About the teacher

The treatise “On the Teacher” (14 chapters) was written by Bl. Aurelius Augustine in 386-391. Belongs to a group of works in which the influence of Neoplatonism is noticeable. Blzh. Augustine explains the words of the Savior: “...for you have one Teacher—Christ” (Matthew 23:10). The work is written in the form of a dialogue, in which the problem of the soul and knowledge is raised. Blzh. Augustine says that during prayer we do not need to utter words: we speak within ourselves. He is convinced that truth, goodness and justice are not conveyed through words. We cannot understand words if we have not yet grasped the concepts themselves. Consequently, we receive instruction not from someone who speaks to us from without, but from Him who speaks within us: from Christ, our true Teacher, the unchangeable and eternal Wisdom of God. Free sciences are inherent in the human soul from birth, and their acquisition within oneself occurs with the help of a teacher who asks the student the right questions. Thus, it is about discovering the truths hidden in one's own soul. *The title of the work in Latin is De magistro. Contents Chapter I. About the purpose for which a person speaks Chapter II. That the meaning of words is again explained by words Chapter III. About whether anything can be explained without the help of a sign Chapter IV. About whether signs are explained by the signs themselves Chapter V. About signs that mutually signify each other Chapter VI. About signs designating themselves Chapter VII. Brief overview of previous chapters Chapter VIII. About the purpose of the preceding discussions and about the fact that the soul, having perceived signs, correlates them with the objects they designate Chapter IX. About the fact that the thing itself and its knowledge are more important than its sign Chapter X. About whether it is possible to learn anything besides signs, and also about the fact that objects are not studied directly with the help of words Chapter XI. That we learn not by externally sounding words, but by internally sounding truth Chapter XII. Chapter XIII teaches us that the Truth is Christ inwardly. That even the soul of the speaker is not revealed through words Chapter XIV. The fact that Christ teaches internally, and man reminds externally with the help of words Chapter I. About the purpose for which a person speaks Augustine. What do you think is our purpose when we speak? Adeodate. Judging by what I now have to do, I either teach or study. Augustine. I agree with the first one, because it is clear that we teach by speaking. But how do we learn in this way? Adeodate. But we learn by asking questions! Augustine. But even in this case, our goal is rather to teach, because when asking questions, we usually want to enlighten the one we are asking. Adeodate. You're probably right. Augustine. So, do you agree that the purpose of speech is to teach? Adeodate. Not quite. For if speaking is nothing more than uttering words, then don’t we do the same thing when, say, we sing? We often sing alone, when no one hears us, which means we don’t teach anyone anything, and we don’t want to teach them. Augustine. It seems to me that there is a certain kind of learning through remembering, a very important kind, which we will definitely talk about later. But if you object to the fact that we ourselves learn when we remember, and we teach others when we remind, then I will not argue and will only note that then we will have two reasons for speaking: firstly, to teach, and secondly, to remember or remind others. And when we sing, we thereby remember. Isn't it? Adeodate. Not really, because, as a rule, I sing not for the sake of remembering, but for the sake of pleasure. Augustine. Understand. But you must admit that in singing you enjoy a certain modulation of sound, the words themselves do not play a special role here, so, in general, you can sing without words. And if so, then singing and speaking are by no means the same thing. In fact, they sing on the flute and zither, birds sing, and we ourselves often produce something musical without words, a sound that can be called singing, but cannot be called speech. Or perhaps you have something to object to? Adeodate. Absolutely nothing. Augustine. So, don’t you think that when we speak, we either want to teach or to remember? Adeodate. What confuses me is this: when we pray, we also speak. However, it would be sacrilege to think that God learns something from us or remembers something. Augustine. You, I think, are well aware that we are commanded to pray in a closed cell (Matthew 6.6), which refers to the secret places of our spirit, precisely because God does not need our words to teach Him or remind Him of what we desire. For whoever speaks manifests his will outwardly with articulate sounds, but God must be sought and implored in the innermost recesses of the rational soul, which is called the inner man, since He was pleased to call it His church. Have you not read from the apostle: “Do you not know that you are the church of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you?” (1 Cor 3.16), and that Christ dwells in the inner man (Eph 3.16–17)? Have you not also paid attention to the words of the prophet: “Meditate in your hearts, on your beds, and be quiet. Offer sacrifices of righteousness and trust in the Lord” (Ps 4.5–6)? Where do you think the sacrifice of truth is made, if not in the church of the mind, in the recesses of the heart? And where a sacrifice must be made, there one must pray. Therefore, when we pray, there is no need for us to speak, i.e. in words pronounced externally, except perhaps in those cases when these words, like those of priests, serve as an expression of thought, so that not God, but people would hear them and, thanks to recollection, coming into some agreement with them, they would place their trust in God. Or do you think about all this differently? Adeodate. I completely agree with you. Augustine. So, you are not confused by the fact that the highest Teacher, when he taught His disciples to pray, also taught them some words (Matthew 6.9), and He did nothing more than teach them what words should be said during prayer? Adeodate. Not at all, for He taught them not so much words as the objects expressed by these words, so that these objects would remind them to whom and what they should pray for when they pray, as was said, in the secret places of the spirit. Augustine. Your reasoning is impeccable! I believe you also understand (even if someone disputes this) that although we do not utter a single sound, nevertheless, imagining other words in our minds, we speak internally, in our souls. And thus, we again remember when the memory that stores words goes through them and brings to mind the very objects of which these words serve as signs. Adeodate. I understand your point and completely agree with it. Chapter II. That the meaning of words is again explained by words Augustine. So, we agree with you that words are signs. Augustine. Can a sign be a sign if it itself means nothing? Augustine. How many words are there in this verse, for example: If the gods do not want to leave anything from such a city. Augustine. So eight characters? Augustine. I believe you understand this verse. Adeodate. I think I understand. Augustine. So tell me what each word means individually. Adeodate. Although I understand what “if” means, I cannot find another word that would interpret it. Augustine. But you will at least determine what this word means, wherever it may be found. Adeodate. I think it means doubt, but where should doubt be if not in the soul? Augustine. Not bad. Continue. Adeodate. “Nothing” means something that does not exist. Augustine. Perhaps, but here I have doubts, and precisely in connection with what we talked about above, namely: a sign is a sign precisely because it means something. But how can something be something that is not? Therefore, this word in our verse is not a sign, because it does not mean anything, and we either incorrectly agreed with you that all words are signs, or that a sign necessarily means something. Adeodate. Your objection is too strong; but since we do not have what to designate with a word, then, in all likelihood, our word is meaningless. Meanwhile, now talking to me, you, I believe, do not make a single sound in vain, but with everything that comes from your mouth, you give me a sign so that I understand something. It turns out that you should not have used these three syllables in conversation, whenever you meant something with them. If you see that the necessary word is made up of them, and we learn and remember when it touches our ears, then it means that you must understand me, although it is extremely difficult for me to express my thoughts now. Augustine. What should we do? Let's just say this: this word does not denote an object that in reality does not exist, but the state of our spirit when it does not see the object, and at the same time finds (or thinks that it finds) that it does not exist. Adeodate. This seems to be exactly what I was trying to explain to you. Augustine. Let us leave this word alone, whatever it means, so as not to produce any more absurdity. Augustine. And so that this very “nothing” does not delay us and force us to mark time. Adeodate. It's funny, but that's exactly what happened to us! Augustine. In due time, God willing, we will understand this contradiction, but now we will return to our verse and try to explain the meaning of the remaining words. Adeodate. Another word is the word “from”, which, in my opinion, could well be replaced by the word “from”. Augustine. What I am trying to achieve is not that you replace one well-known word with another that has the same meaning (although whether it has the same meaning is still a question. However, this is not important now). If the poet said not “from such a city”, but “from such”, and I asked you what “from” means, and you answered that it is the same as “from”, since both of these signs, in your opinion, mean the same thing, then it is precisely this unknown “one and the same”, denoted by the words “from” and “from”, that I want to know. Adeodate. I believe that “from” means some kind of separation from an object of something that was previously in it. It does not matter whether this object itself ceased to exist, as in our case, when after the destruction of Troy some of the Trojans remained alive, or continues to exist, as, for example, when we talk about the fact that merchants from Rome arrived in Africa. Augustine. I think I agree, although there are many exceptions to your rule. But the main thing is: did you understand that you were now explaining to me the most famous words using the same most famous words, i.e. signs are signs, while I wanted you to show me what these signs serve as signs. Chapter III. About whether something can be explained without the help of a sign Adeodate. I’m surprised that you don’t know, or rather pretend that you don’t know, that I don’t have the slightest idea how to answer you. What else can we use in conversation besides words? The same thing you're asking me about, obviously something else. And you ask, mind you, in words! Ask me without words - then perhaps I will figure out how to answer you. Augustine. I agree, you're right. But if I asked you what two syllables mean, for example, in the word “wall”; Couldn't