Отдел второй. Настоящее (эмпирическое) состояние человека.

I. Communication and interaction between the human soul and body. The transition from idea to reality, mediated by sin, was accompanied for man by such significant changes and complications of his nature that the present state of fallen people appeared in the ideas of St. Gregory, as a completely special, different from the original and future, form of being. Body and soul - these two necessary parts of the current human nature - were, however, also in the ideal person. But in their basic properties they were not then what they are now. The body was alien to all lower, animal functions, even to all gross material qualities, and represented a pure organ of the spirit, completely imbued with the properties of this latter; the god-like soul had only two powers - mind (the power of theoretical knowledge) and free will (the power of practical activity): the whole ideal person, obviously, was far from being like us, today's people. – With such a sharp distinction between the primitive state of man and the present, in relation to this latter, in the anthropology of Bishop. Nyssky, a new series of questions arose aimed at understanding its features - at studying the structure and functions of our empirical nature in its difference from our ideal nature. – At the same time, the general nature and method of anthropological research changed significantly. In ideas about the ideal person, the starting point and support for St. Gregory was served by the church-biblical teaching about the innocent state of our ancestors. No matter how uniquely he understood this teaching and no matter how much he deviated from it under the influence of Origen’s philosophy, in any case, religious and dogmatic interests stood in the foreground for him and directed the very course of his anthropology. With the transition to the doctrine of the empirical nature of man, these interests ceased to be the determining principle. The Bible did not provide the necessary information on issues of psychology or physiology, and for religion these issues were not of significant importance. The Christian anthropologist had to turn to secular science for clarification. Natural philosophy and empirical sciences are indeed guided by St. Gregory in this department of his anthropology. On a purely scientific basis, a range of questions arise that are subject to investigation here: on it, their resolution also occurs. And above all, the attention of St. Father focused here on solving a general philosophical question - about the connection and relationship between two opposing substances that make up a person - spiritual and physical. Soul and body are united in a person for a reason. In their connection, the true and eternal intention of the Creator was realized, Who created these two natures one for the other, united them together from the very first moment of their existence and placed all their further development in strict parallel and close dependence on each other. This is the main position put forward and approved by St. Gregory on the question of the relationship between the spiritual and physical elements in the composition of primitive man. As long as we were talking about the ideal man, and while the question itself stood only on religious and dogmatic grounds, this general position represented a sufficient answer to it. The refined idealistic concept of the body of an innocent person smoothed out the slight features of its opposition to the soul and made it possible to imagine their mutual connection without much difficulty. The matter presented itself to our St. in a completely different way. father, when he drew attention to the relationship of two natures in their sharp opposition in empirical man, and when he wanted to clarify this relationship for himself in purely philosophical interests. From this point of view, the connection between soul and body presented so many difficulties for thought that Bp. Nyssa more than once declared it “ineffable and unthinkable” 236 – Mysterious and incomprehensible for the philosophizing philosophizing mind is, in fact, the organic unity of two natures, radically opposed to each other both in essence and in all properties. The body receives impressions from the external visible world; these impressions, devoted to the soul, become instruments of pleasure or sadness, a constant source of thoughts, knowledge, doubts, inclinations and aversions - movements of the most varied and most opposite. For its part, the soul has an even greater influence on the body: it imparts its vitality to it, reflects on it all its internal disturbances, moves and controls it at will and uses it to carry out its decisions. And yet, despite all this, the soul is spirit, the body is matter: the soul has no form, no figure, no measurement, no size, no weight; the body is extended, weighty, rough, divisible into parts, accessible to the perception of all external senses - in shape, figure, size and heaviness. How is it possible between such different substances to have such close, intimate communication as is observed in humans? Philosophy of all times has tried to resolve this question, but despite its extreme difficulty, it has often fallen into the most serious errors and thus revealed its weakness. Not being able to understand and explain the unity of opposite substances, she rather decided to deny their very opposite, sacrificing the independence of one substance in favor of another. She either denied the spirituality of the soul, attributing to it a corporeal nature (as crude materialism did), or, on the contrary, resolved the body into a simple phenomenon of the spirit (as was the case in extreme idealism). With all the awareness of the difficulty of the philosophical problem, St. Gregory, however, tried to give as much explanation as possible. The judgments he expressed on this issue are closely related to Plotinus’s views on matter and the sensory world and, undoubtedly, have their source in them. The sensory world, according to the teachings of Plotinus, is a reflection of the ideal world in matter. Idea and matter are the components of every sensory-corporeal object. The first is what gives an object its appearance, qualitative certainty, in a word - everything that a thing is in our sensory perception and in our rational concept of it; the latter is a bare substrate (υποϰειμενον) a dark background on which an idea with its own properties is reflected. Matter, according to Plotinus, is not the real substratum of sensory things, as it remained in the philosophy of Plato. It is not something standing next to the ideal, like another entity different from it. Plotinus directly includes it in the flow of ideal emanation, as the most extreme boundary where real being ends and passes into its negation, into non-existence. 237 If, with such a view of matter, we raise the question about the reality of the sensory world, then the answer in the sense of Plotinus will be clear: only ideas have real existence in this world. Everything corporeal and sensual, in the philosopher’s mind, disappeared into the supersensible and incorporeal; every body was thought of only as a complex of completely immaterial elements (properties or qualities), with the decomposition of which all that remained of the body was an empty ghost, only a deceptive appearance. 238 From this point of view, there could no longer be any talk about the opposition between the spiritual and the physical; their reconciliation was achieved, their connection and interaction became completely clear. In particular, the question of the connection of soul and body in man received a complete and convenient solution here. St. Gregory of Nyssa used the Neoplatonists' view of the nature of sensible bodies to clarify a difficult anthropological problem. The Christian thinker encountered the same difficulty that arose when explaining the connection between soul and body in man when solving another question - about the relationship of God, the highest Spirit, to the sensory, material world. Regarding the human soul, philosophy asked: how can a spiritual substance have such close unity with another substance, the nature of which is so far from its own? Regarding God, philosophy was perplexed: how could an absolutely immaterial Being produce material qualities? 239 In both cases, obviously, there was essentially the same question: how to explain the influence of spiritual and invisible nature on material and extended substances? – Most of the Greek philosophers and Manichaeans, following in their footsteps, recognized matter as eternal precisely because they could not in any way derive it from God. To say that God created matter (ύλην), in their opinion, meant to necessarily assume the materiality of God Himself, which is impossible and absurd. 240 With the closest relation to the question of the origin of matter from God, St. Gregory develops his theory as follows. Between the divine nature and the sensory-material nature, in his opinion, there is no absolute opposition that would exclude the possibility of any relationship between them. We contrast God with sensory bodies because He does not contain any of the properties that can be perceived by the external senses. But what are these properties in bodies? In essence, here too they are supersensible phenomena. In fact, we can separate each material quality in concept from the substance that bears it, χωρίζεται). Let, for example, some animal or tree, or any material object in general, be perceived: many properties are brought to our attention here, and our thought represents them separately and not mixed (άμιϰτως), although it sees them in the same object. One concept is about color, another about heaviness, another again about quantity, or some other tactile property, because softness, length and other qualities are not confused with each other or with the object itself by our mind. 241 Taken in such an abstraction and considered in itself, none of the sensory qualities is obviously not a body, but only a certain attitude of our mind or concept (ου'δέν έφ' έαυτού σώμα' έοτιν..., αλλά τούτων έϰαστον λογος εστιν). 242 It is, in fact, impossible to call a body one, for example, color or one heaviness, or some other property isolated from the whole set of material qualities observed in a certain object. All this is just mental ideas. And if so, if the bodily properties themselves are not bodies, but only “concepts and bare mental representations” (α πάντα μέ ϰαϑ εαυτά έννοια εοτι ϰαί φιλα νοήματα), 243 – this means that they all essentially belong to the category of being, comprehended by the mind, and not by feeling (νφ ϰαί ούϰ άισϑήσει). 244 But now, with the removal of all qualities from a material object, the very concept of a sensory body is destroyed (πάς ό τού σώματος συνδιαλυεται λογος): not - a body, without a doubt, that in which there is no color, appearance, elasticity, extension, gravity and other properties. 245 So, in the entire material body there is in reality not a single feature that could be presented as an objective opposition to the spirit: everything that we call sensibility in bodily existence and posit as a fundamental difference from spiritual existence is in itself something intelligible (νοητον). The body is a collection of ideas or supersensible entities. – But if there is actually nothing sensory in the composition of material objects, then how can they be subject to the perception of our external senses? The body, that is, the object of sensory perception, answers St. Gregory, following the example of the Neoplatonists, supersensible elements in themselves (material qualities) become only as a result of mutual confluence and connection γινεται). 246 Just as the decomposition of a body into its component elements leads us to the denial of sensuality in it, so, conversely, we must make the mutual connection of these elements the cause of the sensual character of bodies. Being immaterial in themselves, bodily qualities nevertheless produce a material being when they come together. 247 Such an answer cannot, of course, be called completely satisfactory, because it may be followed by a further question: how is a sensory, spatial body formed from the mutual combination of purely spiritual, intelligible elements? – where does this property come from for bodies, when none of the parts included in their composition have it? Based on these perplexities, Bishop. Nyssa did not give any explanations, just as Neoplatonism did not give them. This question was already resolved by a new philosophy, which, in the person of Leibniz, answered it in the sense that space and sensuality are not objective qualities: these are purely psychological phenomena that arise in our soul as a result of its relationship to the simple spiritual elements that form bodies. 248 According to the meaning of the above judgments of our holy father, the entire difference between the bodily and the spiritual (incorporeal) comes down, apparently, only to a very insignificant feature - to the concept of complexity and simplicity: the spiritual is simple, indivisible, does not consist of individual qualities (ποιοτητες): the bodily, on the contrary, is complex, indivisible, represents a combination of individual, independent properties. But behind such an insignificant difference, body and spirit have a deep inner affinity precisely in the sense that both are supersensible, intelligible forces (νοηται δυνάμεις): the spirit is a single intelligible force, the body is a whole aggregate of such supersensible forces. And this similarity, according to St. Gregory, it is absolutely enough to understand their influence on each other: between natures, so similar, the connection and correlation are completely natural. 249 “If the representation of (bodily) properties belongs to the mind (ει νοητή των ιδιωμάτων τούτων ή ϰατανοησις), and the Deity by nature is also represented by the mind (νοητσν δέ τη φύσει το θειον); then there is no inconsistency in the fact that an incorporeal Being produced these mental principles (τας νοεράς άφορμάς) to compose bodies. Spiritual nature naturally produces spiritual forces (τας ѵоητάς δαναμεις), and the mutual union of these latter gives existence to sensory-corporeal nature.” 250 This conclusion was made by Bishop. Nyssa from his general theory in relation to the question of the origin of matter from God. This conclusion was a direct response to the Manichean objections directed against the Church's dogma of creation. He destroyed the main argument on which the Manichaean doctrine of the eternity of matter rested. Why couldn't God create matter? The nature of this latter does not contradict the divine nature. If God has no form, no figure, no dimension, then matter is essentially alien to these sensory properties. If God is invisible and incorporeal, then the constituent principles of matter are also incorporeal and invisible. All the same logical conclusions could be applied with even greater force to the solution of the question of the connection between soul and body in man. If bodily nature does not contradict the divine nature, then all the less, of course, it contradicts the nature of our soul. The unity of the soul with the body should not, therefore, arouse any bewilderment; their close communication and interaction directly follows from the similarity of their natures. If in revealing the views of St. Gregory on the relationship of matter to spirit, body to soul, we dwell on the result obtained so far, then we can unfairly accuse St. father in the extremes of idealism, which denies any substantiality to bodily nature. Indeed, what is matter, what are bodies, if we take them without the qualities that give them visibility and tangibility? If only the “mutual confluence and combination” of qualities produces a sensory body, and if, on the other hand, these qualities themselves, according to Bishop. Nyssa, the essence of a purely spiritual nature, then it seems that there is absolutely nothing left for the share of sensory being in itself, and the entire concept of matter is resolved into an empty, meaningless abstract. This is indeed how Plotinus thought, as we have seen. The thought of Gregory of Nyssa, however, was not like that, and this is his significant deviation from the Neoplatonists. He is not at all inclined to recognize bodies as simple abstractions or purely spiritual phenomena. According to his conviction, by separating all its sensory properties from matter, we will not destroy its reality. In this way we will only reach her true, innermost being, which lies deeper than her external qualities and unites them. St. revealed with clarity. Gregory his thought, explaining the words of the writer of everyday life about the first created earth. “It’s written,” says the bishop. Nyssa, - the earth is invisible and unsettled (Gen. 1, 2); and from here it is clear that everything was already possible at the first creative act. God then produced, as it were, the seeds of all beings, although each individual thing did not yet exist in reality. The earth was invisible and unsettled - in other words: it was and was not, because the qualities had not yet converged on it (αι ποιοτητες). The proof of this is in the expression of Scripture that the earth was invisible.... If it is invisible, then of course it is colorless, and colorlessness implies the absence of an image, and with this the absence of a body. Consequently, at the initial foundation of the world, the earth, like everything else, was among the existing (εν τοις ουσιν), but it was still waiting for qualities to be given to it that would make it what it is now before us.” 251 The primary elements (substance) of matter were created at the very beginning of the creation of the world and existed as realities. But initially they were realities without form, without figure, without color, in a word - incorporeal realities. They became bodies when God imparted to them certain properties, the totality of which made them perceptible to the external senses. So in every body there are two different sides: the visible, sensually perceived, this is the totality of qualities with which material bodies appear in our sensory view, and the invisible, internal grain, which lies behind the external qualities and serves as their carrier. This is the grain or substrate (υλη, υποϰείμενον), which underlies bodies, and forms their own, real essence, in contrast to the essence of the spirit. The body, therefore, is not an empty ghost and not a phenomenon of the spirit alone; it has independent content, different and independent from spiritual substance. St. Gregory is equally far from the extremes of both materialistic and idealistic monism. Он твердо стоит на почве церковно–библейского дуализма и ищет примирения двух субстанций, отнюдь не жертвуя их самостоятельностью. A true philosopher, in his opinion, is recognized by two traits: “on the one hand, he does not consider everything that cannot be seen to be fiction; on the other hand, he does not stop only at appearances, at simple phenomena: έν τοις μή ούσι λογίζεται.” 252 Душа недоступна чувствам; a true philosopher nevertheless studies its nature: αλλά ϰαι ψυχής φυσιν περινοει. 253 Bodies, on the contrary, are subject to the perception of sight; however, he is not content with what he sees in them - “he considers all their qualities separately and together, he separates and combines them one by one in thought, he examines how their various combinations and relationships add up to form material objects.” 254 This correct philosophical analysis reveals in matter the point of contact between it and spirit. Neither from the side of its qualities, taken in abstraction, nor from the side of its essence, considered separately from the qualities, is matter subject to sensory perception, but is a supersensible reality and in this respect completely akin to the spirit. – But the solution to the difficult problem, correct from the point of view of a Christian philosopher, could not sufficiently satisfy the demands that arose in natural philosophy. The entire contrast between the body and the spirit of Bishop. Nyssky understood how the difference between the sensory and the supersensible, and this difference, in turn, was reduced only to the difference in our ways of perceiving and knowing them. We know the body through external senses, the spirit directly through the mind: this is how St. to the father all the difficulty, which he undertook to explain. This is where he directed his entire argument. Having decomposed the complex concept of the body into its component elements and rightly pointing out that not one of these elements, taken separately, is subject to sensory perception, he drew from here the conclusion about the similarity of spirit and matter, and considered the question of the possibility of their unity and interaction to be over. In philosophy, however, this question is posed much deeper, and therefore its solution seems more difficult. Here we are talking about the opposition of bodily and spiritual existence, not only from a subjective point of view and not only in relation to our way of knowing them. What is meant here is their objective opposition, the difference in their very essence, regardless of how they appear to the cognizing subject and in what ways they are perceived by him. As long as spirit remains spirit, matter remains matter, as long as the main difference between them is recognized as two independent and parallel substances, the fact of their relationship is not explained for philosophy. From a strictly philosophical point of view, complete reconciliation between them is achieved only with the recognition of their identity in essence, or - in other words - with the denial of substantiality in one of them in favor of the other. That is why the attempts of philosophers to explain a difficult problem were quite consistently resolved into idealism or materialism, more crude or more refined. This was necessarily driven by the desire to avoid dualism, which is so contrary to philosophical thought and incomprehensible to it. - Our St. The philosopher, however, left this dualism in full force: having brought spirit and matter together on the external, phenomenal side, he maintained the internal difference between them, strictly dividing their substances within themselves. At the same time, he remained faithful to the point of view of church theology, but did not completely resolve the bewilderment of philosophy. Neoplatonism more strictly adhered to the interests of this latter in the denial of substantiality in the body. But Gregory of Nyssa could not do this. That the spirit can enter into communication with the sensory body - this general idea, in its philosophical formulation, ep. Nyssky justified one way or another when he proved that the opposition between the supersensible and the sensual is only apparent, external, that in reality the body, like the spirit, consists of elements not subject to sensory perception. How, however, the unity of soul and body actually occurs in a person, to what degree of proximity it extends and what consequences are accompanied by both united natures - the explanation of these and similar questions, in the interests of psychological ones, is the subject of further research by St. Gregory. With regard to this particular group of questions, St. Father called “a way of connecting the mind (νους) with matter - wonderful and unthinkable (τρόπον αμήχανον τε ϰαί αϰατανόητον).” 255 There is indeed quite a lot of mysterious and incomprehensible here. On the one hand, experience and our inner consciousness force us to recognize the closest connection of two natures, merging into the unity of the human personality. On the other hand, a firm conviction in the substantial difference of these natures forces us to always establish a strict distinction between them and interpret their connection without compromising their independence and some independence. To establish the correct view, in view of such opposing demands, has always been one of the most difficult tasks of rational psychology. It would seem strange to assume that a soul that has no extension can be limited to any space. But nevertheless we see that it lives and acts in a certain body and in many respects shares with it the conditions of spatial limitation. The soul is inextricably united with the body; but where? – where in the body is the center of this unity located? – where is the knot connecting two such different natures? – what bodily organ can be called the point of their contact? Antiquity attached full importance to such questions and answered them differently and sometimes even completely absurdly. 256 More remarkable than others are the opinions of Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle. Pythagoras distinguished the animal part of the soul from the rational, and placed the seat of the former in the heart, and the latter in the head; but in general, the place for the soul, in his opinion, is in the brain. Plato considered the head to be the seat of the immortal or divine principle of the soul (νούς): here, he says, is the throne of the spirit, from here this latter controls the unreasonable, mortal soul. He divides the irrational part of the soul, in turn, into higher and lower: the first, as the beginning of noble passions (ϑυμός), lives in the chest in order to be, so to speak, under the direct control of the rational soul; the second, the beginning of animal desires, lust (επιϑυμία) is located below the membrane. Aristotle considered the brain incapable of being the main organ of the activity of the soul: this organ, he said, is too cold and is intended only to pacify the movements of the heart; and therefore it is most natural to regard the heart as the center of life and understanding. 257 All these opinions were meant by St. Gregory; he knew them with the justifications on which they were based by their various defenders. Linking the location of the soul to certain organs of the body, ancient philosophers drew attention to the primary importance of these organs in the physical and mental life of a person. The central position of the heart in the human body, the life-giving warmth emanating from it throughout the body and having an analogy with the constant movement of thought, and finally, the sympathy between the movements of the heart and the passionate dispositions of the soul, a view according to which the heart was considered the main seat of the soul. 258 “And those who dedicate the brain to the church of reason say that the head is structured by nature as a kind of fortress (aϰpoπoλις τις) of the whole body; in it, like a king, dwells the mind, surrounded by sensory organs, as if standing before it as messengers or shield-bearers.” Here are grouped all the sense organs through which the mind comes into contact with external things. Hearing, vision, smell, touch, taste carry the impressions they receive here and reflect them on the brain membrane (μηνιγξ), which is the image, source and focus of all sensory activity. 259 And since the mind serves as the internal engine of the feelings, directing their activity, giving meaning and certainty to their perceptions, it is quite natural to assume its place is in the same place where its service tools are concentrated. This assumption found great support in the fact that painful, pathological conditions of the brain are always accompanied by abnormal phenomena in the field of mental functions. “Those whose brain membrane is damaged, their reason does not function correctly, and those whose heads are heavy from intoxication and become ignorant of decency.” 260 Facts of the experience of St. Gregory does not dispute, but he cannot even partially agree with the conclusions from them regarding the place of the soul, because the very question of that seems to him inappropriate. He fully recognizes that the heart is very important in the life of our body and significantly influences certain mental states. An even greater role in the process of our organic and mental life undoubtedly belongs to the human brain and, in particular, to the membrane surrounding it; with its rupture and damage, death immediately follows, with the separation of any part of the body from it, this latter becomes insensitive and motionless. But to cite such facts “as proof that the incorporeal nature (soul) is embraced by some local outlines (τοπιϰαλς τισι περιγραφαις),” according to Bishop. Nyssa, completely unfounded. Reasoning even from the point of view of experience, one cannot find serious reasons to consider one particular part of the human body as the predominant seat of the soul. If they point out, for example, the dependence of mental activity on the brain, then on the other hand one can point out a similar dependence on other bodily organs. “Disorder of mind does not come from headache alone; with the painful condition of the hymens connecting the hypochondrium members, the mental power also suffers, as those knowledgeable in medical science claim, calling this very disease φρενιτις (rabies), because the name of those hymens is φρενες (thoracic).” 261 If, further, they refer to the connection between passionate mental movements and the excitement of the blood in the heart, then one can put forward the same connection between other mental phenomena and the liver. 262 Thus, looking for the place of the soul based on its dependence on the body, we will find several centers in which it can be placed with the same right. Strictly speaking, even the entire body can be called such a center, since there is not a single part in it that would stand outside any connection with the soul and would not produce mental disorder to a greater or lesser extent through its pathological conditions. 263 Obviously, in this state of affairs, the very search for a specific place for the soul is labor in vain. “The mind, according to the inexplicable law of dissolution (της άναϰράσεως), comes into contact with each member without preference (ομοτίμως).” 264 “It is not attached to any part of the body, but equally touches the whole body, in accordance with nature, producing movement in the member subject to its action.” 265 In discussions about the connection between the soul and the body, one must completely abandon the point of view of spatial relations, so as not to reach blatant absurdities. Otherwise, “recognizing that the power of the mind is limited to some place, it would be necessary to admit that with the appearance of local tumors the mind no longer has room for itself, as happens with a vessel, which, being filled with something, does not give room for anything else. Physically, such an opinion (σωματιϰή η τοιαυτη δοξα) is completely inapplicable in relation to the spiritual essence. Intelligible nature does not like to dwell in the voids of the body, and is not driven out by an excess of flesh.” 266 It cannot be said about the spirit, as they say about vessels or bodies put into each other, that it is located inside the body or embraces it from the outside. The incorporeal is not contained (оυϰ εγϰρατειται) in the body and does not surround (ου περιλαμβάνει) it; the contact between them is of a very special kind. The soul, if you like, is both in the body and around it, but not as in any place, but in such a way that it is impossible to say or imagine (α’λλύ ώς оϰ εστιѵ ειπειν νοησαι). 267 It penetrates the entire organism, is equally present in all its members, acting in each according to the position it occupies as a whole, the degree of its receptivity and ability. 268 As an essence simple, uncomplicated, it is not divided into different parts of the body; it is all in the whole body (ολη διολου τον σώματος) and in each individual member of it. The sense organs are different and the impressions received by each of them are different: other perceptions of vision, others of hearing, others again of taste, etc. But this does not mean that each particular organ contains a separate soul or a special part of the soul. No, in all (εν πάσι) the same undivided mind operates, and through all (διά πάντων) one integral knowledge is acquired. 269 But not being contained in the body as a place (ούδ’ ώς έν τοπω), the soul is nevertheless in the closest connection with it (αλλ ως ευ σχεσει). 270 It always remains the soul of a certain body, belongs only to it, forms one whole with it, acts through it and depending on it; it is limited to it and has, as it were, a local relation to it. Being in it, she is no longer essentially in any other place. She stands like this. arr. in a very special relation to interaction, union, inclination, affection, disposition towards one’s body: σχεσις, ροπη, διαϑεσις - these are the terms used by St. Gregory to denote the connection of the soul with the body - terms that, on the one hand, express a close, intimate unity, on the other, excluding any thought about the spatial nature of this unity, or about the substantial mixture of two natures. 271 This idea of ​​the method of combining two natures in a person made it possible to assert the independence and separation of the soul from the body to the extent required by the interests of idealistic psychology. From its connection with the body, the soul undoubtedly suffers limitation and constraint. But to what extent does this dependence on the body extend? The answer to this question is St. Gregory gave in the spirit of Neoplatonism. Plotinus, having criticized the different views of his predecessors on this issue, found them unsatisfactory. In explaining the connection between the soul and the body, in his opinion, previously completely inappropriate relationships were put forward, such as, for example. the relationship of content to content, property to essence, part to whole, form or species to matter, etc. 272 ​​From here naturally flowed an exaggerated idea of ​​the mutual conditionality of two natures, which too subordinated the soul to dependence on the body, which Plotinus could not allow in his view of the human spirit as a being of a higher, ideal world, only accidentally and temporarily descending into the realm of sensuality. And so he settled on a new concept for his time about the body, like an organ or a lyre, which the soul uses, like a musician, to discover its art in this world. 273 This analogy turned out to be very meaningful and most suitable for understanding the interaction between soul and body. It excluded, first of all, the idea of ​​a substantial fusion of two natures, which was suggested by the analogies of Plotinus’s predecessors; After that, it greatly elevated the dominance of the soul over the body and reduced the significance of the reverse influence. The body is subject to the dominion of the soul, but does not itself dominate it; it takes possession of the soul, but does not itself own it. 274 How light penetrates and fills the air without being embraced by it; in the same way the soul penetrates the body without being limited to it. 275 She uses the body as an instrument for her purposes and for her activities, and depends on it insofar as she needs this external instrument to express her activities in the sensory world. But in her own being and in the internal development of her life activity, she remains free from such dependence. The God-like mind, which forms her true being, and when connected with the body, does not cease to be in communication with the higher, mental world. 276 St. Gregory of Nyssa assimilated the thoughts of Plotinus and applied them to explain two kinds of facts observed in the life of the soul united with the body. On the one hand, the position that the soul and body, when connected, do not merge substantially, do not lose their independence and specific properties, explains all those phenomena of mental life where the soul acts completely freely and independently of the body, transcends the limits of its limitations and, as it were, separates from it. “And during our life,” says St. father, - the spiritual nature is not contained within the limits of the flesh. On the contrary, while the bodily volume is limited to its own parts, the soul, through the movements of thought, freely extends throughout the entire creation, ascending to the heavens, plunging into the abyss, passing through the entire breadth of the universe, penetrating the dungeons with the inquisitiveness of the mind; and often touches the thoughts of heavenly miracles, without being burdened by the burden of the body.” 277 On the other hand, the fact that in the sensory, material world the soul can live and act only with the necessary mediation of bodily organs makes clear all those phenomena where it finds itself dependent on the body, suffers obstacles and restrictions in its activity from the disorder of its members. In its nature, this dependence is quite similar to that which a musician experiences from his instrument. “Because of the body,” the bishop argues. Nyssa, - is structured like a musical instrument, then just as it often happens that those skilled in music cannot show their art due to the unsuitability of instruments that are not amenable to art (a pipe, damaged by time, or broken by a fall, or made unusable by rust and mold, does not make a sound and does not act, although the most skillful musician inflates it): so our mind, acting on the whole instrument (body) and touching each of his members, in those of them that are in a normal position, he produces what is characteristic of him, and in those that refuse to accept his artistic movement, he remains unsuccessful and ineffective.” 278 – So, pathological conditions of the body and the disorder of mental life they cause, in the opinion of our saint. father, do not testify to such a deep connection and dependence of the soul on the body as the materialists want to see here, triumphantly pointing to such facts to justify their false theory. It is not the very essence of the soul, but only the normal manifestation of its activity that depends on the well-being of the bodily organs. Damage to a musical instrument does not have any effect on the musician’s being; it does not even affect his art, which always remains with him as his hidden property; it produces only that which this art cannot manifest itself outwardly, or manifests itself in an inappropriate form. Likewise, the soul, in case of illness and damage to the bodily organs, does not cease to live internally and act in its own way; only due to the lack of the necessary means, it is deprived of the opportunity to express its activity externally or expresses it abnormally. Without limiting himself to general reasoning, St. Gregory takes a particular fact of our psycho-physical life, in which the dependence of the soul on the body is most clearly reflected. These are phenomena of sleep and dreams. During sleep, all external senses are inactive; the body completely ceases to be a service instrument of the soul. And what do we observe then during the course of mental life? This life does not stop at all; only its normal direction changes. The flow of ideas is chaotic and confusing. One who dreams in a dream often imagines something “inappropriate and impossible” (άτοπον ϰαι αμήχανον), - a clear sign that the soul is not guided here by reason and reflection (λογισμώ ϰαι διανοια). 279 In the lower, unreasonable part of the soul (τω άλογοτέρω τής φυχής ειδει), which is predominantly active during sleep, images and likenesses of what happened in reality, were perceived by the senses and mind and have hitherto been stored in memory are reproduced. Now, from this stock of ideas acquired in the waking state, various combinations are formed completely randomly (ϰαϑώς ετυχεν), without any logical order or sequence. 280 Dreams, which are often given very important significance, for the most part are just such echoes or unconscious repetitions of sensations, thoughts, desires and hopes that prevailed in the waking state. The usual occupation, the strongest impressions received before sleep, especially certain bodily dispositions are most often reflected in sleepy dreams, determining their tone and direction. “So, to a thirsty person it seems that he is at the springs, to one in need of food - that he is at a feast, to a young man blooming with strength he dreams in accordance with his passion.” 281 So, the course of mental life in a dream is mainly governed by plant, organic force; the mind finds itself in a cramped position due to the peace of the external senses. However, he is not deprived of the opportunity to act. With the cessation of relations with the external world, another area remains open for the activity of the mind, the world of higher spiritual being, with which it can come into communication on its own, regardless of the organs of the body and their states. “Due to the subtlety of its nature, elevated above gross physicality, the soul (during sleep) can perceive something truly existing (τωνοντων).” 282 Proof of this is the well-known cases of contemplation of future events in sleepy states: such as, for example. dreams of the butler and baker of Pharaoh, who foresaw in a dream events that would soon come to fruition in reality. True, this kind of natural insight is always distinguished by obscurity, ambiguity, or, as they usually say, mystery (οπερ αινιγμα λέγουσι), and from this side it must be strictly distinguished from prophetic insight in the proper sense, which is accomplished by the power of God and therefore is not subject to the natural laws of dreams. 283 But from a psychological point of view, the very fact of the soul’s intercourse with the higher world is important; evidence is important that even with the complete inactivity of the bodily senses, our mind can act in a manner characteristic of its nature. It turns out that the influence of sleep extends only to that method of cognition and thinking that is dependent on sensory impressions, and the trace. and from the bodily organs that perceive them. Higher, rational knowledge, which embraces its object by direct contemplation and, as it were, by touching it, 284 can be accomplished during sleep, although in itself, without the assistance of the analyzing mind, it does not reach such a degree of clarity as is characteristic of logically dissected knowledge, moving in the field of precise concepts. So, the dependence of the soul on the body is only relative, allowing the possibility of some separation and independent action for the higher side of our spiritual being, the mind. – Taking a general look at the whole theory of Bishop. Nyssky about the relationship of the soul to the body, one cannot help but recognize its important advantages not only over ancient philosophical attempts to solve this issue, but also over those hypotheses that were invented after the revival of philosophy, namely Descartes and Leibniz. True, the teaching of St. Gregory, as we have seen, is not entirely original; it largely represents a repetition of Plotinus' thoughts. But what is important and characteristic is that among all the philosophical opinions of antiquity, St. the father chose and leaned towards what was most faithful and fruitful for psychology. The views of Neoplatonism in those points that were adopted by Gregory of Nyssa have not lost their significance to this day and can provide a significant service to modern science in solving one of the most difficult and least explained psychological problems. In any case, they are higher and more satisfactory than Cartesian “occasionalism” and Leibnizian “predetermined harmony.” Having separated the soul and body as two substances acting according to completely opposite laws, Descartes could not allow their direct interaction, and therefore, to explain the connection between them, he resorted to the assumption of the miraculous intervention of God. What is impossible for the opposite substances themselves, in his opinion, is accomplished by the omnipotence of God: regarding the thoughts and desires occurring in the soul, God produces corresponding movements in our body, and vice versa - on the occasion of the impressions received by the body, He produces thoughts and feelings corresponding to them in the soul. – Leibniz explained the interaction between soul and body in a similar way. In the hypothesis of the French philosopher, he made only that insignificant change that, instead of God’s special assistance for each particular case, he recognized the law laid down by God once and for all, according to which all actions of one nature must find a corresponding echo in another. By the power of his foreknowledge, Leibniz reasoned, God knew in advance all the actions for which the soul would need a body; and on the basis of this foreknowledge, by the power of his omnipotence, he arranged the instrument of the body in such a way that it would automatically do what the soul desires, and do it precisely at the moment at which the soul desires. And vice versa: if something happens in the body due to the action of external objects on it, then the soul immediately forms an idea about it; and representation entails a certain feeling. 285 The shortcomings of both of these hypotheses, both from the scientific and religious sides, are immediately evident. And first of all, to call for help on the miraculous intervention of God means not only not to give the desired scientific explanation, but to directly refuse any explanation, as the above-mentioned philosophers did, recognizing that there is no and cannot be a direct connection between the soul and the body. Then, to introduce extraneous and specifically divine participation into the sphere of human actions means, on the one hand, to contradict the clear evidence of our consciousness, and on the other, to distort and humiliate the idea of ​​God. A person is aware of the unity in his nature, feels capable of both choosing and carrying out his actions freely and independently of anyone: meanwhile, with the assumption of divine intervention, such consciousness should not exist - a person should feel that his desires and intentions are put into action not by him, but by God. One way or another, the duality of the natures that make up our composition would make itself felt if the interaction between body and soul were really organized by an external, divine force. Finally, one cannot allow the idea of ​​divine intervention because it contradicts the ideas of the holiness of God. How can the most holy Being help fulfill the sinful desires of our soul? Whether we admit with Descartes that God is directly involved in each of our individual acts, or with Leibniz that He prepared everything in advance for the fulfillment of our intentions - in both cases, God is an assistant in the commission of our bad actions, which is in no way in harmony with the concept of Him as the Most Holy Being. Theory ep. Nissky is alien to all the shortcomings now listed. Recognizing the substantial difference between the two natures in man, she at the same time affirms the direct, physical influence and interaction between them, due to their true, real unity. 286 Experience and inner consciousness speak decisively in favor of such a view; its merits in explaining various mental phenomena are also not doubtful. All he has against himself is the inconvenience of conceiving too close a connection, reaching the point of mutual penetration, between two natures that are essentially opposite. But this is not so much a psychological question as a general philosophical one. St. Gregory, as we have seen, tried to give an answer to it, although not entirely successfully. However, he did not intend to bring this, in his opinion, incomprehensible secret, to complete logical clarity. II. On the origin of the soul (after the fall). That general idea that soul and body are two natures, created for each other, closely connected with each other, mutually presupposing and conditioning each other, is a thought that runs through the entire anthropology of St. Gregory, - guided his reasoning on the difficult question of the current method of spreading the human race, or more precisely, in the question of the origin of human souls. In the original answer given to this question by Bishop. Nyssky reflected precisely that deep conviction that the soul and body constitute equally necessary parts of the human being, and therefore not a single moment can exist separately and independently of each other, but occur simultaneously, develop strictly in parallel and are never, even in death, completely separated from each other. The question of the origin of souls was not alien to pagan philosophy, which gave several answers to it, the meaning of which was determined by the general nature of various philosophical trends. Philosophy produced the substance of the soul either from the general elements of the world, or from the divine being through pantheistic emanatism. Regarding the time of origin of individual souls, philosophers either held the opinion of their simultaneous generation with bodies, according to the same physical laws, or, like Plato, they assumed their eternal existence in the heavenly state, where they lived in contemplation of truth until that fateful moment when, having committed sin, they were condemned to inhabit earthly bodies in order to be cleansed from sinful defilements. 287 – In Christianity, the question of the origin of souls acquired such an important meaning that it did not have in pagan philosophy. Here he stood in close connection with the basic dogmas of the church - about creation, the Fall, the heredity of sin, rebirth, etc. - and, due to the strength of this connection, aroused the special attention of Christian thinkers. The opinions of pagan philosophy could not find full approval in Christianity, because they did not correspond to religious-dogmatic interests, which for Christian philosophers always came to the fore. Against the materialistic identification of the soul with the elements of the world, Christianity put forward a firm doctrine of the spirituality of the soul, against the pantheistic merging of it with the essence of the Divine - the thought of its creatureliness and substantial difference from the divine nature. The first cause of all being, God, having a spiritual nature and alien to any complexity, could not produce souls by dividing or spreading His being; He could only create them, that is, place them outside himself, without transferring anything from his own being to them. God originally created the human soul in the same way as all other created beings, by an act of his will, the power of which nothing can hinder, and whose power nothing can limit. 288 So regarding the origin of the first human soul. But what about the souls of subsequent people? – from what point in time did they begin their existence and where do they now appear in earthly bodies? 289 Not finding sufficient explanations on this matter in the Bible, Christians have long begun to make various assumptions, often not without the influence of pagan philosophy. By the time of St. Gregory of Nyssa had quite a few such assumptions. In a treatise on the words of Scripture: “Let us make man in Our image and likeness (Gen. 1:26),” he listed the opinions current in his time about the origin and moment of formation of human souls. “Some argue,” he says, “that souls are sent down into bodies from heaven; others - that they come into existence together with the body, created by God; still others, recognizing that man is created in the image of God, think that souls arise through ordinary birth; others believe that the soul is born from the interaction of two sides of a man and a woman, just as a spark is generated from the impact of a stone on iron. Finally, according to some, the soul begins to exist at the very moment of conception of the body; according to others, only forty days after this conception. 290 As can be seen from this list, by the 4th century all those hypotheses had already emerged with which the question of the origin of souls remains to this day. This is the hypothesis of the preexistence of souls, the hypothesis of creationism or the ongoing creation of souls, and the hypothesis of generationism or traducianism, which recognizes the mutual transmission or birth of one soul from another. The first of these hypotheses had the greatest contradiction to the entire system of Christian doctrine, and therefore the least vitality in Christian philosophy. Origen borrowed it from Plato and transferred it to his dogmatic system. All souls, in his view, were created by God simultaneously at the very beginning of creation and since then have existed in the invisible world as pure spirits: they would never have left their heavenly abode if the abuse of free will had not made it necessary for them to cleanse themselves from defilements in this earthly life. 291 As they fall into sin, they are sent from heaven to earth and are united with bodies at the very moment of conception of these latter. – Origen’s opinion was shared by many of his followers, among whom we can mention Pierius of Alexandria, St. Pamphilus, St. Methodius, Synesius and John of Jerusalem. The majority of church writers saw in this opinion a decisive distortion of the Christian teaching about man and often polemicized against it, until finally the whole Church pronounced its judgment on it, rejecting, along with other errors of the Alexandrian teacher, his hypothesis about the pre-existence of souls. 292 St. Gregory of Nyssa polemicizes against this hypothesis in the most decisive manner. Transferred to Christianity from the realm of “pagan fabulous teachings,” it shares all the absurdities of metempsychosis, with which its first inventors, philosophers, inextricably linked it, and not only in the crude form in which it appears among these latter, who allowed the eternal wandering of souls through the bodies of animals and even plants, but also in the formulation that Origen gave to metempsychosis, who recognized the convergence of fallen spirits only into human bodies, ep. Nyssky sees a lot of contradictions and inconsistencies. 293 From the metaphysical side, this teaching does not stand up to criticism because it “merges the properties of nature, mixes and confuses all things with each other.” 294 In fact, if all the creatures of the earthly world are only different forms in which heavenly spirits, identical in nature and differing only in the degree of moral decline, are contained, then obviously there is no hard line between the individual classes of earthly beings. Plants and animals are the closest closest relatives of humans; the difference between them is only external, visible, insignificant. 295 But even if we limit the sphere of soul migrations only to the boundaries of humanity, in this case quite a few absurdities remain: the doctrine of the wanderings of the soul through different human bodies destroys the difference between the sexes, denies the essential connection and relationship between spiritual and bodily natures, etc. 296 The doctrine under consideration turns out to be even more untenable if you look at it from an ethical point of view. Vice tears the soul away from its original, heavenly home and brings it down to earth for purification - this is how the defenders of this teaching argue. According to St. Gregory, this means completely perverting the concept of good and evil. If, living in heaven, in the blissful and dispassionate region of existence, souls cannot remain pure and are darkened by vice, then shouldn’t they fall much deeper in this material life? The body, in any case, represents incomparably more reasons for sin than the incorporeal state. This is how the defenders of metempsychosis themselves look at this matter: for them, heavenly life is higher and purer than earthly life. Meanwhile, in relation to the fate of spirits, they argue completely the opposite: in heaven, spirits are defiled by sin and humiliated, on earth they are cleansed of defilements and exalted. “So with them, the revulsion of present life and the praise of heavenly things merge and mix with each other; because what is reviled, in their opinion, leads to the beautiful, and what is considered best gives rise in the soul to an inclination towards the worse.” 297 Further, if they recognize vice as the beginning of real life, then it is clear that the continuation must be in agreement with the beginning: “for no one will say that good comes from bad, and the opposite comes from good; on the contrary, by the nature of the seed we expect fruit.” 298 If a soul enters the earth already defamed, then where can a return turn to good arise in it? Is it possible for a person born due to a defect to be without a defect? Just as not a single dumb animal attempts to speak humanly and does not consider the lack of the gift of speech to be any loss for itself; Likewise, those for whom vice is considered the beginning and cause of life will never come to desire virtue, because it is not in their nature.” 299 Finally, if the reason for the appearance of people on earth is the fall of spirits in heaven, then human life has a completely random origin. But in this case, first of all, bewilderment arises: how does the darkening of the soul in heaven coincide with the conception of the body on earth? There is no causal relationship between these acts, and yet during the formation of a person, both of them must occur simultaneously. “Isn’t the soul curious to know when those living in marriage come together, and doesn’t it observe the conception of babies in order to enter the nascent bodies? And if the husband renounces marriage and the wife is freed from the pains of birth, then will vice really not burden the soul (in heaven?) It turns out that marriage gives the vice that is there in the highlands an incentive to attack the soul. Otherwise, many fallen souls would have to remain for a long time in an uncertain, wandering position between heaven, from which they have fallen behind, and earth, on which they cannot receive bodies for their share.” 300 But even in addition to such incongruities, the idea of ​​the random origin of people cannot be allowed because it deprives human life of all dignity and subjects it to the rule of unreasonable fate. If it is not the will of God that determines the timing and expediency of our birth in this world, but the unauthorized and accidental movement of created freedom towards evil, then the entire course of our life is independent of divine providence. And then there can be no talk of God’s assistance to our aspirations for virtue; these very aspirations will be useless. 301 Having thus exposed various absurdities and contradictions of the doctrine of the Origenists-Platonists, St. Gregory comes to the conclusion that “it has neither beginning nor end (αϰεφαλος τις ϰαι ατελής):” has no beginning, because it rests on a completely unfounded assumption of the pre-existence of souls in some invisible state; has no end, since it does not at all achieve the goal for which the Greeks invented it, that is, it does not explain the purification and correction of fallen souls through their union with bodies. 302 The polemic now outlined, undertaken by Bishop. Nyssky with the closest attitude to the question of the time of origin of souls, the result was the idea that souls do not exist before bodies. But don't they happen after the bodies? – aren’t they in bodies after conception and some formation of these latter? During the time of St. Gregory had such an opinion - and his defenders even thought of basing their strange assumption on the biblical story of the creation of man. “Some, adhering to the order in the structure of man described by Moses, say that the soul is second in time after the body. since God first took up dust from the earth (Gen. 2:7), created man, and then animated him by inspiration: then on this basis they prove that flesh is preferable (προτιμοτεραν την σαρϰα) to the soul that has already entered a previously created body. The soul, they say, was created for the body, so that it would not be a lifeless and motionless creature.” In relation to the current method of propagation of the human race, supporters of this opinion argued that the soul enters the body on the fortieth day after its conception. 303 In this opinion, St. Gregory does not see the truth - primarily because it is extremely humiliating for the dignity of the human soul. The idealistic direction of Gregory's anthropology, which everywhere elevated the soul over the body, could not allow any advantage in favor of this latter, even a simple primacy in time of origin. According to Bishop Nyssa, this temporary seniority was inextricably linked with the causal relationship: post hoc, ergo propter hoc. If the soul is after the body, a trace. for his sake; and if so, it means that she is lower than him, that means she stands in a subordinate, servile relationship to him, as to her cause. “Everything done for something, of course, is of little value than what it is done for, just as the Gospel says that the soul has more food and the body clothing (Matthew 6:25), because for the soul and body there are clothes and food; And the soul was not made for food and bodies were not made for clothing; on the contrary, when bodies already existed, clothes were also invented out of necessity.” 304 So, “it is impossible to assert that man was first created like an image of clay, and for this image the soul was then created: in this case, rational nature will turn out to be worth less than a mortal creature,” which is obviously absurd. 305 It is impossible to allow this from the point of view of the true concept of God the Creator. “If in the dispensation of man one thing preceded, another happened after, the power of the Creator will turn out to be somehow imperfect, insufficient to produce everything suddenly, but crushing the barrel and working especially on each half.” 306 Finally, if there really was a time gap between the origin of body and soul, then a person, separated in time, would certainly find himself in discord with himself (στασιάζοι προς έαυτον). 307 “For we consider it impossible for the soul to adapt to itself other people’s dwellings (a body that appeared before and independently of it), just as a seal made on wax cannot be applied to other impressions.” 308 Only on the assumption that the soul and body have a common beginning, that the soul itself forms from formless matter a “dwelling akin to itself,” is it possible to explain the close unity and harmonious agreement that actually exists between the two natures of man. Rejecting the opinion of the later entry of the soul into the body in the same way as earlier - the hypothesis of the pre-existence of souls, St. Gregory insistently asserts the idea that “the soul and body begin to exist from the same moment in time (μίαν ϰαί την αυτήν ψυχής τε ϰαί σωματο ντήςσυστα'σεως.” 309 Since both natures constitute an inseparable unity in man, they must necessarily have a simultaneous beginning. προγενέστερος τε ϰαί νεωτερος γενοιτο). The fertile seed, which is the beginning of the bodily organism, also contains the soul of the nascent person. “Since the power for conception is separated not from the dead, but from the animate and living body, then what comes from the living at the beginning of life cannot be something dead and inanimate.” 311 “What is taken from man for the planting of man is itself something living, animate from what is animated, nourished from what is nourished.” 312 That life, and therefore soul, is actually inherent in human seed, this can be observed by the signs by which the animate differs from the dead. The evidence of life is considered to be warmth, activity and movement; the absence of these properties is a sign of deadness. Both warmth and activity are discernible in human seed, a clear proof that it is not inanimate. 313 From the very first moment, as it is placed in the mother’s womb, it begins to live, move and grow - it is obvious that a soul is present in it from the beginning, since nothing inanimate (ουδεν των αψυχων) has in itself the ability to move and grow. 314 In the very first act of conception, potentially everything that a person subsequently becomes is given. The subsequent formation of a living being, the gradual development of its mental and physical powers is only the revelation of what was immediately laid down and destined forever at its first birth. “Like a grain of wheat or any other seed, we say that it contains in the possibility (τη δυναμει) everything related to the ear - greens, stem, knees on the stem, fruit, awns - and we affirm that all this, given in the nature of the seed immediately and together, subsequently develops from itself, without any admixture of any kind. alien nature; Likewise, with regard to human insemination, we assume that with the first beginning of composition, a natural force is infused, which develops and reveals itself with a certain natural sequence, not borrowing anything from the outside as a means to its improvement, but consistently raising itself to perfection.” 315 The earth, having received a shoot of a tree root, does not impart to it the power of life from itself (for in this case, the dead parts of the tree would give offspring), but only excites and supports the life hidden in the planted shoot itself; Likewise, the human seed, placed in the womb of the mother, has life and the ability to develop in itself and needs only favorable conditions for the disclosure of the content contained in it. 316 This opening begins immediately after the conception of a person and takes place in both component parts of his being strictly in parallel. The development of the powers and abilities of the soul is closely related to and dependent on the growth of the body. Just as from the physical side it is impossible to distinguish individual members of the future body in a newly emerging person, so from the spiritual side it is not yet possible to notice in him certain properties and abilities of the soul. But in the first respect, no one can doubt that the formless embryo already contains within itself the entire composition of the future bodily organism; Likewise, regarding the soul, it must be recognized that it is present in the seed with all its powers and abilities, although it begins to manifest them externally only gradually, as the body grows. 317 At first, like a root hidden in the earth, the soul reveals its presence only as a plant and nutritional force (η αυξητιϰη τε ϰαι ϑρεπτιϰη δυναηις). Then, when the baby comes into the world from the mother’s womb, like a sprout emerging from the earth, the soul manifests the gift of sensitivity (η αισϑητιϰη δυναμις), that is, the ability to perceive external impressions through the sensory organs. Finally, with the achievement of sufficient physical maturity, like a certain fruit, rational strength (η λογιϰη δυναμις) begins to shine through, not all suddenly revealed, but quickly increasing along with the improvement of the (bodily) instrument.” 318 This law of gradual development, depending on the growth of the body, according to St. Gregory, became necessary for the soul only as a result of the Fall. “The soul could have been perfect at the very beginning if our nature had not been subject to sin. Sin changed the original method of reproduction of the human race and introduced in its place a passionate and bestial birth, in which the image of God can no longer immediately reveal all its radiance, and man must ascend to spiritual perfection only in a slow and gradual way. In this sense, the great Apostle expresses himself: “When I was a child, I thought like a child; I thought like a child; “When the man was gone, he cast away the child” (1 Cor. 13:11) - not because another soul enters into the husband than that characteristic of the child, but because the same soul, imperfect in the baby, turns out to be perfect in the husband. 319 In the teaching of St. Gregory about the origin of the soul has so far become clear to us that the soul begins to exist simultaneously with the body. But where, it is further asked, does the soul receive its substance and life? In this respect, is it subject to the same natural, physical laws that the body is subject to, or does it have a special mode of origin that is different from the body? An important and difficult question about the very method of origin of souls in the writings of Bishop. Nyssa's answer is not revealed with such clarity and distinctness as the previous question about the time of the appearance of the soul. In the history of Christian psychology on this issue, two different opinions have long been identified, of which one affirmed the direct creation (creatio) of souls by God every time a person needs to be born, the other recognized that the souls of children come from the souls of their parents in the same natural way of birth (generatio) as bodies. In relation to the Christian concept of the soul and in application to certain dogmas of the church that are related to the question of the origin of the soul, each of these hypotheses has its own advantages and disadvantages. The hypothesis of generationalism finds strong support for itself in the phenomena of visible nature and especially in the animal world, where everything happens according to natural laws, arises through mutual birth and transfer of the substance itself from parents to children. To assume an exceptional way of origin for one human soul, to recognize here the special intervention of divine power each time, especially in view of the clear words of the writer of everyday life about the cessation of creative activity on the seventh day (Gen. 2:2), is quite difficult to think about. Alien to such difficulties, generationalism and from a dogmatic point of view has undoubted advantages over the hypothesis of the ongoing creation of souls. The most important dogma of Christianity - the doctrine of the hereditary transmission of original sin and its consequences - is best and most conveniently explained precisely by the assumption that the souls of all the descendants of Adam come from the soul of the progenitor through successive mutual births. Naturally, only the same sinful work can come from a source infected with sin. Meanwhile, under the hypothesis of creationism, this fundamental truth of Christianity is an inexplicable mystery to reason. Only the most perfect creation can come from the hands of the all-perfect Creator, and every human soul, if it is created by God, must necessarily be free from all shortcomings. With such an opinion about the method of origin of the soul, there is obviously no room left for any natural imperfections. – But no matter how strong the hypothesis of generationalism is with the advantages now indicated, however, when applied to the true concept of the soul, it turned out to be so inconvenient that in Christian psychology it could find only a very limited number of defenders. It is in conflict with the basic properties of the human soul. In fact, if the souls of parents give birth to the souls of children, then this process can only be thought of as a process of separation of one substance from another. But at the same time, a sign of complexity and divisibility is introduced into the concept of the soul, destroying the doctrine of its simplicity and spirituality. In view of the various difficulties and inconveniences arising on the side of each of the two mentioned hypotheses, neither of them could gain a final advantage over the other. It has always been a matter of personal inclination of Christian psychologists to speak out in favor of any of them. Depending on what difficulties each of them considered the most important and significant, he leaned towards a hypothesis that did not have them. In general, it is possible, however, to trace some connection between a certain direction of theological thought and sympathy for one or another of these hypotheses. The fathers of the eastern, speculative-idealistic direction were more sympathetic to creationism, as the hypothesis that most corresponded to their spiritualistic tendencies. On the contrary, the teachers of the Western realistic trend, led by Tertullian, the most extreme realist, were more willing to apply to the human soul the same physical law of mutual birth and transfer of substance that operates in the origin of all creatures of this visible world. But given the complexity of the issue and the insufficiency of existing methods for resolving it, Christian thinkers rarely spoke out in favor of one or another opinion with decisiveness, and almost never attached more value to these opinions than what is typical for simple guesses. Even bl. Augustine, this most thoughtful Christian theologian, who did not like to stop at any philosophical and dogmatic difficulties, did not, however, dare to firmly take the side of either of the two current opinions on the question of the origin of the soul. He found so many similarities in the physical life of man with the life of animals, and so many differences in spiritual terms, that the theory of generationism seemed favorable to him in one case, and creationism in the other. Being a highly honest man, he openly admitted that he could not resolve the issue satisfactorily; how the soul comes about. 320 St. Gregory of Nyssa had to face this difficult problem more than once, but it is not easy to find a direct and clear answer from him. There are places in his works that, taken on their own, without relation to the whole structure of his anthropology, can give rise to misunderstandings. It is not surprising if, on the basis of these scattered expressions, researchers of his psychology came to completely opposite results. 321 If we return, first of all, to the judgments stated above, which were expressed by St. Gregory in defense of the position about the simultaneous origin of soul and body, then one can find in them strong grounds for considering St. father, a supporter of the well-known hypothesis of generationalism. In fact, the reproductive seed, separated from the parents, according to his idea, contains both the soul and the body of the future person; so that, strictly speaking, “the inseminating cause of our composition is neither an incorporeal soul, nor an inanimate body άσώματον είναι ψυχην μητε άψυχον σώμα)”, but an inseparable connection of both, the general principle of the whole human being. 322 And this union of the soul with the primary embryo of the body is not external and accidental, not arranged by an outside, divine force, but internal and necessary, lying in the very nature of the human seed and in the conditions of its origin. Due to the fact that it comes from living and animate beings, it itself cannot be devoid of life and soul, since animate and living bodies only give birth to a gifted being with the same properties. ϰαί εμψυχσν άπσγεννίσϑαι ζωον... 323 Expressions like those just given are so clear that - it seems - they cannot be subject to any reinterpretation. St. Gregory produces the souls of children, as well as the bodies, from their parents and subjects their very origin to the laws of natural, physical birth. – – If we add here another clear place (Contr. Eunom., lib. I; t. 45, col. 393), where ep. Nyssa states that “human life in its mode of origin does not differ at all from the life of the dumb, since both dumb and verbal natures equally (ομοιοτρόπως) enter into life by birth (διά τής γεννήσεως),” then it does not remain There is already, apparently, no doubt that our St. Father resolutely adheres to generationalism. This is how the bishop’s opinion is determined. Nyssa, the majority of researchers of his psychology, while expressing bewilderment at how an idealist thinker, who in other cases exaggeratedly exalted the virtues and significance of spiritual nature, on the question of the origin of the soul could side with a realistic hypothesis, which corresponds so little to spiritualism. 324 Tertullian's hypothesis, which has a largely materialistic connotation, is indeed too difficult to reconcile with the entire character and direction of St.'s philosophizing. Gregory, and if it actually takes place in his system, then the place is unusual for it. Probably, such considerations prompted Stiegler to take a closer look at the writings of St. Gregory and led him to the result that “Bishop. Nyssky adheres to the hypothesis of creationism, not generationism." 325 “Every soul, according to St. father, comes into existence from non-existence (aus Nichtseienden), and this can only be accomplished by the direct action of the creative power of God. One natural birth is not enough to produce a whole man; it only provides a reason to discover the activity of the Creator.” 326 What is the thought of St. Gregory is exactly like this; Stiegler finds solid proof of this in Chapter 33. “Oglas. Slov.”, where St. the father, wanting to convince those who doubt the saving effect of the sacrament of baptism, draws a parallel between the spiritual rebirth that takes place in baptism and the natural birth that introduces a person into earthly life. “Everyone knows the method of carnal birth (της ϰατά σάρϰα γεννησεως),” says St. Gregory, - however, how does a person do that which is the basis of a living being? What does the human seed have in common with the properties subsequently seen in man? A fully formed person is a rational and thinking being, endowed with intelligence and knowledge, and the seed is simply moisture and nothing more... Therefore, as here everyone asked must answer that a person is formed by divine power (ϑεία δυνάμει), without whose presence (ης μη παρουσης) the seed would remain motionless and inactive; so in the matter of the mysterious rebirth of man through baptism, there is no reason to deny the action of the same power of God.” 327 Stiegler interprets the above words in the sense of decisive evidence for the hypothesis of creationism. “What else did St. want to say with them? Gregory, is it not that a seed without a soul, which comes as a result of the creative presence of God, is devoid of life and therefore cannot develop and transform into a person?” 328 Divine creative power gives life and movement (i.e., soul) to the bodily seed, or, in other words, the soul of each person is created directly by God - such is the fundamental conviction of St. Gregory. - If in other cases St. the father expresses that “what is separated from man at the conception of man is itself something living, from the animate is animate” 329 ... then this should be understood not in the sense that the carnal seed already contains the principle of life in itself, but in the fact that it does not remain without life and animation for a single moment of time. In the organism of the parents, it is animated by their souls; when separated at the conception of a new person, it at the same moment receives from God its own special, individual soul. It is in this sense, - in the sense of a constant, uninterrupted connection with the principle of life - that the bishop calls it. Nyssa alive (ζωον) and animate (έμψυχον). But when we are talking not about a temporary, but about a causal relationship, St. Gregory strictly separates the bodily seed from the principle that animates it, attributing the cause of the origin of the first to the bodies of the parents, and considering the second (the soul) to be a direct product of the omnipotence of the Creator. 330 Stiegler's opinion is rejected by almost all researchers of bishop psychology. Nyssa and - on quite sufficient grounds 331. The only place 332 in which it is affirmed does not provide firm support for it and can much more conveniently be interpreted in a different sense than what Stiegler would like to see in it. Indeed, in the above-cited chapter 33 “Oglas. words." St. Gregory does not at all mean to express his opinion about the origin of souls. He only wants to confirm the faith of those announced in the incomprehensible mystery of rebirth taking place in St. baptism, an indication of the fact of natural birth, intimately known to everyone, but in essence as incomprehensible as the fact of spiritual rebirth. Just as in a bodily seed our mind cannot discern a sufficient reason for the origin of a future person and necessarily assumes the participation of a higher divine will as the final basis for explaining an incomprehensible phenomenon; so in the matter of spiritual rebirth, what is incomprehensible to our minds finds a completely satisfactory explanation in the action of the almighty power of God. From this comparison it is too difficult to draw a conclusion in favor of the well-known hypothesis of the ongoing creation of souls. And above all, there is no reason to assume that St. Gregory, pointing here to the incomprehensibility of the fact of carnal birth, meant only the origin of the human soul. The formation of a complex bodily organism from a formless seed, “in which, apart from the property of moisture, no other physical qualities can be seen,” represents, according to St. father is a mystery as inaccessible to our understanding as the origin of the soul. In both cases, our mind equally refuses to give a natural explanation and rests only on the assumption of the participation of divine power (ϑειας δυναμεως), which from a simple moist seed produces the whole man as we observe him, with all his mental and physical perfections. 333 It is clear from here what St. means. Gregory in this case, under ϑεία δύναμις, and in what sense speaks about her participation in the matter of the origin of people. This is not the creative (ή δημιουργιϰη) power of God, causing existence from pure nothingness, without any mediation of an external cause; this is a providential power (η προνοητιϰη), 334 elevating and replenishing the action of natural laws, or - better said - producing through natural causes supernatural effects incomprehensible to us. We resort to it every time we are unable to understand the mysterious phenomena of nature, and in it we find the final basis and sufficient cause of these phenomena. – This is how St.’s thought is interpreted. Gregory obviously does not contain any indication of the creation of human souls by God in the sense of the creationist hypothesis; it is aimed solely at justifying the faith of Christians in the providential action of the power of God, revealed in phenomena that exceed our understanding. The origin of man from the seed is exhibited here as one of many such phenomena. With the removal of the only reason indicated by Stiegler in favor of the hypothesis of creationism, all those numerous expressions of the bishop remain valid. Nyssa, where he speaks with undoubted clarity for generationism. Stiegler's attempt to interpret these expressions in his own sense - in the sense only of the simultaneous origin of soul and body, and not of the commonality of their source - should be called the least successful. Attributing life and animation to the seed embryo, as properties that necessarily follow from the very concept of it, - further insistently asserting that the reproductive seed, like a grain of wheat, develops a whole person from itself, without borrowing anything from the outside - St. Gregory, obviously, is far from the idea of ​​​​considering the human soul an element that comes from outside and revives the bodily seed that is dead in itself. No, soul and life are inherent in the seed itself, are inextricably linked with it and are transmitted with it from parents to children. Despite the clarity of the result now approved, however, we would incorrectly define the point of view of St. Gregory, if he were recognized as a supporter of the hypothesis of generationalism in the form in which it appeared among its other defenders, and mainly among its first inventor, Tertullian. Original in many other cases, ep. Nyssa also had his own special opinion on the question of the origin of the soul, which did not coincide with current views on this subject. This is neither creationism nor generationism (traducianism) in their usual formulation, but rather a combination of both. Souls are not created by God every time a new person needs to be born. 335 But they are not born from the souls of their parents in the sense in which all other creatures of our world arise from their producers, receiving from these latter both life and their very essence. No - according to St. Gregory, - all human souls were created by God simultaneously at the first dispensation of the world; Since then they have existed in connection with the embryos of their bodies, but they exist until time potentially, in a latent state; They enter into actual, manifested existence according to the laws of natural birth at the moment determined for each of them by the Creator. – The meaning of this original opinion will be quite clear to us if we remember the teaching of Bishop. Nyssa about the creation of the first man. In the matter of human creation, as we know, St. Gregory distinguished two acts: the creation of an ideal man, or the entire totality of the human race, and the creation of a concrete, real man, Adam. There is nothing more uncertain for us than a collection of people appointed to form a whole race, but nothing is more clear and definite for God. The Omniscient One knew from eternity how many the human race would be and - by the power of this omniscience - immediately embraced all of humanity with his creative power, endowing it with the features of his image. That all people were in person before God in this first creative act, the proof is that they all possess the gifts of God-likeness, communicated precisely then: “the image of God and man revealed at the first dispensation of the world equally have (τη πρώτη του ϰοσμου ϰατασϰευή συναναδειχϑεϊς άνϑρωπος), and the one that will be (γενησόμενος) at the end of the universe.” 336 Thus, in the order of the creation of people by God, there is neither first nor last: they are all called from non-existence to being on the same day, at the same moment, by one act of the will of God. – But between them there is both the first and the last in the order of their entry or appearance into an independent, personal life. Foreseeing the Fall and the voluntary deviation of man from equality with the angels towards the lower, unreasonable creature, God did not immediately introduce all people into real life, but for now only Adam, having already made the origin of the rest of humanity dependent on him, according to the method of mutual succession characteristic of the dumb. 337 Adam was the first representative of the race, which included the entire totality of individual people who had to descend from him through successive birth. The Creator placed in him the germs of life for all his descendants. These are the embryos (seeds) of future bodies and souls together, since both natures are inextricably linked and have a simultaneous origin. 338 To our mind it seems an incomprehensible mystery how so many separate lives are contained without confusion in one, but to the divine mind there is nothing mixed and indefinite. He knows the number of grains of wheat that fruitful fields will give to a person; he determined the order in which these grains will be produced one by one; he arranged everything so that each one appeared in its turn. The same applies to people. God knows their number, order and circumstances of their appearance on earth; He arranged everything so that every person was ready to appear on the day and hour appointed for him. At a time determined by God, living and divided embryos, hitherto hidden in the body of their parents, are separated from them in the act of natural conception and are placed in the foundation of new people, and then gradually develop from themselves the entire being of these latter without any interference from any outside force. 339 The opinion of St. Gregory on the question of the origin of souls has now become completely clear to us. It combines the hypothesis of the creation of souls with the hypothesis of their birth, brings Origen closer to Tertullian, despite the contrasting points of view of these two thinkers. Sympathy for Origenism, reflected in the whole structure of Gregory’s anthropology, was noticeably reflected here, too, in the assumption of the simultaneous, original creation of all people by God. Adam was not created first, he was only the first to “reveal” (συναναδειχϑεις), the first to enter into real, earthly life; and the one who is born at the end of the world will not be created later than others; he will only appear (γενησομενος) i.e. will emerge from a hidden, potential state after all people. 340 This similarity with Origen did not prevent, however, the bishop. Nyssa with all the strength of his characteristic wit to arm himself, as if against the absurdity, against that Origenian opinion, “as if souls, like some kind of people, existed from the beginning in their own special state.” 341 Thought of our St. father is not like that. Created from the beginning, people did not all immediately enter into full real life, but at first only Adam; all the others, in the form of certain potencies or living embryos, were for a time contained in the being of the first-manifested man, from where they then emerge into the light through successive mutual birth, each at the moment appointed for it. - Moving away from Origen, St. Gregory approaches Tertullian here, but in essence remains far from the latter. When giving birth to children, parents do not impart their substance to them; they do not have the creative power to produce new beings solely from themselves. They separate from themselves only that which was already created from the beginning by the omnipotent Creator and placed in them, as alien and different from their own being, as the embryo of a new man, strictly defined in its individuality and already endowed with the properties of the image of God. Such a way of thinking is obviously too far from the crudely sensual hypothesis of the Carthaginian presbyter, who asserted that the souls and bodies of parents, by the force of the command given by God, expel the corresponding substances of children in the act of sexual intercourse. A strong objection that undermines faith in this hypothesis: how can a simple and indivisible soul separate new souls from itself? has no place in the annex to the bishop's opinion. Nyssa. Hypothesis of St. Gregory stands here on the basis of Cretianism and takes advantage of its benefits in explaining the origin of spiritual substances from the highest Spirit - God. In relation to the dogmatic side of the issue, it retains the advantages of generationalism, which very conveniently explains the transfer of original sin from Adam to all his offspring. Adam carried within himself the fullness of humanity the moment he committed his first sin. Thus, all people sinned together with the father of the human race: in him all have sinned (Rom. 5:12). Perhaps the hypothesis of Bishop. Nyssa will seem too bold to the philosopher, to the natural scientist - not entirely scientific, to the strictly ecclesiastical theologian - not entirely in agreement with the letter of St. Scriptures. But no one can deny it originality or accuse it of direct contradiction to general church teaching. The Church openly rejected only the Origenistic opinion about the pre-existence of souls - and St. Grigory does not share it. Regarding the other two hypotheses (creationism and generationism), the Church did not pronounce any decisive judgment, and Bishop. Nyssky uses them, assimilating from each its best side and denying the less convenient one. In a dark question that has not yet been resolved, the peculiar opinion of Gregory of Nyssa should have full value. III. About the unity of the soul, with the diversity of its abilities. Endowed with the properties of a divine image, our soul is essentially rational. Reason and free will connected with it are two traits that the Creator imparted to all human souls at the very first moment of their creation, and which, according to St. Gregory, completely define the true spiritual being of man from its theoretical and practical side. 342 Meanwhile, the concept of the soul in its present, empirical state is far from being exhausted by god-like properties alone. In the real life of the soul we observe phenomena that are often completely contrary to reason and exclude the influence of free will. We find here the movement of various passions, which are in clear contradiction with the demands of reason and enslave the will. We see here a whole area of ​​irrational, although morally indifferent, phenomena in that side of mental activity that is aimed at maintaining the life of our bodily organism. Process of nutrition, growth, etc. physical functions of the living body are performed with the active participation of the soul, as the principle of life, but are performed unconsciously, without any participation of the mind. – How to look at all such phenomena and in what sense to imagine their relationship to the higher, god-like side of the soul? Is it necessary to assume several independent, different spiritual principles to explain them, or can we look at them only as manifestations of different abilities of the same soul? A question for the time when St. lived. Gregory, very difficult and solved differently. Platonism, both in the person of Plato himself and some of his Christian followers, leaned in favor of the recognition of individual spiritual principles in man. Plato distinguished two souls in man - a higher, rational soul and a lower, unreasonable one. The first constitutes the immortal principle in us (το της ψχης αϑανατον) and has its origin from the Supreme God himself. It is placed in the head in order to elevate us above the earth and remind us that we are rather children of heaven than earthly creatures (φυτον ουϰ εγγειον αλλα ουρανιον). The second lower soul is opposite to the higher one and is mortal (τό ψυχής ϑνητόν είδος) like the body that is revived from it. It was created not by the Supreme God, but by lower gods, who wanted the world to have creatures not only immortal, but also mortal. This animal soul serves as the source of all passions in man and has, in turn, two different forces - then έπιϑυμητιϰόν (lust) and τό ϑυμοειδές (irritability), of which the first, as a source of desires aimed at satisfying carnal needs (food, drink, etc.), is placed in the womb, the second - between the belly and the neck, in the heart, so that, obeying the mind, it helps to tame the passions when they resist the sublime dictates of the head. 343 Plato's distinction between two independent principles of the soul was adopted by many Christian teachers of the first centuries. In the life and activity of our soul, they saw so much that contradicted the high idea of ​​the image of God in man that they considered it impossible to derive all mental phenomena from one God-like principle. – Only by supposing a special source for all irrational mental movements did they find a satisfactory explanation for these contradictions. St. Justin, Tatian, and with particular clarity, Origen recognized two souls in man: the spirit (πνεύμα, spiritus), the purely rational, divine principle and the soul (ψυχή anima), the intermediate principle between spirit and body, separating the properties of both. In relation to the whole person they accepted, so. arr., three-part division (spirit, soul and body), and they thought to find sufficient support for such an opinion in the words of St. Paul to the Thessalonians: “May the God of peace himself sanctify you completely, and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved completely without blemish at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Thess. 5:23). - During the time of St. Gregory, such a view on the composition of human nature was held by the Arians, and mainly by Apollinaris the Younger, who found here the basis for his heretical judgments about the face of the God-Man. Coming from the position that man consists of three different parts, Apollinaris did not see any difficulty from an anthropological point of view in making a division between the higher and lower natures of Christ and recognizing the first (spirit) as the Divine, the second (soul and body) as the ordinary nature of man. This is how he thought to resolve the difficult question of the union of two natures in Jesus Christ. 344 St. Gregory of Nyssa, as much from polemical motives as from scientific-dogmatic interests, investigates the question of the unity of the human soul in some detail, but solves it in a sense opposite to the Platonic one. He does not unconditionally deny the very idea of ​​a tripartite division of man and even finds it “not far from his own opinion.” 345 But he resolutely rebels against the division of spirit (mind) and soul (irrational), as two independent substances having different origins, unequal fate, and their own special circle of activity. In man there is only one spiritual principle, one soul, rational and immaterial, which acts and reveals itself in all the variety of mental phenomena. Therefore, if we are talking about the differentiation of special substances in a person, then in our whole being only two parts should be distinguished - the rational soul and the body. 346 What we call the irrational soul is, in essence, a manifestation of the same spiritual principle that operates in the highest realm of knowledge and reason. The light of reason penetrates and illuminates the lower nature of man, so that in those phenomena that man has in common with irrational animals, there is a significant difference between the causes that produce these phenomena in the irrational animal soul and in our rational soul. In us, all life and activity, at all stages of its development and in all its functions, comes from one and the same beginning - the soul, essentially rational and God-like. Animals do not have a rational soul, and therefore those phenomena in their life that seem similar to the phenomena of human life come from a completely different source than in humans - from a lower, unreasonable soul, standing in the closest connection with the bodily organism and completely sharing its fate. As the crown of earthly creations and as a being that connects the earthly with the heavenly, man unites in his nature all types of earthly life and subordinates them to one dominant principle - the highest, god-like spirit. The visible world, as we know, represents several separate steps along which life ascends from less perfect forms to more and more perfect ones. At the lowest level are plants, whose entire life is concentrated only in the power of nutrition and growth, in the ability to accept what is suitable for the growth of the organism and reject what is harmful. Another higher type of life is the life of animals, in which the ability of sensory sensations and perceptions (αισϑητιϰή ένέργεια ϰαί άντίληψις) is added to plant power. Finally, the most perfect life on earth is found in human nature, which, in addition to nutrition and sensations, has the gift of speech and is governed by reason (λόγου μετεχουσα ϰαί νφ διοιϰουμένη). 347 All these stages of life, each of which has its own special circle of beings in which it acts exclusively, stand in such a relationship with each other that the highest includes the lower, as a necessary service element, without which it cannot exist. Animals, with their inherent power of sensation, also have the power of nutrition, because without this latter the former could not act. Man, with the power of the mind, which constitutes his specific property, contains both lower forms of life, because the rational cannot be in the body otherwise than in connection with the sensory σώματι, ει μη τφ αίσϑητφ συϰραϑειη). Thus, all types of souls are dissolved in this verbal animal - man τούτο ξώον, ό άνϑρωπος). 348 But entering into the higher form of life as a necessary condition, the lower force loses its independence and becomes completely subordinate to the higher one, merging with it. Thus, the power of nutrition, which occupies a central, dominant position in the life of plants, and in this sphere rightly bears the name of the soul (ψυχη), ceases to be so in animals, where the significance of the soul, as the main, guiding principle, belongs to the sensitive force, in which the soul of plants appears only as a subordinate, auxiliary ability. In the same way, the soul of animals loses its independent meaning and the very name of the soul when it unites with rational nature, which, like the true soul, alone acts in the entire life of a person, completely subjugating both lower forces and using them only as its life abilities (δυναμεις ξωτιϰαι). Since it stands in connection with the body and serves as the beginning of organic life, it appears as a plant ability; and since it is connected with the senses and acts through them, it manifests itself as a sensitive faculty. Thus, the combination of three different forms of life in man is by no means a mechanical combination of three separate substances. “No one supposes that in the human composition there are three souls, seen in their special outlines... on the contrary, the true and perfect soul is by nature intelligent and immaterial, united through the senses with material nature.” 349 True, we often apply the name soul to both the plant and animal sides of human nature, but this is only due to the imprecision of word usage (έϰ ϰαταχρησεως). Like a stone that has complete resemblance to bread - both in appearance, size, and color - we call it bread only in an improper sense; so in relation to the lower forces of human nature, the name soul is applicable only in a figurative sense, because in fact none of them is a soul, but only “some vital activity, the name equates to the soul, (άλλά τις ένέργεια ξωτιϰή, τη τής ψυχής ϰλησέι συγϰεϰριμένη)". 350 The true soul, which rightly bears this name, is one in man, namely, rational, penetrating and connecting all the elements that make up our body, and imparting vital force to each (έϰάστω - των στοιχείων - τήν ζωτιϰήν δύναμιν ένιεισα). 351 It is not a special soul that acts in our feeding process, nor a different one that perceives sensory impressions; no, the same “essence is active everywhere - a living, intelligent, organic and sensitive body imparting a vital and perceptive force to the senses.” 352 Those who think that the assumption of a plurality of souls will better explain the diversity of psychological phenomena are mistaken. On the contrary, the multitude and diversity of the actions of the soul serves as the firmest proof of the unity of its essence. If each group of actions is attributed to a special, substantially different principle, then the facts of experience are thereby completely distorted: where there are many souls, there is no variety of activities. Each soul will carry out its actions without taking the slightest part in the actions of other souls, without even having the opportunity to acquire consciousness about them. Man is then no longer one being, it is a whole world where several separate beings operate, having in common only the fact that they all live in one body. This is how Aristotle argued 353 against those philosophers who recognized the plurality of souls - and this argument, indeed, has full force. The recognition of one ruling principle at the basis of all the various phenomena of mental life is as much a logical as a psychological requirement, resting in the consciousness of the soul itself. The soul realizes that it is always alone, always identical with itself, because everything is controlled by its activity, everything goes back to it, as to its primary source. She sees with her eyes, she hears with her ears, she expresses pleasure or sorrow through the various organs of the body; to her belongs knowledge, will, command and obedience; she feels it, she is conscious of it. How, given this state of affairs, can it be multiple and composed of several substances? This basic argument in favor of the unity of the soul was also familiar to St. Gregory of Nyssa. “We have,” he says, “only one dominant force, although your relationships to sensory objects are infinitely varied. This only power is our rational soul, mind. The mind operates in each of the senses, it enters into relationships with various beings. He sees things through his eyes, understands what is said through his ears, loves what is pleasant and turns away from what does not give pleasure; acts with his hand as he pleases, takes or pushes away with it, as he recognizes as useful for himself.” 354 From these facts, resting on the irrefutable evidence of consciousness, the conclusion follows by itself. The same principle governs all our actions: it dominates the hidden movements of our thoughts, as well as our bodily, visible actions. There is unity of the soul, yes. arr., an undeniable truth, confirmed by experience. In vain do defenders of the plurality of substances operating in us want to find support for their opinion in Holy Scripture. Ap. Paul, to whom they mainly refer, does not justify them at all. Distinguishing between spirit, soul and body in man (1 Thess. 5:23), the Apostle does not see special essences in these parts: he indicates only three stages of life that God united in man into unity. Body (σώμα) means nutritious and plant life, soul (ψυχή) - sensual life, spirit (πνεύμα) higher, rational life. This is exactly the meaning of the words of the Gospel, in which the Lord teaches the scribe to prefer to every commandment the love of God, testified with all the heart, with all the soul and with all the mind (Luke 10:27). Scripture here calls the physical state heart (τήν σωματίϰω τέραν ϰαταστασιν), soul - the middle nature, thought - the highest, rational and creative force. 355 – It should be noted that the very distinction between the three sides in the composition of man is given by St. writers, and in particular among the ap. Paul, not at all for the purpose of understanding the structure of human nature. The Apostle has in mind the moral structure of human life 356 and mentions the three-part division of man insofar as this division coincides with the degrees of our moral behavior. According to the three types of life, ap. Paul distinguishes in man a threefold direction of the will (τρεις διαφορας προαιρεσεως) and calls the carnal that which is concerned with the belly and its pleasures, the spiritual, which stands in the middle between virtue and vice, rises above vice, but is not fully involved in virtue, and spiritual, which refers to the perfection of life according to God. The Apostle strongly condemns the carnal life of the Corinthians (1 Cor. 3:3); Regarding the spiritual, he notes: “a spiritual person does not accept even the Spirit of God: for he has foolishness”; Finally, regarding spiritual life, he says: “The spiritual one strives for everything, but he himself does not compete with one” (1 Cor. 2:14, 15). In terms of comparative dignity, the spiritual man stands above the carnal, and the spiritual in the same respect exceeds the spiritual. 357 If this is the true meaning of the Apostle’s words, then it is clear that citing them as proof of the doctrine of three independent and separate essences in human nature (as, for example, Apollinaris does) is completely unfair. The Apostle's point of view is purely moral; and if any conclusion of a psychological nature can be drawn from his words, then this conclusion in any case will not be in favor of the Apollinarian teaching. Dividing people into carnal, mental and spiritual, the Apostle “does not deprive the carnal of mental or spiritual activity, nor does he present the spiritual as detached from connection with the body and soul, nor does he present the spiritual as deprived of mind or flesh.” 358 He speaks only about the predominant influence of one or another force on the human will, while the presence in man of other vital forces is not only not denied, but, on the contrary, is necessarily assumed. All these forces are inseparably connected with each other and in their totality constitute one human soul, so that anyone who lacks something, without which his nature would be incomplete, cannot be called a man. 359 We have expounded the teachings of St. Gregory about the unity of the soul - both from its positive and negative sides. Not many fathers have examined this important psychological issue with such completeness and thoroughness. And according to the correctness of the main view, given by Bishop. Nyssky's solution to this question represents a very valuable contribution not only to patristic, but also to modern psychology. Gregory’s teaching cannot, however, be called completely original: in the field of pagan philosophy, similar views were developed by Aristotle and in Christian times by Plotinus. But the Platonist Gregory here deviates from pure Platonism, which was followed by most of the Eastern fathers and especially by the leader of St. Gregory, Origen - can be considered a truly original phenomenon, constituting the true merit of our saint. father. Ep. Nyssky, as we have seen, decisively rejects Plato’s division of the higher and lower souls in man, as two independent, substantially different sources of human life. In all phenomena of our mental life, he sees the action of one and the same principle - a god-like, rational soul, which has several different powers or abilities and, accordingly, several different forms of detection. In the immediate disclosure and substantiation of this principle, St. Gregory follows Aristotle. Aristotle, as you know, recognized three types of soul: nourishing, feeling and rational. 360 A nourishing form of life is a form of life for plant organisms, a sentient life form for animals, and an intelligent life form for humans. Man, as the goal of all nature, is also the central connection of the various stages of development that the life of nature runs through. Therefore, the principle of division of living beings must also be the principle of division of mental abilities. If plants only have nutrition, animals have sensation, and the more perfect of them the ability to change place, then all these three activities belong to the human soul, because each preceding one is a necessary condition and a temporary presupposition for the next one. 361 Man is such a higher form that, as matter or means, contains previous forms of life. His body is organized and nourished from the elements, its organizing and nourishing force is controlled by the sentient, and the sentient by the intelligent. Reason, under the influence and control of the human soul, constitutes the distinctive feature of the human being. He is the unifying principle of all human life, and in this sense can be called the soul of the soul. The lower mental abilities relate to him as an instrument to a goal, as a possibility to reality. We saw exactly the same thoughts about the unity of soul and mind as a unifying center in St. Gregory of Nyssa. Only the relationship of the single soul to its various abilities (δυνάμεις) is clarified even more clearly in him, in the sense of recognizing one cause underlying all mental phenomena. He does not tell us about the nature of the soul, consisting of many faculties, but about a single soul, which remains such despite its many faculties. And he understands these abilities not only as opportunities (in the Aristotelian sense) for the soul to act in a certain direction. In δυναμις St. Gregory, the active side prevails over the side of possibility, that is, it is not only a possibility, but is a certain kind of action. The soul acting in a certain way is its strength, its ability. Here is the ep. Nyssa is close to Plotinus, who also looked at mental abilities as real forces (ισχύς), or as the very actions of the soul in one direction or another. 362 Having understood the general view of St. Gregory on the abilities or activities of the soul and their relationship, let us move on to the analysis of his teaching about each mental ability in particular. We will begin with the main spiritual force, the rational one, “which alone serves as an advantage of our life, having in itself the semblance of a divine image.” 363 1) Faculty of reason (τό λογιϰόν). The highest, ruling power of our soul is reason. St. Gregory gives various names to this god-like part of our being. He calls it mental strength (νοερά δοναμις), 364 strength by spiritual nature (νοητή δυναμις), 365 reason (about λόγος), 366 rational and thinking power (λογική ϰаі διανοητιϰή δυναμις) 367 power of contemplation, observing and discussing things (ή ϑεωρητιϰή ϰαί διαϰριτιϰή ϰαί των οντων εποπτιϰή δυναμις), 368 sovereign ability (το ηγεμονιϰόν). 369 All these and similar names, testifying to the advantages of reason, at the same time mark the most important, distinctive features of its activity. He perceives the light of truth, he distinguishes external objects and discusses them with his thinking. He, on the other hand, has the right to rule over the human person: he controls it according to his will, he rules the whole person both inside and outside. - Accordingly, in the activity of the mind of St. Gregory distinguishes two circles of functions: actions aimed at the perception and knowledge of truth, and actions expressed in the aspirations of love and pleasure, as well as in the aversions of hatred and dislike. These two sides, one of which is theoretical, the other practical, presuppose two different forces in the highest part of the soul: reason in the strict sense of the word, as a cognitive ability (including reason), 370 and will - an active ability. The soul knows with the mind, makes various movements of the will, with the light and guidance of the same mind. A. In the field of cognition, in turn, one should distinguish between two types of activity, depending on the objects to which the cognitive force is directed, and on the method of their perception and cognition. One has to do with being incorporeal, purely spiritual; This is higher knowledge, rational in the strict sense of the word. The other is directed towards bodily objects; This is lower knowledge, sensory-rational, or so-called. external perception. Reason, properly so-called, is capable of cognizing intelligible objects (and, above all, God) without any mediation of external senses; external perception is mediated by the participation of sensory organs. “In what exists,” says the bishop. Nyssa, - one is material and subject to the perception of the senses, and the other is immaterial and comprehended by the mind (των όντων, το μεν εστιν υλιϰόν τε ϰαί αίσϑητον, τό δε νοητόν τε ϰαί αυλον "371 The mind comprehends the incorporeal, truly existing being by direct contemplation and, so to speak, by touching it. This method of knowing the truth in itself, in its own being, without any external cover, is, without a doubt, the most accurate and error-free. “An error (lie) is a vain idea of ​​something that does not exist; and truth is the undoubted concept of what exists.” 372 In our present state, conditioned by the Fall, this most perfect knowledge of the truth through direct contact with it is difficult to achieve and is more a gift of special divine grace than a natural matter of our mind. Connected with the gross body and sharing with it the conditions of physical limitation, our mind is almost completely unable to renounce its attraction to the earth and raise its gaze to the region of pure spiritual existence. However, this should not turn us away, at least from the desire to contemplate and comprehend the truth. Otherwise, what would be the use of the ability to perceive the light of truth inherent in our soul? Our mind is an eye of spiritual nature, akin to the ordinary light of truth, perceiving and reflecting its rays, “just as the bodily eye perceives physical light due to the fact that it has natural light in itself to perceive what is similar to it.” “Like is known by like” - this philosophical position is also valid regarding our knowing mind in the sense that it, as a god-like principle, can know God through contemplation (τφ ομοιφ βλεπειν το σμοιον). 373 Knowledge or ignorance depends here on the degree of moral purity, which determines the closeness or distance of a person from God. 374 More common and more consistent with our current state is another method of cognition - cognition directed towards the external, visible world and mediated by the activity of external senses. While direct contemplation of truth is the exclusive destiny of selected people who achieve the highest degree of moral perfection and, as it were, renounce the earth, 375 the method of knowing the truth through sensory perception is available to all people who have a sound mind and sound feelings. That is why about this last St. Gregory sometimes expresses himself as if he considers it the only possible one for a person living a bodily, earthly life. “There is no sense perception without material substance, and there is no mental activity without sense perception δυνάμεως χωρίς αίσϑησεως ενέργεια γίνεται)" 376. In the matter of sensory cognition, two different factors are involved - the mind and the senses. The senses perceive impressions from external objects, the mind brings what is perceived to consciousness, understands and organizes it. The senses play a passive role here; the mind is the active one: without it, not only cognition, but also sensory perception itself cannot take place. 377 What is the actual act of sensory perception from its physiological side, what change occurs in the sense organs, why certain organs perceive only such and not other impressions - these are the questions asked by Bishop. Nyssa remain without explanation. The physiology of that time had not yet developed definite data to solve them. True, then they already knew about the existence of sensory nerves and their connection with the center - the brain. But the ancients imagined that nerves served only as organs of touch and movement: they had almost no idea about the visual, auditory, taste nerves. 378 At St. Gregory there are hints that apparently give reason to assume that he was inclined to the opinion current in ancient times, according to which the fact of sensory perception was explained by the separation of the subtlest images from material objects and the entry of these images into our sensory organs, where nature posits matter completely analogous to that which comes from external things. 379 But in view of the fact that such hints are very unclear, expressed casually and in passing, we are afraid to attach serious significance to them, so as not to impose St. the father of a thought that does not actually belong to him. Bishop speaks more clearly. Nyssky about the activity of the mind in the process of sensory cognition. The impressions received by the various senses are extremely numerous and varied. The same object often makes impressions on all five senses, and vice versa - the same sense is capable of perceiving impressions from an infinite number of different objects. And despite this, no confusion or errors occur in our knowledge. The mind brings all the diversity of individual impressions into a harmonious unity. St. Gregory makes his point clear with a very successful example. He compares the multitude of impressions entering our mind through the external senses to a crowd of travelers entering a vast city by various routes. “It often happens that others, being fellow tribesmen and relatives, do not enter the city through one gate, but by chance, some entering with one entrance, others with another entrance, nevertheless, as soon as they arrive inside the walled enclosure, they again converge with each other, having mutual connections; but you can find that the opposite happens: those who are not connected in any way and unfamiliar with each other often use the same entrance to the city, but communication at the entrance does not connect them with each other, because, having entered the city, they can separate from their fellow tribesmen. Something similar is noticed in a vast area of ​​our mind. Often, from different senses, one knowledge is collected in us (μία γνώσις σοναγείρεται), since the same object is divided into many parts according to the senses; but the opposite also happens: with one sense we perceive many and varied things that have nothing similar in nature to each other... Let's take the concept of honey as an example. How many different senses acquire knowledge about this subject! Whether someone sees honey, hears its name, tastes it, smells it through smell, experiences it through touch, each sense acquires knowledge about the same object. On the other hand, what a multitude of different objects we perceive with one and the same feeling! Hearing perceives all kinds of sounds, vision - all sorts of visible objects; The same must be said about taste, smell and touch: each sense, through its characteristic perception, gives knowledge about objects of all kinds.” 380 The ordering of this entire mass of heterogeneous impressions, their grouping into one integral concept of an object, or - which is the same - the knowledge of an object as such, on the basis of the impressions it produces, is accomplished by the mind. “The mind examines and disassembles what is perceived by the senses and places everything in the appropriate places of reference (τοις ϰαταλληλοις της γνώσεως τοποις έναποτίϑεται).” 381 Ideas and concepts acquired in the two indicated ways - direct, contemplative and through the external senses - constitute material that is further processed by the mind into so-called knowledge, systematic, scientific knowledge (το μαϑημα). The knowledge of divine things consists mainly of ideas acquired by the higher, intuitive faculty; concepts obtained by the mind through external impressions provide knowledge of nature, which underlies all related sciences. Truth is also inherent in this last order of knowledge, although it appears here far from being as close and frank to our consciousness as in its direct contemplation. The mind must treat the evidence of the external senses with caution and accept its evidence not without critical examination. If he judges objects only by the impressions they make on the senses, he will often mistake appearance for reality and therefore fall into grave delusions. In the physical world, for example, he will form a false idea about the size of the sun, which seems to be a very small circle, but in fact is many times greater than the size of the earth, or he will believe that the moon shines with its own light, when in reality it only reflects the radiance of the sun's rays. 382 In the order of more sublime things, he will form a false concept, for example, about man, recognizing the bodily side as the main part of the human being, or he will take what seems beautiful to be truly beautiful, false goods to be true goods. “Those who look at objects superficially, without attention, when they see a person or some other phenomenon, do not examine anything more in it than just what they see; for them it is enough to see the volume of the body in order to think that they have formed a complete concept of man: but the one who is gifted with a discerning mind does not entrust the examination of objects to the sense of sight alone, does not dwell on the visible alone and does not consider the invisible to be non-existent, but observes both the nature of the soul and the natural qualities of the body, and considers them both in general and each separately; then each of them is distinguished from the other by a special concept and again looks at their general structure and combination in the composition of the object. So in the study of beauty, an imperfect person in mind, as soon as he sees some object that has the appearance of some beauty, considers that very thing (in it) to be beautiful by nature, which attracts his senses with pleasure, and does not try to explore anything else; and whoever has a pure eye of the soul and can contemplate objects of this kind, leaving admiration for the substance subordinate to the idea of ​​beauty, uses what is visible only as a certain step towards the mental contemplation of rational beauty, by communication with which everything else is and is called beautiful.” 383 – This verification of sensory perceptions by the mind, this contemplation of the hidden reality behind the external appearance, this knowledge of things in their idea - this is the true knowledge to which a person studying the visible world should strive. - View of St. Gregory on the essence of knowledge bears clear traces of Neoplatonic influence: the same distinction between two methods of knowledge, with a preference for the rational-contemplative over the sensory-rational, the same attitude of the mind to the objects of sensory perception, the same raising of external phenomena to the ideas operating in them - we also find in Plotinus. 384 Only in this latter such thoughts are revealed much more fully and clearly than in the bishop. Nyssa, for whom purely philosophical interests were pushed aside by religious interests. B. In addition to the theoretical, cognitive ability, the mind has another ability - active, or will. 385 U ep. Nyssky cannot find such a comprehensive, strictly scientific disclosure of the concept of free will, which we later find in Bl. Augustine, who was forced to defend and clarify this concept against the Manichaeans and Pelagians. Ep. Nyssa did not have such polemical motives, and therefore his doctrine of free will is expressed in the form of random, although quite definite, remarks. 386 The will has two opposite movements - the positive movement of love and pleasure and the negative movement of hatred and disgust. “Love is an internal connection with what is pleasant, produced by pleasure and passion. Hatred is alienation from the unpleasant and disgust from the offensive.” 387 The will has a high gift of dominion over these movements; she can curb them and direct them at her discretion in one direction or another. Free will is the most precious asset of our godlike nature. On the one hand, it serves as a necessary condition for virtue and, therefore, for a person to achieve his high purpose: “for virtue is an independent and independent force, and what is done out of necessity and compulsion cannot be virtue.” 388 On the other hand, it places man in an independent position among other beings of this world and consequently determines the fulfillment of his purpose in relation to the visible universe. “The soul directly proves in itself royalty, sublimity and a great distance from gross baseness by the fact that it, without subordination, freely, sovereignly, disposes of its desires.” 389 In relation to man himself, the freedom of his will is freedom of choice, freedom of thought, unlimited self-determination: “will is something not slavish, but autocratic, consisting in freedom of thought (τούτο δε έστιν η προαίρεσις, αδούλωτόν τι χρήμα ϰαί αύτεζούοιον εν τή ελευϑερία τής διανοίας ϰείμενον)". 390 In relation to the outside world, it is independence from any external compulsion or necessity. Refuting the pagan teaching about fate with its seemingly irresistible commands, exposing astrological nonsense about the allegedly irresistible influence of the stars on the fate of man, St. Gregory comes to the result that “the share and fate of everyone is determined by his own will.” 391 The will, in order to act correctly and in accordance with its purpose, needs constant instructions from the mind. Only with the assistance of reason and under the guidance of its advice can she correctly use her high advantage of free self-determination, can autocratically control the movements of love and hatred characteristic of her. This influence of the mind on the acts of the will gives a person’s actions, emanating from the higher side of the soul, such a dignity that the analogous movements of the lower, animal part of the human being do not have. The first are strictly considered, completely free, and in this respect bear a true resemblance to divine actions. The second are blind and arise under the impressions of sensuality; they are in the nature of bestial instincts. So man, according to the excellent comparison of St. Gregory, is like a statue, the head of which has two faces: one, representing the rational part of the soul, reflects the image of God; the other, lower, subject to passionate, sensual aspirations, bears the likeness and characteristics of an animal. 392 Free will, like reason, is subject to the law of development. Here on earth, its movements towards good can only be accomplished with significant difficulties, in a constant struggle with the opposite attractions to evil and sin, coming both from our flesh and from the external world surrounding us. From victories over these obstacles, our will gradually improves. The direction towards goodness, acquired with effort, becomes its lasting asset. And the further the will goes in this direction, the more common it becomes for it, the deeper it penetrates and - so to speak - merges with its very being. After the soul’s detachment from the rough bodily shell and its transition to the afterlife, immaterial, the good skills acquired on earth become the subject of its calm, undisturbed possession. The will here reaches its highest stage of development; it passes into a dispassionate state of direct union with good and becomes identical with love and knowledge of the Highest Source of all good. 393 This is her true freedom - freedom from all attractions alien to her essence and an unchanging direction towards God. 394 – The idea of ​​​​the stability of the will, the concept of its freedom, as an irrevocable strengthening in goodness, is a high feature of Gregory’s psychology in comparison with the psychology of Origen. Despite all the enormous importance that Origen acquired for the factor of free will, not only in human life, but also in the structure of the entire world, he did not reach the correct concept of free will. He settled on the idea of ​​it as arbitrary. He recognized only that phase of freedom where the will can constantly make a choice between opposites. But he knows little about that second period of moral life, where the choice has already been made, the good has been won, and freedom finds its discovery only in normal development. In other words: Origen's theory allows only negative freedom, freedom of struggle and testing, and not positive freedom, which consists in the direct implementation of our moral purpose. Meanwhile, both are equally important and necessary. Without freedom of choice, good, of course, loses all its moral character and becomes a simple, natural necessity. Only through struggle and testing should free will come into possession of truly moral good. But on the other hand, it is also necessary to admit that this period of testing, the choice between good and evil, must end: when the will has made a decisive choice in favor of good, this latter ceases to be a simple act, subject to new changes, it becomes a state of the soul, finally and unchangeably established. 395 Origen, we repeat, did not reach such a concept of free will in created, finite beings. St. Gregory of Nyssa affirmed this in the most decisive manner, as much under the influence of general church teaching as from the principles of his own worldview. In the final and unchangeable affirmation of the will in goodness, he saw the only possible completion of the history of rational and moral beings. Otherwise, this story would have been an eternal drama without end, as it really was in Origen’s imagination. 2) The ability to feel (το αισϑητιϰον). Knowledge and free self-determination are two activities that belong to the higher side of the soul. By their nature, they are purely spiritual movements, developing exclusively in the sphere of the mind, without any relation to the lower, bodily nature of man. They define the very essence of the spirit and therefore equally belong to all spiritually intelligent beings - people and angels, as well as to the highest Spirit Himself - God. But in addition to these higher activities, our soul is characterized by lower activities, which it develops in connection with and depending on the body, as a living, animate organism. By their nature and conditions of origin, these latter differ sharply from the former. There, the source and direction of activity lies in the soul itself, here the excitations come from the sensory-bodily nature, and the soul only responds to them in one way or another. True, in both cases the same soul acts, but there it manifests itself as a completely independent force, acting exclusively on its own and for itself, according to goals and motives rooted in its own god-like being; here her activity is determined by the movements of sensuality and therefore has the character of a certain passivity, similar to the phenomena of the life of irrational animals. It was this similarity with the phenomena of animal life that served St. Gregory is the strongest basis for the sharp separation of the lower activities of the human soul from the higher ones. What in man is analogous to the movements and states of animals, he classifies as lower activities that develop depending on the body. Animals feel sadness and pleasure, and in humans, according to St. Gregory, these are lower, passionate movements (παϑη). Animals exhibit desires, for example, for food and drink, courage, cowardice, etc., and in humans these activities have a basis in the lower, sensual nature. 396 The scope of lower activities, with this principle of its definition, is obviously quite extensive and varied. The soul experiences an infinite variety of impressions through the external senses. All such impressions evoke in her more or less lively and definite emotions, which are usually accompanied by pleasure or sadness. These movements or feelings, developed by the soul in response to sensory impressions, constitute the area of ​​lower activities, the cause of which is St. Gregory believes in a special spiritual force - sensitive (δυναμις αισϑητιϰη). Just as sensory impressions are varied, so are the feelings they evoke in the soul. These include: desire, fear, love, hatred, anger and many other similar movements with which the soul responds to various stimulations of sensuality. St. Gregory divides them into two classes and attributes their origin to two principles - lust (το επιϑυμητιϰον) and irritability (το ϑυμοειδες). “For it can be seen that much is governed by lust, and again much is caused by irritability.” 397 In various places in his writings, St. Gregory says a lot about these two forces acting in the lower side of the soul. But what he says about them relates more to the ethical sphere than to the strictly psychological one. What are επιϑυμητιϰον and ϑυμοειδες from the psychological side, what circle of phenomena does each of these forces embrace, in what relation do they stand to each other and to the highest activities of the soul? - it is difficult to answer such questions with certainty if we limit ourselves only to the instructions of the bishop. Nyssa. The gap in Gregory's psychology can, however, be filled somewhat from other sources, since the teaching related here was common to almost all of the psychology of that time. Plato was the first to distinguish between lust and irritability as two different principles operating in the lower soul parallel to the third, higher principle - reason. “There are three principles in the soul,” says Plato: one is called irritability; it should serve as an assistant to reason, unless it is perverted by bad upbringing. It should not be confused with lust, since it provides a weapon to the mind in its fight against lust... It also differs from the mind, because it is also found in small children, most of whom do not yet have reason, and many will never even have it... The rational part, if only it is truly reasonable, tends to command, the irritable part - to obey reason and provide assistance to it. 398 Explaining Plato's thought, Thomas Aquinas characterizes concupiscence as a certain (lower) movement of the will and attributes to it love and hatred, instinctive attraction and aversion in the sphere of sensory objects. He interprets irritability only as a swift force, through which the soul fights obstacles that stand in the way of its happiness, or resists the dangers that threaten it. Its purpose is to overcome difficulties; her role is essentially militant; she can fight either for the rights of reason, or in favor of lust. “Sensibility has two parts,” says Aquinas. One soul is excited to acquire what flatters the senses and to avoid what unpleasantly strikes them: this part is called concupiscence. Another soul resists objects that oppose its good and cause harm to it: it is called irritation. Its activity consists of conquering difficulties and removing obstacles. Hatred belongs to lust; but it can also refer to irritation, depending on the strength of the struggle that it causes.” 399 Both Plato himself and his interpreter, the great medieval theologian, distinguish two independent principles in the soul - reason and desire, as two opposites standing in mutual enmity. They apparently do not attribute to the third principle - irritation - the significance of an independent, separate principle, but consider it only a known state of the first two. A movement of the mind that reaches a high degree of tension as a result of the struggle with opposing drives of sensuality (lust), or, conversely, movements of sensuality that resist rational dictates and achieve too much strength in this resistance, is irritation (ϑυμός). It is not, therefore, any qualitatively defined ability; it can be called the affective state of every mental activity. Plotinus spoke more clearly and definitely about the lower powers of the soul. He indicated for each of them the corresponding circle of activity, determined their difference and relationship to the higher, rational side of the soul. – To the category of phenomena designated by the name το επιϑυμητιϰον (lust), Plotinus includes phenomena of the will: desires and aspirations, since they have their source in the body and tend to satisfy its needs. This last limitation excludes from the realm of επιϑυμουν all higher movements of the will, all those desires and aspirations that come from rationally free will and constitute the property of only the human spirit, not shared by animals. By the name επιϑυμητιϰον, Plotinus means aspirations that are disordered in nature, which, acting without any obstacles, reveal all their unbridledness. They are very diverse, just as the needs of the body from which they come are varied. Our body naturally seeks pleasure and replenishment. Nature (φυσις) itself sets goals for desires, tries to give them direction and focus on itself. Strictly speaking, desires do not come from the body, since it is something material, but from the body, as an animate organism, capable of movement. The body itself would be completely indifferent whether it would deal, for example, with bitter or sweet, moist or warm... But since the soul is near it, all changes in it reach the soul that animates it, and it, in the case of, for example, pain felt in the body, strives to get rid of impressions that arouse displeasure. 400 Το ϑυμοειδες, according to Plotinus’ definition, is not only anger or irritation in the narrow sense of the word. Among the phenomena included here, Plotinus also lists the states of cowardice and courage. Consequently, by ϑυμοεδες he means an active feeling in general, or a state of the will, accompanied by feeling. Irritation cannot be attributed exclusively to the body and believe that it is rooted in its plant processes. We are capable of becoming irritated not only about the suffering of the body, but also for other reasons, for example. to share the irritation of people close to us or to become angry at the sight of actions that are alien to justice. Cases like these indicate that the state of anger involves feeling and some thinking. 401 If, in the light of the considered judgments, we turn to the teaching of St. Gregory of Nyssa about the lower activities of the soul, then we will find in him complete similarity with the opinions of the above-mentioned philosophers. In most detail St. Gregory speaks of lust and irritability in his “canonical letter to Litoius, bishop. Meletinsky." Let us cite the main point relevant here. Distinguishing two directions in the activity of the lower forces of the soul - the direction towards virtue and the direction towards vice, - Bishop. Nyssky, in relation to the power of lust, argues as follows: “The virtuous direction of the lustful part (του επιϑυμητιϰου μεροθς) of the soul consists in the aspiration of ardent love for what is truly desired and truly beautiful, so that here all the strength and disposition that is in us can find an object for its activity. love, in the conviction that nothing else is desired by nature except virtue and the Being that serves as the source of virtue. Deviation from the straight path and sin of this part of the soul occurs when someone directs his lust (την επιϑυμιαν) to illusory vanity or to blooming bodily beauty. This is where the love of money, the love of fame and all similar vices come from, which have their origin in this type of evil. – The right actions of irritable force (της ϑυμοειδους διαϑεσεως) are: hatred of evil, struggle against passions and strengthening of courage in the soul, so that when fighting for faith and virtue, not to be afraid of what seems terrible to many, but to resist sin even to the point of blood, to despise the threat of death, severe torment and deprivation of what is most pleasant and, in a word, to be above everything, which holds many captive to pleasures. The decline of this strength of the soul is known to everyone: envy, hatred, enmity, slander, quarrels, a grumpy and vindictive mood of the soul, a long-held rancor that leads many to murder and bloodshed.” 402 The first feature that strikes the eye in the activities now indicated is their mixed, dual nature, according to which they can belong to both the rational and the sensual side of the soul. The movements of love and hate, attraction and disgust collide, mix, fight with each other, or help themselves mutually. It is obvious that the abilities from which they come can serve equally both reason and sensuality. The movement of desire and attraction, which has as its source the rational will (the highest side of the soul), is true love, just as the movement of disgust in this area is hatred in the strict sense of the word. But the same movements, only transferred to the sphere of sensuality, already appear, like lust and irritability, as lower activities, common to humans and animals. For patristic (as well as for Platonic) psychology, with a strict separation of the higher, god-like side of the soul from the lower, sensory-animal, the direction of mental activities in one direction or the other served as the principle for classifying these activities according to various abilities and even the beginning of the division of these very abilities. That is why the same movements, only directed at different objects, apply to St. Gregory to different groups and are produced by different forces. There is one essential feature that distinguishes the phenomena of the lower side of the soul from the same phenomena attributed to the higher side - this is the trait of passion inherent in the former and distinguishes them from the even and calm flow of the latter. That in the activity of the irritable force this trait constitutes the most essential sign is clear both from the list of its actions and from the definition given by St. Grigory is irritated. “Some,” he notes, “call irritation the desire to repay with an insult the one who began to insult, but as we might think, irritation is the desire to do evil to the one who has offended (ως δ αν ημεις υπολαβοιμεν ϑυμος εστιν ορμη του ϰαϰωσαι τον παροξυνοντα)". 403 But that the same character of passion essentially distinguishes the actions of the power of desire from the corresponding phenomena of rational free will - this is clearly hinted at by St. Gregory again in the very definition of the ability to desire. “If we begin to define lust (την επιϑυμιαν) as it is in itself, then we will call it a desire for what we lack, or an addiction to the enjoyment of pleasures, or sadness that what we want is not in our power, or some kind of attachment to something pleasant, the enjoyment of which is unattainable.” 404 Obviously, essentially the same movements are indicated here that are characteristic of the higher, purely rational side of the soul; but in the lower soul these movements receive a special connotation: they are always accompanied here by some passionate excitement. The same desire, which in the pure sphere of rational-free will develops completely dispassionately and is calmly directed towards its highest object, the eternal and unchangeable good, - here, in the field of lower, sensual-animal inclinations and needs, develops unevenly, impulsively, indecisively, since it is not combined with confidence in the firm possession of its object. Sensible objects do not have stability and constancy; they are subject to continuous change and fluctuation. This feature of variability is uniquely reflected in the mental movements directed towards them. The desire to master them, combined with the awareness of their fragility, turns into lust, into a passionate desire to quickly obtain and, if possible, hold on to what is desired; and the fear of constantly losing what has been received, or - even more so - the consciousness of the impossibility of achieving the desired object, puts on the very desires the imprint of languor, sadness (λυπη). So, those phenomena that relate to St. Gregory to the lower side of the soul and are explained from two different abilities (lust and irritability), are essentially identical with the movements of rational free will, and differ from these latter only in the object to which they are directed and in the tone that accompanies them. Let modern psychologists call this basis for distinguishing mental abilities insufficient, too external, but for the idealistic psychology of ancient times it, as we noted, had full force. This psychology did not want to allow the movements of pure spirit to be identified with phenomena of a mixed, sensory-spiritual nature, so that for example. desires directed towards God could have a common source in our soul with desires directed towards the sensory world. She could not allow this for fear of losing the distinction between the higher, heavenly and lower, animal principles of the human soul, and through this relegating man to the category of unreasonable creatures. But if the division of higher mental activities and abilities from lower ones had real, although not particularly solid and not entirely scientific, foundations in ancient psychology, then it is impossible to indicate such foundations for distinguishing two separate abilities in the sphere of lower movements of the soul. In fact, lust and irritability, as we have noted, are quite analogous, or, better said, essentially identical with the movements of love and hate characteristic of rationally free will. Why is it that in the higher side of the soul they are movements of the same force, but in the lower side they are considered as two special, independent forces? We find it difficult to answer this question, because the ancient psychologists themselves did not give clear instructions on this matter. Plato, as we have seen, although he separated επιϑυμητιϰου and ϑυμπειδες as two parallel forces, he attributed independent significance only to the first, while he thought of the second as a service, auxiliary ability, devoid of its own content. Plotinus, although he attributed to irritability a special range of actions different from the actions of lust, in relation to the source, he also placed both of these forces in a close connection. – If we turn to the opinion of St. Gregory of Nyssa, then we will find in him the same uncertainty in his view of the power of irritability, sometimes as completely independent and isolated, sometimes as only a private type of activity of lust. In the above passage of the “Canonical Epistle” of St. Gregory interprets irritability as a special force parallel to concupiscence (and reason). Just as that which flatters sensuality is the first motive of lust, so that which unpleasantly strikes sensuality is the main motive of irritation. Hence, each of these forces has its own special range of actions. Lust is always a positive movement or attraction to an object: “from it comes the love of money, love of fame, lust and all similar vices; with a good direction, it is love for virtue and sensual objects that stimulate virtue.” Irritability, on the contrary, is a negative movement, aversion from an object. “When she is not controlled by reason, her actions are: envy, hatred, enmity, slander, quarrels, rancor, etc. p.; with good direction, the same movements are turned to the service of good.” 405 St. Gregory even indicates various places in our body where the actions of the two lower forces begin and primarily develop. For the power of lust, he indicates the space surrounding the liver, for here the plant side of the soul is predominantly revealed. The actions of the irritable force are reflected mainly in the heart and in the blood surrounding it. 406 But no matter how clearly the two forces of the lower soul are apparently differentiated, however, upon a more careful look at the matter, it is not difficult to notice that one of them lacks a solid psychological basis. If lust is a desire directed towards sensuality, trace. a certain mental movement, which has both a special source in the soul and a special object of its activity - then this cannot be said about irritation. Hatred or disgust, as its basis, does not represent a positive and isolated fact in psychological terms. This is an inseparable companion or, better to say, the other side of the same activity of desire. And therefore, instead of attributing disgust to the basis of a special force, it is much more natural to attribute it to lust and attribute to the activity of this latter force a double movement - love and hatred, the soul's attraction to pleasure and deviation from objects that cause sorrow. In this case, the role of irritation will be limited only to the struggle against obstacles that block the path to pleasure or threaten to disturb it. Irritability then can no longer be interpreted as a separate force parallel to lust; it will be the same lust, developed to a high degree of tension. The difference between the two movements will be only one of energy and impetuosity, and not one of nature or psychological basis. In many cases St. Gregory, indeed, is inclined to such a view, depicting irritability only as a certain tone that accompanies the movements of the desired ability. “Irritation fights for faith and virtue, despises the threat of death and the cruelty of torment.” 407 “If there were no irritation in us, what weapons would we have to fight our enemies?” 408 Irritability, yes. arr., elevates and strengthens our desires (no matter which direction they lean), imparts perseverance to them and thereby helps us more accurately achieve our goals. – In the activities of the lower forces of the soul of St. Gregory was interested not so much in their psychological as in their moral side. He saw in them the source of our moral temptations and downfalls, and from this point of view he considered their presence in man and their relationship to the higher, god-like part of the human being. Lust and irritability are not essential, but accidental properties of our soul. 409 They do not come from reason and are in contradiction with it; their basis is in the sensual, bestial side of our nature. It is true that they are so closely connected with the rational soul that they are usually considered parts of it. However, in fact, they are not the same as the soul in essence: both are “like some itching growths”, from the outside and only temporarily attached to the rational, god-like spirit of man 410 - Where is the reason for their origin, and what is the meaning of their existence in our soul, when they do not constitute a necessary accessory to its being? St. Gregory points out two different reasons for their presence in modern man. On the one hand, they are an inevitable condition of the life of the soul in its union with the body; 411 on the other hand, they are a consequence of sin. With the division into sexes, alien to the pure image of God, and with the bestial method of birth, given in view of the Fall, many animal attractions came into human nature. But what in irrational animals constitutes an expedient instinct for the preservation and continuation of life and has the correct boundaries set by nature itself, when transferred to human nature, with the wrong direction of the mind, becomes a disease of the soul, a passion (παϑος). 412 According to their source and direction, all passionate movements can be attributed to love or hatred, to lust or irritability in the sphere of sensual objects. They tend either to enjoy what is sensually pleasant, or to avoid what is sensually unpleasant. But what is regrettable for sensuality often constitutes the dictates of a higher, moral duty, and what caresses it often serves as an obstacle to virtue. Thus, passions are usually instruments of vice and causes of sin. Left to their own devices, not controlled by reason, they develop very quickly and captivate the soul with great force. However, no matter how strong and swift they are, they cannot become a law for the soul; the soul can always remain the mistress of its freedom and not unaccountably yield to instincts that are contrary to its purpose. To evaluate the worth of objects that excite love or hatred, she has a light purer than the impressions of sensuality, this is the light of her mind. Reason discerns what is decent, useful and honest; and his judgments can always provide a sufficient counterbalance to sensual attractions. 413 Free will remains the decider of the choice between the drives of reason and the blind movements of sensuality. The choice is made, however, not without struggle and not without internal discord, since opposing instincts come into conflict with each other and challenge each other for victory over the whole soul. But this is where virtue receives its price, as a person’s true, effortlessly acquired merit. Plato clearly depicted the internal struggle of heterogeneous drives under the guise of two horses harnessed to one chariot. “One horse is beautiful and well ridden; all his members are strong and strong, he holds his head high, his fur is white, his eyes are black;... he loves true glory and easily yields to the leadership of the driver.” 414 He represents the good instincts of sensuality, completely obeying the light of reason. The other horse represents the passionate, disorderly movements of lust. “He has twisted limbs, a flattened forehead, black fur, bloodshot eyes; he is wild, disobedient, jumping from the lash.” 415 Whether he encounters something beautiful in appearance, or experiences the first attack of lust, he becomes angry and furious and tries to rush to the object, the sight of which arouses pleasure in him. In vain the other horse, more meek and obedient to the voice of its leader, resists and refuses to follow this impetuous movement. The chariot wavers terribly, and only with the greatest efforts does the driver finally manage to tame the heat of the fiery horse. 416 – Thus, human freedom must use great efforts to resist the impulses of the passions. If, abandoning her rights, she yields to the violent movements of sensuality, passions become instruments of sin; they gain dominion over the soul and plunge it from abyss to abyss. They become, on the contrary, instruments of virtue if the soul curbs them, controls them and uses their natural strength to serve reason. St. Gregory, although he promises to “leave aside Plato’s chariot and the pair of young horses harnessed to it, which are not equally driven by each other,” 417 and wants to base his teaching exclusively on the word of God, 418 - however, in essence he expresses the same thoughts as Plato. “The movements that we call passions,” he says, “become instruments of virtue or vice, depending on the use that free will gives them. Just as iron is forged at the will of an artist, whatever form the forger’s thought wishes to give it, it is transformed into that, becoming either a sword or some kind of agricultural tool. So it is with us: if reason, this advantage of our nature, gains dominance over what has come into us from the outside, not one of the animal movements will assist us in serving vice. 419 On the contrary, each of them will turn into a corresponding type of virtue: irritability will produce courage, timidity - caution, fear - humility, hatred - aversion from vice, the power of love - lust for the truly beautiful, and majesty of character will elevate you above passions and the way of thinking will remain unenslaved to evil. 420 If reason gives up the reins and, like some charioteer tied to a chariot, drags behind it, carried away by the unreasonable movement of the harnessed horses, then the lower aspirations turn into a destructive passion.” 421 Passions, in this bad direction, are so closely connected with one another that as soon as one prevails, others will follow it. “As in a chain, when the first link is pulled, the others cannot remain at rest, but the link located at the other end of the chain moves along with the first, because the movement in order and connection from the first link passes through those lying near it: thus human passions are intertwined and connected with each other; when one of them gains strength, and the rest of the accumulation of vices enters the soul. For example, one can point to a person possessed even by the passion of vanity. Vanity is followed by the desire to acquire more, for it is impossible to be covetous if this passion is not driven by vanity. Further, the desire to acquire more and have an advantage over others entails either anger towards equals, or pride towards inferiors, or envy towards superiors; envy is followed by pretense, followed by bitterness, and the last by hatred of people, etc.” 422 With such a dangerous proliferation of passions, a person must vigilantly monitor his sensual drives and curb them before the force of habit transforms them into a destructive passion. 423 Maintaining a harmonious balance throughout the entire course of mental life, subordinating all one’s behavior to the guidance of reason - this means living virtuously. “Virtue can be looked at as a mean between extremes and passions; for whoever observes the mean between deficiency and excess in everything distinguishes virtue from vice.” 424 3) Nutrition ability (το ϑρεπτιϰον). In addition to pure reason, which constitutes a specific feature of our spiritual being among all other living beings of this world, in addition to the abilities of a mixed, spiritual-sensual nature, common to humans with dumb animals, our soul also has the ability or power of nutrition, common to it with insensitive plants. 425 The activity of this force is directed exclusively to the body, to maintaining its life, to its growth and development. “The fact that a person feeds and grows,” says St. Gregory, “he has from plant life, because something similar can be seen in plants: they attract food to themselves with roots, but they spew it out of themselves in fruits and leaves.” 426 Our body does not have in itself the principle of life: as a simple combination of material elements, it is subject to the general laws of everything complex and material and is ready to constantly collapse, decompose into its constituent elements. 427 If, in fact, it is not only maintained in existence, but also lives organically, feeds, grows and moves, then this is only due to its connection with the soul. The soul, as a force external to his being, but nevertheless inextricably united with him, acts in nutrition, and in growth, and in his movements, in a word, it produces everything that distinguishes our body, as a living organism, from simple, inanimate material objects. – The side of the soul turned to this matter stands especially among other mental activities. This is a circle of unconscious, instinctive mental movements, sharply different from both pure movements of the mind and movements of a mixed, sensory-reasonable nature. With all the complexity of the process that occurs in the organic life of our body, the soul performs it without having to resort to the assistance of the mind and without even bringing to its consciousness what is happening here. She guesses with her instincts the food that the body needs and delivers this food with the help of the members of the body itself. It is not concerned with the selection of various juices suitable for one or another element of our flesh, nor with determining the proportions in which they should be given to each part of the body. God wanted to free the soul from such worries in order to give it the opportunity to use its activities for more sublime pursuits and more worthy of its true calling. - Let's listen to what St. says. Gregory about the hidden act of bodily-organic life, which takes place in us through the action of the soul. “Let us imagine a garden,” notes St. father - thousands of different trees and all kinds of plants are brought up in him, of which each is seen to be very different in appearance, quality, and color properties. So many plants in one place feed on the same moisture, but the nature of the plants they feed transforms the moisture into different properties. The same moisture in wormwood turns bitter, in hemlock it becomes a poisonous juice, and in something else - in saffron, in balsam, in poppy it takes on other properties, in one it becomes hot, in another it becomes cold, in the third it is of average quality; in laurel, spikenard and similar plants it is fragrant; in the fig tree and in the pear it is sweet; the vine turns into grapes and wine. And the acidity of the apple, and the blush of the rose, and the whiteness of the lilies, and the bluishness of the violet, and the purple color of the hyacinth, and everything that can be seen on the earth, vegetating from the same moisture, differs in so many differences in appearance, in form and in qualities. – Similar miracles are created in our fields, revived by the soul, by nature, or – better to say – by the Lord of Nature. Bones, cartilage, blood veins, nerves, ligaments, flesh, skin, fat, hair, glands, nails, eyes, nostrils, ears, all the like, and besides thousands of other joints, differing from each other in different properties, feed on one type of food, according to their nature; so that food, approaching each of the members, changes to what it is close to, becoming akin to the quality of that member. If it is in the eye, it will dissolve with this visual member, and according to the differences in the eye coverings, it will be given to everyone. If it flows to the auditory joints, it mixes with the nature of the auditory organ; having entered the lip, it becomes a lip; it hardens in the bones, softens in the cerebellum, gains elasticity in the veins, stretches with surfaces, becomes thinner in the corresponding vapors to the point that it produces hair, and, moreover, if it passes along tortuous paths, it produces curly and curly hair; and if the passage of hair vapors occurs along straight paths, then the hair is long and straight.” 428 Thus the soul maintains the life of the body and accomplishes its development and growth through food, without itself having any consciousness of the miracles that it produces here. This lack of consciousness in the actions of the soul aimed at maintaining bodily life excludes them from the realm of strictly psychological phenomena and gives them the character of purely physiological processes. That's why St. Gregory, like most ancient philosophers, does not specifically deal with the functions of the nourishing soul; he is content only with affirming their existence in man in order to prove that our soul unites in itself all the stages of organic life. Among other mental powers, the nutritional ability occupies the last place in dignity: it is lower than the feeling power and immeasurably imperfect than the rational ability. But in the order of the consistent development of the soul, in relation to the growth of the body, the power of nutrition is the first, preceding the manifestation of higher abilities. She alone acts throughout the entire duration of time from the moment of conception of a living being until its emergence into the world at birth. “Like a root hidden in the earth, the soul reveals itself at this time only as a vegetative and nutritional force, because the small and undeveloped body of the uterine child cannot yet accommodate the activities of other forces.” 429 Regarding the stated teaching of St. Gregory on mental abilities, we consider it necessary to make several general comments. Ep. Nyssa combines thoughts - the thoughts of Plato and Aristotle. He brings Plato's division of the soul into reason, lust and irritability closer to the Aristotelian distinction of three forces or three activities of our soul - rational, feeling and nourishing. It is based on St. Gregory this last view, as the most fully and comprehensively embracing the totality of mental functions. Plato's classification is laid out here as a part of the whole: το επιϑυμητιϰον and το ϑυμοειδες to which Plato attached importance to the individual parts of the soul, standing in direct parallel with the mind, are here relegated to the level of private forces, subordinate to one, higher than them, ability - sensitive, which in turn is in a subordinate relationship with two other faculties of the soul - rational and nourishing. – We will not judge how correct and thorough Gregory’s classification is from a scientific and psychological point of view; from the formal-logical side, it can be reproached rather for being too broad and general than for the opposite lack. This commonality of the accepted division was reflected in the teaching of Bishop. Nyssa has other shortcomings - incompleteness in disclosing details. For those spiritual phenomena that are counted by St. Gregory in each of the three categories, there remains a number of other psychic phenomena, or not mentioned at all by St. father or mentioned only casually and in passing, and yet having their own special, strictly defined character and deep interest for the psychologist. To see this gap, let us briefly reproduce the thoughts of St. stated above. Gregory on the issue of mental abilities. The rational side of the soul has two abilities: thinking or knowledge, and will. Knowledge, in turn, has two types: direct or contemplative, directed to supersensible, spiritual objects, and mediated by the activity of external senses and directed to material objects. The will freely determines itself to action through two different movements, love and hate. – The same two movements also characterize the phenomena of the sensual-animal side of the soul: the movement of love or attraction here becomes lust, the movement of hatred and disgust - irritability. Passions are ardent movements of lustful and irritable force; they are born from impressions, pleasant or unpleasant, produced on the sensibility by external objects. The instructions of reason serve as a counterbalance to these sensual attractions: the will must be guided by the suggestions of reason and overcome passions, turning their power to the service of good. – As for, finally, the nourishing ability of the soul, it acts without our knowledge: its activity, full of secrets, is controlled by Providence itself. – Everything that has been said now cannot but be considered fair; but, on the other hand, it is also impossible not to notice that the list given here does not exhaust the totality of mental phenomena, even the largest ones. So the activity of the sensitive ability of the soul of St. Gregory limits it to two movements - lust and irritability. But, as is self-evident, the whole area of ​​sensations is far from being embraced by these movements. There are feelings that are accompanied by pleasant or unpleasant sensations, but the first reason and source of which lies not in external impressions, but in the internal movements of our spiritual and rational nature. These are feelings evoked by the contemplation of the beautiful, the true, the just, or, conversely, by the spectacle of moral outrages and vices. Psychology attributes phenomena of this kind to a special ability, which it calls intellectual or moral feeling. It cannot be said that such mental movements were completely unknown to Greek philosophy. Plato devotes several beautiful pages to an exalted depiction of those high feelings that the soul is capable of experiencing, rising to the invisible world, where eternal and unchanging beauty dwells. 430 We are far from supposing that St. Gregory stood below Plato when it came to understanding and expressing the liveliest joy about the pleasures brought by virtue and justice. 431 But like most ancient philosophers, he did not give himself a clear account of these psychological phenomena and therefore did not indicate either their special source or their place among other mental phenomena. A similar gap is noticeable in the psychology of Bishop. Nyssa in relation to the abilities of memory and imagination. Aristotle and, following his example, Nemesius, a contemporary of St. Gregory, attached very great importance to these two abilities; psychologists of all times have carefully studied them. But St. Gregory speaks about them only by chance: about memory - in Chapter 10. treatise “On the device. people." (p. 105), expressing surprise at “the vastness of this internal container into which all the countless impressions coming through the external senses flow”; – about imagination – in ch. 13 of the same treatise (pp. 127, 129, 130), regarding the fantastic images that appear to us during sleep. Is it possible to reproach the bishop? Nyssa for such omissions? It is to be regretted that he made them, but he cannot be blamed for not having analyzed mental faculties in all detail. The purpose of his research - religiously dogmatic - did not necessarily require such an analysis. V. About the life of the soul and its ultimate goals The totality of activities developed by the soul through various abilities and in various directions constitutes what can be called the life of our soul in the broad sense of the word. But in Gregory of Nyssa the concept of mental life has a more specific and narrow meaning. Not all psychic abilities of St. the father attaches equally important and essential significance to the nature of our spirit, and therefore does not consider all mental functions to be related to the direct goal and purpose of this latter. The true essence of the soul, as we have seen, he defines only by two god-like properties - mind and free will. Accordingly, he believes the true life of the soul only in the development of these higher, god-like properties. The activity of reason and rational-free will is the center around which all movements of our soul should be grouped and towards which they should gravitate. The life of the body is supported and developed like the life of dumb animals by the elements of material nutrition. The other side of the human being, the god-like soul, also has its own life and its own special nutrition, corresponding to its spiritual-rational nature. 432 The food of the soul is not the rough bread that the body feeds on, for it is written: Man will not live on bread alone (Matthew 4:4). 433 The soul is nourished and life-giving by truth and goodness: truth, the light of which enlightens its mind, is goodness, the beauty of which attracts all the aspirations of its will. And since the combination of these perfections represents the Divine Being to the highest degree, we can say that the source of life for the soul is God Himself. Knowledge of God and activity in accordance with His will is the food that supports and preserves the existence of our soul. The soul enters into communion with God through knowledge and love, and in this communion finds its life, its perfection, its purpose and all its bliss. – This is, in basic terms, the idea of ​​St. Gregory about the true direction and ultimate goals of the life of our soul. Let's look at the details. Turning the mental gaze towards God is a natural and necessary condition for the life of all rational creatures; this is also the life of the human soul: 434 In fact, to direct your mind to God, that is, to cognize Him and the eternal truth itself in Him, means in some way to partake of the Divine being, to participate in the Primary Source of all life and being. “If carnal food, flowing in and out, by its very passage imparts life force into those in whom it occurs, then communion (ή μετουσία) of the truly existing, always abiding and eternally unchangeable, does not it much more preserve the being of the partaker?” 435 But if the knowledge of God serves as the source of life for the soul, then, on the contrary, ignorance (άγνοια) of Him is the cause of spiritual death. “Ignorance of the true good, at first like a fog darkening somewhat the visual power of the soul, then condenses into a whole cloud, completely blocking the ray of truth. With the removal of light, the life of the soul necessarily becomes impoverished.” 436 Considered, in its essence, ignorance, like any evil, does not have not only substantial, but even no existence (το δέ μη ϰατ’ ούσίαν ον, ούδέ έστιν άλως); it is simply the negation or cessation of the activity of knowledge γνώσιν ενεργείας άναίρεσις). Nevertheless, in relation to spiritual life, it is the greatest of evils (τούτο δ’ άν ειη των ϰαϰών το έσχατον). 437 With the cessation of the influx of spiritual food, a gradual weakening and withering of spiritual strength begins, which can then end in complete spiritual death. Therefore, the soul must constantly strive for the knowledge of God, so as never to stop communicating with the Source of life. And this is all the more easily achievable for her because knowledge is a natural and normal requirement of her nature, while ignorance is a painful phenomenon, contrary to her nature. Just as the eye, when it is in a healthy state, naturally has the ability to see, and only when it is removed from its natural position does vision remain inactive, so spiritual contemplation is akin to and characteristic of those whose mental gaze is in a normal state, and for whom the disease of ignorance, like some kind of pus, serves as an obstacle to the participation of the true light, they do not have participation in the true, blissful life. 438 Knowledge, or more precisely, knowledge of God, as the basis and source of spiritual life, has several stages, the sequential passage of which consists of the development of the soul. Starting from the first glimpses of rational consciousness, this development continues throughout endless eternity, never stopping. In the whole course of mental life there are two periods, strictly different from each other: present life, earthly, and future life, afterlife. The knowledge available to us here on earth, under the conditions of bodily existence, both in its nature and in its degree of perfection, is much lower than that which our soul will possess when it renounces its connection with gross matter and moves into the realm of supersensible existence. Now we recognize spiritual objects not in their own essence, but in reflections that only approximately correspond to their true nature. Thus, we cannot contemplate God face to face, but to know Him we need the medium of the sensory world, which He created and is, as it were, the left side of His being. The entire visible world, in all its parts filled with divine miracles, serves as a revelation of God. The forces operating in it and the phenomena developing in it provide the most convincing evidence of the properties of the Creator of the universe. Slenderness and order, which dominate everywhere in this world, loudly tell our minds “that there is an artistic and wise power of God, revealed in beings and penetrating everything, and bringing the parts into harmony with the whole, and replenishing the whole in the parts - and that the universe is contained by one force, remaining in itself and rotating around itself, and never stopping movement, and without moving from its proper place to any other.” 439 This is a cosmological testimony about God, according to St. Gregory, has such an irresistible power of persuasiveness that it is capable of proving the existence of God to atheists and justifying the unity of the Divine to polytheists. 440 Every philosophy and every knowledge based on the study of the visible world must first of all listen to this voice of nature, speaking about God, and thus serve as a means to higher knowledge, to the knowledge of God. Every science retains its dignity and proves fruitful for the mind only to the extent that it is imbued with the light of divine knowledge. Even though many sciences pursue material goals and tend to ensure the external well-being of man, they receive their true value only when they lead to the knowledge of God and develop love for Him, i.e. when they support and strengthen the true life of the soul. Otherwise, they will turn out to be empty and fruitless inventions, forever in the pain of birth, but never giving birth to anything living. 441 In the knowledge of truth, which is achieved by our soul in this, earthly world, and which preserves it in being (διης ευ τψ οντι σθντηοειται η φθσις, 442 Bishop of Nyssa distinguishes his stages of development. The highest he designates the stage of knowledge with the terms επιστημηη and ειδησις. This is knowledge characteristic of people who are fully strengthened in the faith, established spiritually - those to whom the Apostle Paul ascribes “the most perfect abilities and senses trained” (Heb. 5:14), and whom in another place he calls pneumatics ( 1 Cor. 2:15) In moral terms, the characteristic feature of this stage of knowledge is διαϰρισις, an unmistakable distinction between good and evil, based on a clear, rational understanding of their natures. The less perfect stage of knowledge is represented by γνωσις. draws the conclusion that γνωσις is not entirely solid knowledge, allowing for the possibility of errors and associated with a certain disposition towards the pleasant (την προς ϰεχαπισμενον διαϑεσιν). Such was precisely the inexperienced and still unexperienced knowledge of our first parents in paradise; and therefore they could be tempted by a tree in which the knowledge of good and evil was mixed. 443 The development of the soul in the sphere of knowledge, which begins in this world, has certain boundaries set by the conditions of real, sensory existence. The most perfect knowledge will be revealed when the soul, having renounced the earthly shell, appears face to face before the highest Source of truth - following the example of Moses, who first took off his shoes and then was worthy to contemplate the light of a burning bush. 444 Then another world will open before us, the world of eternal things - what Plato calls “the land of truth” (τό της αλιϑείας πεδίον), and what we Christians call the kingdom of God. The soul then recognizes the truth, stripped of all veil; she will see God as He is (1 Cor. 13:12). “In the age to come, when everything visible has passed away, according to the word of the Lord... and we will move into that life that is higher than sight, hearing, and thought, then no longer in part and not only from deeds, as now, we will recognize the nature of the Good and not through the visible we will understand the invisible, but, without a doubt, a kind of ineffable bliss will be comprehended, and another way of pleasure will be revealed, which is now not characteristic of ascending even to the human heart” 445. The knowledge of truth, successively ascending from lower to higher levels, represents one side of our spiritual life. Another equally necessary side is the discovery of the known truth in love. Knowledge without corresponding expression in love is sterile and useless. The knowledge of truth begins and sustains the life of the soul; love of truth strengthens and completes it. True knowledge is “a firm concept of what eternally exists”; 446 true love is an unshakable desire or attachment to the unchangeable. Knowledge and love thus have the same object - true being, eternally existing, never changing, or - better to say - God Himself. For knowledge, God appears as the highest truth, for love - as the highest good. Truth is God enlightening our minds: goodness is God attracting our will with love; in the aggregate, it is always the same source of life for our soul. Love, as a free attraction to true good, brings our soul closer and closer to God: “for what we are attached to through love, our souls become accustomed to.” 447 This closeness to God serves as an abundant source of life for the human spirit; as well as vice versa - aversion from true good towards evil leads to spiritual death. 448 Evil is the denial of truth; it is the soul’s attraction to this, which has only a ghostly and unreal existence, and therefore it itself is not any essence, but a direct negation of any essence. “To be in evil does not mean to be in the proper sense, for evil in itself does not exist, it is the absence of good. Therefore, just as he who is in Being truly abides in being; so he who reaches the point of insignificance (evil) is destroyed, according to the word of the psalmist" (Ps. 106)." 449 Just as in the field of knowledge, distinguishing lies from truth is characteristic of pure reason, so in the matter of love, distinguishing true from false, illusory from real, belongs to reason, and not at all to feeling. “Not all love is well-timed, but only that which is directed towards someone worthy of love. In order to know well what is truly worthy of love, the mind must distinguish between two types of goods: some of them are really such and deservedly bear the name they have acquired; others falsely bear this name. Everything that is not temporary only gives pleasure, and is not such that it seems good to one, but is useless for others, on the contrary, it always serves everyone and in everything as good, is true good, always remaining the same and not allowing the admixture of anything bad: such good, strictly speaking, is seen in the one eternal being of God. Everything else that caresses the senses seems good due to false seduction, but in reality it has no permanence, its nature is fluid and fleeting, and only ignorant people can recognize it as a real good.” 450 These people are pathetic, falling into deception. They neglect truth, life, light - everything that cannot be destroyed, and direct their love to vain objects, exhausting themselves in pursuit of these ghosts. 451 “There is only one thing worthy of love by nature, the truly existing (that is, Αληϑως ον), about which the legislation speaks in the decalogue: thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy mind (Deut. 6:5).” 452 Love, like knowledge, cannot achieve complete perfection in this earthly life. Due to the strength of the closest connection and dependence of the will on the mind, shortcomings in the activity of the latter are necessarily reflected by the same imperfections in the movements of the former. Love has its beginning in knowledge: without knowing, one cannot love. It arises with the first glimpse of truth and gradually strengthens as the mind becomes more and more enlightened by the light of true knowledge. And if for the mind the most perfect knowledge, combined with direct penetration into the very essence of truth, is unattainable in real life, then for the will there lies an insurmountable obstacle to the most perfect revelation of true love. In the absence of a direct relationship with God, from Whom the sensory-physical shell now separates us, our love for Him cannot rise to such a degree of strength and liveliness to which it can reach when our soul enters into closest communication with Him. And this will happen when we, having passed into the afterlife and cleansed of all the filth of carnal life, see God face to face. Here the pure attractions of love will no longer meet any obstacles; the soul will unite with the very Source of life and in this will draw its highest bliss: “for is it possible to imagine greater bliss than the sight of God? (τι γάρ αν τις μειζον εις μαϰαρισμόν εννοησειεν του ειδεβν τόν θεόν;)". 453 Having achieved this highest goal of its life, the soul will no longer lack anything: it will embrace the fullness of existence and in it will find satisfaction of all its aspirations. 454 All those movements and those abilities that are closely related to the conditions of her present earthly existence will turn out to be unnecessary for her. Neither lust, nor irritability, nor hope, nor remembrance, nor in general any of those activities that are developing in her now, while the goal of her life is still in the distance and covered by the veil of sensuality, will find a place in her. 455 Even knowledge and love - these high movements of the god-like spirit - will significantly change their character in the future: ή γνώσις άγαπη γίνεται - knowledge will become love, 456 or - better said - knowledge and love will merge into one common, inseparable act - the act of direct contemplation and inner attachment to the highest Thankfully. The soul knows God, and itself will be known by Him; the soul will love God, and will itself be loved by Him: it will be in God; and God will be in her. 457 About the device people Ch. 15. την συναφειαν εχει (Migne, T. 44, col. 177) – Sn. Oh shower. and Sunday page 226. It should be noted, however, that idealistic monism in Plotn’s system is not strictly adhered to. Next to the denial of matter of any intrinsic essence, there is the concept of it as ουσια (Eυn. II. lib. IV, cap, V). as an independent and original beginning of physicality. Stockl, Gech. d. Philos., S. 214. About the device people..., ch. 23, pp. 171–2. Ibid.., p. 172. Sn. Oh shower. and resurrection, pp. 294–5. On the structure of man, ch. 24 (Migne, col. 212–13). Oh shower. and resurrection, p. 296 (Migye, T. 46, col. 124). About the six days, p. 11 (Migne. T. 44. col. 69). Oh shower. and Sunday, page 296 About the device people Ch. 24, p. 174 (Migne, col. 213). About the device people. p. 175 (Migne. col 213. B). Brucker Histor. crilic Philosophiae, T. V, p 402. Stigler, Psychologist, d. Gr. Nys., pp. 65–6. Device volume people, ch. 24, p. 175 (Migne, col. 213, B). About the six-day period, p. 21 (Migne, T. 44, col 77, 80). About virginity, ch. XI. - Creation. St. Gr. Nis. Part 7, page 335 (Mligne, T. 46, col. 364). About the device people, ch. 15, p. 135 (Migne, col. 177, V.). For example, according to Strato, the soul is located between the eyebrows. Skvortsov, Bl. Augustine, as a psychologist, p. 173. About the device people, ch. 12, p. 111. Ibid. page 213 (Migne, col, 157 D.). Ibid., ch. 15, p. 135 (Migne, col. 177, p.). Ibid. – Sn. Ch. 12, p. 116. Ibid. Ch. 10. – Sn. About the soul and resurrection, p. 215. Bergades, De universo et de anima hem. doctr. Gr, Nys., p. 48. Stigler, Psychologist, d. Gr. Nys. S. 57. Anmerk. Vladislavlev. Philosophy of Plotinus, ch. 9, pp. 144–5. Enn. I. lib. IV, cap, XVI. Enn. IV, lib. III, cap. IX. Huber, Die Philos, d. Kirchenvat. S. 58. Ogl. Sl., Ch. 10, pp. 37–38. Sn. About the soul and resurrection, p. 229. About the device people, ch. 12, pp. 116–17. – Sn. Ch. 13, pp. 126–7. Ibid., ch. 13, p. 124 (Migne, col. 168). Skvortsov, Bl, Augustin, as a psychologist. Page 176–8. Plato, Praedre, c. XXVIII-XXX. About the soul and resurrection, p. 296. De eo, quid sit ad imag. Dei et simil. – Midne, T. 44, col. 1332. Device volume people, ch. 28, pp. 193–4. About the soul and resurrection, p. 283. Ibid., pp. 287–8. – Sn. About the device people, ch. 28 pp. 194–6. About the device Chel., Ch. 28, pp. 192–3. Above cits. place from op. St. Gr. Nis. De eo, quid sit, ad imag. Dei etc. About the device people, ch. 28, p. 193. On the soul and resurrection, p. 297. – Migne, col. 125. S. About the device people, ch. 29, p. 197. – Migne, col. 233. About the soul and resurrection, p. 297. About the soul and resurrection... page 297. About the device people, ch. 29, p. 198. Ibid. – Sn. About the soul and resurrection... p. 298. About the device people, ch. 30, pp. 220–21. – St. Gregory the Theologian, it seems, denied the process of development of the soul in the sense in which St. accepted it. Gregory of Nyssa. According to St. Gregory the Theologian, the soul immediately appears in all its fullness and perfection, and if it is not initially revealed as such, it is only because the body, due to its weakness, is not able to express its actions. “Just as a skilled musician on the small flute can produce only weak sounds; so the soul in weak bodily members is weak; if they become stronger, the soul manifests all its spiritual energy” (Carm. lib. I. sect. 1. n. 8). – Tertullian presented the matter differently. Just as the body immediately after conception is in an embryonic state, so the soul initially exists in the form of a seed (semen), subject to development. The bodily and spiritual seed, being organically connected to each other, develop simultaneously and in parallel, although each is of its own kind. The soul grows not in substance (without austio substantiae), but in strength (ѵі), whereby the original modulus receives effigies, that is, the substance of the soul receives its definite form. (See Stigler, Psychol. Greg. v. Nyss. S. 76 – 77, Anmerk.). Bishop's view Nyssa is close to Tertullian, although he is alien to those crudely realistic ideas that characterize the doctrine of the Carthaginian thinker. De gen. ad litt. X, 16, n. 29, – Ep. 190, Optato, p. 1. Thus Sligler (Payeh. d. Gr. Nys., S. 72–83) recognizes St. Gregory as a defender of the creationism hypothesis; on the contrary, Huber (Phil. d. Kirchenvat. S. 201–2), Bergades (Doctrin. Gr. Nys. de an. Horn., p. 64–8), Denis (Phil. d'Origen. p. 471) and others see in him an adherent of the hypothesis of generationalism or even traducianism. About device, people, ch. 30, pp• 218–19. – Migne, col. 353, V. Ibid. – Sn. About the soul and resurrection, p. 297. Denis, Phil. d'Orig., r. 4–71. Stigler, Psych, Gr. Nys., S. S3. Ogl. Sl., Ch. 33, pp. 86–7. Migne, t. 45, col. 84. Oh shower. and resurrection, p. 297. Huber, op. cit. S. 202. Anmerk. 163. – Berg a des, op. cit. p. 64–8. We do not take into account other evidence cited by Stiegler (s.78–80) from the work de anima, falsely attributed to Gregory of Nyssa. Vergades. op. сit. r. 65. This is how Bl. reasoned, among other things. Jerome: “Quotidie Deus fabricatur animas.” Er. 38, ad Pammach., De error. John, lerosalym. – Cp. Nemes, De natur. hom., p. II. About the device people, ch. 16, pp. 144. – Migne, col. 185. Ibid., ch. 22, p. 165; Ch. 17, p. 148. Ibid., ch. 29. pp. 197–8. See above, place 16 chapter. “About the device. people." About the device people, ch. 28, p. 192. About the device people, ch. 16. – Sn. Oh shower. and resurrection, page 230. Plato., Tim. r. 69–70, 90. – Sn, Die specul, Lehre von Mensch., ѵ. I, 331–337. Rebuttal Opinions of Apolline. Creation St. Gr. Nis. part 7. Ibid., § 34, p. 133 and many others. etc. About the device people, ch. 8, p. 98. – Migne, col. 144–5. About the device people, ch. 14, p. 132. – Migne, col. 176: σογϰρίματι, έν ίδίαις περιγραφαις ϑεωρούμενας,... άλλ η μέν αληϑης τε ϰαί τελεία ψυχή μία τή φύσει έοτίν, η νοερά τε ϰαί αυλός, η διά των αισϑήσεων τη ύλιϰή ϰαταμιγνυμενη φύσε. About the device people, ch. 15, pp. 133–4. About the soul and resurrection, pp. 226–7. Aristot., De anima, lib. 1, p. IX, paragraph 4. About the device people, ch. 6, p. 91. Rebuttal Apollin., § 46, p. 168. About the device people, ch. 8, pp. 100–1. Rebuttal Apollin., p. 168. Ariston., De anim., L. I, c.II. c. IX; L. II, c. III, IV; L.III. C. XII. History of Philosophy, Schwegler, trans. Yurkevich. Page 126. Vladislavlev, Philos. Dam, page 165. About the soul and resurrection, p. 241. About the device people, ch. 12, p. 119. – Migne, col. 164. About the soul and resurrection, p. 215. – Col. 32. Ibid., p. 242. – Col. 61. Ibid., p. 241. – Col. 60. Ibid., p. 238. – Col. 57. About the device people, ch. 12, p. 110. – Col. 156. In St. Gregory one cannot find a clear distinction between reason and understanding, although the areas of inquiry inherent in both differ markedly. In general, a detailed classification of mental abilities was not part of the plan of Grigoriev’s psychology, and therefore we have to present this side of his teaching only on the basis of brief and fragmentary remarks. Tolkov. on Eccles., Bes. 6; Part 2, page 294. Migne, col. 697. About the life of Moses, page 266. – Creation. St. Gr. Nis. Part 1. Oh baby, premature. kidnapped death. Page 341. Herrn. Siebeck, Gesch. d. Psychologie, Erst. Theil, S. 379. About virginity, ch. 7, p. 323. 0 shower and sunday p. 215. About the device people, ch. 14, p. 138. – Migne, col. 176. V. - Huber (Phil. d. Kirchenvat, S. 204) incorrectly interprets this expression, considering bishop. Nyssky was a “decisive realist” on the question of knowledge. The Holy Father, as we have seen, does not deny the intuitive way of cognition, although he looks at it as an exceptional and difficult to achieve gift for a physical person. About the device people, ch. 30, p. 208. – Sn. Vladislavleva, Philosophy of Plotinus, p. 172. This seems to be the meaning of the familiar passage from the works. “About babies, kidnapped. death" (p. 341). “The eye,” says St. Gregory, “delights in the light, because in itself it has natural light for the perception of what is similar to it, and neither the finger nor any other member of the body produces vision, because in no other member is nature prepared for light.” See also “About the device.” people", ch. 30, p. 206; Ch. 12, pp. 112. About the device people, ch. 10, pp. 106–8. Migne, col. 152–3. Ibid., p. 106. Col 152, D. About the soul and resurrection, pp. 215–16. About virginity, ch. 11. Creativity St. Gr. Nis. Part 7, pp. 335–6. Migne, col. 364, V.S. Siebeck, Gesch. d. Psychol., S, 379, St. Vladislavleva, Philos. Dam, pp. 182–4. Rebuttal Apolline's opinions. § 41, page 151. Stigler, Psychol. D. hell. Gr. Nys., S. 99 – 100. Tolkov. on Eccl., Bes. VIII, p. 335. About the device people, ch. 16, p. 141. About the device people, chapter 4, p. 88. Ogle, Sl., ch. 30, p. 78. Migne, col, 77. Against the doctrine of fate, page 170. Creation. St. Gr. Nis. part 4. About the device people, ch. 18, p. 150. 0 soul and resurrection, pp. 270–1. Pressense. Histoire des trois prem. Siecles de leglise chret. Paris. 1869 T. V, p. 352–3. About the device people, ch. 18, page 150. About the shower. and resurrection, page 234. Oh shower. and resurrection, p. 231. We willingly retain the terms adopted by the Russian translation of the works of St. Gregory. To designate that group of mental phenomena that ancient psychologists called το επιϑυμητιϰον, it is difficult to find a more appropriate word than the term “lust.” This is reluctance, as a movement of purely rational will, and not lust, as an exclusive movement of sensuality; it is a combination of elements of both, capable of leaning towards both spiritual and sensual-animal interests; it is something between the dispassionate direction of the will towards the highest good and the full of passion of lust for base, sensual objects. The same must be said regarding the term “irritability,” which we will use to designate mental phenomena grouped by St. Gregory under the general name - το ϑυμοειδες. This is not just anger, as a specific, private mental phenomenon (in the sense of modern psychology’s idea of ​​it); This is generally excitement or tension that can accompany any mental activity. T ho m. A quin., Sum. Theol., 1-a p., q. 81, art. II. Vladislavlev, Phil. Dam, pp. 167–8. See there the corresponding quotations from the works of Plotinus. Canon, last, right. I. Creation, St. Gr. Nis. Part 8, pp. 423–4. Migne, T. 45, col. 224–5 Oh shower. and resurrection, page 236. Migne, col. 56. Canon, seq., pp. 423–4. About the device people, ch. 12, p. 111; n. Ch. 30. Oh shower. and resurrection, page 236. Oh shower. and resurrection, p. 245. About the device people, ch. 18, pp. 149–151. Ogl. Sl., Ch. 21, p. 58. 0 souls. and resurrection, page 232. About the device people Ch. 18, p. 152. 0 souls. and Sunday page 242. About virginity, ch. 4, pp. 312–13. Ibid., ch. 9, pp. 328–31. Oh shower. and resurrection, page 240. Will announce. words , ch. 37, page 98 About the device people, ch. 30, pp. 216–18 See eg. “Oh the inscription. Psalm." part 2, ch. 2, pp. 5–8; Ch. 4, pp. 15–18. On Eccl., Conversations. 5, pp. 291–2 and many more. etc. Oh baby. premature kidnapped death, page 340. Migne, col. 173, B. On Eccles., Conversations. 5, p. 291. O Jr., before. don't give a fuck see, page 341. Migne, col. 173, A. Ibid., p. 342. Migne, col. 176.C. Oh shower. and resurrection, pp. 210–12. Publicity words., preface, pp. 2–3. On the Life of Moses, p. 262. See Stigler, op. cit., S. 95–6. Oh, younger, before, fuck. see, page 340. Migne, col. 179. Device volume people, ch. 20, pp. 156–7. Migne, col. 197. Ap. Paul denotes by the term γνωσις our present, fragmentary knowledge, in contrast to the future, intuitive, which he marks with the word επιγνωσϰειν: απτι γινωσϰω έϰ μέρους, τοτε δε έπιγνωσομαι, ϰαϑώς ϰαι έπεγνωσϑην" (1 Κορ. 13, 12). See Stigler, S. 93, Anmerk. On the Life of Moses, p. 267. On the Song of Songs, Conversations. XI, p. 290. Creativity. St. Gr. Nis. Part 3. On the Life of Moses, p. 267. Migne, col. 333, V. D. On Eccl., Conversations. 8, p. 335. About nadp. psalm., ch. 8, p. 53. On Eccles., Conversations. 8, p. 340. On Song. Song., Bes. 6, p. 155. Migne, col. 890. Oh shower. and resurrection, p. 271, etc. Ibid., p. 271. Migne, col. 96. Ibid., p. 278. On Song. Song, p. 155.