Часть третья. De officiis ministrorum св. Амвросия Медиоланского и De officiis Цицерона

Various solutions to the question of the nature of the dependence of St. Ambrose in his De officiis ministrorum from Cicero. Correct formulation of the question. Creation of St. Ambrose's De officiis ministrorum for many centuries enjoyed great attention and veneration among Christians, as can be judged, on the one hand, by the praise that has come down to us from some fathers and teachers of the church, 3358 and on the other, by those numerous lists of not only this entire creation, but also individual parts of it, 3359 which have survived to our time. 3360 This is explained primarily by the ecclesiastical authority of St. Ambrose, and also by the fact that for a long time (before Thomas Aquinas) De officiis ministrorum was almost the only experience of systematization of Christian ethics, 3361 in which Christian society, when resolving ethical issues that arose within it, found authoritative guidance. 3362 Not only that. In view of the special purpose of this book - to be an index of clergymen, the treatise of the Milanese saint De officiis ministrorum throughout the Middle Ages also served as a theoretical and practical guide for young clerics preparing for pastoral service. 3363 However, even in very recent times, interest in the named creation of St. Ambrose not only did not weaken, but, one might say, intensified even more, only the interest was not from a practical need, but from a scientific one, caused by the special closeness of this creation to the work of Cicero De officiis. Converging in recognizing the fact of imitations and borrowings from St. Ambrose from Cicero's work De officiis, learned researchers disagree among themselves on the question of whether the imitation of the Mediolan bishop of the famous Roman philosopher was limited to only the external side of the matter - the title, plan, etc., or whether it affected the very content of Cicero's De officiis. In other words: is St. Was Ambrose in De officiis ministrorum a truly Christian moralist, or did he bring into his work the fire of Cicero’s pagan ethics, alien to Christianity? Scientists answer this question differently. Some of them, seeing in De officiis ministrorum only a copy of Cicero’s work, 3364 categorically declare the unconditional dependence of St. Ambrose from Cicero. Ambrose, they say, is more of a Ciceronian than even Lactantius, 3365 since he transferred Ciceron’s De officiis to Christianity 3366 and (alien to the church 3367) “made Cicero’s ethics recognized as Christian ethics.” 3368 Book of St. Ambrose's De officiis ministrorum, they further say, “is Stoic both in its main idea and in its details” and is “as it were a second edition” of Cicero’s work. 3369 By stating this, scientists usually ignore those Christian thoughts and positions that they find on the pages of the Ambrosius De officiis minictrorum. Other historians and moralists, on the contrary, argue that St. Ambrose borrowed from Cicero from his De officiis only the plan, but not the content, 3370 and that, on the contrary, in De officiis ministrorum of St. the father clearly showed the great advantage of Christian ethics over pagan ones, both in principles and examples. 3371 Stoic thoughts found in De officiis ministrirum by scientists of this category are either suppressed or interpreted in such a (Christian) sense as the St. the father did not give it. 3372 Finally, the scientists of the third group take a position that reconciles the first two opinions. Scientists in this category believe that borrowings from St. Ambrose in Cicero concerned only the external side, that sometimes they extended to the very content, introducing into a Christian work thoughts that would not have been repeated by a Christian moralist of the 19th century. 3373 Since the solution to the question of the relationship of Ambrose's creation De officiis ministrorum to Cicero's De officiis is valuable in itself and, in addition, is of particular importance for clarifying those sources from which St. Ambrose drew both the plan and the thoughts of his creations, then we find it necessary to clarify the question posed as thoroughly as possible. It is only necessary to make the following preliminary remark. It is necessary to distinguish between Stoicism in general and Roman Stoicism and, in particular, Ciceronian Stoicism (more on this, see below). At St. Ambrose, we encounter borrowings from both Stoic writers in general and, in particular, Cicero. 3374 General Stoic Thoughts of St. my father borrowed mainly from Philo, whom he so diligently copied especially from his earliest exegetical works: it should, however, be said that the Stoic spirit inspired by St. Ambrose Philo, is reflected in his works, in any case, no stronger than those of some Eastern fathers and teachers of the church, especially Clement of Alexandria. Relatively sharply stoic thoughts are heard in St. Ambrose in De Iacob, but this is explained by the fact that when writing De Iacob, St. my father used the Fourth Book of Maccabees (otherwise entitled περί λογισμου αυτοκράτορος 3375 or De rationis imperio and falsely attributed to Josephus), which he treated with great respect and which was sometimes attributed to St. canon. 3376 Other general Stoic thoughts 3377 (for example, in De Abraham, 3378 Expositio evangelii s. Lucan) St. Ambrose could have borrowed from some Enchiridion, which were then very widespread and which he, in all likelihood, used. 3379 Finally, with the Stoic tendencies and positions of St. Ambrose was found in the writings of both Eastern and Western theologians. As for Ciceronian stoicism, the borrowings of St. Ambrose from Cicero, found in his various works, 3380 relate almost exclusively to the first years of his theological and literary activity and, in any case, are far from the slavish copying of the famous popularizer of Greek philosophy in Rome, which St. father showed in the book “On the Duties of the Clergy.” 3381 Turning now to the question of which of the opinions we have indicated should be recognized as fair, we must first of all state the fact that the first opinion has a lot of unconditional factual data behind it. Indeed, St. Ambrose stands in close and direct dependence on Cicero. This dependence is reflected not only in the external (sometimes reaching the point of copying) imitations (for example, the title, the method, the division into three parts: about the honest, the useful and the conflict between them, the division of the moral into honest and decent, the most particular divisions of each of the four basic virtues, repetition of Cicero’s examples, etc. 3382), but also in the internal content. Let us indicate a number of similar borrowings. St. Ambrose sometimes presents nature as a teacher of moral behavior, arguing that only those who live in accordance with nature can be honest (moral) - “for God created everything very good” (De off. m. III, 4, 28 – De off. I, 28, 100; III, 3, 13), that honest and shameful “are different from each other according to the very law of nature” (Ibidem), that this same nature obliges us to care for others, patiently endure grief and the labors that befall us (III, 3, 23 = Cic. III, 5, 25), teaches us not to harm another (III, 4, 24 = III, 5, 25), teaches modesty (I, 18, 78 = I, 35, 116) - that in general the image of nature is for people “both a theoretical principle and a (visual) image of honesty” (I, 19, 84 = I, 28, 100). The human mind of St. Ambrose, like Cicero, is the highest that only God has given to man (I, 13, 49 = III, 10, 44). The power of spirit and nature is manifested, on the one hand, in will (όρμή), and on the other, in reason (I, 47, 227 = I, 28, 101), more particularly, reflection (I, 22, 98 = I, 36, 132; I, 29, 102). The task of man comes down to curbing desire and subordinating it to reason (I, 47, 227 - 228 = I, 28, 101 - 102; I, 24, 105 = I, 39, 141) or to mastery over the flesh (I, 36, 186 = I, 23, 179), so that the mind cannot be overwhelmed by any sorrows, no torment (I, 38, 187 = I, 23, 86), that is, no passions, which are disordered movements based on a false opinion (I, 22, 98; 47, 228 = I, 29, 101 – 102). All duties are divided into two categories: ordinary (καθηκοντα) and perfect (κατορθωματα) (III, 3, 10; I, 11, 36 = III, 3, 13 – 14; 4, 15; I, 3, 8). A virtuous person must take care not to do anything thoughtlessly or carelessly and not to allow anything that does not have a rational basis (I, 47, 228 = I, 29, 101). Although virtue is essentially one, it is usually divided into four main ones (II, 9, 49 = II, 10, 35; I, 5, 15): the first place among them is occupied by the virtue of wisdom or prudence, “which is engaged in the study of truth and supports the desire for more perfect knowledge” (I, 24, 115 = I, 5, 15); from this basic virtue all others flow (I, 27, 126 = I, 6, 18 - 19): the virtue of justice has the closest relationship to human society and it manifests itself both in the proper sense of justice and in charity or generosity (I, 28, 130; 33, 172 = I, 7, 20; 17, 56), which developed from family relationships imbued with love to each other (I, 32, 169 = I, 16, 50; 17, 53, 58); justice, which knows no exceptions in relation to places, or persons, or times, or enemies (I, 29, 139 = I, 11, 34), requires that people “love first of all God, then the Fatherland, then relatives and, finally, all other people” (I, 27, 127 = I, 7, 20, 22; 17, 57; III, 23, 90). Nature gave everything into common possession, creating a special right (I, 28, 132 = I, 7, 21; 16, 51), and human violence and greed weakened and diminished the meaning of justice (I, 28, 137 = I, 7, 21), the sin against which “should be avoided with greater diligence than death, loss, poverty, exile and illness” (III, 4, 24 = III, 5, 26). The value of benefits is determined by the motivation for them (I, 30, 147, 149 = I, 14, 44; 15, 49): benefits, manifested either as generosity or wasteful luxury (II, 21, 109 = II, 16, 55), can be provided either in the form of money or in the form of active assistance to the well-being of others (II, 15, 73 = II, 15, 52); the highest manifestation of generosity is the ransom of prisoners, the release of those dragged to execution, etc. (II, 15, 70 = II, 18, 63; 16, 56); a benefit must benefit the one to whom it is provided: it must be shown for the sake of a real need and, moreover, carefully (II, 16, 76, 78 = II, 15, 55). What is glorious is not physical courage, but courage of spirit (I, 35, 178 = I, 19, 62; 23, 78), which comes in two kinds (I, 36, 181 = I, 20, 66). Everyone needs to stick to what he can do (I, 37, 186 = I, 24, 83), which is appropriate for his face, time, age and abilities (I, 43, 212; 44, 214 = I, 34, 125; 30, 107), for in this and in general in life, in accordance with nature (I, 46, 222 = I, 27, 96; 28, 100; 33, 120; III, 4, 28) and consists of (I, 19, 84; 47, 224 = I, 28, 98), which is either general or private (I, 46, 221 = I, 27, 96); beauty, or decentness, is closely related to honesty and “the difference between them can be rather vaguely felt than clearly imagined” (I, 45, 228 = I, 27, 95). Virtue is the highest and only good: only it can give the joy of a blessed life (III, 5, 18 = III, 8, 35). Honest, decent and just are at the same time useful (II, 6, 24; III, 7, 52; 14, 90 = III, 4, 20; 7, 34; 19, 76; 30, 110); according to the law of nature, the same thing is useful both for individuals and for the whole society (III, 4, 25 = III, 27, 101); any deception is shameful (III, 9, 65 = III, 15, 64), however, sometimes one should not keep promises (III, 12, 76 = III, 25, 95), return the deposit and the loan (I, 50, 253 = I, 10, 31) and keep the oath (I, 50, 254 = III, 6, 32). We must value public opinion about us (III, 47, 226; II, 7, 29 = II, 7, 23; 9, 31; I, 28, 99); a good opinion of us is largely consistent with our love and trust in people (II, 7, 39; 8, 40 = II, 8, 30; 6, 21). 3383 The parallels we have noted establish beyond doubt that the borrowings of St. Ambrose in his De officiis ministrorum from Cicero's De officiis touched not only on the title and plan, but also on the content itself, namely: in De officiis ministrorum of St. Ambrose, we encounter not only one or another Stoic terms, but also prescriptions, provisions, and even principles of Stoic ethics. These facts give rise to scientists of the first of the above categories to talk not only about the complete dependence of St. Ambrose from Cicero, but also to assert that the Mediolan bishop recognized Cicero’s ethics, which was alien to the church, as Christian ethics. Without denying the facts cited by these scientists to support their position, we, however, do not find it possible to agree with their conclusion, since in their conclusion, in our opinion, they give more than what follows from the premises. To say that St. Ambrose himself accepted and then transferred the pagan ethics of Cicero to Christianity; it would have been possible (and then conditionally) only if only one creation remained from him, De officiis ministrorum, in which he imprinted his moral views. In fact, as we know, quite a few treatises and speeches remained from the Milanese saint, and, moreover, mostly of an ethical nature. And if this is so, then to establish the views and teachings of St. Ambrose on this or that issue of morality, it is necessary to take not only one, even a special, creation of St. father, and all of them together, 3384 since only such a technique guarantees the thoroughness of the conclusions drawn in this case. We do not need to clarify here the question of the moral teaching of St. father in general, that is, about what is given in all his creations (not excluding De officiis ministrorum), - we did this in the second part of this study. From what we presented in the second part, it undoubtedly follows that in his works St. Ambrose gives not only Christian, but also, one might say, church teaching about morality, based on Holy Scripture and church dogmas - and, above all, on the dogma of salvation through Christ who died for all and rose again. If now in De officiis ministrorum, and only in it, one might say, alone, the Milanese saint deviates from this church teaching in order to accept some Stoic thoughts and positions and then introduce them into Christian ethics, then it is clear that the indicated creation of St. father, as not being in harmony with his other works, must be recognized as exceptional among other works of St. Ambrose. This, it seems to us, a completely fair conclusion does not make it possible to look at De officiis ministrorum as a work that certainly reflects the true and valid teaching of St. father about morality. To think so would be to commit a big mistake. Meanwhile, almost all researchers of the relationship between the moral views of Cicero and St. fall into this error. Ambrose according to their books on duties, since in De officiis ministrorum they want to see an accurate expression of the ethical views of St. father 3385 and therefore ignore all other creations of the Milanese saint. Likewise, when treating the relation De officiis ministrorum of St. Ambrose to Cicero's De officiis, these same scholars say nothing (this new error is, however, a natural outgrowth of the above error) about the historical situation, the conditions of the time and the personal circumstances of St. Ambrose, as the author of the first scientific ethical and practical treatise. 3386 By distinguishing De officiis ministrorum from a number of other works of St. Ambrose, we do not want, however, to say by this that this work of St. father's content is opposite to all the others, that it is only a copy of the De officiis of the famous Roman orator. Such a statement would be highly illogical. After all, it would be highly inconsistent to assume that St. a bishop who for over 15 years zealously defended the truth of Orthodoxy and exposed both heretics and pagans in his sermons and theological treatises, suddenly publishes a book in which he expounds the teachings of pagan moralists. On the contrary, our goal is to prove in the future that the deep chasm and the fundamental disagreement between the moral teaching of St. Ambrose and Cicero, about whom we will now talk, appeared so clearly in De officiis ministrorum that, although they do not exempt it from some fair criticisms, however, they do not allow, as we think, to consider this work a copy of Cicero’s De officiis, to see in it the teaching of a pagan moralist transferred to Christianity and to assert in it the complete dependence of St. father from Cicero. But, before talking about disagreements in the ethical teaching of St. Ambrose and Cicero, it is necessary to clarify the main points and principles of the moral teaching of both one and the other person, since only such a thorough examination and study of the conditions of the problem is the key to its correct resolution. Regarding the moral teaching of St. Ambrose, we tried to clarify it as completely as possible. Now we turn to the study of what Cicero’s moral teaching was. The eclectic Cicero in his ethics comes closest to the Stoics, which is why he is sometimes ranked among the Stoics. However, this was a Stoic sui generis. To understand Cicero's Stoicism more clearly, it is necessary to become familiar with Stoicism in general. The history of Stoicism is usually divided into two periods: Greek - from the emergence of Stoicism (from Zeno), i.e., about 300 BC and until the subjugation of Greece to Rome (about 146 BC) and Roman - from the subjugation of Greece to Rome until the end of the 2nd century after AD 3387. The first period is the era of predominantly theoretical development of the principles of Stoicism and the establishment of the main representatives and pillars of this school - Zeno, Cleathos and Chrysinnos 3388 dogmatic principles of their system. 3389 The second period, on the contrary, is distinguished by its practical direction and is the time of introducing Stoic principles into the life of society and partly adapting them to this life. 3390 Zeno's system, like the systems of Plato and Aristotle, is a special kind of organic combination of Eleatic and Heraclitian 3391 cosmology 3392 on the basis of the philosophy of concepts of Socrates, with whom the Stoics stand in connection due to their proximity and successive dependence on Antisthenes. 3393 Philosophical knowledge among the Stoics is divided into three parts: logic, physics and ethics. 3395 Due to the fact that physics is the source of all knowledge, the Stoics theoretically put it in first place, 3396 however, practically the center of gravity of their entire system was in ethics, 3397 which, in comparison with logic and physics, 3398 was developed by them both more thoroughly and more independently. 3399 Like Plato, 3400 the Stoics taught that only the corporeal is valid, because it can either receive influence from the outside, or itself influence other objects, 3401 which actions are a consequence of either the condensation or dilution of primary matter. 3402 Hence, the Stoics represented as corporeal not only everything that occupies space, but also the substance of deity and soul, 3403 abstract concepts and even virtue itself. 3404 In the world of reality, the Stoics distinguished, as already said, two principles: the suffering and the active, God or force and matter. 3405 Matter in itself cannot create anything: this can be done by a force that penetrates it like the soul does the body, 3406 and which is thus an efficient cause. But since a series of causes cannot extend to infinity, it is clear that there must be one supreme first cause. 3407 Since everything that acts is bodily, and on the other hand, all properties and forces have some fiery and steam-forming matter, the first cause must be the same, i.e. that is, both bodily and fiery: and since the life principle in nature is heat, then heat or fire must also be the force that creates the world. 3408 This same heat, ether, breath or primordial fire is the deity. 3409 So, the final foundations of things are, on the one hand, qualityless matter, and on the other, deity. 3410 The Stoics imagined the very process of cosmic development in this form. All matter, they taught, developed from the original fire, namely: from the original essence, according to some internal law, just as a plant or animal develops from a seed, first of all four elements are formed: fire, air, earth and water. From these four elements, through various combinations, the entire visible world is created with the earth as the central point; in this case, the first two elements form the active force, and the last two form matter. 3411 The moisture into which fire is initially converted is the body, and the heat hidden in it is the soul. 3412 Based on what has just been said, the Stoics interpreted deity as warm breath or fire as a vital principle, as a generative creative force - λογος σπεοματικός, as a formative life-giving spirit, as the soul of the world, and then, taking into account the rationality diffused in the world, as a guiding reason. 3413 Since everything in the world happens in accordance with the divine mind, the latter is characterized as divine providence (πρόνοτα), 3414 as a divine ruler - ήγεμονικον, 3415 in popular usage - Zeus or the will of Zeus, without which nothing happens in the world. 3416 Everything in the world develops, thus, according to the law of divine reason - a law distinguished by its universality, immutability and necessity (άνάγκη) and hence acquiring the qualities of fate or fate - είμαρμένη. 3417 Thus, the deity of the Stoics is characterized either as a spiritual or as a material entity, 3418 depending on what they want to highlight. “Combining ideas about the deity of both kinds, we must say,” writes Zeller, that God is the fiery mind of the world, the spirit of matter, rational breath, everything penetrating, which, depending on the matter, takes on different names, “a formative fire, which, containing within itself all the germs of forms, produces everything in the world according to the immutable laws of the world and things.” 3419 In the Stoic concept of deity we see a typical pantheistic view: between God and the world, in fact, there is no difference 3420: the substance of God is the whole world and heaven, 3421 God and the world are identical concepts. 3422 If the Stoics talk about the difference between God and the world, then this must be understood in the same sense as, for example, they distinguish between active and passive, body and soul, smell and honey. 3423 “God and the world are different not in essence, but in form: deity is the primary power and primary essence in external manifestations.” 3424 In other words: the world eats the self-revelation of the deity. 3425 From God, the Creator of the world, an unborn being, alien to change, immortal, rational, perfect, blessed, not involved in evil, who provides for the world 3426 and called reason, fate, Zeus and other names, 3427 the Stoics distinguished the created gods, who were only forms of manifestation of Zeus, only the names of one many-named God. 3428 By these lower or created gods the Stoics understood either those things in which the power of a deity or primal being was manifested in a special way, 3429 or the invisible forces of nature. 3430 With these gods or forces of nature, under the influence of certain motives of both an internal and external nature, 3431 they identified the folk gods, using for the first time the allegorical method to substantiate this identification. 3432 The Stoics' concept of being necessarily led them to the recognition of the materiality of the soul. 3433 The human soul is a particle of deity, 3434 a particle of divine fire and the mind spread throughout the entire universe - they imagined it in the form of fire and warm breath, 3435 which spreads and embraces the entire body in the same way as the soul of the world spreads and embraces the world. 3436 The Stoics placed the soul in close connection with blood, on the vapors of which the soul is nourished, just as its kindred luminaries are nourished by the vapors of the earth. 3437 The very origin of the soul was explained by the Stoics as follows: from the seed in the mother’s womb, a vegetable soul develops, which only through the influence of external air after birth is formed and condensed into the animal soul, 3438 from where the seat of the soul is not the brain and head, 3439 but the chest and heart. 3440 Just as the world is ruled by the world soul, so is man ruled by his personal soul (ήγεμονικόν or λογισμός), which spreads its branches, reminiscent of “polyp tentacles,” throughout the body. These are, so to speak, separate pneumas, of which the Stoics numbered seven: the five senses, the faculty of speech and the faculty of birth. 3441 The human soul is not immortal: it will exist only until the global fire, when it returns again to primary matter. 3442 From the teaching of the Stoics about the fate dominant in the world with its eternal and immutable laws, it necessarily followed that they denied human free will. 3443 But, since determinism excluded the possibility of ethical prescriptions, they tried to eliminate the contradiction they created by recognizing two types of causes: main and secondary, arguing that only secondary or external causes are determined by fate and that they only cooperate with the main or internal ones, wholly dependent on man. 3444 Everything in the world follows the law floating in nature: and man, as one of the creatures of the cosmos, must also conform to the universal law, with this ορθός λογος, essentially no different from Zeus. 3445 And since this world or universal law is concretely realized in nature, the goal of human existence is life in harmony with nature, that is, intelligently choosing what is consistent with nature. 3446 Such a life in accordance with nature is where human virtue lies. 3447 Virtue or natural life is a divine law for man. 3448 Only this law is not imposed on man from the outside, but is a requirement or law of both his own nature and his own, inherent in each individual, divine reason. 3449 This law, according to the definition of the Stoics, is “direct reason”, commanding what should be done and prohibiting what should not be done ( , άπαγορευτικός δε τῶν ου ποιητεων), is something obliging a person and, from a moral point of view, extremely valuable. 3450 This human λόγος has its source in the above-mentioned λόγος κοινός - in the divine or world mind. 3451 So, man, by his very nature, strives for virtue, and all people have an innate disposition towards it προς αρετήν ). 3452 If a person puts into practice the demands of reason, then his soul becomes strong, healthy and beautiful or, which is also perfect. 3453 The perfection of any thing was called virtue by the Stoics (άρετή). 3454 On the other hand, the harmonious relationship of all mental powers and abilities and their subordination to reason was defined by the Stoics as the beauty of the soul. Thus, virtue was understood as a harmonious combination of all human spiritual powers, strictly consistent with nature at the same time. However, in order to live virtuously, in order to act in accordance with nature and reason, a preliminary recognition of the dictates of nature and the demands of reason is necessary, that is, knowledge of what is virtuous is necessary. But since the Stoics, following the example of Socrates, confused the logical and volitional abilities of man, they, like Socrates, taught that virtue is knowledge, and evil is ignorance. 3455 However, the Stoics were not in this case the faithful disciples of Socrates, since among them we find an attempt to distinguish between the mental and volitional abilities of man. Virtue, in their view, is composed of knowledge and activity: both are two equal and inseparable elements: knowledge without activity is not yet virtue 3456 and vice versa. In general, knowledge and, in particular, science for the Stoics is not a goal, 3457 but only a means to establishing correct moral behavior: all philosophical research stands in the direct or indirect service of virtue. 3458 Hence, the Stoics believed perfect life not in knowledge and contemplation (βίος θεωρητικός, σχολαστικός), but in the practical development of human abilities according to the principles of reason (βίος πρακτικος, πολιτικος). 3459 Since the Stoics did not distinguish between knowledge (will, desire) and activity, 3460 they were inclined to attribute the center of gravity of each virtuous act not to action, but to intention, to the very disposition of a person. What makes a virtue a virtue and a vice a vice is, according to their teaching, solely and exclusively the will or mood (habitus) of a person. 3461 In accordance with this idea, the Stoics quite consistently believed that the bad intention itself is subject to the same punishment as if it were brought into reality. 3462 Since, further, a good disposition and good activity do not and cannot have anything bad in themselves and, on the contrary, then, in fact, all virtues, like vices, are equal to each other, for they have the same ethical value. 3463 However, the Stoics did not hold on to this point of view and, depending on the moral disposition (subjective side 3464), distinguished two types of virtuous actions: κατορθωματα (perfect virtue) and καθῆκον (average virtue 3465). The first follows from a constant virtuous state or disposition (διαθεσις) and is characteristic only of sages. 3466 Καθῆκον, arising not from a permanent spiritual disposition, but only from a temporary impulse and representing (from the objective side) only a partial virtue, is such a following of nature, “of which one can be aware of” (ο πραχθεν εῦλογον άπολογία ἕ χει 3467), i.e., give a reasonable basis, but nothing more. This virtue is only a similarity to the true one and is characteristic only of the imperfect. 3468 Since true virtue stems from a constant virtuous mood, then, as is self-evident, virtue itself is one. 3469 If they talk about different virtues, then the reason for this is not the internal mood, but the conditions for the manifestation of virtue, the difference in those things in which it is manifested. 3470 Depending on these last, the Stoics counted four main virtues: φρόνησις, ανδρεία, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνμ, 3471 which, in turn, they divided into many minor or private virtues. 3472 All individual virtues are interconnected by such a close connection that whoever has one virtue, according to the Stoics, also has all the others, 3473 for the moral disposition from which they come embraces them all in itself. 3474 Of the individual virtues, the Stoics (as it seems since the time of Chrysippus 3475) especially highly valued φρόνησις 3476 or έπιστήμη = σοφια, 3477 because, in their opinion, there can be no virtue without knowledge. From here they exalted physics, which, together with logic, was recognized as part of philosophy. However, their center of gravity lay in practical life. The main virtue in this case was for them justice (δικαιοσύνη), which in relation to the gods 3478 manifests itself as εύσεβεια. 3479 Emphasis on the virtue of justice had its reason for the consideration that all rational beings, naturally united in one common desire to follow the world's reason, feel themselves to be parts of a single, essentially connected whole. 3480 People seem to be created for social life. They, together with the gods, constitute, as it were, one common being, 3481 one society or state, spread throughout the world 3482 (cosmopolitanism 3483). The ideal of the Stoics was a state in which there is no marriage, no family, no churches, no court, no money - a state in which nationalities do not differ, for it is built on the principles of universal equality. 3484 But such a state can only be realized by wise men, clearly aware and always following their rational nature, 3485 loving each other's virtue, and as a result, each other. 3486 While there is no such state, the sage can only take part in the life of that state, which, as he sees, is moving along the path of perfection. 3487 But, since in this state a sage can easily offend the gods, 3488 then, as the later Stoics taught, it is better for him to completely abandon state life. 3489 The highest manifestation of the principle of sociality and, in particular, love (between wise men) is friendship, when “a person uses a friend as himself.” 3490 True friendship, as is quite clear, is possible only between wise men. 3491 The teaching of the Stoics about the equality of all people should, it would seem, lead them to the denial of slavery. Indeed, Chrysippus looked at the slave as a permanent mercenary 3492: however, only the later (Roman) Stoics spoke out more decisively against slavery, 3493 among the Greek Stoics the question of slavery remained unclear. Having identified virtue with knowledge, the Stoics quite consistently taught that vice, passion or passion in its essence is ignorance or a false judgment about good and evil and that all vices arise from unreason or error. 3494 However, although the Stoics taught that affect is an opinion or judgment (κρίσις 3495), however, with their characteristic consistency in this case, mixing the mental and volitional abilities of a person, they saw in affect not only an act of consciousness, but also feelings and the will of a person. 3496 Hence the Stoics defined passion as follows. Passion in your being is a healthy aspiration. Only under the influence of an incorrect perception or idea does this healthy desire turn into an excessive one, which leads the spirit to an incorrect judgment and, through this or at the same time, an unreasonable action. 3497 Like all spiritual aspirations, affects have their origin not in any secondary part of the soul, but in the soul itself 3498 and are its unhealthy states or illnesses of the soul. 3499 Just as there are four main virtues, so there are four main affects, 3500 divided into many particular ones, 3501 although essentially vice, like virtue, is one and all sins are the same, for just as nothing can be more true, so nothing can be more false or more sinful. 3502 Hence the Stoics, in contrast to Plato and Aristotle, who stood only for the moderation of affects, demanded their complete eradication 3503 and defined virtue itself as freedom from affects or apathy. 3504 However, on this point the Stoics were not completely consistent: having condemned insensibility and cruelty, 3505 they allowed for the sage the possibility of good affects (ευπαθεια [pleasure, well-being]), namely: χαρα [joy, delight], ευλαρεια, βουλησις [will, desire], 3506 divided, in turn, into many partial ευπαθεια [pleasure, pleasure]. 3507 The study of the question of the moral task of man among the Stoics, like Socrates, was closely connected with the question of goodness and the essence of the highest good or bliss 3508: to live in accordance with one’s destiny, to live in accordance with nature, meant to live blissfully. 3509 But since a life in agreement with the universal laws of world and human nature is identical with a virtuous life, the Stoics taught that bliss coincides with virtue, 3510 and the good and useful with activity in accordance with duties and reason, 3511 from which their main position naturally followed: goodness lies only in virtue, 3512 for only it makes a person blessed. 3513 Subsequently, quite consistent conclusions were drawn from this position that virtue in itself is sufficient for a happy life 3514 and that one must seek it for its own sake. 3515 Outside of virtue there is no good. Although some things can influence a person’s state in a positive (or negative) way, they are indifferent to a person’s moral state (άδιάφορα 3516). After all, what is considered good, for example, health, beauty, wealth, etc., can be used both good and bad; but what can be used both good and bad is not good. 3517 However, only Ariston remained faithful to this rigoristic teaching of the Stoa. 3518 Usually, the Stoics divided indifferent things into three categories: to the first category of things desirable (ἅ ξια, έκλεκτικά, προηγμένα 3519) they included those useful for natural life (κατά φύσιν 3520) things - first of all, spiritual gifts and abilities, then bodily advantages (beauty, health, life itself) and, finally, external benefits (wealth, honor, noble birth 3521); the second category (ανάξια, άπεκλεκτικά, άποπροηγμένα 3522) included things opposite to the first (παρά φύσιν 3523); to the third - in the proper sense indifferent things - αδιάφορα (for example, skin color, even or odd hair on the head 3524). The Stoics at first did not call the preferred good and distinguished it from good in the proper sense, but then they allowed confusion and began to call the preferred also good. 3525 The Stoics presented the ideal of a morally perfect person in the image of a sage. His state is characterized first of all as a state alien to all passions (άπάθεια 3526). Neither joy nor sadness bothers him. 3527 True, he experiences some unrest, subordinated to reason. 3528 He alone is truly virtuous, since he always shows κατορθώματα, and he alone is truly blessed. 3529 When the sage finds it necessary, 3530 he takes part in state life, 3531 and this participation (if he even lifts a finger) 3532 brings enormous benefit to people and even to the gods, 3533 since the sage in this case promotes good and opposes evil. 3534 But, taking into account his participation in human affairs, the sage is guided not by compassion for people - he does not and cannot have this compassion, 3535 - but solely by the consciousness of his duty in relation to various beings. The opposite of the wise man is the unwise. Every unwise person is stupid, perverted, vicious and unhappy. 3536 Just as each individual act can be either only virtuous or only vicious, so each person can be either only wise or only stupid: there is no middle ground between them. 3537 If there is no middle ground between the virtuous and the vicious, then the transition from the state of stupidity to the state of wisdom has no steps and occurs instantly. 3538 The question is: can a wise man ever lose virtue? The Stoics answered this question differently, 3539 but they said that if a sage is in danger of admitting something unusual to him, he can and should leave life (by suicide). 3540 Life forced the Stoics not only to soften 3541 the high and unattainable ideal of their sage, but even to abandon it: at least, if Zeno still admitted the reality of the existence of sages, 3542 then Chrysippus already limited this reality to one or two philosophers 3543 (and did not consider either himself or any of his teachers or students to be a sage), 3544 and subsequent Stoics did not believe in the possibility at all for someone to realize the ideal of a sage. 3545 Around the half of the 2nd century BC (146 - 130), the second period of the existence of the Stoic school begins, when it, especially with the transition to the Romans, loses its former more theoretical character and takes on a one-sided practical-moral direction, based on the view that philosophy is a vital art. 3546 Representatives of this later period of the Stoa (new Stoa 3547) are Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, who pursued more or less pure Stoicism in their writings. The transition from Greek Stoicism (the earliest) to Roman (latest) took place under the influence of two factors: on the one hand, the eclectic direction that was then dominant in philosophy, clearly expressed in the writings of representatives of the so-called. The Middle Stoa, to which Cicero also adhered in his views, and on the other hand, under the influence of external circumstances: the new homeland of the Stoic school (in Rome), the character of the Romans and their influence on Greek philosophical thought. First we will talk about the first factor. Eclecticism in philosophy, which is usually a symbol of a radical revolution or decline in scientific thought, 3548 began from the time of Carneades, 3549 who shifted from the dogmatic foundations, hitherto standing separately from one another, philosophical schools of both the idealistic-rationalistic (academic, peripatetic and stoic) and the realistic-empirical direction (Epicurean and skeptical). 3550 In its further development, eclecticism led different philosophical schools to close mutual rapprochement. At least in the first century BC, the boundaries between schools were so blurred that it seemed difficult to determine exactly which school a famous philosopher belonged to. One, for example, considers himself a Stoic and, however, accepts Plato’s doctrine of the soul and immortality, the other, “wanting to retreat a little from the severity of the portico, without his knowledge, slides into the soft pleasures of Epicurus.” 3552 Ultimately, this rapprochement between schools led the philosophers of that time to the conviction that all philosophical schools essentially profess the same truth. Thus, Antiochus, a student of Philo of Larisa, the founder of the Fourth Academy, tried to prove that the contradictions between individual philosophical systems partly do not exist at all, and partly it is limited to minor points. 3553 Aristotle and Plato, in his opinion, basically taught the same thing, although in different words, 3554 Zeno himself borrowed his teaching from his predecessors, and his personal thing was that he changed the names. 3555 Stoya did not escape that timeless fate common to all philosophical schools. A strong inclination of Stoic philosophy towards Plato and Aristotle is noticeable in Diogenes, Antipater and Hekaton, 3556 but the most striking exponents of the eclectic direction in the Stoa were representatives of the so-called middle Stoa: Boethus, 3558 Panetius and Posidonius. 3559 Under the influence of the criticism of Carneades, Panetius, as follows from the testimony of Cicero, 3560 not only approached Plato, whom he called the wisest and holiest, the Homer of philosophers, 3561 but on some points came to an agreement with Pythagoras, and also considered Democritus a philosopher, 3562 with which the first Stoics would hardly have agreed, in view of Democritus’s sympathies for Epicurus, not to mention already about the influence, and considerable, 3563 on him from skepticism. 3564 Posidonius is a less critical mind than his teacher, but a more consistent Stoic and learned man. At some important points in which Panetius departed from the ancient Stoic teaching, he returns to it again, 3565 although Posidonius literally borrows his treatise on the treatment and evasion of passions from Plato’s work on the same topic. 3566 Hirtzel even believes that Panetius and Posidonius owe their comparatively high position in the Stoa to Plato. 3567 In the doctrine of the final foundations of physics, Posidonius shared the general Stoic doctrine, only he did not consider either time, space, etc. 3568 to be material. Panetius, under the influence of the attacks of Carneades 3569 and Critolaus on the Stoic doctrine of God and the world, abandoned the doctrine of ekpirosis, i.e., the resolution of the world into fire, and recognized the eternity of both the world and the human race. 3570 Influenced partly by the teachings of Plato, 3571 partly by the criticism of the same Carneades, who pointed out the inconsistency of the Stoics, who either accepted a single deity, or accepted many gods, Panetius and Posidonius, on the one hand, recognized the one eternal and omnipotent God, and on the other, they rejected 3572 folk gods as an invention of poets and statesmen, although, however, Posidonius recognized not only the stars 3573 as deities (this was also accepted by Panetius 3574), but was ready to attribute divine dignity to those spirits that fill the airspace. 3575 The same Posidonius, based on the conviction that it is impossible for man to know the general causes of the world, considered divine help, divine revelation received through mantics 3576, necessary for man; on the contrary, Panetius, based on the fact that everything in the world happens according to unchangeable laws that exclude any external influence, denied (or, as Cicero says, doubted) 3577 both the mantle and the auspices. 3578 According to the teachings of the Stoics, the soul consists of creative fire (πορ τεχνικόν); according to the teachings of Panetius, who followed Caneadus, the nature of the soul is dual, and it consists of ethereal fire and air, it is anima inflammata. 3579 In the soul, Panetius distinguished two parts: rational (ήγεμονικόν) and unreasonable, 3580 manifested most closely in όρμή 3581; the first is only a human property, and the second is also characteristic of animals. 3582 In the soul, the Stoics counted eight parts or separate pneuma: Panetius had only six of them, since he attributed φωνητικόν to ήγεμονικόν, and σπερματικόν to φύσις. 3583 The soul does not come into a person from the outside: it is born with him, and it dies. 3584 By the way, Panetius very decisively asserted the free will of man. 3585 Posidonius in his psychology is aligned with Plato. 3586 Thus, he teaches that the soul (= ethereal pneuma) is the bearer of life in a dead body, there is a god living in man (συγγενής δαίμων). 3587 Like Aristotle, the soul of Posidonius is alien to complexity, united and simple, but manifests itself in three abilities. 3588 Without noticing, further, the significant difference between his teaching about the soul, as a material entity, from Plato’s, as a spiritual one, 3589 Posidonius, following Plato, recognizes the pre-existence of souls, as well as their immortality. 3590 Panetius remained faithful to the materialistic tendencies of the ancient Stoa, which did not reconcile with the possibility of the immortality of the soul. 3591 In the doctrine of virtue and the highest good, Panetius and Posidonius, under the influence of the eclectic trend, also significantly departed from the ancient Stoic teaching. Thus, Posidonius, based on Plato’s teaching about the soul, 3592 did not find it possible to admit that the counter-rational movements of a person had their source ήγεμονικόν, and therefore recognized that affects are movements of other irrational forces 3593 and that they stem not from ήγεμονικόν, but from foolish soul. 3594 Hence he, together with Hekaton (one might think that in this case he followed Panetius) 3595 divided virtues into reasonable and unreasonable. 3596 Reasonable virtue, which consists in knowledge and embraces all philosophical knowledge, is divided into two parts: knowledge of the true, as such (σοφία), and knowledge of the good (φρόνησις). Wisdom has as its subject matter what relates to human and universal nature and their mutual relationship, and prudence extends to the knowledge of ethical principles and is the knowledge of what should be chosen and what should be avoided. 3597 The virtue of the irrational part is the voluntary submission of oneself to the rule of reason, preventing the emergence of passions. It breaks down into three private virtues: moderation, courage and justice. 3598 In Panetius, the first kind of virtues (reasonable) were united in the concept of theoretical virtues, and the second (unreasonable) - in the concept of practical ones. 3599 Posidonius uses the terms “theoretical and practical virtues” somewhat differently. Previously, the Stoics taught about virtue as knowledge, and in each virtue - not only moderation, justice and courage, but also wisdom - they distinguished between a theoretical and a practical element. 3600 Panetius essentially preserved this division. 3601 Posidonius considers activity to be the exclusive property of irrational virtues, and knowledge - reasonable 3602; and if previously the Stoics believed the essence of virtue to be in practice, now Posidonius claims that a perfect person strives only for pure knowledge, since, according to his teaching, the highest virtue, the virtue of the highest part of the soul, is purely theoretical and it consists only in knowledge, which, in contrast to the knowledge of individual sciences, is called philosophical. 3603 New in Panetius and Posidonius is also the Aristotelian definition of virtue as the mean between “too much” and “too little”, 3604 the distinction between perfect virtues and wise men in the proper sense 3605 and perfect virtues (in Plato σκιαγραφία τις εἴδολα άετῆς, in Panetius simulacra virtutis, similitudines honesti or secunda honesta) and wise men in the improper sense. 3606 Hence the difference between κατόρθωμα and καθῆκον is not qualitative, but quantitative. 3607 Next. Carneades, based on the fact that different people define goodness differently, argued that goodness is not such by nature, but depending on external circumstances, namely, utility. This teaching affected Panetius and Posidonius, on the one hand, in that they recognized the possibility of a conflict between the honest and the useful, 3608 and, on the other, in their acceptance of the position that the goal of moral activity for different people cannot be the same and that for individual subjects it changes depending on their individual qualities. 3609 Thus, suicide is permissible for one and impermissible for another under the same circumstances; in the same way, depending on various circumstances, sometimes a certain duty must be fulfilled, and sometimes not. 3610 Carneades had a negative attitude towards the Stoic teaching about virtue as the only good, as well as towards the requirement of apathy. Such a Stoic teaching, according to him, would be fair only if man consisted only of reason; and if this is not the case, then it is impossible to do without some natural goods in addition to virtue (πρῶτα κατά φύσιν), apathy cannot be achieved, and the existence of a sage is unthinkable. These conclusions were also accepted by Panetius and Posidonius. Panetius, recognizing a life in accordance with nature or a virtuous life as the highest good, at the same time argued that wealth, health, etc. are necessary for bliss, as long as they do not contradict virtue. 3611 By the way, Panetius, contrary to the ancient Stoics, 3612 recognized κατά φύσις and pleasure as something, 3613 and at the same time, as is natural, rejected the apathy previously preached by the Stoics. 3614 For his part, Posidonius, although he recognized a life in accordance with nature or virtue as the highest and true good, 3615 however, found that for complete bliss it is necessary to satisfy the needs of not only the rational soul, but also the unreasonable one - namely, the use of nature-conforming and useful things. 3616 Having recognized προηγμένα as good, 3617 neither Panetius nor Posidonius, however, identified them with the highest good or good in the proper sense. 3618 Stoicism in Rome. Principles of Ciceronian ethics The second, external reason that determined both the dominance of the eclectic direction in the Stoa and the softening of the rigoristic character of Stoicism was the latter’s change of homeland and relocation to Rome. The Romans were distinguished by their practical nature; they assessed everything from the point of view of practical benefit and state need. 3619 And in the field of philosophy they were not interested in abstract reasoning and theoretical justifications of this or that philosophical system, but in its practical suitability; from various philosophical systems they perceived only what they found useful for themselves, completely ignoring the deep gulf that sometimes separated one system from another, and the internal close dependence with which individual provisions of a well-known philosophy were connected. 3620 On this side, the Romans were eclectics by vocation, incapable, however, even here of a consistent rather than mechanical combination of the thoughts and positions they borrowed. If the Romans thus valued, in any knowledge, first of all the practical benefit from it, then it is not surprising that the very path along which Greek philosophy penetrated into Rome was, first of all, the path of practical benefit from it, namely, the path of oratory. 3621 As people of practice and a strictly regulated life, the Romans in Greek philosophy were primarily interested in Stoicism. In turn, Stoicism in most cases met the Romans halfway, making concessions to both the Roman religion and the Roman way of life. 3622 These concessions of Greek philosophy to Rome, this penetration of it by the Roman spirit, were partly conscious, since the Greek teacher of philosophy had to conform to the spirit and needs of the listeners, but mostly unconscious - first of all among the philosophizing Romans, and then among the Greek philosophers themselves who taught in the Roman state, 3623 for example, with Posidonius and especially with Panetius, who tried to smooth out sharpness of the Stoa and give the Romans something that would least contradict their usual view, 3624 and, moreover, give it in an elegant presentation. 3625 In these views, he first of all tried to reconcile (although not without the influence of Carneades) the cosmopolitanism of the Stoa with reality. 3626 Thus, Panetius taught that the state (real, not imaginary) is based not on a contract, but on the nature of man, on his inherent reason, and that it strives to realize the ideal of a rational or virtuous life. He also recognized religion, family and slavery, 3627 limited ideal law to the doctrine of healthy egoism, allowed glory 3628 as one of the incentives for a virtuous life, and, finally, placed the interests of the state above truth. 3629 More than that. Living for a long time in Rome and having a close relationship with the circle of Scipio the Younger, Panetius tried to adapt the Stoic teaching to the view of this particular aristocratic circle. For the latter, he wrote that same (Roman in spirit and character) 3630 treatise περί καθήκοντος, which, partly with an abbreviation, 3631 partly with the addition of Posidonius, 3632 Cicero reproduced in his De officiis. But still, in spite of everything, Panetius could not be reborn as a Roman, and his thought essentially remained Greek. 3633 The first 3634 Roman philosopher was Cicero. As a true Roman, he valued philosophy not for its own sake, but for the practical benefits it provided. 3635 “Oh, guide of life, philosophy! What would not only ourselves, but all of life be without you? You planted cities, you gathered scattered people into living societies, you united them first by community of dwellings, then by marriage ties, community of writing and speech: you are the inventor of laws, you are a teacher of morals and (leader) in science.” 3636 However, in other places, Cicero lavishes all this praise not on philosophy, but on eloquence (eloquentiae), for which philosophy was only a means, 3637 just one of the auxiliary sources. 3638 He himself prefers that philosophy that leads to grandeur (peperit dicendi copiam 3639), and even Plato and Aristotle are interested not so much for the sake of content, but for the sake of the external (dialogical) form of their works. 3640 True, Cicero was distinguished by his many-sided reading, he was not an independent and deep thinker, and therefore his merit lies not in independent philosophical research, but in the excellent presentation in which he translated the philosophical works of the Greeks. 3641 He himself admits 3642 that he only transposed the Greek originals, only substituted words into them. His shallow attitude towards Greek philosophy is evidenced by the speed with which he wrote his philosophical treatises. 3643 As for the nature of Cicero’s philosophical treatises, it was eclectic, and the guiding principle in this for Cicero was not the obvious truth of this or that position of a well-known philosophical school, but its suitability and applicability to life. Cicero's eclecticism is determined both by the general dominance of this trend in the philosophy of that time, and, in particular, by the conditions of his personal philosophical education. The fact is that his teachers were representatives of almost all philosophical schools. In his youth, he was a student of the Epicurean Phaedrus, the academician Philo and the Stoic Diadochos (who later lived in the house of Cicero until his death). Before his speech to public service, Cicero visited Asia Minor and Greece, and in Athens he listened to the Epicurean Zeno, his old teacher Phaedrus and mainly the academician Antiochus, whose eclecticism had such a strong influence on him. At the same time, Cicero also listened to Panecius’s student, Posidonius, with whom he maintained relations until the death of this philosopher. 3644 As an eclectic, Cicero did not join any philosophical school, 3645 however, in the field of theoretical reasoning he pursued predominantly skeptical (New Academy) principles, and in the field of ethics he most closely followed Stoicism. The reason for Cicero's attraction to skepticism 3646 and the principle of probabilism he pursued was, firstly, mutual disputes and disagreements of various philosophical schools on issues of paramount importance, 3647 secondly, the favorable attitude of the Middle Academy to eloquence, while the Stoics, in Cicero's opinion, 3648 did not convince eloquently enough in morality; thirdly, and finally, Cicero’s task was to introduce his compatriots to a philosophy unknown to them, for which purpose the method of presenting pros and cons was most suitable. 3649 In the field of ethics, Cicero, as already said, most often pursues Stoic thoughts. The best proof of this is the treatise De officiis, in which he, in his own words, 3650 closely follows Panetius. 3651 True, being a great practitioner, from whose attention some abstractness of Stoic ethics and its detachment from life could not escape, 3652 Cicero often deviates from the moral teaching of the Stoa. Thus, he does not recognize, strictly speaking, the real existence of a wise man, 3653 also does not agree with the fact that the wise are equally happy, and the unwise are equally unhappy, that there is no significant difference between a grave crime and the mildest sin, 3654 etc. However, in general, despite Cicero’s direct statements about himself as a peripatetic 3655 and academician, 3656 he still adheres to the Stoic teachings. In particular, he not only adopted, but also further developed Panecius’s principle of adapting Stoic ethics to Roman reality. The Stoics taught that people who have the same law - reason, form one great rational state. It was this imaginary ideal state that Cicero tried to bring closer to the Roman state, 3657 having previously based the positive law, so revered in Rome, on the rational law innate to every person, which is a reflection of the universal reasonable law of nature. “We believe that the beginning of already existing law,” he says, 3658, “is in that highest law that existed before any law was written, before any state began to exist.” The highest law is a universal 3659 true law, it is a recta ratio consistent with nature; he is the same in Rome and Athens 3660; he is the recta ratio summi lovis, the ruler of the entire universe. 3661 This mens Dei, 3662 this ratio summa, by nature innate (insita in natura) to every person, 3663 commands him what he should do, and turns him away from the opposite. 3664 From this universal reasonable law comes that essentially unified right, 3665 by which human society is bound, for by our very nature we are inclined to love people, and this constitutes the basis of law. 3666 Just as reason is innate to people, so is law innate to them. “To whom reason is given by nature, recta ratio in commands and prohibitions is also given; and if (given) lex, then jus also. And just as everyone is given reason, so everyone is given the right.” 3667 In the first book of De legibus, Cicero devotes six entire chapters to proving that law is not an accidental, but a natural phenomenon, 3668 co-eternal with the human race. 3669 “If,” he says, “the fear of punishment kept people from living an unjust and vicious life, then there would be no unjust people,” for the vicious should only be called careless...; on the contrary, the honest would not be virtuous, but cunning 3670, etc. But if law and right are based on nature, then why do people not have the same legal law? Cicero explains this for various reasons, but mainly due to the influence of pleasure (voluptas), the mother of all vices. 3671 However, the main reason for this phenomenon, of course, is that only a sage has a perfect law, 3672 people do not have true justice, 3673 which is why the law of nature has to be distinguished from the law and civil law. 3674 Carneades considered justitia naturalis and justitia civilis to be opposite. Although Cicero also distinguishes them, however, contrary to Carneades, he thinks of them as closely connected with each other, and justitia naturalis, in his opinion, connects all rational beings (both people and gods), and justitia civilis only human society. 3675 Having identified the moral with the right, Cicero began to prove not only the identity of the moral (honest) with the useful, 3676 - which was usual for the Stoics, 3677 - but also the unity of interests (not only in the field of virtue, but also in the narrowly practical field) of the individual and society or the state, 3678 i.e., he entered on an even more slippery path than that of the Stoics. And if Panetius and Posidonius, fleeing the cruel criticism of Carneades, who distinguished the moral from the useful, had to introduce into ethics a special treatise on the conflict between the moral and the useful, then Cicero’s position became even more complicated. In the end, he had to allow a clash of interests between the individual and the state and (partly following Plato 3679) subordinate the former to the latter in the most categorical form (which, of course, was quite consistent with the basic credo of the Roman patriots). “Man is born not for himself,” he writes, “but for the fatherland, for his own people, and only the slightest part of it remains for himself.” 3680 “We must be ready to jeopardize our own benefit rather than the good of the state,” 3681 for “there is nothing dearer or more honorable than that society” that unites each of us in the state, 3682 and for its sake which of the virtuous would hesitate to sacrifice even their lives? 3683 Concerns about the fatherland must be put in first place, 3684 and for those who have worked for the fatherland, a blissful residence in heaven is prepared, where they will live happily and forever. 3685 As a conclusion from this, it follows that service to the state is higher than the personal activities of the sage 3686 and the activity of legislators is higher than the activity of philosophers. 3687 Hence, Cicero considers the removal of a person from participation in the affairs of the state not only not commendable, but downright shameful 3688 and, in agreement with Plato, 3689 does not find it possible to recognize as fair philosophers who do not take part in public affairs. 3690 Cicero not only identifies morality with law, as we said above, but also subordinated the former to the latter. True, he says that the moral law prohibits a person from many things that the civil law does not prohibit or punish, 3691 that one should not so much care about the disposition of the people as follow the dictates of one’s conscience, 3692 however, for one reason or another, he recommends that the lawyer defend not only the true (this, in fact, is the business of the judge), but also the probable 3693; he finds it possible for the sake of others, and especially for the sake of friends, to retreat even from virtue. 3694 Thus, the ethical principle of Stoicism in Cicero takes on a bright political coloring 3695 and not only of Roman law, but also of Roman statehood and the Roman way of life, which has developed over centuries, with its typical shortcomings. 3696 When Cicero tries, like the Stoics, to paint the ideal of a rational world state, then this ideal image takes on the features of the Roman Empire. 3697 Thamin expresses himself even more sharply. “Cicero,” he writes, “was never a citizen of the world, but a citizen of Rome. The Roman state is the concrete form in which he embodies the philosophical idea of ​​human solidarity. What he demands from Stoicism is the justification of its patriotism and the justification of the theory related to it. Patriotism is the highest of all good spiritual movements, because it united them all in itself... Here is the center of Cicero’s morality.” 3698 This is the principle of Cicero's moral philosophy. In it, he comes closest, as we have already said, to Stoicism, but, being an eclectic, in this case he does not differ in consistency and falls into contradictions. Often these contradictions are explained by the personality of Cicero himself as a thinker. The fact is that in his writings he appears either as a philosopher, or as a statesman, or as a private person. According to each of these provisions, he argues differently. 3699 A striking example of this is his contradictory attitude towards folk religion and mantika. 3700 Moral teaching of Cicero Cicero's doctrine of divinity is not distinguished by certainty; Yes, he himself declares that nothing definite can be said about the essence of the gods. 3701 Often he defines the intelligible God as a free, perfect mind, alien to all corporeal materiality, 3702 and also speaks of the unity of the deity. 3703 However, along with this, he completely stoically thinks of it as fire or air, 3704 sometimes, in agreement with Aristotle, speaks of its ethereal essence 3705 and even calls the external sky by the name of deity. 3706 Like the Stoics, he not only considers the world to be a manifestation of a perfect deity, 3707 but also identifies God with the world 3708 and says that the universe is penetrated and supported by God, who is ratio perfecta and sempiterna, animus mundi, mens and sapeinta perfecta, prudentia, fortuna, necessitas. 3709 Like the Stoics, Cicero considers this world to be a living being, 3710 although not eternal, 3711 since the world will exist until the global conflagration, 3712 which will occur when the stars return to where they came from. 3713 As for the folk gods and the popular cult, Cicero essentially has a negative attitude towards both, 3714 however, for reasons of state 3715 character 3716 (otherwise loyalty, justice, and the entire human community 3717 would perish) defends and supports both the belief in the gods 3718 (only the Roman gods recognized by the state 3719), and the cult with all its little details and superstitions. 3720 Not only that. He considers the idea of ​​a deity or gods to be innate to man. 3721 In the idea of ​​divinity, Cicero, in accordance with his practical point of view on religion, brings to the fore the idea of ​​​​divine world rule 3722, on which the possibility of mantics is based. 3723 As for the doctrine of the soul, Cicero refuses to give a positive answer to the question of what the soul is. 3724 Recognizing in any case the divine origin of the soul, Cicero considers it a spiritual essence, consisting of eternal stellar fire or fiery air and alien to all earthly materiality. 3725 Cicero’s soul, like Posidonius’s, is divided into two parts: rational and unreasonable. 3726 The first manifests itself in reason or reflection, and the second in volition (όρμη): the first teaches what to do and what to avoid, and the second carries out the instructions of the first. 3727 The seat of the rational soul is the head. 3728 Prompted by the same practical considerations as in the matter of religion, Cicero especially diligently proves the immortality of the soul and free will. In support of the immortality of the soul, Cicero cites a whole series of evidence: the innateness of the idea of ​​the immortality of the soul, 3729 the simplicity and indivisibility of the latter, 3730 the ability of the soul to smell, feel, live - which is a property of the divine, heavenly and therefore eternal, 3731 - human concern for posterity and subsequent fate 3732 and the so-called Platonic proof of the immortality of the soul: what moves forever has its beginning in itself and, as such, it is eternal. 3733 But the soul is not only immortal: it also existed before it was sent to the real body - these shackles are for it. 3734 Thus, following Plato, Cicero comes to recognize the pre-existence of souls. 3735 After death, the souls of the righteous go to heaven, and the souls of sinners remain on earth. 3736 Free will, according to Cicero, is a fact of immediate consciousness. 3737 Cicero defended it in the same way as the Stoics, i.e., that although a chain of causality reigns in the world, it is necessary to distinguish between internal and primary causes and external and secondary causes, and that the first of these causes are determined exclusively by the will of man. 3738 But as if sensing the weakness of these evidence, Cicero also points to the moral necessity of free will, arguing that by rejecting free will, one will have to reject morality itself. 3739 Like the Stoics, virtue in Cicero is based on nature and on right reason and is essentially a perfecta ratio, 3740 perfecta et ad summum perducta natura, 3741 from which the goal of man is to live in accordance with and in unity with nature 3742 and his first duty is to preserve himself in the natural state (in naturae statu), i.e., to adhere to what is in accordance with nature, and to turn away from what contradicts her. 3743 When speaking about nature, Cicero means first of all general nature. But, since every living being, in addition to its participation in the general nature, also has its own separate nature, then man also has the same special nature. Hence, when it is said that a person lives in accordance with nature, what is most closely understood is his human nature. 3744 The distinctive feature of human nature is ratio and mens 3745 or ratio and oratio. 3746 In accordance with the ratio innate to man, the life of a virtuous or wise husband proceeds. In the divine mind, man is given the moral law, and at the same time the moral ability or seeds of ethical activity, which he must develop in his life. 3747 Although the moral law is innate to man, recognizing it requires some persistent work, careful introspection and introspection. 3748 From this it follows that man must learn what is in accordance with nature, 3749 or, in other words, that virtue can be learned. 3750 It should be noted that Cicero distinguishes two natures in man himself: universal and personal or individual 3751 and teaches that a person must conform not only to the general nature, but certainly also to the personal. 3752 From here he (in agreement with Panetius) speaks of the duties of young men, old men, magistrates, private individuals, etc. 3753 and even (introducing the Peripatetic heresy into Stoicism) allows for the possibility of one person being distinguished by some virtues, and another by others. 3754 Since virtue must be consistent with nature, then, according to Cicero, it must embrace all of nature, that is, soul and body. 3755 It is necessary, by bringing the soul to the forefront, to harmoniously develop the entire being of man. 3756 Just as, when treating about law, which is based on nature, Cicero wondered about the reasons for the difference in legal concepts, so now he asks how to explain the diversity of moral views, and gives the same answer as to the first question, namely: the diversity of moral concepts is explained by the influence of the environment or the influence of pleasure - the mother of all evils. 3757 If virtue has its basis in nature, then it, like the latter, must be distinguished by constancy: it must be a constant and consonant disposition of the spirit, and not a random mood of the soul, 3758 for what makes virtue a virtue and vice a vice is an internal mood, and not just an external manifestation. 3759 From here, by the way, it followed that virtue is one. 3760 If Cicero subsequently allows for the division of virtue, he does so, according to him, only when applied to the popular idea. 3761 According to the "popular idea", Cicero divides the single virtue into four 3762 main ones: wisdom, courage, 3763 justice and moderation. 3764 Cicero, like Panetius and Posidonius, 3765 divides these basic virtues, contrary to the early Stoics, into two categories: theoretical virtues (knowledge, wisdom) and practical virtues (the other three), 3766 which, in turn, are divided into those related to the subject himself and to other people. 3767 Posidonius placed the virtue of wisdom above other virtues, as their crown. He is followed in this case by Cicero, who, like Panetius, distinguishes in wisdom, on the one hand, σοφία - knowledge of divine and human things (as well as the communication of gods and people), and on the other, φρονησις (prudence) - knowledge of what should be done and what should be avoided. 3768 The virtue of wisdom Cicero calls the queen of 3769 virtues and places him above all of them. 3770 Cicero further calls wisdom the mother of all goods (it gives the highest and purest pleasure), 3771 arguing that in comparison with this virtue the gods did not give people anything more fruitful, more flourishing, nothing better, 3772 and in connection with this he praises science as such. 3773 But still Posidonius did not restrain Cicero, and the latter returned to his assertion that knowledge is only good when it is followed by action, 3774 that all the glory of virtue is in action, 3775 that to the duties of knowledge and knowledge must be preferred the duty of justice, which unites people and supports the public 3776 and which, in particular, constantly has human benefit in mind. 3777 Depending on this point of view on the essence of virtue, Cicero now claims that not wisdom, but justice is the queen and mistress of virtue 3778 and that the virtue of human society, in particular justice, is the first commandment of the innate human reason or moral law. Since human society, as the best and necessary cement, required a benevolent attitude towards other people, Cicero introduced into his innate desire for society and an element of benevolence and even love for them. Hence, justice is characterized by him as right, i.e. that is, a negative virtue, then like charity, that is, a positive virtue. “The virtue of human society is divided into two parts: justice, in which the greatest splendor of virtue is manifested, and charity, which can also be called benevolence and generosity.” 3779 When Cicero defines justice in the sense of right, he argues that one cannot love others more than oneself, nor demand that others (even friends) 3780 love us more than themselves, that a good person, as far as possible, benefits everyone and does not harm anyone, but under one indispensable condition: unless he himself is offended, 3781 - that we should not give up what we ourselves need, that we must give to everyone as much as can be given to him without causing offense to another. 3782 When justice is defined by Cicero in the sense of benevolence, then he forgets about law and speaks of the need to show mercy and condescension to all people, 3783 not only fellow citizens, but also other nations, 3784 not excluding those who have offended us, 3785 for people are blood related to each other, 3786 and we are born, as Plato says, not only for us, but for fatherland, parents and friends. 3787 In demanding benevolence towards people, Cicero goes so far that he is ready to deny even property 3788 and recognize stinginess as the most vile vice. 3789 Cicero considers friendship to be the highest manifestation of the innate desire for society and benevolence in people, the gods of which have not given anything better to people. 3790 Speaking about justice in general, Cicero places duties in relation to the gods in the first place, then to the fatherland, parents and all other people, 3791 not excluding the lowest position, slaves who must be used as mercenaries, 3792 and even enemies, in relation to whom (and to all people in general) 3793 deception is unacceptable. 3794 However, even here Cicero did not betray himself when he placed public benefit and state benefit above the moral law. “The duties of justice,” he says, “do not remain immutable, but vary according to circumstances.” So sometimes you have to not fulfill a promise or not return something borrowed from another for a while. In these cases, you need to pay attention to the fundamentals of justice (fundamenta justitiae): firstly, that this or that action does not harm and, secondly, that it serves the common good. 3795 The fourth virtue, manifested in verecundia and, as it were, a certain beauty of life - in temperantia and modestia, consists in moderating the disorderly movements of the spirit and observing the measure of things. 3796 Cicero compares this ordered state of the soul with the state of health in the body 3797 and brings it closer to the decorum inherent in each virtue (in Greek - πρέπον), which, in turn, is identified by him in general with honest - at least, Cicero refuses to define the difference between honest (honestum) and decent (decorum). 3798 In the doctrine of passions or affects, Cicero generally adheres to the Stoics. Affects are false opinions and judgments, 3799 and in affects (as well as virtues) he thinks of not only a logical, but also a volitional element, since their concept includes movements of feeling and will. 3800 Every emotion is a voluntary 3801 movement of the spirit, either devoid of reason, or disobeying reason and disobedient to reason - a movement excited by the deceptive idea of ​​good or bad. 3802 Unlike the early Stoics and in agreement with Posidonius, Cicero believes the source of disordered movements is in the unreasonable part of the soul. 3803 Affects are illnesses of the soul that upset mental life and deprive the spirit of health. 3804 Passion is a certain illness that indicates a person’s unwisdom or stupidity. 3805 Passion brings disorder not only to the soul, but also to the body. 3806 One must abstain from all passions, whatever they may be, 3807 making no exception for moderate 3808 affects, as is the custom among the Peripatetics, 3809 - in particular for anger. 3810 One must be completely free from passions, maintaining equanimity of spirit, 3811 characteristic of man by nature. 3812 An exception can be made only for εύτάθεια, 3813 but not for pleasure, which is the opposite of honesty. 3814 Like virtue, vice is divided into four main ones: sadness and fear (aegritudo et metus), immoderate joy and passion (laetitia gestiens lebidoque) and many secondary ones. 3815 Like virtues, all vices are equal. 3816 What is the highest good that all people crave 3817 and on the definition of which the meaning of a person’s entire life depends. 3818 “This is established,” says Cicero, “not by human judgment, but is indicated by nature itself, 3819 which directs man to what is most suitable for him.” 3820 This means that just as nature is the leader of life, just as the principle of a virtuous life lies in it and following it, so exactly the highest good should be seen in it and following it. 3821 But since nature teaches only one thing, which is most becoming for a person and what is honest, it is clear that a blessed life is created only by honesty 3822 or virtue 3823 and that a blessed and happy life is nothing other than a reasonable and right life. 3824 Since the highest good coincides with virtue, 3825 one must act virtuously not for the sake of any other secondary goal or pleasure, but exclusively for the sake of virtue, for we have the fruit of virtue in it itself. 3826 Just as virtue has no degrees, so goodness cannot increase, 3827 just as it cannot decrease or even disappear completely, 3828 for the virtuous person possesses the only true and eternal good 3829 and virtue is not only in itself sufficient for a happy and blissful life, 3830 but is also the only and highest good. 3831 He who is virtuous has no need for anything external and temporary, he desires nothing and seeks nothing. 3832 External goods add nothing to his bliss, and suffering takes nothing away. 3833 He is not only happy and fortunate, 3834 but in his bliss he conquers fortune itself. 3835 But, as was natural to be expected, the practical Cicero could not hold 3836 on this point of view and already took a rather ragged road to the recognition of secondary goods, distinguishing between the fact that nec bona, nec mala - firstly, something secundum naturam προηγμένα, producta, praeposita, praemota, then, naturae contraria ( άποπροηγμένα, remota, rejecta) and, finally, in the proper sense of adiaphora. 3837 At the same time, like his closest teachers, he did not consider it fair not to involve the body in participation in bliss, for man does not consist of the mind alone. 3838 Subsequently, this led him to affirm the unnaturalness (contra naturam) of suffering, 3839 to recognize the legitimacy of moderate pleasure 3840 (although in the latter case he in every possible way wants to distinguish himself from Epicurus 3841) to assigning especially honorable places to glory 3842, etc. The influence of the Middle Stoa and personal practical attitude to life forced Cicero to significantly soften the ancient Stoic doctrine of the sage. True, in theory he recognizes the Stoic sage and characterizes him with the features of the ancient Stoics. The sage is perfect in everything, 3843 he is always virtuous, 3844 delusion, self-deception, frivolity, 3845 regret and rejoicing, 3846 feelings of fear 3847 and general weakness 3848 and disordered movements are alien to him, 3849 he never has to repent of anything, 3850 he is truly free, 3851 always happy, 3852 for he depends exclusively on himself and believes everything in himself 3853; nevertheless, he regards what happens to him as nothing. 3854 Cicero does not deceive himself at all regarding the reality of the existence of such sages 3855 and not only softens the Stoic ideal of the sage, but also, following the Middle Stoa, 3856 introduces, contrary to the ancient Stoic theory, the doctrine of double morality: true (κατορθωμα) and secondary (secunde quaedam honesta) 3857 - only the likeness of virtue (simulacra virtutis), 3858 with which he identifies the Stoic καθῆκον. 3859 In his work De officiis, he, one might say, completely forgets about the sage and speaks exclusively about this secondary virtue, 3860 which is also perfection in its own way. 3861 After this, it is quite consistent for Cicero to deny the position of the Stoics that all unwise people - and, in fact, all people belong to such people - are equally stupid and bad, and also that all sins are completely identical in meaning. 3862 Comparison of the ethical views of St. Ambrose according to his De officiis ministrorum with the ethical views of Cicero according to his De officiis. Conclusions We have deliberately outlined the moral teaching of Cicero as fully and thoroughly as possible so that the irreconcilable disagreement that exists between the ethical views of St. Ambrose and Cicero, between the moral teaching of a Christian and church father of the 4th century, on the one hand, and a pagan and Roman patriot of the 1st century BC, on the other. We do not think that it is now necessary to further emphasize and deliberately point out all the points of disagreement between St. Ambrose and Cicero, and therefore we proceed directly to the proof that the indicated fundamental difference in the ethical teaching of St. Ambrose from Cicero's morality was also manifested in De officiis ministrorum. The most significant and fundamental difference between St. Ambrose and Cicero lies in the principles and final foundations of ethics in both. For Cicero, the principle of ethics is nature, more precisely, its reasonable and unchanging laws and, even more precisely, the human mind. If he speaks about a deity, then this deity for him, as a pantheist, dissolves in the concept of nature itself, the unchangeable laws of which remain unchanged for the deity itself, which he identifies not only with the world mind, but sometimes with the human mind. 3863 As for the folk gods, Cicero did not believe in them and, if he did not categorically deny, and even defended, he did this for state reasons, similar to those motives for which the Stoics sought, through allegorism, to reconcile their ideas about the deity with popular beliefs. The folk gods and, in general, the deity as a person, therefore, according to Cicero, have no actual relation to ethics: the sinner is guilty first of all before the laws of nature and only then before the gods. 3864 At St. Ambrose, the religious nature of ethics comes to the fore, the idea of ​​​​a personal, all-perfect Creator, in whose power both life and death, who governs this world according to His will and to whom all people will have to give an account of all their affairs. 3865 The first requirement of morality is in St. father, fulfilling the will of God, 3866 the will of Christ, 3867 the basis of all virtues is piety (pietas), 3868 and the first Christian virtue is faith in a personal God, 3869 partly brought together by St. father with the first of the main Stoic virtues - wisdom, from which Abraham 3870 and Moses 3871 are recognized as the wisest precisely because they showed great faith in God. Faith in a personal God is a necessary condition for a morally valuable life, for “without faith, good deeds are short-lived,” 3872 and where there is no faith in God, there is no moral activity. 3873 Cicero taught that a person learns about his ethical duties through reason from observation and introspection, and that no outside help or revelation is required either in the recognition of the moral law or in the practical implementation of it. 3874 At St. Ambrose, moral principles are not the fruit of the human mind, but revelations of God, revealed in Holy Scripture, which St. the father recognizes the main source of 3875 ethical knowledge, which is why he refuses to recognize as truth what he does not find in the Word of God. 3876 But God's help to St. Ambrose considers it necessary for a person not only in the matter of knowledge of the moral law, but also in the matter of fulfilling this law, since human nature, corrupted by sin, is not able to voluntarily and independently follow the moral ideal that Holy Scripture indicates to the Christian in the person of the all-perfect Heavenly Father. 3877 True, Cicero also briefly expresses the idea of ​​​​the sinfulness of the flesh, 3878 but for him this is only a random thought, which was little consistent with the nature of his ethics. On the other hand, it is also true that the idea of ​​human depravity and the doctrine of hereditary sin are not developed by St. Ambrose with due completeness (this was the work of the later fathers and teachers of the church and, most of all, Blessed Augustine), but still he directly speaks of the need for a person to die to sin, to die to the flesh, to die to the old man in order to become capable of a new, truly moral life. “Let our flesh die,” he exhorts, “so that all guilt may die in it, and let us, as if raised from the dead, rise again through new deeds and morals.” 3879 This dying of the old man and the rising of the new 3880 is accomplished in the sacraments of baptism 3881 and repentance. 3882 Another fundamental difference between the ethics of St. Ambrose from the ethics of Cicero, connected, however, with the first, is the teaching of St. father about the final goal of moral perfection. Cicero considers the ultimate goal of a person’s virtuous life to be his achievement of a certain personal perfection here on earth. Hence, Cicero limits the entire moral life of a person to the short limits of his earthly existence. At St. Ambrose, the moral life of a person embraces not only the short time of present earthly life, but also the infinity of the future, for which present life is only a preparation, for only there will the true life of man begin, only there, in this fatherland of ours, is complete moral perfection and complete bliss possible. Thus, to the fore, St. the father puts forward the idea of ​​immortality, the idea of ​​eternal life beyond the grave after the general resurrection and the end of this world. This is where the negative attitude of St. Ambrose to the earth, this place of exile and punishment of man, - that place in which everything is transitory, everything is illusory and false, for this world has become the kingdom of the devil, for it has sunk in evil. Everything in this world is false, and all its blessings are also false and deceptive, for they are decisively opposed to the blessings of true life, which can only begin after a person leaves behind a temporary and perishable shell - the body. “Those (philosophers) recognize temporary blessings as good, but we recognize them as evil, for whoever receives blessings in this life... is tormented there, and Lazarus, who suffered evil here, is consoled there.” 3883 The future life completely obscures St. Ambrose represents real life, in which St. the father evaluates everything from the point of view of eternal stay behind the grave. 3884 “We do not establish,” writes St. Ambrose, “there are no rules of decency and honesty that would not have more to do with the future (afterlife) than with the present, at least we do not consider useful that which tends to delight in this life, and not to joy in the future.” 3885 “If you clothe the naked, you thereby clothe yourself with truth. If you bring a stranger into your home, if you welcome a poor person, then he, in turn, will bring you close communication with the saints, and will also introduce you to the eternal abodes. This gratitude is important, since you sow bodily things, and in return you will receive spiritual things.” 3886 The indicated difference between St. Ambrose and Cicero in determining the sphere and limits, as well as the center of gravity of a person’s moral life, a natural and necessary consequence is the difference in the purpose and nature of the moral precepts of one and the other moralist. For Cicero, who knows no other life than the present, the moral code is practical in nature and has as its main task showing a person how it is more convenient and profitable for him to live. Hence, he allows for the possibility of violation of moral duties in cases where their fulfillment would adversely affect the well-being of the individual or society. At St. Ambrose’s moral law has as its goal the personal perfection of man, preparing himself for blissful union with the most perfect person of God, for communion with perfect angels and being with the saints. Nothing external and material, no earthly benefits and blessings, no torment and suffering can deviate a person from the goal of personal self-improvement indicated to him by God. 3887 Having limited the moral and generally spiritual life of man to the limits and interests of earthly existence, Cicero went even further in this direction when he identified a morally ideal society with the Roman state. The world Roman republic is his highest ethical ideal, 3888 and participation in the affairs of the republic is, in his opinion, the most important human occupation. 3889 Cicero knows nothing higher than the laws of this state and dearer than the republic itself. That is why, when it comes to preserving the republic, all sorts of means are permissible. 3890 St. Ambrose, contrary to Cicero, did not find it possible to mix ethics with politics: in the state he saw only one of the forms in which the kingdom of God is embodied. 3891 The Kingdom of God, as an image of a morally ideal society of believers, can be realized within the boundaries of an earthly state, but does not coincide with this latter. The idea of ​​the kingdom of God and its tasks are infinitely higher than the idea and tasks of the earthly kingdom. The latter is called only to the obedient and feasible implementation of those ethical principles that St. indicates to him. church identified with St. Ambrose, as we know, with the kingdom of God. When the imperial power in the person of Valentinian II wanted to extend its jurisdiction to the church, St. Ambrose protested vigorously. “The emperor is in the church, but not above the church,” 3892 - he resolutely declared, joining the cause of God in the fight against the imperial court. 3893 Having raised the idea of ​​statehood so highly, Cicero in his moral teaching placed responsibilities towards the fatherland and people in general 3894 at the forefront: the queen of all virtues is justice. 3895 On the contrary, at St. Ambrose, who subordinated the state to the church, responsibilities in relation to people are no longer in first place, but, as is natural, in second place. “When you fulfill your duty in relation to your Creator,” he writes, “then you can devote your strength to doing good and helping people.” 3896 Thus, the place of the state is in St. Ambrose stood up for the church, which is the image of justice, 3897 resting on Christ as its foundation. 3898 Finally, it should be noted that Cicero’s De officiis is a moral and practical guide, designed for an educated Roman aristocrat and almost completely ignoring the masses and people of low birth. 3899 Although St. Ambrose in his De officiis ministrorum is not completely free from a certain aristocratic attitude towards people, 3900 however his book, written, however, especially for clergy, sets out Christian ethics, equally accessible to the aristocrat and the commoner, the rich and the poor - in short, to all people without exception. We now turn to a comparison of the teachings of Cicero and St. Ambrose on virtue. St. Ambrose is reproached for borrowing from Cicero the division of duties into ordinary and perfect. But, as we saw above, 3901 such a division existed among the church fathers even before him, and, most importantly, the understanding of perfect duties among Cicero and St. Ambrose various. The virtue of fulfilling the evangelical advice is not yet a perfect virtue for St. Ambrose, as Cicero understands her. According to the teachings of St. father, perfect virtue cannot be achieved here on earth, in the conditions of bodily existence, 3902 for perfect virtue is possible only beyond the grave, when a person puts aside the material shell that aggravates and defiles him, i.e., is possible only in a future life. “Perfection can be of two kinds: one has all the fullness of duties, and the other only a part, one here, the other there, one in accordance with the powers of man, and the other in accordance with the perfection of the future.” 3903 Thus, St. Ambrose divides duties not into two categories, like Cicero, but into three, giving them at the same time a special spirit and special content. 3904 In the general concept 3905, the main of the virtues of wisdom, engaged in the investigation and establishment of truth - this virtue, more desirable than which nothing can be - Cicero distinguishes between wisdom in the proper sense, as knowledge of things divine and human, and prudence, as knowledge of those things that should be desired or avoided. 3906 St. Ambrose, without distinguishing between wisdom and prudence, 3907 uses both names indifferently to designate the virtue of wisdom, and, like Cicero, by wisdom he means knowledge of the truth. 3908 However, he narrows this broad formula and fills it with more specific content - knowledge of God, faith 3909 in Him and love 3910 for Him. "At St. For Abraham, prudence was in the first place, as Scripture testifies to this: “And Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness” (Gen. 15:6). For no one can be prudent without knowing God. Therefore, the fool said that there is no God (Ps. 13: 1), but the prudent person will not say this.” 3911 This wisdom in the sense of knowing God by St. Ambrose not only decisively delimits, but also contrasts wisdom as knowledge of things in general or worldly wisdom. 3912 Thus, he says that Moses, for the sake of God, in order to see and hear Him, abandoned Egyptian wisdom only because he saw in it “harmful absurdity.” 3913 Thus, although St. father borrowed from Cicero the position that knowledge is the first virtue, but he filled it with another content 3914: “the word too, but the meaning is different.” 3915 In defining the most important of the virtues - justice, which has its basis in the rationality inherent in all people, Cicero includes two concepts: justice as law, and justice as benevolence, i.e., a legal element and an ethical element. Cicero took on the impossible task of merging morality and law, where a person renounces his moral duties in the name of his rights, but in the end he had to abandon the precepts of ethics in the name of the requirements of law and take refuge behind a purely legal formula: do not harm anyone unless you are caused by offense. 3916 St. Ambrose at first seems to accept Cicero’s understanding of justice, 3917 but immediately abandons it and speaks of justice as love for people, as service to others and self-sacrifice for them, 3918 and, depending on the changed nature of this virtue, he gives it another justification. “It’s not just that that’s important,” argues St. father, - that nature has united all rational beings into one society, 3919 and then, mainly, that we all form mystical members of one organism, closely connected with each other 3920 by mutual service - the body of Christ, 3921 figuratively represented by the church.” The Church is the most ideal society and the image of justice. 3922 Indeed, the church does not know the advantages of individuals; as a society, it prays for everyone, acts for everyone, and is tempted for everyone. 3923 It is in the church and from the church that the virtue of love for people receives its justification and special development. 3924 What binds individual members of the church together is doctrine, sacraments, 3925 faith 3926 and love. 3927 “Let us bear our burdens, as the apostle taught (Gal. 6; 2), who spoke thus to those whom love had made members of the same body." 3928 “Love one another,” St. himself exhorts. father. “There is nothing sweeter than love and better than peace.” 3929 This Christian love comes from God and is a similarity to divine love for people 3930; like divine love, it is combined with self-sacrifice for the sake of another, 3931 regardless of his moral dignity, 3932 as well as his disposition or disposition towards us, since a Christian, according to the commandment of Christ, loves even his enemies. 3933 “What is glorious here,” asks St. father, - if we do not harm someone who does not harm us? But this will be true virtue when you forgive those who offended you.” 3934 It is necessary not only to forgive others, but also not to defend ourselves even when a robber attacks us with a weapon in his hands, 3935 for it is unreasonable to harm someone to whose happiness we must give all of ourselves. 3936 Such is the virtue of Christian love, which St. Ambrose sometimes calls justice. This virtue knows only duties, but does not know rights. 3937 Christian charity also rests on the feeling of love for people. First, this virtue of St. Ambrose wanted to narrow it in the Ciceronian spirit, wanted to limit it with the rules borrowed from him, 3938 but then he abandons this idea and speaks of the need to do good not only to everyone without exception, 3939 but also without measure, providing those in need with both feasible and unbearable help. 3940 Along with this, the rationale for Christian charity changes. Cicero bases charity on the duty to help those who are endowed with reason along with us. However, he also recommends giving primarily to the poor and precisely for the reasons that the poor are more grateful and that rewards can be expected from them more quickly. 3941 Regarding St. Ambrose, then in him self-interest is completely excluded from the motives of charity. 3942 He bases the very obligation of charity not only (like Cicero) on the natural connection of all rational beings, not only on the fact that the poor, together with us, are members of the body of Christ, not only on the fact that they are our brothers, but also on the fact that they represent God Himself on earth. God Himself was poor, and He made the Apostles poor too. 3943 And so a Christian, by doing good to the poor, thereby, as it were, doing good to God, 3944 Whom he has as a rewarder for his good deeds. 3945 Cicero also includes meekness, or rather, gentleness or humanity 3946, among the fourth of the main virtues - moderation; however, this humanity, like mercy, is recommended by him to the statesman only as a means of gaining people's love. 3947 At St. For Ambrose, meekness is independent and, moreover, one of the first virtues: it is voluntary humiliation and humility before everyone else, regardless of his condition and position. “If we want to please God, we will have love (for people); Let us be unanimous and humble, considering everyone superior to ourselves.” 3948 “Why do you consider yourself better than another, when the duty of a Christian commands him to prefer another to himself..?” 3949 This preference for oneself over another is reflected, among other things, in the fact that Christians do not care about their rights, 3950 holds their tongues or remains silent when they insult them, 3951 remains insensitive when they insult them, 3952 etc. Not only that. The meek also shows humility; only he humbles himself not before others, but before himself. 3953 Having identified morality with law, Cicero also identified it with what is useful for humans, arguing that all people, due to the commonality of their rational nature, have one common benefit, which excludes a clash of interests of the individual and society. 3954 Following him, St. Ambrose identifies the honest with the useful, 3955 only distinguishes the useful in the everyday sense from the useful in the moral sense, bodily and spiritual usefulness, 3956 the usefulness of monetary gain and usefulness in the sense of progress in piety, 3957 precisely that in order to gain Christ. 3958 This last usefulness of St. father and identifies with honest or moral. In the teaching on the passion of St. Ambrose in general follows Cicero, only, contrary to him, he allows anger and even justifies it with texts from Holy Scripture. 3959 But the significant difference in this point is St. Ambrose from Cicero is that the factor of sin, along with the disordered movements of the soul and body, 3960 also considers the influence on the part of the devil, either promoting the development of passions, 3961 or generating them, 3962 and the influence of sinful and sensual flesh. 3963 As for the doctrine of the highest good, Cicero recognizes as such virtue itself, which for him, thus, as for the Stoics, is an end in itself. 3964 And St. Ambrose, following Cicero, in one place calls virtue the highest and only good 3965; however, in the same place he says that it is a means to acquiring blessed, and through it, eternal life. 3966 “The reward for virtue,” he writes in the same second book of De officiis ministrorum, “is the bliss of eternal life.” 3967 Blessed eternal life, as a reward for virtue, is given to a person not in this, but in a future life. 3968 Presenting virtue only as a means 3969 to obtaining the highest good - eternal life, St. Ambrose introduces into the concept of the highest good the same transcendental principle that he introduced into the concept of virtue and which so sharply distinguishes him from Cicero. 3971 But this is a characteristic difference in the ethics of St. father from Cicero was reflected not only in the formal, but also in the material definition of the highest good. For him, the future bliss of eternal life is composed primarily of the concept of higher religious and moral knowledge, knowledge of the Divine, 3972 knowledge of the very image of revealed truth, 3973 since future bliss is, first of all, “pure and intelligible pleasure of the mind.” 3974 The second element in the concept of the blessed or eternal life of St. father is thought of as “the joy of a clear conscience.” 3975 Since the joy of good deeds and “serene innocence” 3976 are available to man already on earth (as well as the knowledge of God), to that extent St. Ambrose allows for partial achievement of bliss in this life, for “for a righteous man his mental state is a source of bliss, and for a sinner it is a source of suffering; the first is justified by his judgment, and the second is condemned; the first one rejoices at death, and the second one is sad.” 3977 Recognizing virtue as the highest and only good, Cicero at the same time accepts the Stoic doctrine of what is preferable and consistent with nature. And at this point St. Ambrose disagrees with Cicero. He argues, for example, that external goods are not only indifferent to a blissful life, 3978 but even harmful, 3979 for they serve as an obstacle to achieving bliss, 3980 and that the very possession of them, for example, wealth, is a burden and misfortune for the owner. 3981 At the same time, St. the father also indicates the reason for his denial of the blessings of this world. Everything earthly, everything perishable is vanity. 3982 Whoever denies this vanity enters the path of truth or virtue, 3983 ascends to some kind of pinnacle of wisdom. 3984 On this same basis, disasters and suffering not only do not hinder Christian virtue, but, on the contrary, contribute to its development, 3985 for through many sorrows we must enter the kingdom of God. 3986 This is partly St. the father explains the apparently incomprehensible fact that the righteous suffer in this life, 3987 and sinners enjoy prosperity. 3988 Among earthly goods, Cicero placed glory especially highly. Following him, St. Ambrose recommends that clergy pay attention to public opinion, 3989 but it is not in it, as such, that he believes the good: it is only a witness to the virtue of Christians, constantly remembering only one sentence - the sentence of the coming Judge of the world. 3990 In other cases, St. the father directly denies the importance for a Christian of both fame and human opinion. “A blessed life is not interested in people’s opinion of itself, since it does not seek reward in it and is not afraid to face censure from it: on the contrary, the less it seeks glory, the more it rises above it.” 3991 “Whoever seeks reward from men already has his reward, but whoever seeks from God has eternal life.” 3992 The teaching of St. Ambrose about the sage, however, is sometimes presented in the formulas of Stoic definitions, 3993 but the image of the sage in St. Ambrose is so softened by the features of a Christian righteous man that he becomes decidedly different from the image of the egoistic sage of the Stoics. 3994 Noting the difference between the treatises “On Duties” of St. Ambrose and Cicero, we must also point out the general position that even under the same formulas and words 3995 the same meaning, the same thoughts (as well as vice versa) are not always hidden, which is why the external similarity between St. Ambrose and Cicero in certain points of ethics cannot always serve as proof of the ideological dependence of the first on the second, 3996 especially if we take into account the historical situation, the fact, in particular, that this was the first scientific experience of Christian ethics and that at that time scientific formulas and terms for the concepts of Christian morality had not yet been developed. 3997 Analysis of the ideological side of De officiis ministrorum showed us that St. Ambrose is not a blind imitator of Cicero in this work. The last thought is proved, however, also by an analysis of the external side, or, more precisely, the plan of this work of St. father. The first pages of the treatise of St. Ambrose, in comparison with those of Cicero, have a completely different content and are imprinted with a different spirit, which is reflected in bringing to the fore a Christian virtue unknown to the ancient world - humility: these pages show, by the way, what the ethics of St. Ambrose, if he did not know Cicero. 3998 In particular, as for the first book, in it St. Ambrose first speaks about some of the basic virtues and only then about all of them in general, 3999 and not vice versa, as in Cicero. Cicero devotes the first two chapters of the second book (about the useful) to justifying his philosophical studies before his compatriots and only then proceeds to present his teaching about the useful. St. Ambrose, in the first five chapters of the second book, discusses the highest good or beatitude (which we do not find in Cicero’s De officiis) and only from the sixth chapter begins to talk about the useful, following in this case, although with great freedom, Cicero. 4000 At the end of the second book of St. Ambrose speaks independently of Cicero. 4001 In the third book of De officiis ministrorum one can notice traces of two almost regularly alternating influences on St. father: on the one hand - Cicero, and on the other - the sacred text. 4002 Here we can also mention that instead of Cicero’s examples from Roman history, St. Father always gives examples from Holy Scripture and biblical history. Let us now summarize all of the above. We set the task of this part of the study to prove not that (as some zealous apologists of the Holy Father are trying to justify) St. Ambrose in De officiis ministrorum is independent from Cicero in terms of content (this is impossible to prove), but only that St. the father in him was not a slavish imitator of a pagan moralist, that De officiis ministrorum is not “a Stoic book both in the main idea and in details”, is not only a copy of Cicero’s De officiis, is not his “second edition”, 4003 that St. Ambrose did not over-salt and “did not pour all the pagan morality of Cicero into Christianity,” 4004 that on the contrary, in this creation it is more than felt that it was the Christian writer who, contrary to Cicero, 4005 pursues, and in essence could not help but pursue, the beginning of a specifically Christian ethics, so opposed to the Stoic morality of the famous Roman orator, whose work De officiis of St. Ambrose took this as a model for his treatise on duties. All of the above and, in particular, the examples we cited above convincingly enough, it seems to us, prove that in reality this was the case. The question is: do the conclusions just drawn refute all those facts and examples of the close dependence of St. Ambrose from Cicero, which were given at the beginning of this book and, if not refuted, then how can they be reconciled with the conclusion we have drawn? Remaining on the basis of justice, we must say that it is not refuted that the fact of frequent and extensive borrowing, not limited only to individual private prescriptions of Cicero’s ethics, but also capturing its fundamental provisions and justifications, remains a fact. Only this statement we, on the basis of the above, find it possible to accept with some reservations. In his conclusions concerning the De officiis ministrorum of St. Ambrose to Cicero's De officiis, scholars who belong to the third of the groups we have mentioned above usually assert that in their book “On the Duties” of St. the father gave a mixture of Christian and pagan, 4006 an amalgam of Stoicism and Christianity, 4007 Stoic morality and Christian instructions, 4008 the connection of Christian teaching and morality with pagan, 4009 that in this creation we find two moralities standing parallel in it, one Stoic, basing our duties on our nature, the other Christian, built on divine Revelation or divine law 4010; We find two principles that are closest to the definition of the highest good, either as virtue in itself, or as future eternal life with God. We do not deny that in De officiis ministrorum, along with Christian ethical teaching, there are also Stoic rules and regulations borrowed from Cicero, but we cannot agree that the result is an amalgam or, in other words, that Stoic ethics occupies a place in the book of St. father is the same place as Christian. This did not and could not happen. Let us remember that this book of St. Ambrose published it after fifteen years of theological and literary activity, when he wrote most of his works, after fifteen years of lively and extremely zealous service in the rank of bishop, after fifteen years of courageous and decisive struggle against paganism in all its manifestations. Is it possible that in his moral guidance for the flock, and closest to the clergy, he began to assign the same place to the principles and precepts of pagan ethics as to the Christian commandments? Is this possible for a bishop who, in the affairs of God, in the matter of religious convictions, did not want to know any concessions, any compromises? We think not. And yet St. Ambrose fully draws content from the pagan book. How can this contradiction be reconciled? Yes, St. the father borrows Stoic provisions and rules from Cicero, only they have a different meaning and meaning from the father of the church of the end of the 4th century, 4012 than from Cicero, a pagan writer of the 1st century BC. While retaining their form, most of the prescriptions and principles, like “enchanted” salt, were lost from the saint. father his inner pagan strength. 4013 For St. Ambrose, most of these pagan prescriptions and pagan principles remain only empty, not confessed by the heart of the saint. father with words that ended up in his work mostly because the author was not so independent as to resist the temptation to copy that harmonious (relatively) system of ethics that he found from his old teacher. Even more important for us is the fact that St. Ambrose in De officiis ministrorum clearly and definitely speaks of his desire to borrow from the works of pagan writers only such thoughts that do not contradict, or more precisely, are confirmed by the authority of Holy Scripture. “How,” asks the saint, “can we borrow something that we do not find in Holy Scripture?” 4014 True, the lack of independence prevented St. father to consistently carry out the task so decisively outlined by him, especially since this was prevented in this case by his school education, which imbued Christian youths with pagan thoughts, for the special respect that Stoic ethics, and in particular Cicero, enjoyed among Christian writers (see below for this), nevertheless St. Ambrose does not lose sight of this task throughout the entire book he examines, “On the Duties of the Clergy.” Sometimes he seems to forget about it for a while, but then he remembers again and, ignoring the Stoic definition he had just given, borrowed from Cicero, he begins to present a Christian view of the matter. That is why, for example, recognizing nature as the guide and way of moral life, 4015 St. the father, however, does not consider this Stoic example to be the only and primary one, 4016 but immediately (albeit in passing) points out the Christian principle of morality, namely, perfection in the image of the Heavenly Father, 4017 and presents real images of this moral perfection in the person of the Old Testament and New Testament righteous people. That is why, further, seeing, together with Cicero 4018, justice as one of the most important virtues, 4019 St. the father refuses, however, Cicero’s definition of this virtue. 4020 That is why, having spoken about the need to provide only feasible assistance to one’s neighbor 4021 and in general to be moderate 4022 and prudent in one’s generosity 4023 (this was Cicero’s teaching on this issue), 4024 St. Ambrose immediately says that it is necessary to provide unbearable help, 4025 or, pointing out the need to investigate the actual situation of those asking for help and mercy, 4026 St. the bishop writes: “God is no respecter of persons, for He knows everything; We must be merciful to everyone.” 4027 That is why, also, showing in De officiis ministrorum, like Cicero in his De officiis, a certain patrician-aristocratic attitude towards the lower class, 4028 St. the father immediately exhorts: “If we want to please God, we will have love (for people); Let us be unanimous and humble, considering everyone superior to ourselves.” 4029 “Why do you consider yourself better than another, when the duty of a Christian (commands) to prefer another to himself.” 4030 We repeat: borrowed from St. Ambrose (very often involuntarily) in Cicero, the Stoic rules and definitions in their abundance are often hidden from St. Father’s task, set by himself - not to accept what is not in Holy Scripture - does not allow him to apply (consistently) the principle 4031 of Christian ethics outlined by him (even if not clearly enough) and introduces great confusion and inconsistency into the book of the Milanese saint. Nevertheless, it is impossible to call this book an amalgam of Stoicism and Christianity, since this creation, imbued with the Christian principle of morality and fanned 4032 by the spirit of the Gospel and Christ, is precisely a Christian book, 4033 in which the Stoic element occupies a secondary and, in any case, subordinate place. Cp. August., Ep. 82, 21; Cassiodor., Divin. Iect. I, 16. Cp. F. Hasler, S. 20; I. G. Krabinger, “S. Ambrosii episcopi mediolanensis De officiis ministrorum libri III”, praefat., p. III – IV; Fessler, “Instinutiones patrologiae,” p. 705. R. Thamin, 234: Il faut ajouter que ces manuserits s'étagent sur des siècles différents, ce qui démontre que le succès fut persistant. Outre les copies littérales du texte, il en fut fait des résunés, des extraits, d'ou nous pouvons conclure que nous avons affaire non seulement á un livre qúon lit, mais à un livre, qúon étudie. Hasler, 20; I. G. Krabinger, praef., p. IV. I. Reeb, S. 13. Cp. R. Thamin, 234: De bone ce livre fut condideré comme le manuel officiel de la morale chrétienne. Cp. Th. Schmidt, S. 13: Hat es ja doch von Augustin und Cassiodorus an, die das Werk rühmend erwähnen, durch das ganze Mittelalter hindurch in ethischen Fragen als masgebend gegolten und einer der bedeutensten Kenner der Dogmengeschichte nennt den A. “eine der namhaftesten Autoritäten für das Mittelalter.” Th. Schmidt, S. 13. In France, even in the 19th century, one edition of De officiis ministrorum was made for the use of seminarians - R. Thamin, 234. Likewise, in German Catholic lyceums, the book “On the Duties of the Clergy” is used to clarify issues of Moral Theology - Th. Schmidt, 13. Dr. T. Ziegler, “Geschichte d. christl. Ethik.” Strassburg, 1886, S. 234 – 236. Prof. Th. Zielinski, “Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte”. Leipzig und Berlin, 1908, S. 140. G. Gossel, p. 49; A. Degert, 76. Prof. Th. Zielinski, 142; Dr. P. Ewald, passim. "General history of European culture." Edited by professors I. M. Grevs, F. F. Zelinsky, N. I. Karev and M. I. Rostovtsev. Volume VI. "Early Christianity". Department 2; E. Gatch, “Hellenism and Christianity.” St. Petersburg, 1911, p. 82. Le Duc De-Broglie, “Saint Ambroise”, 51. Nirschl, II, 375; Dominicus Leitmeir, I. Reeb and Hasler. For example, R. Cannata, treating the borrowed St. Ambrose among the Stoics, the position that virtue is the highest good, writes: Quod virtutem Ambrosius, stoicos secutus, summum dicit bonum, id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam, virtutem non esse... in se summum bonum, sed illud parere hominibus; viam scilicet essay (33). Or the same Cannata, stopping at St. Ambrose's thoughts on nature as a teacher of virtue, writes: Sed apud Ambrosium sermo est de natura ampliori significatione sumpta, id est de natura demum quae eadem sit ae Dei volutas; minime vero de ea natura, quae cum sit peccato malisque appetitibus corrupta ae depravata, rationi saepius obsistit (31). Also argues Hasler (S. 34 – 35) and Leitmeir (S. 35), to which Dr. thoroughly objects. P. Ewald (S. 43 – 44 und Anm. 1). For example, Dr. Th. Forster, Th. Schmidt. Cp. preface to our translation of the book De officiis ministrorum (“On the duties of clergy.” The work of St. Ambrose, Bishop of Milan. Kazan, 1908, p. 21). It is only necessary to make a reservation: Cicero in his ethics is closest to the Stoics, but in general he is an eclecticist typical of that time in ethics, and, mainly, in his philosophy. Cp. C. schenkl, t. XXXII, pars. II, p. XIV – XV; I. B. Kellner, 112. An exception must be made for Exameron VI, 54 – 57, where St. Ambrose, according to G. Gossel (p. 65), followed, together with Lactantius, some unknown Stoic. Cp. pars. I, praef. XXVIII. Cp. Pautus Plass, 20 – 21. They are found, for example, in De excessu fr. II, 12, 29, 35; De virginibus II, 5, 34; III, 4, 16; De virginitate 5, 25; De Cain et Abel II, 10, 36; De Spiritu Sancto II, 13, 154; De obitu Valentiniani 10. Cp. R. Thamin, 311 – 313; Dr. I. E. Niederhuber, “Die Eschatologie”, 13 flg.; Franz Rozynski, passim., cp. review of this dissertation by W. Wilbrand in Theologische Revue, 1911, No. 4, S. 110 – 111; MPL. t. XVI approx. to the above quotes from the works of St. Ambrose. Slope Th. Schmidt (S. 23) in all the Stoic thoughts of St. Ambrose to see borrowings from Cicero is not true, as we can conclude based on what is stated in the first part of this study. Cp. Forster, 177; Ed. Thouvenot, 116; Alzog, 373; prof. Th. Zielinski, 133. St. Ambrose borrows from Cicero not only certain ethical principles, but often also the rules of everyday experience or good manners. For example, he gives instructions on how and when to speak, in what voice, so as not to be rude and impolite (I, 19, 84 = I, 35, 129), etc. All individual cases of borrowings from St. Ambrose in Cicero are indicated by us in the footnotes to our translation. Wed. also A. Matrokhin, “Comparison of the contents of the works “De officiis” of Cicero and St. Ambrose of Milan" in "Orthodox Interlocutor", 1912, April, 429 - 462. Wed. Forster, 176; R. Thamin, 364. Some of these scholars seem to find it possible to accept De officiis ministrorum as an adequate expression of Christian ethics. Wed. titles of works by D. Leitmeir (“Apologie der christlichen Moral, Darstellung des Verhältniss der heidnischen Ethik zunächst nach einer Vergleichung”…), Hasler (“Über das Verhaltniss der heidnischen und christlichen Ethik auf (t) Grund einer Vergleichung”…), I. Reeb'a (Über die Grundlagen des sittlichen nach Cicero und Ambrosius.. Ein Beitrag zur Bestimmung des Verhältnisses zwischen heidnich-philosophischer und christlicher Ethik”). A happy exception in this case is the wonderful treatise by R. Thamin “Saint Ambroise et la morale chrétiene an IV-e stècle” and then the detailed and thorough monograph by Dr. Th. Förster: “Ambrosius, Bischof von Mailand...” Wed. I. Nevzorov, “The morality of Stoicism and Christian doctrine.” Zeno laid the foundation of the school, Cleanthes continued, and Chrysinnus completed the construction of the building of the Stoic system. Of particular importance in this case was Chrysinnus, of whom it was said that if Chrysinnes had not existed, there would have been no Stoa. Diogenis Laerti “De vitis, dogmatis et apophthegmatis clarorum philosophorum libri decem”, Editit N. G. Huebnerus. Volumen secendus, Lipsiae, A. MDCCCXXXI, lib. VII, 183. Dr. L'abbe A. Chollet, “La morale stoicienne en face de la morale chrètienne.” Paris, 1898, p. 47 – 48; I. Nevzorov, 4. The influence of Heraclitus especially affected Cleanthes (H. Hirzel, Il Th., I Abth., S. 179 und Anm. 2). The dependence of the Stoics on the Cynics especially affected Zeno. The latter was not only an eclectic who blindly adopted one or another, perhaps alien to each other, elements, but he positively sided with the cynics, firmly establishing their principle. He has a cynical nominalistic-empirical theory of knowledge, further, the rapprochement of virtue and knowledge, the distinction between good, evil and the indifferent, the self-sufficiency of virtue and knowledge. Like Antisthenes, Zeno looks at human nature as something good in itself, in a life consistent with which he sees virtue; From him he borrows cosmopolitanism and an allegorical interpretation of myths, through which Antisthenes wanted to reconcile popular religion with his philosophical views. This dependence on Antisthenes explains, among other things, that cynicism remained the ideal of the Stoics, in which they saw the shortest path to wisdom. The Stoics, by the way, said that once a sage has become a cynic, he must remain one. Diog., L., VII, 121.Cp. Dr. Eduard Zeller III, 1, 280; 350 – 351; 361 – 362; A. Schmekel, 471; P. Barth, “Die Stoa,” 203, 49; R. Hirzel II, 1, S. 12. For the different meaning given to logic by Plato and Aristotle, on the one hand, and the Stoics, on the other, see Schmekel I, 471 – 472. Cp. Windelband, History of Ancient Philosophy. Translation by St. Petersburg students. Higher Courses edited by prof. A. Vvedensky, St. Petersburg, 1908, p. 252. On the influence of the teachings of the Peripatetics on Stoic physics, see Dr. E. Ziller III, 1, S. 361 – 362. Dr. E. Ziller III, 1, 206. On the difference that existed in this case between Plato and Zeno, cf., for example, P. Barth, 36. Diogen Laertis VII, 56, 150; Stob., Ecl. I, 336 (Iohannis Stobaei “Antologii libri duo priores, qui inscribi solent Eclogae physicae et ethicae.” Recensuit Curtius wachsmuth. Vol. I – II (Berolini MDCCCLXXXIV); Plut., De comm. not. XXX, 2 (Plutarchi Cheronensis “Scripta moralia.” Graece et latine. Th. I – II. Editore Ambrosio Firmin Didot. Parisiis, MDCCCXLI); De plac. philos. I, XI, 4; IV, XX, 2; Cicero, Acad. post. I, 11, 39 (M. Tullii Ciceronis “Scripta quae manserunt omnia”. Recognovit C. F. W. Müller. Partis IV, vol. I – III. Lipsiae. MDCCCLXXXX, MDCCCXC (Bibliotheca Scriptorum graecorum et romanorum Teubneriana). Cp. “Scriptorum veterum fragmenta”, collegit Ioannes ab Arnim, Vol. “Chresippi fragmenta logica et physica”, § 299 sqq. Cp. Dr. E. Zeller III, 1, S. 131, Anm. 2, 3; P. Barth, 46 – 47. Hipp., Refut. haer. I, 21; Nemes., De nat. hom. 33, 34.(Nemesius Emesinus. “De natura hominis.” Graece et latine. Editit Chr. Fr. Mattaei. Halae Magdeburgicae, MDCCCII); Diogen Laertis, VII, 157; Cicero, De natur deis III, 14, 36. Cp. Dr. E. Zeller, III, 1, S. 133 – 145. Stob., Ecl. II, 144; Plutarch, De comm. not. XLV, 2; Seneca, Ep. 106.5; 113, 1 sqq. Stob., Ecl. I, 306; Diogen Laertis, VII, 134; Sext. Emp., Adv. mathem. IX, 11 (Sextum Empiricus. Ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri. Beuolini, 1842); Plutarch, De plac. philos. I, III, 39; Sen., Ep. 65, 2 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana). Ibidem; cp. Zeller, III, 1, S. 131 – 134. L. ab Arnim., v. III, § 346a. Cicero, De natur deis II, 9, 23 – 24; III, 14, 35 – 36. Diogen Laerti VII, 156; Plut., De plac. phil. I, VI, 1; Cicero, Acad. poster I, 11, 39. Cp. Stob., Ecl. I, 186; P. Barth., 45 – 46. Diogen Laerti VII, 134; Stob., Ecl. I, 306, 322; Sext. Emp. Adv. mathem. IX, 11; Plutarch, De plac. philos. I, III, 39; Sen., Ep. 65, 23. Diogen Laerti VII, 136 – 137, 142; Stob., Ecl. I, 312, 370 – 372, 414; Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. XL, 3; Nemes., De nat. hom. 72; Plutarch, De comm. not. XLIX, 2. De Stoic. repugn. XLI, 6. Diogen Laerti VII, 136 – 138; 147 – 149; Stob., Ecl. I, 58, sq.; 66; Plutarch, De comm. not. XLVIII, 2; De plac. philos. I, VII, 17. Cp. Zeller III, 1, S. 138 – 143. W. Windelband, “History of Philosophy”, 166 – 171; P. Barth, 47. Diogen Laerti, VII, 138, 147; Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. XXXIV, 5; XXXIX, 2; Stob., Ecl. I, 178. Diogen Laerti VII, 139; Sext. Emp., Adv. mathem. IX, 102. Cleanthes, distinguishing between principale and spiritus, recognizes fire as the matter of the deity. Chrysippus, for whom ήγεμονικον, as an essence penetrating the whole world, coincided with πνεῦμα, adopted the Cleanthean (Heraclitian) idea of ​​the primary essence (deity) as fire, without abandoning his idea of ​​it as πνεῦμα. Subsequently, he united fire and air, and therefore the essence of song is designated by him as both fire and air. The later Stoics follow Chrysippus. P. Hirzel, II, 1, S. 210 – 212; cp. S. 220. Diog Laertis VII, 147; Plutarch, De Stoic. repung. XXXIV, 5; XLVII, 4; Cicero, De natur deis II, 14, 37 – 45; 38 – 40. Diogen Laerti VII, 149; Stob., Ecl. I, 186; Plutarch, De plac. philos. I, XXVII, 3; XXXVIII, 3 – 4; A. Gell., Att. noct. VII, 2, 1 sqq. Cp. V. Windelband, “History of Philosophy,” 166. Plutarch, De plac. stoic I, VII, 17. Zeller, III, 1, 138 – 141; cp. I. Nevzorov, 18. Cicero, De natura deorum I, 15, 39; Sen., De benefit. IV, 7, 1; 8, 3. Hence the Stoics sometimes recognized the cosmos as λογικόν and the earth as a living, breathing being, a living breathing organism (Diogen Laerti VII, 143; Sext. Empir., Adv. mathem. IX, 101 - 103; Seneca, Natur. Quaest. VI, 16, 1 sqq. Cp. R. Hirzel, II, 1, S. 221; II, 2, S. 778). Zeller, III, 1, 148 – 149; I. Nevzorov, 20. Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. XXXVIII, 5, 6; De defect. orac. 19; Sen., Ep. 26, 16 (in Lactaut., Instit. d. I, 5 sq.); Diogen Laerti VII, 147. For example, luminaries were recognized as deities. Diogen Laerti VII, 145; Stob., Ecl. I, 66, 446, 518; Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. XLI, 2; Cicero, De natura deorum I, 14, 37; 15, 39; II, 15, 39, 42; 21, 54. Further, the Stoics considered earth, water, etc. to be deities. Cicero, De natura deorum I, 15, 39; Plutarch, De comm. not. XXXi, 5; Arnim, “Fragment”, I, § 165. Arnim, “Stoic. vet. fragment” I, §§ 168 – 169. The Stoics deified everything in which divine power was manifested, even if they were soulless objects. Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, LXVI. Cp. Zeller III, 1, S. 316 – 318; I. Nevzorov, 23; V. Windelband, “History of Philosophy,” 173 – 174. Cp. Zeller, III, 1, pp. 311 – 312. Cicero, De natura deorum II, 24, 63. Already Zeno, but even more Cleanthes, Chrysippus and their successors tried to indicate natural philosophical and moral ideas in the folk gods and stories about them. Cicero, De natura deorum III, 24, 63; Zeller, III, 1, S. 322 – 323; V. Windelband, “History of Philosophy,” 173 – 174. However, Antisthenes already laid the foundation for allegorical interpretations. P. Barth, 49. Nemes., De nat. hom. 33 – 34. Arnim, “Fragment”. I, § 495. Diogen Laerti, VII, 156 – 157; Cicero, De natura deorum III, 14, 36; Tuscul. I, 9, 19; Galen, Deplac. Hipp. et Plat. (“Medicorum graecorum opera quae extant.” Editionem curavit D. Garolus Gottlov Kühn. Volum. V, Lipsiae, 1823) III, 1 (p. 287); II, 8 (p. 282). Cicero, De natura deorum II, 9, 24; 11, 29; Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. XLI, 2. Galen, Deplac. Hippocr. et Plat. II, 8 (p. 282 – 283); M. Aurel., V, 33; VI, 15; Euseb., Praep. evang. XV, 21, 3. Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. XLI, 1, 8; De comm. not. XLVI, 2; De prim. frig. II, 5. This was Cleanthes's opinion. P. Barth, 77. Galen, Deplac. Hipp. et Plat. I, 6 (p. 184 – 185); II, 2 (p. 215); II, 5 (p. 241); III, 1, (p. 287). Cp. Zeller III, 1, S. 187; Anm. 2. Diogen Laerti VII, 110; Nemes., De nat. hom. 15, 96; V. Windelband, “History of Philosophy,” 172. Cleanthes saw in various parts of the soul only emanating actions from ήγεμονικόν, and Chrysippus considered them to be parts of ήγεμονικόν. R. Hirzel II, 1, 154. Diogen Laerti VII, 156. Cleanthes argued that until the end of the world the souls of all people will exist, but according to Chrysippus - only the souls of the wise (Arnim, “Fragment”, I, § 521). Most of the later Stoics adhered to Chrysippus's view of this subject. Diogen Laerti VII, 157; Plutarch, De plac. philos. IV, VII, 2; Euseb., Praepar. Evang. XV, 20, 6; I. Nevzorov, 31; P. Barth, 92. Cp. Zeller, 1, S. 165, 167. Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. XXIII, 3; XLVII, 4; Cicero, De fato 18, 41; 16, 36, 38; 12, 28 sqq; cp. Zeller, III, 1, S. 165 – 168; I. Nevzorov, 29. Thanks to the indicated distinction between main and secondary causes, the Stoics saved their doctrine of fate operating in the world according to immutable laws. Both people and all other (lower) beings are certainly subject to this law, with the only difference being that the former follow the eternal world law by their own urge and internal self-determination, and the latter - against their will and forcibly. Sen., Ep. 107, 11; Zeller III, 1. S. 168 und Anm. 2. Diogen Laerti VII, 88. By nature Zeno means (cf., however, P. Barth. 130, Anm. 6, 131, Dr. P. Deussen, “Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Keligionen,” Zweiter Band, Erste Abteilung. Leipzig, 1911, S. 421) nature in general (ή φύσις). Cleanthes - general nature (κσινή μόνη φύσις), and Chrysippus - both general and actually human (ίδίως άνθρωπίνη). Diogen Laerti VII, 89, 87; cp. Stob., Ecl. II, 34; P. Barth, 131 – 132; I. Nevzorov, 39. Diogen Laerti VII, 87, 89. Stob., Floril. 44, 11(Edit. Meineke 12) (Iohannis Stobei “Florilegium” Recognovit Augustus Meineke, Vol. I – IV, Lipsae MDCCCLV – VII); Diogen Laerti VII, 88; Cicero, De natura deorum I, 14, 36; De legg. I, 6, 18. Cp. Zeller, III, 1. S. 222, Anm. 4. Stob., Ecl. II, 184. Cp. Cicero De legg. I, 12, 33; II, 4, 8. Zeller, III, 1. S. 222, Anm. 4. Diogen Laerti VII, 88; Cicero, De natura deorum, I, 15, 39 – 40; Seneca, Ep. 66, 12. Stob., II, 116; Diogen Laerti VII, 89. Cp. Seneca Ep. 108, 8: “Nature has given everyone the soil (fundamenta) and the seeds of virtue.” Diogen Laerti VII, 90. In this sense, the Stoics spoke of the virtues of animals and plants. Seneca, Ep. , 11.Cp. I. Nevzorov, 40 – 41. Diogen Laerti VII, 93; Stob., Ecl. II, 108. Cp. P. Barth, 158 – 160. Plutarch, De placit. philos., prol. 2; De Stoic. repugnant. IX, 6. Seneca, Ep. 89, 8. Gerill was considered a heretic for placing science above moral perfection, for seeing knowledge as the goal of life and the only highest good. Diogen Laerti VII, 165, 37; Cicero, Acad. prior 42, 129; De inib. bon. et mal. II, 13, 43; IV, 14, 36; V, 25, 73. Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. VII, 4; Seneca, De otio I (28), 4. Cp. Zeller, III, 1. S. 236 – 237. Zeno in his state considered any spiritual education that was not related to a moral goal to be useless (Diog. VII, 32). The first who, as we know, abandoned this cynical point of view was Chrysippus, who, according to Diogenes (VII, 129), recognized the need for ευχρηστείν δε καίίτάάέγκύκγια μαθήματα. Cp. II, 1. S. 523 – 524. Cp. Zeller III, 1, 237 – 238: “For the Stoics, both elements (theoretical and practical) are not only inseparable, but represent one and the same thing (Ein und dasselbe): knowledge is unthinkable without virtue and virtue without knowledge: both are the correct activity of the soul or, better, the active soul itself, reason itself, exactly as it should be; hence virtue can quite rightly be called knowledge or fortitude, and from the point of view under consideration, the question of which of these two elements should be recognized as prior cannot take place.” Seneca, De benefit. VI, , 3; I, 5, 2; 6, 1; Cicero, Acad. poster I, 10, 38; Parad. 3, 1. Stob., Fliril., 6, 3 (Mein. 19). Diogen Laerti VII, 101, 120; Stob., Ecl. II, 218; Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. XIII, 1; De virtut. moral X; Sext. Empir., Adv. mathem. VII, 422; Cicero, De finib. IV, 27, 25; Parad. 3; Seneca, Ep. 66, 8 sqq. Sometimes, however, the Stoics evaluated this or that action (καθήκοντα) from an objective point of view, thereby introducing confusion into the very principle of judging the comparative value of actions. Cp. Zeller III, 1, pp. 266 – 267. Stob., Ecl. II, 192, 158.Cp. Dr. P. Deussen, 422. Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. XI, 1, XV, 10; De virt. mor. III; Cicero, De finib. III, 18, 59; IV, 6, 15; De officiis I, 3, 8; III, 3, 14. Stob., Ecl. II, 158. Diogen Laerti VII, 107. Ibidem. Zeno was the first to use the word καθῆκον and wrote a book about it (Diogen Laerti VII, 25). However, καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα had a special meaning for him: the first meant only duty, and the second only activity. (R. Hirzel, II, 1, S. 147). Καθῆκον, as an activity consistent with the rational and necessary law operating throughout the universe, is characteristic not only of people, but also extends to the animal and plant worlds. Diogen Laerti VII, 107. Cp. Plutarch, De virt. morel. II. Proceeding from this, the Stoics argued, among other things, that in each individual virtue all others are manifested (cp. Diogen Laerti VII, 125; Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn.VII) and, conversely, whoever has one vice also has all the others. Arnim I, § 216; cp P. Barth, 166. Galen, Deplac. Hippocr. et Plat. VII, 1 (p. 590); VII, 2 (p. 591); Plutarch, De virt. moral II, De Stoic. repugn. VII, 4. Cp. Diogen Laerti VII, 161. However, Chrysippus allowed for internal difference and a qualitative change in the soul, that is, he allowed for many virtues. Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. VII, 3; De Virt. mor. II; Galen, Deplac. Hippocr. et Plat. VII, 1 (p. 590). Diogen Laerti VII, 92, 100; Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. VII, 3; De virt. mor. I; Stob., Ecl. II, 102. For Zeno, Φρόνησις was not only one of the four main virtues, but also the main one for others (Cp. De virt. mor. II; De Stoic. repugn. VII, 2). In order to eliminate the contradiction made by Zeno, Ariston made φρόνησις an ordinary virtue, and attributed the meaning of the main one, as Chrysipus later did, to έπιστήμη (Galen, De plac. Hippocr. et Plat. VII, 2, 595 - 596). Cleanthes, instead of φρόνησις, put έγκράτεια in first place (Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. VII, 4) (Cp. R. Hirzel II, 1, S. 97 flg.; II, 2, S. 618 - 619. Dr. O. Weisenfels, 80). Compare, for example, Stob., Ecl. II, 106; Plutarch, De virit. moral II; Diogen Laerti VII, 92, 93. Diogen Laerti VII, 125 – 126; Stob., Ecl. II, 112, 114; Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. XXVII, 1. Diogen L. VII, 125; Stob., Ecl. II, 110, 116; Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. XXVII, 1. Cp. Zeller III, 1, S. 244. Plutarch, De plac. philos. proem., 2; Cicero, De officiis I, 43, 153; Seneca, Ep. 89, 5;Zeller III, 1, S, 238; R. Hirzel II, 2, S. 619. As can be seen from Cicero's De officiis (I, 43, 153; II, 2, 5), the Stoics, as one might think, already from the time of Ariston and Chrysippus, distinguished between σοφια and φρόνησις, although there was a very close relationship between these virtues. Wed. Plutarch, De virt. mor. II; Zeller III, 1, S. 238, Anm. 3. The Stoics divided all beings into two kinds: ζῶα λογικά and ᾶ λογα. The first include rational beings - gods and people, the second - unreasonable ones (A. Chollet, 30). A person can show justice only to rational beings, that is, to gods and people who, being rational beings, form one world state. Cp. Cicero, De finib. III, 19, 64; De legg. I, 7, 23. Stob., Ecl. II, 106. Cp. Diogen L. VII, 119. V. Windelband, 160 – 161. Cp. Zeller, III, 1, S. 301. Stob., Floril. 40, 9; Arnim. II, § 1131; M. Aur. III, 11; IV, 4; VI, 44; Seneca, De vit. b. XX, 5. Cp. Zeller, III, 1, S. 298 – 299. Diogen Laerti VII, 33, 131; Plutarch, De Alex. m. virt. s. fort. VI. Stob., Ecl. II, 184; Cicero, De natura deorum I, 44, 121. Ibidem; cp. Seneca, Ep. 9, 6. Diogen Laerti, VII, 124; cp. Stob., Eclog. II, 130. Diogen Laerti, VII, 124; cp. Seneca, De benefit. VII, 12, 2. Seneca, De benefit. III, 22, 1. Cp. Barth. 191. Seneca, De element. I, 18, 1; De benefit. II, 20, 1 – 2; 18, 2; cp. Ep. 95, 52 – 53. Diogen Laerti, VII, 93; Plutarch, De virt. mor. X. Cp. Epict., Dissert. , I, XXVI, 7. Diogen Laerti VII, 111; Plutarch, De virt. mor. III; De anim. proer. in Tim. XXVI, 3; Stob., Ecl. II, 168. Pluarch, De virt. mor. X; Galen, Deplac. Hippocr. et Plat. IV, 3 (p. 377); Cicero, Tuscul. IV, 7, 15; cp. Stob., Ecl. II, 172 sq. Diogen Laerti VII, 110; Stob., Ecl. II, 164 – 166; A. Schmekel, 331 – 333. Plutarch, De virt. moral 3; Diogen L. VII, 159; Galen, Deplac. Hippocr. et Plat. III, 7 (p. 335); V, 6 (p 476). The question of how irrational movement can arise in ήγεμονικόν remained unclear among the Stoics, although they made attempts to clarify it. Zeller, III, 1, S. 230; A. Schmekel, 333 flg.; Windelband, History of Philosophy, 181. Diogen Laerti VII, 115; Stob., Ecl. II, 182; Galen, Deplac. Hippocr. et Plat. V, 2 (p. 432); Cicero, Tuscul. IV, 10, 23; 12, 28; 13, 20. Stob., Ecl. II, 166, sq.; Cicero Tuscul. III. 11, 24 – 25; IV, 7, 14 sqq. Diogen Laerti VII, 111 sqq.; Stob., Ecl. II, 174.; Cicero, Tuscul. IV, 7, 16. Diogen Laerti, VII, 120. Thus taught Chrysippus, Perseus and Zeno; Heraclitus of Tarsus and Athenodorus believed that there are different types of sins. Ibidem 121. Cicero, Tuscul. III, 10, 22; IV, 17, 30; 18, 42; Seneca, Ep. 85.5 sqq.; 116, 1. Moreover, the Stoics could not agree with the assertion of the Peripatetics that some of the affects are not only permissible, but also useful and necessary. Ibidem. Diogen Laerti VII, 117. Cp. P. Barth, 129 – 130. Diogen Laerti VII, 117; Plutarch, De comm. notit. XXV, 5; Stob., Florit. 7, 20 (Mein. 21); Seneca, De ira I, 16, 7; cp. P Barth. 8, 107, 150. Diogen Laerti VII, 115 – 116. Cp. Stob., Ecl. II, 22; Plutarch, De virt. moral IX. Stob., II, 138. Cp. Zeller III, 1, S. 208. Diogen Laerti VII, 88, 94; Stob., Ecl. II, 134, 138; Plutarch, De comm. not. XXVII, 9. Diogen Laerti VII, 30, 101, 94; Stob., Ecl. II, 138, 200 sq.; Sextum Empiricum, Adv. mathem. XI, 184. Diogen Laerti VII, 98; Stob., Ecl. II, 78, 188, 202; Sextum Empiricum, Adv. mathem. XI, 22, 25, 30; Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. XII, 1; De comm. not. XX, 1. Zeller III, 1, 217; P. Barth, 173 flg. Cp. Seneca, De vita b. 9, 4. Stob., II, 90; Sextum Empiricum, Adv. mathem. XI, 11. Diogen Laerti VII, 102 – 103. Cf. I. Nevzorov, 44. Diogen Laerti VII, 103. And, conversely, the opposite things, for example, illness, poverty, etc., are not evil: all this is neither useful nor harmful. Diogen Laerti VII, 102. Diogen Laerti VII, 160; Cicero, De fin. IV, 17, 47; R. Hirzel (II, 1, S. 44) classifies him not even as a Stoic, but as a Cynic. Diogen Laerti VII, 102b 104 – 105; Stob., II, 142, 144, 146, 148. Diogen Laerti VII, 105; Stob., II, 144, 146. Diogen Laerti VII, 105 – 107; Stob., Ecl. II, 146. Cp. I. Nevzorov, 45 – 46. Diogen Laerti VII, 105; Stob., II, 142, 144, 146; Cicero, De fin. III, 15, 50 – 51; 16, 52 – 53. Diogen Laerti VII, 104, 107; Stob., Ecl. II, 142; Sextum Empiricus, Adv. mathem. Xi, 59 sq.; Cicero, De fin. III, 15, 51; 16, 52. Cp. Zeller III, 2, S. 261 – 263. Hekaton and Chrysippus excluded pleasure from προηγμένα (Diogen Laerti VII, 103), and Cleanthes even considered it contrary to nature (Sextum Empiricum, Adv. mathem. XI, 73). However, other Stoics believed that there are pleasures that are in accordance with nature and therefore desirable, because ὴδονή is έπιγέννημα of nature-like life, its natural, but not a goal-consequence (Diogen Laerti VII, 86; cp. Seneca, Ep. 116, 3; cp. R. Hirzel II, 1, S. 96). But recognizing ὴδονή as an affect, the Stoics were afraid to call the joy of the virtuous by this name and called it χαρά, guadium (Diogen Laerti VII, 116; Seneca, Ep. 59, 2; cp. Zeller III, 1, S. 218, Anm. 3). Guerrillus, depending on the two kinds of good, apparently distinguished, like the Peripatetics, in addition to the main goal of virtue, also subgoals - ύποτελίδες (Diogen Laerti VII, 165). In fact, as R. Hirzel proves (II, 1, S. 165), he was an adiaphorist, and his ύποτελίδες is the same as Zeno’s προηγμένα (cf. Zeller III, 1, S. 259, Anm. 3). These are: χαρά, εῦλάρεια, βούλησις. Diogen Laert VII, 115 – 116. Cf. Nevzorov, 65. Stob., Ecl. II, 196 – 197; Plutarch, Stoic. absurd. poet. dic. 4, 2. Diogen Laerti VII, 121; Stob., II, 230; Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. XX, 3. Diogen Laerti VII, 121; Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. II, 3; Stob., II, 184. Plutarch, Stoic. c. not. XXII, 2. Diogen Laerti VII, 124; Stob., Ecl. II, 124; Cicero, Parad. IV; Tuscul. III, 5, 10. Cp. Zeller III, 1, S. 252. Diogen Laerti VII, 127; Stob., II, 116, 198. Plutarch, Stoic. absurd. poet. dic. IV, 1; De comm. not. X, 4; De perfect. m. virt. I. Cp. Zeller III, 1, 255 – 256. Cleanthes, along with the cynics, believed that virtue cannot be lost, but Chrysippus thought differently. Diogen Laerti VII, 127. Cp. P. Barth, 161. Diogen Laerti VII, 130; Stob., II, 226. Read more in Zeller III, 1, 305 – 308. Already Chrysippus and even Zeno recognized, in addition to the wise and the foolish, the class of successful προκοπτοντες still standing between one and the other (P. Barth., 186). Sextum Empiricus, Adv. mathem. IX, 133. Cp. Euseb., Praepar. evang. I, VI, c. 8 (MPG t. XXI, p. 449). Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. XXXI, 5. Cp. Hirzel II, 1, S. 280 – 281; I. Nevzorov, 69 – 71. A. Chollet, 48 – 49; M.Ad. Frank, “Dictonaire des sciences philosophques”, Paris, 1885, Art. "Stoiciens", p. 1675; Dr. O. Werssenfels, 81 – 82; Leipoldi, “Christenthum und Stoicismus,” “Zeitschrift f. K. -G.”, XXVII (1906), S. 133 – 134. Cp. Deussen, 394 – 395; 402 – 409. Zeller III, 1, S. 529; Book S. N. Trubetskoy, “History of Ancient Philosophy,” part two, Moscow, 1908, p. 118. Carneades (214 – 129) was a representative of the New Academy (Sextum Empiricus, Pyrr. Hip. I, 220), which, as is known, tended towards skepticism. Historians consider Arkzilaus (316 – 241) to be the founder of this Academy (Windelband, “History of Ancient Philosophy”, 272 – 273; Deussen, 2 B. I Abth., S. 307 – 312). A. Schmekel, 477; Book S. N. Trubetskoy, “History of Ancient Philosophy,” part two, p. 116 – 117. Cp. Zeller III, 1, 614 – 615. K. Martha, “Philosophers and moral poets of the Roman Empire”, Moscow, 1886, p. 240. Cp. A. Schmekel, S. 391; O. Heine, Ciceronis Tusculanarum disputationum libri V, Erstes Heft: libri I et II, Leipzig, 1892, Einleitung. S. XIV – XV. Acad. poster 4, 17; 6, 22; Acad. prior 5, 15; Defin. V, 3, 7. Acad. poster 10, 37; Defin. III, 2, 5; V, 8, 22; De legg. I, 13, 38; Cp. Defin. IV, 22, 60. Zeller III, 1, 553; Windelband, 148. Since Boethus did not have much influence on Cicero, we will limit ourselves to only mentioning him. Panetius (born in 185 - 186 in Rhodes, died in 110 - 109), a student of the Stoic Diogenes (Cp. I. Reeb, 9), spent many years in Rome, where, together with Polynius, he was the soul of the circle grouped around Scipio Africanus the Younger (Cp. De officiis I, 26, 90; I. Reeb, 9). Posidonius, student of Panetius (Cicero, De officiis III, 2, 8; De divinat. I, 3, 6), born (...). Cicero listened to him (De natura deorum I, 3, 6; Tuscul. II, 25, 61; De fato 3, 5; Brut. 91, 316) in Rhodes either in 78 (A. Schmekel, 12 – 13, Anm. 1), or in 77. (Zeller III, 1, S. 574, Anm. 2). Cicero, De finib. IV, 28, 79. Seneca, Ep. 90, 32. Cp. Zeller III, 1, pp. 578 – 579. Windelband, History of Philosophy, p. 149. R. Hirzel, II, 1, S. 257. Cp. Zeller, III, 1, S. 575 flg.; Dr. O. weissenfels, 12 – 13. A. Schmekel, 372. The Stoic trend in Pythagoras, which was held, among other things, by Varro, Macobius, Theon of Smyrna and Philo of Alexandria, was brought to life mainly by Posidonius and especially by his commentary on Timaeus (I, Schmekel, 436 - 437; cp. 431 - 432, Anm. 1). Op. cit. II, 1, S. 335. Cp. Paul Barth, 26. Stob., Ecl. I, 338; Plutarch, De plac. philos. II, IX, 3. Cp. A. Schmekel, 239 – 240. Cp. P. Barth, 199; Dr. P. Deussen, 400. Diogen Laerti VII, 142; Stob., Ecl. I, 414; Cp. Cicero, De natura deorum II, 45, 115; 46, 119. Cp. A. Schmekel, 187 – 237; Zeller III, 1, 561 Anm. 2 ff.; R. Hirzel, I, 226 flg. Even earlier than Panetius, Zeno of Tarsus (successor of Chrysippus) and then Diogenes of Selencia came to the same conclusion (Zeller III, 1, S. 553). A. Schmekel, 190, 243, 317; Zeller III, 1, 566 – 567. Cp. A. Schmekel, 190; P. Barth, 50. Cp. Cicero, De divin. I, 30, 64; cp. A. schmekel, 242 – 243; P. Barth, 50 – 51. Diogen Laerti VII, 149; Cicero, Acad. prior 33, 107; De divinat, I, 3, 6.Cp. Schmekel, 245 – 247. Diogen Laerti VII, 149; Cicero, De divinat. I, 3, 6; Acad. prior 33, 107. Cicero, Tiscul. I, 18, 42. A. Schmekel, 203 – 205. Cp. P. Barth, 40. A. Schmekel, 199. The unreasonable part, in turn, is composed of φύσις and άλογος ψυχή (A. Schmekel, 203 – 205). Ὀρμή is essentially a healthy faculty; This is how it remains in all those cases when it obeys reason; otherwise, it turns into πάδος (Cicero, de officiis, I, 28, 101; 29, 102; cp. A. Schmekel, 205). A. Schmekel, 199, 203 – 205. Nemes. De nat. hom. 95 – 96. Cp. A. Schmekel, 200 – 201; Zeller, III, 1, 564. Cicero, Tuscul. I, 32, 79; 18, 42. Cp. A. schmekel, 197; Zeller III, 1, 503, Anm. 1. A. Schmekel, 380 – 381; 316; Some scientists are even inclined to classify Posidonius not so much as a Stoic, but as a Platonist. R. Hirzel, II, 1, S. 138. A. Schmekel, 248 – 249, 256. A. Schmekel, 336; Zeller III, 1, pp. 583 – 584. A. Schmekel, 336, 249, 314, 316. Cleanthes, to whom Posidonius stands much closer than to Chrysippus, also taught about the immortality of the soul. A. Schmekel, 381; R. Hirzel, II, 1, S. 138. Cp. Zeller, III, 1, S. 579. Galen, Op. cit. V, 1 (429). Cp. Zeller III, 1, S. 580, Anm. 4; A. Schmekel, 327 flg.; R. Hirzel II, 1, 331 – 334; Windelband, 210 – 211. Galen, Deplac. Hipocr. et Plat. IV, 3 (p. 377); V, 5 (p. 461); A. Schmekel, 327; Zeller III, 1, 579. R. Hirzel, II, 1, 332 – 333. Ibidem S. 272 (Anm. 4) – 273. Duogen Laerti VII, 92. Theoretical virtue is concerned with the investigation of truth and manifests itself as wisdom; practical has as its subject the realization of truth or the implementation of moral principles in practical life; this virtue falls into two parts: the first covers practical virtues towards oneself, and the second – towards all other people. For more details see A. Schmekel, 216 – 218. Sstob., Ecl. II, 110, 112; R. Hirzel, II, 1, 511 flg. Strictly speaking, Panetius occupies the middle between the ancient Stoics and Posidonius. Thus, in the same way as the latter, he teaches that virtues are divided into theoretical and practical (VI, 92), and together with the former, he asserts that knowledge underlies both theoretical and practical virtues (Cicero, De officiis I, 5, 17; 6, 19; cp. A. Schmekel, 216). Diogen Laerti VII, 92. R. Hirzel, II, 1, 510 flg.; 496. Cp. Seneca, Ep. 94, 45. R. Hirzrl, II, 1, 529 – 530. Panetius left the question of the reality of the sage without attention, and Posidonius said that reality did not reveal the sages, although he did not deny the fundamental possibility of their appearance in the future (A. Schmekel, 366). Ibidem. S. 212, 214 Anm. 2. Ibidem 212; R. Hirzel, II, 1, 430 flg. Cleanthes recognized pleasure as something contrary to nature. Sextum Empiricus, Adv. mathem. XI, 73 (Arhim I, § 574). R. Hirzel, II, 1, 452. Panetius could not advocate the eradication of man’s desire for sensual pleasure, since this desire, in his opinion, is closely connected with the animal part of our nature. The only thing he could demand from a person in this case was mastery over sensual aspirations (R. Hirzel, II, 1, 464). As for pleasure itself, Panetius distinguished between two types of pleasure: spiritual and physical. The first relates to the soul: this is a noble and befitting feeling for a person, which, however, should not be the goal of human aspirations. The second has to do with feelings; since this pleasure does not contain anything bad, then it has the right to exist.A. Schmekel, 223 – 224; cp. R. Hirzel, II, 1, 464. R. Hirzel, II, 1, 464 – 465; A. Schmekel, 365. A. Schmekel, 274. Cp. Zeller, III, 1, S. 582. If Panetius and Posidonius attach the name ἅ γαθα to προηγμένα, then in this case they partly followed Plato (R. Hirzel, II, 1, 335 - 338), and, most importantly, having in mind the general public, for fear of being misunderstood by the word προηγμένα preferred ἅ γαθα (R. Hirzel, II, 1, 270 – 272zh cp. Ibidem 350 – 351; P. Barth, 137 Anm. 7). Cp. Victor Faminsky, “Religious and moral views of L. Anneus Seneca (philosopher) and their attitude to Christianity,” Kiev, 1906, pp. 2 – 3. Cp. Zeller, III, 1, S. 20 – 21; 540; I. Nevzorov, 8 – 9. Zeller, III, 1, S. 539; I. Reeb. 4. Prof. D. Naguevsky, “History of Roman Literature”, volume one: “From ancient times to the era of Augustus”, Kazan, 1911, p. 348. Cp. A. Chollet, VIII. Zeller, III, 1, 538 – 539. Zeller, 1, 565; A. Schmekel, 446; O. Heine, VI. Windelband, 250; cp. R. Hirzel, II, 1, 376 flg. A. Schmekel proves that Panetius wrote only two of the three books he proposed (Cp. Cicero, De officiis, III, 2, 7). The second of these books was copied by Cicero in his De officiis. As for the first book, which treated theoretical virtues, he published it almost without a trace (A. Schmekel, 23, 25 – 27). To justify his teacher from some criticisms, Posidonius wrote a commentary on his περί καθήκοντος, in the third part of which he treated the conflict between the honest and the useful, which part was used by Cicero in the third book of De officiis (III, 2, 8; Ad Attic. XVI, 2, 4). Cp. A. Scmekel, 28; prot. V. Molodensky, “De officiis of Cicero and St. Ambrose of Milan", "Faith and Reason", 1887, No. 17, p. 216; R. Hirzel, II, 1, 324 – 327. Until the beginning of the 2nd century. BC, the Romans, one might say, did not know Greek philosophy at all, and Cicero’s statement that the Romans had long been engaged in philosophy is just a phrase. For the first time, the Romans began to get acquainted with it only after the second Punic War and then the war with Macedonia and Syria, when, on the one hand, the Romans penetrated far into the East, and on the other, the Greeks appeared in Rome as either hostages or slaves. Thus, among the Achaian hostages taken to Italy in 167 was Polinius. At this time, so many philosophers had already appeared that the Senate, which looked at philosophy as the culprit of corruption of good morals, especially dangerous for young men, expelled rhetoricians and philosophers from Rome in 161. In 155 (according to Zeller, in 156) an embassy arrived from Athens to Rome for political purposes, which included, among other things, three philosophers: the academician Carneades, the peripatetic Critolaus and the Stoic Diogenes. The latter took advantage of the opportunity to publicly expound their philosophy to the Romans. True, due to circumstances beyond their control, they soon had to leave Rome, but the seeds they threw did not die. By the way, under the influence of their preaching, the circle of Scipio Africanus the Younger became interested in philosophy, and became close to the philosopher Panetius. After that, Rome little by little is filled with adherents of all four main philosophical schools (Zeller, III, 1, S. 531 - 538; O. Heine, V - VI; Dr. G. Fischer, “M. Tulii Ciceronis Tusculanarum disputationum ad M. Brutum libri quinque”, Berlin, 1863, Einleit., S. V - VI; Dr. O. Weussenfels, 3; D. Leitmeir. Despite the significant spread of philosophy in Rome, the Romans had almost no national literature. Attempts in this spirit by Aenius, Valerius Soranus, M. Terence Varro, as well as the Epicureans Amafinius, Rabius and Cacius (to whom Cicero was negatively disposed (Acad. poster. 2, 5; p. ad fam. 15, 19, 2) were unsuccessful. The only exception is the poem by Lucretius Cara De rerum natura (Prof. D. Nagulevsky, 349; Dr. O. Weissenfels, 3; Cicero, De amit. 5, 18; Parad. proem. 2. Cp. Zeller, III, 1, 648; Dr. H. Ritter, “Geschichte der Philosophie”, Vierter Theil, Hamburg, 1834, S. 118 – 119. Tuscul. V, 2, 5. Cp. G. Boissier, “Cicero and his friends,” M. 1886, p. 281. Cp. prof. D. Naguevsky, 340; De. H. Eitter, 105. Brut. 93; Tuscul. I, 2, 3; Parad. proem. In philosophy, Cicero found a cure for the wounds inflicted on him by the blows of fate. Acad. post. 3, 11. Prof. D. Nagulevsky, 396. Cp. Zeller, III, 1, S. 649, Anm. 9; O. Heine, IX; prof. D. Nagulevsky, 397. With the exception of the books “De republica” and “De legibus”, all of his philosophical works were written in the period 46 - 43 (Dr. O. Weissenfels, 4; Prof. D. Nagulevsky, 432) Zeller, III, 1, S. 649; O. Weissenfels, 5 – 6. Zeller, III, 1, S. 661; H. Ritter, 107; prof. D. Naguevsky, 369: O. Heine, “M. Tullii Ciceronis ad Marcum dilium libri tres.” Berlin, 1878, Einl., S. 16; G. Stoerhug, “Quaestiones ciceronianae ad religionem spectates”, p. 38, sqq.; Friedrich Überwegs, “Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie”, Erster Theil: Das Alterthum. Beatbeitet und heransgegeben von Dr. Max Heinze", Berlin, 1903, S. 340. Cicero did not see any significant disagreement between individual schools and had a negative attitude only towards the Epicureans. Cp. Acad. prior. 5, 15; Acad. post. 6, 22; De officiis I, 1, 2; De leg. I, 21, 55; 20, 53. Cicero, De officiis, III, 4, 20: “Our Academy gives us great freedom to defend what seems most probable” Cp. II, 2, 7; Tuscul. V, 28, 83; Acad. prior 22, 69; Acad. poster 4, 13; 12, 43, 46; De natura deorum, I, 5, 12. However, Cicero’s skepticism was peculiar (cf. Prof. I. G. Redkin, “From lectures on the history of the philosophy of law in connection with the history of philosophy in general,” volume seven, St. Petersburg, 1891, p. 185 et seq.). First of all, it did not flow from his independent judgments about the principles of epistemology, but was a consequence of the indecision into which the disagreements of philosophers placed him (Zeller, III, 1, S. 652); then, Cicero recognizes the actual objective truth, and denies only the possibility of its perception and comprehension (comprehendi et percipi - Acad. prior. 38, 119); he recognizes the importance of proof of the evidence of a known truth, in which proof he justifies his doctrine of the probable (Acad. prior. 3, 8; 13, 41); further, in the religious and moral sphere, which directly concerned life and the existing way of life, he did not find it possible to use skepticism (Cp. Zeller, III, 1, 654 – 655), arguing that religious and ethical truths are based on innate concepts (a position with which the Stoics would not agree), transforming probable knowledge into reliable (Tuscul. I, 16, 36). Tuscul. II, 3, 7 – 9; De divin. II, 1, 1; De fato2, 3 – 4; De finib. IV, 3, 5 – 6. Tuscul. II, 3, 7 – 9; De divin. II, 1, 1; De officiis I, 1, 3. Cp. H. Ritter, 116; D. Leitmer, 6 – 7,. In general, Cicero borrows a lot from Panetius. This is most clearly seen from the fact that when he deviates from Panetius, he falls into contradiction with himself (about the meaning, for example, vivere convernienter naturae). But even though he departs from Panetius, Cicero is still under his influence (III, p. 3). Not only that. He even takes the trouble to respond (III, p. 7) to his critics (R. Thamin, 191 – 192). Where Cicero does not follow in De officiis Panetius, his source is either Posidonius, or Hecato, or Athenadorus (R. Hirzel, II, 1, 501). De anic. 5, 18; De officiis, III, 4, 16. De finib. IV, 9, 21; 19, 55; 28, 77; cp. De officiis, I, 8, 27. Wed. IV book. De finib. (Zeller, III, 1, S. 663 und Anm. 3). When writing works directly related to this issue, mainly De republica and De legibus, Cicero used the works of Panetius and Posidonius, an essay on the state of Aristotle, but mainly an essay on the state of Plato. A. Schmekel, 374; Dr. H. Ritter, 165; G. Boissier, “Cicero and His Friends”, 25. De legibus I, 6, 18; II, 4, 10. De republica III, 22, 33. De legibus I, 6, 18 – 19; 15, 42. De legibus I, 12, 33. Cicero distinguishes, although he does not make this distinction completely, consistently, between lex and jus. Following Greek terminology, he designates the first as a general concept, and the second as a particular concept (A. Schenkel, 47). De legibus I, 10, 28, etc. De finibus III, 19, 62 – 63; De legibus I, 12, 33. De legibus I, 14, 40 – 41; cp. 43 – 46. Ibidem; cp. De legibus I, 15, 42. De legibus I, 7, 23; De republica III, 22, 23; 23, 24; De finibus III, 20, 67. Cp. A. Schenkel, 59, 47, 455 – 456. De officiis III, 3, 11; 15, 64; Cp. III, 7, 34, where Cicero argues that it is not the useful that can come into conflict with the honest, but only the seemingly useful. A person who follows reason lives a normal life, in harmony with general and personal nature, and, therefore, a useful life. Hence the virtuous and useful life are identical. De officiis, III, 6, 26; 12, 56; cp. III, 17, 72; 5, 25. De finibus, II, 14, 45; cp. De officiis, III, 5, 25. De officiis, I, 43, 153 – 154. De republica, I, 2, 2; I, 7, 12. Cp. Vekhov, S. “Cicero’s essay “On the State,” in “J. M.I. Pr.”, 1881, CCXVIII, p. 589. According to Plato's teachings, the concept of morally good is not fully realized in an individual person, but only in a society of people who form a separate state organism. A state based on the idea of ​​justice is a concrete reality, an objective realization of the idea of ​​justice. Since what is morally good is determined by the concept of justice, only one who is a member of the state can be morally good or righteous. F.Chr. Baur, “Drei Abhandinngen zur der alten Philosophie und ihres Verhältnisses zum Christentum”, Leipzig, 1876, S. 256. De finibus, II, 18, 57 – 58; De officiis, III, 17, 68 sqq. De officiis, II, 14, 54. As if frightened by such a bold statement, Cicero hastens to take refuge behind the authority of Panetius, whom he obsequiously calls gravissimus stoicorum. De amicit. 16, 57; 17, 61. Cicero's morality contains many prejudices that are Roman in general and aristocratic in particular. He, for example, praising the Roman state, not only considers the rule of the Romans over the peoples conquered by arms to be fair, but also, like Plato and Aristotle, defends slavery (De republica, II, 16, 30; III, 24, 36; 25, 37) and disdains the professions of menial labor (De officiis, I, 42, 151). Cp. Dr. H. Ritter, 167 – 168; A. Degert, 73. R. Thamin, 199. Thamin almost literally repeats A. Degert, 73. G. Boissier, “Roman Religion from Augustus to the Antonines.” Translation by Maria Korsak, M. 1878b p. 44 – 45. Ibidem 45 – 49; cp. G. Stoerling, “Quastiones ciceroniae ad religionem spectantes”, p. 29 sqq.; “M. Tullii Ciceronis De divinatione et de fato” ed. G. H. Moser, Francofurto ad Moenum. MDCCCXXVIII, praef. XI, 29, 31. De natura deorum, I, 22, 60 sq. De legibus I, 7, 22; Sonm. Seip. 13, 13; 15, 15. De respublica, VI, 17, 17; cp. Zeller, III, 1, S. 666. De natura deorum, II, 7, 18. De natura deorum, II, 17, 46. Acad. poster 7, 28 – 29. Tim. 3, 10: Hune mundum animal essay... De natura deorum, II, 46, 118; De div. I, 49, 111. Tuscul. I, 21, 48; De divinatio, II, 33, 71, etc. Cf. S. Vekhov, p. 591; V. Kozhevnikov, “Moral and mental development of Roman society in the 2nd century”, Kozlov, 1874, pp. 37 – 39; G. Boissier, "Roman Religion", preface, pp. 3 – 4; page 45: “Cicero loved philosophy, and his own philosophy was not one from which the Roman religion could derive great benefits. Among his works we find one discussion about the nature of the gods, and another about fortune telling. In both cases, he has a very bad attitude towards popular religions and, without hesitation, laughs at the gods and fables about them, at fortune-tellers and their miracles. The last essay was written clearly, firmly, precisely, without any hesitation or hints; in it, Cicero sincerely expresses his thoughts... Meanwhile, he himself was an augur and was vain about it”; page 48 “In the correspondence, Cicero is shown to us from a new side. There is no place in it for either philosophical or popular religion. He never once touches upon those questions which he himself proclaimed to be the most important, and which, according to him, should occupy most of all reasonable minds (De natura deorum, II, 1). In the most difficult moments, religious thoughts did not come to his mind, and he never tried to console himself in the sorrows of his present life with hope for the future life. Approaching the end, he consoles himself with the Epicurean maxims that he once attacked so ardently... The noble hopes for immortality that fill his writings never occur to him in moments of misfortune and danger.” De natura deorum, I, 2, 4; II, 61, 153; De legibus, I, 7, 23. De legibus, II, 7, 15; 13, 32. De natura deorum, III, 2, 5; De legibus, II, 8, 9: “Let no one separately have gods and privately worship neither new nor newcomers, unless they are publicly recognized.” De natura deorum, III, 2, 5; 17, 43; De legibus, II, 13, 32; 8, 19 – 9, 21; De divinitio, II, 12, 28; II, 33, 70; 72, 148; cp. Syu Vekhov, 592. De natura deorum, I, 1, 2; Tuscul I, 16, 36; 13, 30. Cicero explains this innateness, following Plato, as a memory of pre-worldly life and pre-worldly knowledge (De legibus, I, 8, 24 - 25). However, visible nature also teaches a person to believe in the gods. (Tuscul. I, 28, 69 – 70; De divinatio, II, 72, 148; De natura deorum, I, 1, 2). Tuscul. I, 29, 70; 49, 118; V, 25, 70; De natura deorum, I, 2, 3; De legibus, I, 7, 21; II, 7, 15; 13, 32; III, 1, 3. Legal and moral law is considered by Cicero as copies of the divine world-ruling wisdom. De legibus, II, 4, 8. Cp. Zeller, III, 1, S. 666. De legibus, II, 13, 32; De natura deorum, II, 65, 162. Cp. Hirzel, I, 195 – 196. Tuscul. I, 25, 60; 27, 66 – 67; cp. 28, 70. Tuscul. I, 29, 70; 26, 65; 27, 66; 18, 42; V, 13, 38; Somn. Scrip. 15, 15. De officiis I, 28, 101; 36, 132. Tuscul. I, 29, 70. In this case, Cicero retreats from the teachings of the ancient Stoics towards Plato; Wed Tuscul. I, 10, 20. Tuscul. I, 13, 30; 15, 35; 16, 36. Tuscul. I, 29, 71; De senect. 21, 78. Somn. Scrip. 25, 27; 26, 28; De senect. 21, 78. Tuscul. I, 24, 57 – 58: “To learn is nothing other than to remember what the soul knew even before it was imprisoned in the shackles of the body. This needs to explain the fact of the existence of general concepts - ἔννοιαι. External perceptions serve only as a means for the soul to remember, to clarify the general concepts existing in it. Tuscul. I, 24, 57; De divinitio, I, 51, 115; 36, 63; De senecta, 21, 78. Tuscul. I, I, 12, 27; De senecta, 23, 84. Cp. Dr. E. Zeller, III, 1, S. 661. De fato, II, 24, 25; 18, 41. De legibus, I, 16, 44 – 45. De legibus, I, 8, 25; cp. 7, 22, 23. De finibus, V, 9, 25 – 27; cp. De officiis, I, 4, 11. Cp. De officiis, I, 16, 50; 4, 12. Since ratio is also characteristic of the deity, it must be said that the virtue of gods and people is the same and that it no longer exists in any other kind. De legibus, I, 8, 25. De officiis, I, 28, 101; De finibus, V, 21, 59 – 60; II, 14, 15; Pro Milon, 4. Tuscul. V, 24, 69; 25, 70, 71. The closer a person is to nature, the purer he reflects it in himself: we learn from children what is in accordance with nature. De finibus, II, 11, 45; V, 22, 61; cp. 62. Ad Att. 10, 12, 7. Cp. prof. D. Naguevsky, 241. De officiis, I, 34, 122 – 124. De finibus, V, 12, 35 – 36; 13, 36 – 38; cp. 14, 36. Tuscul. IV, 15, 34; Parad. 3, I, 22. Acad. poster 10, 38; Parad. 3, I, 22; De finibus, III, 9, 32; De officiis, I, 15, 49. De officiis, II, 10, 35; Acad. post. 10, 38. Cicero even claims, contrary to reality, that all philosophers recognized the unity of virtue. De officiis, 10, 35. In place of άνδρεία, Cicero puts magnitudo animi, to which he subordinates άνδρεία, whereas, according to the Stoic view, these two virtues stood in the opposite relationship. Cp. O. Heine, "M. Tullii Ciceronis. De officiis ad Marcum filium libri tres", Berlin, S. 23 – 24. Cp. Diogen Laerti, VII, 92; Schmekel, 36. De officiis, I, 5, 15 – 16; Orat. part. 22, 76. De officiis, II, 5, 18. Cicero borrowed this division from Panetius, more precisely, from Posidonius, who combined the Platonic-Stoic doctrine of the division of virtues into four main ones with the Aristotelian division of them into theoretical and practical, and he classified wisdom as a theoretical virtue, and the other three as practical (Diogen Laerti VII, 92; see above). In this place (De officiis, II, 5, 18) we have this division of virtues into three categories, borrowed by Cicero from Panetius and Posidonius. (Cf. Seneca, Ep. 89, 14). De finibus, I, 7, 25; De natura deorum, II, 1, 3; Tuscul. V, cap. 24. De legibus, I, 22, 58 – 59. Defin. I, 7, 25; IV, 5, 12; Tuscul. V, 3, 9; 24, 69; De natura deorum, II, 1, 3; Dr. H. Ritter, S. 122. De officiis, I, 43; 153; cp. 9, 28; 21, 71. De officiis, I, 43, 153; cp. I, 44, 158. De officiis, I, 7, 20; III, 19, 76. De officiis, III, 10, 42; cp. I, 15, 48. De officiis, I, 25, 88; Tuscul. I, 14, 32; Partit. orat. 23; De legibus, I, 7, 23. We must do charity first of all to those who love us most (De officiis, I, 15, 47), and then to those who need it most (De officiis, I, 15, 49). De legibus, III, 2, Fragm. Lactant., Institute. div. V, 8, 10. De officiis, I, 45, 160; I, 17, 58. De officiis, I, 13, 41. In this case, obviously, the influence of Panetius and Posidonius was felt, who, under the influence of the attacks of Carneades, if they did not completely reject slavery, then at least significantly limited it. Hecato (whom Cicero, as we know, also followed in his writings) remained with his previous point of view and looked at slaves as property. De officiis, I, 11, 34 – 35. De officiis, I, 10, 31 – 32. De officiis, I, 27, 93 – 95; Tuscul. IV, 13, 31; De officiis, I, 28, 98. Tuscul. IV, 37, 79 – 81; 7, 14; III, 11, 24 – 25; De finibus, II, 10, 35. Tuscul. IV, 31, 65; 35, 76. Tuscul. III, 11, 24; IV, 6, 11; 14, 31. Tuscul. IV, 10, 23; 15, 34; 28, 61. Although Cicero distinguishes mori = νοσήματα from aegrotationes = άρρωστήματα (Tuscul. IV, 10, 23), however, in essence he thinks of them as inseparable (Tuscul. IV, 11, 24). Tuscul. III, 4, 5 – 9, 10. Tuscul. III, 10, 22; Acad. poster 10, 39. Tuscul. III, 10, 22; IV, 17, 38 – 39; 28, 60; De finibus, III, 10, 35; De officiis, 33, 119. De officiis, I, 25, 88 – 89; Tuscul. III, 9, 19; 5, 11; IV, 19, 43 – 44; 25, 55; 37, 77 – 79. De officiis, I, 26, 90; Acad. post. 10.39. Tuscul. IV, 6, 12 – 13; 31, 66. De officiis, III, 33, 119. Tuscul. V, 15, 43; IV, 7, 14, 16; III, 11, 24 – 25; De finibus, III, 10, 35. Acad. prior 43, 132; De finibus, V, 6, 15. De finibus, IV, 17, 47; Tuscul. II, 13, 39. Tuscul. V, 28, 80: “Neither virtues can exist without a blessed life, nor a blessed life without virtue.” De finibus, II, 22, 72 – 73. Sometimes Cicero defines this beatitude negatively, as freedom from passions. Tuscul. V, 15, 43; 14, 42. De finibus, III, 14, 45; 10, 33, 34. Tuscul. V, 14, 40; Parad. VI, 3, 51. Parad. I, 1, 9; VI, 2, 48. Parad. II; Tuscul. V, 1, 1; V, 10, 28. De officiis, III, 8, 35; Parad. I, 1, 9. Tuscul. V,26, 73 sqq.; 28, 80. Acad. poster 10, 36 – 37; De finibus, III, 15, 51 – 16, 52, 53, etc. De finibus, IV, 15, 41; 14, 36; 10, 25; 12, 28; V, 24, 71. Tuscul. II, 13, 30; 12, 29. Cicero considers this view of suffering to be a general Stoic one, but in fact the Stoics considered suffering, as can be seen from Stob., Eclog. 11, 146 to impersonal things – άδιάφορα. R. Hirzel, II, S. 45. Cp. De finibus, II, 10, 31 – 32. De legibus, I, 11, 32; cp. De finibus, III, 17, 57; De officiis, II, 9, 31; 10, 36 – 37; 11, 38; 12, 43. The Stoics were not unanimous in deciding how to relate to fame; some, like Ariston, treated her indifferently, others considered her desirable. Cicero himself is not always consistent in his attitude towards glory. O. Heine, Op. cit., S. 69, Anm. 1. Tuscul. V, 7, 16 – 17; Acad. poster 10, 38. De finibus, III, 22, 75 – 76; Parad. V, 34 sqq.t De finibus, III, 13, 42; 22, 76; Tuscul. V, 36, 103; Parad. 11, 17. Hirzel, II, 1, 324 – 325, 327; cp, 314: “The difference between the early and later Stoics lies, among other things, in the fact that, according to the view of the former, the wise and the unwise are subject to the same laws, and, according to the latter, there are some laws for the wise, and others for the foolish.” De officiis, III, 4, 15, 17. De officiis, III, 4, 15; 3, 14; cp. I, 3, 8. For the inaccuracy made by Cicero in this place, see P. Barth”a, S. 141, Anm. 2. De officiis, III, 4, 15. Cp. Friedrech Brandscheid, “Ethik, zur Cicero von den Flichten und zum Selbststudium für Jedermann verfasst”, Wiesbaden, 1895, S. 52 und Anm. 1. De officiis, III, 3, 15 – 17. De officiis, III, 10, 44: “When taking oaths, you must remember that you have God as a witness, that is, as I think, your mind (mentem suam).” De officiis, III, 6, 28: “Whoever violates justice, who thereby denies charity... must be considered a sinner before the immortal gods.” De officiis ministrorum, I, 26, 124. De officiis ministrorum, I, 31, 163. Cp. De fuga saeculi, 4, 17, where virtue is depicted as imitation of God. De officiis ministrorum, I, 26, 125. De officiis ministrorum, I, 27, 126. De officiis ministrorum, I, 50, 252., De officiis ministrorum, I, 20, 117. De officiis ministrorum, I, 26, 123. De officiis ministrorum, II, 2, 7. De officiis ministrorum, I, 25, 117. This was a sin inherent in all Greek and Roman ethics. Cp. Friedländer, “Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Romis in der Zeit von August bes zum Ausgang der Antonine.” Dritter Band, Leipzig, 1881, S. 612. This statement in no way denies the possibility of a person himself to recognize the religious and moral aspirations inherent in his spiritual nature, but only the last way of understanding a person’s moral duties is made dependent on the only true and unconditional knowledge communicated in divine Revelation. De officiis ministrorum, I, 23, 102: “Multa praelerca de ratione dicendi dant praecepta saeculares viri, quae nobis praelereunda arbitror ut de iocandi disciplina. Nam licet interdum bonesta ioca ac suavia sint, tamen ab ecclesiastica abborrent tegula, quoniam quae in scripruris (sanctis – Migne) nom reper imus ea quemadmodum usurpare possumus?” Cp. Ibidem I, 8, 25. Cp. Ewald, 62 – 63. De officiis ministrorum, I, 29, 142. De officiis ministrorum I, 37, 185. De officiis ministrorum III, 18, 107. De officiis ministrorum III, 18, 108. Cp. Ewald, 70. Hence, the statement of Professor F. Zelinsky that Ambrose in De officiis ministrorum does not mention the corruption of human nature is not entirely fair (S. 134). De officiis ministrorum, I, 9, 29. Friedrich Überwegs, “Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie.” Zweiter Theil, S. 117. De officiis ministrorum, I, 9, 28. De officiis ministrorum, I, 11, 39; cp. 7, 24. Wed. De officiis ministrorum, III, 8, 56; 9, 63. However, by this we do not deny the presence of selfless moral actions in Cicero’s code, but only indicate the dominant tendency among him. De officiis ministrorum, I, 17, 57. De officiis ministrorum, I, 21, 72. De officiis ministrorum, II, 24, 85; 14, 50 – 51; III, 5, 21; 29, 107. Cp. Dr. D. Leitmer, 155; F. Hasler, 31 – 32; Luthardt, I, 177; R. Thamin, 274 – 275. Cp. De officiis ministrorum, II, 29, 150 – 151. It is true that Cicero placed duty to the gods above duties to people and the fatherland, however, these are only words, only a phrase borrowed by Cicero from his teachers, but which did not receive practical application to life. De officiis ministrorum, III, 6, 28. De officiis ministrorum, I, 50, 252. De officiis ministrorum, I, 59, 251. Cp. R. Thamin, 250 – 251. Cp. De officiis ministrorum, I, 25, 85. De officiis ministrorum, III, 3, 22; 6, 37. De officiis ministrorum, I, 48, 237. De officiis ministrorum, III, 2, 11. Cp. Ewald, 75 – 76; Forster, 182. De officiis ministrorum, I, 5, 15. De officiis ministrorum, II, 2, 5. De officiis ministrorum, I, 25, 118. De officiis ministrorum, I, 50, 252. Cp. H. H. Schullard, “Early Christian Ethics in the West frog Clement to Ambrose” London, 1907, p. 271. Worldly wisdom, knowledge of the things of the world, St. Ambrose does not attach an ethical character, since only religious knowledge has such a character. De officiis ministrorum, I, 26, 123. Cp. Th. Zielinski, 134: “Wisdom, contrary to the spirit of Cicero, is formulated by St. Ambrose, as the knowledge of God, since truth is precisely God.” Since in the wisdom of St. Ambrose conceives of not only faith, but also the practical virtue of love of God, which is the source of all other virtues, insofar as between the virtue of wisdom and the other virtues he, in fact, does not notice that sharp line that is characteristic of Cicero (and the Middle Stoa). De officiis ministrorum, I, 7, 20; cp. Pro Murena c. 30. Cp. De officiis ministrorum, I, 28, 130 – 135. De officiis ministrorum, I, 28, 136; 29, 142; II, 30, 155; III, 3, 19; 4, 27; cp. Ep. 63, 83. De officiis ministrorum, I, 28, 130 – 135. De officiis ministrorum, III, 13, 19. De officiis ministrorum, III, 3, 18, 19. De officiis ministrorum, I, 33, 170. De officiis ministrorum, III, 3, 19. De officiis ministrorum, III, 22, 128. De officiis ministrorum, II, 30, 155. De officiis ministrorum, I, 11, 37 – 38. De officiis ministrorum, I, 29, 142; 28, 136. De officiis ministrorum, III, 4, 27. De officiis ministrorum, I, 21, 94. “Love,” writes R. Thamin (p. 263 – 264), “fills everything in the treatise of St. Ambrose "On Responsibilities". In the first book, according to Cicero’s plan, it takes a place next to justice, but in order to absorb it and remake it in its own way: justice is only the beginning, the minimum of love... In the second book, when he tries to decide the question of the best means to force himself to love, he finds that such a means is love. Finally, in the third book, he shows that for a soul that truly loves, there cannot be those contradictions between honest and useful, which found place in Cicero, for it is our interests, and not the interests of others, that are most often contrary to our duties. De officiis ministrorum, I, 21, 94; III, 9, 59; 2, 13. De officiis ministrorum, II, 27, 134; III, 2, 13. De officiis ministrorum, I, 27, 127. True, in his other works (cf. Victor Faminsky, 456) Cicero speaks of the need to have love for the entire human race (De finibus, V, 23, 65), however, this was not the center of gravity of Cicero’s ethics, and Cicero introduced this very love within the framework of legal relations that exclude Christian self-sacrifice. “You cannot,” writes this famous Roman lawyer, “neither love others more than yourself, nor demand that others (even friends) love us more than themselves (Tuscul. III, 29, 73). De officiis ministrorum, I, 30, 144, 145; II, 16, 76 – 78. De officiis ministrorum, I, 20, 49. De officiis ministrorum, II, 28, 136. De officiis ministrorum, I, 15, 47; II, 20, 69. De officiis ministrorum, II, 14, 67: “It is glorious and worthy of a ruler over others not to be selfish, like the Tyrian merchants and Gilead merchants, not to put all the good in money and not to calculate profits like mercenaries recalculating their daily earnings.” De officiis ministrorum, II, 21, 107: “And you, by accepting a stranger, are sure that you are not thereby accepting Christ?” De officiis ministrorum, I, 11b 39th Cp. R. Thamin, 268 – 268. Philosophies such as the Stoic and aristocrats such as Cicero did not know the virtues of meekness and humility. De officiis, I, 25, 85; II, 14, 51. De officiis ministrorum, II, 27, 134. De officiis ministrorum, III, 4, 28. De officiis ministrorum, I, 18, 70. De officiis ministrorum, I, 4, 14; 5, 18. De officiis ministrorum, I, 6, 22. De officiis ministrorum, I, 25, 118. We understand such exaltation of St. Ambrose the virtue of humility. We saw above that he considers pride not only the first sin in the world, but also the beginning of all sin. And, on the contrary, humility is his first duty, for humility is the beginning of correction, and Christ, in order to save people, first of all humbled himself. De officiis ministrorum, III, 6, 27; 8, 35; 3, 11; II, 3, 10. De officiis ministrorum, II, 6, 23, 25; III, 2, 9. De officiis ministrorum, II, 6, 27. De officiis ministrorum, II, 6, 23. De officiis ministrorum, II, 6, 26. De officiis ministrorum, I, 3, 13. De officiis ministrorum, I, 3, 11. De officiis ministrorum, I, 4, 15. De officiis ministrorum, I, 4, 16; 5, 20. De officiis ministrorum, I, 37, 185; cp. III. 2, 9; 18, 108. Cp. Ewald, 46 – 49. De officiis ministrorum, III, 8, 35. De officiis ministrorum, II, 5, 18. Ibidem. In this case, St. Ambrose distinguishes between eternal and blessed life, although elsewhere (De officiis ministrorum, II, 1, 3) he categorically declares their identity. See above for more information. De officiis ministrorum, II, 3, 9; cp. 2, 7. De officiis ministrorum, I, 16, 59; cp. I, 3, 11, 15, 57; 26, 124; 30, 130. Cp. H. H. Senllard, “Early Christian Ethies,” p. 183 – 184; 185 – 187. Cp. Förster, 178 – 179; Ewald, 24. De officiis ministrorum, II, 2, 5; 3, 9. De officiis ministrorum, I, 16, 62. De officiis ministrorum, I, 31, 164. De officiis ministrorum, II, 5, 19. De officiis ministrorum, II, 1, 1. De officiis ministrorum, I, 12, 45; cp. 12, 46; III, 4, 24. In vain only Ewald (Op. cit., S. 29) is ready to see traces of Ciceronian influence in this serenity of innocence. De officiis ministrorum, II, , 4, 15; 3, 9. De officiis ministrorum, II, 49, 244: “Riches, despite all their abundance, are not at all useful (for you), on the contrary, they are (harmful, since they) remove from you the image of God and clothe you in the earthly.” Wed. above: “The attitude of a Christian to wealth, poverty and, in general, to the misfortunes of life, as well as temptations.” De officiis ministrorum, II, 5, 16. De officiis ministrorum, I, 49, 241. De officiis ministrorum, I, 6, 23. De officiis ministrorum, I, 38, 191. De officiis ministrorum, III, 17, 98. De officiis ministrorum, I, 15, 58. De officiis ministrorum, I, 12, 44. De officiis ministrorum, I, 15, 57. De officiis ministrorum, I, 50, 246. De officiis ministrorum, II, 1, 2. De officiis ministrorum, II, 1, 3. De officiis ministrorum, III, 1, 7. Cp. De officiis ministrorum, III, 2, 11: “Different meanings are often hidden in the same words.” However, in these cases you need to be careful not to impose St. Ambrose of thoughts and views that he did not have, and so as, on the other hand, not to reveal in De officiis ministrorum such theological subtleties that are known to every theologian of the 19th and 20th centuries and, of course, were alien to the bishop of the 4th century. Such immoderate defenders of St. often sin against this. Ambrose, like Leitmeir, Hasler, etc. Cp. H. H. Scullard, “Early Christian Ethics,” p. 271. Cp. A. Ebert, 153; Forster, 177; Th. Schmidt, 14. E. Goetsch, “Hellenism and Christianity,” p. 82 in "General History of European Culture", vol. VI. Prof. F. Zelinsky, “Rivals of Christianity.” From the life of ideas, vol. III, St. Petersburg, 1907, p. 191. Th. Schmidt, 16; Forster, 184. Förster, 179, 184. Cp. R. Thamin, 307. Cp. Thamin, 275: “...Lorsque en conseils identiques sont donnés de part et d'autre, ce n'est pas encore la même chose.” After all, we also use some pagan expressions, which, however, have lost the meaning and meaning that the pagans had. It is known that the Romans in the proper sense “adored” their emperors (the cult of the Caesars), classifying them as gods. Christians, as we know, are forbidden to recognize gods other than the True One, or to deify anyone; Meanwhile, even now Christians, and even representatives of the church, do not find anything reprehensible in the expression “adored monarch,” etc. De officiis ministrorum, I, 23, 102. By this, St. Father’s intention is clearly outlined to give precisely Christian ethics, based on Holy Scripture and therefore superior to pagan ethics. Cp. Rev. Thomas Slater, “A Short History of Moral Theologie,” New-York, Cineinnati, Chicago, 1909, p. 14. De officiis ministrorum, I, 19, 84. As if feeling the inconsistency of such a statement with the Christian teaching about nature undergoing corruption, St. Ambrose hastens to take refuge behind the biblical teaching that “God created everything very good” (De officiis ministrorum, III, 4, 28). In his first creation – De excessu fratri (I, 45) the term “live in accordance with nature” by St. the father understands it primarily in the sense of “giving praise to the Creator.” Cp. R. Thamin, 222: “Un des critères – nous ne disons pas le seul que saint Ambroise invoque est le critère stoieien de la conformitè à la nature.” De officiis ministrorum, III, 2, 11; I, 11, 37 – 38. De officiis ministrorum, I, 7, 20. De officiis ministrorum, I, 28, 130. De officiis ministrorum, I, 28, 131: “We deny what philosophers see as an essential sign of justice. They say that justice first of all requires not to harm anyone, unless you are caused to do so by an offense (inflicted on you), and this is not allowed by the gospel teaching (Luke 9:56). Scripture wants us to have the spirit of the Son of Man, who came (to) pour out grace (and) not (to) harm anyone.” De officiis ministrorum, II, 28, 136; cp. Ibidem I, 28, 135 – 136. De officiis ministrorum, II, 16, 78. De officiis ministrorum, II, 16, 76. De officiis ministrorum, II, 15, 54; III, 10, 42: “Everyone should be given as much as can be given to him without causing offense to the other.” De officiis ministrorum, II, 16, 77. De officiis ministrorum, I, 30, 149. On this side, F. Böhringer was right when he argued (S. 77) that in the book De officiis ministrorum there is no single all-pervading principle. Cp. Dr. a. Harnack, S. 24, Anm. 48. This (we use the expression of Cicero and, then, St. Ambrose) is easier to feel and imagine than to express in words. Cp. R. Thamin, 275.