Отдел первый. Первобытное (идеальное) состояние человека

I. The place and purpose of man in the universe. He is the center of two worlds. He is the king of the earth. The harmony of the world as a whole is made up of a combination of opposites. Starting with the difference between the elements or elements of matter and successively ascending the ladder of opposites observed between the properties of things in the physical world, our thought finally reaches the extreme limit, where the region of the material, visible ends and the region of the invisible, spiritual begins. The invisible and the visible, the supersensible and the sensual, spirit and matter are the most extreme and highest poles to which all the particular differences of the created world are reduced: “the highest division of all beings is the division into the rational and the sensible (π 'ντων των οντων η ανωτατω διαίρεσις εις τε το νοητόν, ϰαί το αισθητόν την τομήν έχει).” 86 If the mutual opposition between material objects is only relative and is based only on the difference in their properties, with the commonality of their essence, then the opposition between the supersensible and the sensual is the most decisive and is rooted in the difference in their essence. In the same way, water, in its qualities, represents a connecting link between heaven and earth, with its fluidity and inconstancy recalling the distinctive property of the former, and with its heaviness and downward tendency approaching the main property of the latter. Thus, the sharpest contrasts observed in the sensory world between its finite parts find reconciliation within the same sensory reality, in a consistent series of objects and phenomena that stand in the middle between the extreme points and combine their opposite properties. Thanks to this combination of various properties, the sensory-material world is harmonious, full of harmony and a closed whole. 88 This is not at all the relationship between the supersensible and the sensual, the spiritual and the material, these two separate worlds into which all creation falls. There is not a single common property here, nothing mediating or bringing together, here is a decisive and substantial opposition, excluding any possibility of a direct (genetic) transition from one sphere to another. The boundary between them is the sharpest: where the region of the physical world ends, the region of the spiritual world begins, but without any connection with the first. “The firmament, which is called heaven, is the limit of sensual creation, and beyond this limit follows a certain intelligible creature, in which there is no image, no size, no limitation by place (τοπου ϑεσις), no measure of extension (το εϰ διαστηματων μετρον), neither color, nor outline, nor quantity, nor anything else seen under the sky.” 89 The spiritual, angelic world and the earthly, sensory world represented in the primordial universe two polar opposites, between which there was no contact at any point. Being disconnected from the spiritual world, the earth was at the same time deprived of any participation in the goods of this world - in those goods, the enjoyment of which constitutes the true life of all creation and the purpose of its existence. In fact, God serves as the source and beginning of all good for finite beings, and every creature participates in this good and becomes good itself because it is in communion with the Primary Source of all good, gravitates and approaches Him. 91 But God, as the Highest Spirit, is available for communication only to spiritual beings, who by their very nature stand in some affinity with Him. 92 Sensible nature - due to the opposition of its essence with the Divine being - in itself cannot enter into any communication with God, and therefore cannot enjoy the divine good. Thus, the entire half of the primordial universe, with all the beauty and harmony in its structure, apparently did not achieve the true purpose determined for all creation in general. It is clear that according to the wise plan of the Creator there could not be such inexpediency: not a single part of the universe should have been deprived of the participation of divine blessings, if not directly, then - at least - through the medium of such an organ that would have the closest, related relationship to it. Man is such an organ and conductor of the highest blessings for the sensory world, without whom “the light of God would remain invisible (on earth), and His glory unattested, and goodness unknown, and everything else that is seen in the nature of God, idle.” 93 In man, the dualism that is created by the opposites of the spiritual and material is reconciled and resolved; in it “according to the wisdom of God, a certain mixing and dissolution (μιζις τε ϰαι αναϰρασς) of the sensory with the mental takes place, so that everything equally participates in the beautiful, and not a single creature is left without participation in the best nature.” 94 In its dual nature, one half of which belongs to the sensory world, the other to the spiritual, both of these worlds are united into a harmonious, harmonious whole. Hence, they do not oppose each other, like two hostile parts of the universe, but connected in the unity of the human personality, they are mutually penetrated and gravitate towards one common goal - to communicate with God, to glorify His greatness and omnipotence. “So that the earth does not remain completely without a part and share in the existence of spiritual and incorporeal beings, for this purpose, by the best providence, human nature was brought into existence, in which the spiritual and divine essence of the soul is clothed with an earthly part, so that, in accordance with this part, akin to the oppressive downward and corporeal, the soul lived in the earthly element, which has something close and homogeneous with the essence of the flesh. The purpose of what was created is so that in all creation the power that exceeds all is glorified by the spiritual nature, when the heavenly and earthly by one and the same action - I mean turning the gaze to God - is united with each other towards the same goal. 95 – So, the purpose of man, which determines his cosmic position, consists 1st in the fact that he mediates the connection of two great worlds - the heavenly and the earthly - into one harmonious whole, in which spirit and matter are organically connected, 96 and 2ndly in the fact that through him bodily and earthly life becomes receptive to divine blessings, like the heavenly one. 97 Embracing the organic unity of opposites between the highest and the lowest, the heavenly and the earthly, the rational and the unreasonable, the free and the unfree, spirit and matter, man completes the visible world and together immeasurably elevates it to communion with the invisible world. Everything heavenly and earthly must unite for the harmonious glorification of the triune God, the one, uncreated, unchangeable, source of all life and being; and man has the high purpose of being the mediator of the unreasonable creature and elevating it to a higher life. In order to fully fulfill this purpose in relation to earthly creation, a person must have in his nature an affinity with the whole visible world, must embrace all its elements and all forms of life, so that in creation, according to the word of the Apostle, nothingness is marked out (1 Tim. 4:4) and deprived of divine communion. 98 The visible world in its structure represents a gradual ascent from lower forms to higher ones, and moreover, in such a way that each higher level contains within itself a lower one, as a subordinate moment entering into it. Everything that exists in this world is divided primarily into inanimate, that is, devoid of life, and animate, or living. The inorganic is subordinate to the organic, enters it as a lower component (body), and receives in it the true meaning of its existence. The organic world, in turn, represents three successive stages in which vital or spiritual force is revealed. There is only plant and nutritional force, otherwise called physical (φυσιϰή) and observed in plants. There is another kind of life that embraces the first and, in addition, imparts the ability to control oneself by the movement of feelings: such is the life of dumb animals that do not only feed and grow, but have sensory activity and sensory perception (την αισϑητιϰήν ένέργειαν τε ϰαί άντιληψιν). Finally, the third and highest form of life on earth is human life, which contains both lower forms and, in addition, has the gift of speech and reason, which everything else living on earth is deprived of. Man thus realizes within himself the whole idea of ​​life; “For what he eats and grows, he has from plant life; but what is governed by feeling comes from the dumb; the gift of understanding and speech, considered in itself, is not shared with other beings and constitutes the property of human nature.” 99 This sequence in the ascent from lower to higher is also noted by St. writer of everyday life in the story of the creation of the world. First of all, the Creator creates inorganic nature, alien to all life; it then adds vital force, first in plant form, then in sensory-animal form, and only at the end of the whole creation in rationally human form. Man enters the world last, precisely in the sense in which the last, according to the necessary law of development, is at the same time the most perfect. 100 Man was introduced last into creation not because, as worthless, he was rejected to the very end, but because, together with the beginning of being, he had to become the king of the subordinates. The Creator of our nature first filled this dwelling with all kinds of beauties and prepared a rich feast in it, and only then introduced man, charging him with the task of not acquiring what does not yet exist, but enjoying what already exists.” 101 This preferential, outstanding position of man among all other creatures of the earth was clearly expressed in the very way of his creation by God. While all other earthly creatures were brought into existence “as if hastily,” suddenly spoken by the command of God, the dispensation of man is preceded by a council in which the Creator, as it were, ponders the future creation: “and what it should be, and what prototype it bears in itself likeness; and what it will be for, and what it will produce after creation, and what it will rule over - all this is provided by the Word, so that man will receive a dignity that is higher than his being, acquire power before he himself comes into being.” 102 “What a miracle!” exclaims St. Gregory, quoting the words of an everyday writer about the consultation of God that preceded the creation of man: “the sun is set and no council precedes it; likewise, heaven, although there is nothing equal to it in creation, is created by a single utterance; about the same thing - from what and how, and about anything else similar to this, not a word is said. So everything taken separately - the ether, the stars, the air that fills the middle, the sea, the earth, animals, plants - everything is brought into being by the word. The Creator of the universe approaches the creation of man as if with caution (περειεσϰεημενως), in order to prepare the substance for his composition, and to liken his image to some kind of primitive beauty, and to designate the purpose for which he will exist, and to create a nature appropriate to him, suitable for his activity, suitable for the intended purpose. 103 II. The dual composition of man. The virtues of his bodily nature. Man's position in the universe, assigned to him according to the Creator's plan, was supposed to determine the structure of his nature both from the point of view of its general composition and from the side of its particular properties and advantages. Placed in the middle of two worlds, as their connecting link, man, by the strength of this position, had to combine in his nature the elements of both worlds. Due to its connection with the earthly, material world, it must have a visible, sensory part in its being; due to its relationship with the spiritual world, it must contain within itself a spiritual, supersensible essence. This is how real man is with his dual nature - with a visible, material body and an invisible, supersensible soul. – Each of these parts, in turn, had to receive an organization that would be most consistent with the purpose that a person is called to fulfill in his life and activities. In relation to the visible world, as we have seen, man is appointed to be the language of dumb creatures, i.e. True, if we consider the human body without regard to its higher purpose, as an instrument of the soul, and compare it with the bodies of earthly animals, then, it seems, one can only regret its insufficiency and helplessness. In fact, nature has not given our body such coverings and weapons as those of other animals that serve as excellent protection from enemies. We have neither horns, nor sharp claws, nor hooves, nor teeth, nor a sting equipped with deadly poison; Our body is not covered with hair to protect it from the harmful influences of the air. We are deprived by nature of those physical properties that in animals and birds serve as excellent tools for self-preservation and maintenance of life: we do not possess the speed of a hare, or the vigilance of a chamois, or the strength and size of an elephant, or the wings of birds. “Man is slower than all those who are fleet-footed, shorter than those who are tall, and more defenseless when protected by natural weapons.” 105 How can we now reconcile this apparent helplessness with the concept of man as the king and ruler of the earth? 106 The slowness and inability of our body forced us to resort to the help of a horse; bodily nakedness prompted us to employ the services of sheep, which annually provide wool for the preparation of our clothes; the need to transport vital supplies from foreign countries harnessed pack animals; The impossibility, like other animals, of eating grass turned the labor of the ox, which we use for arable farming, to our advantage. Likewise, many other needs prompted man to actually extend his power over the entire earthly world. “We don’t have horns or sharp claws, but we have at our disposal iron, which is stronger than horns and more piercing than claws, and - what is especially important - it, not being an integral part of our body, does not disfigure its appearance, does not serve as a permanent burden for it, but having provided a temporary service, is then left on its own. Nature did not give us crocodile scales, but in necessary cases this weapon is at our service: a warrior covers himself with it in a fight, and when the need has passed, he takes it off again and thus frees his body from unnecessary weight. We do not have wings like birds, but we have the art of archery, which surpasses the speed of birds and completely subjects them to our power. 107 Thus, not one of the visible advantages that nature has endowed with animals seems to be something unattainable for man: reason and art subordinate the entire earthly world to his power and turn into his service all those wonderful properties of this world that the nature of man himself lacks. The absence of natural weapons and coverings, with the constant opportunity to use them by borrowing from outside, is not a disadvantage, but rather the highest dignity of the human body, which, being free from unnecessary burdens, can be completely devoted to serving the highest side of the human being - the soul. The body is an instrument of the soul, this is its main purpose, and its structure, as well as possible, is expediently adapted to this high service. The very figure of man, his straight waist, his face turned to the sky, reveal his royal greatness and superiority over all other creatures of the earth, bowing down and as if expressing their submission to the power that has risen above them. 108 The straight position of the body is also extremely important in the sense that in order to maintain our body in balance, the support that the legs form is completely sufficient, whereas in animals inclined downward, the front members corresponding to our hands have the same duty. This feature in the structure of the human body constitutes one of its outstanding advantages, which to a certain extent determines the possibility of discovering the highest gift of our nature - the gift of speech. Through the hands, which remain free from the service of the body performed by the legs, we are able to express our word in writing, so to speak, to conduct a silent conversation. On the other hand, the meaning of hands is also important for the word spoken by voice. At least, such a structure of the organs of our speech, which is necessary for the pronunciation of articulate sounds, is possible only under the condition that all vital needs are satisfied with the help of the hands, and the mouth, lips, tongue and in general all the members involved in the formation of sound are completely free to serve the word. If a person were deprived of arms, and therefore had to look for and take food directly with his mouth, then all his vocal organs would necessarily have the same structure as in four-legged animals: the face would be elongated and thinner towards the nostrils; at the mouth, calloused, hard and thick lips would protrude forward; a tongue would be inserted between the teeth, different from the present one, fleshy, elastic and hard, helping the teeth, or moist and soft at the edges, like in dogs and other raw-eating animals, rotating in the crotches of the sharp row of teeth. It goes without saying that with such a structure of these organs, a person could not possibly form an articulate sound; he should either bleat, or moo, or bark, or neigh, or bray like oxen and donkeys, or make some kind of brutal roar. And now that our body has been given hands, the structure of the mouth, lips and tongue is completely adapted to the need for speech. “Hands, therefore, turn out to be a necessary accessory of a verbal being; The Creator invented them for the convenience of the word.” 109 Likewise, in all its other parts and organs, the human body is an extremely wisely and purposefully constructed vessel of the soul, which at the same time reveals the superiority of man over all other creatures of the earth. That is why the wise David, after a thorough examination of himself, said: Your mind was amazed at me (Ps. 139:6): “From the art manifested in me, that is, from the wisdom with which my body is structured, I came to know the great Creator.” 110 – Such is a person according to that side of his being on which he stands in closest relation to the earthly, material world: his outstanding position here makes itself felt too clearly. III. Soul of man. Its substantiality and spirituality. Its difference from other spiritual beings - God and angels. The main greatness of a person is not in the body, but in the highest side of his being - in the soul, which immeasurably elevates him above the visible world and directly relates him to God Himself. “I know two people,” notes St. Gregory, “one visible, the other hidden under the visible, invisible, internal. So, we have an inner man and in some way are twofold. But to tell the truth, we are only inside; for I am made up only of the inner man; the external is not me, but mine; for I am not a hand, but that which thinks in the soul (το λογιϰόν της ψυχής); and the hand is a part of man, so that the body is an instrument of man, an instrument of the soul, while man is actually the soul itself.” 111 By his true, specific nature, man is above the visible world and cannot be compared with it; he belongs entirely to the spiritual, god-like world, and only thanks to this is he capable of fulfilling his world purpose and achieving the highest goals of his own existence. That in the visible, material body of a person a special, invisible and immaterial essence, or soul, lives and acts, different from it, is a truth that no one with common sense can doubt. However, in view of the dominance of materialistic views, if not in the Christian, then in the pagan-philosophical consciousness, St. Gregory makes an attempt to rationally substantiate the idea of ​​the substantiality and immateriality of the soul. He follows the usual method of proof among the Church Fathers (St. Basil V. and especially Augustine); from external, observable actions and manifestations of the soul, he draws a conclusion about its existence and difference from the body. Just as we are unshakably convinced of the existence of God, although it is not subject to sensory perception, on the basis of divine actions in the visible universe, so we are forced to recognize the existence of the immaterial soul on the basis of its discoveries in the material body. Both of these truths, in relation to the method of their knowledge, represent a complete analogy, and where one is denied, the other must be denied with the same right and on the same grounds. But the truth of the existence of God is so firm and undeniable that only a madman, according to the word of the prophet, can say: “There is no God” (Ps. 13:1). 113 The entire universe, “by the miracles performed in it,” irresistibly testifies to the existence of its Supreme Organizer and Manager. The world's elements, with all the diversity and opposition of their basic properties, are united by ineffable wisdom into one harmonious, harmonious whole, aimed at achieving one common goal, each bringing from itself a certain force to support the whole. Based on the visible rational and purposeful structure of the universe, we thus clearly learn that the artistic and wise power of God, revealed in beings and penetrating everything, brings the parts into harmony with the whole, and completes the whole in the parts. 114 – But just as in the great world (macrocosm), contemplation of the visible leads our thought to the necessary recognition of “He who wisely holds the universe in his hand”; - so in the small world (microcosm), man, there is quite a bit of data - from the visible we can infer about the hidden. 115 The possible measure of the functions of the body, compared with the actual measure of human actions, forces an impartial observer to recognize the substantial soul. And first of all, the very life and activity of a living being already gives evidence that there is in him an immaterial and disembodied soul, acting and moving in accordance with its nature, and detecting its characteristic movements with bodily organs. The organic structure of the body remains in the same form among the dead, but their body is motionless and inactive, due to the absence of an animating principle in it. It moves only when there is sensitivity in the organs (αισϑησις) and through it the mental force (η νοητή δόναμις) acts, which, with its own aspirations, moves the sensory organs as it pleases. 116 By themselves, these latter are nothing more than dead matter, completely incapable of producing those actions and functions that are actually accomplished through them. For a clear explanation of this thought, St. Gregory takes the doctor diagnosing the disease. By placing his fingers on the pulse and feeling it, the doctor, using the sense of touch, conducts, so to speak, a silent conversation with the painful organism, from which he learns the origin and intensification of the disease. In the same way, the sense of vision, by the pale and bilious complexion, by the sad appearance of the eyes and the emaciation of the whole body, guesses the course and degree of strength of the disease. So, finally, other senses - hearing and smell - provide significant assistance to a person knowledgeable in medicine in recognizing painful conditions. The external senses themselves would never have given such knowledge if they had not been guided by a higher power, acting in them and through them, but not identical with them. The process of thinking that follows sensory perception and, based on external discoveries, determines the internal cause that produces them, irresistibly testifies to the presence in a person of a higher, spiritually rational principle. In fact, what would a hand touching the pulse teach a doctor if thought (εννοια) did not lead the sense of touch to the knowledge of the basis hidden under the visible phenomenon? How could the rest of the sensory organs contribute to the knowledge of an unknown cause if they acted only on their own, separately from thinking (διανοιας διεξευγμενα)? Such and similar observations of what happens in us physically lead to the necessary recognition of our rational essence hidden in nature. “But isn’t this rational essence only the result of a certain correlation between the mechanical and physical forces of nature, “just as something similar is produced by the builders of machines, who imitate nature in an artificially arranged substance, not showing similarity in appearance alone, but on the contrary, it consists in movement and is even imitated by some words, when the machine makes sounds in its vocal part?” 119 This is how materialists of all times really objected to the doctrine of the substantiality and spirituality of the soul. To build, for example, a machine that produces sound, you need to first notice and study the reasons for the origin of sound - the conditions required for its artificial reproduction, and on the basis of these data build a mental plan, according to which you must then select suitable material and arrange it into a whole mechanism. Each machine, therefore, is the fruit of the action of a special intelligent force, standing above matter and dominating it: matter itself will never turn into a work of art, it is only capable of visibly embodying an invisible thought. 120 From the refutation of the materialist objection, the conclusion necessarily follows about the substantiality of the human soul and its difference from the body, and from this last position the path opens to the definition of the soul’s own essence. And above all, the recognition of a substantial opposition to the body introduces negative traits into the idea of ​​the soul. The soul is something immaterial, invisible, not subject to sensory perception; it does not have any of those qualities that characterize matter: “neither color, nor shape, nor elasticity, nor gravity, nor quantity, nor extension in three dimensions, nor local position, nor anything at all seen in substances.” 121 But by excluding from the concept of the soul all the properties of sensory materiality, we are not in danger of resolving this concept into an empty, contentless abstract, equal to pure nothingness for our thought. The very negation of the opposite results in something positive to the definition of the soul by its very essence (ϰαταυτήν την ουσίαν). That in addition to sensory existence there is another, opposite region of supersensible existence - this, as we have seen, cannot be disputed by anyone who recognizes the existence of God. If there is a God who is alien to all materiality, then there is no reason to deny the existence of the human soul, devoid of all corporeality. 122 So, the human soul, despite the denial of all signs of materiality, must be recognized as a purely spiritual essence, with all the positive properties that characterize this area of ​​​​being. In the sphere of spiritual, supersensible existence, Revelation distinguishes two natures - the nature of the highest, infinite Spirit - God and the nature of created, limited spirits - angels. In what relation to one and the other should the human soul be imagined and with what positive features, therefore, should it be thought of? – As for the relationship of our soul to God, St. Scripture defines it in two ways. On the one hand, it teaches that the human soul is created in the image of God and reflects in itself the properties of the Prototype, therefore it stands in the closest relation to it. On the other hand, as a created and limited entity, it is infinitely distant from God and has no genetic relationship with Him. Clarifying the relationship of man's spiritual nature to God from this latter side, St. Gregory of Nyssa resolutely denies a substantial connection between them. To attribute to our soul an essential identity with God, in his opinion, would be extreme wickedness. 123 The human soul, similar to God in many of its properties, is by no means identical with Him in essence. If the image were in everything without distinction similar to the prototype, then it would cease to be an image, but would completely merge with the very object of which it represents the likeness. The relationship between the image and the prototype certainly presupposes a more or less significant difference between them. “The Gospel calls the features of Caesar on copper an image (ειϰονα), since in appearance the image is like Caesar, but in reality there is a very significant difference between the image and the likeness.” 124 So our soul, reflecting in itself the features “which distinguish the uncreated nature of the Prototype, according to the peculiarity of nature (ϰατά την φυσεως ιδιότητα) is something different from Him.” 125 “Just as often in a small fragment of glass, when it happens to lie under the sun’s ray, we see the whole circle of the sun, appearing in it not in its own size, but in the volume of the circle that the smallness of the fragment contains, so in the smallness of our nature images of the inexpressible properties of the Divine shine (ούτως έν τή βραχύτητι τής ημετερας φυσεως των άφράστων εϰείνων τής ϑεότητος ιδιωμάτων αί ειϰόνες έϰλάμπουσιν" 126 According to the direct meaning of the comparisons just given, any essential connection between God and man is denied and only an external relationship of resemblance or likeness is affirmed, as a portrait representing a faithful copy of a living person does not have. However, with this latter there is no material identity, and man, reflecting the features of the Divine in his spiritual nature, has nothing of the very essence of the Divine in himself. God imprinted his image on the human soul, but He Himself remained outside it, without conveying anything of His essence to it. Gregory distinguishes (in the above passages), on the one hand, the property or peculiarity of the divine nature (φυσεως ιδιότητα), on the other, the properties of the Divine (ϑεότητος ιδιώματα), and asserts that in the first respect our soul is significantly different (άλλο τι) from God, in the second - she is completely similar to Him. As a spiritually intelligent, incorporeal, intelligible essence, representing the image of an intelligible essence ουσίας έστίν είκων), 127 - she is in everything (διά πάντων πάντως) similar to the Prototype. But in its origin, as well as in the form or mode of its being, it is immeasurably distant from God, as the finite creature is from the Infinite Creator. And this difference is of such a kind that it must be thought of as a difference of natures, since the very first cause of being separates man from the Divine being, since God is not created, has no beginning, is the cause of himself, is eternal and infinite, while the human soul is created, finite and changeable. 128 More clearly about the similarities and differences between our soul and the Divinity of St. Gregory expresses himself in chapter 16. essays “About the device. people,” where he asserts that man is like God in that “what is equally seen in both divine and human nature (τά επιϑεωρούμενα τη ϑεία φύσει ϰαί τη ανϑρώπινη) is different from Him in the very basis of being (εѵ τω ύποϰειμενφ).” Just as in material objects we distinguish external properties from the internal basis, or their carrier (substrate), so in spiritual beings we should distinguish the properties or attributes of the spiritual essence from this essence itself, as their owner and bearer. From this point of view, drawing a comparison between God and man, St. Gregory recognizes the similarity between them in the first respect (in properties) and the fundamental difference in the second (in essence). Thus, there is a fairly clear and definite line between the Divine being and the essence of the human soul. But in the world of spiritual beings, as we noted above, there is also an angelic nature. In what relation did St. Gregory the human soul to this last? The substantial difference that he affirmed between God and man, as Creator and creature, certainly could not take place here, since angels are the same creation of God as man. Intelligible, incorporeal, spiritually intelligent, but at the same time finite, limited and by nature subject to change, 129 - on all these sides they share the basic properties of the human soul and, like the latter, are immeasurably distant from the essence of God. In reality, the only difference between angels and people is that the former are pure, heavenly spirits, while the latter are spirits clothed with material flesh and living on earth. From here follows, then, a very important moral difference between the inhabitants of heaven and the inhabitants of the earth: the former, as immaterial spirits, are in the closest relationship to God, stand in direct communication with the Source of life and, due to such proximity, are forever freed from the danger of spiritual death, that is, from all sinful defilement; 130 whereas people “who have received as their inheritance a kind of sludge of dirt,” earthly life, are subject to various passions, temptations and falls. If this difference in the strength as it exists now cannot be recognized as initial, established at creation, but only later acquired by the creatures themselves, some of whom (angels) remained faithful to their highest purpose and strengthened in goodness to the point of being unable to sin, others (people) underwent the Fall with all its sad consequences; then, in any case, the difference between angels, as pure spirits, and people, as spirits clothed with earthly flesh, must be recognized from the beginning as given by the Creator Himself. 131 However, this seemingly insignificant difference, being recognized as originally given by the Creator Himself, becomes very significant. Man, according to the fundamental concept of him, is a dual being, consisting of two natures, while an angel is a pure spirit. The race of people is a special race of spiritually intelligent beings who have never been angels and will never be angels. The soul was created for life in the body - and this sign is one of the essential for it, although not so much that on the basis of it one can assume the substantial identity of the spiritual and physical nature of man. The soul, as an independent entity, can be separated from the body and live an incorporeal life (from death to general resurrection). IV. Determination of the essential properties of the human soul from the concept of it as the image of God. – The embodiment of the pure image of God in an innocent (ideal) soul. – Particular properties of godlikeness. - Analogies of St. Trinity in the human soul and their meaning. 133 Incomprehensible in essence, God is accessible, however, to our knowledge according to his properties. The same method of knowledge is completely applicable to the human soul - and from this side we can form a fairly accurate and clear idea about it. When determining the essential properties of our soul, St. Gregory of Nyssa leaves the concept of her as the image of God. Not through empirical means, but through experience and observation of the manifestations of mental life, he wants to acquire true knowledge of the properties of our soul, but through a purely rational way, by considering the properties of the divine nature reflected in the depths of our spiritual being. Observation acquaints us with the facts of present reality, but it does not provide a guiding principle by which we could, in the multitude of mental forces and abilities, separate those that belong to the very essence of the soul, constitute its original, necessary and inalienable property, from its accidental, conditional and temporary complications. It is possible to know the properties that determine the true essence of the soul only through comparing it with the highest Prototype, the likeness of which it represents. Against this last position, expressed so categorically, St. Gregory saw the objection from the point of view of the present, empirical state of the human soul. 135 In our present soul one can find quite a few properties that have no analogy in the Divine. All mental movements and emotions, passions and affects, desires and aspirations, and finally, the entire sum of abilities and forces directed towards the earthly world and having a mixed, spiritual-sensual character - all these are necessary accessories of our mental life, and yet in the life of the Divine Spirit they have nothing like them. 136 Thus, for someone who compares our nature with God and wants to strictly maintain the concept of similarity between them, the dilemma seems inevitable: “either recognize the Divine nature as passionate, or the human nature as impassive.” 137 But neither one nor the other, obviously, can be allowed. – How then can we justify the truth of the biblical teaching that man is the image and likeness of God? – St. Gregory finds a way out of the difficult dilemma in a strict distinction between the real, empirical state of man and the ideal state, which fully corresponds to the plan and intention of the Creator - between what a person is and what he should be in theory. “There is a great distance between what is mentally imagined according to the prototype and what is created according to the image (πολύ γάρ το μέσον έστί, τού τε ϰατά τό νοουμενου, ϰαί τού ϰατ’έιϰονα γεγενημένου.” 138 Man, according to the divine idea of him, is not at all what man in real reality represents in himself as a pure, unalloyed image of the Divine, alien. all sorts of qualities unusual for the being of God; the latter, in addition to the traits of God-likeness, has in his nature many such properties that he has in common with lower, dumb animals. That the ideal state of a person should be conceivably completely different from the actual, empirical one - this is for St. Gregory is the truth beyond doubt. It follows with logical necessity both from the concept of God the Creator and from the concept of the purpose and purpose of man. God, in essence, is the highest good, or - better said - the fullness of all goods. The goodness of God was the only motivation for the creation of the world and, in particular, man. “And if so, then it is clear that in bringing man from non-existence into being (έϰ τού μη οντος εις γένεσιν), God could not reveal His goodness in relation to him only half, giving something of what was characteristic of Himself and being stingy in the message of another. On the contrary, the perfection of divine goodness lies in the fact that it makes a person the owner of all goods. And since the detailed list of these benefits is large and it is inconvenient to designate them by number, the Word of God noted only their entirety, saying that man was created in the image of God. For this also means what to say: (God) made human nature partaker of every good; because if the Divinity is the fullness of good, and man is His image, then this means that the image is similar to the prototype, that it is full of all good.” 139 There is no place here for any shortcomings, for anything contrary to the goodness of God. The concept of the perfection of the primitive nature of man, which is only possible for a created being, is thus a necessary consequence of the correct concept of the All-Good Creator. – Then paying attention to the purpose of man’s creation, it is easy to determine the most specific features of the perfections of his spiritual nature. “If a person comes into being in order to become a partaker of divine blessings, then of necessity he is constructed in such a way that he is capable of participating in these blessings.” 140 “Like an eye,” says St. – With what particular properties should we think of the soul of an ideal, primordial person, and what features, therefore, should be considered the most essential in our present soul? God, according to the teachings of St. Scripture is mind and word (νοῦς καί λόγος). And in the nature of the human soul, these are the most basic properties that determine its entire ideal, godlike being. 143 Thus, in comparison with other rational creatures (angels), man receives his definition by a distinctive feature - corporeality (η ενσώματος φύσις); 144 so on the contrary, in comparison with the sensory world, the specific nature of man should be defined as the mind (νους), expressed in words. 145 This is the highest, “sovereign” (ήγεμουιϰόν), as St. often calls it. Gregory, - the side of our soul, or - better to say - this is the only soul in its own and true sense, as the only God-like principle in us; nevertheless, other parts or forces, now distinguished in our soul, do not belong to its original essence, and if in ordinary language they are called soul, then only in a figurative sense, due to the imprecision of word usage. 146 The soul, by the very idea of ​​it, as a purely spiritual essence (πνεύμα), is only reason. Analyzing the concept of mind (νους), we can distinguish the following particular features in it. Simple and uncomplicated (απλους ϰαι ασυνϑετος) 147 in nature, and in this property quite similar to the Prototype, the mind has, however, various detections or movements (ϰινήσεις). The most important of these movements is thinking, as a general process, and thought, as its particular product (διανοια ѵоδ ϰίνησίς εστι ϰαι ένέργεια). 148 This is a theoretical, cognitive activity of the mind, which can have either an intuitive, contemplative, or a discursive, rational character, depending on the nature of the object to the knowledge of which it is directed (τό ϑεωρητιϰόν τε ϰαί διαϰριτιϰόν ίδιον έστι του ϑεοειδούς της φυχης). 149 Since the first and highest object to which this activity of the mind must constantly be directed is God, true knowledge of Whom is achieved through contemplation, then the direct, intuitive method of knowledge should be placed incomparably higher than the rational-logical one. If sin had not separated us from God, our minds would only know in this way. – Cognition represents one side in the life of our mind. The other, which already has its basis in it, is the active-practical ability or will. Will is the result of the action of thought, and therefore of the mind (... 150 St. Gregory does not give more detailed explanations regarding the relationship between the thinking and leading abilities of our spirit, but nevertheless he strongly recognizes the closest connection and dependence between them, due to the unity of their source. The mind, in his opinion, completely determines the spiritual life of a person, both from its theoretical and practical sides. 151 Its first and immediate movement is thought, which in turn has two essential properties: cognition and activity (διανοιά - έστι - νοερά ϰαί ποιητιϰή δυναμίς). 152 So, the soul of a primordial, innocent person, representing the exact embodiment of the divine idea of ​​​​it, St. Gregory depicts it as a pure spirit or mind, capable of cognizing God and actively participating in the assimilation of divine benefits. Calling man to participate in his benefits, God created him not only capable of this, but also put natural inclinations into his nature, or - as St. Gregory - “reasons” (τάς αφορμας) 153 of all these benefits, and through this gave a certain direction to his aspirations. “We have been given the idea of ​​everything beautiful, every virtue and wisdom, everything that is best imaginable.” 154 These natural gifts, according to the Creator’s plan, were supposed to arouse in the human soul an attraction to the divine, in which their ideal is located. “For this reason, man is adorned with life, and with words, and with wisdom, and with all the divine blessings, so that, because of each of these gifts, he may have a desire for what is characteristic of him (προς το οιϰειον την έπιϑυμίαν έχοι).” 155 In order to fulfill his purpose and not deviate from his calling, a person could only follow the urges of his spiritual nature and develop natural, God-given powers - but develop without at all interrupting communication with the Primary Source of all good things - God. Only under this last condition could the true life of the human spirit be preserved. For just as earthly bodies, for their maintenance and development, have a need for material food, which by its influx imparts to them some vital force, so spiritual life, through which nature is maintained in its being, has its vital source in communion with the truly existing, always abiding and eternally unchanging. 156 God gave life to the human spirit, but allowed the strength for its maintenance and development to be drawn from Himself, - He gave reason, - this royal ability, - but again under the condition that it constantly gravitates towards the highest Reason and in the contemplation of His being finds true satisfaction of its nature - He gave wisdom and virtue, but the basis and source of all wisdom is in God, and all virtue is in imitation of Him. Thus, in the spiritual nature of man, the possession of God-like benefits is made dependent on communication with God and constant striving for Him. Only a continuous influx of life-giving forces from the Primary Source Himself could preserve these benefits in us and give them further development. The attraction to the Prototype, as a condition for preserving the pure divine image in us, although it was intended in the very structure of our ideal nature, could not, however, be a matter of physical necessity. While endowing human nature with various gifts, God could not deprive it of the best and most precious thing - the gift of freedom. “If some kind of necessity prevailed over human life, then from this side the image would become incorrect, due to such dissimilarity it would become far from the prototype. For nature, subordinated and enslaved to any necessities, could it be called the image of a royal Being? By virtue of being likened to the Divine in everything, man should, without a doubt, have in his nature autocracy and non-enslavement, so that the participation of goods would be the reward of virtue.” 157 “Some inanimate and dumb,” notes St. Gregory is in another place - you can lead to anything by someone else’s will; a verbal and rational being, if it ceased to act freely, lost at the same time the gift of rationality.” Gregory - following the example of other Christian teachers - makes a distinction between the concepts of image (ειϰων) and likeness (δμοιωσις) of God in man. By the first he means what was given by God at creation itself, the natural heritage of the human spirit, by the second - the preservation and correct use of God-given powers conditioned by the free initiative of man. 159 The image of God is placed in us as a basis or form, which we ourselves must fill with appropriate content. – By the power of such a comparison and differentiation of concepts, of which one defines the spiritual nature of man from the ontological side, and the other from its moral side, free will is of the same importance for the life of our spirit as reason is for his very being. These are two fundamental properties of the soul, equally important and necessary in achieving the highest goal of human existence. In reason, man received a natural organ for the perception of the divine, in free will - a force that autocratically directs this organ in one direction or another. In the absence of reason, a person would be deprived of the physical ability to communicate with God; without free will, he would not have the ethical ability to do so. Only the mutual, harmonious combination of these two forces makes him fully capable of partaking of divine blessings. And so the human spirit (πνεύμα) is, on the one hand, rationality expressed in words (λογιϰόν, νοερον), on the other, unlimited self-power (αυτξόυσιον). 160 The result of the correct interaction of these faculties is every virtue and its corresponding measure of bliss. 161 They elevate man above all creatures of the visible world and give him royal power on earth - a true likeness of the power of the King of the universe. 162 Augustine found its most brilliant application in an attempt to give a rational explanation of the dogma of St. Trinity. Like any beginning, the judgments of St. Gregory is no stranger to significant shortcomings in this direction. He finds the analogy of the Divine Trinity primarily in the distinction between soul, word and spirit (mind). The soul (ή ψυχή), as a common basis, as a bearer of private mental powers and abilities, in relation to these latter can be called “unborn and guiltless” (αγέννητος ϰαί αναιτιος) as independent of them in its origin and being. From this side, she represents the image of God the Father, Who is also characterized by the attributes of unbornness and absolute independence from any cause. The mental word (ονοεροςλογος - a word that has not yet been expressed in sound) no longer has the sign of unbornness; it is born from the soul ineffably, incomprehensibly, invisible and dispassionately ϰαι άορατως, ϰαί άνερμηνεύτως ϰαί απαϑώς); - and in this property represents the true likeness of the birth of the Son, or the eternal Word of God from the Father. 166 – “So in the unity of the being of our immortal and rational soul, as in an image, three hypostatic properties are revealed - the unbornness (αγεννησια) of the soul, the birth (γεννηαις) of the word and the procession (εϰπορευσις) of the spirit... so that - if I may put it this way - in in a person, especially a righteous person, the whole fullness of the Divine lives figuratively (τυπιϰως), but not physically (φυσιϰως), because the Triune God appears in him only as if in vague outlines (σϰιαγραφων αμυδρως).” 167 In the field of the same psychological concepts on the basis of which Bp. Nyssa has now made the indicated conclusion; he finds another analogy of the Holy Trinity. The sequence that is noticed in the discovery and gradual development of mental abilities as a person grows physically, in his opinion, is fully consistent with the gradual revelation of Divine Persons in the history of mankind. The presence of the soul with its basic properties - word and reason - is, of course, beyond doubt even in a newborn baby. However, at first the word and reason are not revealed at all, but exist only in possibility (δυνομει); and only after a more or less significant time, with the growth and strengthening of the bodily organism, the word seems to be born for the first time - and not immediately in the form of perfect, articulate speech, but first in the form of unclear babble, which later turns into speech, quite distinct. Even later than the word, the mind is revealed, the perfect activity of which is revealed already after a person reaches mature, manly age. – The history of the revelations of the Trinity God to the human world presents us with exactly the same process of development. The act of the Fall deprived man of the light of knowledge of God and made him like a baby imprisoned in his mother’s womb and unable to see the light of the sun. The first enlightenment was given to the fallen man by the law of Moses, which imparted to him the concept only of God the Father; The Son and the Holy Spirit, although They are one with the Father in essence, were, however, still hidden for man under the law. It was not safe to reveal to an infant man at once the entire lofty truth of the Trinity, because - with a weak mind - he could easily imagine polytheism here. The law was followed by prophecies, which with unclear instructions somewhat lifted the veil from the mystery of the Divine Sonship. No matter how you look at the above analogies, they cannot be given much importance. They are based on purely external signs of similarity that do not express the true relationships between the facts to be compared. That the mutual relations between the Persons of the Holy Trinity in reality have nothing essentially similar to the relations of the various faculties in our soul - that in divine activity such a distinction of moments cannot be allowed as occurs in human activity - this hardly needs to be said. It is true that St. Gregory, apparently, was far from the idea of ​​looking at his analogies as evidence of a complete and essential correspondence between our soul and God. According to his consciousness, our thoughts about God are always lower than their subject, and those features that in our soul represent the imprint of the divine image are only weak similarities of the highest properties of the Divine Being. But behind all that, he attached more importance to the exposed rapprochements than how much they actually have. Gregory wants to see in his analogies an expression of real correspondence, on the actual basis of the resting affinity of our soul with God, and not a simple and purely accidental coincidence, which occurs between phenomena that have no relation to each other and do not stand in any connection with each other. It is completely clear from this why he considers our self-knowledge to be the best method of knowing God, and vice versa - true knowledge of our spiritual nature makes it closely dependent on the correct concept of the nature of the divine. “Learn from what is within you to know the hidden God; learn from the Trinity that exists in you to cognize the Divine Trinity; This (internal) testimony is much stronger and more certain than that which is borrowed from the law and Scripture.” 169 If between the spiritual life of man and the life of the highest Divine Spirit there really existed such an exact, causal relationship as the bishop assumes. Nyssky, then the conclusion from the phenomena of one of them to the phenomena of the other would have an undeniable power of persuasiveness. Knowledge of the properties and manifestations of our own inner life would give us a clear and correct idea of ​​similar facts in the divine life. However, in fact, it is difficult to attach such serious significance to those external analogies that we saw in St. Gregory; and in general the idea of ​​the actual relationship of our soul with God in such particular features as those indicated by St. father, one cannot help but call it exaggerated. And first of all, what prevents us from accepting this thought in all its rigor is the consideration that our soul has its own special conditions of life, significantly different from the life of the Divine Spirit, and its own special tasks and goals of existence, which completely determine both its structure and a certain amount and correlation of its abilities and strengths. Moreover, to see in each mental ability, and even more so in the very combination and discovery of them, a reflection of the actual properties of divine life, obviously there are no sufficient grounds and motivations. Even if there may be coincidences here, they are not of a significant nature, but only of a random nature, because they are not based on a necessary causal connection. – This is indeed the nature of all the above-considered analogies of St. Gregory. The very artificiality of their construction indicates the absence of a significant relationship between the phenomena subject to rapprochement. That in the manner of the origin of our word and mind from the soul there is in fact no true similarity with the birth of the Son of God or the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father is quite obvious, since the very concepts of “birth” (γεννησς) and “procession” (εϰπορευσις) in application to the acts of our mental life have only a figurative, improper and inaccurate meaning. Immediate reality in itself would never have given a reason to designate these acts with such concepts, if the desire to find in them similarities with the phenomena of Divine life did not prompt this. Is it possible, for example, on the basis of experience and introspection, to form an idea of ​​the origin of our spirit or mind (εϰποπεοσίς πνέυματος, ήγουν τού νοος) from the soul? 170 and what is the soul itself, taken separately and independently of the mind and all other powers? It is clear that the thought of St. Father moves here in the area of ​​abstract-logical, and not real, factual relations, and the previously given features of the biblical teaching about St. The Trinity transfers to phenomena of a person’s mental life, which are not always well chosen. Thus, the meaning of the analogies of St. Gregory is actually not nearly as great as St. apparently assumed. a father who too broadened the concept of the image of God in man; but it is not as insignificant as some (Ritter) of the new bishop researchers think. Nyssa, who attach absolutely no value to these analogies and see in them only “a sign of the weakening of theological thought.” 171 Due to the lack of an internal, real connection between the phenomena being compared, they (analogies) lose interest for anthropology, but retain a certain significance for theology. They do not bring anything to the knowledge of the human soul, since they do not explain the real reasons and foundations of its structure, but in the matter of knowledge of God they give our mind very significant support. In fact, the mystery of the One God and at the same time the Trinity represents an insoluble riddle with which our thought would be difficult to reconcile if in the depths of our own being we did not find some, albeit weak, similarity to it. Only due to the fact that within ourselves we feel and recognize one spiritual principle, acting and revealing itself in various abilities and forces inseparable from it, do we somewhat understand the possibility of combining unity with trinity in the hidden life of the Divine. The conviction that there is no direct causal relationship between our mental phenomena and the processes of divine life, such as exists between a copy and an original, a type and a prototype, does not take away the significance of analogies, as long as they are looked at only from this formal-logical point of view. What is important here is recognition and conviction of the possibility of a fact that apparently contradicts the laws of logic - a recognition that calms and reconciles our thought. No matter how such a conviction is achieved, it makes no difference. Therefore, analogies borrowed from the physical world can have the same value here as psychological ones. 172 The whole advantage of these latter is only in their immediate proximity to our consciousness, and therefore in greater persuasiveness for our mind. V. Origenian influence in the above teaching of St. Gregory about the soul and its essential properties. The difficulties that arose for the bishop. Nyssa out of passion for Origenism. An attempt to reconcile these difficulties. If you now look at the general structure of Gregory’s teaching about the nature of the human soul in its innocent, ideal state, it is difficult not to notice the influence of Origen’s ideas. The features that Origen depicted the primordial world of spirits, St. Gregory transfers to the human soul and only in them sees the whole essence of this latter. Two main concepts determined the point of view of the Alexandrian teacher on the nature and properties of primordial spirits - the concept of the infinite goodness of the Creator and the concept of the purpose and purpose of the created spirit. As the creation of the All-Good God, the primitive spirit must be conceivable with all the perfections that are possible for a creature, 173 and as destined for communion and unity with God, it must have received a nature and structure that were fully consistent with such a designation. 174 Any imperfection, everything that does not stand in direct connection with the divine nature and does not have any justification for itself in it, Origen excluded from the idea of ​​the essence of primordial spirits. These were pure minds, all identical in nature, equal in perfection, 175 placed in close communion with God and alien to any contact with gross (earthly) matter. Only later, when some of the spirits cooled in their desire for God and deviated from Him towards evil and sin, did they become human souls, as we now observe them, clothed in earthly, material bodies and full of various kinds of imperfections. 176 – From the same principles, as we have seen, St. Gregory in characterizing the properties of the ideal human soul. And for him, as for Origen, the determining principles in this characterization were the concepts of the goodness of God and the purpose of man. Nothing other than a passion for the ideas of Origenism can explain the fact that the concept of the appointment of a person as a bishop. Nyssky’s acceptance here was somewhat one-sided and not entirely in agreement with the principles of cosmology he himself approved. Even more: not only the very essence of the soul, its strengths and abilities, but also their known location, combination and relationship, according to Bishop. Nyssa, bears the stamp of actual relationships of divine life. Due to the strength of such an idea of ​​the essence in the whole structure of the ideal soul, the entire set of mental properties and activities addressed to the sensory world was excluded from the definition of the primitive spiritual nature of man and was an insignificant complication that only later (as a result of sin) came to it. 177 However, the more elevated St. Gregory the dignity of the spiritual nature of man through its rapprochement with God, the more difficult it became to understand the connection of our soul with the body and to explain its transition from a god-like, ideal state to the present, empirical, as it turns out, significantly different from it. What in Origen flowed quite naturally and consistently from the general, unique principles of his system, then in Bishop. Nyssa was in disharmony with his other basic views, with his whole concept of man. Origen, who assumed the initial incorporeal existence of the soul, could easily define the human soul in its innocent state only as a pure, dispassionate mind, as a being wholly God-like and akin to God; but St. could not have done this with such convenience. Gregory, who recognized both the supersensible and the sensory elements as equally original and necessary for composing a complete man. If the soul of a person is not accidentally connected with the body, but according to the plan of the Creator Himself is destined for life in it, then it is obvious that the idea of ​​​​pure spirituality and its complete likeness to God turned out to be not entirely sufficient, too narrow. There was a need - in addition to god-like properties - to allow in it the equally primordial presence of lower, spiritual-sensual forces, which have no analogy for themselves in the divine nature, but nevertheless are completely inevitable for the purposes of earthly, bodily life. In view of this urgent demand of St. Gregory was faced with a dilemma: either to give up the strict Origenistic concept of the nature of the original soul in favor of a general church idea of ​​it, which, in addition to the god-like spirit or mind, introduced into its being the traits of a lower, sensory-animal character, as a necessary accessory of the human (as opposed to the divine and angelic) spiritual nature; or - change the church-biblical teaching and admit, together with Origen, that people were originally supersensible spirits (minds). The question, obviously, came down to a fundamental difference in views on the whole person and his history. The clash of Origenism with the firm teaching of the Church created for our St. Father faced too many difficulties, from which he could not get out without significant efforts and even contradictions. He did not want to completely sacrifice any of the opposing views in favor of the other; he wanted to reconcile and unite them in one common idea. – He made the first attempt of this kind in a peculiar doctrine about the creation of the first man. In the matter of the creation of man by God, St. the father distinguishes two separate moments: - the creation of an ideal man with the features of the purest, divine image and the creation of an empirical man with those properties of a sensual-animal character with which human nature is now. In St. Bishop's Scriptures Nyssa wants to find a basis for such a distinction. God created man, in the image of God create him (Gen. 1:27), - this is how the writer of everyday life notes the first creative act, presenting it as completely completed. Then he repeats the predicate (create) again, indicating a new object of creation: create them husband and wife. According to St. Gregory, in this last case we mean a completely special creative act, different from the first, since the division into sexes given in it has no relation to God, in whose image man was created by the first act: about Christ Jesus, says the apostle, there is neither male nor female (Gal. 3:28). “Thus, concludes St. This discrepancy between the idea and its implementation, this complication of the god-like nature, the properties of the sensual-animal character, was produced by the Creator in view of the Fall of man. “God, who knew everything before their existence (Dan. 13:42), as the prophecy says, taking into account, or - better said - foreseeing by the power of foreknowledge, towards which the movement of human arbitrariness through arbitrariness and autocracy will tend, invents for the image a distinction between male and female sex, which has nothing to do with the divine prototype, but is characteristic of dumb nature." 181 The divine foreknowledge of sin and the subsequent changes in the conditions of human life was thus the reason that the original, purely rational nature of man received from the Creator additions alien to the image of God, borrowed from the nature of animals. The sin, however, had not yet actually been committed when the change in nature caused by it followed. So, the first real person did not embody the image of God in its pure, unalloyed form. However, the divine idea about man could not remain without implementation. Sin could change the original creative plan, but not at all cancel it, since otherwise the human will would be more powerful than the divine will. And St. Scripture, indeed, affirms that God carried out his ideal plan completely, in all its contents. “Let us create man in our image and likeness,” such was the divine plan before the beginning of the creation of man: “And God created man, in the image of God created him” (Gen. 1:26, 27)—this is the actual fulfillment of this ideal plan. Where did the pure image of God find its embodiment, in whom was the true divine idea realized? God embodied it, answers St. Gregory, not in an individual, real person, but only in the whole totality of the human race. As the property of the ideal man, the image of God turned out to be superior to its private carriers, none of whom could contain it in all its purity and breadth. 189 In fact, the pure image of God was for the first time imprinted in Adam, since he was the representative and bearer of the entire human race, therefore, it was imprinted not as his personal property, but as the highest universal gift, which a private, empirical person could not contain in all its purity and completeness. The distinction between two moments in the creation of man gave the bishop. Nyssky has some means of combining the Origenistic idea of ​​the primitive state of man with church teaching about it. With the first wave of creative omnipotence, the pure idea of ​​man as a completely God-like being was realized, with the second, this idea was complicated by the addition of lower properties; the combined result of both acts was the first real man, whose nature represents a combination of higher, god-like elements with lower, animal ones. In the spirit of Origenism, St. Gregory firmly supports the idea of ​​the difference between the ideal man and the primordial Adam, in whom he does not see the embodiment of a pure divine idea. Here he significantly diverges from the church view, according to which innocent Adam is the complete and pure realization of God’s idea of ​​man. But arguing, on the other hand, that the ideal state for individual people was not valid, Bp. Nyssa no less strongly deviates from Origen with his teaching about the primordial world of pure spirits, which included people. This is a deviation from Origenism towards church teaching - of such a kind that it changes the whole view of human history. What for Origen seemed like a historical period, experienced by each of us in the past, for Bishop. Nyssa was only a potential state, never before realized for private people. If Origen taught that all human souls, created in the image of God, initially belonged to the world of pure spirits, and then, as they fell into sin, they received a nature of a lower order with an admixture of sensory-animal properties, then St. Gregory, in the sense of the church-biblical concept, argued on the contrary that from the hands of the Creator, only one first man came out and with exactly the same structure that we now find in ourselves. The change from ideal human nature to the current, empirical one, in his opinion, took place in the divine plan itself even before its actual implementation. - So he thought to eliminate the obvious contradiction between the Origenistic and church-biblical ideas, to reconcile and bring them closer through mutual concessions. VI. Characteristics of the ideal state of man: the method of propagation of the human race without the Fall; lack of material food and drink for innocent people; their denial of the gross material body. – A close transition to identifying the ideal person with angels. Having diverged from Origen in the above-mentioned respect, St. Gregory, however, remained in agreement with him in principle. He fully shared his opinion that the present state of man was preceded by another, essentially different from it. Let this last not find full realization in concrete reality; in any case, the question about it, about its characteristic properties and features arose for the bishop. Nyssa in full force. How, in fact, should one imagine the position and life of an innocent person? Which of the properties and functions of our present nature should be excluded from the concept of ideal nature? In resolving these issues for St. Gregory had great scope to be carried away by the ideas of Origen. The danger of contradicting church and biblical teaching could not particularly frighten him; from it he could find peace in the consciousness that he was interpreting only the potential, which did not leave the realm of the possible (and therefore not what the church had in mind) - the human condition. And, indeed, ep. 194 Now transferring a similar image of representation to man, St. Gregory had to admit that the same method of reproduction is possible for the human race, that is, the simultaneous creation of all people by God, as Origen claimed. Although not entirely clear, this opinion was actually expressed by Bishop Nyssa. “The Creator did not wait (ουϰ ανεμεινεν ίδείν),” he notes about the first creative act, “while the number of souls reached its fullness by the gradual increase of those born, but by the power of foreknowledge, immediately visualizing all human nature in its proper completeness, he honored it with a high and equal angelic lot (ισαγγέλλψ λήξει). since He foresaw that the free will of man would not follow the direct path to the beautiful and would therefore fall away from the angelic life, then, so that the number of human souls would not be reduced, losing the way in which the angels grew into multitudes, He prepares an appropriate for the fallen, bestial way of reproduction through mutual succession (τής έλλήλων διαδοχής)". 195 From these clear words it is easy to draw an unsaid conclusion. If the law of temporal succession and mutual dependence was introduced into the spread of the human race only in view of sin, then without sin all people would have been born at the same time - and, moreover, through divine creation, and not through successive birth from each other. “The ineffable and unknown (άρρητος ϰαι άνεπινο'ητος)” method of reproduction of angels, with which St. put it in parallel. Gregory, an innocent man, was just like that. The attraction to Origenism is clearly reflected in the further features that Bishop portrays. Nyssa's ideal state of man. The pre-sin life of man, in his opinion, should be conceivable as angelic in the further respect that it did not require material food and drink for its maintenance. In the biblical story about the food of our first parents in paradise, St. Gregory saw a pure allegory. "Listening to St. Scripture, I mean not only bodily food (βρωσιν) and carnal pleasure, but I also know some other food, similar to bodily food, the pleasure of which extends to one soul. Eat my bread, wisdom commands those who are hungry (Prov. 9:4), and the Lord pleases those who hunger for such food (Matthew 5:6) and says: if anyone thirsts, let him come to Me and drink (John 7:37). And the great Isaiah commands those who are able to understand the height of his (teaching): drink joy (Is. 25.6). There is also a prophetic threat to those worthy of punishment that they will be punished with famine: and this famine will not be from any lack of bread and water, but from deprivation of the word, for it is said: not the famine of bread, nor the thirst of water, but the famine of hearing the word of the Lord (Amos. 8:11).” 196 Thus, according to the testimony of the Word of God, there is a special spiritual food that supports the life of the soul. This food for an innocent person served as the only source of life. “Every tree of paradise,” the Creator commanded innocent people to eat its fruits (Gen. 2:16), does not need to be imagined as a material plant that produced material fruit. No, it was the fullness (every tree) of purely spiritual blessings that nourished the human spirit. 197 The ideal person had no need for any other sensual food. Like the angels, he lived entirely in contemplation of the divine and from here he drew strength both to continue his existence and to develop his activities. From such views to pure Origenism, with its idea of ​​​​the incorporeality of primitive people, there was only one step. With the denial of sexual difference and the method of reproduction of the human race based on it, with the denial of the urgent bodily need - the need for food and drink, the very concept of the body, if not completely disappeared, then became too refined. In any case, there was no possibility of attributing our present, sensory-material body to an innocent person. In his “word to those who mourn the dead” St. Gregory, indeed, depicts the pre-sin state of man as incorporeal, at least in comparison with the present, grossly corporeal and passionate. Those leather vestments with which our first parents were clothed after the fall (Gen. 3:22), in his opinion, symbolically mean our real flesh. “If we remained what we were at first,” says St. father, then of course there would be no need for this leather robe, since our likeness to the Divine would illuminate us. The divine image, which appeared in us at the beginning, was not a property having any outline or color, but in which divine beauty is seen, man was also adorned. 198 But when a person preferred material pleasure to spiritual joy, God, apparently, assisted him in this desire through leather clothing, which he clothed him with because of his inclination towards evil and along with which the properties of an irrational nature were mixed with man (της αλόγου υσεως;) ... This is what (i.e. our deviation towards evil) made the need for a body necessary for us " 199 Our present material body, with its sensual-animal needs and urges, therefore does not constitute the original property of man. As a pure likeness of the divine Prototype, man did not have this “flesh shell”. It is clear that in the current position of man, clothed with a gross material body, there is a significant abnormality, which cannot, of course, be allowed in his primitive, ideal state. If our body turns out to be not entirely expedient, then its origin as part of man did not lie in the ideal divine plan, but was a consequence of a violation of this plan, caused by the invasion of the world of evil. Initially given only to dumb animals, it was then transferred to the rational nature of man, when this latter darkened himself with the Fall and through this became unworthy of the incorporeal life, which in theory was more characteristic of him. The radical change produced by sin in the moral state of man necessarily caused a change in the structure of his nature. Sin destroyed the direct unity of man with God and introduced a division into the originally pure life of the human spirit, imbued with one desire for good. Inevitably, from here the original structure of man, completely adapted to the conditions of this life, had to change. Incorporeal nature turned out to no longer correspond to the new position into which fallen man had entered. The split in the aspirations of the human mind, the gravitation towards sensual pleasures instead of a direct direction towards spiritual benefits, required the same duality in the composition of human nature: the pure spirit had to receive a material body. Only under this condition was the harmony destroyed by sin restored again, although this new structure of man, caused by sin, was incomparably lower than the original one, in the divine idea of ​​what was given. - This is the way of thinking of St. Gregory, aimed at denying the body of innocent people. The idea of ​​the incorporeality (albeit relative) of an innocent person, expressed with such determination and so firmly substantiated, directly led to the last Origenistic conclusion - to the identification of ideal people with angels. Indeed, any real difference between them seemed to disappear. People, like angels, according to St. Gregory, were originally spirits alien to communication with gross matter. There is no visible difference in their spiritual nature. Both were equally endowed with the features of the divine image, and were called to the same goal of communicating with God and enjoying His benefits. If for a person the achievement of this goal was made dependent on his free will, then the angels did not immediately enter into full possession of divine goods, but had to acquire them gradually and freely with the possibility of losing them. If man fell, then Lucifer also fell, and he was not one of the least in the heavenly army. 205 Thus, in the idea of ​​an ideal person there is not a single feature by which one could clearly distinguish him from the angels. Apparently, there was nothing more natural than to draw from this the Origenian conclusion that all the first-created spirits were completely equal to each other, at first they formed one indivisible kingdom of the celestials, or that present-day people are only angels who fell to earth. In the works of Bishop There are several places in Nyssa that could perhaps give rise to the assumption that St. the father was not completely alien to such thoughts, especially if we consider places of this kind separately and not without some prejudice. Thus, in the explanation of the first words of the Lord's Prayer: Our Father, who art in heaven, St. Gregory notes: “it seems to me that the word of Scripture here has that deep meaning, that it reminds us from what fatherland we have fallen and what nobility we have lost (τής πατριδος ής έϰπεπτωϰαμεν, ϰαί τής εύγενειας ής άπεβλήϑημεν)". 206 Our original and true fatherland is in heaven; here on earth we are only strangers and strangers, like the prodigal son in the stream (Luke 1:5, 18), who have wandered into a distant country from the abodes of the Heavenly Father. Еще яснее ту же мысль выражает св. father in the parable of the lost sheep (Luke 15, Hence, they could rightfully express that the Fall separated man from the angels, that is, it diverted his spirit from true, heavenly blessings to temporary, earthly pleasures, while the angels remained faithful to their original high purpose. Of course, there is nothing similar to Origenism in this church view. Behind the indicated rapprochement, St. the fathers always believed a deep metaphysical division between the angelic world and the human world, as two different classes of spiritually intelligent beings, delimited by God Himself. – St. Gregory of Nyssa could have thought exactly the same way. At least, the above passages from his works are quite reconciled with such an explanation. VII. A turn from Origenism towards general church teaching. The body is a necessary component of a person, by the very idea of ​​it. The importance of the body in the development and life of the soul. – Reconciliation of apparent contradictions in the teaching of St. Gregory about the primitive nature of man. No matter how close St. came Gregory came to the extreme conclusion of Origen's anthropology, but he did not make it. While affirming the premises on which Origen's opinion rested, he did not accept the conclusion drawn from them by the Alexandrian teacher. Denying one after another all the particular differences between angels and people, he did not reach the general idea of ​​complete equality or perfect identity of both. 210 Even in those works where he argues, apparently, in the spirit of pure Origenism, he strictly distinguishes two kinds of beings in the world of spiritually intelligent creatures - angels, the inhabitants of heaven, and people, the inhabitants of the earth - and the reason for this difference is not in sin, like Origen, but in the all-wise and eternal plan of the Creator. 211 – There were deep reasons why St. Gregory could not accept Origen's opinion, no matter how close he came to him. He could not do this due to his fundamental views on the world and the world position of man - views that were purely ecclesiastical and just as far from Origen’s. While he considered man in himself, with his lofty goals and objectives, following Origen and exaggerating the importance of our spiritual nature to the detriment of our physical nature was possible and, perhaps, even natural. But as soon as he paid attention to the position and calling of man in the universe, Origen’s ideas no longer had a place, and the importance of the sensory element in human nature rose. The primordial world, as we know, consisted of St. Gregory is not one of the intelligent spirits akin to God. The region of existence, material and non-rational, opposite to the spirit, has the same independent and independent basis for its existence in the creative will of God. Spirit and matter are two primordial opposites, which man is called upon to unite into one harmonious whole. Such a calling necessarily required that a person unite both opposing elements in his being. The body, and specifically the earthly, sensual body, is a necessary component of his nature. 212 And from here, directly contrary to Origen’s view of man as a spirit fallen from heaven and embodied, he with all decisiveness affirmed the opposite position, that man is a being, by the very idea destined for life on earth, and therefore united with the earthly body by chance and subsequently, and essentially and according to the original plan of the Creator. If previously, under the influence of Origenism, St. Григорий склонен был смотреть на тело, как темницу души и источник нравственных ее несовершенств, то теперь он изменяет этот взгляд. Само по себе тело отнюдь не зло, и не в грехе лежит причина соединения его с духом человеческим. Оно – простое орудие духа, нравственно – безразличное по своей природе и способное одинаково склоняться как в добрую, так и в дурную сторону. Такое или иное направление телесным движениям дает уже сам дух, в распоряжении которого они находятся. Одному разуму, по божественному установлению, принадлежит владычество во всей природе человека , 215 – и это не только по отношению к теоретической, познавательной деятельности, но еще более – в отношении к деятельности нравственно–практической. From him all mental and physical forces are stimulated to action; it also determines the very nature and direction of their actions. Наделенный даром свободы, чуждый всякого принуждения и насилия, он является безусловно независимым распорядителем целой человеческой жизни. Before they become motives for activity, they must pass before the court of reason, which can treat them either affirmatively or negatively, or implement them or reject them. The last, decisive voice here belongs to reason; свобода выбора, ему присущая,ни в каком случае не нарушается. However, if we take a closer look at the actual nature of our free will, we can, it seems, strongly dispute what is asserted by St. about the father the idea of ​​the dominance of the mind over the body and even the balance between them. Let us assume that lower, carnal impulses cannot act forcibly, that in order to perform every action that has a moral character, the voluntary consent of the mind is necessary. But if we take into account that man is changeable (τρεπτος) by nature - (for such is the property of every being, which has no reason for being in itself and is created from nothing), 218 - that already in the very gift of freedom, regardless of any external incentives, lies for him the greatest danger of deviating from the true good, then what can we say about the position of the human will, when it is still affected by carnal desires that excite it to sin? Will she not lean towards these latter almost necessarily, although apparently not without her own consent? – St. Gregory calls such a thought wicked. “For the Creator would have been guilty of evil if He had placed in nature the necessary incentives for error.” 219 It is true that variability is a fundamental property of human free will, but this will was not from the very beginning placed in a completely indifferent attitude towards good and evil. If her bodily nature could partly incline towards the latter, then her spiritual nature was no less, perhaps even more, drawn towards the former. Good, even if it is not given to man as a ready-made and inalienable property of his being, in any case represents the closest and most natural object towards which all his desires should gravitate and all his activities should be directed. The God-like mind of man is so designed by the Creator that for him to strive for good means only to follow the inclinations of his nature. And as long as he remains faithful to these instincts, he has in them a sufficient counterbalance to all stimulation of sensuality and can completely dominate the flesh. True free will remains intact in him. “Only when the mind voluntarily gives up the reins of government and, like a charioteer tied to a chariot, drags behind it, do bodily movements take over and become destructive passions, and a person passes from a rational and godlike state into an unreasonable and dumb one.” 220 The reason for this perversion of the normal order obviously lies solely in reason itself; carnal movements are not at all to blame. They take only the power that the mind itself, without any coercion, cedes to them. But since, in addition to this calling characteristic of the human spirit, the whole person has another, no less essential one - to be a mediator between heaven and earth, connecting the material world with the spiritual, then the body is as necessary a part of his being as the spirit itself. Thus, there can be no talk about the advantages of an incorporeal state for a person. The limitation that the human spirit experiences from connection with the flesh has a basis in the eternal plan of the Creator, and therefore should be considered as a completely normal phenomenon and in accordance with the basic laws of development of the spirit itself. This is how it really is. In itself, it is dead and lifeless matter; only with the assistance of the spirit does it receive life and movement, becomes an organ of spiritual and moral actions, and through this acquires some participation in a higher, consciously intelligent life. The spirit is not as fundamentally dependent on the body as the latter is on it. He has life, knowledge and reason in himself, and he himself determines the beginning and direction of his activity. Nevertheless, due to the strength of his close connection with bodily nature, he necessarily obeys its laws in the development and discovery of his abilities and powers. The law of gradual development is the general law of everything that exists, and the human spirit is subject to it on an equal basis with all other creatures. The human soul grows along with the body and in direct dependence on it: periods of physical growth are at the same time stages of development of the spirit: there is a complete analogy between the two. But even after the soul reaches the full flowering of its powers, it does not cease to need the services of the body to develop and improve these powers. Our mind does not possess knowledge as given, ready-made material; our free will does not have good as an inalienable property. Knowledge and virtue are acquired gradually and successively, with the necessary assistance of the bodily nature. The external world around us, with the wonders of divine wisdom scattered everywhere in it, serves as the closest object to which our mental activity should turn. Knowing the Creator from His revelations in visible nature is the necessary and most natural way for our minds to know God. “Whoever was not guided by the world to understand the world’s highest blessings, but somehow went through real life weak, untrained, uneducated in mind,” even after moving from here to a higher region of existence, does not immediately achieve such mental maturity and the degree of bliss associated with it, which is the lot of a person who moves to the heavenly country with a previously acquired stock of knowledge. Thus, infants who have not had time to develop their spiritual powers here on earth, upon their transition to the afterlife, find themselves far from being in such a perfect state as people who have acquired spiritual experience here. 222 Completely free from all sin, with pure, spiritual powers, infants are, however, imperfect in the sense that their powers do not have the proper development that is acquired by the human spirit in this earthly life. Any true knowledge achieved here is a positive property of our mind, leading it to higher and higher perfection; every stage of development passed on earth is a positive and necessary step along the straight path that leads our mind to its final goal and purpose. – If this is a natural, God-established law for the human mind, that its initial development should take place in the closest connection and dependence on the visible material world, then from here the whole significance that belongs to the human body in this matter is clear. With its sense organs it necessarily mediates the relationship between rational spirit and irrational matter, between which there is no direct communication. Only with the help of bodily instruments can our mind come into contact with the sensory world; to perceive impressions from him and through that to know him. 223 The very concept of free will therefore necessarily requires the existence of two opposite sides, from which morally different excitations would emanate to the free spirit, opening up for him the possibility of choice and completely independent decisions. This indispensable condition for the development of moral activity - (at least until it gains stability and is established forever in the chosen direction) - for the human will is given most closely in the organic union of two natures - spiritual and sensual. The first acts on our will in an elevating way, encouraging it to strive for true, eternal and unchangeable good; the second attracts her with pleasures of a lower order, in which real evil is hidden under the guise of good. 224 These heterogeneous drives - since their basis lies in the very essence of man, in his dual nature - influence his will constantly and jointly. And this is precisely what true moral activity should be in its essence. Where there is no struggle and choice between heterogeneous motives, there are no proper reasons for discovering freedom, and where there is no complete freedom, there is no virtue. In man, all these conditions are realized in close dependence on his bodily nature, which serves, so to speak, as a constant touchstone for testing and strengthening his free will. Sin brought man down from the heights of a god-like, purely spiritual state, into a state of mixed, rational-animal existence. 226 Another reason for St. Gregory could not find an explanation for our real structure, which did not correspond, as it seemed to him, to the pure idea of ​​man. – According to another way of thinking, the sensory element in human nature is recognized as primordial, like the spiritual one. Here the state of the ideal person is conceived as essentially identical with our present state and differing from this latter only in the relationship of the various parts connected in the human composition. Spiritual nature, in theory, belongs to dominion and control of the entire being of man; sensual nature is assigned to subordination and service to the spirit. Sin destroyed this original harmony and perverted the normal relationship between natures, placing the former in a subordinate and subservient position to the latter. 227 How to reconcile the apparent contradiction of the views now indicated? Which of the two different ideas is considered the main belief of St. Gregory - and in what sense in general should his view of the nature and state of an innocent person be interpreted. If we compare the evidence in favor of the Origenistic view with the opposing arguments in favor of the ecclesiastical view, then the advantage in all respects will undoubtedly be on the side of the latter. Before pure Origenism, as we know, St. Grigory did not arrive. He never expressed the idea of ​​the disembodied state of an ideal person, no matter how close he was to it. He refrained from the extreme conclusions of Origen's doctrine and not just for fear of coming into conflict with church authority; as we have seen, he was also prompted to do so by the fundamental principles of his own system, which were different from Origen’s. Gregory in further words, which throw a bright light upon his whole doctrine concerning the nature of innocent men. “When we take off this deathly and vile tunic imposed on us from the skins of dumb animals (and when I hear about skin, I think to understand the appearance of dumb nature - το σχήμα της αλογου ψύσεως - in which we have clothed ourselves, having become accustomed to passion); then we throw off everything that was in us from the skin of the dumb, taking off the tunic. We have received from the skin of the dumb the following: carnal mixture, conception, birth, uncleanness, breasts, food, eruption, gradual coming to perfect age, maturity (age), old age, illness, death.” 233 Gregory firmly adhered to the teachings of the Church and was just as far from Origenism; on a point of secondary importance - in the exaggerated idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthe likeness of God and the purity of innocent human nature - he discovered a tendency towards Origenism to the detriment of a strictly ecclesiastical view. However, even in this last case, St. Gregory, it seems, was not aware of the deviation from church norms, or - at least - did not consider this deviation a direct contradiction. In the church teaching about the future blissful state of people, he found exactly the same sublime spiritualistic features with which he himself portrayed the primitive nature of man. But here he lost sight of the fact that - according to the church's view - the end of human history is not identical with the beginning, and that the angelic life that awaits the righteous after the resurrection is not a simple repetition of the original life of paradise, but the replenishment and elevation of this latter to its possible degree of spirituality. That state will be a reward for obedience, a reward for the difficult path traveled, and as such, of course, cannot be completely parallel with the state of a person who has just received life. 235 However, as presented by the bishop. Nyssa identified both of these states. From here arose those peculiar features with which we have become acquainted so far, and which to a certain extent were reflected in the further course of his anthropology. Contr. Eunom. lib I.Curses. Compl. Palrolog col. 333. About the device people, ch. 1. – St. Gregory here accepts the general astronomical concept of antiquity, according to which the earth was thought of as a solid, motionless center, around which the circular movement of the entire sensory world takes place, closed by the vault of heaven in the shape of a ball. About Shestodnevo, page 25. – The decisive denial of all material properties in the angelic world does not contradict the opinion about some corporeality of heavenly spirits, which was shared by St. Gregory, together with the teachers of the church contemporary to him (see, for example, Table of Contents, Chapter 6, p. 20; About the Child, Premature Repose, see, p. 339). Speaking about the very nature of angels, Bishop. Nyssky rightly denied the idea of ​​sensuality and spatiality in his ideas about it (as he denied it in the definition of the essence of the human soul); when he had in mind the relationship of angels, as created beings, to God, he attributed to them a subtle body corresponding to their spiritual nature and, at the same time, a spatial position in supermundane countries, thereby expressing the idea of ​​their limitations (not omnipresence). Oh baby, treasure kidnapped death, p. ZZ9.Tvor. St. Gr. Nis. part 4. Contg, Eunom. lib I, col. 333. Publicity sl. Ch. 5. page 15. Oh baby, kidnapped. see, pp. 339–340. On prayer, ch. 4th. Creation St. Gr. Nis. part 1. page 437. About the soul and resurrection, p. 240. – About the device. people Ch. 8, pp. 98–99 About the device people Ch. 8, p. 101. About the device people Ch. 3, page 86 Ibid., p. 87. – Sp. Orat, in verba: “Faciamus hom, ad imag. et simil. Nostram", Curs compl, Patrolog. T. 44, col. 259. About devices, people Ch. 4, page 88. In verba: faciamus hominem. etc. or. I, col. 258–60. About the device people Ch. 16, pp. 136–7, – St. himself. Gregory calls man a microcosm (On the soul and resurrection, p. 212), but he means not only his physical nature, but by which he unites in himself all the elements of the visible world, but his special position in which he is the connector of two dissimilar worlds - the spiritual and the material; so that in Nyssa's view, the concept μιϰρος ϰοσμος is identified with the concept μιϰτος ϰοσμος. – See Stigler, Psychol, des Gr. v. Nyssa, S. 8, Anmeik. 2. About the soul on Sunday, p. 210 Ibid. p. 215, The saying of the learned pagan quoted here is attributed to Epicharmus. Ibid., p. 218 – They guess that St. Gregory here means a hydraulic organ - this is the famous invention of Archimedes, about which Tertullian spoke with such surprise (De anima, p. XIV). About the device Person Ch. 16, p. 142. About the soul and resurrection, p. 225. About the soul and resurrection, p. 225, – Patrol. Curs. Compl. T. 46, col. 41 D About device, people, ch. 16, p. 142. Contr. Eunom. lib. VIII, in. fine. - Oglas. Sl., Ch. 6, pp. 22–3. About prayer, lyrics. 4th, pp. 438–9. – Sn. De eo, quid sit ad. imag. Dei et simil. Curs. Cjmpl. Patrolog. T. 44, col. 1329. Oh, young one. premature don't give a fuck see, page 339 About the device people Ch. 17, p. 145. De eo, quid sit ad imag. Dei et sim., col. 1328: δοναμεων ϰόσμον, μεϑ δν ϰαι τον ύλιϰόν τούτον. – Sn. Ogl. words Ch. 8, and many more etc. About the device people Ch. 17, p. 148. – Curs. compl. col. 189. Ibid., ch. 19, pp. 154–5. A word to the mourners. about the deceased, p. 515. Creativity. St. Gr. Nis. Part VII. Ibid,, pp. 517 – 19. – Curs, compl Patrolog. t. 46. ​​col. 525.B. About the device people Ch. 18 pp. 150–1 Denis, Philos, d'Origene, p. 468–9. De orat. dom. II. Curs. Compl. T. 44, col. 1144. Adv. Apollo, c. 16, – T. 45, col. 1154. Other passages of the same kind are collected by Moller (op. cit. p. 47). Denis, b. 469. Moller, § 15. Ritter. S. 119. De orat. dom., Or. IV, col. 1165.–Sn. Ogl. sl. Ch. 6; About the soul and resurrection. p. 240 and many more. etc. On the soul and resurrection, pp. 283–292. About the device people Ch. 12, p. 117. Ibid., ch. 12.–Migne, col. 164, A. About the soul and resurrection, p. 241. Ibid., pp. 242–3. Sn. About the device people Ch. 14 and 18. About the soul and resurrection, p. 298. – Sn. About the device people Ch. 29. Oh baby. kidnapped death., pp. 248–9. About human devices, ch. 12. – Ritttr, Geschichie d. сhr. Phil. S. 126. Ibid. Ch. 14. Sn. Bohringer Die alte Kirche, T. 8. S. 82–3. Heyns, Dicpul. Hist. – teolog. de Gr. Nyss., p. 5. Rupp. Gr. v. Nyss. S. 17 etc. About the soul and resurrection. pp. 314–15. Moller, Gr. Nys., anthroopl., p. 53. Stigler, Psychol. d. Gr. Nys. S. 87, Anmerk.