you just point your finger at me so that I can just see the object that this two-syllable word serves as a sign? Just showed without saying any words? Adeodate. I admit the possibility of this, but only in relation to the names of objects, and when these objects themselves are present. Augustine. Is color an object, or rather some quality of an object? Augustine. But the color can also be indicated with a finger. Wouldn't you add to objects their properties, which also, if they were present, could be studied without words? Adeodate. When I spoke about objects, I meant everything corporeal, i.e. everything in bodies is accessible to the senses. Augustine. However, think about whether you need to make any exception to this? Adeodate. Your warning is very thorough: I should have said not “everything corporeal”, but “everything visible.” I confess that sound, smell, taste, heaviness, warmth, and so on, related to the other senses, although they are not felt without bodies, which is why they are bodily, they cannot be pointed out with a finger. Augustine. Haven’t you ever seen how they conduct a kind of conversation with the deaf through gestures, and the deaf themselves, with the help of gestures, ask, answer, teach, and express everything they want, or at least very much. And if so, then without words, not only the visible can be indicated, but also sounds, taste, and so on. After all, comedians quite often present entire performances in theaters without words, through pantomime. Adeodate. I have nothing to object to this, except perhaps that not only I, but also the comedian-dancer himself is unable to explain the meaning of the particle “from” without words. Augustine. Perhaps you're right; but let's imagine that he is capable of doing this. I believe you will agree that whatever the body movement with which he tries to show me the object designated by this word, this movement itself will not be an object, but a sign of it. Therefore, in this case, he will indicate, though not with a word, but with another sign, but still - a sign is a sign, so both this monosyllabic particle “from” and his body movement will mean one thing, the very thing that I demand to be shown to me without a sign. Adeodate. But how, tell me, is what you require possible? Augustine. The same way our wall did it. Adeodate. But it, as far as I understood from the previous conversation, cannot be indicated without a sign: after all, pointing with a finger is not the wall itself, but a sign through which the wall can be recognized. So I don't see anything that could be indicated without the help of a sign. Augustine. Why? Suppose I asked you what it means to walk, and you got up and began to walk: would you not, in this case, use the action itself, and not the words or other signs that indicate it? Adeodate. I admit, this is true, and I am ashamed that I overlooked such an obvious thing. Now I also imagine a thousand objects that can be indicated by themselves, and not with the help of signs, such as, for example, eating, drinking, sitting, standing, shouting and much more. Augustine. Fine. But tell me now, how would you teach me if I, completely ignorant of the meaning of the word “walk,” asked you, a stroller, what it means to walk? Adeodate. I would continue to walk, only a little faster, so that with this new shade of movement I would convey to you the concept of what you asked about, and this would be exactly what I should show you. Augustine. Don’t you know that walking is one thing, but rushing is another? For he who walks does not always hurry, and he who hurries does not always walk. After all, you can rush when writing, and in conversation, but you never know where else. Judging by what you would have shown me, I would have decided that “walking” means precisely hurrying. It was this new shade of movement that would mislead me. Adeodate. I give up: without a sign we cannot convey anything about the subject if we are asked about what we are doing at the very moment when we are doing it. Indeed, in order to do without the help of signs, we must give our actions some new shade, otherwise the questioner will simply decide that we do not want to answer him and, not paying attention to him, continue to do what we were doing. But if he asks us about something that we can do, but are not doing at the moment, then in this case, having taken up this task after his question, we can, with this deed, better than we already know, show him what he asked about. It will be funny if, while I am speaking, he asks me what it means to “speak.” In this case, whatever I say, demonstrating the conversation to him, I will speak out of necessity, and continuing this way, I will speak until I make it clear to him what he wants to know, without breaking away from the object of his curiosity and, at the same time, without looking for signs with the help of which this object could be indicated, in addition to this object itself. Chapter IV. On whether signs are explained by the signs themselves Augustine. The idea is quite ingenious. So, then, we now agree with you that without signs something can be indicated that when we are asked about it, we either do not do it, but can immediately begin to do it, or, if we are already doing it, then we make the signs ourselves? After all, when we speak, we make signs. Augustine. This means that when asked about any signs, the signs can be explained by signs, and when we are asked about the objects themselves, which are not signs, in this case we can indicate them either by doing it ourselves, if these objects are something that we can do after being asked about them, or by giving signs through which they could be noticed. Augustine. So, in this three-part division, let us examine, if you like, first of all, that signs are explained by signs. Are words alone the essence of signs? Augustine. It seems to me that when we speak, we denote with words either the words themselves or other signs, for example, when we name a gesture or a letter - for what in this case is denoted by these two words are signs, or something else that does not represent a sign, for example, when we say “stone” - for although this word represents a sign, since it means something, but what it denotes is not itself a sign. This last case, when words denote something that is not a sign, is not included in the area we are now about to explore. We are interested in cases where signs are designated by signs, and these can be divided into two types: with the help of signs we learn and remember either the same signs or some others. Do you agree? Augustine. Tell me, signs, when words serve as them, what feeling do they relate to? Augustine. And when we read written words, are they really no longer words? Or would it be more correct to call them word signs? After all, a word is something that is pronounced with an articulate sound with a certain meaning, and the sound cannot be perceived by any other sense except hearing. Therefore, when a word is written, a sign is written for the eyes, with the help of which something that relates to hearing would come to mind. Adeodate. I completely agree. Augustine. I believe you will also agree that when we say “name”, we mean something. Adeodate. And what something is called, for example, Romulus, Rome, courage, river and much more. Augustine. Do these four names mean any objects? Augustine. Is there any difference between these names and the things they mean? Adeodate. There is, and a very large one. Augustine. I'd like to hear from you what that difference is. Adeodate. Firstly, names are signs, but objects are not. Augustine. Would it please you to call those objects that can be designated by signs without being signs themselves, “designated” objects, just as we call “visible” those objects that we can see, so that in the future it will be more convenient for us to talk about them? Augustine. Tell me, is it possible to designate with any other signs the four signs that you cited earlier? Adeodate. Do you really think that I have forgotten what we just talked about: that what is written serves as signs of those signs that are spoken aloud? Augustine. Tell me, what is the difference between them? Adeodate. And what is written is visible, and what is said out loud is audible. For why don’t you accept this term too, if we have accepted the term “signified”? Augustine. I accept with pleasure. But I ask you again, can those four signs be indicated by some other audible sign, just as you remembered about visible signs? Adeodate. I remember this as something that was said even more recently. I answered you that the name means something, and in confirmation of what was said, I cited those four words. I think that both the name and these words I have cited, if they are pronounced out loud, are audible. Augustine. And what is the difference between that audible sign and these signified things you cited, which, in turn, are signs? Adeodate. Between what we call a name and these four signs, which I gave as an example of a name, in my opinion, the difference is that the first is an audible sign of audible signs, and the latter, although they are audible signs, are no longer signs of signs, but partly signs of visible objects, like Romulus, Rome and the river, and partly of conceivable objects, like courage. Augustine. Well, I agree. But do you know that every articulate and meaningful sound we pronounce is called a word? Augustine. This means that a name is a word, since it, as we know, is pronounced articulately and carries a semantic load, so when we say that, say, a speaker uses elegant words in his speech, we also mean names by this. And when Terence’s servant turned to his old master: “Please say kind words,” he also named many names. Augustine. This means that you also agree with the fact that when we pronounce, for example, “a word,” these two syllables denote both the name and what it serves as a sign for? Adeodate. I agree with this too. Augustine. Now answer me this question. If a word is a sign of a name, and a name is a sign of a river, the river is a sign of an object that may already be visible, so that between this object and the river, i.e. its sign, and between this sign and the name that you called the sign of this sign, then what, in your opinion, is the difference between the sign of the name, which we recognized the word, and the name itself, of which the word is the sign? Adeodate. The fact is that what is denoted by a name is also denoted by a word, for just as a name is a word, so a river is also a word; but what is denoted by a word is not always denoted by a name. After all, the “if” that stands at the beginning of the verse you proposed, as well as the “from” about which we have been discussing for so long, are also words, but by no means names; and there are a great many similar examples. Therefore, since all names are words, but not all words are names, then, in my opinion, the difference between a word and a name is clear: it is that between the sign of a sign, which does not mean any other signs, and the sign of a sign, which, on the contrary, also means other signs. Augustine. Do you agree that every horse is an animal, but not every animal is a horse? Adeodate. Who will doubt this? Augustine. Consequently, there is the same difference between a name and a word as between a horse and an animal. However, you could object that with a word we also designate something that can be inclined according to tenses, for example: I write - I wrote, I say - I said, which words, clearly, are not names. Adeodate. You're right, this fact confuses me a lot. Augustine. Don't be embarrassed. After all, we call signs anything that signifies anything, including words. But we also call military standards signs, which are signs in the literal sense and by which words are not meant. Now, if I told you that just as every horse is an animal, but not every animal is a horse, so every word is a sign, but not every sign is a word, I think you wouldn’t doubt this at all? Adeodate. Now I understand and completely agree that there is the same difference between a word in general and a name as between an animal and a horse. Augustine. Do you also know that when we say “animal,” this four-syllable name pronounced out loud is one thing, but what it denotes is completely different. Adeodate. I have already completely agreed with this. Augustine. Do you think all signs mean something other than what they are in themselves, just as when we say “animal,” this four-syllable word in no way means what it is? Adeodate. Not all, of course; for the word “sign,” for example, means not only all signs in general, but also itself: it is a word, and all words are certainly signs. Augustine. But wouldn’t a similar approach apply to the two-syllable word “word”? After all, it denotes any word, including itself. Adeodate. Quite applicable. Augustine. Shouldn't we say the same about the name? For it means names of all genders, and it itself is a name of the neuter gender. After all, if I asked you what part of speech the name belongs to, your answer would be correct only if you said that it is a name (noun). Adeodate. I completely agree with you. Augustine. So, there are signs that, while signifying something else, at the same time signify themselves. Augustine. Doesn’t the two-syllable sign “union” seem like such a sign to you? Adeodate. In no case, for what is designated by it is not the essence of the name; he himself is a name. Chapter V. On mutually signifying signs Augustine. You got to the heart of the matter quite well. Now pay attention to this: are there signs that mutually signify each other? For example, the word “union” and what it denotes: “if”, “or”, “and”, “for”, etc., are not in such a mutual relationship, since, although all these particles are defined by this one term, it itself is not denoted by any of them. Adeodate. Understand. Please continue. Augustine. Don't you know that when we say, for example, "name" and "word", we are saying two words? Augustine. And when we say “name” and “word”, aren’t we saying two names? Augustine. Consequently, you understand that just as a name is signified by a word, so, in turn, the word is signified by a name. Augustine. Can you tell how they differ from each other, except that they are written and pronounced differently? Adeodate. Perhaps I can: I think I pointed out this difference a little earlier. When we say “word”, we mean by this everything that is pronounced in an articulate voice with a certain meaning; hence, every name, as well as the term “name” itself, is a word, but not every word is necessarily a name (noun), although the term “word” itself is a name (noun). Augustine. Well, if someone began to assert that just as every name is a word, so every word is a name: could you in this case find any difference between them, except for different sounds and letters? Adeodate. I couldn’t, and I don’t think there is any essential difference between them. Augustine. Well, if everything that is pronounced in an articulate voice with a certain meaning, although it represents both words and names, is nevertheless a word for one reason, and a name for another, then won’t there be any difference between the two in this case? Adeodate. I don't understand how. Augustine. But, at least, you must understand that everything that is colored is visible, and everything that is visible is colored, although these two words each have their own, and different, meaning? Augustine. But in the same way, every word can be a name, and every name can be a word, although these two names or words have different meanings. Adeodate. Now I see that this is possible, but how is this possible - I ask you to show me. Augustine. I believe you know that everything pronounced articulately and with a known meaning affects first of all the ear, through which it is perceived, and then transmitted to memory in order to be recognized. Augustine. Therefore, when something is spoken aloud, the process of perception does not consist of one thing; and at least from two actions? Augustine. Well, what if the name “word” comes from one of these two actions, and the “name” comes from the other; those. “word” comes from something that strikes the ear, as it were, and “name” from knowledge, so that the first is given by hearing, and the second by the soul? Adeodate. I agree if you show how we can call each word by name. Augustine. Willingly. I think that you remember that the so-called pronoun is placed instead of a name, although it denotes an object and is less complete than a name (noun). I believe that the one from whom you studied grammar defined it this way: “A pronoun is a part of speech that is substituted in place of a name (noun) and has the same thing, only a less complete meaning.” Adeodate. I remember this definition and fully approve of it. Augustine. So, you see that, according to this definition, pronouns serve only names and can only be substituted for them; for example, when you say: “this man”, “the king himself”, “that woman”, “this gold”, “that silver” - this, himself, that, this, this are pronouns, and husband, king, woman, gold, silver are names that denote objects more fully than the above pronouns. Adeodate. I see and agree. Augustine. Now name me a few of any unions. Augustine. Don't you think all the things you mentioned are names? Adeodate. No way. Augustine. At least, do you think I expressed myself correctly when I said: “Everything that you named”? Adeodate. Absolutely right, and I can already guess with what amazing skill you will now show me that I have listed names (nouns) for you; for otherwise it could not be said about what I have listed: “all that.” But at the same time, I am afraid that it is not because you seem to me to have expressed yourself correctly, because I consider the four conjunctions I have cited to be words; so in relation to them the expression “all that” could be correct because the expression “all these words” is correct. And if you ask me what part of speech “words” belong to, I will answer – to a noun. It was probably this noun that your pronoun referred to, so your expression was correct. Augustine. A very witty mistake, but in order not to make witty mistakes in the future, take into account what I will say, if only I can express my thought well, because talking about words with the help of words is the same as clasping your hands and rubbing your fingers against your fingers: hardly anyone, except the one who rubs, will be able to recognize which fingers are itching and which are helping the itchy ones. Adeodate. I'm paying full attention, because you have extremely intrigued me with your example. Augustine. Words are undoubtedly made up of sounds and letters. Adeodate. I have no doubt. Augustine. Let us best use the evidence that is most dear to us. When ap. Paul says: “For the Son of God Jesus Christ, who was preached among you... was not “yes” and “no,” but in him was “yes” (2 Cor. 1.19), one should, it seems to me, think that in Jesus Christ there were not those two letters that we pronounce when we say “yes,” but rather what these letters denote. Adeodate. You're absolutely right. Augustine. So, you understand that the apostle, having said, “yes was in him,” did nothing more than call by the word “yes” what was in Jesus Christ; just as if the apostle had said: “In him was virtue,” it would have to be agreed that he did nothing more than call that which was in Jesus Christ virtue. It was not these four syllables that we pronounce when we say “virtue” that were in Christ, but what these syllables denote. Adeodate. I understand and completely agree. Augustine. Do you understand that there is no difference whether you say “he named a virtue” or “he pronounced the name of a virtue”? Augustine. This means that it is also clear that there is no difference whether to say “he called the word “yes””, or “named” what was in Christ. Adeodate. I see that this is so. Augustine. It is possible that now you also see what I wanted to show you. Augustine. Don’t you see, it means that a name is what a known object is called? Adeodate. This is certain for me. Augustine. Look: “yes” is a name if it is used to describe what was in Jesus Christ. Adeodate. I won't deny this. Augustine. But if I asked you what part of speech “yes” belongs to, I think you would say that it is not a name, but a word, although our argument shows that it is a name. Augustine. Do you still doubt that other parts of speech can also be names, as we have just shown? Adeodate. I have no doubt, because I admit that they mean something. But if you asked about the things they designate, what each of them is called or what name it individually bears, I could not give you any other answer except that these are parts of speech that are not called names, but which, as I see, we have every reason to call names. Augustine. Are you not afraid that there will be a person who will undermine this argument of ours, saying that the apostle should be ascribed the authority not of words, but of objects, and therefore the basis of our conviction is not as firm as it seems to us. After all, it is possible that Paul, although he lived and taught in the most correct way, however, when he said: “in Him was “yes”,” he expressed himself inaccurately, especially since he himself admits to being unskilled in speech (2 Cor 11.6). How do you think we should refute this man? Adeodate. I have not the slightest idea, and therefore I ask you to find, among the opinions of people with the highest knowledge, some confirmation of our conclusions, so that, relying on proper authority, it will be easier for us to move on. Augustine. Do you really need any other authorities besides simple common sense, with the help of which we have proven that each part of speech signifies something, and therefore is called; if it is called, then it is named, and if it is named, then it is certainly called by name? This is very easily confirmed by comparing different languages. After all, if you asked: what do the Greeks call what we call the word “who” - they will answer you (?); What do they call what we call “I want,” they will answer (?); What do they call what we call “good,” they will answer (?); what do they call what we call “written”? - they will answer (?); What do they call what we call “from,” they will answer alo; What do they call what we call “alas,” they will answer; in all these cases, the questioner would not have the right to use the pronoun “what” if the parts of speech I listed were not names. So, if, leaving aside the authorities of the speakers, we can prove that the Apostle Paul expressed himself correctly, then why should we look for a person whose authority would confirm our opinion? But lest anyone, stupid or shameless, continue to insist on his own and begin to assert that he can submit only to those authorities who are generally recognized as legislators of language, then tell me, what could be written in Latin that is more excellent than the works of Cicero? Meanwhile, in his famous speeches, known under the name “Verresovsky”, he calls the preposition cogm, although he uses it in that place as an adverb, calling it “name”. It is possible, perhaps, that I do not understand this passage too well, and that in another case it could be explained differently either by me or by someone else, but there is something against which, I think, nothing can be objected to. The most famous teachers of dialectics say that a complete thought, which can be affirmed or denied, consists of a name (noun) and a verb - such a thought in one place of his writings Tullius (Cicero) calls a sentence - and that since there is a third person of the verb, then, they say, there must necessarily be a nominative case of the name (noun). And they say it rightly. In fact, if you consider the following, for example, expressions: “a man sits”, “a horse runs”, then, I believe, you recognize that these expressions are two sentences. Augustine. Do you notice that each of these two sentences has its own special name, in one – “man”, in the other – “horse”, as well as a special verb, in one – “sits”, in the other – “runs”? Adeodate. Of course I notice. Augustine. This means that if I only said “sits” or “runs,” you would have the right to ask me “who” or “what” so that I would answer “man” or “horse” or “animal” or something else of that kind, so that the name attached to the verb could complete the sentence, i.e. that thought that can be affirmed or denied. Augustine. Now imagine that we see something too far away and don’t know for sure whether it is an animal, or a stone, or something else; and I would say this: “This is an animal, because it is a person.” Wouldn't I say it's absurd? Adeodate. Of course, but you would put it correctly if you said: “It is an animal if it is a person.” Augustine. You're absolutely right. So, in your expression I like the “if”, you like it too; but both you and I don’t like mine – “because”. Augustine. Now see if the following two thoughts are complete sentences: like - “if”, don’t like - “since”. Adeodate. Completely full. Augustine. Point out what are verbs here and what are names. Adeodate. The verbs are “like” and “don’t like,” and the names are what else if not “if” and “since”? Augustine. So, it has been sufficiently proven that the two conjunctions are also names? Adeodate. Absolutely enough. Augustine. Can't you now yourself, based on the same rule, do something similar with other parts of speech? Chapter VI. About signs denoting themselves Augustine. Let us now move on to another subject. Tell me, doesn’t it seem to you that all names are names, and all names are names, just as we recognized that all words are names, and names are words? Adeodate. Apart from the different sounds that define these concepts, I do not see any difference between the two. Augustine. For now I will refrain from objections, although there are people who distinguish them by meaning; however, we will not consider their opinion at the moment. But you, undoubtedly, understand that we have now moved on to such signs that designate themselves mutually, not differing from each other in anything except sound, and which, together with all other parts of speech, signify themselves. Adeodate. I have no idea what you're talking about. Augustine. This means that you do not understand that a name is denoted by a name, and a title by a name, and, moreover, in such a way that, with the exception of the sound of the letters, they do not differ in any way from each other, as far as the name in general is concerned: for in the narrow sense of the word, we call a name (noun) something that, among the eight parts of speech, occupies such a position that it does not embrace the other seven. Augustine. And this is what I said, namely, that the name and the name mean themselves mutually. Adeodate. I understand, but I ask what your words mean: “which mean, together with all other parts of speech, themselves”? Augustine. Didn't the previous reasoning show us that all parts of speech can be called by names and names, i.e. can be indicated by the words “name” and “title”? Augustine. Well, if I ask you what you call the name itself, i.e. the sound itself, expressed by its two syllables, won’t you answer me that it is a name (noun)? Augustine. But does the sign that we express in two syllables when we say “union” mean itself in the same way? After all, this name cannot be included in the number of what it itself denotes. Augustine. And this means what I said, namely, that a name, in line with what it means, also means itself; and what can be said about the name in the same way, you will understand for yourself. Adeodate. This is not difficult, but here’s what I thought: the name has a general and specific meaning, while the name is not among the eight parts of speech; therefore, I believe that the name and the title differ from each other and this, and not just a different sound. Augustine. Do you think the name and onoma differ in any way other than the sound that distinguishes the Latin and Greek languages? Adeodate. Perhaps nothing more. Augustine. So, we have come to the following conclusions: signs can also mean themselves; one sign can be mutually signified by another: what is signified by one is signified by the other; There are signs that, with the exception of sound, do not differ from each other in any way. Adeodate. I completely agree with this. Chapter VII. Brief overview of previous chapters Augustine. Now I would like you to review what we have come to in our conversation. Adeodate. I'll try. First of all, we spent some time exploring the question of the purpose for which we speak, and came to the conclusion that we do this to learn and remember, and even when asking questions we strive to learn or remember. Further, singing, we decided, is not literally talking. When we turn in prayer to God, whom we cannot think of as learning or remembering, words have the meaning that with their help we either instruct ourselves, or thanks to us others remember and learn. Finally, when we had finally determined that words are nothing more than signs, and that signs cannot be signs unless they mean something, you proposed a verse, the meaning of the individual words of which I tried to show; the verse was: Although the word “nothing” of this verse is very well known and clear, yet we could not discover what it means. When I expressed the opinion that we do not use this word in conversation in vain, and with its help the one who listens to us learns something, you replied that this word apparently means the state of our mind when it finds or considers itself to have found that the object it is looking for does not exist (however, you considered it necessary to postpone consideration of this issue). Then you demanded that when I explain the next word, I do it not with the help of other words, but directly through the object itself, denoted by the word being explained. When I noticed that we could not do this by speaking, we began to explore what could be pointed with the finger. I expressed the opinion that everything corporeal could be pointed with a finger, but then we came to the conclusion that only the visible could be pointed. From here, I don’t even remember how, we moved on to deaf people and comedians, who with facial expressions and gestures indicate not only the visible, but often even the incorporeal. We recognized these gestures as signs. Then we returned again to the question of how, in addition to all signs, we can point to the objects themselves that we are accustomed to denoting by these signs. At first I rashly rejected this possibility, but you explained that without the help of a sign something can be shown that we did not do when asked, but after asking the question we can begin to do; this, however, does not apply to speech, for it is clear that if, when we speak, we are asked what it means to speak, then this is not difficult to show by the deed itself. From here we came to the conclusion that we can indicate either signs with signs, or something else that is not signs, with signs, or, finally, the objects themselves - without the help of signs. We focused most carefully on the consideration and study of the first of these three provisions. As a result, we came to the conclusion that, on the one hand, there are signs that cannot be mutually designated by the signs that they themselves mean, such as the word “union,” on the other hand, there are those that can, such as, for example, when we say “sign,” we designate the word with it, and when we say “word,” we also designate the sign with it. For a sign and a word are simultaneously two signs and two words. It was shown that among these signs that mutually signify each other, some have unequal meanings, some have equivalent meanings, and some have completely identical meanings. Indeed, the monosyllabic word “sign” denotes absolutely everything by which something is signified; on the contrary, the “word” is not a sign of any signs, but only those that are pronounced aloud and articulately. From here it is clear that although a sign also denotes a word, and a word a sign, i.e. the syllables of the first are the syllables of the second, and vice versa, but the sign has a broader meaning than the word, i.e. the syllables of the first are indicated more than the syllables of the second. The word in general and the name in general have equivalent meaning. For it has been proven that all parts of speech are also names, because pronouns are applicable to them, and regarding all of them it can be said that something is named by them, and among them there is not a single one that could not, when combined with a verb, not form a complete sentence. But although the name and the word have equivalent meaning, since every word is a name and vice versa, they are not the same thing. It was explained that for one reason what we express is called a word, and for another - a name, since a word has its name from the fact that it touches the ear, and the name - from the fact that it is remembered by the soul (this, by the way, can be understood from the fact that, wanting to consolidate a certain object in memory, we say that this object has such and such a name, and not such and such a word). From among the signs that have not only equivalent, but also completely identical meaning, and between which there is no other difference except the difference in the sounds of the letters, we have found the name and onoma. At the same time, I lost sight of the fact that among the signs that mutually signify each other, we did not find a single one that did not also signify itself. That's all I can remember. Whether I retold this well and in the proper order, judge for yourself; After all, I think you did not utter a single word in this conversation except with knowledge and conviction. Chapter VIII. About the purpose of the preceding discussions and that the soul, having perceived signs, correlates them with the objects they denote Augustine. You remembered everything well and, I admit, thanks to this and to me, now everything we talked about seems much clearer than it was in the process of our reasoning. But what I actually tried to achieve through such circumlocutions is difficult to say at the moment. Perhaps you think that you and I are having fun and distracting the spirit from serious subjects with childish amusements, or that all this is an empty and mediocre pastime? I would really like you to believe that we were talking about important things, that there is a blessed and eternal life that we should strive to achieve under the guidance of God, i.e. the Truth itself, while walking on steps adapted to our unsteady tread, and that is why we began our consideration not with the things themselves, denoted by signs, but with signs. So, excuse me for the somewhat drawn-out prelude, which I started not for the sake of a game, but to exercise strength and sharpness of mind, with the help of which we could not only endure, but also love the light and warmth of that country in which there is a blissful life. Adeodate. Continue: I would never dare to think that anything you find necessary to say or do deserves to be neglected. Augustine. Let us now consider those cases when signs designate not signs, but what we called “signified.” And, first of all, tell me: is a man a man? Adeodate. Now I really don’t understand whether this is a joke or not. Adeodate. How is this “why”? The question is extremely strange. Augustine. In the same way, you would probably think that I was mocking you if I asked whether the first two syllables of this name are something other than a chela, and the last one something other than a century. Adeodate. Absolutely right. Augustine. But these three syllables, united together, are the essence of man; or do you deny it? Adeodate. Who will deny this? Augustine. In that case, I will ask you: are these three syllables connected together, are you? Adeodate. No way. But I understand what you're getting at. Augustine. Then tell me so that I don’t inadvertently offend you. Adeodate. Do you think to draw the conclusion that I am not a person? Augustine. But doesn’t this follow from your previous agreements and denials? Adeodate. First, answer me, were you asking about those three syllables when you asked the question “is a person a person,” or about the thing itself that these syllables mean? Augustine. It’s better for you to answer in what sense you understood my question: after all, if the question is ambiguous, you should not have answered before you had clarified for yourself in what sense I asked you. Adeodate. Why would this ambiguity hinder me if I answered both this way: a man is a man, for those three syllables are nothing other than exactly those three syllables, and what they signify is nothing other than what it is. Augustine. The answer is subtle, but why did you understand only one word “man” in both senses, but not the rest of what we said? Adeodate. How can it be seen that I understood the rest differently? Augustine. Not to mention everything else, if you understood my very first question in the sense that only syllables sound, you would not be able to answer me anything at all: after all, then you might decide that I did not ask you anything. Meanwhile, when I uttered three words, one of which I repeated twice, saying: “Is a man a man,” you understood the last two words not as signs, but as what they signify: this is evident at least from the fact that you immediately considered it necessary to answer the question. Adeodate. Quite fair. Augustine. Why did you decide to understand only the first word both in the sense of the sound that is heard in it and in the sense of the meaning that it has? Adeodate. Because I understand everything only from the perspective of what it denotes. Therefore, I agree with you that we are absolutely unable to express anything unless our soul, having heard the words, is transported to what these words are signs of. Show me now how the conclusion from which it follows that I am not a man could deceive me. Augustine. On the contrary, I want to ask you the same thing again so that you yourself can find the flaw in your reasoning. Augustine. However, I will not ask you what I asked from the very beginning, since you have already answered me. Pay more attention this time to whether the two syllables “chelo” and “vek” are the same as man and age, or is it something else? Adeodate. What else is different about them? Augustine. Well, if you put these two syllables together, won’t a person come out? Adeodate. I cannot agree with this in any way: after all, we decided (and decided correctly) that, as soon as a sign is given, we should pay attention to what it signifies, and accordingly, either accept or reject what is said. These same two syllables, pronounced separately, because they sound without any meaning, belong to what we have decided to consider as sound. Augustine. So, have you decided and firmly stand on the fact that the questioners should not be answered otherwise than from the point of view of those objects that are designated by words? Adeodate. If these are just words, I don’t understand why not. Augustine. I would like to know how you would refute someone about whom you hear in a humorous speech that he drew the conclusion that a lion jumped out of the mouth of someone arguing with him? When he asked whether what we say really came from our mouths, his opponent could not agree more; then he spoke to this man in such a way that he forced him (which was not difficult) to utter the word “lion” in the conversation. When this happened, he began to mock him for the fact that he, being a kind person, vomited such a fierce animal, because he agreed in advance that everything we say comes from our mouths, and because he could not deny what the “lion” said. Adeodate. It would not be at all difficult to refute this joker: I would not agree that everything we say comes from our mouths. For when we speak, we only designate what we are talking about, and from the mouth of the speaker it is not the thing signified that comes out, but the sign by which it is signified, unless it is the sign of other signs, as we discussed before. Augustine. You are probably well armed against this man; but what would you answer me if I asked: is man a name? Adeodate. What else if not a name? Augustine. So, when I see you, I see a name? Augustine. Shall I tell you what follows from here? Adeodate. It seems that I understand myself: after all, if my answer is correct, then I am not a person. But I had already decided before that I should agree with or deny what is being said from the point of view of the object that is being designated. Augustine. But in my opinion, you were not mistaken in giving such an answer; in this case, the law of reason innate in our minds turned out to be stronger than your discretion. For if I asked you what man is, you would probably answer that he is an animal; and if I asked what part of speech a person belongs to, you would say that a person is a noun. Therefore, as soon as it turns out that a person is both a name and an animal, then the former is said about him when it comes to a sign, and the latter when about the object that is designated. Thus, if someone asked me: “Is a person a name,” I would answer “a name,” since it is quite clear that the questioner wants to hear the answer in this very sense. And if he had asked: “Is man an animal?” I would have answered in the affirmative even more quickly, because if he had kept silent about the name and animal, and simply asked only: “What is man,” our soul, guided by the laws of speech, would have directly stopped at what is denoted by these syllables, and the answer would have been given either that man is an animal, or in full definition, a rational and mortal animal. Is this true in your opinion? Adeodate. That's right. But if we nevertheless answered that a person is a name, how can we avoid that extremely offensive conclusion that we are not people? Augustine. And not otherwise than by saying that this conclusion does not follow from the sense in which we gave an affirmative answer to the question. And if he says that he derives it from the same meaning, then in this case there is nothing to be afraid of: for what should I be afraid of - to agree that I am not a person, i.e. not these syllables? Adeodate. It couldn't be said better. But why, when they say: “therefore, you are not a person,” is our spirit offended, if, according to the way you just showed it, everything said here is absolutely fair? Augustine. Because when these words are heard, I cannot help but think that this conclusion does not apply to what is denoted by these syllables, due to the rule that naturally has the greatest significance, according to which our attention is transferred from the audible signs to the objects they denote. Chapter IX. That the thing itself and its knowledge are more important than its sign Augustine. Now I wish you to understand that signified objects should be valued more than their signs. For everything that only exists for the sake of another is necessary lower than that for which it exists. But maybe you think differently? Adeodate. In my opinion, this should be considered first. For example, when we say “coenum” (dirt), isn’t this name better than the object it denotes? For what in it offends our ears does not belong to the sound of the word itself: if only one letter in this word is changed, then the result will be “coelum” (sky); but there is a huge difference between those objects that are designated by these names! Therefore, I would never attribute to a sign what is hateful to us in the object it designates, and, therefore, I have the right to prefer the sign to the object. Augustine. Prudent precaution! So, is it false that objects should be valued higher than their signs? Augustine. Then tell me what you think they meant who gave a name to so vile and despicable an object; do you approve of them or disapprove of them? Adeodate. Neither one nor the other - because I don’t know what they meant. Augustine. Can't you at least say what you yourself mean when you pronounce this name? Adeodate. I can do this: wanting to teach the person with whom I am speaking and remind him of this subject, I designate with this name what, in my opinion, he should learn and remember. Augustine. Well, shouldn’t this teaching or reminder, which you so conveniently give or receive with the help of a name, be considered more valuable than the name itself? Adeodate. I agree that knowledge acquired through a sign should be preferred to the sign itself; but I don’t think that the subject should be preferred to it. Augustine. So, although in the proposition we have expressed it is false that all objects should be preferred to their signs, it is true, however, that everything that exists for another is lower than that for which it exists. Thus, the knowledge of dirt, for the sake of which this name was invented, should be considered more important than this name itself, which, in turn, as we recognize, should be preferred to dirt. For this knowledge is preferred to the sign of which we have spoken, not for any other reason than precisely because it is not knowledge, as it seems to us, that exists for the sign, but, on the contrary, the sign for knowledge. So, when some glutton, or, as the ap. Paul, who works in the belly (Rom. 16.18), said that he lives in order to eat, but the man who heard his words could not stand a moderate life and said: “It would be much better if you ate in order to live.” He said this based on the same rule. The speech of the first could not be liked for any other reason than because he valued his life so little that he considered it lower than the pleasures of the womb when he said that he lived for food. On the other hand, the latter’s speech is commendable precisely because he understood what he served. It is possible that in the same way, you and any other person who knows how to value things, to some talker and phrase-maker, in response to his words: “I teach in order to speak,” would say: “Wouldn’t it be better for you, my friend, to speak in order to teach?” If this is so (and you know that it is so), then you now fully understand that words must have less meaning than what we use them for; for the use of words should be preferred to the words themselves: words exist so that we can use them, and we use them in order to teach. Therefore, as much as teaching is better than speaking, speaking is better than words. Science, therefore, is much better than words. But I would like to hear any objections that you may consider necessary to make. Adeodate. I agree that science is better than words, but I don’t know if there is anything that could be objected to the rule: “everything that exists for the sake of another is lower than that for which it exists”? Augustine. We’ll better discuss this issue another time, but now what you just agreed with is quite enough for me. You agreed that knowledge of things is more valuable than their signs. Therefore, knowledge of things denoted by signs should be preferred to knowledge of signs. Is this what you think? Adeodate. Did I agree that the knowledge of things is superior to the knowledge of signs, and not that it is superior to the signs themselves? Therefore, I am afraid that I will not agree with you now. In fact, if the name “dirt” is better than the very object that it means, then why not prefer the knowledge of this name to the knowledge of its object, even if the name itself was inferior to this knowledge? We now have four things - a name, an object, knowledge of a name and knowledge of an object. If the first is superior to the second, then why is the third not superior to the fourth? But let us assume that it is not superior; Is that the only reason why it should be ranked lower? Augustine. I see that you remember very well what you agreed with, and you have clearly explained what you think. But I believe you understand that, for example, the word “vice” is better than what it denotes, although knowledge of the name itself is much lower than knowledge of vices. Let us now imagine that you compare the degree of consideration: the name and the object, knowledge of the name and knowledge of the object; we have the right to prefer the first to the second. In fact, this name, placed in the verse of Perseus: “But he was amazed at vice,” not only does not introduce anything vicious into the verse, but, on the contrary, gives it some decoration, although the very object denoted by this name makes the one in whom it is located vicious. But this is not the relationship between the third and the fourth. We find in this case that the fourth is preferable to the third. Indeed, knowledge of this name is insignificant compared to knowledge of vices. Adeodate. Do you think this knowledge is preferable even when it makes us unhappy? After all, the same Perseus, above all the punishments that the cruelty of tyrants either invents or their greed carries, puts the one thing that torments people who are forced to recognize the vices that they cannot avoid. Augustine. But in the same way you can deny that knowledge of virtues should be preferred to knowledge of the name “virtue”: after all, knowing virtue and not having it is also torment; and the same satirist wished that tyrants should suffer such punishment. Adeodate. May God protect you from such madness! Now I understand that we should not blame the knowledge itself with which the best of all science fills our spirit; but we should consider the most unfortunate - as, I believe, Perseus also considered them - those who are infected with a disease for which even this healing does not cure. Augustine. You reason well; but what does the opinion of Perseus have to do with us? In such matters we should not submit to the authority of such people. And in general, whether one of these cognitions should be preferred to another is not easy to decide in the present case. For me, what has been done is enough, namely, that the knowledge of objects denoted by signs, if not better than the knowledge of signs, is at least better than the signs themselves. Therefore, let us now consider in more detail what kind of objects are, regarding which we said that they can be indicated besides signs, by themselves, such as, for example, speaking, walking, sitting, lying, etc. Adeodate. I remember, continue. Chapter X. About whether it is possible to learn anything other than signs, and also about the fact that objects are not studied directly with the help of words Augustine. Is everything that we can be asked about and immediately dealt with can be indicated apart from the sign, or do you exclude anything from it? Adeodate. In the indicated class of objects I do not find anything that could be taught besides the sign, with the exception perhaps of speaking and that which is defined by the word “teach.” Indeed, I see that whatever I do to teach someone, the latter will not learn from the very thing that he demands to be shown. So, if I were asked, when I was doing nothing or doing something else, what it means to walk, and I, trying to teach in addition to the sign, began to walk immediately, then it is possible that the questioner would decide that walking is exactly the way and to walk as much as I showed him, otherwise it is no longer walking, but something else. And all of the above applies not only to walking, but to everything in general, with the possible exception of the concepts of “speaking” and “teaching.” Augustine. So be it; But don’t you think that speaking is one thing, and teaching is something completely different? Adeodate. Of course, if it were the same thing, then only the one who speaks would teach. And since we can learn a lot not only from words, but also with the help of other signs, who will doubt the difference between the one and the other? Augustine. Is there a difference between the concepts of “teach” and “designate”? Adeodate. I think it's the same thing. Augustine. Is he right who says that we designate in order to teach? Augustine. Well, if someone else said that we teach in order to designate, wouldn’t this be refuted by the previous position? Adeodate. It would be refuted. Augustine. Consequently, if we designate in order to teach, and do not teach in order to designate, then teaching is one thing, but designating is something completely different. Adeodate. You're right: I take it back. Augustine. Now answer me this: does the one who teaches what it means to teach do so by means of signs or in some other way? Adeodate. I think that's the only way. Augustine. This means that what you stated a little earlier is false, i.e. that when they ask what it means to “teach”, they can be taught without the help of signs: after all, you yourself admitted that to designate is one thing, but to teach is something completely different. If both are different, as it turned out to be in practice, and one can only be indicated by the other, then it means that they cannot be indicated through themselves, as it seemed to you. Consequently, we have not yet found anything that could be indicated by itself, with the exception of speaking, which, meaning something else, means itself. But since it itself is a sign, it turns out that there is absolutely nothing that could be learned without the help of signs. Adeodate. I completely admit that you are right. Augustine. So, it has been decided that we learn nothing without the help of signs and that knowledge itself must be more valuable to us than the signs through which we know (although not everything that is signified is necessarily better than its signs). Augustine. Do you remember how we got to this little point in a roundabout way? After all, everything about which we quarreled for so long was limited only to finding the following three things: is it really impossible to learn anything without the help of signs; Are there any signs that should be preferred to the objects themselves that they signify? and, finally, whether knowledge of the objects themselves is better than knowledge of their signs. But there is a fourth thing that I would like to briefly ask you about: do you consider all this that we have found to be so true that you can no longer doubt it? Adeodate. I would like everything that we have achieved with such difficulty to be indisputable. However, I admit, this question of yours makes me think and not rush to answer. It seems to me that you asked for a reason and that we missed something else, but I just can’t understand that. Augustine. Your doubt pleases me, because it means that your spirit is by no means unreasonable. For it is very difficult not to be greatly embarrassed when what we have learned willingly and with great confidence is shaken by objections from the opposite side and seems to slip out of our hands. Therefore, just as it is good and just to yield to prudent and judicious arguments, it is also dangerous to consider the unknown as known. If what we are accustomed to consider very firmly founded and unchangeable is often destroyed, then there is every reason to fear that we will fall into a state of such mental aversion or fear that we will come to the idea of ​​not believing in the most obvious truth. But let's quickly consider whether you had sufficient reason to doubt what we have justified. Imagine that a person unfamiliar with catching birds, carried out with the help of rods and bird glue, met a bird catcher, although equipped with these items, but had not yet started catching birds, but was just going hunting; seeing him, he would stop and, as often happens, begin to reflect in surprise and ask himself, what does this man’s decoration mean? The bird catcher, noticing the close attention paid to himself and driven by a desire to show off, would have prepared his canes and, noticing a bird close to him, with the help of a pipe and a hawk, would have stopped it, attracted it to him and caught it. The question is, would he not teach his viewer, in addition to all the signs, but in fact what he would like to know? Adeodate. I'm afraid this is not what I said about the man who asked what it meant to walk. I don’t think that birding was fully demonstrated here either. Augustine. It is not difficult to free you from this fear: it is enough to just assume that he was so understanding that from what he saw, he fully understood this type of art; It is enough for the matter that only a few objects and only a few people can acquire knowledge without any signs. Adeodate. I can assume the same thing about walking: the questioner was so understanding that, although walking was shown to him in just a few steps, he fully understood what it meant to walk. Augustine. Please, not only am I not going to interfere with this, but on the contrary, I will help as best I can. You see for yourself that we both come to the same conclusion, that someone can learn something without signs, and that what we asserted a little higher is false, that there is absolutely nothing that could be shown without signs. After all, not only one or the other of the above, but there are thousands of objects that are recognized by themselves without any sign. Why, pray tell, will we doubt? Not to mention those countless spectacles that people present in all theaters by themselves, without any signs, but this sun and this light that fills and adorns everything, and this moon and all the other luminaries, and this earth, the sea and everything that is born in them - doesn’t God and nature directly show all this to those who contemplate it, as it is in itself? And if you look at this more closely, then perhaps you will not find anything that can be recognized through signs. In fact, when a sign is given, this sign cannot teach me anything if I do not know what object it serves as a sign; and if I know, then what do I learn with its help? When I read: “and their saraballs have not changed” (Dan 3.94), then this word does not allow me to see the object that it means. For if this name denotes a kind of head covering, then, hearing this word, do I learn what a head is, or what a covering is, if I was not previously familiar with these objects? I acquire an idea of them not when I hear about them from others, but when I see them myself. In fact, when the three syllables of the word “head” touch my ear for the first time, I know just as little what they mean as when I hear or read the word “saraballi” for the first time. But when they often say “head,” then, noticing and considering in what case this word is pronounced, I discover that it is the name of an object that has long been known to me. Until I discovered this, this word was only a sound for me; and that it is also a sign, I learned this when I discovered what object it serves as a sign; and I discovered this when I noticed, and not by meaning, but by observation. Thus, we are more likely to recognize a sign after we recognize an object than to recognize an object by a given sign. To understand this more clearly, imagine that we hear the word “head” for the first time, and not knowing whether it is just a sound, or whether it also has some meaning, we ask what “head” means (remember that we are not interested in the object itself, but in a sign that is completely unknown to us until we find out what it serves as a sign); and so, when we ask such a question, they point a finger at the subject itself. Having seen an object, we gain knowledge about a sign that we had previously heard but did not know. But since there are two sides to this sign - sound and meaning, we perceive sound not through the sign, but by what affects the ear, and we understand the meaning when we see the designated object. For pointing with a finger can mean nothing other than what it is directed at, and it is directed not at a sign, but at that part of the body that is called the head. Thus, by pointing with a finger, I do not gain knowledge either about an object that I knew before, or about a sign to which this indication does not extend. However, I do not attach much importance to pointing with a finger, because it seems to me more like a sign of direction, like the adverb “here,” than a sign of any indicated objects: we usually add this adverb to pointing with a finger, considering that pointing with a finger alone is not enough. I am now trying to convince you as best I can that with the help of signs called words we do not learn anything, for, as I said, rather the power of words, i.e. We recognize the meaning that is hidden in the sound by recognizing the designated object itself, rather than getting an idea of ​​the object with the help of this meaning. What I said about the head can be said about the veils, and about many other objects. Even if I knew them, I still don’t know Saraball. If someone had either gestured them to me, or drawn them, or pointed out something that they look like, then he, perhaps, would have taught me something: I would have understood this subject without much difficulty if I wanted to talk more about it; but I say that I would not receive the closest concept of the subject from words. Just as if they were present, and they were pointed out to me, saying: “Here are the saraballs,” I would receive knowledge about an unknown object not through spoken words, but through a glance at the object, with the help of which I would recognize and internalize what this name means. For, since I study the subject itself, I trust not other people’s words, but my own eyes; I trust, perhaps, the words of others, but only enough to pay attention, i.e. through inspection to examine what I see. Chapter XI. That we learn not by externally sounding words, but by internally sounding truth The meaning of the words does not extend beyond this. They, even if we attribute to them those capabilities that they do not have in sight, only convince us to explore objects, but do not provide knowledge about them. The one who teaches me something is the one who presents either to the eyes, or to some other bodily sense, or directly to the mind itself, what I want to know. With the help of words we learn only words, even only the sound, the crackle of words, for if what is not a sign cannot be a word, then, although I hear a word, I do not know that it is a word until I find out what it means. Consequently, knowledge of words is acquired after objects are known—we do not even learn words by hearing. For we do not study those words that we know, and if we do not know them, then we cannot say that we have studied them without acquiring their meaning; meaning is acquired not by the fact that we hear the sounds produced, but by the knowledge of the designated objects. It is rightly said that when words are spoken, we either know what they mean or we don’t know: if we know, then we remember rather than learn; if we don’t know, then we don’t remember, but are prompted, perhaps, to search for this meaning. So, if you were to say that although we can only really receive knowledge about those head coverings, the name of which is nothing more than a sound for us, if we see them, and that we will fully recognize this name only by recognizing the coverings themselves; However, what we know about the noble youths: how they conquered with faith and piety, what praises they sang to God, what honors they deserved from their enemy - we learned no other way than through words, then I will answer that we already had an idea of ​​​​everything that is denoted by these words. For what are three youths, what is a stove, fire, a king, and finally, what is it to be unharmed by fire, and in general everything that these words mean, I already knew before. Ananias, Azariah and Misail are also unknown to me, like the Saraballi; and their knowledge does not help, and their names cannot help. I confess that I rather believe than know that everything told in this story happened then, as described. A similar difference between knowledge and faith was known to those whom we trust. For the prophet speaks. “If you do not believe, it is because you are not qualified” (Isaiah 7:9). He would not have said this if, in his opinion, there was no difference between the one and the other. So, what I understand is what I believe, but not everything I believe is what I understand. Everything that I understand is what I know, but I do not know everything that I believe. I know how useful it is to believe many things that I do not know, and I include this story about the three youths in the area of ​​​​this useful. Therefore, although I cannot know many things, I know the benefits of believing in them. We ask about everything that is comprehensible to us, not from the one who speaks, thereby uttering sounds externally, but from the truth inherent in our mind itself, prompted, perhaps, by words. The one we ask and who teaches us is Christ who dwells “in the inner man” (Eph 3.16–17), i.e. God's immutable power and eternal wisdom; although every reasonable soul turns to it with questions, it reveals itself to each of us only as much as he is able to accept, depending on his good or bad will. And if we sometimes make mistakes, this is not due to the fault of the truth that teaches us, just as our eyes are often mistaken not due to the fault of the light. In reality, we also turn to light in relation to visible objects so that it shows them to us, in accordance with our ability to see them. Chapter XII. That Truth – Christ teaches us internally If regarding color we turn for information to light, and regarding the rest of what is felt by our body - to the elements of this world, to the same bodies that we feel, and to the senses themselves, which, as interpreters, our mind uses to know these objects, and regarding all intelligible things - to inner truth - then what can we learn from words? After all, everything that we know, we know either with our bodily senses or with our mind. The first type of knowledge is called sensory, the second - mental, or, in the language of our writers, the first - bodily, the second - spiritual. If we are asked about the first kind of objects, we give an answer when we have what we sense, as when, for example, we look at the newly born moon, and we are asked what the moon is like or where it is. In this case, the person asking us, if he does not see the subject, takes our word for it, and often does not believe it, but in no case does he learn unless he sees for himself what he is being told about; and if he sees, then he learns no longer through the sounds of words, but through the objects and feelings themselves. For for someone who sees, the words sound exactly the same as they would sound for someone who does not see. But if we are asked not about what we feel directly, but about what we once felt, in this case we are no longer talking about the objects themselves, but about images imprinted and stored in memory: how in this case we present as true what we ourselves consider false, I absolutely do not know, unless we assert that we do not see or feel it, but saw and felt it. Thus, the images of objects that were previously subject to our sensation, preserved in our memory, represent a kind of documents, mentally contemplating which we do not lie, as long as we speak in good conscience; but they are only documents, and the one listening to us, if he himself previously felt or was present at the events that we tell him about, does not learn anything on the basis of my words, but remembers, reproducing images to himself, and if all this was not subject to his sensations, then it is clear that in this case he rather believes the words than learns. When we are talking about intelligible objects, contemplated by reason and reason, then although we say that we contemplate them as inherent in the inner light of truth - the light with which the so-called inner man is enlightened and delighted, however, even in this case, the one who listens to us, if he himself sees these objects with a secret, inner eye, knows what I am talking about through his own contemplation, and not through my words. Thus, I do not teach him, who contemplates the truth, when I speak the truth; for he learns not from my words, but from the things themselves, clear to him by the inner revelation of God; therefore, being asked about this, he can answer himself. And what could be more absurd than the opinion that by my speech I will teach someone who, before I speak, can say the same thing if asked? For if the person being asked, as often happens, first denies something, and then a series of questions is forced to admit it, then this happens due to the weakness of the mental gaze of the person being asked, which is not able to comprehend the entire object in the next world at once, which is why he is forced to do this in parts, when asked about these very parts, from which the whole is composed, which he was not able to grasp with his gaze at one time. If he is led to this by the words of the questioner, then the words do not teach him, but are only used as special techniques through which the questioner is able to learn internally. So, I asked you: is it really impossible to learn anything with the help of words? Being unable at first to grasp this subject as a whole, you found this opinion absurd. Then, in order for your strength to be able to listen to the inner true teacher, I had to ask you where you learned what you recognize as true in my words, what you are sure of and what you claim to know? Let's say you answered that I taught you this. Then I would ask that, suppose I assured you that I saw a man flying: would this be as convincing to you as my assertion that smart people are better than stupid ones? You, of course, would reject this and say that you don’t believe the first one, and even if you believed it, you still don’t know it; you know the latter without a doubt. From this alone you should have understood that from my words you could not learn either the first, which you did not know, or the last, which you knew very well; because even after I asked you separately about both, you would swear that the first is unknown to you, and the latter you know. After this, you will admit everything that you denied as a whole, since the parts from which it is composed will be undoubted and clear in your opinion, namely: the one who listens to us either does not know whether what we say is true, or knows that it is false, or, finally, knows that it is true. In the first case, he either believes, or reflects, or agrees regarding our words; in the second he opposes or rejects them, in the third he confirms them; therefore, he does not learn in either case, or in the other, or in the third case. This means that the one who, even after my words, does not know the subject, and the one who knows that he has heard something false, and, finally, the one who, being asked, could himself answer the same thing that was said - all of them, obviously, have not learned anything with the help of my words. Chapter XIII. About the fact that through words even the soul of the speaker is not revealed Therefore, regarding those objects that are contemplated by the mind, it is in vain that he listens to the words of the contemplator who cannot contemplate these objects himself, and if not in vain, then only because it is useful to believe such things even without knowing them. Whoever is able to contemplate is inwardly a student of truth, but outwardly he is a judge of the speaker, or better yet, a judge of speech itself. For very often he knows what is being said, while the speaker himself does not know what he said. Thus, if someone, following the Epicureans and considering the soul to be mortal, were to begin to develop those arguments that are given in defense of its immortality to a person who can contemplate the spiritual, the latter would think that he was speaking the truth, while the speaker would not know whether he was speaking the truth, and would perhaps even consider his own words to be extremely false: shouldn’t we then think that he is teaching what he himself does not know? But he uses the same words that someone who knows could use. Thus, it is not even left for the words to reveal at least the soul of the speaker, since it remains unknown whether she knows what she is saying. Add to this liars and deceivers, from whose example you can easily see that words not only do not reveal, but even hide the soul. I do not at all argue that the words of truthful people are aimed at discovering their own soul; with general agreement they would have achieved this goal if liars were not allowed to speak. Although we have often experienced both ourselves and others that words are not spoken about the objects we think about. This, in my opinion, can happen in two ways: either when a speech pours out of our lips, memorized and on the tip of our tongue, and at that moment we ourselves are thinking about something else, which often happens to us while singing a hymn; or when some words come out of the tongue instead of others against our will, by mistake, for in this case too the signs of the wrong objects are heard. As for liars, they think about the very things they talk about, so that although we do not know whether they are telling the truth, we know, however, that they mean exactly what they talk about; unless one of the two above-mentioned cases happens to them (if someone would argue that sometimes this happens, and when it happens, it is clearly revealed, I will not deny it, although often it is not so clear at all, and they have often misled me). But to these two cases is added one more, which occurs very often and serves as the seed of countless disagreements and disputes, namely: when the speaker, although he means what he thinks about, but only for himself and for a few others; for the same person with whom it speaks, as well as for most others, it means something completely different. Thus, if someone were to say in our presence that man is superior to some animals in valor, we could not tolerate it and would reject such a false and harmful opinion with extreme indignation; Meanwhile, he, perhaps, calls bodily powers valor, and with this term he expresses exactly what he is thinking about - he does not lie, is not mistaken, does not confuse the words stored in his memory when thinking about something else, does not, finally, by mistake, express what he does not think, but only calls the object he is thinking about by a name other than ours. We would agree with him immediately if we could discern his thought, which he could not convey to us with the words he expressed. It is said that such an error can be eliminated by a definition; So, if in the above case a definition was given of what valor is, it would turn out, they say, that the dispute was caused not by the subject, but by the words. I probably agree with this, but can everyone be considered able to make good definitions? Moreover, there have been many disputes regarding science to give definitions, which at the moment is not the time to discuss; Yes, I don’t approve of them at all. Not to mention the fact that we can’t quite hear a lot of things, and then we argue about it for a long time and a lot, as if we heard everything. So recently, when I called mercy with some Punic word, you noticed that this word, as you heard from people who know this language better, denotes piety; I did not agree with you, insisting that you had forgotten what you heard: it seemed to me that you said not “piety”, but “faith,” although you were sitting next to me and these two names should not have deceived my ears, for they sound extremely dissimilar. At the same time, for a long time I was of the opinion that you did not know what was said to you, although I did not know what you said. If I had heard you, it would not at all seem absurd to me that mercy and piety are called by the same word in the Punic language. This happens very often, but, as has been said, we will pass over this in silence, so that it does not seem as if we are condemning words because of the negligence of the listener or even because of the deafness of people. I am more concerned about the cases I mentioned earlier when we are unable to understand the thoughts of people speaking in words that are clearly perceived by our ears, Latin words, which we ourselves speak. But I admit and agree that when words are perceived by the ear of a person to whom they are known, he may also know what the speaker thinks about the objects denoted by these words: will he therefore also know what we are now looking for, namely: did he say the truth? Chapter XIV. The fact that Christ teaches internally, and man reminds externally with the help of words Do teachers then teach so that their thoughts are perceived and remembered, and not the sciences that they expound through words? Whose curiosity would be so unreasonable that he would send his son to school for the sole purpose of letting him know what the teacher thinks? But when the teachers have taught with the help of words all those sciences which they have taken upon themselves to teach - the sciences of virtue and wisdom - then the so-called disciples are aware of whether what is said to them is true, contemplating the inner truth in accordance with their abilities. This means that they then actually learn, and when they internally discover that what is said is true, they praise, without even suspecting that they are praising not teachers, but rather those who have been taught; if, however, they know what they are saying. People are deceived by calling those who are not teachers at all teachers, because for the most part there is no gap between the moment of speaking and the moment of knowledge; and since internal learning appears after the reminder of the speaker, it seems as if they are learning from the outside, from the one who reminded. But about the benefits of words in general, which, if you think about it carefully, are not at all small, we will discuss, if God helps, at another time. Now I tried to convince you that we should not attribute more meaning to words than they should, so that we not only believe, but also understand how truly it is said in the divine scripture, so that we do not call anyone on earth a teacher, since one is the Teacher of all in heaven (Matthew 23.8-10). And what is in heaven, He himself will teach us this, who reminds us through people externally, with signs, so that, turning to Him, we learn internally. Loving and knowing Him constitutes a blessed life, which everyone shouts about looking for, but not everyone can rejoice that they have actually found it. But I would like you to tell me now what you think about all this speech of mine? If you recognize what I said as true and, being asked about each thought separately, say that you know it, then you also now know who taught you this - at least not me, whose questions you were answering all the time. If you do not admit it, then neither I nor He taught you; I - because I cannot teach at all, He - because you are not yet able to learn. Adeodate. From your words I learned that words only dispose a person to learn and that it rarely happens that the speaker’s thought is clearly visible in words; But whether one or the other speaks truly - this is taught to me only by the One who lives in me internally, although he also speaks externally. With His help, I will love the more fervently the longer I study. I am especially grateful to your eloquence, for which you are invariably distinguished, because it foresaw and resolved all the objections that I was ready to present; You didn’t miss anything that made me doubt, and that mysterious voice didn’t give me the answer that your words assured me of. You might be interested in: