Книга восьмая 937

1. Research, both philosophical and theological, should always be conducted in such a way that it leads to something positive. The most ancient sages, in their research, did not, in the end, come to any doubt or awareness of the helplessness of their position. All the less should we, Christians, who firmly adhere to the true philosophy, come to this. Scripture even directly entrusts us with the obligation to seek the truth through intelligence and investigation in order to finally discover what and where it is. The newest of the Hellenic sages, in daydreaming about themselves, carried away by the meaningless and endless desire for deceptive and external splendor and seeking the opportunity to boast of themselves, in their eternal disputes and quarrels do not go beyond amusing buffoonery. Barbarian wisdom presents a completely different spectacle. Completely rejecting the spirit of strife, she says: Seek and you will find; knock, and it will be opened to you; ask, and it will be given to you (Matthew 7:7; Luke 9:9). Speech, through questions and answers, investigating the truth and exploring it, as it seems to me, knocks on its doors. And if the barrier that made it difficult to perceive the truth has once fallen, then speculative comprehension of it, understanding, begins. Therefore, to those who knock with such sincere dispositions, I think that what we are looking for is also revealed. Those who treat the investigation of Scripture in this way are rewarded by God with the sacred gift of perfect knowledge and understanding, which is the goal of all their aspirations: by investigating the subject of it, it is finally illuminated before the mind comprehensively and in all its completeness. It is impossible to find without looking. You can’t search without investigating. And research is unthinkable without removing entanglements and exposing all and any kind of veils and covers; During the investigation, the subject being examined must be clearly placed before the eyes. Finally, it is impossible to move forward in research without reward for labor, that is, without reward by knowledge of the truth that called for the research itself. So, anyone who seeks can find: but before looking for something, you must be convinced that you do not have it. Anyone who, in his striving forward, is animated by a holy and subtle desire for beauty, let him seek it honestly, without entering into vain disputes, closing the doors of his heart to the suggestions of vanity, asking and answering, weighing what is said. Strict consistency is absolutely necessary not only when studying the Divine Scriptures, but even when acquiring the most ordinary knowledge, if they want the study to lead them to some result, the benefits of which would be undeniable. We leave people who, in their studies, do not observe this orderliness and the flow of their idle fabrications, to listen to hordes of people who love chatter and jostling; another stage should be reserved for this. The friend and disciple of truth is not like them. He is peaceful; completely free from selfishness, in his aspirations to scientifically substantiate the truth, he is guided by a single passion, only one desire: to speculatively perceive the truth, comprehend and contemplate it; this will be his knowledge of her. 2. In philosophical and theological matters, the first means of acquiring positive knowledge is the exact identification of things, as well as the combination of clear and definite concepts with their names. At the very beginning of such scientific research, the best and most obvious method for representing the truth is to consider a clear definition of the meaning of the word about which there is controversy, so that all speakers of this language associate a definite and distinct concept with it. Such a meaningless word, for example, as blityri, which means nothing and is a combination of only a few articulate sounds, is not supposed to be used in evidence 938. And that is why neither an orator, nor a philosopher, nor a single judge can draw evidence from this meaningless word for or against anything, 939 and, likewise, of the litigants in court, not a single one will be able to explain what it means or determine its meaning; they know that this word contains absolutely no meaning. That is why true philosophers, of the many meanings of a word, try to rely only on one that contains actual truth and, moreover, an immutable one. So, no matter what subject anyone decides to properly reason or argue about, he should raise his speech to no other principle and base it on no other concept than the indisputable one, which is recognized by all the people speaking that language, the whole nation, as denoted by that word. Taking this concept as a starting point, then it is necessary to search whether this word really has the meaning that is usually associated with it. If this were discovered, then we should carefully investigate whether the generally accepted meaning of the word, the concept associated with that word, whether it is consistent with itself, with its nature and essence, whether it contradicts itself, and in comparison with the concept that we decided to associate with a given word and to which we limited this latter, whether the nature of that concept contains anything superfluous. It is not enough to speak about the subject under study in general terms, and, moreover, rely only on your opinion, because your opponent, for his part, can oppose the same arbitrariness: what has been said must be certified and confirmed with evidence. Because if the dispute of both opponents were to be raised to some position and were to take as the point of departure one that would equally arouse doubt in both of the competing parties, then the debate could continue indefinitely and, taking on an indefinite character, would not lead to any result. If, on the contrary, the debate is traceable to something known for certain and not subject to dispute, recognized by everyone and not arousing doubt in anyone, and if by itself it confirms a preliminary position of still dubious merit, then this latter can be recognized as essential, one of the fundamental and most important points of the teaching. So, whatever thought, whatever concept you prove, you should base it on a position, on a genuine, non-ambiguous and undoubted statement, which would be recognized by both of the parties interested and taking part in the dispute, for both it would be obvious: this position is intended to serve as an element, one of the starting points and a principle guiding further research; Therefore, special care should be taken to ensure that it is clear to the thoughts of researchers, so that the light from it shines on evidence in favor of truths that are still being sought, followed and related to the main principle. Let us suppose, for example, that the object to be studied is the sun. The Stoics define it as follows: “It is a torch, powered by the waves of the sea and endowed with reason.” But this definition of the being of the sun is darker than the word that defines and speaks about its nature. To confirm its truth and to become meaningful, it itself therefore needs clarification. Wouldn’t it be better, in order to obtain such an undoubted and decisive position, to join the generally widespread, simple and understandable opinion that the sun is the most brilliant of the heavenly bodies? This definition, I think, of faith is more worthy, more understandable and more acceptable to everyone. 3. The second means of acquiring positive knowledge is evidence. Its difference from a syllogism. Everyone, of course, will also agree that the proof agrees with common sense when a questionable and controversial point is confirmed by provisions that have already been recognized as true and considered indisputable. But not only proof, faith and knowledge, but also fundamental, axiomatic propositions can be of two kinds: some of them are scientific and immutable; others are only sought, expected, based for the time being only on hope. A proof that has full legal force is one that instills scientific faith in the soul of the listener, which is reasonable and coherent knowledge; all other evidence is only apparent and inauthentic, for it is based only on assumptions and opinions. The same must be said about man. A true man is only one who possesses common human common sense; others all look more like savages or animals. And this is why the comic poet writes: “Man is a sweet animal as long as he remains a real and true man.” 940. The same must be said about the will, the horse, the dog, i.e. that they are perfect only to the extent that they have the good and noble qualities inherent in each of these types of animals; when these properties are weakened, the perfection of the individuals included in the species is diminished. That the matter is precisely in the embodiment of higher and essential principles, this is revealed, for example, from the following. Paying attention to specific perfections, we focus our attention only on those qualities that are close to ideal. So, by doctor we mean a person who knows everything about how to treat; By a true sage (gnostic) we mean the bearer of an entire system of knowledge, which is a complete and harmonious set of experimental and speculative truths. The proof is different from a syllogism. What is proved in the proof is at the same time explained; what is being proven and what is being explained here are one and the same, they merge together. So pregnancy is proof that a woman is no longer a girl. In a syllogism, on the contrary, although one concept is also presented, it is accompanied by numerous evidence. So, for example, let’s take the following statement: “Puphon betrayed the Byzantines.” To explain Pufon's guilt, this one statement is not enough, but numerous pieces of evidence are required. To finish what your opponent admits, to draw conclusions from it, will be “constructing a syllogism”; to draw conclusions or conclusions from provisions previously recognized as true means “to prove.” And this is why proof has two advantages over syllogism: one of these advantages is that from what is already recognized as true and indisputable, guidance is made to the truth that is still sought; the other thing is that this conclusion regarding the sought-after truth has an essentially and immediate relationship with the indisputable position. If you have not previously provided such an indisputable provision, i.e. if you derive a consequence, although correctly, but from erroneous premises, then instead of a solid proof you are only making a syllogism. Something else: a syllogism consists solely in the legality of the conclusion and its agreement with the premises. The proof lies in the legitimacy of the premises themselves. If you made each of the previous provisions tangible and undeniable, then you no longer reasoned syllogistically, but directly and completely proved your topic. To conclude, as this word itself shows, means to end, that is, to bring speech to its final point. And the final point of any dispute is the sought-after object; The conclusion is therefore also called the solution to the question, the end of the matter. No simple and first proposition that comes to hand is called a syllogism, even if it were true. A syllogism consists of at least three parts; the first two are taken as Lemmas 941, the third as a corollary. Everything must be provable, or do some things already bear proof in themselves? Is the first statement correct? Demanding proof for any proposition, we go into infinity, and it turns out that we are still not able to find a satisfactory proof. If the second proposition is true, that some truths already contain evidence for themselves, then they can serve as a basis, a starting point, and principles for other evidence. All philosophers agree that none of the original propositions is amenable to our proofs. Consequently, if a proof is given, it means that necessity itself requires that there must first exist something that in itself deserves belief. This something is called an initial position that does not require proof - a principle from which one does not deviate. So, every proof is ultimately reduced to a certain proposition that is taken on faith and does not require proof. In addition to this source for the discovery of truth, in addition to belief in propositions that do not require proof, there are also sources from which we can borrow evidence; This is evidence, which appears as such both to our feelings and to the contemplative activity of our mind. The objects presented to our senses, internal and external, are simple and indecomposable. But the objects that we discover in our own mind and common sense are also, so to speak, to the point of prosaicity, known to everyone and known by everyone; they are spontaneous, original, simple. The concepts that are formed along these two paths, although complex, are nevertheless obvious, reliable and, in comparison with the first ones, that is, those taken on faith, are distinguished by their rational character. On reason, that noble faculty by which we excel over all other creatures of nature, lies the duty of judging what is consistent, in accordance with those fundamental principles, and what is inconsistent. So, if any thought process proceeds in such a way that the authority of already reliable provisions supports and confirms other provisions that have not yet aroused self-belief, then this already presents us with the essence of proof; We already seem to have it in our hands. But we have already established that there are two types of both faith and evidence: as a result of one of them, a conviction is formed in the soul of the listener, with which he is content; another type of evidence serves as a source of knowledge. Therefore, if someone would take as the starting point for his thinking the positions that are obvious both to his feelings and to his reason, and then draw consistent conclusions from them, then through this he would already prove the most well-known truth in the full sense of the word. If someone stops on the basis of only arbitrary human opinions, without rising to the principles or provisions of the original, i.e. If you limit your thinking to the sphere of only such objects, which cannot be subject to either your external feelings or your internal feelings, and are not obvious to reason, then you are able to construct syllogisms, even very strict ones, but you will never have to deal with scientific proof, exemplary-harmonious, correct and consistent, and at the same time clearly defining. If your thinking is based not on what is in you, what is, so to speak, at home, but on what is arbitrary, then you are not capable of reasoning, nor have the right to construct a syllogism: you have no lemmas, premises, material for this. So, the proof comes down to nothing other than the decomposition of a known proposition into simple concepts, to analysis. Each of the provable provisions is provable through another provable position and is, in fact, previously proven; and so, rising from stage to stage, we reach positions that are in themselves reliable, or that which is subject to our external and internal feelings and is comprehended by reason. This is precisely what analysis consists of. The proof is that from the initial provisions, from the principles, through all intermediate provisions, they descend to the controversial issue or position. So, turning to a person gifted and possessing the ability to reason, we say: Try first and most of all about the truth of your lemmas, or premises, about their real content, truthfulness, fidelity to the essence of things and deeds; What's the use of empty-mindedness and idle talk? Call it what you want: axioms (self-truths), premises one, two: the price will be the same. Likewise, be very careful in your conclusions. And here, too, do not attach the slightest importance to empty words. What does it matter whether you call your conclusion a final conclusion or a final corollary or a syllogism. i.e. by inference? Anyone who tries to prove something also takes upon himself the obligation to strictly observe both of these just-named points: he must establish only truly truthful propositions and draw conclusions based on induction. Guidance is the name given to the discretion of the particular in general; Whatever issue you are discussing, the previous principle must already contain a solution to this issue. And if, thus, it is already included in the composition of the judgment, then in order to affirm something, it means that one only has to deduce it from a preliminary principled position. But since fundamental provisions come in different varieties, one should start from a position that is relevant to the nature of the given issue and, moreover, one that is recognized by everyone as true and is not subject to dispute. The reason why this should be done is quite simple. If you take as the starting point of your reasoning such preliminary provisions that have no relation to the given question, then you will never discover the truth, since the whole task of finding the unknown about the given, the whole problem and what is called the situation of the question, slips out of your hands. So, in all kinds of investigations there is data known from the very beginning - such that in themselves are completely reliable, and therefore acceptable even without any evidence. They should have a dual purpose: they should serve as a starting point for research, and then as a criterion for what we have discovered. 4. When explaining any question in general, one should begin with a definition of the subject in question in order to avoid the ambiguity often presented by terms. Any research arises from some previous knowledge. It should, therefore, be recognized that knowledge exists before research, no matter what kind of question is subject to it. And this preliminary knowledge about the object under study is of such a kind that sometimes they only have the key to the object, to its substance, to its essence, they know only its principle, without knowing all the accidents, states or relationships. This has application, for example, to stones, plants, animals, whose active states elude us. Either we do not know their sensations, or their characteristics, or - in short - we are unanswered to this or that question concerning what is happening inside them. Then we know one of the features characterizing a known substance, one of its sensations or similar properties. So, for example, we know the desires and sensations of our own soul, but its essence is unknown to us and we are only seeking knowledge of it. In many cases, having established its views on both substance and accidents, the mind nevertheless examines which of the substances these different states can befit. We begin the study, having formed in our minds a concept of both, both the substance of the object and its properties. But there are also objects whose sensations are completely unknown to us, although at the same time we know both their active states and their substance. So here is a method that puts us on the path leading to the acquisition of truth. One should begin with a thorough and comprehensive recognition of this issue, for it has already happened more than once that the forms of verbal expression were so deceptive that the mind was not able to discern what, in fact, the subject was being discussed. This is, for example, the question: Is the animal contained in the womb an animal or not 942? Knowing what is meant by animal; and, likewise, having some idea of ​​the embryo contained in the uterus, we ask ourselves: Is the concept of an animal suitable for the substance still contained in the uterus, i.e. Is she able to move and feel? Because the idea of ​​the active states of a certain substance and its passive states, for example, sensations, must be in accordance with its essence. So, the one who posed this question, at the very beginning of the study, should be asked: What do you call an animal? This technique is especially necessary when a known word is used in different meanings; in this case, one must carefully investigate whether the doubt stems from the mutual meaning of the word and whether everyone associates with that word a clear and distinct meaning that is not subject to dispute. If your opponent answers that by animal he means everything that grows and eats, then we will ask him again: Do you not include plants 943 among animals? If he admits this point, then it will be necessary to find out to which kingdom, in his opinion, the embryo contained and developing in the uterus belongs. Plato 944 indeed classifies plants as animals. because, as he says, they most of all have an affinity with the third type of soul, the plant soul. Aristotle 945 is of the opinion that at the same time they have both a vegetative and a nourishing soul; but he does not want to call them animals; this name he reserves exclusively for beings gifted with the second of these souls, namely the sentient one. As for the Stoics, they do not call plant power soul 946. If the one who raised this question denies the identity of plants with animals, then we will prove to him that he contradicts himself. On the one hand, calling an animal a being that eats and develops, and on the other, declaring that a plant is not an animal, he is not saying anything else, but as if he is saying: “A being that develops and feeds is an animal and is not.” Let him explain what he wants; What purpose does he pursue with this definition of an animal? Does he want to convince us that the embryo, enclosed in the uterus, develops in it and is nourished, or does he want to prove that it takes part in movement and the ability to feel? According to Plato, the plant actually has a soul and is truly an animal. According to Aristotle, on the contrary, although a plant is animated, it is not yet an animal, because it lacks the ability to feel; and an animal, in his opinion, is an animated being, endowed with the ability to feel. We turn to the Stoics and they answer us: A plant is not animate and is not an animal, for an animal is an animate being. This means that if an animal is an animate being, and the soul is endowed with the ability to feel, then it is obvious that an animate being is necessarily endowed with the ability to feel. To the one who raised the question about this, we will now therefore say: So, do you continue to call the animal imprisoned in the womb that way, that is, an animal simply because it feeds and grows? From now on you have already received the answer. If my opponent objects to me: I didn’t ask about that; I only wanted to know: Is the fetus capable of feeling and being excited by any desire or inclination? Since there is no longer any ambiguity in these expressions, the point now is to openly explore this issue. If your opponent remains dumb to answer all the questions addressed to him; if he stubbornly refuses to explain what meaning he associates with the expressions he uses, or what creature he calls by the name of an animal when he poses the question in this way; and if it turns out that he does all this only to create disagreement and division between us: in this case, it means that he is a man who loves strife and disputes. There are two ways to challenge any question: first, follow your target with questions and answers; the second goes into detail, which he reviews from point to point. If our adversary rejects the first of these two methods, then let him listen to us as we examine this question (and others according to this model) in all its various ramifications. And when we finish, he can discuss all the points related to this subject. If he tries to interrupt the argument with questions, he will provide obvious proof that he does not want to listen or know anything. But let’s assume that he prefers to answer us. Then first of all we ask him: “Which creature do you give the name of animal”? When he explains this to us, we will ask him again: “What do you mean by an embryo enclosed in the womb? Is there a being with already developed members that can be called a living animal? Or is this one of those creatures whose constituent parts are still in an elementary form, a mass barely outlined, which in medicine is called an embryo”? When our antagonist explains this to us, it will be possible to draw some conclusions and shed some light on the proposed question. If he demands that we conduct our reasoning without asking him, then we will turn to him with the following words: “Since you did not dare to answer us in what sense you are asking this question, then, without seeking the meaning, I will directly delve into your question and answer you: Know that your question is equivalent to this: “Is a dog an animal”? I have the right to ask you: “What dog are you talking about? There are dogs on land; there are sea dogs - sharks; there is a celestial constellation called the Dog (Dog); there are philosophers - dogs, Diogenes, for example; there are many other dogs; what dogs are you asking me about? About all of them or about just one of them? I can't guess this. Therefore, explain more precisely: what exactly are you asking me about, since anyway, after my answer to you, you will be forced to do this. If you resort to verbal chicanery, then it is obvious to everyone that the word “embryo” is not an animal. not a plant, but a name, an articulate sound, a body, a substance, a certain thing, everything in the world, and, finally, not an animal. Was this the purpose of your question? If this is it, then I answered you. According to the meaning contained in the word “embryo,” it is not an animal; it is an incorporeal substance; you can call it a certain thing, a concept, everything in the world, finally, but not an animal. The nature of the various meanings of the word "animal" is completely different from the nature of the animal that is mainly discussed in the question. So the other side of the question would be: What is the nature of an animal? In this case, I reason like this: If you call an animal everything that is capable of feeling and moving due to the desire inherent in it, then an animal is not just everything that can feel and move at will, because it can also sleep or not feel sensible objects in the absence of them. The ability to move at will was given by nature to the animal as a distinctive feature, by which it is recognized. This gives rise to the following considerations. Is the embryo incapable of moving at will and feeling? This is the first question to be resolved. The second is the following: “Can the embryo feel and feed without being prompted to do so by desire”? There is nothing mutual here; the case speaks for itself. You asked us: Is the embryo an animal or is it just a plant? To avoid any ambiguity in the discussion, we have defined the word “animal”. Then, upon the discovery that this creature, endowed with sensitivity and movement, is no different from an animal, we distinguished it from creatures similar to it or close to it, saying that there is a difference between a creature that has only the ability to move and feel, but can use it only in the future, and a creature that already has everything that has actually been said. The ability that is already active and the ability that can act, but for the time being is still sleeping or dormant, are different in their very essence. That was the whole question. For from the fact that the embryo is nourished, it does not at all follow that it is an animal, unless we ourselves want to join the ranks of those people who neglect the essence of things, paying all attention to only accidental signs. Whenever one strives to acquire something, it is therefore necessary to present something that was previously clearly known, that is, a consistent series of judgments that, by a whole series of previously recognized things, would declare the thing not yet discovered. The researcher must recognize and cognize this previously known; then the object sought will become tactilely clear to him. The most convincing of all means in finding any new truth is evidence for the senses and mind; From these elements the first means or method for the discovery of any new truth, or the so-called first proof, is composed. A means formed from the elements of the first leads to a conclusion already different from the first; however, this last one deserves no less faith than the previous one, although it cannot be called the first, because it is not directly deduced from preliminary provisions (presumptions). So, the difference that can arise regarding the issues under study is of three types. We have already spoken about the first type of differences, or disagreements, i.e. the case when the essence is known, but any of its active states, or relationships, or - what is the same - movement is unknown. The second difference that can accompany the research of one in comparison with the research of the other is when we, knowing the active states, internal movements of an object, or its relationships, nevertheless do not know the essence, such as, for example: “In the human body, where the soul that controls them resides”? 5. A sample of evidence that refutes the doubts of skeptics regarding the possibility of knowing the truth. The same technique is observed when analyzing and refuting the following position. Some scientists argue that “the substance of an animal cannot contain more than one principle.” The idea of ​​an animal undoubtedly cannot contain several or many homogeneous or related principles; This we willingly admit. But in the acceptance for an animal of several heterogeneous principles, united by its animal substance, there is nothing absurd and contrary to common sense. Or let us take as an example the skeptical attitude of the Pyrrhonians towards all teachings in general, who find all and any kind of reasoning useless, because nothing in this world is solid and immutable 947. If we apply its own principle to this Pirronian theory, it will be revealed that through it it deprives itself of credibility, undermines and abolishes itself. So, it must admit one of two things: either there is something true, and then, therefore, there is no reason to doubt the possibility of reaching the truth with judgment regarding this or that thing or object. Or should she insist that the truth is impossible to find and does not exist; in this case, and first of all, it becomes obvious that it itself, this theory, is untrue. There is no middle ground: this theory is either false or untrue. If she speaks the truth, then, against her will, she admits that there is still something true in the world. If she lies, then it means that she leaves in all their integrity and inviolability the truths that she wanted to suspect. In fact, from the very moment that a well-known theory, having made claims to overthrow the truth, is exposed as a lie, the truth that this theory wanted to darken returns to itself renewed life and begins to shine with its former brilliance. This is as if Morpheus began to assert the falsity of all dreams in general: through this he would testify to the unreality of his own being. Undermining itself, this Pyrrhonian theory only affirms the value of the others. In a word, if this theory is true, then let it apply its own principle to itself, doubting the reliability of not something else, but first of all in itself, in the reliability of what it itself asserts. If she extends her doubts to only extraneous objects, then through this she is fighting against herself. - Then if a follower of Pyrrho admits the existence of man and the fact that he himself is a man; and equally, if he admits the reality of his doubt, then through this he makes it clear to us that he still does not renounce the judgment of truth. If you ask him questions, he answers you; therefore, in this respect at least, he has no doubts. Meanwhile, listen to what he says: “I doubt that there is anything true; and therefore whether something is true or false, I refrain from judging about it.” But if you find it impossible for yourself to make judgments about anything at all, because there is nothing reliable in this world, then first of all you should doubt the validity of this very doubt and abstain from judgments on this basis. Would you like to call this doubt of yours acceptable or not? Or, it would be better to speak with the Pyrrhonians like this: Imagine that we have to decide the following question: “A well-known theory should be recognized as true or not”? And we answer: “There is no way to resolve this issue, because no one has proposed anything true.” But if this last position is true, then it itself cannot assert its own truth and reliability. If a skeptic doubts the truth of this statement of yours, he will thereby prove that it is possible to know the truth. The skeptical theory of the doubtfulness of the truths existing in the world is not able to prove; and through this she exposes herself as incompetent. If the drawing up and expression of this or that judgment is nothing more than a disposition to accept any teaching or even recognition of it, or - according to another understanding - a disposition to mutually connect and harmonize many teachings with each other and through this establish a point of view in general on the world of phenomena; and if in the end all teachings are reduced to a single goal, to the correct structure of human life: (further, if each teaching is a certain kind of association of concepts perceived by the mind; even further, if a concept is a certain state of the soul and its disposition: then, it means that not only skeptical philosophers do not recognize a single phenomenon in the world as reliable, do not speak about anything with confidence, but only with restraint and do not make definite judgments about anything expressing, - but also positive philosophers, dogmatists - the principles on which they build their systems are not researching, but simply considering them as undoubted, in some cases having the habit of refraining from judgment - do this (not at all due to the absence of anything true in the world), but, either because of the weakness of their judgmental ability, which is the common lot of all people in general, or because of the uncertainty and obscurity of the subject, or by paying attention to equivalence of evidence for one thing or another. 6. Genus, species, difference. Using them in definitions. Before defining, proving and distinguishing, take the trouble to establish in what manner the matter can be understood. Homonyms should be discussed, synonyms should be distinguished and classified accurately according to their distinctive meanings. Then try to investigate whether the subject to be discussed should be considered in relation to others, or whether it should be taken by you only on its own and discussed only on its own merits. Then the questions must follow: Does it exist? What is this item? What accidents or modifications are characteristic of it? Or, what would be better: Does he exist? What is this item? Why does it exist? It is acquaintance with the particulars and with the general and main features of the subject; It is precisely paying attention to outstanding, distinctive features, knowing them and distinguishing one from another that especially contributes to the illumination of controversial issues. Induction leads from the particular to the general and to a definite concept, and differentiation leads to the determination of the species, to the understanding of the substance of the object, to the comprehension of its individuality. An investigation into the points of view from which a given subject can be discussed leads us to an understanding of its true meaning; and doubts (aroused by accidents) lead us to an understanding of what causes these very differences, by which one object differs from others; The same circumstance calls for evidence. In addition, doubt contributes to the comprehension of the subject; and although the conclusions are limited to certain limits, their number is multiplied. Knowledge and truth are a result composed of these heterogeneous elements. The overall reduction of discrimination is called definition. Therefore, the definition is placed either before or after the division: before it, when it is given by the consent of the parties or is assumed; - after, when it is already mediated by evidence and when a general conclusion is drawn from these individual elements, discovered and understood by reason. The beginning and source of induction is the inner feeling, and its end is generalization. Induction does not explain at all what an object is; whether it exists or not, that is its domain. Distinction, on the contrary, shows what an object is. Definition, as well as distinction, teach us what is its essence and what is its nature; they don’t care about the existence of the object. Proof fulfills three duties; it speaks of the existence of the object in question, its nature and meaning. Some definitions may also contain a reason. Since knowledge does not arise before we recognize the cause, and there are four causes - matter, movement (principle), form, purpose - then there are four types of definitions. This means that first of all you need to understand the genus, which contains all the substances closest to the highest community; then one should interpret the differences that are closest to this community. The concatenation of differences, little by little dividing the genus and subdividing, helps to replenish the concept of the essence of an object, or its definition. However, there is absolutely no need to depict all the differences of each object; you can limit yourself ONLY to those whose strength it belongs to a known species. Geometric analysis and synthesis are similar to distinction (separation) and definition of dialectics. From discrimination we ascend to the most simple and noble beings. We divide the genus of the object subject to our study into its main types contained in it. Let's take a person, for example. The generic concept for him is the animal. We decompose it into two types seen in it, mortal and immortal. And so the genera that seem complex to us, constantly dividing them into simpler types, we approach the desired point, which can no longer be subdivided. Indeed, having divided animals into mortals and immortals; then mortals again on earth and water; then earthly ones on wings and walking on legs, etc. continuing to the species closest to the sought-after object and containing it in itself, through these successive decompositions we will reach the simplest species, which no longer contains anything other than the very object about which we are talking. We divide animals that walk on legs into rational and irrational. Further, from all these types obtained through division, we select the qualities most directly related to man, combine them into one sentence and define man in such a way that he is a mortal, earthly animal, walking on two legs and endowed with reason. From here, it is revealed that division plays the role of material, seeking out the simplicity of the name for definition; determination, which composes and organizes and mediates the knowledge of what is, represents the artist and creator. True definitions are definitions not of objects or ideas, but of substances, the general concept of which is presented to our spirit. We call the disclosure of concepts about them interpretative speech. There are different divisions of these concepts about substances. One substance to be divided is divided into species; such, for example, is the genus. The other divides it into parts; This is, for example, the whole. The third divides it into accidents, or modifications, modifications. When dividing a whole into parts, most often what is meant is magnitude. A division that pays attention to accidents can never explain the whole, for it is necessary that every being have a substance identical to itself. That is why these two divisions have no authority behind them. The only legitimate division is that which divides the genus into species; it follows the same character of identity both in the genus and in the diversity of its particular differences. We always see a species in one of the parts of the genus; however, it is not so that a part in turn can become a species. For example, although a hand is a part of a person; but not the appearance of a person. On the contrary, the genus consists of the species. For example, the properties of an animal are at the same time common to both man and ox. The whole, on the contrary, is not contained in its parts; for example, a person is not completely contained in his legs. This means that the species has an advantage over the part. Everything said about the genus can also apply to the species. It is good to see the genus in two, if not three species. Divided species, having the genus as their starting point, give refuge to both the character of identity with it and the differences between themselves. Those who continue to separate characterize themselves with common properties. Indeed, each of the species is either a substance; as, for example, if we say: Among creatures, some have a body, others are incorporeal; or whether it is a matter of quantity, relation, place, time, action, and state. Therefore, everything that we know clearly and thoroughly can be given a definition; just as someone who, no matter what it comes down to, is not able to form a concept about it or give a verbal definition of it, he, we say, therefore has no knowledge about this subject. The inability to draw up a definition results in many judgments of dubious merit and completely false ones. In fact, if someone who knows an object has a concept about it and carries knowledge about it in the depths of his rational soul; then he can verbally express what he thinks; His explanation of his thought is already a definition of it: from here it necessarily follows that a person familiar with the subject can, therefore, give a definition of it. Another attribute is added to the definitions, playing in it the role of a coat of arms, a distinctive feature, a sign. Consequently, if we add to the definition of a person the following sentence: “having the ability to laugh,” then it will complement it and this entire definition will sound like this: “A person is a rational animal, mortal, earthly, walking on two legs, gifted with the ability to laugh.” The attributes introduced into the definition speak about the distinctive features of an object, but they do not indicate the essence of the things themselves. A distinctive feature, as is unanimously recognized, is imparted to the individual by his peculiarity, which specifically distinguishes him from all other objects, because it is unique to him and is obvious to everyone. It is necessary, therefore, that in definitions the genus should be taken as something important and fundamental. In long definitions, the substance and nature of an object are revealed from a number of species, in turn revealed through ten categories; in short ones, its essence and nature is indicated by the main types, selected from adjacent ones. And yet, even the shortest definition must consist of at least three parts: the genus and the two most necessary species. This happens through reduction. So, the definition of a person can be reduced to this: “A person is an animal capable of laughing.” Then you need to add to this the main random characteristic of the defined object, or its particular attribute, or its special active state, or something from its other characteristics. Consequently, a definition, which is obliged to interpret the essence of an object, cannot seem to accurately capture its nature. And if so, then what does it do? By naming the main types, it reveals the essence of the object and comes close to knowing it through indicating the qualities inherent in the object. 7. About the reasons why one does not trust one’s own judgments and about the reasons for stopping them. For two main reasons, they refuse to continue the reasoning and stop it. The first is rooted in the versatility and instability of the human mind. His very nature seems to be such that he is condemned by it either to constant disagreement with others or to not be like himself. The second reason for doubt and renunciation of judgment lies in the differences that exist between objects. As a result of this mutual disagreement between them, they are neither able to believe in all the objects we see, nor are they able to refuse to recognize all of them, because then it would turn out that there is no need to believe this statement: “nothing needs to be believed,” since it is part of everything; and equally unable, due to the similarity of motives speaking in favor of both of the two sides, to believe in certain things, having refused recognition by some others, or not to believe: we are forced to refrain from our decision due to all this. Of these two main reasons for which we delay the act of decision, the one generated by the instability of thought produces disagreement. This is the reason for doubt and the cessation of all reasoning. Hence it follows that our life is filled with judgments and meetings; That’s why we are busy choosing one or another of the so-called goods and evils: all this is far from unequivocal evidence of the instability of the mind, the weakness of which fluctuates between objects that contradict each other and mutually reject themselves. Hence all these libraries filled with books; – various schools; - these disputes with shouts of scientists and unscientists, professing opposing teachings and convincing each other that the truth is on their side. 8. A method by which both the objects themselves and the concepts about them, expressed by names, can be reduced to certain categories. There are three things 948 about the words of the language to be considered. First of all, words serve as representatives of concepts, and then of objects. Secondly, concepts are reminders of objects and imprints from them. That is why the thoughts of all people are the same: existing objects make the same impression on everyone with their form and the same type. But the same cannot be said regarding the names of objects, since there are different languages. Thirdly, and finally, there are things that arouse certain thoughts in us. Grammar reduces all names of objects to 24 common elements (letters). The number of elements must indeed be limited and they must have a definite character; otherwise objects, due to their innumerability, would elude knowledge. The peculiarity of science is that it is based on principles that are general and specific to the point of comprehensiveness 949. And this is why particular provisions are reduced to general ones. Research, in particular philosophical research, begins with rational concepts and with substances that are present. Since the number of these particular substances extends to infinity, they were reduced to a few primary elements, under which the object sought, whatever it may be, is subsumed. If it turns out that it can be subsumed under one or some of these elementary concepts, then we affirm its existence. If he is not subsumed under these rational concepts, then we declare that he does not exist. In human language, words are used either in mutual connection or without correlation with each other. They are placed in mutual connection when we say, for example, like this: “A man is running; man wins." They are used without any connection, for example, in the following example: “A man, an ox, runs, wins.” There is nothing here that would form a coherent speech and which, in relation to the truth or error of its contents, would be distinguished by some consistency or orderliness. Words used outside of mutual relationship with each other denote only the essence, or substance; other of them indicate quality; still other quantity; some - attitude; behind this and then others there is a place; again by others - time; again by others – state; others – belonging; finally, still others – activity; still others - some kind of passive state. These are the elementary concepts of bodily essences; they are reduced to known principles. These fundamental concepts can only be comprehended by reason. The substantiality of objects, due to its immateriality, can only be comprehended by the most sublime speculation. Of the substances that fall under one of the ten categories, some are original, such as, for example, the nine orders of categories (in parts of speech); others refer to some object. On the other hand, of the substances that fall under one or another of the ten categories, some are synonymous, such as, for example, ox and man, since both of them are animals. Two objects are synonymous, understood under one common name, for example, an animal; the meaning and definition of these objects in this regard are the same, i.e. animate beings; Heteronyms consist of different names for the same concept; These are, for example, ascension and descent, since whether we ascend or descend, this is still the path we follow. There is another type of heteronyms; eg horse and black. Here both the name of the object and the epithet are alien to each other and are not necessary in the same subject. That is why it would be more appropriate to call these words not heteronyms, but rather completely alien to each other, having no connection with each other. Polyonyms are those words that contain the same concept under different names; such as, for example, a sword, a broadsword, a saber. Common nouns derive their name from another name; so, for example, “courageous” comes from “courage.” Homonyms are words that are identical only in their sound composition, but have different meanings - for example, a living person and a drawn person equally express the concept of an animal. Among homonyms, one has the same meaning completely by chance; so, for example, Ajax the Locrian and Ajax the Salaminian; Other homonyms are used with the same meaning deliberately. Of this last category of homonyms, some are based on actual similarity; for example, the word “man” denotes both a living being and its image in painting. Other homonyms are based on complete analogy and mutual agreement, such as, for example, “the sole of Mount Ida” (Il. XX, 57) and “the sole of man,” because the lower part is generally called the sole. Other homonyms are determined by the action they produce; like, for example, the “legs” of a ship (oars), which set it in motion, and the “legs” of a person, which serve as a means of movement for him. Things used by the same person for the same purpose are also called homonyms; such, for example, are “medical knife” and “book”, because in his healing art the doctor uses both for the same purpose of treatment. Of the reasons, some are called pre-initial; others - permanent, or active; third - auxiliary: fourth - causes sine quibus non. The primordial cause is the one that, more than any other chance, gives rise to something. Thus, for example, the sight of beauty arouses the flame of desire in the heart of an intemperate person; it produces an erotic movement, but not at all necessary and indispensable. A constant cause is one that Greek synonymy also calls constantly, independently and with full force, acting, independent of any other, that is, exerting its effect without the assistance of another cause, on its own. Next, you should explain to the student the difference between these reasons using examples. For example, the father is the original cause of the teaching; the teacher is acting; the student's abilities are an auxiliary reason; and finally, time plays the role of a cause of sine qua non. Actually, a cause is called everything that is capable of producing any effect. Thus, iron is capable of cutting not only when it cuts, but also when it does not cut. So, the reason is potential, i.e. capable of producing something means simultaneously both something that acts and something that does not yet act, but still has the power to act. According to some, causes come from bodies; according to others, from immaterial objects. Others give the name of cause only to matter in the proper sense. If, they add, something incorporeal is assimilated by causes, it is only through the abuse of language, in an improper sense, to indicate the basis of any action. Others again say the exact opposite of this, calling incorporeal, immaterial substances the true causes. Only in a non-proper sense can bodies be considered causes. Let's take cutting, for example. Even though it is realizable, it still remains immaterial and nevertheless acts as a cause on material things: on the cutting blade, which produces this action, which is something immaterial, and on the object being cut, which turns out to be cut as a result of this action. Cause operates under three different species. There is, for example, a sculptor cutting a block of marble: the sculptor is the cause of the statue; that of which he is the cause appears from under his hand, i.e. e a carved statue, thirdly, there is marble here, used by him: marble in some way is the reason for the statue. To become cut and to be cut, these two phenomena, representing the results of actions, have intangible causes for themselves in actions. And this is why there are reasons for categories or, to use the expressions of Cleanthes and Archedemus, words, i.e. concepts that (such as space and time) have only a formal (and not substantial) meaning. Or let's say better: Some of the reasons should be called reasons of categories, i.e., degrees into which our thoughts are divided, or purely formal; so, for example, “it is being cut”, this will be a purely formal state, in relation to which “being cut” seems to be a random state. Other states will be aphoristic states, or not requiring further proof; as, for example, “the ship is built”, in relation to which phenomenon “the ship is built” will be random. Aristotle calls by name everything that belongs to the corresponding genus: house, church, burn, cut. As for cases, that is, verbal forms, they, of course, express something immaterial; this point cannot be doubted. That is why this sophism is resolved this way: The word spoken by you passes through your mouth, this is true; but if we are talking about house as a word expressing a known concept, and someone claims that “house” passes through your mouth, then this is not true. We are not talking about a house, which represents a collection of stones and some kind of body, but we express the concept of a house in words and in a certain grammatical case of this latter, considered as something immaterial. And about an architect, when we say that he builds (although he himself does not build), we say this with an attitude towards what will come out of his hands. In the same way we say: The cloak is woven, for the action is indicated by the action. What acts on something is not something else, but precisely this is the cause of what it acts on; so here weaving is the cause of the cloak, the structure of the house. But since these actions are the cause of the origin of these objects, then the action itself is the cause of origin in general. But, on the same basis that something is a cause, it is also an efficient cause and a cause producing something, that is, an efficient cause and a cause by virtue of which an object exists are one and the same cause. And if something consists of a cause that is also an efficient cause, then it merges with the cause by virtue of which the object exists. But from the fact that one thing exists by virtue of another, it does not follow that this other cause is entirely an efficient cause. In fact, there are many things that from afar contribute to some final goal, although because of this it is still impossible to call them all actual causes. Medea, for example, would not have strangled her children if she had not been blinded by anger; and she would not have been blinded by anger without the poison of jealousy; the poison of jealousy would not torment her heart if she did not love; if she had not loved, Jason would not have sailed on his ship to Colchis; Jason would not have sent his ship to Colchis if the ship Argo had not been built; it would not have been built if trees had not been cut down for it on the heights of Pelyun. All these circumstances, from which the children finally fell in love with Medea, are, however, not decisive reasons. Medea alone is the cause of it. That is why what does not prevent cannot be called action. Therefore, that which does not prevent is not the cause; what does not hinder is a circumstance that only allows action: for the reason is seen only in the performance of something and in someone’s activity. Moreover, what does not hinder is separated from what happens, while the cause is in close relation to what happens; This means that what does not interfere cannot be the cause, and an action is performed because the one who could interfere refuses to act. There are four types of causes: acting, such as a sculptor producing a statue; material, this is the substance from which it is made; formal, this is the character it assumes; the final one is the glory depicted by the statue of the gymnasium. Bronze, or another substance that is an element necessary for the existence of a statue, sine qua non a statue, is also a cause. For everything, without the assistance of which action is impossible, is certainly a cause, if not absolute and in itself and constantly containing its action, then at least auxiliary. Everything that acts produces an effect, and an object capable of perceiving an action experiences it. A cause is something determining and arranging, but every object experiences a certain action in accordance with its predisposition to this by nature, for properties also contribute to the action and take the place of the eorum of necessary elements, sine quibus non. Without the assistance of the ability of the object, the cause is therefore invalid. However, this ability of an object to receive an influence is not a cause, but only an auxiliary means. In fact, every cause contains the concept of action. The earth would not produce itself; therefore, a cause cannot be its own cause. To say that it is not fire, but wood that causes combustion; that it is not the sword, but the body that causes the cut; that an athlete in wrestling gains the upper hand not over the opponent’s strength, but over his own weakness, is ridiculous. A cause, in itself and constantly containing its effect, does not need time; start cauterizing the skin and immediately arouse a feeling of pain in it. As for the initial or preparatory causes, some of them need time for their action to take place: others do not need it, such as, for example, the case of a fracture of something. Let us explain, however. These causes are called acting without an interval of time not so much because they do not require time to develop, but because they require a very short period of time for this to happen. The same should be said about the word “suddenly”: it does not at all mean that the action followed immediately the cause. Every cause, taken by itself, is understood only as producing an effect or as manifesting itself on something. For example, a cutting action is performed by a cutting blade; this action is detected on something, i.e. on a subject properly disposed to it; for example, fire reveals its effect on a tree; for fire will not burn a diamond 950. The reason always refers to another subject. The concept of it can be formed only by this type of affinity with another object. In order for us to understand the cause as such, it is necessary that two objects mutually influence each other. The same applies to an artist, a performer of something, a father. A reason in relation to itself is not a reason; just as a man cannot be his own father; otherwise the first would become the second. The reason is effective; it makes an impression. And what is produced by the cause is in a passive state and only perceives the impression. One and the same object and the action related to it cannot simultaneously be actively and passively perceived; just as you cannot be both father and son at the same time. Moreover, the cause, in relation to the effect it produces, necessarily has behind it a period of existence. It is necessary that the blade pre-exists the wound. The same object as a cause cannot exist before matter and later than it as an effect of the cause. There is a huge difference between being and becoming. So a cause is the cause of that which begins to exist; so the father is the cause of the son. It is truly impossible for one and the same thing, as identical to itself, to be and become at the same time. Nothing, then, is a cause for itself. Causes do not occur reciprocally from others, but rather exist reciprocally for others. Thus, a preliminary disease of the spleen is not the cause of fever, but only the reason that fever occurs; and the previous fever is not the cause of splenic disease, but only that the disease may intensify. Thus, the virtues, with their mutual consequences, interlock into an insoluble knot 951. This is how the stones that form the vault hold each other in place; but they are not at all the causes of one another. According to this logical category, the teacher and the student are mutually the cause of success for each other. It sometimes happens that causes mutually produce the same effect on each other; So, for example, a merchant and an innkeeper bring profit to each other. In other cases, causes acting on each other produce different actions. Such, for example, are the sword and the body. The sword acts on the body, cutting it; the body acts on the sword, causing it to cut. It is quite rightly said: an eye for an eye; life for life. In fact, the attacker, having dealt a fatal blow to the victim, is for him the direct cause of death, or at least the fact that death may follow. But the attacker, in turn, mortally wounded by the victim, also has its cause, but in the opposite way and on a different basis. He was the cause of death for the victim; but it is not death that deals him a mortal blow, but the wounded man himself; having fought, one acted upon the other as a cause; but the other became the cause for him. And the one who offends is the cause in relation to the one whom he harmed. On the contrary, the law that condemns a villain to execution is not the cause of violence and crime: it renders justice and vengeance to one; he corrects and instructs the other. Therefore, causes do not give rise to each other; they remain in a state of simple, uncomplicated causes. They ask, moreover, whether united forces become multi-complex causes of one action. Several people, who together drag the ship, are the reason that it moves forward; This is true. But the reason they are together with others; unless you want to call the contributing cause identical with the cause in general. According to some others, although the causes are numerous, any one cause, taken separately, is the cause and, moreover, the effect of only one. So, for example, virtues, the number of which is large, give rise to happiness, which is one. The same can be said, for example, about heat and sadness: they are produced by many reasons. But what? Various virtues, everything that makes you hot or everything that causes pain, does all this have only one effect? Is it true that with all the multitude of virtues, which in relation to the race is something unified, is it true that they produce only one effect, namely happiness? It is at least certain that the initiating or preliminary causes, considered in their genus and form, although there are many of them, produce only one effect: in genus, such as, for example, any type of illness, colds, tabes, excess, drunkenness, stomach pains; in their form, for example, fever. For example, if someone smells pleasant, then in relation to the genus the pleasant smell is something unified; from the side of the species, there are many reasons that can contribute to this, for example, incense, rose, saffron, dew incense, myrrh and various other incense. But there is a difference between one scent and the others: a rose does not smell as strong as myrrh. Sometimes the same cause produces opposite effects, which sometimes depends on the size and strength of the cause itself, sometimes on the abilities or disposition of the object experiencing the effect. We say: Whether the same cause produces opposite effects sometimes depends on the strength of the cause itself. So the same string, depending on the greater or lesser degree of its tension, produces a sound either sharp or low. Secondly, the production of opposite actions by the same cause depends on the properties of the object on which the cause acts. Honey, for example, is a sweet juice for a healthy stomach; but it seems bitter to a sick person tormented by a fever. The same wine irritates one person, loosens the tongue of another and causes a cheerful mood in him. The same ray of sunlight melts the wax and dries the dirt. Among the causes, some are clear to the eye, while others are seen only by the mind: some are unclear, while others can be comprehended along the path of conclusions. Among the unclear reasons, some are obscured only for a while; secret and mysterious at a certain time, after a certain period of time they are revealed. Others remain unclear by their very nature; so they remain covered in eternal darkness. Some of the reasons for this last category are, however, comprehensible by speculation. That is why some philosophers do not dare to call them unclear causes, since through reason one can reach the discovery of them, to comprehend them through general presumptions. Such, for example, is the parallelism of two dubious questions; but speculation also penetrates through it. Some other reasons, remaining constantly inaccessible to understanding, are called completely unclear. Some of them are preparatory, others are constantly and independently acting; some acting jointly, others only auxiliary. Some are reflected in actions consistent with their nature; others disagree with her. Some, depending on the circumstances, are reflected by diseases; others to varying degrees and according to the intensity of their impressions; the action of others depends on time and circumstances. Destroy the preliminary cause: its effect, nevertheless, remains. But the same cannot be said about a constantly operating cause: it exists, and the action also exists; if it is destroyed, the action disappears. According to synonymy, an efficient cause is also called an independent cause, independent, acting on its own, because it contains within itself a sufficient reason for action. If a cause of this kind means, due to its inherent internal force, a complete action, then an auxiliary cause means an official action, performed with the assistance of an outsider. If it did not contribute at all to the action, then it would not be called auxiliary. On the contrary, if it acts at least partially, then it will be to some extent the cause of the action, for thanks to it it is carried out. This means that the cause will be auxiliary if the action is performed as a result of its presence, the action is obvious when the cause is obvious and unclear when it is unclear. A participating reason is included in the category of reasons in the same way as, for example, a brother in arms or in age becomes a soldier or a peer, a comrade of someone. An auxiliary cause helps an efficient cause, doubling its effect. The concept of a coexisting cause does not contain anything of the kind, because there may be coexisting causes, but still not be active causes. This name is given to the coexisting cause because it is not capable of producing any action on its own; it can only be caused by some other cause. An auxiliary cause differs from a co-participating or coexisting cause in that the latter acts together with another, which separately and alone would not produce the given effect; the first, on the contrary, being separately incapable of producing an effect, when it is attached to an active and independent cause, it increases the power of its action. If you want to increase the intensity of a known cause, then you only need to turn the protarctic (preliminary, initial) cause into an auxiliary 952. The eighth book “Stromat” has no connection with the previous ones. In the first seven books, despite all the deliberate deviations from the main subject, they still talk primarily about Gnostic perfection and they have a theological character, at least, everything comes down to theology; the eighth book “Stromat”, based on Aristotelian research, talks about various matters of logic and dialectics. It is believed that this is an excerpt from the extant Hypotypos (Hypotypos) of Clement, a work in which, in contrast to the sophistry of his time, he outlined the logical schematism of Christianity. According to the testimony of Diogenes Laertius in the “Life of Zeno”, this word was an example of a word that has no meaning. According to Svida, it served as a sentence, so to speak, a plug, and was inserted into a speech or sentence simply to round them out where another word was suddenly not found. Therefore, no one asked what the word blityri meant; no one even thought of explaining it or defining it. Plutarch attributes this verse to Menander, and Stobaeus to Aeschylus. As such preliminary provisions, which are accepted only so that they can subsequently serve as support points for the conclusion. The opinions of philosophers about this are conveyed by Plutarch in “De placitis philosophorum.” V, 15. And some of the most famous philosophers have argued this, for example. Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Empedocles. In the book. II "De anima", ch. 3, 4.–Ethic. ad. Nic. I, 13. Galen in the book. IV about the teachings of Hippocrates and Plato. - Compare also in the commentaries on Epictetus. There is nothing written left of Pyrrho himself, but from the words of his disciple Ascanius the Abderite, Diogenes Laertius in the book. IX writes the following about Pyrrho: “He was the inventor of the doctrine that nothing is necessary and cannot be judged with certainty, and one should not dwell on certain concepts. He argued that there is neither absolutely honest and honorable, nor shameful and vile, nor absolutely fair and unjust. He taught the same about everything else; Nothing seems to be true, but everything, either by force of law or by force of custom, has entered into human life. In accordance with this, in life he declared himself: he did not lean towards anything and did not shy away from anything. For example, if he met a chariot on the road, he did not turn aside; there was a pothole, I didn’t go around it; dogs, I wasn’t afraid of them; he didn't trust his feelings. If he remained intact, it was only thanks to the friends who followed him.” that is, objects, concepts about them and words by which those concepts are expressed. Words represent concepts about objects; things are represented by concepts. Both things and concepts about them are identical, but the words are different. Aristotle “De interpretatione” ch. 1: “Just as the letters are not the same for everyone, so are the words. The mental states of which words are symbols are the same for everyone. The things of which those mental states (concepts) consist of signs are also identical. Compare Aristot. Analyt. poster I, 4. Compare Strom. VII at the end of ch. 11th. As is revealed from the prefaces and epilogues to previous books, this book lacks much. And, equally, it is doubtful that this VIII book was the last Stromat. Much was promised in the prologues to previous books that was not explained here.