of each of His natures, then you will have to confess wills along with the natures, along with other natural properties. On the other hand, if the councils anathematized both Apollinaris and Arius for their assertion of one will (because each of them used this to substantiate their own heresy: one wanted to show that the flesh is consubstantial with the Word, and the other tried to introduce a Son of another essence with the Father; then how can we be pious without professing statements contrary to the heretics? And the fifth council (let’s skip the rest) two wills and commanded, decreeing - literally - “to accept all the writings of Athanasius, and Basil, and Gregory” and some others, defined as “chosen teachers,” which also speaks of two wills. P. And don’t you think that when they talk about natural will, it hurts the ears of many? M. How many types of life do you think existents have, with the exception of the Divine? M. Plant-based, sensual and thinking. M. And since each species is distinguished from the others by some determination in creation, what is this distinctive and special determination of each? P. Please, tell me about this too. M. The peculiarity of plant life is nutritious, growth-promoting and generative movement, sensual life is movement according to aspiration, and thinking life is autocratic. P. You have presented the peculiarity of each type of life very clearly and without confusion. M. If the peculiarity of each species has been presented clearly and without confusion, then I ask again: is the nutritious, growth-giving and generating movement inherent in plant life by nature, and what is inherent in sensual life is that which is by aspiration? P. Undoubtedly, by nature. M. This means that thinking [life], according to the sequence of [reasoning], [is inherent in] autocratic movement. P. Of course, this is recognized by those who reason in accordance with their own principles. M. So, if thinking beings by nature are characterized by autocratic movement, then everything that thinks is also by nature capable of will. For the blessed Diadochos of Photiki defined autocracy as desire. If everything that thinks is also by nature capable of willing, and God the Word became flesh, truly animated by reason and thought, then it means that He was essentially capable of willing as a man. And if so, when they talk about natural will, it does not hurt the ears of the pious, but the ears of heretics. P. I was already convinced that the wills in Christ are natural, and I do not require any other proof of this. For reasoning showed the very nature of existence to testify no worse than Divine prophecies, that One and the same was He who willed according to His natures, favored as God, obeyed as man, and that natural wills are necessarily consistent with natures: the beginningless - without beginning, and the beginning - having a beginning, and that it was impossible for them to ever coincide in one will, although they belong, just like natures, to One and That same: the beginningless and the beginning, the uncreated and the created, the created and the created, the limitless and the limited, the deified and the deified. And those in Byzantium, still opposing natural wills, claim that the fathers said that the Lord has human will by assimilation. M. Since you yourself directed this amazing and brilliant education of theirs, tell me according to what kind of assimilation they say this: the essential one, according to which everyone, having natural properties, learns thanks to nature, or the relative one, according to which we amicably assimilate what relates to each other and love it, without doing or suffering anything from it ourselves. P. It’s clear, in relative terms. M. So, before showing the absurdity of such [a statement], it would be more just to examine more precisely whether a person is capable of willing by nature or not. For when this is shown, the blasphemy of such heresy will become more obvious. P. Let's explore this, if you like. M. The fact that natural things are not taught is not only said by people who have studied nature with reason and are different from the majority, but it is also common among the more ordinary. And since one does not learn what is natural (and one does not learn to want, because no one ever learns [the ability] to want), it means that a person is capable of wanting by nature. And again, if a person is rational by nature, and what is reasonable by nature is also autocratic by nature - after all, according to the fathers, autocracy is desire - then it means that a person is capable of desire by nature. And again, if nature guides the dumb, but in a person who moves voluntarily at will, it is guided, then it means that a person is capable of desire by nature. And again, if man arose in the image of the blessed and essential Divinity, and the Divine nature is autocratic by nature, then, therefore, man, as truly its image, is autocratic by nature, and if [he] is autocratic by nature, then, consequently, he is capable of desire by nature, because it has already been said that the fathers defined autocracy as desire. And also, if it is inherent in all people to want, and not in such a way that it is inherent in some and not in others (what is seen equally in all marks the nature of the individuals falling under it), then it means that a person is capable of willing by nature. P. It has been proven in many ways that man is capable of desire by nature. M. So, since this has been clearly proven, let us consider, as we suggested above, the absurdity of their premise. M. If, as has been shown, man is capable of willing by nature, and, in their opinion, Christ had human will by simple assimilation, then they will have, as long as they adhere to their own principles, to say that the rest of our natural [properties] are at one with it, that is, with the natural will, also by simple assimilation, and for them all speculation and the mystery of the economy will be accepted in the imagination. Then, if the decree of Sergius anathematized those who spoke of two wills, not in one sense or another, but in general, and they themselves speak of two, albeit erroneously - because of “assimilation,” then it means that the defenders of this decree agree with the anathema pronounced against them. And again, if, according to the premise they defend, persons are introduced along with wills, then, therefore, speaking of two wills (albeit erroneously, as said, due to “assimilation”), they will also affirm persons introduced along with them, according to such a premise. And who will endure the cutting of One into two faces? P. What about the fathers? Didn't they say that the will that Christ sealed in Himself is our [will]? P. Consequently, with the word “human” they did not designate the will inherent in Him by nature, but that which He accepted by assimilation. M. Since they said in the same way that He assumed our nature, it follows that, in the opinion of those people, He possesses nature itself by simple assimilation. After all, if the first is true, then the second is also true, and on the contrary, if the second is false, then the first is [false]. P. What, then, did the fathers designate what was inherent in Him by nature, saying that He imprinted ours in Himself? P. What do you mean by this? M. Since One and the Same was wholly God together with humanity, and He is wholly man along with the Divinity, He Himself, as a man, in Himself and through Himself subordinated the human to God and the Father, presenting Himself to us as the best prototype and example to follow, so that we, looking to Him as the leader of our salvation, would voluntarily bring ours to God by no longer wanting what is displeasing to Him. P. Those people said this not out of malice or any deceit, but wanting to reveal the ultimate unity. M. If we concede this to the supporters of Sevier, then won’t they also say with full justification (as far as [this] relates to the admitted position) that, “we are not speaking of one nature out of malice or any deceit, but wanting, just like you, through one will, to show the ultimate unity in nature”? For the Sevirians will use their weapons against themselves, just as David did against Goliath. So, speaking of one will, they coincide with those in statements and concepts. However, what do they want to call this one will? After all, they should rightfully give it a name. P. They call it gnomic. M. So, if gnomic, then also derivative, and if derivative, then intention, as the first cause, will be the essence. P. Intention is not an essence. M. If it is not an essence, then it is a quality, and quality will result from quality, which is impossible. So what do they call intention? P. Intention is nothing other than what Blessed Cyril defined it, that is, a way of life. M. And the way of life, say, in virtue or in vice, is inherent in us by choice or not? M. So, do we choose with will and consultation, or without will and consultation? P. It is generally accepted that desiring and consulting. M. This means that intention is nothing more than some kind of desire that relatively adheres to either a real or an imaginary good. P. You probably made an explanation of the paternal definition. M. If the interpretation of the paternal definition was carried out correctly, then, firstly, one cannot speak of gnomic will. After all, how can we allow will to come from the will? Secondly, speaking of the purpose in Christ, they (as research has shown) affirm Him by a simple man, like us, predisposed to reasoning, ignorant and doubtful, and having contradictions, like someone who deliberates about doubtful things, and not about certain things. For we by nature have the desire for what is simply good by nature, and the experience of a relatively certain way of good - thanks to search and advice. And therefore, as applied to us, intention is spoken of in the exact sense, since it is a method of use, and not a definition of nature, because nature changes countless times. In relation to the humanity of the Lord, which was realized not just like us, but divinely (for for our sake He who appeared from us in the flesh was God), one cannot speak of intention. After all, being itself, that is, fulfillment in a divine quality, by nature had a closeness to good and alienation from evil, just as Basil taught the “Great Eye of the Church” in his interpretation of the 44th Psalm, saying: “In this sense, understand also what was said about Him in Isaiah, that “before a child knows or prefers evil, he will choose good.” Because before a child knows good or evil, in order to choose good, he does not listen to vice. For “before” means that He had the good by nature, without exploring, like us, without consulting, but by being itself, divinely realized.” P. So, are virtues natural? P. And if they are natural, then why are they not equally inherent in everyone who is of the same nature? [M. They are equally inherent in everyone who is of the same nature.] P. Where does such inequality come from among us? M. Because we carry out the work of nature differently. So, if we were all equally, for which we arose, fulfilling the work of nature, then both equal nature and virtue would appear in everyone, not accepting more or less. P. If natural properties are inherent in us not from exercise, but from creation, and virtue is natural, then why do we acquire virtues that are natural through labor and exercise? M. The exercise and the labors accompanying it were invented by lovers of virtue only in order to separate the deception brought into the soul by sensation, and not in order to only now bring virtues from the outside - after all, as they say, they are implanted in us from creation. Therefore, as soon as the deception is completely washed away, the soul immediately reveals the shine of natural virtue. After all, whoever is not stupid is wise, and whoever is not cowardly or impudent is courageous, and who is not depraved is chaste, and whoever is not unrighteous is righteous. By nature, the mind is understanding, the ability to judge is righteousness, and the wrathful principle is courage, and the lustful principle is chastity. Consequently, after taking away what is contrary to nature, usually only that which corresponds to nature is discovered, just as after the loss of rust, the natural shine and sparkle of iron is revealed. P. This reveals the greatest blasphemy among those who say that Christ has an intention. M. One should not leave unmarked what is obvious to the attentive reader: the word γνωμη has many uses and meanings, both in Holy Scripture and among the Holy Fathers. For sometimes they apply it to exhortation and advice, as when the apostle says: “But concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give advice (γνωμη)”; sometimes - to a meeting, when blessed David says: “They were tricking against Your people with advice (γνωμη)”, which, clarifying, another publisher wrote: “They were tricking against Your people with advice (βουλην)”; sometimes [they apply this word] to a sentence, just as Daniel, the great among the prophets, says about someone: “A shameless sentence has come out on behalf of the king”; another time - to opinion, or faith, or judgment, as Gregory, nicknamed from theology, sets out in the 1st word “On the Son”: “Since it is not a great thing to forbid, for it is very easy, and anyone can do it, but to present one’s judgment in return is the work of a pious and intelligent person.” And simply speaking, so that, analyzing everything separately, not to make the speech boring, I, noticing from the Holy Scriptures and the Holy Fathers, found among them the word γνωμη in eighteen meanings, for it does not indicate the peculiarity of something general or particular, but the meaning intended by the speaker, and is determined by what is said either before or immediately after. Therefore, it is impossible to limit such a word to only one meaning. P. How is it possible for something expressed in many senses to highlight one thing? M. So, that the shame of such heresy may become more clear, let us consider this premise in another way. P. Let's consider it, if you like. M. Speaking about one will, voluntary, or gnomic, or sovereign, or, if they want to call it something else, and we do not argue about this, they will be forced to consider it either Divine, or human, or angelic. And from the very beginning, no matter which of them they call it, they will call it natural, since each indicates nature - and what they seemed to avoid by the dividing method, they confirm by the permissive method. And as a consequence, if they call the will only Divine, then they affirm Christ by nature as God, and nothing more; if - angelic, then - neither by God nor by man, but by some angelic nature; and if human, then they will show Him to be simply human and subservient. P. When they encounter such absurdities, they say that the will is neither natural nor gnomic, but they assert that it is inherent in us as a faculty. M. Is this ability inherent in us by nature or not by nature? M. This means that they, again, according to permission, call the will of nature and did not receive any benefit from this bypass. And since ability through learning causes state and action, then, therefore, in their opinion, Christ acquired state and actions of the will from learning and success, and succeeded before learning, not knowing what he was learning. Why then do they turn away from Nestorius, ardently grasping at his words and concepts? Yes, because, speaking of one will, they defend his views, declaring that Nestorius teaches about one will in the two persons he invented, as evidenced by Ekphesis, which they defend. And also, if they deny that the will is natural, then they will call it either hypostatic or contrary to nature. But if they say that she is hypostatic, then the Son will have a different desire than the Father. For the hypostatic marks only the hypostasis. If the will is contrary to nature, then they affirm the damage to His essence, since what is contrary to nature destroys what is in accordance with it. I would be happy to ask them this: does God and the Father desire all things as the Father or as God? But if he is like the Father, then He has a different will than the Son, because the Son is not the Father. And if, like God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, then they will admit that the will relates to nature, that is, natural. And again, if, according to the fathers, those who have one will have one essence, and, in their opinion, the Divinity of Christ and His humanity have one will, then it means that they say that they (the Divinity of Christ and humanity) have the same essence. And how, in such wickedness, do they claim to follow their fathers? And again, if, according to the same fathers, the difference of natures does not manifest itself in one will, they will have to either, speaking about one will, deny the natural difference in Christ, or, speaking about the natural difference, deny one will - since they are guided by the paternal rules. And again, if, according to the same teachers, both do not have a common will, in the sense of essences, then it is necessary for them either not to say that both natures of the One and the Same have together one will, or, in asserting this, to clearly contradict the paternal laws and regulations. P. The reasoning has very clearly and concisely shown that with every invention of the opponents wickedness is intertwined. But what do we say if they try to show this from [the writings of] the fathers? M. If they want to call “fathers” those who divide or merge the prenatural economy, we allow them [to do so]. For all such recognized a single will, although in wickedness they were directly opposed. If it is the Fathers of the Church, then we will not allow them to do this. Because let them show at least one of the famous and well-known fathers, so that we, when Christ God accuses us on the day of the trial of our affairs: “Why did you accept an expression that destroys the whole mystery of My incarnation?”, We will have an excuse: “Respecting the opinion of our father in everything.” P. Are not the words of Gregory the Theologian directed against two wills: “For His will in no way contradicts God, everything is deified.” M. No way. On the contrary, it perfectly reveals two wills and everything else. M. As ignition brings with it the ignited and the ignited, and as cooling - cooled and cooled, and passage - passing and passing, and vision - seeing and visible, and thinking - thinking and conceivable (after all, it is impossible to think or talk about a relationship without relating): so, according to the sequence, the deified and the deified. On the other hand, if the deification of the will, in their opinion, contradicts two wills, then the deification of nature will contradict two natures. For the father applies the same concept of deification to both. P. The father’s saying was shown to be completely consistent with the two wills, but it should be shown that Gregory, who glorified the Church of Nyssa, also agreed with this. After all, they present him as thinking only will, on the basis of what the father said about the Lord: “The soul desires, the body touches - thanks to both, the illness disappears.” For they assert that, according to the father, the soul of the Lord desires the Divine hypostatically united with it by the Divine will. M. So, according to the same order [of reasoning], he said that the body is touched by the Divine touch, therefore, the Divinity will be tangible for them. After all, [anyone] else, transferring what they say about the soul of the Lord, in an equivalent statement to the body, will lead them to extreme error. P. You very succinctly presented the blasphemy of such an understanding. What then should we say about the sayings of the great Athanasius cited by them, one of which: “The mind of the Lord is not yet the Lord, but either desire, or volition, or action in relation to something”? M. And they put this forward against themselves. Therefore, true reasoning to refute their opinion is based in everything on their own arguments. Because truth will never become so impoverished that it needs its own weapons against its opponents. After all, if, according to the Father, “The Mind of the Lord is not yet the Lord,” then His mind, of course, is something different in comparison with the Lord, that is, the mind of the Lord is not by nature the Lord, is not God. For they believe that he became His mind by hypostasis, and this is clear from the continuation [of the Father’s words]: “either wanting, or volition, or action in relation to something.” Here he uses as a criterion the teachings of a truly philosopher of philosophers, Clement, who in the 6th book of Stromatus determined that desire is an aspiring mind, and volition is a reasonable aspiration, or a desire aimed at something. This divine teacher spoke about “action in relation to something” because He used the thinking and rational soul hypostatically united with Him in relation to everything divinely accomplished by Him. P. Truly, they did not understand that thanks to the same thing with which they seemed to oppose piety, they suffered reproof. It is also necessary to examine another saying of the father that they cite, so as not to leave them any pretext against the truth. M. What other saying is this? I don't know him. P. As this wondrous man says: “He was born of a woman, from the first creation, having restored to Himself the form of a human, in the manifestation of the flesh, but without carnal desires and human thoughts, in the form of newness. For will belongs only to the Divine.” M. It is self-interpreted and does not require the help of inferences at all. P. Why is it doubtful for them? M. From great ignorance. Because who does not understand, unless he is completely deprived of spiritual vision, that the Father set forth this not about the definition of nature, but about the way of His existence in the flesh, wanting to show that the incarnation was a matter of Divine will, and only when the Father was pleased, the Son acted personally, and the Holy Spirit assisted, but not carnal movement and not human thoughts, that is, marriage succession? After all, the “God of all,” having become a man, did not introduce innovations into the definition of nature (because He was not yet a man, not having a complete and unchangeable definition of nature in everything), but in the image [of its existence], that is, in conception from the seed and birth through corruption. So, the godly teachers of the Church in no way denied the definitions of the nature of the united [principles], but, in agreement with the evangelists, apostles and prophets, they said that our Lord and God Jesus Christ desired and created our salvation in accordance with both of His natures. P. And this can be proven from the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments? M. Of course, for the fathers, not motivated by themselves, but having learned from them, philanthropically taught us this too. After all, it was not they who uttered it, but the grace of the Spirit with which they were completely imbued. P. Since you, in imitation of Divine goodness, setting the goal to bring benefit, took up these labors of research, teach this too without laziness. M. The Holy Gospels say about the Lord: “...The next day Jesus wanted to go to Galilee,” but it is clear that He wanted to go, since He was not there, but He was not only in humanity, because in Divinity He is not absent anywhere. So, then, He wanted to go as a man, and not as God - and He was able to will as a man. And again in another place [it is said]: “I want that where I am, they should be there.” If Christ, as God, is above “where” (after all, He is not in [any specific] place, since He is God), and it is impossible for created nature to be above “where,” then it means that He, as a man, wants them (the apostles) to be in the same place where He is - and the same One was able to will as a man. And again: “And, having come to the place, he said: I thirst. And they gave him wine mixed with gall, and having tasted it, he did not want to drink.” According to what part of Him is it said that He was thirsty? If according to Divinity, then His Divinity will be passionate, contrary to nature, wanting to drink. If according to humanity, it means that according to what He was thirsty, according to the same thing, He did not want to drink something unsuitable for nature - and the same One was able to desire as a person. Elsewhere it is said: “And Jesus walked through Galilee - for He did not want to walk through Judea, because the Jews sought to kill Him.” If walking by nature refers to the flesh, and not to the Divinity hypostatically united with it, it means that the Same One, like a man, walking through Galilee, did not want to walk through Judea - and the Same Same One was capable of willing as a man. And in another place: “And when they came out from there, they passed through Galilee, and He did not want anyone to know.” It is recognized by all that the ability to overcome space by nature belongs, as has been said, to the humanity of the Lord, and not to His Divinity. If it was inherent in Him by nature, as a man, and not as God, it means that, walking with the disciples as a man, He did not want anyone to recognize Him - and the same one was capable of desiring as a man. And again in another place: “And departing from there, he went into the borders of Tire and Sidon. And having entered the house, he wanted no one to find out and could not hide.” If Christ, as God, was self-hypostatic strength, and as a man - weakness, “after all, if He was crucified,” according to the apostle, “it was from weakness, but alive from the power of God,” then He, as a man, and not as God, having entered the house, did not want anyone to find out, and could not hide - and the same one was able to desire as a man. And in another place it is said: “About the fourth watch of the night he came to them, walking on the sea - and wanted to pass them.” If anyone accepts that this is said about Him as God, then he will be forced to say that the Divinity is encompassed by bodily boundaries, I mean, upper and lower, front and back, right and left. If he asserts that this is said about Him as a man, it means that the same One was capable of willing as a man. And it is also said: “And His disciples came, saying to Him: Where do You want us to go and prepare the Passover for You to eat?” If eating the Passover refers to the knowledge of the law, and the Lord submitted to the law as a man, and not as God, then it means that He wanted to eat the Passover as a man - and the same one was able to desire as a man. And the divine apostle speaks about Him in the Epistle to the Hebrews: “Being obedient even to the point of death, death on the cross.” So, therefore, He was obedient voluntarily or involuntarily? But if involuntarily, then this would rightly be called violence, not obedience. If, however, He became willing, but obedient, not as God, but as a man (after all, as God, He, according to the fathers, is neither obedient nor disobedient, “for this,” says the divine Gregory, “is characteristic of those inferior and subordinate”), then He was able to desire as a man. And blessed David [speaks of Him] in the 39th Psalm: “You did not desire sacrifice and offering, but you prepared a body for me. He did not require burnt offerings or sin sacrifices. Then I said: here I come. At the head of the book it is written about me to do Your will: My God, I have willed.” That the Father is called His God because Christ is a man, and not because He is God, just as the Father is called His God, because He is God, and not because He is a man, I think even opponents have no doubt. If the Father is His God, because He is a man, and not because He is God, then, it means that He wanted to create the Father’s and His will as a man, and not as God, for the Father’s will is also His, because He, too, is essentially God. And if so, then He was able to will not only as God and consubstantial with the Father, but also as a man and consubstantial with us. You should know that the divine apostle in the “Epistle to the Hebrews” attributed the words of the psalm just cited to the Lord. The great Moses, in the creation of man, represents God as saying: “Let us make man in our image and likeness.” So, if man is the image of the Divine nature, and the Divine nature is autocratic, then, therefore, the image, if it retains a similarity to the prototype, is autocratic by nature. And if so, and the Prototype by nature became also an image by nature, then it means that He is capable of willing in accordance with both of His natures. After all, from the [works] of the fathers it has already been proven that will is natural autocracy. You need to know that the word “autocracy” is used in different senses, like “nature”: in one way it is understood in relation to God, in others - in relation to angels, and in others - in relation to people. To God - superessentially, to angels - in the sense of such a coincidence of the state with the action, which does not allow a time interval at all, and to people - in such a way that the state is thought to precede the action in time. After all, if Adam voluntarily obeyed, and voluntarily looked, and voluntarily tasted, then desire is the primary suffering in us. If desire is the primary suffering in us, and the Word, as they say, having become incarnate, did not receive desire along with nature, then I, therefore, did not become sinless. If I have not become sinless, then it means I am not saved: since what is not accepted is not healed. And further, if the autocratic power of nature is His work and creation, and, in their opinion, the Word, having become incarnate, did not accept it in ineffable unity with nature, then He sent it (the power of nature) away from Himself, either condemning His own creation as not good, or being stingy with healing for us in this regard, [thereby] depriving us of perfect salvation, and Himself, due to unwillingness or inability to save completely, revealing to those subject to passions. This concerns the ability of the incarnate God of the Word to will also as a person. And this is where we learn that He is capable of willing and as God. After all, our Lord and God Himself, the only Truth, says this about Himself in the Gospel: “Jerusalem, Jerusalem, who kills the prophets and stones those sent to her, how many times have I wanted to gather your children, as a bird gathers its chicks under its wing, and you did not want to? Now your house is left to you empty.” It is clear that He said this not as a man, since He became a man recently, but as God, showing the many different images of His wise providence for people, when He wanted to use them to “gather” nature to Himself from external error, but it did not want to. And again He says: “As the Father raises the dead and gives life, so the Son gives life to whomever He will.” If “as” is a comparative adverb, and comparison occurs between consubstantial things, then, therefore, it is impossible for this to be said about Christ according to His humanity. So, the Savior taught us that just as the Father, being God, gives life to the dead by will, so He, being of one essence and of the same will with the Father, gives life to whomever He wants. These are the dogmas of the evangelists, apostles and prophets. So what greater proof is there beyond this that the same One is capable of will by nature: both because He is God and because He is man? P. There is nothing clearer to prove that wills are natural. Then why did Vigilius, the then Roman primate, accept the message handed to him by Mina, the former bishop of the capital, containing one will and, moreover, in imperial secret in the presence of the then Roman emperor and the synclit? M. I am surprised how you, being patriarchs, dare to lie. Your predecessor, in a letter to Honorius, said that “it was drawn up, but not delivered and not presented,” and you yourself, in your letter to Pope John among the saints, say that “it was delivered and presented,” having been read by the quaestor Constantine. So who to believe? To you or your predecessor? It is impossible for both to tell the truth. P. Is that what my predecessor wrote? P. Okay, let's leave Vigilius. And what can you say about Honorius, who, turning to my predecessor, clearly established the dogma of the one will of our Lord Jesus Christ? M. Who is the reliable interpreter of this epistle, the one who compiled it on behalf of Honorius, who is still living and illuminating the whole West with both his other virtues and the dogmas of piety, or those who in Constantinople say whatever they please? M. So, in a letter to Saint Constantine, the then emperor, again on behalf of the likewise sainted Pope John, he said about this message: “we spoke in relation to the Lord about one will, not among His Divinity and humanity, but only among humanity. For when Sergius wrote that some claim two opposing wills in Christ, we replied that Christ did not have two opposing wills, in the sense of flesh and spirit, as we have after the Fall, but only one, which naturally distinguishes His humanity.” And obvious proof of this is the mention of flesh and members, which does not allow us to understand this in relation to His Divinity. And then, anticipating an objection, he says: “If anyone says: “For what reason did you, when discussing the humanity of Christ, not mention His Divinity?”, then we will say that, firstly, this was an answer to the question, and secondly, that, as elsewhere, we followed here the custom of Scripture, which sometimes speaks from His Divinity (as, for example, when the apostle says: “Christ is the power of God and the Wisdom God"), and sometimes - from His humanity, and only (as when He Himself says: “The foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the powerless of God is stronger than men”).” P. My predecessor, paying attention to the expression, accepted it in its simplicity. M. To tell the truth, nothing alienated me more from your predecessor than his changeability, that is, the fact that at different times he moved from one opinion to another, and was not firm in any view. First, approving of those who call this will alone Divine, he asserted that the Incarnate is only God, then, welcoming those who called it deliberative, he represented Him as a simple man who, like us, deliberates and is no different from Pyrrhus and Maximus. Sometimes, calling this will hypostatic, he, along with the difference of hypostases, introduced the difference of wills among consubstantial ones, and sometimes, approving and calling it arbitrary, he affirmed a relative union - after all, will, power, and similar things are obviously movements of intention (γνώμης). And sometimes, accepting and placing over himself as masters those who call it the will of will and intention, he (Sergius) represented the Lord not only as a simple man, but also changeable and sinful - since intention (γνώμη) judges opposites, seeks out the unknown and deliberates about the unclear. Otherwise, he followed those who call the will economical and decided that before the economy He was without will, and all other absurdities that can follow this reasoning, and fell into many other absurd opinions, having no support in the truth. And if I wanted to write them all down exactly, along with the same nonsense, the next century would not be enough. But what is the need to present letters and split the holy Church of God? He couldn't even understand what everyone had in common. After all, either your charters (if we yield to you) contain conciliar decisions (as you untruthfully claim), and then we do not need these charters, because we both before and now accepted and welcomed these councils, or there are no conciliar dogmas, and it would be much more just to turn away from them and flee. So, since the offer of these same letters in both cases is unfair and illegal, then their rejection in both cases is fair and canonical. P. Sophrony, who was the Patriarch of Jerusalem a little earlier, forced us to do this, and, contrary to the proposal, at the wrong moment he started a dispute about actions. M. I am completely at a loss as to how you are going to justify yourself by accusing an innocent person so gravely. After all, tell me, in the face of the truth itself, where was Sophronius then when Sergius wrote to Theodore of Paran, sending what he calls the message of Mina through the mediation of Sergius Macarion, bishop of Arsinoe, urging him to express his opinion about one action and one will that were in the message, and he wrote in response that he accepted them? Or when he wrote to the former northerner Pavel One-Eyed in Feodosiopolis, sending him Mina’s letter, Faranit’s consent and his own? Or when he wrote to the Paulineist George, nicknamed Arsan, so that he would send him excerpts about this one action of theirs, and insert into the letter that he was thereby creating the unity of the Church with them? And Blessed John, Pope of Alexandria, snatched this message from Arsan with his own hand, which is why he intended to depose him (Arsan) because of him. But he was prevented by the then Persian invasion of Egypt. Or, when he responded to the letter of Cyrus of Phasis, to his question about one and two actions, by sending him the mentioned letter from Mina? So? Since Sergius made public his own illness in many ways and harmed most of the Church, Blessed Sophronius confronted him with the humility befitting his rank: throwing himself at his feet and, instead of any prayer, bringing him the life-giving passions of Christ God, so that he would not renew the heretical statement, which, fortunately, had been extinguished by the previously living holy fathers - so, was he himself the culprit of such a temptation? P. The reasoning properly refuted all the arguments presented, and nothing was missed at all in the investigation of wills. M. Since the inquiry about wills has come to an end, would you like to talk in the same way about actions? P. Not knowing that wills are natural, I also accepted the position about actions, and if I affirmed something orally or in writing, then I had this thought in mind. Now, when we have recognized by generalization that will and action are natural, everything that I previously defended on this issue is canceled, and it seems to me unnecessary to discuss this at all in the future. M. So what? Since God has called us to the knowledge of His truth because of our purpose known to Him in advance, should not what some have written or spoken about it be dissected for the sake of gullible people who, as usual, take everything without caution? P. If research has such a goal, then it is necessary. For concern for the safety of simple-minded people is an imitation of Divine love for mankind. M. So, if this is an imitation of Divine love for mankind, let us begin our consideration of this subject from here. M. I found in your writings a statement about one action in Christ, since He is one. So, if He has one action, since He is one, and the one is His hypostasis, then this [His] one action is hypostatic, and it turns out that He has a different action, as well as a hypostasis, in comparison with the Father and Mother - if Christ is not one of them. P. If you speak of two actions because of two natures in Christ, and not of one because of the unity of the person, then man will have two actions because of the essential difference between his soul and body. And if so, then Christ will have three actions, not two. M. What you put forward to refute natural qualities is the same thing put forward against natures by those who fight against them. This is the only thing you are good at: following them in everything. Therefore, we also apply the same accusations that were presented to them by the fathers to you, as to those possessed by the same illness: they say, if, due to the difference of two natures in Christ, you, too, together with us, will affirm two natures, and not one - because of the unity of the face, then in this way there will be two natures in man because of the essential difference between his soul and body, and if so, then Christ will have three natures, and not two. If, because of the difference of natures, you, together with us, affirming two natures, do not speak of three natures in Christ, then how can we, when we talk about two actions because of the difference of natures, get three actions? After all, what you say with us in response to those who argue this against nature will be enough for us to object to you in relation to actions. But in this way the reasoning refuted you at the same level, showing the absurdity of the question. And from the above we conclude that the species unity of man is not essentially identical to the unity of soul and body. For the species unity of man shows the uniformity of all individuals falling under nature, therefore we do not speak of it vaguely, but by adding “man.” And the unity of soul and body essentially damages their very existence, pushing it towards complete non-existence. If the species unity of man is not identical to the unity of soul and body in essence, then it means that we do not need to talk about one species action, or call it hypostatic, or affirm three actions, because the action relates to nature. P. But with actions, faces are introduced, like those of Nestorius, and it is necessary, speaking of two actions, to defend his vile dogmas. M. Just Nestorius, speaking of two persons, decrees one action. And if, in your opinion, faces are introduced along with actions, then with faces, speaking consistently, actions will also be introduced. And you, following your own rules, will be forced, because of one action of the Holy Deity, to speak about His one person, or because of His three hypostases - about three actions, or, like Nestorius - about a relative union, for one action is His unity, as the same Nestorius and his gang showed in their writings. And in relation to us, since we have one specific action, but many hypostases, you will have to talk either because of one specific action about one person for all, or because of the multiplicity of persons - about a multiplicity of actions. And the fatherly word will be in vain, stating: “Those who have one essence, have one action.” Moreover, if, according to them, a person is introduced along with the action, and they admit that many actions emanated from the same incarnate Word, then they will also allow persons introduced along with the outgoing actions, since they want to be in agreement with themselves, and it will turn out that One and the Same has countless persons and actions. And again, if, according to them, a person is introduced along with the action, then when it is eliminated, it is also necessarily eliminated. And if this is true, along with the elimination of both two and one action, two and one person will be eliminated, and Christ, as far as it is in their power, will pass from the existent and the superexistent into the non-existent - and what could be more wicked than this? If someone, out of great abundance, wants to consider this in relation to each of us, then he will find that we are at the same time thinking and walking, or thinking about one thing and talking about another with those we meet, which, as it is related, Moses did: at the same time interceding before God for the people, and in conversation with the people, encouraging them to good hopes. And each person is not divided into two because he acts dually in accordance with his natures, and because the one who acts dually is one, he does not confuse the movements that are essentially inherent in his natures. And the same applies to the spoken word: we see the meaning embedded in speech, and speech as the bearer of meaning, and their complete interpenetration, and just as with their difference the difference of persons is not introduced, so with the closest unity - confusion. But what can we say then about a red-hot sword, which preserves no worse the two natures, that is, fire and iron, and their natural actions, that is, burning and cutting, and manifests them in everything simultaneously? After all, neither its burning is inseparable from the cutting after the connection, nor the cutting from the burning, and because of the duality of the natural action, two red-hot swords are not introduced, and because of the uniqueness of the red-hot sword, there is no confusion or dissolution of the essential difference. P. Wasn’t there only one acting? P. So if there is one active, then the action is one, like one. M. This One is Christ. For, since we have returned to the same thing, I will again ask you the same thing as before: Is He one by hypostasis or by nature? P. By hypostasis. After all, by nature He is dual. M. So, He acts dually because of the duality of natures or singularly because of the uniqueness of the hypostasis? But if He, the One and the Same, acted dually, being alone, then it means that the number of persons is not introduced along with the number of actions, and if - singly (due to the uniqueness of the person), then reasoning about this will entail the same absurdities on the same occasion. After all, if an action is hypostatic, then along with the plurality of hypostases, the difference in actions will also be seen. P. It is not necessary that since He acted dually, then He had two actions, but since the Actor was one, [then the action was] one. M. Likewise, another tells you about natures: since He has a dual nature, this does not mean that there are already natures and are called two, but since His hypostasis is one, then His nature is and is called one. And in order not to mention everything that can be said about this when discussing one action, which one exactly do you deign to talk about: divine, human, or neither one nor the other? But if about the divine, you say that Christ is only God, but if about the human, that He is not God at all, but simply a man, and if about neither one nor the other, then you decree that He is neither God nor man, but one who does not exist. P. When we affirm that the Divinity of Christ and His humanity have one action, we say that it is inherent in Him not in the sense of nature, but in the manner of union. M. If action arose in Him, according to your word, from the union, then, therefore, before the union He was inactive and, in your opinion, was forced to create. And again, if His action arose from union, and the Father and the Holy Spirit were not united hypostatically with the flesh, then They, therefore, do not act. And if They do not act, then they are not Creators, not to say that They do not exist at all. And again, since the union is a relation, and not a thing, it means that Christ’s action is a relation, and not a thing. And yet, you will be forced to call it (this action) either created or uncreated, because between the created and the uncreated there is absolutely no middle [action]. And if you call it created, then it indicates the created nature, and only, and if you call it uncreated, then it indicates the uncreated nature, and only, because it is necessary that the natural qualities necessarily correspond to the natures. And how is it possible for a created and beginning nature to have an uncreated action, beginningless and limitless, creative and preservative? Or, as in the uncreated and beginningless [nature], is [an action] created, and given a beginning, and limited, and preserved by another, so as not to disintegrate? P. Do you not approve of anyone and do not agree even with those who call one action the consequence of the deeds done by Christ? M. Different actions have different consequences, and not one, as was shown in relation to the red-hot sword. After all, although they are connected to each other, the effect of fire and the effect of the blade, we see that the effect of fire is burning, and the effect of iron is cutting, although they are not separated from each other in a burning cut or in a cutting burning, just as the sky has one [action], and the earth has another, and the sun has a third. So, it is impossible to talk about one consequence, since the act is not only one. Therefore, if you have decreed a single will, bearing in mind the consequences of the deeds performed by Christ, then either decree one act, or, due to countless deeds, countless actions. However, what we are looking for relates to works - after all, we are not talking about what is outside of Christ, but about what is in Christ Himself, that is, about the natural determination of Christ’s essences, whether it suffered damage from the union or remained without damage, and, if it suffered, can a defective nature exist; But the fact that natural action does not relate to external things is clear from the fact that without works there can be nature, and without natural action nature can neither exist nor be known. By the way each thing acts by nature, we make sure that it does not turn into [what it is not]. At the same time, you established as a dogma one action invented by you like a goat deer, meaning not an action, but the natural determination of the united entities. And a true confirmation of this is the “Chapters” (set forth by Cyrus, and favorably and very joyfully accepted by you), in which he, having decreed one action, asserted that Christ accomplished both the Divine and the human in one and the same way, contradicting not only the Holy Scriptures and the Holy Fathers, but also the very nature of everything that arose. After all, nothing that exists is capable of creating the opposite, remaining within the framework of its nature. For fire does not heat and cools, and ice does not cool and warms, and earth does not dry and moisturizes, and water does not moisten and dries. Therefore, if this is not seen in any of the existing things, then how are you not afraid to say that the Word, incarnate and essentially becoming a man, with one action performs both miracles and passions, which differ from each other by the definition of nature? P. Why did the church luminary Cyril put forward a dogma opposite to the pious understanding that has now emerged as a result of the discussion, speaking of “showing through both [actions] one related action,” that is, about Christ? M. This statement does not at all contradict the two actions; on the contrary, it confirms them. After all, he did not say that the Divinity of Christ and His humanity have one natural action (because otherwise he would not have said in another place that “no one in his right mind would allow one action in the Creator and creation,” but wanting to show that the action of the Divinity is one - both without flesh and with flesh. As if someone, wanting to show that the action of fire is the same with wood and without wood, would say that fire burns both without wood and with wood. So also the Father did not call the action of two natures one, but called the Divine and the Father one action, essentially present in the incarnate Word of God, by which He not only, by the all-creating command, incorporeally performed Divine signs, as He Himself says (once and after the incarnation He is one-acting to His own Parent, who acts incorporeally), but also by the touch of His flesh manifested them bodily. So the revival of the young woman, or the sight of the blind, or the blessing of the loaves, or the cleansing of the leper, which took place by the word and the all-creating command, are akin in nature to what is accomplished through bodily touch, in order to show the life-giving flesh as in the full sense belonging to Him, and not to another, thanks to an unalloyed union with Him. For through both of these things (I am talking about command and touch) the Divine action was recognized from the works themselves, without in the least harming the human and passive action of the flesh, which is similar to us, but, on the contrary, preserving it for its own manifestation. In the same way, the soul, through its own body, like an instrument, and its natural action, produces an action that is characteristic of it and its own by nature. For the reaching out of the hand, and the touching, and the holding, and the mixing of clay, and the breaking of bread - and simply everything that was done by means of the hand or another member or part of the body, belonged to the natural action of Christ's humanity, by which He Himself, God by nature and naturally creating the Divine, acted as a man, so that one would be certified by nature through the other, showing that He truly is a perfect man "except only in sin." So, the Father was not unaware of the exclusive peculiarity of each of the natures, including other natural properties, that is, the creative and vital action transmitted from the soul to His body. Preserving them in himself, the incarnate God the Word showed them clearly distinguishable and unmixed: the creative - by creating essence, quality and quantity, from which, in which and through which the existence of beings occurs and is contemplated (although among the Hellenes philosophizers stretch existence to ten definitions, but it is in these [three] that the universe is contained). [He created] the essence by filling the missing eyes of the blind man, the quality by turning water into wine, and the quantity by multiplying the loaves. He showed the vital action by breathing, speaking, seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, eating and drinking, moving his arms, walking, sleeping, and so on, which in all things falling under nature shows the uniformity of natural action. P. You presented the father's thought piously and without exaggeration, not contradicting, but agreeing in everything with the two actions. And what then shall we say about Saint Dionysius, who said in a letter to Gaius, the minister of Christ, that He “carried out in us some new divine action”? M. Is novelty quality or quantity? M. This means that it introduces with itself the same nature, if the definition of any nature is the content of its essential action. But not only this, but when the apostle says: “Behold, all things have become new,” he is saying nothing more than: behold, all things have become one, and whether you want to call it “by nature” or “by operation”, let it be at your discretion. If novelty is a quality, then it denotes not just one action, but a new and ineffable image of the manifestation of Christ’s natural actions, in accordance with the ineffable image of the interpenetration of Christ’s natures into each other, and His human life, amazing and unprecedented, and unknown to the nature of existence, and the image of mutual exchange in ineffable unity. P. Doesn’t “More Godly” mean one [action]? M. No. For this expression, on the contrary, periphrastically, through the calculation of natures, conveys their actions, since with the negation of the extreme [principles] there is nothing in between in Christ. If it denotes one action, then Christ, as God, will have another action besides the Father. Therefore, the Son will have a different action than the Father, since the Father is not more divine. And besides, “More Godly” distinguishes and establishes nature. After all, action, being natural, is an establishing and innate sign of nature. And those who considered questions related to these things said that the kind of quantity is one thing, and the quality is another. P. Novelty is neither quantity nor quality, but an essence. M. I’m surprised how you decided to say this. What is the opposite of essence? M. So novelty is not an essence, but a quality. But how, if we understand this expression in the sense of one action, will we not thereby present this theophany teacher as contradicting himself and the other fathers? After all, they all clearly together said and taught that those who have one essence have one action, and those who have one action have one essence, and that those who differ in essence differ in action, and those who differ in action differ in essence. P. This was said by the fathers in relation to theology, but not to economy. Therefore, it is not for the mind that loves the truth to transfer to the economy what they said in relation to theology, and thereby introduce such absurdities. M. If the fathers said this only in relation to theology, then it means that after the incarnation the Son, in your opinion, is not considered in theology together with the Father. And if it is not considered in theology, then it is not numbered [with the Father] in the baptismal invocation, and faith and preaching will be in vain. And again, if the Son after the Incarnation is not considered in theology together with the Father, He will not be of the same essence, for those who differ in definition will certainly be different in nature. And again, if after the Incarnation the Son is not considered in theology together with the Father, then to whom do we refer the words: “My Father works hitherto, and I work,” and also: “Whatever He sees the Father doing, the Son does likewise,” and: “If you do not believe Me, believe My works,” and: “The works that I do testify of Me,” also: “As the Father raises the dead and gives life, so does the Son whom He will, life-giving? After all, all this shows that He not only has one essence with the Father even after the incarnation, but also one action. And again, if providence for things is the action of God, and it belongs not only to the Father and the Spirit, but also to the Son even after the incarnation, then it means that He has the same action with the Father even after the incarnation. And again, if miracles are the action of God, and from miracles we learned that He is of the same essence with the Father, then it means that He was revealed as one and the same essence with the Father from the same action with Him - and He is considered in theology together with Him even after the incarnation. And again, if creative action is essentially inherent in God, and what is essentially inherent is inalienable, then they will either have to, by saying that after the Incarnation He does not have the same action with the Father, admit that He is not of the same essence with Him (after all, where there is no natural action, there will be no nature), or, by saying that He is of the same essence with Him, come to the conclusion that He has the same action, considering Him in theology together with the Father and after the Incarnation, for where nature is, there will certainly be a general action in accordance with it. P. We speak of one action not in order to deny human action, but because, in contrast to the Divine action, it is in this sense called suffering. M. According to this reasoning, those who speak of one nature do not say this to deny the human, but because this nature, in contrast to the Divine, in this sense is called passive. P. So what? Did not the fathers call human movement suffering in accordance with the difference from Divine action? M. By no means. After all, generally speaking, no one’s existence is cognized and determined by juxtaposition and comparison (or else things will turn out to be the cause of each other). After all, if due to the fact that the Divine movement is action, and the human one is suffering, then, of course, if the Divine nature is good, then the human nature is evil. In the same way, and according to the converse statement with opposition, the Divine movement is called action, since the human movement is called suffering, and the Divine nature will be good, because the human is evil. But enough. For truly all this is due to great stupidity. P. So what? Didn't the fathers call human movement endurance (passion)? M. They called it variously, that is, depending on the implied meanings. M. They called it strength, and action, and difference, and movement, and peculiarity, and quality, and endurance, but not in opposition to the Divine, but, as preserving and unchangeable, force; as distinctive and revealing uniformity in all [hypostases] of one type - by action; as separating – by difference; like the index finger - movement; as a component inherent only to him and not to another - a feature; as a species-former – by quality; as something moving – by undergoing. After all, everything that is from God and after God undergoes through that which moves, since it is not self-movement or self-power. So, not by opposition, as has been said, but because of the causal meaning creatively embedded in them by the Essence that made up the universe. Therefore, proclaiming it together with the Divine, they called it action. For he who said: “Acts in each of the species with the participation of the other,” has he done anything else? Or who said: “For, having remained forty days inaccessible, he later became hungry: after all, when He wanted, He allowed nature to act in its own way,” or those who spoke about his different actions, or about double, or about one and the other [that they did something else]? P. Truly, the investigation of actions showed one action to be absurd when it is expressed in any way in relation to Christ. But I apologize for myself and for those before me. For we fell into these absurd concepts and logical conclusions out of ignorance. I urge you to find a way so that this introduced absurdity is abolished, and the memory of your predecessors is preserved. M. There is no other way than to keep silent about persons, and to anathematize such dogmas. P. But if this happens, it will turn out that Sergius and the council that took place under me will be ejected along with them. M. I am surprised that you call a council something that did not take place according to the laws and cathedral canons or rules, because there was neither a district message with the consent of the patriarchs, nor a specific place or day of the meeting. There was neither accused nor accuser. Those gathered had no accompanying letters, neither the bishops from the metropolitans, nor the metropolitans from the patriarchs. No epistles or locums were sent from other patriarchs. So who, who is still in their right mind, will allow calling something that has filled the whole earth with temptations and strife a council? P. If there is no other way than this, I, preferring my salvation to everything, am ready to do this with every confirmation, asking only one thing, that I first be honored with the veneration of the apostolic tombs, or rather, the supreme apostles themselves, and subsequently the sight of the Holy Pope, and hand over to him the tomos of the incongruities that have occurred. When he said so, Maxim and Patrik Gregory replied: “Since your proposal is good and useful for the Church, so be it.” So, finding himself with us in this illustrious city of the Romans, he fulfilled his promise, condemning the dogmas of the wicked “Ekphesis” and uniting himself through the Orthodox confession with the holy, catholic and apostolic Church, the grace and assistance of the great God and our Savior Jesus Christ, to Him be glory forever and ever. Amen. You might be interested in: