Книга девятнадцатая

In this book there is a discussion about the ends of this and that City, earthly and heavenly. The opinions of philosophers are given regarding the end of good and evil, who in vain tried to create bliss for themselves in this life. As these opinions are thoroughly refuted, the bliss and peace of the heavenly City or the Christian people are explained, in what form they are possible here or expected in the future life Chapter I. That on the question of the end of goods and evils, raised by philosophers, according to the thorough judgment of Varro, two hundred and eighty-eight sects are possible I now have to talk about the proper ends of both cities - earthly and heavenly. But first, as far as it is necessary for the completion of this work, I consider it necessary to set forth those arguments of mortals with which they tried in the misfortunes of this life to create bliss for themselves, so that, on the basis not only of divine authority, but also of considerations of reason, which we can add to it for the sake of the unbelievers, we can understand the difference from their empty dreams of our hope that God has given us, and its very fulfillment, that is, the true blessedness that God will give. For philosophers have judged among themselves a lot and in different ways about the end of good and evil; With the greatest effort, analyzing this question, they tried to discover what makes a person blessed. The end of our good is that for the sake of which everything else should be desirable, while it itself is desirable for its own sake; and the end of evil is that for the sake of which other things should be avoided, while it itself should be avoided for its own sake. Therefore, at present, we call the end of a good not that by which the good ends in order to cease to exist, but by that by which it is brought to perfection in order to become complete; The end of evil is not when it ceases to exist, but what it leads to through its harm. So, these ends are the highest good and the highest evil. To discover them and to achieve in this present life the highest good and the avoidance of the highest evil, as I said, those who, in the vanity of this age, have made the study of wisdom the task of their lives, have worked hard. They were mistaken in various ways. Nevertheless, the limit set by nature itself did not allow them to deviate so much from the path of truth that some of them did not put the end of good and evil in the soul, others in the body, and others in both places. In this threefold and, as it were, general division of sects, having subjected the question to careful and strict research, Marcus Varro, in a book on philosophy, saw such a difference in teachings that he very easily brought the number of sects to two hundred and eighty-eight - not those (sects) that certainly existed, but those that could have existed by adding some differences. To show this briefly, I must begin with what he himself drew attention to and what he outlined in the mentioned book. There are four things that people strive for as if by nature, without a teacher, without any instruction from anyone, without diligence or the art of living, which is called virtue and which, undoubtedly, is learned, namely: lust (voluptas), which pleasantly excites the bodily sense; peace to such an extent that no one experiences any unpleasant bodily sensation; or both together (Epicurus calls them by the same name of lust); or the principles of nature (prima naturae), which include both the above and the other, whether in the body, such as the freshness of the members, health and integrity, or in the soul, which is everything, small or great, that is found in people as innate properties. These four, that is, lust, peace, both together and the principles of nature, exist in us in such a way that either the virtue that science subsequently inspires should be strived for for their sake, or for them for the sake of virtue, or for both of them together for their own sake. Hence twelve sects arise, since each of them is thus divided into three. When I show this in one, it will not be difficult to discover the same in the others. So, when bodily lust is either subordinated to bodily virtue, or receives an advantage over it, or is equalized in importance, it gives three differences of sects. It is subordinate to virtue when it is used for the needs of virtue. The duties of virtue include, for example, living for the fatherland and giving birth to sons; neither one nor the other can exist without bodily lust. Without it, food and drink are not taken in order to live; without it there is no copulation for the propagation of the race. When it is placed above virtue, it is desirable for its own sake, and virtue is considered worthy of being acquired for its sake, that is, the latter serves only to satisfy and preserve bodily lust. Such a life is, of course, ugly, since virtue is the slave of mistress lust; and virtue cannot in any way be called virtue; nevertheless, even this disgusting ugliness had some philosophers as its patrons and defenders. Lust, further, is placed next to virtue when neither of them is desirable for the sake of the other, but both are desirable for their own sake. Accordingly, just as lust, depending on whether it is subordinate to virtue or receives an advantage over it, or is equalized in value, gives rise to three sects, so peace, both together, and the principles of nature are represented as forming three other sects. For when human thoughts are present, they are sometimes subordinate to virtue, sometimes placed above it, sometimes equated with it, and thus the number of sects is brought to twelve. But this number doubles as soon as one difference is added, borrowed from social life, because when choosing one or another of the indicated twelve sects, everyone does this either exclusively for his own sake, or for the sake of a member of the society for which he must desire the same as for himself. As a result, there are twelve who believe that one should adhere to one way of thinking, meaning only themselves, and twelve who dwell on one or another type of philosophizing, meaning not only themselves, but also others, for whom they wish the same benefits as themselves. In turn, these twenty-four sects double and form forty-eight, as soon as the difference introduced by the new academicians is added. For each of these twenty-four sects alone can be supported and defended as undoubtedly true, just as the Stoics defended the doctrine that the good of a person, which makes him blessed, consists solely in spiritual virtue; and another may defend it as not obviously known, just as the new academicians defended what, although they were not obviously aware of it, nevertheless seemed true. So, twenty-four sects are formed from those who consider it obligatory for themselves to follow them as undoubtedly true by virtue of the truth (recognized by them), and the other twenty-four are formed from those who consider them obligatory for themselves, although they are not obviously known, due to their similarity to the truth. Then, since each of these forty-eight sects can be followed by one, adhering to the customs of other philosophers, and another by the Cynics, then from this new feature the sects are also doubled and there are ninety-six in total. Finally, following any one of these sects, people can choose for themselves either a life free from everyday affairs, which those who devoted their time only to academic pursuits wanted and were able to lead; or an active life, such as was led by those who, although they were engaged in philosophy, nevertheless took the most ardent part in government and in the conduct of human affairs; or, finally, a life formed from both of its types, which was spent by those who distributed their time alternately between the quiet pursuit of science and necessary activities: these differences triple the mentioned number of sects and bring it to two hundred and eighty-eight. I have stated this, as briefly and clearly as I could, from the book of Varro, conveying his thoughts in my own words. And how, having rejected the other sects, he chooses one, namely, the ancient Academicians, who, having received their origin from Plato, right up to Polemon, who after Plato was the fourth in charge of the school that bore the name of the Academy, had, in his opinion, real convictions; how he distinguishes them in this respect from the new academicians, for whom nothing seems certain, and whose type of philosophy he begins with Archesilaus, the successor of Polemon; and how he believes that this sect, that is, the ancient Academicians, is far from both hesitation and all kinds of errors - it would be too long to convey this in all details. But we cannot remain silent about this. So, he first eliminates all those differences that multiply the number of sects; He considers it necessary to eliminate them because the end of good is not in them. He believes that one should not consider such a philosophical sect as existing separately, which differs from the rest not in that it teaches differently about the end of good and evil. After all, if the only motivation for a person to philosophize is the achievement of bliss, and what makes blissful is precisely the end of good; and, therefore, there is no other matter for philosophizing except the end of good; then a sect that does not have as its object a certain end of good should not be called a philosophical sect. Therefore, when the question arises about social life: should a wise person treat it in such a way that the highest good, which makes a person blissful, is desired and sought as much for his friend as for himself, or what he does is done only for his own bliss - then the question here is not about the highest good itself, but about the acceptance or non-acceptance of an ally to participate in it, and not for the sake of the recipient, but for the sake of the same ally, in order to rejoice in his benefits so the same as your own. In the same way, when the question is raised about the new academicians who doubt everything: should we look at the things that constitute the subject of philosophy as they do, or should we consider them reliable, as other philosophers believe, the question is not about what we should strive for, as the end of the good, but about whether we should or should not doubt the reality of the good itself, which constitutes the object of striving, that is, to put it more clearly, should we strive for it in such a way that the striver considers it true, or so that the aspirant considers it to seem true to him, even though it may be false; in both cases the object of desire will be the same good. And in the difference that is introduced from the way of life and customs of the Cynics, the question is not raised about where the end of good is, but about whether this way of life and customs should be adhered to by someone who strives for true good, no matter what he chooses and no matter what he strives for as true good. And in fact, there were people who, although they accepted various objects as their ultimate benefits: some virtue, others lust, nevertheless adhered to the same way of life and customs, according to which they were called Cynics. Thus, what alone distinguishes the Cynic philosophers from the rest does not matter at all in choosing and achieving the good that would make them blessed. If it had any significance, the way of life, without any doubt, would involuntarily lead to a certain end, and a different way of life would not allow one to reach this end. Chapter II. How Varro, having rejected all differences, which are not sects, but questions, came to three definitions of the highest good, from which one must nevertheless be chosen And regarding the three kinds of life mentioned above - one that is not inactive in the strict sense (of the word), but dedicated to contemplation or the search for truth; another activity dedicated to the conduct of human affairs; and a third, formed from both kinds - and regarding this, when the question is asked which of these is preferable, there is no dispute about the end of the good, but everything comes down to which of these three makes it difficult or easier to achieve the end of the good. For the end of good, as soon as someone reaches it, immediately makes a person blessed. In academic leisure, as well as in public activity or in alternating both, no one immediately becomes blessed. Many can lead one or another of these three kinds of life and at the same time be mistaken in the pursuit of the final good that makes a person blessed. So, it is one thing to ask about the end of good and the end of evil, which gives rise to individual philosophical sects, and quite another thing to ask questions about social life, about the doubt of academics, about the clothing and lifestyle of the Cynics, about the three kinds of life - contemplative, active and formed from both; none of these latter talks about the end of good and evil. And since Marcus Varro, by adding these four differences, that is, borrowed from social life, from the new academicians, from the Cynics and from the indicated three kinds of life, brought the number of sects to two hundred and eighty-eight, then (although in the same way some others could be added to them), eliminating them all, as not related to the question of the sought-after highest good and therefore not representing sects and not being able to bear the names of the latter, Varro returns to those twelve who pose the question of what is the good of a person, with the achievement of which he becomes blessed, in order to indicate one true one from among them, and classify the others as false. Indeed, with the elimination of the well-known threefold kind of life, the number of sects decreases by two-thirds and there remain ninety-six of them. With the elimination of the distinction borrowed from the Cynics, the number is reduced by another half and remains forty-eight. Let us then discard what was added from the new academicians, once again the remainder will be half, i.e. twenty-four. In the same way, the difference introduced from social life is discarded, and twelve sects remain, which are doubled by that difference, turning into twenty-four. It is no longer possible to say anything about these twelve, why they should not be considered sects. In them, indeed, the question is about nothing other than the end of good and evil. Once the ultimate good has been found, its opposite automatically represents the end of evil. But in order to form these twelve sects, the well-known four were tripled: lust, peace, both together, and the principles of nature, which Varro calls primegenia (primigenia) 185. For when these four things, each separately, are subordinated to virtue, so that they seem desirable not for their own sake, but for the service of virtue, then they are preferred to it, so that virtue is considered necessary not for its own sake, but for the achievement and preservation of those; then they are equalized, so that both virtue and they are considered equally desirable for their own sake; they triple their quadruple number and reach twelve sects. But of these four things, Varro eliminates three, namely: lust, peace, and both together, not because he does not approve of them, but because the firstborn of nature combines both lust and peace. Why, in fact, make any three out of these two (I mean two, when the object of desire is called separately lust or peace, and a third - when both are combined), if the principles of nature contain, in addition to this, much more? So Varro decided to subject the three sects to a thorough examination in order to determine which of them should be considered more preferable. For true reason admits the existence of only one true one, whether it is among these three or somewhere besides them, as we will see later. Let us now show, as briefly and clearly as possible, how Varro chooses one of these three sects. Let us recall that these three sects are formed when either the principles of nature are the object of striving for the sake of virtue, or virtue for the sake of the principles of nature, or both, i.e., virtue and the principles of nature, for their own sake. Chapter III. Which of the three sects concerned with the question of the highest human good does Varro decide to choose, following the opinion of the ancient Academy as formulated by Antiochus? So, which of these three is true and should be turned into a rule of life, Varro tries to prove as follows. Firstly, since in philosophy the subject of study is not the highest good of a tree or animal and not of God, but of man, he believes that it is necessary to determine what man himself is. In human nature, he distinguishes something dual, body and soul, and of these two he has no doubt to recognize the soul as the best and most excellent in all respects; but it poses the question: is the soul alone a person, so that the body serves it like a horse serving its rider? After all, the rider is not a man and a horse, but one person; although a person is called a horseman because he has a certain relationship with the horse. Or a person is made up of one body, which has a certain relationship to the soul, like a glass to a drink: for it is not the vessel and with it the drink that is contained in the vessel that is called a glass, but only one vessel; although it is called so because it is adapted to the content of the drink. Or a person is formed by not one soul, and not one body, but both together, so that one soul or one body constitutes only a part of him, while the whole of him, in order to be a man, consists of both; just as we call two horses harnessed together a pair, of which both the right and the left form part of the pair, but we call a pair of them not one of them, no matter in what relation to the other he may be, but both together. Of these three, Varro chooses the last, the third, and believes that a person is made up of not one soul and not one body, but both together. Therefore, he argues that the highest good of a person, which makes him blessed, consists of the goods of both, i.e., soul and body. Therefore, he thinks that the principles of nature must be desirable for their own sake, just like virtue, which science imparts as an art of life, but which among the goods of the soul is the most excellent good. For this virtue, that is, the art of living, having accepted the principles of nature that existed without it and existed even when science did not exist with them, turns both them and itself into the object of its aspiration; She uses all of them and herself together in such a way that she loves everyone and finds pleasure in everyone, more or less, depending on the comparatively greater or lesser value of each; but finding pleasure in everyone, sometimes of lesser importance, if necessity requires it, he neglects it in order to achieve more. However, out of all possible mental and physical goods, virtue does not prefer one to itself. She makes proper use of herself and the other goods that make a person blessed. But where it is not there, even though there are many benefits, these benefits are not for the benefit of the one whose they are; and therefore they should not be called benefits of someone to whom, due to their bad use, they cannot bring benefit. So, that human life that enjoys virtue and other mental and physical goods, without which virtue cannot exist, is called blessed; if she also enjoys others, several or many, without whom virtue can exist, she is even more blessed; and if absolutely by all, so that there is absolutely no lack of any of the goods, both mental and physical, then she is most blessed. For life is not what virtue is, but only wise life; and yet some kind of life can exist without any virtue, but virtue cannot exist without some kind of life. I can say the same about memory, and about the mind, and about many other similar things. Although they exist before science, without them there can be no science, and therefore no virtue, which in any case is studied. But running fast, having a beautiful body, having great physical strength, etc. - these are qualities that virtue can exist without them, just as they can exist without virtue; nevertheless, they are also good; and after those (which are mentioned above), virtue loves these for its own sake, uses them and finds pleasure in them, as befits virtue! They add that this blessed life is also a social life, because (who lives such a life) loves the goods of friends for the sake of these goods as well as his own, and for their sake he wants the same things for his friends as for himself, whether they are in his own house, like a wife, children or someone from the household; or in the place where the house is, for example, in the city, which are all the so-called fellow citizens; or in the whole empire, as different tribes united to him by human union; or in the world in general, by which are meant heaven and earth, as those whom they call gods and represent as friends of the wise man, those whom we more accurately call angels. At the same time, they deny any doubt regarding the end of goods and evils and assert that this is precisely the difference between them and the new academicians and that they do not attach any importance to whether someone philosophizes in this direction, which they recognize as true, adhering to the customs and way of life of the Cynics or any other (philosophers). Finally, of the three aforementioned types of life: alien to activity, active and formed from both, they express preference for the third. This is what the ancient academicians thought and taught: Varro claims this from the words of Antiochus, who was the teacher of Cicero and him, although Cicero presents Antiochus as a Stoic rather than an ancient academician. But as for us, for whom it is much more important to consider the matter itself than to know who and what attached special importance to people. Chapter IV. What do Christians think about the highest good and the greatest evil, as opposed to philosophers who argued that the highest good is found in themselves? If we were asked what the city of God would answer to each of the questions under consideration, and first of all, what it thinks about the end of good and evil, it would answer that the highest good is eternal life, and the greatest evil is eternal death; to acquire the former and avoid the latter, we must live righteously. Therefore it is written: “The just shall live by faith” (Habak. II, 4; Rom. I, 17; Gal. III, 12; Heb. X, 38). Since we have not yet seen our good, it is necessary that we seek it by faith; and the righteous life itself is beyond our strength, if through our faith and prayers the One who gave us the very faith by which we believe that He should help us does not help us. Those who thought that the end of good and evil lies in this life, believing that the highest good is either in the body, or in the soul, or in both, or, more honestly: either in lust, or in virtue, or in both together; either in peace, or in virtue, or in both; or together in lust, in peace and in virtue; or in the principles of nature, in virtue, and in both of them together - they, out of amazing empty-headedness, wanted to be blessed here and by themselves. The truth laughs at them through the prophet, who says: “The Lord knows the thoughts of men, that they are vanity” (Ps. 93:11), or as the Apostle Paul cited this testimony: “The Lord knows the thoughts of wise men, that they are vanity” (1 Cor. III, 20). For who is able, no matter what gift of eloquence he may possess, to depict the misfortunes of real life? Cicero mourned her in consolation on the occasion of the death of his daughter, mourned as best he could; but how great was what he could do? These so-called principles of nature: when, where and how can they be preserved in this life so well as not to be influenced by unforeseen accidents? What suffering, the opposite of lustful pleasure, what anxiety, the opposite of peace, cannot fall on the body of the wise? The taking or mutilation of human members destroys their integrity, ugliness destroys their beauty, illness destroys their health, exhaustion destroys their strength, lethargy or torpor destroys their mobility; What of all this cannot happen to the body of a wise man? The erect position and movement of the body, as decent and appropriate, are considered among the principles of nature; but what if some disease causes the limbs to tremble? What if the spine bent until the arms reached the ground, turning the man in some way into a four-legged animal? Will this not completely distort the position and movement of the body and its beauty? And what about the firstborn of the soul itself, its so-called goods, among which, having in mind the understanding and perception of truth, the feeling is placed first of all, if, by keeping silent about something else, a person has become deaf and blind? And where does the mind and reason go, where does it go to sleep if a person falls into madness due to some illness? When crazy people say or do a lot of stupid things, very often alien and even contrary to their good intentions and morals, when we hear about it or see it, we can hardly restrain ourselves or even cannot restrain ourselves from tears if we seriously think about it. What can I say about those who are attacked by demons? Where is their own meaning hidden or buried when an evil spirit uses their soul and body at will? And who will believe that such evil cannot happen to a wise man in this life? Then, of what quality or extent is the perception of truth in this flesh, when, as we read in the truthful book of Wisdom, “the corruptible body burdens the soul, and the earthly dwelling burdens the over-anxious mind” (Wis. IX, 15)? Further, the impulse towards reality, or impetus (if this word correctly expresses in Latin what the Greeks call ὁρμην) - since they are considered among the initial good of nature - is not this also what governs the pitiful movements of the insane and those actions that terrify us when the meaning is perverted and the mind is lulled to sleep? Then virtue itself, which is not among the principles of nature, since it is added to them later through the medium of science - virtue, which takes for itself the highest place among human goods - what else is it occupied here with, if not a continuous war with vices, not external, but internal, not strangers, but our own? First of all, this refers to virtue, which in Greek is called σωφροσύνη, and in Latin temperantia (temperance, chastity), which curbs bodily lusts so that the soul is not disposed to complicity in any shameful deeds. This is a real vice if the apostle says this: “The flesh desires what is contrary to the spirit”; and virtue counteracts this vice, if he says this: “But the spirit is contrary to the flesh: they oppose each other, so that you do not do what you would like” (Gal. V, 17). And what do we want to do when we want to achieve the end of the highest good, if not that the flesh ceases to passionately desire what is contrary to the spirit, so that this vice does not exist in us, which the spirit resists with its desires? Although we want this in this life, but since we are not able to fulfill this, with the help of God we succeed at least in the fact that we do not yield to the flesh that lusts against the spirit with obedience on the part of the spirit and do not allow ourselves to be drawn into committing sin with sympathy for it on our part. So, while we are in this internal war, we must be far from thinking that we have already achieved the bliss that we wish to achieve through victory. And is there anyone so wise that he would have absolutely no conflict with lust? What about that virtue called prudence? Is not all her vigilance aimed at determining the difference between good and evil, so as not to make any mistake in striving for the former and avoiding the latter? And therefore it serves as proof that either we live in evil, or evil lives in us. For it teaches us that evil consists in sympathy, and goodness in lack of sympathy for lust and sin. This evil itself, which prudence teaches one not to sympathize with, and abstinence makes such an opportunity, neither prudence nor abstinence can eradicate, however, from this life. And justice, which consists in giving to everyone what is his essence (from which a certain natural order of justice is manifested in man himself, according to which the soul submits to God, the flesh to the soul, and through this both flesh and soul to God), does not it show that it rather exhausts its strength in this matter than leads it to a successful conclusion? For the soul is the less subject to God, the less it represents God in its thoughts; and the less the flesh submits to the soul, the more it desires what is contrary to the spirit. So, while this illness, this ulcer, this weakness is inherent in us, how can we consider ourselves healthy? And if we are still unhealthy, how can we dare to call ourselves already blessed by that final bliss? And that virtue, whose name is courage, with any wisdom serves as the most obvious evidence of human evils, which it is forced to endure with patience. Regarding these evils, the Stoic philosophers assert with amazing shamelessness that they are not evil, admitting that if they are so great that the wise man is either unable or does not have to endure them, then they can force him to inflict death on himself and move from this life. In these people, who believe that the end of good is here and that they themselves become blessed, there is so great a proud stupidity that even if their sage, as they imagine him to be in their amazing empty thoughts, were blind, deaf, dumb, lost limbs, suffered, and even if another similar disaster befell him, which can be named or invented in order to force him to commit suicide, they are not ashamed to call such a miserable life blessed. There is nothing to say, blessed life, which, in order to commit suicide, turns to death for help! If it is blessed, let them continue it; if, due to the indicated evils, they run away from her, how is she blessed? Or how are these disasters not evil, which overcome the good of courage and this very courage forces not only to give in to oneself, but also to reach such meaninglessness as to call the same life blessed and convince one to avoid it? Who is blind to such an extent as not to see that if she is blessed, then she should not be avoided? And if they admit that she should be avoided because of the oppression of weakness oppressing her, then why don’t they, bowing their proud heads, admit that at the same time she is unhappy? Tell me, for God's sake, did the famous Cato kill himself due to patience or impatience? He would not have done this if he had patiently endured Caesar's victory. Where is the courage? It yielded, it weakened, it was defeated to such an extent that he left the blissful life, abandoned it, fled. Or was she no longer blessed? In that case, she was unhappy. How then were these disasters not evil when they made life miserable and forced us to avoid it? Those who recognize these disasters as real evil speak more intelligently, like the Peripatetics and the ancient Academicians, whose sect Varro defends. But they are also mistaken, claiming that life still remains blissful even in the face of these disasters, even if they were so severe that they would force the person suffering them to turn to suicide in order to avoid them. “Suffering and bodily torment,” he says, “are real evil, and the worse the evil they are! In order for you to free yourself from them, you need to escape from this life.” From what life, tell me, for God's sake? From this one, he answers, which is oppressed by such great disasters. It turns out, then, that she is blessed under these very disasters, because of which, according to you, she should be run away from? Or do you call her blessed because she allows you to be freed from these evils through death? After all, if, in fact, by some divine destinies you remained with them and you were not allowed to either die or ever be freed from them, you, of course, would then call such a life unhappy. In this case, she does not cease to be unhappy just because she is easily abandoned; if she were eternal, you yourself would recognize her as unhappy. So, one should not deny misfortune on the grounds that it is short-lived; or, what is even more senseless, on the grounds that misfortune is short, even call it bliss. Great is the power of those evils that force a person, in their opinion, even a wise one, to take away from himself that which makes a person. They themselves say, and they say rightly, that in its kind the first and strongest voice of nature inspires man to get along with himself, and therefore, naturally, avoid death; that he is his own friend to such an extent that he wants to be an animated being, wants to live in this union of soul and body and ardently strives for this. Great is the power of those evils that overcome this natural feeling, which avoids death in every way, by all forces and means; and wins in such a way that what is avoided becomes an object of desire, harassment, and if it does not happen from somewhere from the outside, it is inflicted on oneself by the person himself. Great is the power of those evils that make courage a murderer; if, however, one should call courage that which is conquered by evil to such an extent that a person whom it has accepted as a virtue for control and protection is not only unable to protect through patience, but is even forced to kill. True, the wise must patiently endure death, but one that happens from the outside. If, in their opinion, he may be forced to inflict it on himself, then in any case they must admit that it is not only evil, but also unbearable evil that forces him to decide on this. So, a life that is oppressed by the oppression of such great and grave evils or subject to their accidents would in no way be called blessed, if the people who say this, just as they yield to misfortune when, overcome by aggravating calamities, inflict death on themselves, so would they deign to make a concession to the truth, overcome by undoubted arguments in reasoning about the blessed life; They would not even think that it is possible for them to achieve the end of the highest good in this mortality, where the virtues themselves, in comparison with which there really is nothing better and more useful in a person, as much as they serve as a great aid against threatening dangers, are also undoubted evidence of disasters. But if the virtues are true virtues, possible only in those who have true piety, they will not promise that they can ensure that people to whom they are inherent will not suffer any disasters; true virtues are not false to promise this; they will say openly that human life, which is forced by so many evils of the present century to be unhappy, is blessed, as well as unharmed, by the hope of the future century. For how can she be blessed when she is not yet unharmed? Therefore, the Apostle Paul, not about unreasonable, impatient, intemperate and unrighteous people, but about those who lived according to true piety and therefore had what true virtues they had, says: “We are saved in hope. But hope, when it sees, is not hope; for if anyone sees, what can he hope for? But when we hope for what we do not see, then we wait with patience” (Rom. VIII, 24–25). Thus, just as we are saved by hope, so by hope we are blessed; and we no longer possess both salvation and bliss as present ones, but expect them as future ones; and this is “in patience,” because we are in disasters that we must endure patiently until we achieve those blessings where there will be everything that will give us unspeakable pleasure, and there will be nothing that we will have to endure. Those philosophers do not want to believe this bliss, because they do not see it; and they are strengthened by both pride and false virtue to create a false (bliss) for themselves here. Chapter V. About social life, which, although very desirable, is often destroyed by the multitude of insults received And that they represent the life of the wise as a social life, then we, for our part, give this idea even wider development. For this city of God, about which we now have at our fingertips the nineteenth book of this work, where would it have received its beginning, how would it continue to exist and how would it reach its proper end, if the life of the saints were not public? But who in the essay will calculate, who is able to weigh, how much and what kind of evil human society is filled with in this disastrous mortality? Let them listen to how their comedians have a person with common human feeling and sympathy say: I took a wife for myself, that’s when I found out trouble! The children were born, here's another concern for you 186. And those vices associated with love, which are listed by the same Terence: Jealousy and malice, then a truce, Again war and again short-term peace 187; have they not overflowed human relations everywhere? Do they not almost always meet even in the respectable mutual affections of friends? Do they not fill human relationships in general, so that we feel resentment, jealousy, anger, war in them as evil, not subject to any doubt, and peace as a dubious good, because we do not know the hearts of those with whom we would like to live in peace? Even if we could know today, we cannot know what it will be like tomorrow. Who, in fact, usually is or should be more friendly with each other than those who are part of the same family? Meanwhile, who can be confident in his safety on this side, when the secret treachery of family members has often been the cause of such great evils - evils all the more bitter, the more pleasant the world was, taken for the true world at a time when it was a matter of the most crafty pretense? That is why this strikes the hearts of everyone to such an extent that we clearly hear the groan in the words of Tullius: “There are no treacheries more hidden than those that lurk under the feigned appearance of duty or under some name of kinship. You can easily avoid an open enemy by taking precautions; This hidden, domestic and family evil not only exists, but also strikes you before you are able to warn yourself and notice it” 188. Therefore, without deep heartfelt sorrow one cannot hear the famous divine words: “A man’s enemies are his own household” (Matthew X, 36). Even if someone were so courageous that he would endure it indifferently, or so vigilant that he would, by prudently taken measures, avoid what was planned against him under the guise of friendship; However, if he himself is a good person, the evil of such treacherous people, when he learns from experience that they are the worst people, will inevitably torment him cruelly, regardless of whether they were always bad and only pretended to be good, or changed their kindness to this anger. So, if the family is unsafe, this is the common refuge of the human race in the misfortunes of real life, then what can we say about civil society, the courts of which, the larger it is, the more burdened with civil litigation and criminal cases, even though not only rebellious, but often bloody insurrections and internecine wars do not arise, from the actual appearance of which societies are sometimes free, but from the danger of their appearance they are never free? Chapter VI. About the error of human courts when the truth is unknown And the judgments of people about people, inevitable in civil societies, no matter what world they are in: how pitiful they are, what a mournful sight they represent! After all, those who judge are those who cannot know the conscience of those they judge. Therefore, they are often forced to torture witnesses to find the truth in a case that is foreign to the witnesses. And when someone is tortured for his own cause, and they torment him, trying to find out whether he is guilty, and he, being innocent, suffers all too familiar executions for an unknown crime, not because he committed it, but because they do not know that he did not commit it? Ignorance of the judge is almost always a disaster to the innocent. And what is even more unbearable, what should cause even more sorrow and be washed, if only it were possible, with streams of tears, is such an unfortunate consequence of human ignorance when a judge, having subjected the accused to torture in order not to ignorantly kill an innocent, kills the one tormented by torture and the innocent whom he tortured, so as not to kill without guilt. If the latter, according to their wisdom, preferred to escape from this life rather than endure the mentioned tortures, he would thereby say that he did something that he did not do. Having convicted and killed him, the judge does not yet know whether he killed a guilty or innocent person, torturing him so as not to kill out of ignorance without guilt; and it turns out that he tormented the innocent in order to find out, and killed because he did not know. Will a wise person in this darkness of public life hold the position of judge or not? There will be, of course. He is tied, attracted to this position by human society, to change which he considers a crime, but at the same time he does not consider it a crime that innocent witnesses are tortured in the affairs of others; that the accused, often unable to bear suffering and giving false testimony about themselves, are also subject to punishment without guilt after being tortured without guilt; that even if they are not punished with death, they very often die from the torture itself; that sometimes the accusers themselves, who perhaps wanted to benefit human society (so that crimes would not go unpunished), due to the lies of witnesses, due to the extraordinary firmness in torturing the guilty person, are ignorantly condemned by the judge because they are unable to prove what they are accused of, even if they were accused fairly. He does not consider all this and similar evils to be sins, because a wise judge does this not out of a desire to harm, but out of necessity of ignorance; and to the extent that human society forces this, and by necessity, the courts. So, if this is not the anger of the wise, then at least the misfortune of the person we are talking about. Or is it for him, when, out of necessity of ignorance and judgment, he tortures and executes the innocent, it is not enough to be irresponsible, but he must also be blessed? How much more just and worthy it is for a person to admit this necessity of disaster and hate it in himself, and if he is pious, to exclaim to God: “Lead me out of my troubles” (Ps. XXIV, 17)! Chapter VII. About the difference of languages, which produces discord in human society, and about the disaster of wars, even those called just After civil society or the city comes the state union, in which they see the third degree of human intercourse, starting from the family, moving to the city and ending with the state; the latter, like a collection of waters, the more extensive it is, the greater the danger it poses. First of all, the difference in languages ​​alienates man from man. For if two such people meet, not being able to separate, but forced by some necessity to be together, one of whom does not know the other’s language, then dumb animals of different breeds will more easily enter into mutual communication with each other than these two, although both of them are people. Such similarity of nature is not at all conducive to the communication of people, since, due to differences in languages, they are not able to share feelings with each other; and this is true to such an extent that a person would rather spend time with his dog than with a stranger. An order has been established according to which the commanding city, through peaceful relations, imposes not only a yoke, but also its language on the conquered peoples; why there is not only no shortage of translators, but even an abundance. This is true; but how many and how great was this achieved by wars, by what human defeats, by what shedding of human blood? With the end of the latter, however, the severity of the same kind of evil did not end. In addition to the fact that external peoples were and remain enemies, against whom wars have always been, are being and will be waged, the very vastness of the empire gave rise to wars of the worst kind, that is, allied and civil; they lie on the human race with an even heavier burden, whether they are carried out in order to someday cease, or are a subject of fear as they might arise again. If I wanted to properly explain the multitude and variety of disasters from these evils, their difficult and unfortunate consequences, although I am not able to present them as the case requires, will there be an end to my long speech? But a wise man, they say, will wage just wars, as if he, if only he remembers that he is a man, will not grieve much more that he needs to wage just wars; after all, if they were not fair, he would not have to lead them, and in that case, for the wise, there would be no wars at all. The injustice of the other side forces the wise to wage just wars; and this injustice should cause sorrow in a person’s soul, because it is human injustice, even if because of it there was no need to start a war. So, whoever with mental pain delves into these types of evil, so grave, so terrible, so cruel, will recognize them as a disaster. And whoever endures them or reflects on them without mental pain is, by this very reason, too pitiful when he considers himself blessed, because he has lost human feeling itself. Chapter VIII. That the friendship of good people cannot be calm in view of the inevitable anxieties inspired by the dangers of real life Unless ignorance, which is similar to stupidity, happens, which, however, often happens in the unfortunate conditions of real life, that a friend is considered an enemy, and a friend is considered an enemy, the only thing that consoles us in this human society, overflowing with mistakes and sorrows, is unfeigned devotion and mutual love between true and good friends. But the more and in larger places we have them, the more and more often we are afraid that some evil will happen to them from this mass of evils of the present age. We worry not only that they do not suffer from hunger, wars, disease, captivity, that in that very slavery they do not suffer anything that we cannot even imagine; We even fear (and our fears in this case are much more bitter) that their friendship will not turn into treachery, into malice, into deceit. And when something like this happens (and it happens the more often the more of them there are and in large places they are located) and comes to our attention, who is able to understand, except the one who feels it, the torments that torment our heart? We would rather hear about their deaths; although without grief we cannot hear about this either. For if their life, due to the consolations of friendship, pleased us, then their death cannot but cause us sadness. He who does not allow such sadness should not, if possible, allow friendly conversations; let the very feeling of friendship be prohibited; let him, with wild numbness of the soul, break off all human ties, or let him show a way to use them in such a way that no pleasure for the soul follows from them. If this is absolutely impossible, then how will it be possible that the death of someone whose life was sweet would not be bitter for us? That is why lamentation is like a kind of wound or harm in the human heart, to heal which appropriate consolations are used. This is not proof of the absence of a wound that it is healed, because the better the soul, the sooner and easier it is healed. So, although the life of mortals is sometimes easier, and sometimes more upset by the death of dear people, and especially those whose services are necessary to human society, we would rather see those we love dead than to hear about their loss of honesty or good morals, that is, that they have died in the soul itself. The earth is full of such a great nutrient for evil. Therefore it is written: “Is not man’s life on earth a trial?” (Job. VII, 1). That is why the Lord himself says: “Woe to the world because of temptations” (Matthew XVIII: 7). And again: “Because iniquity multiplies, the love of many will grow cold” (Matt. XXIV, 12). That is why it happens that we rejoice for good deceased friends, and although their death saddens us, it also gives us more certain peace, because they escaped the evils that either suppress even good people in this life, or spoil them, or threaten them with danger of both kinds. Chapter IX. About the friendship of the holy angels, which in this world cannot be felt by a person due to the cunning of the demons with whom they met who consider it obligatory to worship many gods In the society of holy angels, to whom those philosophers who wished to have the gods as friends assign fourth place, moving, as it were, from the circle of earthly life to the entire totality of creation, in order through this to somehow embrace heaven, - in this society we are not at all afraid that such friends will sadden us with their death or damage. But angels do not enter into such close relationships with us as people do (which also applies to the hardships of this life), and sometimes Satan, as we read, transforms himself into an angel of light (2 Cor. XI, 15) in order to tempt those who need to be taught in this way or who are justly deceived. Therefore, the special mercy of God is necessary so that someone, while counting good angels among his friends, does not actually have evil demons as imaginary friends and suffers in their person enemies, all the more harmful, the more cunning and insidious they are. And who needs this special mercy of God, if not the extremely pitiful human condition, upon which lies such a burden of ignorance that it is easily deceived by demonic pretense? There is no doubt that those philosophers in the wicked city, who claimed to have the gods as their friends, came across evil demons, to whom that entire city is subject, having to share with them eternal punishment. This was demonstrated with sufficient clarity by those who were revered by them by the sacred service, or rather by the sacrilege, with which they were considered to be honored, and by those most immoral games in which their crimes were glorified (by which they were considered to be propitiated; since they are both the institutes and the perpetrators of these outrages. Chapter X. What benefit will the saints receive from victory over the temptations of this life? Saints and faithful admirers of the one true and highest God are not guaranteed against deceptions and various temptations on their part. For in this country of changeability and in these evil days, this kind of anxiety is not useless, so that with all the more ardent desire they strive for that serenity where peace is the most complete and most reliable. The gifts of nature, that is, what is given to our nature by the Creator of all natures, will no longer be only good, but also eternal; and not only in the soul, which will be healed by wisdom, but also in the body, which will be renewed through the resurrection. Virtues there will not wage war against any vices or against any evil, but will enjoy, as a reward for victory, eternal peace, which no enemy will violate. This world is the ultimate bliss, the limit of perfection, which no longer has its end. Although we call ourselves blessed here too, when we enjoy the peace that is only possible here with a good life; but this bliss, compared with what we call the final state, seems a very miserable state. When we, mortal people, in the conditions of mortal life, have the peace that is only possible here, then if we live properly, virtue enjoys its benefits properly; when we do not have it, virtue makes good use of the evil that a person suffers. But true virtue exists when all the benefits that we use well, and everything that we do with the good use of benefits and disasters, and it directs itself towards that end, where for us there will be such and such a great world, better and greater than which the world cannot be. Chapter XI. About the bliss of eternal peace, in which there is an end for the saints, that is, true perfection Therefore, we can call the world the end of our blessings, just as we called eternal life this end: especially in view of the fact that this city of God, about which we are conducting such a difficult discussion, is said in the holy psalm: “Praise, O Jerusalem, the Lord; Praise, O Zion, your God. For He strengthens the ropes of your gates, He blesses your sons in your midst; establishes peace within your borders” (Ps. 147:1-3). When the ropes of its gates are strengthened, no one will enter it, no one will come out of it. And therefore, in this case, we must consider the limits of it to be the world that we want to present as finite. For the very mysterious name of this city, Jerusalem, as we have said before, translated means “vision of the world.” But since the word world is very often used in the conditions of this mortal life, where in any case there is no eternal life; then the end of this city, where its highest good will be, we decided to call it better eternal life than peace. About this end the apostle says: “Now that you have been freed from sin and have become slaves of God, your fruit is holiness, and the end is eternal life” (Rom. VI, 22). But, on the other hand, since those who are little familiar with the Holy Scriptures can understand by eternal life also an evil life, either because, as some philosophers believe, the immortality of the soul, or because, as we also believe, the infinity of punishments for the wicked, who, of course, could not suffer forever if they did not also live forever; then the end of this city, in which it will have the highest good, should be called either peace in eternal life, or eternal life in the world, so that it can be more easily distinguished from everything else. For the good of the world is so great that even in the conditions of earthly and mortal life, they usually do not listen to anything with great pleasure, do not desire anything more heartily, and, finally, cannot find anything better. If we decide to talk about it a little longer, we will not, as I believe, bore our readers, both because of the end of this city that we are talking about, and because of the very pleasantness of the world, which is kind to everyone. Chapter XII. That even the ferocity of those who wage war and all human worries desire to achieve a peaceful end, without the desire for which no nature exists Whoever, together with me, takes a quick look at human affairs and nature in general, will admit that just as there is no one who would give up joy, so there is no one who would not want to have peace. Those who desire wars desire nothing else but victory; They wish, therefore, to achieve a glorious peace through war. After all, what is victory if not the subjugation of those who resist. When this is accomplished, peace will come. So, with the goal of peace, wars are also waged, even by those who try to exercise military valor through the reign of wars. From this it is clear that peace is the desired end to war. By waging war, everyone achieves peace; but no one, concluding peace, achieves war. For even those who want to disrupt the peace in which they find themselves do not hate the world, but want to change it according to their will. They do not want the world to not exist, but for it to be the way they want it to be. Then, those who separated from others through indignation, if they do not maintain at least some kind of peace with their accomplices or accomplices in the conspiracy, will not achieve what they strive for. Yes, even robbers, in order to harm the peace of others more powerfully and safely, try to be at peace with their comrades. Even if there were one among them, possessing such enormous forces and fearing his accomplices to such an extent that he would not trust any comrade, and, making ambushes and attacks alone, would carry out the robberies himself, cutting and killing whomever he could; then even such a one would certainly maintain some shadow of peace with those whom he cannot kill, or from whom he wants them to hide his actions. In his own house, with his wife, children and everyone else, whoever is there, he, of course, tries to live in complete peace; their fulfillment of his will at his one wave gives him pleasure. If this obedience does not happen, he becomes irritated, worried, insists on it, and, if necessary, establishes peace in his house through the most brutal measures; he understands that this peace is impossible if in a domestic union everything is not subordinate to one known authority, which he represents in his own home. Therefore, if very many people, a city or a people, declare their submission to him, and they obey him in the same way as he wanted them to obey him in his house, he will no longer hide in secluded places as a robber, but will openly put himself in the high position of a king, although the same greed and the same anger will remain in him. So, everyone wants to be at peace with their own, from whom they want them to live according to their will. For, waging war with someone, they want to make them, if possible, their own, and, having conquered them, impose on them the laws of their world. But let us imagine someone such a person as is depicted in poetic and fairy-tale stories, precisely because of the cruelty incompatible with common life, presenting him as more of a half-man than a man. His kingdom was a secluded wild cave, and his anger was so unique of its kind that his name was given to him after it; because evil in Greek is called κακός, and that was his name. No wife addressed him or responded with affectionate speech; there were no children with whom he would joke when they were little, or whom he would order when they grew up. He did not have the pleasure of talking with any friend, not even with his father, Vulcan, whom he was much happier, at least in the sense that he himself had not given birth to such a monster. He didn’t give anything to anyone, but from whomever he could and when he could he took away what he wanted and how much he wanted. Nevertheless, in the very solitude of his cave, the ground of which, as described 189, was always warm from the murder that had just been committed, he wished for nothing but peace - so that no one would bother him, so that no one's strength or fear of someone would disturb his peace. He finally wanted to have peace with his body, and as far as he had it, he felt good. He kept his members in obedience; and when his mortality rebelled against him in case of lack of something and aroused a rebellion of hunger in order to break the connection between soul and body and remove the former from the latter, he, with all the haste he could, pacified it, robbed, killed, devoured it; Fierce and ferocious, he defended the peace of his life and his well-being with the same ferocity and ferocity. Consequently, if the peace that he very diligently preserved in his cave and with himself, he wanted to preserve with others, he would not be called either evil, or a monster, or half-man. Or, if the appearance of his body and the stinking flame spewed from his lips kept people from communicating with him, then it is possible that he raged not out of a passion to harm, but out of necessity, for the sake of maintaining life. But he did not exist at all, or, what is much more likely, he was not as the poetic nonsense describes him. If Cacus had not been shown in an extremely bad light, Hercules would have had little honor. So, such a person or half-man, as I said, most likely did not exist, just as in reality many other poetic fictions did not exist. For even the most ferocious animals, from which he borrowed part of the brutality (because he was also called a half-beast), protect their kind in the known world, copulating, breeding, giving birth, warming and feeding children, although for the most part they are not sociable and wander alone, not like sheep, deer, pigeons, starlings, bees, but like lions, foxes, eagles, owls. What kind of tiger, for example, does not purr quietly to its children and caress them, having tamed its brutality? What kite, no matter how much it circles alone in the air for prey, does not pair up, build nests, hatch eggs, feed its young, and does not maintain, in a possible world, a kind of domestic communication with the mother of its family? Moreover, man, in some way, by the laws of his nature, is disposed to enter into communication and to maintain peace, as far as this depends on him, with all people; and when the evil wage war for the sake of their world and wish, if it is possible for them, to make everyone their own, so that everyone and everything will submit to one, then why is this done, if not because out of love or out of fear they subordinate their actions to its world. Thus pride contradicts God in a wrong way. For she hates equality with her comrades when submitting to Him, but tries to impose her dominance on her comrades, instead of Him. She hates the right world of God, but loves her wrong one. However, she in no way can not love any world. There is no such unnatural vice that would completely erase the traces of nature. So, that the world of the unjust in comparison with the world of the righteous cannot even be called peace, this is clear to those who know how to prefer the right to the wrong and the orderly to the perverted. After all, that which is perverse, in some part, in some way and with some part of something in which it is located or of which it consists, is certainly pacified; otherwise it would not exist at all. For example, someone is hanging upside down. The position of his body and the order of his limbs are obviously wrong; because what nature intended to be above turns out to be below; and what by nature should be below became above. This vicissitude has disturbed the world of the flesh and is therefore painful. However, the soul is at peace with its body and cares about its salvation; and therefore there are those who mourn. And if, as a result of illness, the soul renounced the body, left it, and then, while the connection of the members was maintained, what remained would continue to maintain a certain peace in its parts: there would still be one who hangs. And when the earthly body is pulled to the ground and held by the noose on which it is hung, it strives for the state of its world and, as if with the voice of its heaviness, asks for a place in which it could calm down; and already soulless and devoid of any feeling, it does not change its natural peaceful position when it reaches it or is brought into it. If medical means and care are applied that will not allow decomposition and destruction of the external appearance of the corpse, then a kind of peace will connect parts to parts and the whole mass will be confined to an earthly and appropriate, and therefore peaceful place. If embalming is not used, but everything is left to its natural course, then the corpse, as it were, experiences rebellion from those divided into parties and therefore not corresponding to our feelings (for this is precisely what is felt in the stench until it merges with the elements of the world and piece by piece and little by little enters their world). In this case, nothing, however, happens apart from the laws of the supreme Creator and Manager, Who governs the world of everything; when small animals are born from the corpse of a large animal, by virtue of the same law of the Creator, every atom serves the peaceful well-being of their little souls; and when the bodies of the dead are devoured by other animals, no matter where they are taken away, no matter what things they are combined with, no matter what things they turn into and change, they meet the same laws, poured out in everything for the well-being of all kinds of mortals, pacifying the corresponding with the corresponding. Chapter XIII. About universal peace, which, despite any disturbances, cannot, according to the law of nature, not be preserved to a greater or lesser extent, until in a righteous court everyone receives by order what he deserves by choice So, the world of the body is an ordered arrangement of parts. The peace of the unreasonable soul is the orderly calming of urges. The world of the rational soul is the orderly agreement of judgment and action. The world of body and soul is the orderly life and well-being of an animate being. The peace of mortal man and God is orderly obedience in faith under the eternal law. The world of people is an orderly unanimity. The world of the home is the orderly agreement of the cohabitants regarding management and obedience. The world of the city is the consent of citizens ordered regarding governance and obedience. The world of the heavenly city is the most orderly and one-spirited communication in the enjoyment of God and mutually in God. The peace of all is the calm of order. Order is the arrangement of equal and unequal things, giving each its place. Because of this, the unfortunate, who are so unhappy as they do not have peace, although they do not enjoy such peace of order in which there would be no disorder, however, since they are deservedly and justly unhappy, cannot be in this very misfortune of theirs contrary to order - not as united with the blessed, but as separated from them, but - by the law of order. As far as they are without disorder (order), they are connected with the things among which they are, by whatever consent there is; therefore they have some peace of order; some peace is inherent in them too. But they are unhappy because, although they do not grieve with a certain calm, they are not, however, in a position in which they should not be calm and grieve; They are even more unhappy if they do not have peace with the law itself, which governs the natural order. When they mourn, a violation of the peace has occurred in that part from which they feel grief; but the world still remains in that part where grief does not torment and the connection itself has not yet been broken. Consequently, just as there is some life without sorrow, but sorrow cannot exist without some life, so there is some peace without any war, but there cannot be war without some peace; this is not due to the fact that it is war, but due to the fact that it is waged by those or occurs in those who represent some kind of nature; They could in no way be such natures if they did not exist in any world. Therefore, there is a nature in which there is no evil at all, or in which no evil is possible; but there cannot be a nature in which there is no good. And the nature of the devil himself, so far as it is nature, is not evil; It was her depravity that made her evil. So, he did not stand in the truth (John VIII, 44), but he did not escape the judgment of truth; He did not remain in the peace of order, but through this he did not escape the power of the Manager. The goodness of God, which is in his nature, did not allow him to escape from the justice of God, which appoints him to punishment; In this case, God does not pursue the good that he created, but rather the evil that he committed. For He does not take away everything that He gave to nature, but He took something away and left something, so that there would be something to grieve over what was taken away. And sorrow itself is evidence of the good taken away and the good left behind. If the good were not abandoned, grief over the lost good would not be possible. He is much more evil who, while sinning, finds pleasure in losing what is right. And whoever is tormented, if he does not receive any benefit from it, grieves over the loss of well-being. And since both, righteousness and well-being, are goods, and one should rather mourn the loss of a good than rejoice (if, however, there is no compensation for the loss with the better, and the righteousness of the soul is better than the well-being of the body), then it is much more appropriate for the unjust to grieve in torment than to rejoice in crime. Consequently, just as joy over the loss of a good in sin testifies to an evil will, so sorrow over the loss of a good during punishment testifies to a good nature. For whoever grieves over the loss of the peace of his nature, grieves over it due to some remnants of the world that make nature dear to him. At the last punishment, it will be a direct matter of justice that the unjust and unfortunate mourn in agony the loss of natural goods, feeling that the most just God, Whom they despised, took away these goods when He was their most benevolent giver. God, the all-wise Creator and the most just Manager of all natures, who gave the greatest adornment to the earth in the mortal human race, gave people some benefits corresponding to this life, that is, a temporary world in the very welfare, integrity and communication of its kind, and what is necessary for the preservation and restoration of this world, which is the essence of everything that is decent and appropriately falls under our senses: this visible light, inhalable air, suitable for drinking water; and what corresponds to the nutrition, covering, treatment and decoration of the body - he gave on the fair condition that the one who correctly uses such mortal benefits, adapted to the mortal world, will receive greater and better ones, that is, the world of immortality and the corresponding glory and honor in eternal life for the enjoyment of God and his neighbor in God, and the one who uses it badly will not receive these and will lose these. Chapter XIV. About order and law, whether heavenly or earthly, according to which both domination has the form of care for human communication, and care has the form of serving it So, all kinds of use of temporary things are important for the acquisition of earthly peace in the earthly city; and in the city of heaven it is important for acquiring eternal peace. Thus, if we were irrational animals, we would want nothing more than the orderly state of the parts of the body and the calming of desires - nothing more than the peace of the flesh and the satisfaction of desires, so that the peace of the body would contribute to the peace of the soul. For the absence of bodily peace also interferes with the peace of the unreasonable soul, since it cannot achieve calmness of urges. Together, both of these favor the peace that the soul and body have between each other, that is, the world of ordered life and well-being. How animals reveal their love for the physical world when they avoid painful sensations, and for the spiritual world when they follow animal passion to satisfy their urges; Thus, when they avoid death, they show with sufficient clarity how much they love the world that mutually connects soul and body. But since man has a rational soul, he subordinates everything that has in common with animals to the world of the rational soul, in order to discuss this or that with his mind and do something accordingly, so that he has an orderly agreement of judgment and action, which we called the world of the rational soul. He must wish not to be disturbed by painful sensations, not to be disturbed by needs, not to be destroyed by death, in order to learn something useful and arrange his life and morals according to this knowledge. And so that in the very desire for knowledge not to fall into any disastrous error due to the weakness of the human mind, he needs divine instruction, which he could follow with confidence, and divine help, with which he could freely conform. And since he, while he is in this mortal body, wanders away from the Lord, he walks by faith and not by sight (II Cor. V, 7); and therefore every peace, whether body or soul, or body and soul together, directs towards that peace which has been established between mortal man and the immortal God, in order to be in orderly obedience to Him in faith under the eternal law. And since the teacher-God teaches two main commandments: love of God and love of neighbor, then in these two commandments a person finds three objects for his love: God, himself and his neighbor; and he who loves God does not err in love for himself; It is also natural that he takes care that his neighbor also loves God - the neighbor whom he is commanded to love as himself. This kind of concern is about his wife, children, family, about all the people whom they may concern; and he desires the same kind of care for himself from others if he encounters a need for such care. In this way he will be in reconciliation, as far as it depends on him, with every person and with the human world, that is, in orderly agreement; This order consists, firstly, in not harming anyone, and secondly, in bringing benefit to those who need it. So, first of all, he will have to take care of his family: they are closer and more accessible than others to his advice and care due to the order of nature, due to the order of human communication itself. Why does the apostle say: “If anyone does not provide for his own, and especially for those at home, he has denied the faith and is worse than an infidel” (1 Tim. V, 8). From here arises domestic peace, that is, orderly agreement regarding the management and obedience of those living together. Those who care govern, somehow: husband - wife, parents - children, masters - slaves. Those who are cared for obey in some way: wives to their husbands, children to their parents, slaves to their masters. But in the house of the righteous, who lives by faith and is still at a wandering distance from that heavenly city, the stewards serve those whom they apparently rule. For they rule not out of a desire to dominate, but out of a duty to care, and not out of their proud position of authority, but out of compassionate forethought. Chapter XV. About natural freedom, and about slavery, the first cause of which is sin; because a person with a bad will, although he is not the property of another person, is already a slave to his own lust This is prescribed by the natural order, this is how God created man. “Let them have dominion,” He says, “over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the livestock, and over all the earth” (Gen. I, 26). He wanted the rational creation in His image to rule only over the unreasonable: not man over man, but man over animals. Therefore, the first righteous people appeared as shepherds of animals rather than as kings of men; God also instilled in us what the order of nature requires, what sins force us to do. It is made clear that the state of slavery is rightfully assigned to the sinner. In Scripture we do not meet a slave before the righteous Noah punished his son’s sin with this name (Gen. IX, 25). It is not nature, therefore, but sin that deserves this name. The name of slaves (servi) in Latin apparently has the following origin: when the victors left those who by law of war could be killed alive, the latter became slaves, receiving the name from preservation (servi a servando). But even in this case, sin is not involved. After all, even at a time when a just war is being waged, for the sake of sin the opposing side exposes itself to danger, and every victory, even if it leans towards the side of the bad, by divine judgment humiliates the vanquished, either correcting or punishing sins. A witness to this is the man of God Daniel, who, while in captivity, confessed his sins and the sins of his people to God and in them, with pious sorrow, pointed out the reason for this captivity (Dan. IX, 5). Thus, sin is the first cause of slavery, by which man is subject to man by virtue of his condition; and this happens no other way than by the judgment of God, with whom there is no unrighteousness and who knows how to distribute various punishments according to the guilt of those who sin. And since the Supreme Lord says that “everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin” (John VIII, 34), and therefore many pious serve unrighteous masters, who themselves, however, are not free: “For whoever is overcome by someone is his slave” (2 Pet. II, 19); then in any case it is better to be a slave to man than to lust; for the very lust of domination, not to mention others, with terrible cruelty devastates the souls of mortals with its domination. In the order of the world, according to which some people are subordinate to others, just as humiliation benefits those who serve, so pride harms those in power. But according to the nature with which God originally created man, there is no slave to man or to sin. However, the slavery awarded as punishment is determined by the same law, which commands the preservation of the natural order and prohibits violating it; because, if there were no offense against this law, there would be nothing to punish by forcing slavery. Why does the apostle exhort slaves to submit to their masters and to serve them from the heart with readiness (Eph. VI, 6-7), that is, if they cannot receive freedom from their masters, then they themselves can make their service free in some way, serving not out of feigned fear, but out of sincere disposition, until untruth passes away, all rulership and human power is abolished and God will be all in all. Chapter XVI. On the justice of the rights of domination In this regard, our righteous fathers, although they had slaves, nevertheless organized the domestic world in such a way that, distinguishing the lot of children from the condition of slaves in relation to these temporary blessings, with regard to the veneration of God, in whom the hopes of eternal blessings rest, they cared with equal love for all members of their household. This is prescribed by the natural order to such an extent that the name paterfamilias 190 came from here and received such wide use that the rulers themselves find pleasure in being called by this name, even if not deservedly. True fathers of the family, in all that concerns the honoring of God and serving Him, care for all members of the family as if they were children, desiring and praying to reach the heavenly home, where there will no longer be a need for the obligatory duty to command mortals, because there will no longer be a need for the obligatory duty to care for their happiness in that immortality. Until this happens, domination requires more patience from fathers than service requires from slaves. If anyone in the house opposes the domestic world by his disobedience, such a person is tamed either with a word, or with a whip, or with another fair and permissible type of punishment, as far as human society allows, for the benefit of the person being tamed, in order to join him to the world from which he has deviated. Just as it would not be a good deed, while helping, to cause the loss of a greater good, so it would not be an innocent deed, sparing, to allow the commission of a more serious evil. The duty of an innocent person is not only not to do evil to anyone, but also to restrain from sin or punish sin, so that either the punished person, having experienced the punishment, will correct himself, or others, seeing the punishment, will be restrained by fear of him. And since a person’s house must be the beginning or part of the city, and every beginning has a certain relationship to its end and every part to the whole of which it forms a part, then the obvious consequence is that the domestic world has a relationship to the civil world, that is, that orderly agreement regarding commands and obedience between cohabitants serves to establish orderly agreement regarding command and obedience between citizens. The father of the family must therefore take the rules from the civil law and govern his house according to them in such a way that it serves to strengthen the peace of civil society. Chapter XVII. In what respects does the heavenly society maintain peace with the earthly city, and in what respects does it disagree with it? But the house of people who do not live by faith seeks from things the benefits of this temporary life of the earthly world. The house of people who live by faith awaits what is promised in the future as eternal, and uses earthly and temporary things as a wanderer: not in order to get carried away by them and forget about their desire for God, but in order to find support in them for more easily enduring the burdens of the corruptible body, which burdens the soul (Wis. 9:15). Thus, both people, this and that house equally use the things necessary for this mortal life; But everyone has their own purpose of use and is very different. In the same way, the earthly city, which does not live by faith, strives for earthly peace and towards it directs agreement in the government and obedience of citizens, so that regarding things related to mortal life, they have to a certain extent the same way of thinking and desires. The heavenly city, or rather that part of it that wanders in this mortality and lives by faith, is forced to be content with such a world until the very mortality for which it is needed passes. Therefore, while he spends, as it were, a captive life of his wandering in the regions of the earthly city, although he has already received the promise of redemption and as a guarantee of it - a spiritual gift, he does not hesitate to obey the laws of the earthly city, which govern what serves to support mortal life, so that, since mortality itself is common, in the things related to it, harmony between one and another city is maintained. But the earthly city had some of its own, not approved by the divine teaching of sages, who, being persuaded or deceived by demons, believed that many gods should be assigned to the human world, to the various positions of which various subordinate objects belong: one has the body, another the soul; and in the body itself there is a head for one, a neck for another, and so on, something special for something special; in the same way, in the soul of one there is intelligence, in another there is science, in another there is anger, in another there is desire; and in the affairs of life itself, to one - cattle, to another - wheat, to another - wine, to another - oil, to this - forests, to another - coin, to another - shipping, to another - wars and victories, to another - marriage, to another - childbirth and fertility, to another - other things of the same kind. The heavenly city knew that only one God should be revered, and with true piety believed that only he should serve that service, which in Greek is called γάτρεια and is obligatory only in relation to God. Because of this, it turned out that he could not have common religious laws with the earthly city and was forced as a result to argue with the latter, became a burden to people of the opposite way of thinking, was subjected to their anger, hatred and persecution, until, finally, through the fear of his multitude and the constant divine help, he curbed the insolence of his enemies. So, this heavenly city, while it is on earthly pilgrimage, calls citizens from all nations and recruits a wandering society in all languages, without attaching importance to what is different in the morals, laws and institutions by which the earthly world is established or maintained; without canceling or destroying anything from the latter, but on the contrary, preserving and observing everything that, although different among different peoples, is directed towards the same goal of the earthly world, unless it interferes with religion, which teaches the veneration of the one highest and true God. Thus, the heavenly city also uses its earthly world in this earthly journey, and in objects related to mortal human nature, as far as this is compatible with piety and religion, it preserves and maintains the unity of the image of human thoughts and desires and directs this earthly world towards the heavenly world. The last world is of such a nature that it alone should be considered and called the world of a rational creature. This is the most orderly and most unanimous communication in the enjoyment of God and mutually in God. When this world comes, life will not be mortal, but immediately and undoubtedly living; and the body is not spiritual, which, while perishable, burdens the soul, but spiritual, without a feeling of dissatisfaction in anything, in all respects subordinate to the will. While he wanders, he has this world in faith and according to this faith he lives righteously, when he directs towards the achievement of this world all the good that he does for God and his neighbor, since the life of the city, in any case, is a social life. Chapter XVIII. How great is the difference between the indecisiveness of the new Academy and the firmness of the Christian faith? And as for that feature in his views that Varro borrowed from the new academicians, who consider everything unreliable, the city of God decisively rejects such doubt as madness; for he has knowledge of objects accessible to understanding and reason, although small, due to the corruptible body burdening the soul, for, as the Apostle says, “we know in part” (I Cor. XIII, 9), but most reliable; and the feelings that the soul uses through the body, when something is obvious, it believes; for he is more wretchedly deceived who believes that they should never be believed. He also believes in the sacred Scriptures, ancient and new, which we call canonical: they have nurtured the faith itself, from which the righteous lives (Habak. II, 4), by which we do not hesitate to walk as long as we are removed from the Lord (2 Cor. V, 6). Preserving it and convinced of its truth, we doubt about any such things that we cannot grasp either with our senses or with our reason, which the canonical Scripture does not make clear to us, or information about which has not come to us from such witnesses, and it would be absurd not to believe them, without being subject to fair censure. Chapter XIX. On the external way of life and the rights of the Christian people But this city does not at all concern what external image and custom of life someone adheres to, as long as it is not against the multiple commandments and against the faith that leads to God. Therefore, he forces the philosophers themselves, when they become Christians, to change not their clothes and lifestyle, which do not at all interfere with religion, but false dogmas. Therefore, the city of God absolutely does not attach importance to the feature that Varro pointed out in the Cynics, unless it is expressed in shamelessness and debauchery. Regarding those three kinds of life, that is, free from worldly affairs, active or formed from both of its kinds, then although everyone can spend life in each of the mentioned types without harm to faith and achieve eternal rewards, it is important, however, which of them he holds on out of love for the truth, to which he devotes himself out of duty of love. And everyone should not shy away from everyday affairs so much that in this peace he does not think about the benefit of his neighbor; and not be so active that you do not indulge in thinking about God. In rest from business, it is not inactive idleness that should give pleasure, but the search or discovery of truth; so that everyone succeeds in it, so that he preserves what he has discovered and does not envy the other. In activity, the object of love should not be honor in this life or power (for all is vanity under the sun), but the work itself, which is sometimes done through honor and power, if done correctly and usefully, that is, in such a way that it can serve the well-being of subordinates, which corresponds to the will of God, as we have already talked about above That is why the apostle says: “If anyone desires the episcopate, he desires a good work” (1 Tim. III, 1). The apostle wanted to clarify what bishopric is: it is the name of a work, not an honor. This word is Greek and its meaning is that he who is placed over something oversees what he is placed over, having care for it. For ἐπì means super (above); σκοπός is intentio (goal, intention) 191: ἐπισκοπεῖν, therefore, we can, if we want, express the Latin word superintendere (supervise), to make it clear that he is not a bishop who prefers to rule rather than to be useful. So, the zealous desire for knowledge of the truth is not prohibited to anyone; this is the commendable side of peace from everyday affairs. But the highest place, without which it is impossible to govern the people, even if one enters it and occupies it properly, is, however, indecent to achieve. Love of truth seeks holy peace; social duties assume the inevitable duty of love. If no one imposes this burden, one should use leisure for the knowledge and contemplation of the truth; if it is imposed, it must be accepted out of the inevitable duty of love. But even in the latter case, one should not give up the pleasure brought by the truth, so that that pleasure does not disappear, and this need does not suppress. Chapter XX. That the fellow citizens of the saints during the present life are blessed with hope If, therefore, the highest good of the city of God lies in the eternal and perfect world - not in the one that mortals experience when being born and dying, but in the one in which the immortals abide without suffering any calamity at all, then who will deny that that life is the most blessed; or who does not admit that in comparison with that, real life is the most pitiful, no matter what external mental and physical blessings it abounds in? However, whoever spends the latter in such a way that he uses it to achieve the one who is the object of his fiery love and unshakable hope, it is not without reason that we can say that he is blessed in real life, but only in hope, and not in reality. Present reality without this hope is false bliss and great disaster, for it enjoys untrue spiritual blessings. This is not true wisdom, which is that it discriminates its efforts wisely, courageously carries out, restrains moderately, distributes fairly, does not direct its efforts to the end in which “God is all in all” (1 Cor. XV, 28), and with Him - unchanging eternity, perfect peace. Chapter XXI. Did the Roman Republic ever exist according to Scipio's definitions given in Cicero's dialogue? Now it is appropriate to fulfill the promise made in the second book that the Roman Republic, according to the definitions given to it by Cicero in the books “On the Republic” by Scipio, never existed. He defines the republic briefly as a matter of the people. If this definition is correct, then the Roman Republic never existed, because it was never the work of the people, which the definition of a republic indicates. For he defines a people as a collection of many people united by mutual agreement in law and common benefit. And what he calls consent in law, he explains in his reasoning, showing that a republic cannot be governed without justice. So, where there is no true justice, there can be no right. For what happens rightly certainly happens justly. And what is done unjustly cannot be done rightfully. Unjust decisions of people cannot be considered and called law. They themselves call right what has its source in justice, and false what people of the wrong way of thinking are in the habit of asserting, as if right is what is useful to the stronger. Therefore, where there is no true justice, there cannot be a collection of people united by mutual agreement in law; therefore, there cannot be a people, according to the given definition of Scipio or Cicero, and if there is no people, there is no people’s cause, but there is a matter of some crowd unworthy of the name of the people. Thus, if a republic is the work of the people, there is no people, if it is not united by agreement in law, and there is no law where there is no justice, then it undoubtedly follows that where there is no justice, there is no republic. Further, justice is a virtue that gives to everyone what is due to him. What then is that human justice that takes man himself away from the true God and subjugates him to unclean demons? Does this mean giving everyone what they should? Or he who takes land from the one who bought it, and gives it to someone who has no right to it, is unjust; and whoever takes himself away from the sovereign God by whom he was created and enters into slavery to the insidious demons is just? In the same books "On the Republic" there is a very ingenious and powerful defense of justice against injustice. First comes the side that defends injustice against justice, and asserts that a republic cannot maintain itself and expand except through injustice. The strongest position is the following: it is unfair that people are enslaved by ruling people; and meanwhile, if the city in power, to which the great republic belongs, were not guided by this injustice, it could not command the provinces. The side defending justice responds that this is fair because slavery is useful for such people, that it is to their advantage when it is established properly, that is, when the opportunity to cause offense is taken away from bad people; conquered, they will be better, because in a state of independence they were worse. And to support this argument, a wonderful example is given, borrowed from nature, and it is said: “Why does God command man, the soul - the body, the mind - lust and other vicious sides of the soul?” This example really shows that slavery is good for some, but serving God is good for everyone. The soul serving God rightly commands the body, and in the soul itself the mind, submissive to the Lord God, rightly commands lust and other vices. Therefore, what kind of justice can be assumed in a person who does not serve God, since neither the soul with the body, nor the human mind with vices can at all command fairly, without serving God? And if there is no justice in such a person, then, without any doubt, there is none in the human assembly consisting of such people. Consequently, there is not in this assembly that agreement in law that forms from the crowd of men a people, whose cause is called a republic. Why should I then talk about the benefit, the community of which, according to the above-mentioned definition, is connected by the community of people, called the people? After all, if you delve into the matter properly, then there is no benefit from life to those who live wickedly, as anyone lives who does not serve God, but serves demons; the more wicked, the more they, being the most wicked spirits, desire that sacrifices be made to them as to gods. But I believe that what we have said about consent in law is enough to see that, within the meaning of the above-mentioned definition, there is that people who form the so-called republic. It is true that they say that the Romans in their republic served not unholy spirits, but good and holy gods. But do we really have to repeat several times what we have already said enough, and even more than enough? Who of those who have read the previous books of this work up to this point can still doubt that the Romans served evil and unclean demons, unless he is extremely stupid and shamelessly stubborn? I will even leave aside the question of what kind of people they honored with sacrifices; in the law of the true God it is written: “Whoever sacrifices to the gods except the Lord alone must be destroyed” (Ex. XXII, 20). He who commanded this did not want sacrifices to be made to either good or evil gods. Chapter XXII. Is this the true God whom Christians serve, to whom alone sacrifices must be made? But they may object: “Who is this God, how can one prove that the Romans should have obeyed His command and not honored with sacrifices any of the gods except Him?” It is a sign of great blindness to continue to ask, “Who is this God?” This is the God whose prophets predicted what is happening before our eyes; This is the God from whom Abraham received the answer: “In your seed all the nations of the earth will be blessed” (Gen. XXII, 18). That this was fulfilled in the person of Christ, who in the flesh came from his seed, is admitted, willingly or unwillingly, even by those who remain enemies of Christianity. This is the God whose divine Spirit spoke through the mouths of those whose predictions and the fulfillment of these predictions in the person of the Church, spread before our eyes throughout the world, I have outlined in previous books. This is the God whom the most learned of the Romans, Varro, considers to be Jupiter, although he himself does not know what he is saying. I found it necessary to mention this because a husband with such knowledge could neither deny this God nor consider Him unimportant. He thought that this was the God whom he considered the highest. Finally, this is the same God whom the most learned of philosophers, although the greatest enemy of Christians, Porphyry, recognizes as a great god, following the oracles of those whom he considers gods. Chapter XXIII. What answers, according to Porfiry, did the oracles of the gods give about Christ? In the books that he inscribes ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας and in which he expounds and describes in detail supposedly divine answers about things related to philosophy, he (I will quote his own words, as they are translated from Greek into Latin) says: “To the one who asked, by prayer to which god could he distract his wife from Christianity, Apollo answered in verse as follows.” Then the following words are quoted allegedly from Apollo: “You can, perhaps, sooner learn to draw letters on water or, spreading light wings, fly like a bird, than bring back the feeling of a defiled and wicked wife. Let him continue as he wishes, persisting in empty deceptions and chanting with false sobs the dead God, Whom, destroyed by right-thinking judges, was put to death by the worst of the plausible, together with iron, death.” After these verses of Apollo, translated into Latin without observing the meter, he continues like this: “He indicated the deviation of their thoughts that cannot be corrected in the following words: “The Jews believe in God more than these.” Thus, by dishonoring Christ, he places the Jews above Christians, recognizing, however, that the Jews believe in God. For the verse of Apollo, in which the latter says that Christ was killed by right-thinking judges, he stated as if Christ, as a result of their fair trial, was subjected to deserved punishment. Whether the false predictor of Apollo really said this about Christ, and Porphyry believed him, or whether the latter himself, perhaps, composed a speech that he did not say, that is his business; but how true he is to himself, how much the sayings of the oracles agree with each other, we will see later. For now, let us note that about the Jews, as believers in God, he says that they correctly judged Christ when they decided to subject Him to the most painful kind of death. Consequently, the God of the Jews, Whom he recognizes as God, must be listened to when He says: “Whoever sacrifices to the gods except the Lord alone, let him be destroyed” (Ex. XXII, 20). But let us hear further how great he represents the God of the Jews. To a similar question to Apollo, which is better: the word, or reason, or the law, the latter, according to him, “answered in verse, saying so.” He then quotes the verses of Apollo. Of these, I consider it sufficient to cite the following: “In God the ancestor and in the highest King, before Whom the heavens, the earth, the sea, and the hidden refuges of the underworld tremble, and the deities themselves are terrified; for them the law is the Father, whom the truly holy Jews honor.” With this saying of the oracle of his god Apollo, Porphyry represents the God of the Jews as so great that even the deities themselves are terrified of him. If this God said: “Whoever sacrifices to the gods, except the Lord alone, let him be destroyed,” then I am surprised that Porfiry himself was not horrified and, while making sacrifices to the gods, was not afraid of being exterminated. This philosopher also speaks good things about Christ, as if he had forgotten about his reproach of Him, which we mentioned before, or as if his gods slandered Christ in a dream, and upon awakening, they found him good and praised him according to his worth. Then, as if intending to say something surprising and incredible, he says: “Some will, no doubt, find what we say as a surprise. The gods proclaimed Christ most pious and made immortal and spoke of Him with great praise; but Christians,” he says, “they call vicious, defiled, given over to error, using many other reproaches against them.” Following this, he cites something like oracular sayings of the gods reviling Christians. And then he says: “When they asked about Christ, whether He was God, Hecate answered: “The procession of the immortal soul after the body is known to you; the soul wanders, having lost the truth; this is the soul of a man who is most excellent in piety, but they do not honor it in accordance with its actual state.” Inserting his own words after these sayings of the supposed oracle, Porfiry says: “So, she said that He is a most pious man, and that His soul, like the souls of other pious people, is endowed with immortality after separation from the body, but that Christians honor it ignorantly. And to the question: why was He condemned? “The goddess,” he continues, “answered: “The body is always subject to torture and mutilation, but the soul of the pious dwells in a heavenly dwelling. The same soul, by the determination of fate, allowed other souls to fall into error, to whom fate did not allow either to use the gifts of the gods or to have knowledge of the immortal Jupiter. Therefore they are hated by the gods; for to them, who were destined neither to know God nor to receive gifts from the gods, to them, by the decree of fate, He allowed them to fall into error. He Himself is pious, and as a pious one He departed into heaven. So, do not blaspheme Him, but pity the madness of people, their easy and dangerous fall through Him.” Who is so stupid as not to understand: these sayings of the oracles were invented by an evil man, who at the same time is a terrible enemy of Christians; it is possible that these answers were given by wicked demons with similar intent. They praise Christ in order to give greater credibility to their reproaches of Christians; in order to thus block, if possible, the path to eternal salvation on which every Christian stands. They feel that their crafty art of harming in a thousand different ways will not be hindered at all if they are believed when they praise Christ, if only they will be believed when they at the same time blaspheme Christians; whoever believes one and the other, they will make him such a praiser of Christ that he will not want to be a Christian; and therefore Christ, whom he praises, will not free him from the domination of demons. After all, they praise Christ so much that anyone who believes in Him as they present Him will not be a true Christian, but the heretic Photinian, who considered Christ only a man, but not God; and therefore will neither be able to receive salvation through Him, nor avoid the traps set by these lying demons, nor be freed from them. We, for our part, cannot accept either the words of Apollo, who reviles Christ, or Hecate, who praises Him. He makes Christ appear to be in the wrong, saying that He was killed by right-minded judges, and this one is a most pious man, but only a man. Both, however, have the same goal: they do not want people to be Christians, because without becoming Christians they will not be able to free themselves from their power. Let that philosopher, or better yet, those who believe such allegedly oracular sayings against Christians, take care, if they can, that Hecate and Apollo first agree among themselves regarding Christ himself and both either condemn Him with one voice, or both praise Him equally. But even if they managed to do this, we would still avoid the lying demons, whether they praised or blasphemed Christ. Now, when their god and goddess contradict each other, this one reproaching, and this one praising Christ, and people do not believe their blasphemies against Christians, if they themselves think correctly. In fact, praising Christ, either Porphyry or Hecate, when he says that He allowed Christians to fall into error by fate, reveals the reasons for this, as he thinks, error. Before setting out these reasons in his own words, I will ask: if Christ allowed Christians to fall into error by fate, did He want or not to do this? If He wanted to, then how is He just? If he didn’t want to, then how is He blessed? But let’s listen to the reasons for the error themselves. “There exist,” he says, “in a certain place the lowest earthly spirits, subordinate to the power of evil demons. The wisest of the Jews, among whom Jesus belonged, warned pious people against these evil and base spirits, as stated in the above-mentioned divine sayings of Apollo; They forbade them to celebrate festivals, but ordered them to honor mainly the heavenly gods, and most of all, God the Father. The gods command the same thing, he adds, and we have shown above how they exhort the soul to turn to God and how they command to honor Him everywhere. But ignorant and wicked people, to whom fate rightly did not allow either to take advantage of the gifts of the gods or to have an understanding of the immortal Jupiter, without listening to either the gods or divine men, rejected all gods, and not only did not hate the forbidden demons, but began to venerate them. Pretending to worship God, they do not do that which alone expresses the worship of God. For although God, the almighty Father of all, does not need anything, it is beneficial for ourselves when we worship Him with truth, purity and other virtues, turning our very lives into prayer to Him through imitation and seeking of Him. For seeking,” he says, “purifies, and imitation deifies, producing love for Him.” He spoke well about God the Father; He also spoke well about what morals one should honor Him with. The prophetic books of the Jews are filled with similar commandments, when they condemn (the life of the wicked) or praise the life of the saints. But in relation to Christians, he is as much mistaken and allows himself as much slander as the demons, whom he considers to be gods, desire; as if it is so difficult to remember how much vile, how much ugly is committed under the guise of serving the gods in theaters and churches, and to compare this with what is read, said, listened to in churches or what is offered to the true God, and to understand from this where creation takes place and where destruction of morals takes place. Who, if not the devilish spirit, suggested or instilled in him such an absurd and open lie, that Christians treat with reverence, and do not hate, those demons that the Jews forbade to honor? That God, Whom the wisest of the Jews revered, forbids making sacrifices even to the heavenly and holy angels and the powers of God, whom we in this mortal journey of ours honor and love as our most blessed fellow citizens, when he thunders in His law, given by Him to the Jewish people, and with the greatest demand says: “He who sacrifices to the gods... let him be destroyed.” And lest anyone think that it was ordered not to make sacrifices only to the most evil demons, or, as Porphyry calls them, to the lowest, for even these in the Holy Scriptures are called gods, but not of Jews, but of pagans; which was clearly confirmed by the Seventy interpreters in the psalm, saying: “For all the gods of the nations are idols” (Ps. 95:5), - so, lest anyone think that it is forbidden to offer sacrifices only to these demons, and to the heavenly ones, whether all or some, it is permitted, he immediately adds: “Except for the Lord alone,” that is, exclusively only to the Lord. Hearing the expression: “Only to one (soli) Lord,” let no one consider the sun (solem) to be Lord and think that he should make sacrifices; that this is not to be understood is very easily understood from the Greek Scriptures. So, the Jewish God, for whom the aforementioned great philosopher expresses such deep respect, gave His Jewish people a law written in the Hebrew language, not some obscure and unknown one, but one that had already become known to all nations, in which it is said: “He who sacrifices to the gods except the Lord alone must be destroyed” (Ex. XXII, 20). Is it necessary to look for much on this subject in His law and in His prophets? Not even to look for it, since indications of this are neither obscure nor rare, but to collect and present in my present study that from which it is clearer than light that the true and highest God did not want sacrifices to be made to anyone other than Himself? Let this one thing, briefly, but sublimely, with a threat, but rightly said by that God, Whom their most learned people so extol, be listened to, instilled with fear, and carried out, so that those who disobey are not subjected to extermination. “He who makes sacrifices,” he says, “to the gods except the Lord alone, let him be destroyed”; this is not because He has need of any thing, but because it is saving for us that we should be His thing. That is why in the sacred Scriptures of the Jews it is sung: “I said to the Lord: You are my Lord; You don’t need my blessings” (Ps. XV, 2). The purest and most excellent sacrifice to Him is ourselves, that is, His city; We perform the sacrament of this with our offerings, which are known to the faithful, as we spoke about in previous books. For about the cessation of the sacrifices that were made by the Jews who lived in the canopy, and about the offering by the peoples from the east of the sun to the west of one sacrifice, as is already happening before our eyes, divine sayings spoke a lot and loudly through the Jewish prophets; We have already cited some of these sayings, as necessary, in this work. Because of this, where there is no justice, so that the one and highest God would command the city, obeying by His grace, not to offer sacrifices to anyone except Himself, and as a result of this, in all people belonging to that city, the soul would completely rule over the body and the mind over vices; so that each individual righteous person, as well as the assembly and people of the righteous, should live by faith, manifesting its actions in love, with which a person loves God according to how God should be loved, and his neighbor as himself - where, I say, there is no such justice, there is absolutely no assembly of people united by agreement in the right and community of benefit. If the latter does not exist, then, of course, there is no people, if such a definition of the people is correct. Consequently, there is no republic; There is no people's cause where there are no people themselves. Chapter XXIV. How, therefore, is it necessary to define the concept of people and republic in order to say that these names were correctly adopted not only by the Romans, but also by other kingdoms? If we give the people not this, but another definition, if we say, for example: the people are a collection of a rational crowd, united by a certain community of things that they love, then in order to see what this or that people is like, you need to pay attention to what they love. Whatever he loves, however, if this is a collection not of an animal crowd, but of rational beings, and if it is united by a community of things they love, it is not without reason that it bears the name of a people. The people will, of course, be as much better as they are unanimous in the best, and as much worse as they are unanimous in the worst. By our last definition the Roman people are indeed a people; and his business, without any doubt, is a public matter - the republic. What this people loved in its first and subsequent times and as a result of what morals, reaching cruel indignations, and from them to allied and civil wars, shook and upset this unanimity, which in some way constitutes the health of the people, history testifies to this. In previous books we cited a lot from it 192. From this, however, it does not follow that he is not a people or that his cause is not a republic, as long as there remains any assembly of a rational crowd, united by the community of things that they love. And what I said about this people and about this republic must be considered as what I said and as my way of thinking about the people and republic of the Athenians or any other Greeks, about the people and republic of the Egyptians, about that first Babylon of the Assyrians, when they held small and great kingdoms in their people's government, and about any other people whatsoever. In general, the city of the wicked, which is not in obedience to God, who commanded that sacrifices should be offered to Him alone, and in which, as a result, the soul does not properly control the body, and the mind does not control vices, is alien to true justice. Chapter XXV. There can be no true virtues where there is no true religion Even though it may seem that the soul brilliantly commands the body, and the mind – vices, but if the soul and mind itself do not serve God as God commanded to serve Him, they by no means command the body and vices in the right way. For what kind of master over the body and vices can a mind be that is ignorant of the true God, not subject to His power, but succumbing to the corrupting influence of the most vicious demons? Why are the virtues themselves, which he apparently has, through which he commands the body and vices to take or maintain this or that direction, if he does not attribute them to God, more likely vices than virtues. Although some then consider virtues to be true and honest when they are attributed only to themselves, and are not sought for the sake of something else; but then they are arrogant and proud, and therefore should be considered not virtuous, but vicious. As that which gives life to the flesh is not of the flesh, but above the flesh; so not from man, but above man, that which gives blissful life to man, and not only to man, but also to all the Power and Power of heaven. Chapter XXVI. About the world of a people alien to God, which the people of God use for piety while they wander in this world Therefore, just as the life of the flesh is the soul, so the blessed life of man is God, about which the sacred Scriptures of the Jews say: “Blessed is the people whose Lord is God” (Ps. 143:15). Consequently, a people alienated from God is unhappy. But this people also loves a kind of peace, although not distinguished by honesty, which, however, in the end they will not have, since before the end they use it inappropriately. And so that he has it before the time in this life, this is important for our city; While both cities are mutually mixed, we also use the world of Babylon, from which the people of God are liberated by faith as if they were in it on a temporary journey. That is why the apostle exhorts the church to pray for kings and rulers, adding: “That we may lead a quiet and serene life in all godliness and purity” (1 Tim. II, 2). And the prophet Jeremiah, when he predicted the coming captivity to the ancient people of God and on behalf of God commanded that they should go to Babylon with obedience, serving their God with this very patience, he also convinced them to pray for him (Babylon), saying that “with her prosperity, you too will have peace” (Jeremiah XXIX, 7); The world, of course, is temporary, common to both good and evil. Chapter XXVII. About the world of serving God, the complete serenity of which cannot be achieved in this temporary life Our private world, at this time, is with God in faith, and in eternity it will be with Him in vision (2 Cor. V, 7). But at this time, both that common and our special world is such that it represents more a consolation in misfortune than the joy of a blissful state. Even our justice itself, although true because of the ultimate goal of true good, to which it is directly related, in this life, however, is such that it is rather accomplished by the remission of sins than by the improvement of virtues. The prayer of the city of God, wandering on earth, testifies to this. For through all his members he appeals to God: “Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors” (Matthew VI, 12). This prayer is not valid for those whose faith without works is dead (James II, 17, James II, 26); but for those whose faith works through love (Gal. V, 6). For, being in subordination to God, but in conditions of real mortality and in a corruptible body that burdens the soul, the mind cannot completely command vices. That is why such prayer is necessary for the righteous. No matter how they actually command, they never command without encountering vices. Both the one who fights well and the one who dominates, after defeating such enemies and subjects, will certainly, in conditions of real weakness, hide from view something in which he sinned, if not through an evasive action, then through an unsteady word or a fleeting thought. And therefore, as long as one has to control vices, there is no complete peace; because even with those who resist, a war is waged, full of dangers; and those who are defeated do not yet leave room for a safe and calm triumph, but must be kept in a depressed state by the cares of the commanding power. In such temptations, about which it is briefly said in divine words: “Is not the life of man a temptation on earth?” (Job. VII, 1), - in such temptations, is it only an arrogant person who imagines himself living in such a way that he has no need to say to God: “Forgive us our debts.” Truly, he is not great, but arrogant and pompous, whom He who gives grace to the humble justly opposes. That is why it is written: “God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble” (James VI, 6; 1 Pet. V, 5) So, in real life, justice in anyone comes down to the fact that God commands the person who obeys Him, the soul - the body, and the mind - the vices that are still stubborn or already suppressed; and to ask God himself for the grace of merit and forgiveness of sins, and to bring thanks to Him for the benefits received. In the state of that finite world, with which this justice must be related and for the achievement of which must be observed, since the nature restored in immortality and integrity will not have vices and since none of us, either from the other or in ourselves, will encounter any resistance, there will no longer be a need for reason to command vices that will not exist at all. But God will command man and soul and body; and in obedience there will be the same pleasantness and ease as there will be happiness in life and reign. And in each and everyone it will be eternal there, and the eternal will be undoubted. Therefore, the world of that bliss or the bliss of that world will be the highest good. Chapter XXVIII. What will ultimately be the outcome of the wicked? Those who do not belong to this city of God will then face an everlasting calamity. It is also called the second death, because it cannot be said that they will live there, neither about the soul, which will be alienated from the life of God, nor about the body, which will be subject to eternal sorrows. The horror of this second death lies in the fact that it will not be able to end in death. But since, like the opposition between misery and bliss, death and life, the opposition between war and peace is also presupposed, it is not without reason that the question is asked: if peace is preached and praised as the ultimate good, then, in contrast to this, what kind of war and of what nature can be assumed as the ultimate evil? Let him who poses such a question pay attention to what is harmful and dangerous in war, and then he will see that this is nothing more than mutual hostility and a clash of things. What kind of war can be imagined that is more difficult and more terrible than the one when the will is so hostile to passion, and passion to the will, that no victory on their part can put a limit to such enmity; or when the power of suffering comes into conflict with the very nature of the body so that neither of them is inferior to the other? When such a collision occurs in real life, then either suffering wins and death takes away the sensation of pain, or nature wins and the sensation of pain is eliminated by recovery. But there suffering will remain to torment, and nature will continue to exist in order to feel suffering; both will not cease, lest the punishment cease. And since the good and the evil will move to this final good and to the final evil, to that which is desirable and to that which is terrifying, to the former the good and to the latter the evil as a result of judgment, then I will talk about this judgment, as far as God wills, in the next book. Video Cicer. lib. II. de finibus. Terent. Adelph. Act. V. sc. 4. The father of the family, which included all kinds of domestic servants including slaves σκοπός – observer; intentio – also “attention”, “alertness”. – Editorial staff of “ABC of Faith” You might be interested in: