Divorce due to adultery and its consequences according to the teachings of Christ the Savior

Contents I. Divorce due to adultery and its consequences according to the teachings of Christ the Savior II. Criticisms and practical considerations I. Divorce for adultery and its consequences according to the teachings of Christ the Savior (Exegetic-polemical study) Παρακαλῶ, καί δέομαι, καί άντιβολῶ, μήτε ἂ ν ὃ ρας έκβάλλιν γυα ἳ κας, μήτε γυα ἳ κας ἂ ν ὃ ρας άφιναι ... τλήν πορνείας. S. Ioannes Chrysostomus 1 Γάμος θανάτ ῳ μόν ῳ καί μοιχεί ᾳ ὂ ιακόπτεται The only places in which sacred. the books of the New Testament allow for the dissolution of marriage due to adultery, limiting themselves to two verses of the Gospel of Matthew - V, 32 and XIX, 9. The more important these testimonies are for members of the militant Church, by the very nature of the issues raised in them, the more attention they deserve - especially if from a theoretical view one has to step directly onto the practical ground of life. Therefore, we will analyze these foundations as carefully as possible and in all detail, so that, fulfilling the duties of an exegete, we will discover their true and original meaning. Let us first take Matthew. XIX, 9 for reasons that will become clear below. Here is the Savior in response to the tempting question of the Pharisees (v. 3): is it worthy for a man to let his wife go for any reason? answers: “I say to you, if anyone lets his wife go, he commits adultery and marries another woman; and if he marries a prostitute, he commits adultery.” Despite the general negative tone of the saying for divorce, it also indicates one clause, as an exception to the categorical rule. But what is the strict force of the noted exception is not yet obvious and requires deliberate research, which is also necessary because the text of the quoted verse is not entirely solid and presents several options: 1) Παρεστο᾿ ς λο᾿ γου πορνει᾿ ας (B. D. Aliqu. Minusc. It [excepta causa adulterii; praeter -nisi ob-causam fornicationis]. Augustine [excepta cansa-nisi ex causa-nisi ob causam-fornicationis], translations-Syric Cureton [cp. Evangelienfragmente. Der griechische Text des Cureton`schen Syrers wiederhergestellt von Friedr. Lpzg. 1885, S. 30], Sahidic, Coptic, Jerusim lectionary [Evahgelium Hierosolimitanum, ed. Erizzo, Veronae 1861, f. 150]. 2) μη᾿ ε᾿ πι᾿ πορωει 'ᾳ (8. C. I. N. unc 13 al. 150 fere g 2 . Vulg. 3) [nisi ob fornicationem]. syr utr arm. St. I. Damascene in Parall. Theophylact ap. Migne gr. CXXIII, 352 A; so in Griesbach, Tischendorf, Tregelles and Westcott-Hort; Wed Chr. Fr. Matthaei Evangelium secundum Matthaeum, Rigae 1828, p. 290); 3) ει᾿ μη᾿ επι᾿ πονει 'ᾳ (R. M. Sch. [G.] and edit. Elzev. 1624 unaque edit. Rob. Stephani 1550; see edition major F. H. A. Scri υ ener, Nov. Test., p. 47, in Matthaei ibid, p. 291 not. For all scientific reasons, the second reading 4 must be recognized as more authentic, for the third is not so common and is its later proofreading, and the first probably came here from Matt. V, 32. But we will consider all these variations so that not the slightest doubt remains as to the intrinsic energy of the utterance under analysis and so that the final results are not disputable because only one shade has been adopted for them. The compound παρεχτο᾿ ς, formed from παρα ' and ε᾿ χτο᾿ ς like α᾿ πεμπροσθεν (Acta Thome § 14), was not native to the Greek language. According to Thayer's classification (p. 692; cnf. P. 687, 688), its occurrence dates back to the period of time between 322 and 150. BC In any case, it is not found either in the classics or in the LXX, where πα᾿ ρεχ and πα᾿ ρεξ 5 are used in equal meaning, which are not found in the New Testament. It is certain, however, that these words indicated an exception for that which is outside the given order and does not fall under its laws. παρεχτο᾿ ς also has the same energy, for which there is evidence from non-biblical authorities. It is enough to name examples in Geoponica (X century) 13, 15, 7, Etymologicum Magnum (X-XI century), h. 652, 18, Testamentum (II century) XII Patriarch. (cap. VI-test. Zabulon, § 1 ap. Migne, gr. ser. t. II, col. 1092: με᾿ παις , παρεχτο᾿ ς εννοι᾿ ας ου᾿ δε᾿ μιμνη᾿ σχομαι , ὂ τι period, Ioann. (ap. Birch, Auctarium codicis apocriphi N. T. Fabriciani, fasc. I, Havniae 184, p. 279: παρεχτο᾿ ς τοῦ σοῦ ε᾿ ται᾿ που; ρ. 298: παρεχτο᾿ ς τοῦ πλα᾿ νου) in the recently opened monument Διδαχη᾿ τῶν δω᾿ δεχα ` Αποστο᾿ λων (VI, § 1 in A. Harnack in “Texte und Untersuchungen” II, 1–2, Lpzg. 1884, S. 19: παρεχτο᾿ ς Θεοῦ σε διδια᾿ σχει) and in the 40th canon of the Council of Loadicea (according to the publication of the Moscow General. ?? ει᾿ μη᾿ δι ` α᾿ νωμαλι᾿ αν α᾿ πολιμπα᾿ νοιτο, glory “if he neglects the invitation to the council, then he will blame himself: unless he stays due to illness”). It is much more important for us that Aquila chose this term when transcribing Deuteronomy. I, 36. But here in LXX we read πλη᾿ ν (Heb. זזלָחִי, Slavic “is it possible”) - and this loudly tells us that the student of Akiba (†135) combined with παρεχτο᾿ ς the concept of an exception from the general rule. Turning to the New Testament, we see that here this saying is used as a pretext or named. We find it adverbial only once - in 2 Cor. XI, 28: χωρι᾿ ς τῶν παρεχτο᾿ ς, i.e. γινομε᾿ νων, and of course something external (cf. Slav.), according to others, additional beyond what is listed (St. Chrysostom: τα᾿ παραλειφθε᾿ ντα - in Homil. XXV, 2 in Epist. II ad Cornith. Ap. Migne, gr. Sr. LXI, col. 571; Moscow 1851, p. 307). In the sense of praepos. παρεχτο᾿ ς is composed in gen. pad. (cnf. G. B. Winer, Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Sprachidioms § 54, G, W. E. Jelf, Greek Grammar § 644: vol. II, Oxford 1881, p. 844), which makes known a thing that is necessarily distinguished from an ordinary action. An irrefutable argument in favor of this interpretation is provided by a single parallel in Acts. XXVI, 29: παρεχτο᾿ ς τῶν δεσμῶν του᾿ ρων. This is said about how Paul wanted Agrippa and the others to be like him in everything except the very bonds of an evangelist. Thus, the identification should not extend to the latter - and they find themselves outside the influence of the verb. All these observations categorically affirm the thesis that παρεχτο᾿ ς marks something that is withdrawn and not subject to normal definition. This conclusion is accepted by all lexicographers (cf. Ioh. Fr. Schleusner, Novum Lexicon graeco-latinum in Novum Testamentum, II 1, Lipsiae 1819, p. 443. Car. Gottlieb Bretschneider, Lexicon manual graeco-latinum in libros Novi Testamenti, Lipsiae 1840, p. 316. C. L. W. Grimm, Lexicon graeco-latinum in lidros Novi Testamenti, Lipsiae 1888, p. 339 b. Ios. H. Thayer, A greck-english Lexicon of the New York 1893, p. 487 b. Leipzig 1886, S. 107 b. Sh. Green, A Greek-english Lexicon to the New Testament, p. 139 b, with A critical Greek and English Concordance of the New Testament, Boston, 1891, Neutastamentliches Wörterbuch, Gotha 1892, S, 39a Schivlitz. Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, Giessen 1893, S. 318a. W. H. Hicke, Greek-english Lexicon to the New Testament, New York and London 1893, p. 142a. Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine periods, by E. A. Sophocles, ed by Prof. I. H. Thayer. 1887, p. 855b. Handwörterbuch der Griechischen von Fr. Passow, bearb. Rost-Palm etc., II 1, Leipzig. 1852, S. 737a) and explains the appearance of the variant (see Con. Tischendorf, Novum Testamcntum graece, editio octava critica major, vol. I, Lipsiae 1869, 114 not. The New Testament, with their various readings in full, and Latin version of Ierome by Samuel Prideaux Tregelles, London 1857–1879, p. 70) πορνει᾿ ας. It is true, at least for Matt. V, 32 with unshakable and indelible παρεχτο᾿ ς 6. Another reading - μη᾿ ε᾿ πι᾿ πορωει 'ᾳ - does not differ in its energy from the first, although there are no such convincing analogies for it. The phrase Matthew comes somewhat closer to this expression. XXVI, 5 Mrk. XIV. 2: μη᾿ ποτε ἒ σται θο᾿ ποβος τοῦ λαοῦ ). When examining this place, it is obvious to everyone that, according to the calculations of the high priests, scribes and elders, Christ could be taken at any time - just not on a holiday, which was excluded from their plans. And the conspirators were confident that the whole thing would work out safely and quietly if the capture did not take place at that moment; otherwise they expected dangerous popular indignation. It is clear that the successful ending does not concern μη ', but it entails completely different results. In relation to the issue under consideration, this means that any reason for divorce is reprehensible and does not justify it, except for fornication, which this act allows without incurring that condemnation. This connotation is also emphasized by the adversative nature of the denial itself - “not because of this, but because of something else” (cf. Lk. XIII, 14. 1 Jn. V, 16), which will be shameful, while the first one results in a legal action. In conditional and final maxims (cf. Winer § 55, 2 - A. Buttmann, Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Sprachgebrauchs, Berlin 1859, S. 296) such a μη ' simultaneously and equally destroys both the condition and the possible conclusion from it (cf. Lexicons Grimm `a, p. 284 sub I 3, and Thayer'a, p. 408b). Therefore, everything that is said about the release of the wife in a positive tone does not in the least relate to the extraordinary πορωει᾿ α. As for the third combination - ει᾿ μη ', everyone admits without hesitation that it indicates an exception, namely: the position in negation and vice versa 7. There are extremely many examples of this in the New Testament language, and we will note only the closest ones - with the prepositional combination 8. Mf. XII, 24-Christ (as if) does not cast out demons except by Beelzebub, and only with him and through him does He possess such power, which is why the Savior then objects (v. 27): χαι ' ει᾿ ε᾿ γω᾿ ε᾿ ν Βεελζε &#94#946; ου᾿ λ ε᾿ χβα᾿ λλω τα᾿ δαιμο᾿ νια . XII, 57 - in general, a prophet is never without honor for the exclusion (ει᾿ μη᾿ ε᾿ ν) of his fatherland and home (cf. Mark VI, 4). XV, 24-The Lord was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel and to no one else except them. XVII, 21 This race is not driven out by anything, but is driven out by prayer and fasting (cf. Mark IX, 29). Rom. VII, 7 - did not know sin ει᾿ μη᾿ δια ' νο᾿ μου, through (per) who recognized it. According to all these data, it is certain that ει᾿ μη ' also denotes a fact outside the normal series and its laws. Because of this, the blessedness of divorce disappears if it is committed due to adultery, for it excuses it, as this is even more directly expressed by the phrases ας 9, – ε᾿ πι᾿ πορνει 'ᾳ. The general result of the analysis of the Greek text of Matthew. XIX, 9 (and V, 32) will be the one that in πορνει᾿ α an exception is indicated for the possibility of a husband's absolution of his wife. It would be both tedious and pointless to review all the interpretations of ancient versions of the New Testament that do not shy away from the stated interpretation 10 . We will limit ourselves to one Slavic translation with its variants, which are known to us from published documents 11. In relation to V, 32, there are no differences, and all lists use “unless” with slight deviations in the transfer of further terms. It is also predominant for XIX, 9 (see “The Holy Gospel of Our Lord Jesus Christ. Ancient Slavic text” in the edition of † N. I. Ilminsky, Kazan 1889, p. 61. Archim. [† bishop of Uglich] Amphilochius, “Four Gospels of Galich 1144”, vol. I, Moscow 1882, pp. 295. 296). Another edition - μη᾿ ε᾿ πι ' πορνει 'ᾳ - is proposed by the Pandects of Antiochus of the 11th century. and St. Metropolitan Alexy; in the first it is said “not with fornication” (see Amphilochius I, p. 296), but in the second (see “The New Testament of Our Lord Jesus Christ.” The work of St. Alexy, Metropolitan of Moscow and All Rus', - in the photographic edition of Archimandrite Amphilochius, Moscow 1887, and in the phototypical † Metropolitan Leonty, Moscow 1892, sheet 12, volume 1 init.; cf. Amphilochia “The Four Gospels of Galich”, vol. IV, Moscow 1885, pp. 55) stated “not because of fornication.” Savvino's Gospel of the 11th century gives a somewhat peculiar reading. (in the edition of † I. I. Sreznevsky), which, omitting “like” (since it takes ὂ τι for recit, in the sense of our colon; cf. Russian translation), continues (cf. A. Amphilochius I, 295) like this: “... I did not love my wife” 12. In all these modifications the idea is clearly expressed that adultery is excluded and is not subject to the prohibition of remission. Therefore, Byzantine commentators categorically noted that divorce is sinful only when it is arranged χωπι᾿ ς πορνει᾿ ας (Theophylact ad Matt. V, 32 Ar. Migne, gr. ser. t. CXXIII, col. 197) or δι᾿ χα αι᾿ τι᾿ ας πορνει᾿ αε (Evfimy Zigavin ad h. 3. Ar. Migne, gr. ser. t. CXXIX, col. 217; cf. Augustine’s De conjug-adult. I, 9 Ar. Migne, lat ser. t. XL, col. 456–457: excepta causa-sine causa-praeter causam-fornicationis). And this solid result of textual-philological analysis cannot be eliminated by citing that in the parallels of Mrk. X, 11–12 and Luke. XVI, 18 no such restriction is mentioned. No matter what this deviation occurs from, it will always be undeniable that the general rule also allows for exceptions. And if the Evangelist Matthew points them out, it does not in the least follow that this is his personal addition or a later gloss, for example, from V, 32. On the contrary: these words are necessary and natural for him, as a direct answer to the tempting question of the Pharisees (v. 3): “Is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife for any reason?” Christ destroys such abuse negatively - not for any reason, but only for fornication. Likewise, the further conversation of the Lord with the disciples (v. 10 ff.) rests partly on this clause, which to such an extent binds the freedom (resp. arbitrariness) of the husband. And since Jon. Leonh. Hug (author of the famous Einleitung in N. T. in “Dissertatio de conjugii christiani vinculo indissolubili” in Freiburger Zeitschr. 1816, p. 4; cf. Fritzsche, Evangelium Matthaei, Lipsiae 1826, p. 596. De Wette, Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthai, Lpzg. 1838, S. 67), Gratz (Kritisch-historischer Commentar über das Evangelium des Matthäus, Tübingen 1821) and Berlepsch (Quatuor Novi Testamenti Evangelia, Ratisbonae 1849) - together with Weisse, Schenkel, Volkmar, Keim - are working hard to remove the exclusive insertion, then this is only clearly convinces us of the instability of extreme Catholic opinion 13 . It no less betrays its weakness when it asserts that the restriction in question had force and significance for the Jews alone. In this regard, both Google and Jos. Grimm (Die Einheit der vier Evangelien, Regensburg 1868, S. 258, and Leben Jesu nach den vier Evangelien, Bnd. V, S. 250) declare too boldly and decisively that the conditional possibility of divorce is applicable only to the stiff-necked Jewish people and is intolerable in Christianity 14. This idea, that the words of the Savior debet restringi ad Mosaicam legem (Perrone, Motta, Calmet) and see in them the temporary-accommodative principle of pastoral adaptation, is often repeated in Catholic writings with different variations; but a living protest against such an interpretation, shared by almost all papistic authorities, is Matt. V, 32, where it is difficult to discern a private and transitory commandment. Otherwise, we would have to understand all the other instructions of the Discourse on the Mount in this way, which would be a blatant absurdity 15. This means that the absolution of a wife is also conceivable in the Christian Church for the reason punctually noted by the Redeemer. And we now need to more accurately determine its properties and why it has dissolving energy. For this purpose the term πορνει᾿ α is used. He did not specialize so much that there could be no controversy about his content. From here, Catholics have developed quite a few original interpretations, which often pave the way to salvation in the midst of the most dangers. Sometimes the quoted word is understood in the strict sense of simple fornication, that is, outside and before marriage, carnal communication of an unmarried woman (girl) with a man - whether he is married or not. Then πορνει᾿ α will be a guilt committed before marriage, and therefore marriage, at least consummated (matrimonium consummatum), does not actually exist. Naturally, it is terminated by itself 16 as not valid 17. This was expressed by Gratz (I, 329), Döllinger (Christenthum und Kirche in der Zeit der Grundlegung, Regensburg 1868, S. 390 ff. 461 ff.) - before their break with Rome - and Walter (S. 713, Anm. 2), but their opinion 18 did not meet with sympathy either from papist theologians or from Protestants, from of whom only the rationalist Paulus joined him. This view is approached by those Catholic authors who discover in πορνει᾿ α an indication of unio mere fornicaria (Fr. X Patritius, De interpretatione Script. Sacr. I, n. 281. Aberle), for example. venus illicita - due to incest in close degrees of kinship. In this form, it will be a prodigal and illegal relationship, concluded with obstacles that necessarily break it and turn it into nothing (matrimonium attentatum cum impedimento natura sua dirimente). This leads to the conclusion that, according to the teachings of Christ, marriage is not permitted unless, in its essence, it is a crude concubinage and bad cohabitation. However, all this is idle daydreaming based on religious interests. We perfectly understand the special shades of πορνει᾿ α compared to μοιχει᾿ α (cf. and J. N. Heinr. Schmidt, Synonymik der griechischen Sprache § 66, 4.6 : Bnd. II, Lpzg. 1878, S. 414 – 415. 417 – 418), but that’s not the point here. For anyone with sight, it is irresistible that Matthew is talking about true and indisputable marriage. And this is axiomatically immutable by all common sense considerations. Cohabitation is always a voluntary private agreement of famous persons, apart from any legal forms and norms. Therefore, its termination depends solely on the free decision of the concubins. Об этом не было надобности и спрашивать; the less it was necessary to answer. If this is the illegality of the marriage, at least due to the unchastity of the bride, then again it was strange to inquire about the permissibility of its dissolution when it was directly prescribed by law (Deut. XXII, 13 ff.; cf. J. Seldeni Uxor Ebraica, Francofurti ad Oderam 1673, p. 312 et passim). Let us assume that Christ names the most irremovable reason for divorce from the point of view of Jewish law; then it will remain unclear why the Savior, adhering to national-legal and religious grounds, bypassed all other motives, let us assume, those by which Ezra was guided (Ex. XXIV, 16. Second. VII, 3) (1 Ezra IX, 2 ff. Neh. XIII, 23 words). And by the force of the reference to Moses (cf. Deut. XXIV, 1) it is undoubtedly that the Pharisees meant a legal marriage. According to all this, πορνει᾿ α a will be the wife’s crime already during the last 19. But, supposedly, this is still not adultery (adulterium) 20. for among the Jews it was punishable by death (Lev. XX, 10. Deut. XXII, 22), by which the innocent per se was freed from all obligations and received freedom to enter into a second marriage. This difficulty, which also confuses Russian canonists, gives rise to several new Catholic interpretations. since in the Old Testament deviation from Jehovah to pagan cults is often called adultery, some in the Gospels find a hint of fornicatio spiritualis or idolatry (Bruno Astensis, Dionysius Carthusianus, etc.), expanding it to the degree of a lege Dei aberrare 21, i.e., simple, religious error (Beda Ven., Gloss, ord., Anselmus Lauduncnsis, Zacharias Chrysopolitanus). Such a view is visible in places and among the blessed. Augustine (De sermone Domini in monte, lib. I, cap. XVI, § 46 ap. Migne, lat. ser. t. XXXIV, col. 1253: fornicationem generalera et universalem intelligere cogimur), but then he himself refuses a categorical decision (Retractationum lib. I, cap. XIX, § 6 ap. Migne, lat. ser. t. XXXII, col. 616: sed quatenus intelligenda atque limitanda sit haec [y Mf. V, 32] fornicatio, latebrosissima quaestio est). And this is understandable. Throughout the entire train of thought, it is clear that both the Jews asked and Christ answered regarding the crimes of the wife only in relation to her husband - and only on this side were misunderstandings possible. Otherwise, the consequences of idolatry would be no less grave than in the case of adultery, and then the injured spouse would not need any justification for his release; there would not even be a need for a divorce letter if one who fell into idolatry was inevitably doomed to death 22 . And the figurative language of Scripture means nothing more than that the religious obligations of the believer to God were clearly presented in the form of marriage (cf. Isa. LIV, 5. Jer. III, 14). According to this analogy, the violation of the former is in the religious sphere the same as πορνει᾿ α in marriage. It seems there is no need to add that the identity of idololatria and fornicatio least of all follows from this. It is only true that they are both similar and equally intolerant, each in its own field. R. Schegg takes a slightly different path (Evangelium nach Matthüus übersetzt und erklärt, München 1856–1858). In his judgment, since adultery is a crimen capitale, the words of the Lord simply say that marriage is broken only by death; under any other conditions it remains insoluble. And in the gospel saying itself, he sees a subtle sound play. “It is said: do not let your wife go until there is ervat dabar (LXX-ti in Deut. XXIV, 1); but I say: do not allow this except d e bar ervah ( עֶרְיָח דְבַר λο᾿ γος πορνει᾿ ας ), in which marriage is not possible for a woman guilty of this sin, since she will lose her life.” But again this is clearly contrary to the entire tone and character of the gospel news. They necessarily refer us to the legal marriage union, which alone raises doubts about the break. With illegality, of course, everyone is forced to return to the prescribed norms: and the Jewish divorce lovers knew this, of course, much better than Shegg. Then, his first thought is untenable. True, according to the letter of the law, adultery was punishable by death, but this rule was hardly practiced at that time. Everyday relationships necessarily caused his limitation - and the sword of Damocles was attached with a strong chain 23 ... And it is certain that Christ did not sanction this cruel severity of the Mosaic code, opening the way to repentance for the fallen. Then it would turn out that, according to the New Testament teaching, even a look with lust (Matt. V, 28) should be punished with the death penalty, which is probably only possible for the installed Tertullian 24. The Lord’s goal is to narrow and constrain the freedom of liberties, but instead the result would be a breadth that even the most whimsical Jewish spouses could not dream of, and salvation for a woman could not be a Muslim veil, but only one voluntary deprivation of her eyes... Finally, the Savior, wanting to clarify the matter, would have expressed himself extremely vaguely and would have given rise to new difficulties, which is also evident from the disagreements in Christian societies, since they begin to move away from the direct meaning gospel texts. Meanwhile, the co-questionnaires were completely satisfied with this decision and understood it in the most direct and categorical sense, that it is permissible to let go of his wife only ε᾿ πι᾿ πορνει 'ᾳ. With this logical structure, it turns out that this is a woman’s adultery towards her husband in her carnal communication with others. This interpretation of the term in question is confirmed by its use in LXX in Os. III, 3 and Amos. VII, 17 (cf. Sir. XXVI, 11). Even if this crime was mortal, it was still dissolving marriage bonds, for it destroyed them with its presence, since death was its inevitable consequence. And it is incomprehensible how it lost this energy in Christianity, where it is an even greater sin. Does the husband really become less right and free because the wife is punished less cruelly, without becoming innocent? The question of punishment is a matter of time, resolved in different ways, in accordance with the development of society, but it concerns only the fate of the fallen side and does not in the least affect the dignity and rights of a member of the faithful. The latter retains all the advantages of a divorced person, even if the excommunicated person was given leniency: this is a secondary point and not at all related to him. Summarizing all that has been said, we can formulate the results obtained in a few brief theses: 1) πορνει᾿ α (fornicatio) is the crime of one of the spouses after the conclusion of a marriage union and 2) consists of insulting and desecrating him (scortatio) by carnal relations with other persons (St. Chrysostom, Euthymius Zig.). In fact, there will, of course, be μοιχει᾿ α -adulterium here, as patristic exegetes have long noted 25 . It goes without saying that by doing this we eliminate the specifically Byzantine distinction in the said vice. In the spirit of Roman legislation, where only the husband had jus thori - the right to his wife's fidelity, in this case any violation of marital purity was considered adultery, and the former committed it only during intercourse with a married woman 26, when he sinned not by adultery itself, but rather by forcing his accomplice to trample on her marital duties. There is not the slightest basis for this in the Gospel text, and this opinion is directly rejected by the Christian teaching on the equality of both spouses. And their marriage prerogatives are absolutely identical (cf. 1 Cor. VII, 3-4. 11) 27. Therefore, πορνει᾿ α is simply a carnal connection, which equally dissolves the marital union, whether it is allowed by the husband or the wife and, moreover, with any stranger 28. This view opens the possibility of divorce too clearly for Catholics to try to dampen its natural energy. And they sometimes resort to desperate means to save themselves. Yes, Dr. Dreher, in the Catholic Magazine, 29 points out that the question of marriage in the age of the Lord caused great and heated controversy. First of all, it should be noted that the purity of family life among Jews by this time had become greatly darkened and the strength of the marriage union was significantly shaken. The Talmud speaks sufficiently for this, assimilating divorce exclusively to the people of God as a special privilege. Rabbi Hananiah, on behalf of Rabbi Phinehas, proves this by the fact that in the entire second chapter of the book of the prophet Malachi, the Lord Almighty is mentioned, and only in the 16th verse is He called the Lord of Israel, when it is commanded: “if you hate her (the wife of your youth), let her go.” Equal to p. Haya Rabba asserted that “divorce is not permitted to the pagans” 30. This directly demonstrates how weakened the marriage bonds of the Jews were in the era of Christ the Savior. And we know that Josephus Flavius ​​formulates the following principle in this regard: “whoever wishes to be separated from his cohabiting partner for any reason - and people have many of these - let him confirm in writing 31 that he will never touch her; for through this she receives the freedom to encroach on another” 32. For illustration, it is useful to mention that Pheroras, at the insistence of his brother Herod and Ptolemy, divorced his slave wife only to take his niece Cyprus, although he did not fulfill his promise 33 And the historian himself sent away both his first and second wife, with whom he already had three children, solely because “he was dissatisfied with her morals” 34. Philo quite calmly allows the dissolution of marriage χαθ ἣ ν ἂ ν τυ᾿ χ ῃ προ᾿ φασιν 35 . This practice was also legalized by the rabbis, who tried to base themselves on the words of Deuteronomy. XXIV, 1. Opinions regarding their meaning are divided. Shammai adhered to the literal understanding of the commandment of Moses and limited all reasons to the actual act of de bar ervah ( םשוס רכר ערוח ob rem turpidinis seu turpem ) - the fact of the committed fornication, “the revelation of nakedness.” However, Hillel reasoned differently. Dividing the formula of the law into two equal members through the conjunction “or” ( סשום כל רכר או םשום ערוח או tam ob causam aliam qualemcunque, quam ob turpidinem), he gave the husband unconditional freedom to reject his wife for any reason, to a simple caprice inclusive. For him it was equally important if, for example, his wife became mute, a drunkard, an epileptic, and if she cooked the dinner poorly, over-salted and over-cooked it; if there were no children for ten years and if a better and prettier woman was found who liked the master; Voluntary separation by agreement is also allowed when a famous couple considers their marriage unsuccessful “by mistake” 36. This latter trend, which pandered to human passions, gained predominance. Naturally, under him, marriage fell almost to the level of a simple civil contract. Marriage blessings 37, in which the divine origin of the marriage was noted and sanctification from above was solemnly requested, faded into the background, since, despite the instructions of the Talmud, 38 they could be pronounced by anyone present without the slightest damage to the act itself. Rabbi Akiba, who exerted an overwhelming influence on his contemporaries, categorically stated that it is quite legal for a husband to remove his wife, since he sees another one who is more beautiful than her 39 . Nevertheless, the people's conscience did not easily put up with this licentiousness, and therefore disputes constantly arose. And so Christ seems to express that He does not want to touch these school debates and goes through them in silence. At the same time, the restrictive addition will read: “without talking about adultery and without affecting the existing controversy on this subject.” Such an interpretation closely borders on philological absurdity, since it allows for equalities: παρεχτο᾿ ς bypassing, λο᾿ γος heteroglossia or reasoning. But the first is unthinkable according to what was stated above, 40 and the second is no less absurd. Does the term λο᾿ γος foundation (cf. Acts X, 29 and often among the classics; so Euthymius Zig.: δι᾿ χα αι᾿ τι᾿ ας πορνει᾿ ας . G. D. Curke in Observationes sacrae in Novi Foederis libros I, Wratislaviae 1755, p. 25 – 26, etc.) or causa (Jo. Alb. Bengelii Gnomon Novi Testamenti, Tubingae 1742, p. 44. Delitzsch, Schegg, Guillemard, Schürer, Grimm, Scham, etc.), is rather indifferent to us. With all this, it is immutable and unshakable that this word never contains the meaning acquired by the hypothesis. After this, it turns out that παρεχτο᾿ ς gives an exemption for π ᾶ ς ο᾿ α᾿ πολυ᾿ ων, and μη᾿ ε᾿ πι ' XIX, 9 limits the general prohibition to one particular case, which is not hushed up, but energetically emphasized. One can, of course, admit (contrary to Knabenbauer`y I, 1, p. 230) that the very temptation of the Pharisees’ conversion was rooted in the actual (casuistic) competitions in marriage law 41: this is somewhat expressed by a deliberate emphasis on (χατα ') π ᾶ σαν ( αι᾿ τι᾿ αν ). We strongly think that understanding will rather be against Dreher. It itself requires that an appropriate answer be presented to the question, while there would be an evasion from it, since the Lord omitted the most essential point in the matter, its central core. This is not likely, why πορνει᾿ α turns out to be outside the bonds of marital indissolubility and will be a blessed basis for divorce. Where exactly lies the tearing force of this sin? - This is extremely important, since this determines the degree of dissolution itself, and this is precisely where the whole misunderstanding lies. At this point, it is far from uninteresting that Christ uses πορνει᾿ α, although in fact we are talking about μοιχει᾿ α. It is difficult to guess the special motive of this calculated feature, and we must concentrate on the main and more indisputable. In this case, the common connotation of πορνει᾿ α in the designation of promiscuous carnal intercourse by persons who are extramarital or who trample and reject marital ties, if any, is undoubted for everyone. From this provision it follows that every πορνευ᾿ ων thereby destroys the marriage union, dies for it and frees the innocent for a new marriage 42 . A parallel to this can be found in the relationship of the Bridegroom-God to Jews and Gentiles. The former once enjoyed primarily the closeness of Jehovah, and the Jewish nation was rightly considered His chosen wife (Isa. LIV, 1; cf. Gal. IV, 27), but it betrayed this union and, like a withered branch, fell away from it. After this, the previous marital communion ends completely, and the empty place is occupied with equal rights by the previously barren church (cf. Rom. XI, 17, etc.). So: in πορνει᾿ α one member leaves the marriage relationship, which is why the other remains alive for the second marriage. This thesis finds an excellent illustration - on the negative side - in the depiction of what happens with any other divorce, which, being illegal, is revealed indirectly when it becomes legal. Christ defines this in relation to wife and husband. In the first respect we have (V, 32) the formula that he who arbitrarily releases his wife ποιεῖ αυ᾿ τη᾿ ν μοιχευθῆναι. The passive form of the verb is very firmly attested by the authority of Greek manuscripts 43, and the reading of μοιχ ᾶ σθαι 44, supported by Slavic translations 45, differs only in shade, which adds its own special touch 46. With this last option, the verb receives the active energy of free action (cf. μοιχ ᾶ ται commits adultery) and thereby increases the responsibility of the released person, so she commits a crime voluntarily. Μοιχευθῆναι affects her suffering and greatly weakens her guilt, for the divorced woman is, as it were, forced to commit adultery 47, being placed in such a position as a “husbandless wife.” This second interpretation is stronger logically, since μοιχει᾿ α is only the result of ποιεῖ - and we are still talking about the husband, about his sinfulness in the illegal dissolution of the marriage. But fundamentally the question does not change, because in all cases, after a frivolous absolution, there will actually be μοιχει᾿ α, no matter what it comes from. The nature of this offense is clear from the fact that the person in question continues to be undivorced if she is separated παρεχτο᾿ ς or unreasonably. Then μοιχευθῆναι. it will indicate that, with an ongoing obligation to one person, she enters into carnal communication with another. In comparison with the general type of carnal sin in πορνει᾿ α, - μοιχει᾿ α will be its special detection in adultery itself, in violation of marital purity, and not simply in extramarital sexual defilement. We have no right and cannot think that the terminology of the Gospels is accidental, and therefore we must take full attention to all its details. From this point of view, it is necessary to believe that divorce is not legal as long as it is accompanied by μοιχει᾿ α, adultery. It is very characteristic that the celibacy of the woman is not taken into account here, which means that the Lord is rejected by the thought of a new marriage. Divorce and marriage are closely connected with Him, like inseparable ante and post, which is why all speculations about divortium with a prohibition for both members of the marriage couple are false. This is the first. Then. The abnormality of separation lies in the fact that it entails adultery in the sense of adultery or a second union while maintaining the previous one (bigamy). But this ceases with παρεχτο᾿ ς, since it limits the categorical veto for α᾿ πολυ᾿ ων, does not impose on it the mentioned formidable consequences. At the same time, termination is completely acceptable and excusable; it will punish only the guilty party, protecting the marital benefits of the victim. All these conclusions are self-evident, and they were firmly formulated by St. John Chrysostom. He categorically insists on the lifelong commitment of the couples: δε 'ἒ τερον ε᾿ πεισαγειν νομφι᾿ ον, ου᾿ δε᾿ δευτε᾿ ροις ο᾿ μιλεῖν γα᾿ οις “A wife, even if she received thousands of divorce bills, would be subject to the law of adultery,” “having gone to another, she would be an adulteress.” And this is because she has a husband μενον ἒ στι ) 48 . However, it is commanded to endure everything bad in the spouse πλη᾿ ν πορνει᾿ ας 49, which, therefore, breaks the existing connection and eliminates the danger of μοιχει᾿ α. Concluding back and going from the unnatural to the proper, we find that marriage is a mutual marital union with the exclusive belonging of the members of the married couple only to each other. Such a general understanding is logically inevitable and materially unshakable according to the Gospel text. It compulsorily requires the recognition that the marital union is necessary and disintegrates if the specified condition is violated, with the assumption of πορνει᾿ α. But if it is not there, the one who omits it tramples the very foundation of marriage, separates what God united by the law of nature and sanctified in Christianity with a deliberate sacrament. And the Savior’s commandment in Matt. XIX, 6 it is not divorce itself that prohibits, but the reason that decisively breaks the marital union and makes its dissolution inevitable. At this point, Catholic dogma is especially weak, for it places the very mystery in the voluntary consent of those getting married, while the Church only blesses it and asks for divine help for its strength and fruitfulness 50. Then, with betrayal, the obligation ends, and grace turns to justice for the criminal, as with the unworthy acceptance of the body and blood of Christ. The Orthodox view eliminates this naturalistic understanding and, concentrating predominant importance on the secret action itself, elevates the natural connection between man and woman into a truly mysterious one - Christ's 51. Here, marriage is not just living together, but, first and most of all, it is a Christian duty to reproduce in it the relationships that exist between the Lord and His Church. At least we think that this is precisely what is expressed in the classical passage of Ephesus. V, 32, where we are far from talking about a simple comparison 52. With this interpretation, all other analogies are conveniently explained, for example, the primacy of the husband as the image of God (1 Cor. XI, 7), his dominion over his wife (Eph. V, 22-24 a1.), etc. This shows that marriage requires mutual self-devotion for the purpose of spiritual and moral improvement to the “age of the fulfillment of Christ” (Eph. IV, 13) and oneself and one’s offspring, as members Churches. Therefore, it must be indissoluble as long as the communion of the Redeemer with believers is eternal. But on the other hand, it is destroyed no less decisively, since this principle is violated by one of the spouses - and the head finds itself without a body or vice versa. Such is the “church of the wicked,” whose members, despite all their external connections, will later hear the terrible voice of the Lord Christ: “I have never known you” (Matthew VII, 23). From the previous one it is clear that arbitrary absolution is criminal because it forces the divorced woman to destroy the marriage that still exists, because there is no πορνει᾿ α. In this case, the presence of the latter fact will eliminate these sad results and, of course, for the reason that the marriage union had already been previously terminated by this guilt. This means that adultery abolishes marriage. And this is inevitable to accept if we are not willing to internalize the idea of ​​the indelibilitatis of the sacraments. Now the question arises about the extent of this dissolving effect - and here is the very nerve of the disagreement between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. The first considers the breakup unconditional and allows the innocent to remarry 53 . This is not how Catholic dogma judges. Its teaching was developed gradually 54, partly under the influence of external historical circumstances, and was finally revealed at the Council of Trent by a categorical rule (Conc. Trid. sess. XXIV-de sacramento matrimonii, can. 7): “Si quis dixerit, Ecclesiam errare, cum docuil, juxta Evangelicam et Apostulicam doctrinam, propter adulterium alterius conjugum matrimonii vinculum non posse dissolvi, et utrumque, vel etiam, innocentent, qui causam adulterio non dedit, non posse, altero conjuge vivente, aliud matrimonium contrahere, qui, dimissa adultera, aliam duxerit, qui, dimisso adultero, alii; nupserit; anathema sit" 55. The marriage relationship is absolutely not destroyed under any condition other than death; therefore adultery does not terminate it, since it is causa desinendi a conjugio, and not causa divortii. Then the influence of this crime can only be accompanied by an external separation of coexistence in the everyday and “carnal” sense (quoad co-habitationem, a thoro et communione). bonorum). Technically, this is expressed by the formula that marriage is not permitted quoad vinculum and allows only the separation of the spouses a mensa et thoro (from the table and the bed) for a time (separatio temporaria) or forever, until the death of one of them (separatio perpetua). This is actually not divorce (divortium, διαζυ᾿ γιον), but rather separation 56, which, as a surrogate for the first, was also practiced in Rus' in the 18th century. 57. It is clear that here neither party receives the right to a new marriage. This view is held by Old Catholicism 58 a. theoretically recognized by other Western confessions 59 . It is in close internal correlation with the fundamental concepts of papistic dogma about the essence of the marriage sacrament. The latter is affirmed not by the sacred act, but by the voluntary consent of the spouses, which, being a free act of the taken individual, ends only with the cessation of her existence. We will not go back to these fundamental principles of the issue under consideration and will only note that, constituting the heritage of the pagan Roman past 60, such a view is insufficient in its limitations, since it captures one (and, in our opinion, not the most important) moment and is not devoid of logical self-contradictions 61. And this is because an agreement that is not raised to a higher and independent association always allows its violation, which abolishes the obligation itself. Otherwise, the repentant’s determination to do good would exclude his fall even when acting ex opere operato. But we are only interested in whether such a judgment is justified by the Gospel text of the passages in question. This is the most important thing in the whole problem, since in the abstract sphere of general considerations only a relative probability is acquired, which is never guaranteed against all objections and cannot claim to be compulsorily unconditional acceptance. The Catholic consciousness, of course, is presented with an analogy of a married couple with a living organism. In the latter, the diseased member is cut off so that it does not infect healthy ones, but this does not destroy it. In parallel to this, in marriage, the culprit is removed without decisively breaking the marriage union. However, comparison is non est ratio, because the comparison itself does not stand up to criticism and has a purely external appearance of persuasiveness. And it is easy to understand this if we take into account that the “marital organism” consists in the actual self-devoted unity of two and continues as long as the specified property is preserved. Without this, he turns into a dead corpse, which, for its revival, requires communion with another. Therefore, the image of the head and the body, existing only with the presence of the inseparability of both, comes closer to the meaning of the Christian sacrament. This means that when they are separated, even their very existence disappears, which in marriage will indicate its complete abolition, opening the path to a new marriage for the innocent victim. Then the whole question will depend on whether this second marital relationship is permissible. Catholic writers respond with a categorical negative, arguing that the Savior’s reservation concerns only the absolution of the wife and does not in the least relate to the future fate of her and the husband himself. In this case, it turns out that the one who divorced frivolously will commit adultery upon his marriage, regardless of whether his wife has committed adultery or not. Thus, παρεχτο᾿ ς is said negative, non exceptive, with an absolute prohibition of subsequent concepts for each of the parties. Such an understanding is somewhat favored by the uncertainty α᾿ πολελυμε᾿ νην. Not having a member with it, this word does not necessarily include only those divorced in this way, that is, without guilt, and makes us understand any kind of misunderstanding 62. This small detail is so fatal that the impartial and most authoritative exegete, the Anglican Bishop (of Gloucester and Bristol) S. J. Ellicott, finds only the hopeless non liquet true, meanwhile he is inclined more towards the Orthodox interpretation 63. There are also some side considerations involved. They say: if you extend the power of παρεχτο᾿ ς throughout the entire 32nd Art. Vth chapter Mf., then it turns out that the union of the rejected ε᾿ πι ' πορνει 'ᾳ will be both normal and legal. This would amount to a cruel and flagrant absurdity (Knabenbauer: plane arbitrarium... plane absurdum... maxime perversum) that the sinner takes precedence over the innocent, who is shackled by the threat of adultery. Logic is seductively captivating, but no less dangerous and treacherous. She only warns us that we do not need to express ourselves as awkwardly as the archimage did. († Bishop of Kursk) Michael, when to Matt. XIX, 9 noted: “and he who marries a divorced woman not for the same reason (adultery), but without permission, also commits adultery, for she is still united by law to her former husband, although she has been released by him” 64; as if if the divorce were legal, these results would not happen 65. However, the mistakes of some do not excuse the mistakes of others, since the starting point of the arguments is false. We readily admit that παρεχτο᾿ ς with its energy is confined exclusively to the first part of Matthew. V, 32, why α᾿ πολελυμε᾿ νη will be every wasteland. But this does not affect the issue at all and only confirms its necessary consequences according to the very essence of the matter: 1) since the wife was released in vain, her husband commits adultery with another, because the existing marriage continues; 2) since she is abandoned ε᾿ πι ' πορνει 'ᾳ, everyone else is defiled by fornication through communication with an adulteress 66 and here even talk about any marriage is unthinkable 67 . Next, it is natural to ask: what will happen, in the case of a new marriage, to someone who has been divorced on good grounds? From Matt. V, 32 this is not visible, because with ὂ ς ε᾿ α᾿ ν χτλ, it is not assumed π ᾶ ς ο᾿ α᾿ πολυ᾿ ων. Now the task arises - to reveal what is accompanied by divorce for the husband. Here is the most cardinal point of the theorem, the solution of which will give an exact answer about the breaking effect of adultery on the part of the one who releases it. On this subject and for special purposes we do not need to insist on the authenticity of Matthew. XIX, 9 according to reading textus recepti 68. For us, the following words are sufficient and undoubtedly authentic: πορνει 'ᾳ χαι᾿ γαμη᾿ σ ῃ ἂ λλην μοιχ ᾶ ται . In them, the guilt of the divorced marriage partner is noted through μοιχει᾿ α. When does it happen: with μη ' or with ε᾿ πι ', - with legal or arbitrary termination? Here, in order to eliminate unnecessary disputes, it is important to pay special attention to the fact that the Evangelist uses the term that was previously used in relation to the lettuce. This means that in both places the same meaning is connected to it. We will proceed from the facts obtained and immutable. In Matt. V, 32 μοιχευθῆναι indicates the badness of the woman’s carnal intercourse, since she shares a bed with another while still obligated to completely belong to her frivolous husband. Μοιχει᾿ α is a carnal connection between a spouse, as such, and it happens only because the previous marriage has not been settled. When it is terminated, this brake also disappears. Consequently, in XIX, 9 the husband is μοιχ ᾶ ται for the sole reason that the divorce is fictitious and has not actually taken place legally. It goes without saying that he does not commit this sin if there is no causa efficiens for the illegality of the vacation. Hence, the negative necessarily turns into the categorical, that with the blessed abolition of the marital union, the one marrying does not commit adultery, i.e., with ε᾿ πι᾿ πορνει 'ᾳ, which justifies the release of the wife, a new marriage is permissible for him, for μοιχει᾿ α does not happen otherwise when the the marriage bond retains all its strength. This idea is clearly expressed in Mrk. X. 11: λλην, μοιχ ᾶ ται ε᾿ π ` αυ᾿ τη᾿ ν. The whole typicality of this phrase is in the final prepositional combination, which is very firmly established 69. It is usually classified as “other”: so in Catenae graecorum Patrum in Novum Testamentum (ed. I. A. Cramer, vol. I, Oxonii 1844, p. 374 -ad Marc. X, 11; 151-ad Matt. XIX, 3: μοιχ ᾶ ται ε᾿ π ` αυ᾿ τη᾿ ν , τουτε᾿ στιν ε᾿ πι᾿ – τη᾿ ν – δευτε᾿ ραν )-Victor (?) and Apollinaris, Euthymius Zigavinus (Ar. Migne, gr. ser. t. CXXIX, col. 825: ει προ᾿ τη᾿ ν σαχτον ), Bleek, Ewald, Schegg. Among the Russians, this opinion is also defended by the Kazan prof. A. A. Nekrasov (“Reading the Greek text of the Holy Gospels”, Kazan 1888, pp. 61) - contrary to the current synodal translation, approved by the authority of Metropolitan. Philaret (see “Works of Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow and Kolomna on the Transposition of the New Testament,” St. Petersburg, 1893, page 51; cf. “The Holy Gospel” in the publication of the Russian Bible Society, St. Petersburg, 1819, page 153). But Slav. - along with “with her” (St. Alexy, fol. 21 vol., col. 1st) - often uses the mutual “on nude” 70. And it should be noted that the no longer encountered grammatical combination μοιχ ᾶ σθαι ε᾿ πι ' τινα (in no way equals ἒ ν πινι, which is why it is more fair to give the preposition the meaning “against”, “in relation to” his released wife. For all these reasons, it turns out that and in Mark the concept is considered fornication not absolutely, by the nature of the fact itself, but conditionally, since even as long as there was no legal removal, as Catholics agree with us on this, then the new marriage of a divorced person through the fault of the other party will not be μοιχει᾿ α, or will become completely normal. Summarizing the results of our research, we summarize them in a few brief theses: 1) According to the teachings of Christ the Savior, a fundamentally indissoluble marriage union can be broken by a husband due to the fault of his wife’s adultery. 2) Divorce is complete and leaves the spouse free to enter into a new marriage, since he commits adultery in it only if there is a previous marital relationship, which is completely broken. 3) Given the perfect equality of men and women in Christianity, this restriction applies equally to both spouses. Our conclusions will not be unshakably strong if we do not confirm them on the basis of church tradition. The church received St. scriptures and knows them exactly as his own property - by analogy with how with us the contents of any private letter are best known to its immediate addressee. This means that exclusively infallible understanding belongs to her. From this side, the opinions of untested or rejected authorities are also important when they serve for us as an expression of the general church voice and the dominant tradition. It is not our task to collect all paternal testimonies 71. They are already indicated in sufficient quantities in various foreign manuals 72 . However, these confessional codes must be used with extreme caution; all the less you should take their considerations on faith, which happens quite often among us. First, we will make only a few experiments in order to establish the correct point of view on the patriotic teaching on the issue raised and to eliminate the exaggerations of the Catholic interpretation. By the way, it is also expressed in our literature that St. Justin “directly calls adultery a new marriage (any?) committed by a husband,” but in fact this apologist simply quotes the Gospel saying: ? The mention of bigamy makes one guess that the philosopher-martyr is actually focusing on accepting another wife when the one who has been released remains undivorced 73 . Likewise, Athenagoras asserts only fundamental indissolubility. He writes: “A second marriage is specious adultery, for the Savior says: if anyone lets his wife go and marries another, he commits adultery (Matt. XIX, 9), without commanding either to let go of the one from whom someone has taken her virginity, or to marry a second time. He who departs from his first wife, even if she has died, is a hidden adulterer, both because he transgresses the word of God, since in the beginning God created one husband and one wife, and because he separates flesh from flesh in their union when they merge in carnal communion" 74 . From this it follows much more that “the philosopher does not assume any possibility of a new marriage for divorced spouses.” If we accept Athenagoras's reasoning in all its rigor, it turns out that a second marriage is not permissible for either a widower or a widow. It is clear that absolutely nothing can be learned from this to solve the special problem of dissolution, especially when the apologist stubbornly remains silent about the evangelical limitation. Theophilus preserved it, but he, too, speaks only of purity, not only in deeds, but even in the heart and in the gaze 75 . The judgment of Clement of Alexandria is not quite definite, which is why it should not be exaggerated in the sense of a categorical prohibition. “That the Scripture,” he says 76, “encourages one to get married, although it does not allow one to fall away from the concluded marriage, is clearly laid down in this regard: “let you not let your wife go, except (πλη᾿ ν ει 'μη') according to the words of an adulterer” (πορνει᾿ ας); marriage during the life of another of those separated is considered adultery (μοιχει᾿ αν)... And “if you accept a prostitute wife, she commits adultery,” says (Scripture); for (“if anyone lets his wife go, he commits adultery” (μοιχ ᾶ ται αυ᾿ τη᾿ ν), that is, he forces her to be an adulterer (α᾿ ναγχα᾿ ζει μοιχευθῆναι) Not only the one who lets her go is guilty of this (subsequent adultery), but also the one who accepted her, since he gives the wife a reason to sin, since if he had not accepted, she would have returned to her husband.” Clement is not favorable for the innocent victim in a divorce, however, it is important that at the end he does not mention at all the clause regarding a normal divorce and thus gives room to the idea that he is talking about an unlawful separation. Otherwise, the one who “let go” would be responsible not along with the one who “accepted”, but doubly and, first of all, for violating the commandment of God, regardless of the further fate of his ex-wife. Then the latter turns out to be the victim μη᾿ ε᾿ πι' λο᾿ γῳ πορνει᾿ ας. Much more direct and complete is the opinion of St. Epiphany. From him we read: “The people, due to their weakness, may be allowed to marry a second wife after the death of the first, if they are not able to be content with one wife. He who has one remains in great praise and honor among all members of the church rank; and one who cannot limit himself to one, as long as she dies or is separated (from her husband) for some reason, for example. fornication, adultery, or, in general, due to a serious fault, and the one who is married to another wife or a wife with a second husband is not condemned by the divine word, nor is he excluded from the Church and life, but is tolerated out of leniency towards weakness; - only so that whoever does not have two wives at the same time, the other while the first is alive, and those who are separated from one, if it happens, are legally married to the other. He is shown mercy by the priesthood (hierarchy) and the holy Church of God, especially when he is otherwise pious and acts according to God’s law” 77 . These judgments are characteristic and remarkable already because St. the father protects himself with frankly biblical and church authorities. They are too tangible and categorical, and yet Catholics try to weaken them with the reference that Epiphanius “places divorce and remarriage between the errors of Ebion” 78 . But here things are disparate to the point of incomparability, for the Ebionites extended the resolution ἂ χρι ε᾿ βδο᾿ μου γα᾿ μου 79 . Sometimes the blessed one came very close to this view. Augustine. Thus, he considers it beyond doubt that it is permissible to release a wife who has fallen into carnal impurity. “And when I said,” he continues, “that this is permitted, but not commanded, I did not pay attention to another Scripture (Prov. XVIII, 23), where it says: keep the adulterer mad and wicked” 80 . It is not difficult to find something similar in Tertullian, who is portrayed in our country as the stern argus of the marriage bed for divorced people. Meanwhile, he declared more than once that Christ “put a ban on divorce conditionally, if someone gets divorced only to marry another: whoever, He says, will let his wife go and marry someone else will commit adultery; and marry a prostitute who commits adultery (Matt. XIX, 9). Consequently, it is not permissible to marry another for the same reason that it is not permissible to let go: for whoever marries someone who has been unlawfully set aside is an adulterer, since she is not divorced, and as long as the (former) marriage continues, the new one will be adultery. Thus, if He (the Lord) forbade the release of a wife conditionally, He did not completely forbid it; and, without completely forbidding this, He allowed (to marry) others where there is no reason preventing (divorce)... What does your husband (Marcion) do if his wife has committed adultery? Is he really holding her? But, as you (Marcion) know, your Apostle (Paul in his epistles distorted by the heretic) does not allow the members of Christ to be communed with the harlot (cf. 1 Cor. VI, 15-16). So the legality of divorce has Christ as its guarantor (habet itaque et Christum assertorem justitia divortii)... Apart from the guilt of adultery, God does not separate what He Himself has united,” and with it, complete dissolution occurs 81. Therefore, Tertullian only advised celibacy “to the holy wife, after the dissolution of the marriage in any way” (qnaqunque sorte) 82. Further, he, respectu humanae infirmitatis, directly condemns women “who, after divorce or death of a spouse (divortio vel mariti excessu), not only reject this reason for such a good of abstinence, but do not even get married, prompting us to remind the commandment that it is much better to violate the Lord... And the more permissible and easier it is to get married in the Lord, the more guilty is the one who does not observe what she can” 83. Here, marriage is clearly allowed through divorce, which Tertullian considered legal and consensu pari 84. His testimony is especially important because even during this period of belonging to the Orthodox Church, the Carthaginian presbyter recognized no more than one marriage 85, but did not recommend it to the faithful 86, and found the second one downright harmful 87. The following remarks of the blessed one are also instructive. Jerome, which somewhat smooth out the exaggerated harshness of his general negative decision. “The Lord commanded that a wife should not be released unless it was the word of an adulterer, and also that one who has been released should remain single... When an adulterous wife is not released, it is right that the husband is considered an adulterer. Cling to the filthy one, there is one body (1 Cor. VI, 16); therefore, she who communicates with (the husband of) the fornicator and the unclean is one body with him.” These considerations are then applied to the particular case of Fabiola's divorce and new marriage. “They say she let the vicious one go,” she let go of his accomplice and his crimes, “she let go when, except for the wife who was hiding, all the neighbors were crying out about it. If they accuse her of why, having rejected her husband, she did not remain celibate, I admit this guilt, but I will point out the necessity. It is better, says the Apostle (1 Cor. VII, 9), to get married than to become thin. She was still very young and could not bear her “widowhood.” She saw in her members a different law, opposing the law of her mind (Rom. VII, 23), and, being defeated and captivated by it, she bowed down to cohabitation. She considered it better to openly confess her weakness and bring upon herself some shadow of an unhappy (second) marriage, than to commit the deeds of a harlot under the cover of her monogamous glory. Therefore, the Apostle “desires that young widows should marry; gave birth to children and did not give the enemy any reason for slander” (1 Tim. V, 14). And further he (St. Paul) sets out why he desires this: “for some have already turned aside after Satan” (v. 15). Therefore, Fabiola, when she was convinced and convinced that she had justly released her husband, and did not know the severity of the Gospel, in which wives are in every possible way prohibited from marrying while their husbands are alive, carelessly accepted one wound, avoiding many wounds of the devil.”88 Here Jerome examines the fact of the pagan past, but apologies for it with purely Christian principles, which for him turn out to “excuse” both the dissolution and second marriage of an innocent person. We do not hide the fact that this writer was apparently inclined towards the celibacy of divorced people, however, he also allowed exceptions that were of equal importance to the marriage of widowers 89. What has been said, not without reason, can be summarized in the idea that paternal opinions cannot and should not be decisively tilted in favor of the absolute prohibition of marriage after divorce. Patristic authorities recognized freedom for a new legal cohabitation for those who released ε᾿ πι ' πορνει 'ᾳ no less than for widowers; therefore, both such marriages are permissible according to the pedagogical condescension of the Church: this is the first limitation. But then we must firmly remember that Christianity for a long time was under the rule of hostile pagan laws, which, by their invasion or reflection, shook and even destroyed the entire evangelical system of believers. Naturally, under such conditions of marital indiscipline, legally protected and legally unpunished, a wide and uncontrollable space opened up, so temptingly attractive to weak human nature. It is clear that then the church authorities needed to energetically and predominantly insist on the sacred indissolubility of marriage bonds in order to protect Christians from the plunder of the elements of a dissolute world 90 . This deliberate emphasis on one fundamental side was caused by the era itself and should not blind us to the possibilities of exception. From this point of view, even weak hints about the permissibility of marriage after absolution receive special weight. Having secured this data, useful for an objective-historical and impartial judgment about the matter, we present below a set of patristic comments regarding the biblical passages of Matthew that interest us. V, 32 and XIX, 9. Let's start with Origen. He says: “Some heads of the Church allow a wife to encroach while her husband is alive, contrary to the Scripture, which reads: a wife is bound by the law as long as her husband lives (1 Cor. VII, 39) and also: for the same reason I live, the husband of an adulterer is punished if he be married to another (Rom. VII, 3), but not entirely unreasonable (ου᾿ μη᾿ ν πα᾿ ντη α᾿ λο᾿ γως ); for they rightly give such leniency to eliminate the worst evils" ... since among the Jews divorce was carried out too easily, "The Savior does not at all allow a marriage to be dissolved for any other sin than for one adultery found in the wife: everyone who lets his wife go, unless he commits adultery, commits adultery (Matthew Duck, 32). Perhaps someone will ask: is it forbidden to release a wife in addition to capturing her in adultery, for example? for preparing poisons (ε᾿ πι᾿ φαρμαχει 'ᾳ), or for killing a baby born to them, during the removal of a husband, or for some other murder? If she turns out to be devastating and plundering her husband’s house, but not an adulteress, then someone might ask: is it fair to reject her, since the Savior forbids anyone to let go of his wife except on the word of an adulterer? In both cases this seems inappropriate, but I do not know whether it is really absurd, for it seems unreasonable to endure such sins as are worse than adultery and fornication; however, hardly anyone would consider it pious to act against the Savior’s instructions. Now let us pay attention to why He (Christ) did not say: “Let no one let go of an adulterous man,” but says: “Whoever divorces his wife, except for the guilt of fornication, gives her a reason to commit adultery,” since by letting go an unfornicating wife, he himself clearly encourages her to commit adultery. For if I live and live with an adulterous husband, and if I have another husband, then the one who sets her free gives her grounds for a second marriage, thereby forcing her to be an adulteress. Whether or not he who releases someone caught preparing poison or committing murder has an apology or not, judge for yourself: after all, besides divorce, a husband can give his wife a reason for adultery in other ways, for example. beyond what is proper, allowing her to do what she wants and be friends with the men she wants, for similar offenses often happen to wives due to the simplicity of their husbands (when they abstain from them, not in accordance with their inclinations, or only let go of the words of an adulterer)... And just as a wife who thinks of encroaching on her husband during the life of the first one is an adulteress, so a husband who believes that he will marry a divorced woman does not marries because he commits adultery, according to the saying of our Savior” 91. According to this teacher, adultery between the one who lets her and the one who lets her go is an imaginary and criminal marriage relationship, if the former one is not permitted. Therefore, when the marriage is dissolved, there is no μοιχει᾿ α in the new marriage, or it is completely legal in case of divorce for the reason specified by the Lord - ε᾿ πι᾿ πορνει 'ᾳ. And one can most likely guess that at the beginning of the quote, Origen excuses marriages of those divorced not even for fornication. St. discusses our subject much more extensively. John Chrysostom. “Notice,” he writes 92, “that the Savior everywhere turns his speech to the husband, for he says: when he lets his wife go, she will commit adultery. The first, although he did not take the other, is already guilty of making his wife an adulteress; and the other becomes an adulterer because he takes someone else's. Then, so that, having placed all responsibility on the one who expelled him, he would not make the wife more insolent through this, He (Christ) closed the doors for marriage with her and the one who accepts her after this (absolution), saying: whoever takes a prostitute commits adultery, thereby inclining the wife to chastity, since he blocks her access to all vices and eliminates all reasons for pretense. For, knowing that it is absolutely necessary for her either to stick to the husband she got first, or, after leaving his house, not to have any other refuge, she is involuntarily forced to love her husband.” Does this mean that a second marriage is not permissible for any member of the married couple? Of course, but only in the case where there was no legal termination. Meanwhile, the Savior “allowed for one way of divorce, saying: only in the words of an adulterer. After all, if it were commanded to keep one who lives with many people, adultery would be allowed to happen through this.” Here the obstacle to the second marriage disappears, that the pustnitsa still remains the wife of the one who rejected it. Christ only strengthens and corrects the ancient teaching of the law, which did not hinder a man who hates his wife from removing her for various reasons and then taking another in her place. In a conversation on Chapter XIX. Ev. Matthew St. the father, asserting the fundamental unsolvability of marriage, does not stop at the clause of Art. 9th 93 - and it’s impossible to deduce anything from here. Therefore, more important are Chrysostom’s categorical remarks on 1 Corinthians, where we read: “In the case of adultery of a wife who drives her out, the husband is not condemned - because the marriage has already been destroyed (ο ' γα᾿ μος ἢ δη διαλε᾿ λυται) and both persons (living together) are being corrupted. She who has once fallen into adultery is not pure; if he who cleaves to a harlot has one body with her (1 Cor. VII, 16) and himself becomes unclean, then through this they are both deprived of purity... After adultery, the husband is no longer a husband" (μετα᾿ τη᾿ ν πορνει᾿ νη᾿ ρ ου᾿ χ ἒ στιν α᾿ νη᾿ ρ ), so that ε᾿ πι᾿ πορνει 'ᾳ there is a complete dissolution 94 . Because of this, the commandment about celibacy for a divorced person refers to separation for reasons of abstinence, other reasons, or displeasure 95 . These thoughts are revealed even more energetically in the Latin homilies that have come down to us under the name of St. John Chrysostom and, undoubtedly, very ancient ones. It says here: “As cruel and unjust is the one who lets go of a pure woman, so is the one who detains a harlot insane and unforgivable (cf. Proverbs XVIII: 23), for he who hides a wife’s crime is already the patron of her debauchery” 96 . Chrysostom's contemporary, Bishop Asterius of Amasia, no less decisively considers μοιχει᾿ α as a basis for dissolution of marriage. “If someone,” he notes, “exhibits the guilt of adultery and refers to it to justify divorce, then I will immediately accept the defense of the offended person and, having prepared an indictment against the adulteress, I will act instead of an adversary to the husband - his good defender, praising the one who is fleeing from the treacherous and breaking the ties with which he is connected with an asp or viper. The Creator of all things is the first to give permission to such a person, as one who is truly offended and lawfully drives away the plague from his home and hearth. After all, marriage is concluded for two reasons - for the sake of love (mutual) and childbearing, but neither of them is preserved with adultery: since there is no love if goodwill inclines towards the other, and goodwill is equally destroyed when the mixing of children occurs" 97 . Despite all the expressiveness of these words, Catholic publishers are perplexed: an sic dimissa aut dimittentes, a prioris conjugii vinculo, liberi existant 98 . However, the phrase of Asterius already quoted in the epigraph shows that, on the issue of divorce, he completely equated μοιχει᾿ α with death, which is why the consequences in both cases should be identical 99. According to St. Cyril of Alexandria 100, “throwing out a chaste woman gives her a good reason (ἂ δειαν) to encroach on another, which is a type of adultery; since with God marriage is not permitted by a profane book, but by shameful behavior” (η ' ἂ τοπος πρ ᾶ ξις). Theodore of Heraclius says 101 almost literally similar to the author of the Latin homilies of Chrysostom: “Just as it is unlawful to cast out a chaste woman, it is also wicked to retain an adulterer, according to what is written by Solomon” 102 . Equally, Apollinaris thinks 103 that “Christ allowed the fornicator to be rejected because she had already destroyed the natural (based on the laws of nature) combination and was no longer under this husband” 104. His view on the issue that interests us is blessed. Theodoret briefly formulates in the following words: “The Creator of nature... forbids allowing marriage, but indicated one reason for dissolution, breaking the union in its very essence (άληθῶς). For he says: everyone who puts away his wife, unless he commits adultery, commits adultery, and whoever understands the prostitute commits adultery (Matt. V, 32). Therefore, you need to endure everything unpleasant in your wife if, for example, she is talkative, a drunkard or abusive; but since she clearly neglects the laws of marriage and is looking for another (union), then the marriage is commanded to be dissolved” 105. Theophylact of Bulgaria believes 106 that in Matt. V, 32 The Lord “does not destroy the law of Moses, forbidding a husband to hate his wife without guilt. If he (the husband) left her for a good reason, that is, for fornication, then he is not subject to condemnation; if not for fornication, then he is subject to judgment, for he forces her to commit adultery. But even the one who accepts her (unjustly rejected) becomes an adulterer; for if he had not taken her, she might have returned and submitted to her husband. And a Christian should be a peacemaker even for strangers, and even more so in relation to his own wife” (with whom God copulated with him). It is clear that here, too, the idea of ​​being expelled is considered sinful only because the previous marriage was not actually destroyed. It is clear that if it is terminated it will not be criminal. But is a complete divorce possible? - Theophylact answers this by passing on Matt. XIX, 9 thus: “And I say, the Lord notes, that it is good to cast out (καλόν έκβάλλειν) a prodigal woman, as to a fornicator; but if someone drives out someone who has not committed adultery, he is guilty of her fornication” 107 . IIo in the words of Evfimy Zigavin, “Christ commands not only not to let his wife go, except for the word of an adulterous woman, that is, except for the guilt of adultery, but he also does not allow a woman who has been released to marry another husband. For whoever sends his wife away not because of the guilt of fornication forces her to commit adultery when she marries another husband, and he who marries one who has been set aside by another commits adultery with someone else... Thus, by accusing both the one who expels his wife unjustifiably (άλόγως) and the one who marries the one who has been set aside by another, the Lord strengthened the peace of the spouses and took care that it would not be allowed adultery" 108 . The Savior “commanded to cast out only one prodigal or adulterous wife... because every other guilt can be healed, but only this one is incurable”... “That’s why the disciples say: “if such is a man’s duty to his wife,” that is, if such is the condition of a marriage, so as not to be separated, then it is better for a man not to marry” 109. Few commentaries on the Gospel of Matthew have reached us from Latin patristic writers, but they are also important as witnesses to the Western church tradition, which is generally consistent with the Eastern Greek tradition. Hilary, comparing the old law with the new, says: “The Evangelical faith not only encourages peace, but also makes the husband responsible for the forced adultery of his wife if, under the pressure of separation, she marries another; it (faith) does not prescribe any other reason for the termination of marriage, except in the case where the husband would be defiled by communication with a prodigal wife” 110. According to the content of Matthew. XIX, 9 blessed. Jerome expresses himself in the following expressions: “Fornication alone can overcome a husband’s affection for his wife; since she shares one flesh with another and is herself torn from her husband by her fornication, she should not be kept, so as not to be under the oath of Scripture: keep an adulterer, a fool and a wicked one (Prov. XXVIII, 23). Therefore, where there is fornication or there is a suspicion of fornication, the wife is released freely. since it is possible that someone will slander the immaculate one and, for the sake of a new marriage, will bring charges against the previous one, in view of this, it is commanded to let go of the former wife, but not to have a second one, while the first one is alive. What has been said can be conveyed this way: If you let your wife go not because of lust, but because of her resentment, then why are you exposed to the danger of a new marriage, having experienced the misfortune of the previous one? It is equally unacceptable for a wife, having given a divorce to her husband in accordance with this law, to accept a second one. And since she, as a harlot and having already been an adulteress, will not fear dishonor, the second husband is commanded that if he marries such a woman, he himself will be guilty of adultery” 111. It only follows from this that when allowing a divorced person to marry, a special and insightful consideration is required, in addition to the bare fact of his ex-wife insulting him. The opinion of the blessed Augustine seems to directly favor the theory of separatio a mensa et thoro. In any case, it is true that he categorically denies the possibility of a conjugal union after divorce, which he makes too easy with his broad understanding of the term fornicatio (see De sermone Domini in monte, lib. I, cap. XIV-XVI, n. 39 - 50). По его суждению, «не позволительно вступать в брак ни жене при живом муже, от которого она отступила, ни ему жениться на другой при живой жене, которую он отпустил» 112 . “Whether the wife is released or leaves herself, she must remain celibate or be reconciled with her husband” 113. But he also indicates some restrictive condition: “If a wife is released by the husband with whom she wanted to live, then the one who takes her, according to the saying of the Lord, commits adultery; But is she also subject to the same crime? - it is unknown” 114. And once we answer in the negative, such a marriage will already be legal, for there is no reason why the taker should suffer, since the woman who wants to be married is innocent. Он грешить тут лишь чрез нее и освобождается от всяких упреков вместе с нею. These considerations are equally valid for the blessed. Jerome, whose teaching often leans towards the Catholic system. In relation to the wife, there is no doubt that the ban on remarriage is imposed on her due to her impurity, so it may not apply to the virgin. No less than that, a divorced spouse is not allowed to choose another spouse for himself solely because this indicates his lustful motives and the very dissolution of the previous union. In general, with a noticeable disapproval of second marriages 115, the exegetical tradition of patristic authorities is silent about the further fate of the one who released and the one who released legally. However, here it is necessary to understand that she considers the new marriage shameful only because of the adultery that accompanies it, when the old one has not yet been destroyed and continues to be exclusively legal. This means that now everything depends on whether the divorce is complete, freeing the victim from any obligations to the traitor. But on this score, it is undeniable that - according to the father's decision - πορνεία severed the marriage bond completely, and did not simply weaken it. The divorce issue is a matter of life itself, which is first and foremost normalized by church authority, applying the Gospel definitions to historical needs and conditions. For this reason, for the sake of completeness of the study, it is useful for us to consider how church legislation understood the analyzed sayings of the Savior in Matt. V, 32 and XIX, 9. We are content with only this side of the matter, for it is the only thing that is interesting to us in our special task. Therefore, we omit all the details of the subject, the difficulty of which is further complicated by the assumption that in it “there is currently an important and deep disagreement between the dogmatic and canonical teaching of our Church about the form (sacramental character) of the sacrament of marriage” 116. The 48th Apostolic Canon prescribes: “If any layman, having cast out his wife, understands another, or one rejected by another: let him be excommunicated” 117. Here the commandment of Christ in Matthew is actually repeated. V, 32, but the removal of the clause about πορνεία shows that this canon itself cannot be interpreted in an absolute sense. And indeed, Zonara, Aristin and Balsamon attributed it to illegal abandonment, without guilt, and their judgment is not unimportant, since these Byzantine commentators tried to stay on the basis of church tradition 118. The last of them notes: “He who expels his wife without reason cannot take another; otherwise he will be subject to excommunication. In the same way, the one who took a wife who was not free (from marriage), but who was released (and a released wife is one who is not divorced from her husband according to the law) is subject to excommunication, and is condemned as an adulterer, according to the word of the Lord, who says: marry a prostitute, he commits adultery” 119. And this is completely in accordance with the spirit of the 18th Apostolic Canon 120, where the one who has taken an outcast from marriage is only prohibited from entering the church rank, but there is no mention of divorce at all. The reason, apparently, is the same as for one who married a widow. In this case: if a marriage union with a second woman is permitted, then it is not prohibited for one who has been released or has separated from her husband due to his adultery. In accordance with the custom, the saying of Matt. V, 32, St. Vasily V. believes: “A wife who leaves her husband is an adulterer, even if she goes to another husband; but an abandoned husband is worthy of leniency, and the woman who cohabits with him is not condemned. If a husband, having departed from his wife, understands another, then he himself is an adulterer, having committed her (the first?) adultery, and the woman living with him is an adulteress, since she attracted someone else’s husband to herself” 121. From the last expression - άλλότριον ἂ νδρα - there is no doubt that in the final conclusion the rejection is illegal, but it is also true for the beginning, because, by the force of the rule of the 35th, leniency is given only then, “if the wife appears who has left without reason” 122. If such cohabitation does not attract condemnation, then its combination after normal dissolution, which is allowed for adultery for both husband and wife, is even less worthy. And this is all the more necessary because St. the father directly commands: “a husband expels a defiled wife from his house” 124. Therefore, Zonara Ave. The 8th is understood in the sense that “one who has legally united with a deserted husband is not condemned either as an adulterer or as a harlot” 125. Accordingly, in canon 77 Vasily v. “he who left his wife, who was legally married to him, and took another” is subjected only to penance and says nothing about the permission of his new relationship 126. It is only necessary to add that the Archbishop of Caesarea treats his wife much more strictly and advises every prostitute to remain unmarried, 127 perhaps because he interprets πορνεία as adultery, which, according to the views of that time, 128 for a husband was only in carnal communication with an unfree woman, that is, exclusively with a married woman. And the Council of Trulla, referring to the rules (9. 21. 35 and 77) of St. Vasily V., imposes penance on the one who left her husband without guilt and leaves (unreasonably: Zonara) legally coupled 129, from where, by contrast, Zonara concludes that “if a wife, not without reason, left her husband, who, perhaps, was excessively irritable against her, or treated her badly, or had any other reasons for this on the part of her husband, in that case she will be innocent if became the wife of another" 130. The Council of Carthage judges much more harshly, determining: “It has been decided, yes, according to the Gospel and Apostolic teaching, that neither one abandoned by his wife, nor one who has been put away by his husband is combined with another person; but either let them remain, or let them be reconciled with each other. If they neglect this, they will be forced to repentance” 131. Let us not emphasize the fact that the separation of this marriage is kept silent here; - for us, it is important that the quality and method of abandonment are not specified here, and Zonara applies this rule to divorce “according to ancient custom, when each of the spouses wanted (separation)” 132, i.e. to the Roman divortium ex cosensu (κατά συναίνεσιν), with which the Church has always fought most decisively. From all the collected data it follows that the canonical tradition categorically allowed divorce for adultery and even allowed a new marriage for an innocent person, even if he left for less valid reasons. This also confirms our thesis, obtained through exegetical means, that at the end of the marriage there is a complete cessation of the marriage bond, freeing the virgin for a new marriage. And the whole reason is that this crime completely strikes the most essential elements of marriage, shakes the very foundation of the marriage union, since it should be an absolute mysterious unity of those coupled - a small church of the two, where Christ dwells and where His mutual love with the believers is reproduced. Because of this, adultery undermines and destroys the very root of marriage. But it is clear that for this purpose the latter must be preserved when one side firmly guards the holiness of the sacrament; otherwise there will be nothing to destroy, and only in this case is it possible for it to be desecrated by the other. If they both fall, from the point of view of the mutual relationship of those combined, who are in an equal position of guilt before God, this will be an insult of man against man. For such a complication, the apostolic commandment already comes into its own: bear each other’s burdens (Gal. VI, 2), so that, with mutual condescension and unrelenting correction, they achieve marriageable fidelity and through this prove worthy of mystical sanctification. For this (we think) reason, and if each member of the marriage couple cheats, they are not allowed to cohabitate. But it goes without saying that the marital fall of only one is essentially a sin, which does not exclude restoration 133. This means that for the irrevocable rupture of a marital union, the presence of πορνεία, the concept of flagrante delicto (έπ αύτοφόρ ῳ), is still not enough, but the inveterate stubbornness of the fornicator, his entrenchment in vice and his reluctance to regain the disposition of the abused are necessary. Hence the obligation for the victim to strive in every possible way for reconciliation and the establishment of a normal order. Only after that will his divorce intentions be pure; without this, clinging to a single example, he will reveal the deceit of his heart, oblivion of the fact that what God has combined must be supported to the last opportunity and with self-sacrifice. Therefore, divorce cannot be allowed for the simple fact that in practice many and serious abuses are not alien. On the contrary, when such a case is discovered, first of all and in every possible way one must take care of destroying the storm that has arisen and preventing shipwreck 134 by correcting the fallen and turning to the forgiveness of the faithful. From this point of view, the short-term and formal 135 process of “exhortation” hardly satisfies the strict requirements 136 . It seems that it would be more prudent and timely to legitimize a longer disciplinary experience - for the betrayer in repentance and self-purification, for the other - in fraternal condescension for the benefit of his own flesh. But then, as the church authorities and the offended exhaust all means of admonition, the innocent is completely freed from previous marital duties for new ones. This is in accordance with the spirit of the teaching of Christ, where we are talking only about an extraordinary exception from the general rule, and with the meaning of church tradition, which speaks extremely reservedly about divorce and, even more so, about the marriage of a divorced person 137 . According to the fair remark of Blessed. Augustine, the words of the Lord mean that He cogit retinere uxorem, si causa fornicationis non fuerit; si autem fuerit, non cogit dimitiere, sed permittit 138 . Some living illustrations from the era of the ancient Church are also instructive in this regard. From the time of her St. Justin M. reports the following edifying incident: “One woman, who had previously been dissolute herself, lived with a dissolute husband. When she, having learned the teachings of Christ, became chaste, she began to persuade her husband to chastity as well... But he, being in his lewdness, constantly entered into illegal relations. Considering it wicked to share a bed with a husband who indulged in carnal pleasures contrary to the laws of nature and beyond all the world, she decided to finally break off all (marital) ties with him. But even at the same time, she respected the advice of her 139 and forced herself to stay longer - in the hope that her husband would someday change. And when it became known that her husband, having gone to Alexandria, began to do much worse, she, having given the so-called divorce, separated from him, so that, while remaining in the union and sharing the table and bed with him, she would not be an accomplice in disorder and wickedness” 140. According to this and the practical result of our reasoning, it would be best to formulate the lessons of the recently (January 6, 1894) deceased Bishop Theophan: “Only one legal reason for divorce is indicated - the infidelity of the spouses: but what if something like that is revealed? Be patient. We have a universal commandment - to bear each other's burdens; the more willingly such close persons as spouses should perform it mutually to each other. Reluctance to endure inflames troubles, and trifles pile up into the dividing wall. What is the mind given for? Smooth out the path of life. Prudence will sort out the opposites encountered. They do not get divorced from a lack of everyday prudence, but more from a reluctance to think about the state of affairs and, even more, from the lack of other goals in life other than pleasures. When pleasures cease, contentment with each other also ceases; further and further, here comes the divorce. The more the goals of life are trivialized, the more divorces become more frequent, on the one hand, and, on the other, lawless temporary cohabitation” 141. Therefore, it is necessary not to expand and strengthen the reasons for divorce, as many of us want to do following the example of Protestants, 142 but, if possible, to eliminate and weaken them, to try to turn the most evil into good. If a husband is the image of God, it is necessary and obligatory for him to be completely like Jehovah, who through the mouth of the prophet cries: “Return, apostate daughter of Israel, says the Lord. I will not pour out My wrath on you; For I am merciful, says the Lord, and will not be angry forever. Only admit your guilt: for you have departed from the Lord your God, and you have committed debauchery with strangers under every branching tree, and you have not listened to My voice, says the Lord. Return, you apostate children, because I have joined with you” (Jeremiah III, 12–14)! II. Criticisms and practical considerations 143 This article had long been completed when we received one essay in which fundamental objections were made to our view. We consider it appropriate to speak specifically about them, and the issue raised will be illuminated by some additional clarifications. This work was written by the Dean of Lichfield, Herbert Mortimer Lukecock, in view of the lively and heated debates in the English church and society, and with detailed comprehensiveness (XVIII-321 pp.) reveals “the history of marriage, Jewish and Christian, in its relation to divorce and certain prohibited degrees of kinship” 144. This treatise is distinguished by its completeness and scientific solidity of argumentation, and it is all the more important for us that on the subject of interest it gives an absolutely negative conclusion on the basis of the Word of God and church authorities. Naturally, we cannot leave it indiscriminately and must take it seriously. Let's look at everything in order. As for the Gospels, Lucock first of all draws attention to the differences in their evidence and, in order to eliminate conciliatory hypotheses, recalls the theses of Bishop Andrews: the smaller, quantitatively, must be explained from the larger and the earlier is the later (pp. 51–52). These rules, of course, benefit the author, but they are not applicable to this subject, since the relationship of synoptic editions is unknown to us exactly either by mutual dependence or by chronological continuity, and then for cases of this kind, he himself unconditionally recognizes the force of the formula (Bengel): proclivi transcriptioni praestat ardua (p. 101). Consequently, the testimony of Ev. Matthew must be interpreted separately, without weakening their special energy by deliberately emphasizing the contrast with other homogeneous sayings: only then are speeches about agreement permissible. Lucock willingly takes this position and, having established himself in it, begins to carry out various tactical maneuvers to ensure his victory. The basis for all further operations is the provision about the “local coloring” (color) of our Gospels, which is why in some places the application of the Lord’s words turns out to be limited in the sense that He spoke for the Jews and only to the Jews, although His teaching was intended for all the nations under heaven (p. 56 sequ.). With this principle, some adaptations to the demands of listeners, accommodative unification with them, as well as exhortations for their sake alone, with a temporary nature, are completely understandable. But it is certain about the Apostle Matthew that he published his creation “for the Jews” and therefore most preserves the commandments of a transitory nature. Thus, in his Sermon on the Mount, Christ pursues two goals: a) partly to eliminate and partly to spiritualize the instructions of Moses, and b) thereby restoring them to their original purity, contrary to the sophistical perversions of the rabbis. In it we have simply a correct disclosure of the Mosaic code (p. 58). In the expression itself one hears the language of rabbinic casuistry (cf. above on p. 15 ff.), which decisively sanctioned the legality of divorce 145, as long as all the complex formalities 146 regarding the “loose book” were strictly observed. Therefore, the Savior actually notes that the law does not allow such unbridledness at all and allows dissolution solely because of a “shameful matter” (Deut. XXIV, 1); nevertheless, everything else is irrevocably dismissed as a human invention, morally intolerable (pp. 59–60). It is not surprising now that Mark and Luke did not transmit this section in view of its uselessness for the Gentiles, and Matthew withheld it because it was “deeply significant for every Jew” (p. 63). After this, all difficulties are easily eliminated with a brief reference that the Discourse on the Mount was neither spoken nor written for Christians, since it was not with them. Lukecock's idea is not at all original 147 and, unfortunately, not new even for Russian exegetical literature. It has its merits, since it protects the eternal inviolability of the moral standards of Moses and in this way the content of the entire speech brings into absolute agreement with the categorical statement of Matthew. V, 17–19. But, on the other hand, at the same time we will come into an even more dangerous collision with the teaching of the Apostle Paul and, speaking honestly, we will have to perish in this hopeless collision. The ego is so obvious that there is nothing to spread. And we firmly think that there is not the slightest need to fall from the frying pan into the fire. The Savior directly limits the indefeasible action of the law to the limit until everything will be, which is fulfilled in Him. Νόμος - along with the prophets - only until John (Matt. XI, 13. Luke XVI, 16), for he is absorbed in Christ (Gal. IV, 4–5), - and then the heavy pedagogical (Rom. VII, 7 ff., etc.) influence of the commandments of Moses ceases completely 148. There is no decisive incentive to extend beyond this interpretation. The formula “spoken to the ancients” does not at all mean that the Sermon on the Mount contains school book opinions that were presented as “legal”; on the contrary, the demolition from Acts. XV, 21 undoubtedly convinces us that the written word of Moses and what follows from it are conceived of as corresponding to it. In this case, Lukecock argues (p. 59), verse 31 is not affected, since it is preceded by a shorter “said”; This means that it quotes later rabbinic glosses. However, it also occurs in Art. 38, where the Old Testament saying is reproduced with punctuality equal to Art. 27, for which τοῖς άρχαίοις is again extremely controversial. Based on all this, it is irrefutable that the starting point of the hypothesis of the author being analyzed is completely erroneous. However, in our question the center of gravity is not here at all and for him it is completely indifferent whose expressions are mentioned by the Lord. The only important thing is what exactly and in what spirit Christ Himself expounds. But, first of all, it is difficult to agree that He only crushed the creations of rabbinic ingenuity and did not go further than that. Firstly: in examples of this kind, the Lord speaks categorically directly and, which is especially characteristic, never merges commandment and tradition, but contrasts them (Matthew XV, 3.6. Mark VII, 9.13), while in the conversation on the mount we observe the opposite phenomenon. Secondly: the imposed tendency did not in the least force such a sharp contrast that it was necessary to assimilate the antithetical “a I” to the divine Teacher as His special suggestions to His listeners in order for them to achieve the ideal height of likeness to the Heavenly Father (Matt. V, 48). And in one place He emphasizes that His demands immeasurably exceed the usual and sanctioned norm (Matthew V, 46.47), as is also differentiated in Luke (VI, 32 - 34). Then the accommodation of all the Gospels will be the same, and Luke will lose his point of support. Thirdly: it is completely impossible to comment on the entire speech on the mount in the sense of the correct interpretation of the Mosaic Law, and any attempts in this direction are certainly idle and in vain, because they are ephemeral. For an unprejudiced reader, it is irrefutable that many of its theses are separated by a whole abyss from legalistic ones and do not follow from the latter at all, which is why, even with all the art of dialectical resourcefulness, there is no internal connection between them. True for two cases, this conclusion is indisputable for everyone, in particular for Art. 32. The Catholic Anglican argues that in this place the restriction of Deuteronomy is reproduced in its entirety. XXIV, I o d e bar ervah. In his opinion, these terms indicate the uncleanness of the wife during her girlhood (pp. 21–22), when the marriage itself is fictitious. From this side, it is very pleasant for him that Mf. V, 32 πορνεία is used, which differs from μοιχεία no less than the Hebrew. גָאַף and וָכָח for it makes known carnal unchastity before marriage, and not during it, where a married woman enters into an unlawful relationship with another. “If so, then we discover the explanation in a strictly Jewish custom (?), according to which the discovery by the husband of a premarital sin in the bride permits the marriage. In general, the teaching of Christ rests on an ideal view of the primary marital union, which, undoubtedly, was indissoluble. As a true Restorer (no more?), He could only (!) return to the fundamental source of all morality; It is natural that, having encountered the perverted practice of the Jews, He reveals that once the unity concluded by the marriage bond is irremovable and that, however, separation is allowed only under the condition that there was simply an outward appearance of marriage. This is where the betrothed woman, after the marriage ceremony, will find herself having lost her virginity even before. In this case, in the eyes of the Jews, strictly speaking, there was not so much a divorce as a declaration of the invalidity of marriage... This custom was based on a high and praiseworthy principle, and our Lord refers to it without any hesitation, at least before the people who adhered to it and attached value to it; because this is the only exception (now allowed by Christians, at the birth of a child, in Austria, Hungary, Württemberg, Hamburg, and in Sweden extended to all illegal intercourse) does not in the least subvert the original intention of God in establishing marriage. Thus, this is a feature of the “local color” of the Gospel of St. Matthew; and he alone carefully preserved it because of its purely Jewish coloring. But it had no application for other nations and did not find a place for itself in the pages of St. Mark (?) and St. Luke" (pp. 60–62). This web is not cunning or complex, but rather woven with the help of imagination. The author greatly values “purely linguistic grounds” (p. 63), and it is all the more surprising that he confines himself to the unsubstantiated statement that “a careful analysis of all those places where the words under discussion are used (i.e. πορνεία and μοιχεία) both in the LXX and in the New Testament shows that the difference between them is usually preserved.” (p. 60–61). Briefly and... not entirely convincingly, since Lucocq is a little higher and himself (cf. Heng. Stephani Thesaurus V, 1466–1467) admits 149 that “πορνεία also applies to a married woman when: - in addition to her infidelity - she will become an open prostitute, but nowhere does it characterize the general fact of simple adultery” (p. 60). Isn’t this a sufficient refutation of the artificial hypothesis of terminological distribution, if this saying means all kinds of carnal uncleanness without the most precise qualification, and this is absolutely affirmed by all lexicographers? And it is difficult in Acts. XV, 20. 29; XXI, 25 to mean exclusively fornication of unmarried persons or τήν γυναῖκα ΄ Ιεζαβήλ in Apoc. II, 20. 21 considered a girl. It is even more characteristic that the connection between the Corinthian inbred and the “father’s wife” is called πορνεία (1 Cor. V, 1). Finally, even in the Discourse on the Mount itself, a lustful look at a woman is recognized as μοιχεία (Matt. V, 28), but a limitation is hardly permissible here. In any case, the New Testament language does not scrupulously maintain the individual shades of the words being analyzed; therefore, on this basis it is not possible to create anything lasting 150. It is also significant that none of the patristic writers puts forward this feature and many speak out against it (cf. Saiceri Thesaurus II, 809). It is much more important for us to decide for what purpose a deviation from the more usual usage is allowed - and here we get the precious idea that fornication dissolves a marriage because the guilty person thereby puts himself in the position of a celibate lust, and a new marriage in the event of an illegal divorce is not possible for the reason that it would be an adulterous relationship, since the previous one has not been dissolved 151. These are very significant points necessary for the clearest and most striking expression of the entire argument; For this reason, special terminology is chosen. Then, and in general there is no doubt that in Art. 32. it speaks of a wife no less legitimate than in the previous one; otherwise it was necessary to expect a sharper shade to eliminate all reciprocity. But let Lukecock be fair: and then he does not get what he wants in the form of a “correct interpretation of the Mosaic Law.” This one directly states that a divorced woman is free to marry anyone and only not her former husband (Deut. XXIV, 2-4), while Christ categorically states that a union with her will be the relationship of an adulterer: where is even the slightest similarity? where is the thread of unity between these mutually negating extremes? True, Lucoc tries to bridge the gap between “custom,” but he cannot withstand his own weight, and the daredevil inevitably plunges into the abyss. History does not know such a custom among Jews; Yes, even if there was one, we would have taken upon ourselves a grave sin, thinking that the Lord sanctified human traditions and presented them as the purest essence of the law, according to the “primordial intention of God.” And in what light will the ideal of Christian perfection to the degree of sonship of God appear before us, since it is based on a simple adaptation of a temporary nature? Doesn’t it follow from this that it is more convenient to remain silent about “local color” and not use it as the basis for comprehending the essential meaning of the Savior’s own words? This is only a side effect, but not the foundation, which is why Lucoc builds on sand. This is even more noticeable when interpreting Matthew. XIX, 9, for it is impossible to imagine that it would mention fornication outside of marriage, as the English writer agrees with this. For this case, he resorts to this paraphrase. To the tempting question of the Pharisees, the Savior answers them that, not being a command, the Mosaic commandment is not compatible with the original idea of ​​​​marriage and was forced from the legislator by the hard-heartedness of the people to prevent great evils; however, in this area, permission extends only to carnal defilement. Hence, “He simply reminds his hearers that Moses did not sanction divorce on their flexible principles, but only on the ground of impurity. Briefly, He does not pronounce a legal norm for Christianity, but corrects Judaism. This is the reason for the preservation of this clause in the Gospel of St. Matthew, written for the Jews, and its omission in the Gospels of St. Mark and St. Luke (although he is speaking - XIV, 14. 18 - before the Pharisees?), counting on readers of pagan origin" (p. 64 - 65). However, even in this place the prohibition of marriage for a divorced woman remains in full force; there is not even a hint of seizure and, on the contrary, any union with a hermit is declared adulterous (p. 67). By this, Christ supposedly rejects all Jewish restrictions and prescribes the law for the Church of the future (p. 68). All this is wonderful, but the author does not see where he is going. If so, is it possible to assert that “in the second example (i.e., in Matthew xix. 9) our Lord was only setting forth the Mosaic law, where dissolution is not permitted except in a shameful matter” (p. 66)? After all, the answer now goes too far beyond the boundaries of the matrimonial views of the Jews, and Christ had to fight with them with their own weapons; they did not recognize anything other than a legalistic basis and were not inclined to accept anything according to His personal verdict (p. 64), meanwhile it turns out that He recommends to them Formulas unheard of and dissimilar to the word of Moses. Thus, it turns out that Lucoc’s end forgets its beginning, which for this reason turns out to be a point of injury. So it is with all certainty. Matthew treats not just the release of the wife, but also the marriage of the husband, which is not at all present in Deuteronomy. Therefore, it is clear that with the first we do not have the restoration of the Mosaic commandment in its true content. In this severe misfortune, Lucoc turns to a desperate remedy and declares the phrase καί γαμήσ ῃ ἂ λλην to be a later gloss. One is simply amazed at such courage in such an important subject, where such barbaric methods are least acceptable! It is all the more unexpected because, for the sake of the integrity of the tenth canon of the Council of Arles in 314, the author is ready to go almost to the cross (pp. 100–101), since this rule is useful for him. And the grounds for the said violence are completely insignificant. Lukecock himself does not attach much weight to the evidence of the manuscripts, emphasizing only in his notes (p. 66) that “the reading he accepts is found in the Vatican List (B) and in the Codex of Ephraim the Syrian (C 1), is certified by the Coptic version, Origen, Augustine, and is strongly supported by such an early authority as St. Clement" (Alexandrian?). This is too little, not to say more sharply, if regarding the latter, others 152 think that both μή έπί πορνεία and πκρεκτός λόγου πορνείας were borrowed precisely from it. It is enough for us to mention that only Tischendorf agrees to the proposed exclusion on a ghostly basis (petitum est ex parallelis) (I, 114), and the newest critics can hardly be suspected of delicacy in relation to the New Testament text. Moreover, the named church writers do not quote Matthew. XIX, 9 is punctual, but this is an obligatory conditio sine qua non, when we want to confirm scientifically that they did not know the controversial words, although, for their purposes, they should have cited them several times. In any case, there are more votes for the regular editors and they are louder and more impressive. For this reason, Lukecock is more willing to use theoretical “considerations”; however, the value of such items is not more than a penny, because they are absolutely subjective. First of all, he refers to the fact that καί γαμήσ ῃ ἃ λλην “introduces a new element” (p. 65), and isn’t it much more original to prohibit marriage for a divorced woman? Why should we hold on to this and cross out that? Have you heard of this method being practiced in any serious textual criticism? Of course, we also know quite a few who, together with Lucock, find that of the two dubious (?) readings, the one consistent with other observations is preferable (p. 66). What is forgotten here is that these gentlemen are Bruno Bauer, Steck, Friedrich (Malice), who are ready to shorten all of Pavlova’s epistles into a hundred verses for the same reasons. But it seems not at all proper for our author to imitate them if he defends the “fundamental principle” of the superiority of lectionis arduae (p. 101). In Matthew this is necessary. To the disciples, the Lord’s decision seems like a “cruel word,” and they cannot accept it 153. From the Gospel story itself (Matt. XIX, 10) it is clear that they were embarrassed by the actual fate of their husband; they did not care about their spouse, looking at the law through the prism of rabbinic interpretations 154. They are worried exclusively about “the guilt of a man with his wife.” Why is this, since it includes premarital and postmarital sins that are not strictly classified? Let absolution be tolerated only with μοιχεία - and there was nothing to be surprised about, because this opinion was energetically propagated by Shammai, and Christ sanctioned it. Where is the unusualness of a striking quality here? It does not exist and cannot exist. But the picture changes completely, since one cannot marry even though Moses and the most conservative rabbis allowed this. This is the key to the whole mystery, and throwing it into the sea is absolute folly. From this point of view, Lukecock’s “considerations” speak against him and indirectly defend the idea that in Matt. XIX, 9, both divorce and new marriage are allowed only in cases of adultery, in which both the first and the second are legal for an innocent person. It further follows that this is a commandment of Christ himself, not limited in its meaning either locally or chronologically. Naturally, separate echoes of it should be preserved in patristic literature; It is no less clear that the English writer will fail in this area. However, even in this field he does not lose his presence of mind and summarizes his general view in the following expressions: “The Fathers and Councils, in general, favor divorce due to adultery, but only with rare exceptions - and even then in the later part of the ancient period and only in one branch of the Church - do they strictly prohibit a second marriage for both parties, until death destroys their original union” (p. 80). We saw above to what extent this categorical judgment is incorrect, and therefore we will now limit ourselves to a few additional comments. Here, already at the beginning, we come across a sharp contradiction, extremely dangerous for Lukecock, although he suppresses it with heroic stoicism. In his opinion, “for all His members the Lord imposes the requirement of absolute indissolubility of the marriage union” (p. 71); equals “if St. Paul was a faithful interpreter of the mind of Christ—the earliest independent interpretation on the subject of marriage would be that it cannot be broken by divorce or separation” (p. 79). Meanwhile, it turns out that non posse turns into esse, sometimes directly into debere with “fornicating words.” Are we not right to think that, having adopted this feature of “local color,” the Church also accepted the result that follows from it? And, without a doubt, such a conclusion will be more logical than the other, that the Apostle of tongues “set the tone for the whole future, because in the first centuries we find almost continuous agreement with this view in patriotic and conciliar decisions” (p. 79). In any case, there was one very important retreat, and there should be no talk of a complete consensus either in the Posenician or in the pre-Nicene era. The latter is especially dear to Lucock, and about it he states: “from various provinces of the western half of the Church there is evidence in favor of absolute marital indissolubility, but Christians lived by this norm in the East as well” (p. 103). For him, Origen himself is interesting, because St. Justin and Clement do not express themselves quite clearly. But the Alexandrian teacher, as we know, is least suitable for these purposes, since he ascribes to the ecclesiastical authority the competence of marriage. Contrary to this, the author philosophizes that “the rule and practice of the Church in the time of Origen, undoubtedly, rested on the belief that marriage is inviolable by nothing but death. Of course, she is free to allow for some the right of dispensation, for one reason or another, when the principle of Mosaic indulgences is required by human weakness - and Origen does not undertake to condemn this absolutely, recognizing the same for Moses; yet he leaves no shadow of doubt that the authority of Scripture and legitimate church practice were against it” (pp. 88–89). Here the simplest matter is needlessly and very awkwardly confused, when it should have been said that divorce was an exception and was nevertheless allowed ού μήν πάντη άλόγως 155, and no one else wants this. The West is much more favorable for Lukecock, although he does not always sing in unison with it. Hermas, for example, commands that a husband who has let his wife go for adultery should remain celibate (vir per se maneat), but he had special considerations for this. Further, he reads: “If the woman of the desert repents and wishes to return to her husband, should he accept her? Definitely; if he does not accept, he will sin and sin grievously. A repentant sinner should be accepted, but not. often, for for the servants of God repentance is one (τοῖς γάρ δούλοις τοῦ Θεοῦ μετάνοιά έστι μία). It is precisely in view of repentance that a husband cannot marry another woman once he is separated from his wife” 156. Thus, Hermas does not think in the spirit of Lucock, since unrepentance of the kind reported by Justin Martyr is also possible (see page 55 to note 138). The mention of μετάνοια μία loudly says that the prohibition for a divorced person is valid no longer as long as there is hope for the correction of the erring spouse; then it apparently ceases, and the innocent is given a legal path to a new marriage. The Council of Elvira condemns (in Sap. VIII) to final excommunication from communion “those wives who - without any previous reason (nulla praecedente causa) - leave their husbands and unite with others.” It hardly follows from this that the only thing that applies here is greater punishment for arbitrary abandonment (Luckock, p. 98), since according to can. IX and quae adulterum maritum reliquerit fidelem non prius accipiat communionem, nisi quem reliquerit, prius de saeculo exierit; nisi forte necessitas infirmitatis dare compulerit. In any case, the second marriage is not dissolved, even if it is not considered equal to the first. Tertullian turns out to be much more intractable, causing a lot of trouble for Luke, forcing him to take risky measures. He himself agrees that the Carthaginian presbyter “admits the legality of divorce” (p. 91) and “after him the possibility of marriage without incurring the guilt of adultery, but he does not talk about this at length and does not define what legal divorce is” (p. 90). This means asking beyond what is given and, in the absence of an exact registration, not seeing the striking argument that in the era of Tertullian causae divortii were generally known. To eliminate this conclusion, Lukecock points out (p. 91 – 93) to the treatise De monogamia, where it is stated: nobis, etsi repudiemus, nes nubere quidem licebit 157, and to deduce from this that “his language is as accurate as possible in the sense of the African Church’s disapproval of divorced marriages” (p. 94). Это было бы верно, если бы Тертуллиан к тому времени не был монтанистом. And such an objection cannot be weakened by the ploy that belonging to a heresy discredits only the interpretation and does not affect the evidence of historical reality (p. 92). Unfortunately, this is exactly what is not there, since the Carthaginian teacher argues not with factual references to church practice and the authority of the fathers, but purely dogmatically - with his personal theoretical considerations. He does not state, but legislates from his reason and in this area he gets carried away too far - almost to the destruction of the marriage itself, when he finds: malum est contingere (cf. 1 Cor. VII, 1) or - in the most lenient assessment - non mere bonum esse, quod permittitur 158, which he considered every marriage to be and how it was not alien to the entire ancient Christian consciousness. It is necessary that with such a point of view there was no proper line between matrimonium and sturpum, for in both cases there is carnal communication, the desire of which the Lord equates to fornication 159. Because of this, “those who wish to enter heaven must abstain from what closes heaven,” and be virgins 160. It is not necessary to add that second marriage turns directly into a grave sin: non aliud dicendum erit secundum matrimonium, quam speciem sturpi 161. It would be interesting to hear now how this Tertullian could talk about the marriage of divorced people, since he was bitter against its very foundations? Doesn’t all his harshness say, rather, that condemned phenomena in church practice were encountered without restraint, why, for the sake of an imaginary highest perfection, he joined Montanism and inspired others with his mood, why Hermas even called amator, patronus et socius moechorum 162? Otherwise there would be no need to cry out about this with such uncontrollability. But, in all truth, Tertullian is the only ally of Lukecock who strides too broadly and generalizes the exceptional into the unremarkable. The later history of the Eastern Church, in its categorical sanction of marital freedom for the innocent party of a divorced couple, is completely unpleasant for our author, and he has a hard time. But he again resorts to a very ingenious maneuver, blaming his misfortune on what is rightly seen as the greatest event in the triumph of Christianity. This is its proclamation as the state religion under Constantine. According to Lukecock, there is a lot of sadness in this revolution (pp. 80–81), and he readily agrees with Stanley that after this church authorities showed “undignified compliance with compromises” with the sacrifice of the ecclesiastical code for the sake of the civil code (pp. 103–106). The emperor's conversion brought danger to the Church (p. 108–109), since, living under the shadow of the imperial throne, she was powerless against the peace of secular power (p. 147). The East allegedly gradually fell away from the ancient teaching (p. 148), and its church rulers and leaders showed weak resistance even in those cases when almost pagan licentiousness was introduced (for example, under Theodosius the Younger) (p. 149). In this, Luke finds protection for himself from his Western enemies. Thus, in the “Penitential” of Theodore, apxbishop of Canterbury (from 663 - 669), it is stated (lib. II, cap. 12, § 5) that not only an innocent husband is free to marry, but also an adulterous prostitute, if she repents, after five years can legally encroach on another. This is understandable, - objects the English writer (p. 165-166), - for Theodore was born in the East, in Tarsus, brought up in this city and in Athens, and for more than sixty years was under the influence of Eastern discipline and theology and - at the time of his unexpected appointment in Canterbury - did not yet know the laws and rules of the Western Church. Reading all this, you involuntarily and with amazement ask yourself: wouldn’t it be better for Christianity if the era of persecution did not stop and the cross of Christ never shone openly? This, of course, is not stated directly by Lukecock; but all the more energetically he praises the West, which is dear to him with its marital strictness. It was he - in the person of his three “heroes-champions” (Jerome, Ambrose and Augustine) - who in close ranks invariably maintained his position (p. 147); thanks to his comparative independence from the state, he deviated less from the original ideal (p. 154) and is the best witness to the ante-Nicene interpretation of the divorce problem (p. 130). We do not take upon ourselves the task that does not belong to us to analyze these fabrications as a church historian and for our special purposes we will use only the argumentum ad hominem. Without a doubt, it is a grave disaster when state authority suppresses church authority, forcibly invades the territory of the second and plants its banners on churches, instead of or along with the symbol of Christian redemption. This should be bitterly regretted if it happens anywhere, but let Lucoc point out and prove it en masse, as the fundamental and dominant fact for the Christian East in the 4th century! He does not do this, and the more criminal is his responsibility before God and conscience. And then: is Western “freedom” much more beautiful? History told us how it was resolved, and its answer is far from comforting. In the West, a tendency towards the greatest possible elimination of all secular influence and towards complete autonomy in its area began to be revealed early on. The papacy dreamed of more and little by little added to its competence matters of a purely state-civil nature, since it itself thought of being a “canopy” for the imperial thrones. Таким образом здесь обрисовываются пред нами две характерные черты церковной независимости и церковного абсолютизма. But the abnormality of such a system is sufficiently evidenced by the fact that it led to constant conflicts and mutual antagonism, which, of course, was only harmful for the conflicting parties and undermined the authority of one or the other, sometimes both together. So, in relation to our question, in the West of Europe it often happened that the powerful of this world in marriage difficulties were able to cope perfectly well without the permission of Rome, whose prohibitions were trampled upon with remarkable audacity and therefore closely resembled ridicule of oneself. Is this useful and beneficial for the Christian consciousness, which was divided between two masters and in the end lost any point of support? And this is especially true since the Roman hierarchs were often guided by outsiders when, for example, they protested against the marriage of the divorced Charles in Genmirgard not so much because of the violation of marriage laws, but out of hatred for the insidious and hostile house of Lombardy to the popes (Luckock, pp. 156–157). It was even worse that the Western clergy more than once compromised their convictions and tried to cover up their betrayal with sophistical twists, so as not to lose the hands of secular rulers. It is known that Lothair was completely wrong in his slander against his first wife Teutoberga, and yet the synod recognized this union as fictitious ab initio 163. It is equally reliable that Eugene II and Leo IV “due to circumstances abandoned their previous position” and guaranteed the marriage rights of the innocent, although it was as if the original banner of the ban was being held (p. 161). Bishop Laud (cnf. The Life of Arzchbishop Laud. By the Rev. H. C. Simpkinson) married his patron, the Earl of Devonshire, to a divorced adulteress, thus offending the canons (p. 178). And the Trent “fathers” abandoned their initial anathema solely because it would have been “extremely impolitic” (pp. 162–163) 164 . What can we say about those cases where “the selfish interests of man prevailed over the law of God” (p. 181), and (p. 204) “the flock was led into temptation, the house of God was desecrated and the most solemn services in it turned into farce and blasphemy”? How to call the “compromises of the Church” (p. 206) in the same vein as the “sad and scandalous fact” that in twelve dioceses (England) - under the dogmatic rule of strict tradition - they did not limit marital indulgences even for inveterate adulterers, and in sixteen others they opened wide scope for them (p. 207)? Not without reason, Luke also regrets the consent of the (Anglican) bishops to the clause on the significance of previous illegal marriages, since this entails “terrible consequences” (pp. 305–306), as well as in general about the conflict between church and civil authorities (pp. 313–314). Of course, the author can explain all this by “evil desires and passions, indulgence of base lusts” (p. 107), but such a judgment will only be a grave insult to any Church and, above all, to Anglicanism, which considers itself such 165. It is obvious that the vaunted Western church autonomy has not distinguished itself in our subject. Along with this, it also led to other dangerous results. Secular power had difficulty putting up with the burdensome church guardianship and found a plausible loophole in the right of dispensation or exemption from mandatory restrictions 166 . Already Karl in. declared royal prerogatives “above the law” and scornfully rejected papal intervention (p. 156). John, married to the daughter of William, Earl of Gloucester, Gadvisa, lived with her quietly for eleven years; then, captivated by the beauty of Isabella of Angoulême, he removed the first and took the second, although she was the betrothed bride of another. At the same time, it was stated that the king was beyond legal constraints - and he was readily given permission for this adulterous union (p. 173). Friedrich V. went further and acquired for himself all the privileges of the dispensation (p. 290). Lukecock considers this order to be completely natural (p. 286), thinking that, of necessity, the state is absolutely impeccable in its claims to concessions (p. 315). It is interesting now to note how an Anglican, having begun to be a Catholic, ends up a Protestant. According to the current law, in the latter, marriage, in addition to all legal forms and norms, is permitted simply by a rescript of the local ruler “by virtue of his powers,” for (according to the court of the Grand Ducal Altenburg Consistory of November 5, 1811) let “it is better for the supreme representative in the state to allow an exception from the law than to legally introduce weakened rules for everyone” 167. Regarding this view, we must say in the words of Origen: “What God has joined together, let no one separate, neither the beginning nor the power; since God who combines is stronger than anything that can be thought of” 168. Under the absolutism of secular jurisdiction, there will not be the slightest obstacle to human arbitrariness, because everyone is master in his own sphere. To what extremes things go in this case, it is enough to recall the characteristic story of the late English historian Froude: “On a ship, the captain, like the sovereign, is the supreme head not only in secular, but also in spiritual matters. The famous Elizabethan admiral, Francis Drake, first put this theory into practice when he excommunicated a priest on his ship. Then these relations strengthened and acquired the force of law, which has not been violated to this day”; так, капитан «прочитывает-по воскресеньям-службу, имея пред собою, вместо аналоя, подушку, покрытую английским флагом» 169 . All of the above convinces us that Lucock’s principle is absolutely false, making it difficult for an impartial historical review of issues about marriage and divorce. In this regard, the view of Gefken, who so cruelly deceived you with his book and made you languish in vain with tense expectations about receiving it, is much more fair. Promising the manual “Zur Geschichte der Ehescheidung vor Gratian,” in his treatise he speaks, however, only about the Western Church (S. 5) and, mainly, among the Germans and Franks 170. Its preliminary outline is too small and does not deserve special attention; Only his general judgment is instructive, equally applicable to both the West and the East. Christianity was only a leaven that gradually transformed the structure of socio-political and private life according to its principles. It does not suddenly conquer the inert mass, but everywhere it subjugates it little by little and then achieves final victory. From this side, he was not supposed to legislate, but to normalize the behavior of believers, for example, through penitential discipline, in order to raise them to a height that allowed legal canonical legalization. This is not a rejection of one's original beliefs; rather, here is their consistent triumph. “Practice,” says Prof. E. Schürer in his “rector’s” speech 171 did not always correspond to the ideal and, due to human weakness, reality was lower than it, but as a requirement, he invariably shone for Christians and, undoubtedly, showed a strong influence on the moral life of communities.” Therefore, one cannot and should not focus on exceptions of imperfection and impose them only on the East, although there are no less of them in the West, according to Gefken and Lukecock himself. In a fundamental subject it is necessary to eliminate the element of secular, state interference; otherwise we will deprive ourselves of all support for the historical solution of the issue, being left without witnesses, and for our salvation we will be forced to the ugly tricks of arbitrary acceptance - one for the pure expression of the apostolic teaching, the other for darkening it through worldliness. This is exactly what happened to the English writer, out of inevitable inevitability. If Eastern voices have an alien and false secular tone, then why listen to them? Tormenting your ears with cacophony - what's the point? Obviously, it can only be acquired through the subjective separation of harmonic sounds, but here all independent control disappears and everything comes down to personal insight. Here Lactantius says that “the marital bond is broken by infidelity” (perfidia), “an adulterer who marries a woman set aside by her husband, as well as one who lets his wife go without the guilt of adultery in order to take another” (Divin. Iustit. VI, 23). This is very categorical, and nevertheless “owes to the influence of Constantine, to whom he (Lactantius) closely aligned himself in his mental make-up” (p. 112), having moved from Africa to the East and living in Bithynia Nicomedia, where he adopted the views of the Greek Church (p. 110). St. Basil v. not everything pleased Lukecock, but “he, at least for a while, submitted to state legislation and prevailing custom” (p. 119), abandoning his own judgment (p. 120). The author's speech completely changes when he finds this father prohibiting marriage with his daughter-in-law. Its approval by the civil authorities is explained here by its adaptation to the Christian religion, because the former itself never “pulled the strings of restriction” to such an extent. Direct proof of this lies in the works of St. Basil V., Archbishop of Caesarea. Attempts have been made to undermine the strength of his testimony, but it would not be difficult, if necessary, to free him from suspicions that wish to weaken or destroy his authority. His honest and trustworthy character cannot be disputed; therefore everything he reports about the practice and general opinion of Christian antiquity is impressive (pp. 271–272; cf. 274–275). With this whole tirade, Lucoc destroys himself first of all, since it was he who cast a shadow on the personality of the ruler of Caesarea for the sake of his tendencies, according to which he now exalts him, albeit rightly. Similar opportunistic maneuvers are reflected in other circumstances. Regarding the Council of Trullo, the author notes that it cannot claim the dignity of universal ecclesiastical jurisdiction and is not at all recognized by the West (p. 117, 2), for it is cited in favor of marriage by divorce, while he himself resorts to its protection to give great weight to the apostolic canons and the above-mentioned opinion of St. Basil, adding now that he is considered the universal Greek branch of the Church (p. 94, 3. 276). Constantine by edict of 331 allows divorce for five reasons: – this is an echo of the Roman pagan past (pp. 112–114); but since he does not allow marriage to his sister-in-law, this speaks of the emperor’s agreement between the civil code and the church code (pp. 270–271). How poorly disguised is the desire per fas et nefas to achieve one’s own in everything, and not what history gives?! For this purpose, he is ready to use any means and categorically declares as an interpolation the words of Epiphanius, in which he guarantees marriage in the event of separation of spouses not due to death alone, but also “for some reason, for example. fornication, adultery, or, in general, due to grave guilt" 172. And all this because the omission of this phrase simplifies the argument (pp. 122-123)... As if Lucoc does not understand the tasks of textual criticism and does not know how much he is sinning against its very alphabet, because there is no factual and logical data! With no less haste and “about the three famous fathers, St. Basil, Epiphanius and Chrysostom,” he expresses that “the importance of their authority cannot be compared with the evidence of the first three centuries” in view of the “revolution caused by the union of Church and State” (pp. 116 – 117). But why, then, is the Montanist Tertullian considered a convincing indicator regarding the church practice of his time, and why is the latter not sectarian, like the thesis of divortum a mensa et thoro? Are these church teachers inferior to the “Nestorians, Syrians, Armenians, Copts and Abyssinians” whom Lucocq readily quotes (p. 291), because they fit his views? This, of course, would be terrible, but the author is not afraid of such extremes; on the contrary, he directly writes: “to the honor of the Nestorians, it must be mentioned that in the most vital issue (divorce) they were more firm in the original truth than their “Orthodox” brothers” (p. 153). This is only true in the sense that it reveals the fundamental falsity of the artificial hypothesis and allows us not to worry further about its chameleon-like changeable fate. Let us now take a look at the patriotic tradition without any bias. The West is especially dear to Lucock; so be it: let us take him into account! Three “heroes” are mainly put forward here - Jerome, Ambrose and Augustine. We have discussed some of them above, and therefore, even without our warnings, readers will guess that it is not fair to say that they have no exceptions in our subject. In a letter to the presbyter Amaid, Jerome says 173: “Stopping all excuses, the Apostle (Paul in Rom. VII, 1 - 3. 1 Cor. VII, 39 ) quite clearly determined that an adulterous wife, if she marries another during her husband’s lifetime, please do not tell me about violence, the admonitions of the mother, the power of the father, the crowd of relatives, the deceit and neglect of servants, the losses in the household. As long as the husband is alive, even if he is an adulterer, a sodomite, extremely vicious, and even if he was abandoned by his wife for these crimes, he is still considered her husband and she cannot take another. The Apostle decrees this not according to his own authority, but according to the inspiration of Christ speaking in him, in accordance with His saying in the Gospel: if he lets his wife go, except in the words of a fornicator, he commits adultery, and whoever takes a prostitute commits adultery (Matt. V, 32). Whether the wife herself left her husband or was abandoned by him, the one who takes her for himself will always be an adulterer.” The latter is true, because in any case the second marriage is not legal if the first one appears to have not yet been dissolved, as an arbitrary emancipation. And what is said above directly denies any divorce and reveals the personal rigorism of Jerome, according to which “iron and cauterization are needed for rotten bodies” 174. Ambrose writes: “Do not dare to let your wife go if you do not want to deny that the author of your union is God. By being condescending to strangers, you must be tolerant of your wife and correct her morals. Listen to what the Lord said: everyone who puts away his wife commits adultery (Luke XVI: 18). If marriage is prohibited while the husband is alive, only the attack of sinful passion can prompt a change in marriage... Suppose the rejected woman does not encroach: is this a praise to you, your husband, when she remains faithful to the adulterer? Let us further assume that it comes out: the fault of this necessity is again yours, and the imaginary marriage is adultery” 175. But in this place Ambrose had no need to interpret exceptions from the general rule and, accordingly, Lk. XVI, 18 outlines the normal type of married life; This means that the only thing that follows from this is that, in principle, the marriage relationship is insoluble, and no one argues against this. Another question about exceptions; about them, without much contradiction to himself, Ambrose could argue that “a husband is allowed to marry if he has released his wife for her sins; the husband is not bound by the law like the wife, since he is her head” 176. In any case, the practice of his days was not so inexorable, which is clear from the words of Ambrose: “you let go of your wife as if by right and without condemnation, and consider this to be permitted to you, since the human law does not prohibit this; but the Divine forbids it” 177. There is no doubt, therefore, that the ecclesiastical authorities of the West, in general, patronized the marital freedom of divorced people; otherwise there would be no talk about it. Augustine expresses himself more decisively that “it is possible to separate and remain celibate only if the husband commits adultery” 178, because “the previous connection remains” 179. Nevertheless, this teacher also says that “the one who leaves his wife on evidence of adultery and takes another, it seems, should not be compared with those who release adultery without guilt and marry. And in the Divine Scripture itself it is not clear that, although it is undoubtedly possible to let an adulterer go, is it fair to consider him an adulterer if he takes another, for, in my opinion, everyone sins here excusably. Therefore, obvious crimes against chastity prohibit access to baptism, since they are not smoothed over by a change of mood and repentance; and in doubtful cases, these obstacles must be eliminated in every possible way” 180. Here there is already a direct practical permission for marriage for an innocent member of a divorced couple; - and it is all the more important because it consists in the work assigned to new converts and delineating for them the true way of Christian life: in such a situation, any careless concessions would be intolerable. Cyprian formulated his view in a brief maxim: uxorem a viro non recedere, aut si recesserit, innuptam manere 181, but it was hardly possible to title the excerpt from 1 Cor. VII, 10. Biblical sayings are paraphrased no less vaguely in the work De discipliaa et de bono puditiae 182, not mentioned in Lucocq (p. 94), hypothetically assimilated to Cyprian. He simply establishes the Christian norm, without entering into particulars, and for the latter he is not a witness. Thus, it is only true that Western authorities were more inclined towards the celibacy of both divorced people, but this conclusion should not extend further. If a categorical denial is deduced from this, then in an absolute sense it will be completely false. Then: the named “heroes” are not the only bearers of the Western tradition, and the English author, who does not draw anything from second hand (p. X), was in vain to remain silent about the others. We will refer here to two. From the half of the 4th century. The writings of Hilary of Pictavia (Poitiers), a prominent church figure and writer, whom Pope Pius IX in 1852 proclaimed doctor ecclesiae universalis, have reached us. In his commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, he reveals the question that interests us as follows: “The law represents the freedom to reject a lewd letter, and the gospel faith not only disposes to peace, but also makes the husband responsible for the forced adultery of his wife, if she encroaches on another because of a disagreement; it does not present any other reason for the termination of marriage, except in the case where the husband would be defiled by communication with a prodigal wife” 183. Under the latter condition, the divorce will be decisive because it is necessary; This means that this eliminates for the innocent the danger of impurity in the new marriage, which is not shameful, as it happens simply ex dissensionis neces-itate 184. Chromatius of Aquileia, who died around 407, agrees with this. According to him, “Our Lord and Savior will transform for the better the commandments (jura) of the ancient law. Although the Jewish people, who lived disorderly and served their own lusts, were apparently given by Moses unlimited freedom to dissolve marriages, this was not required by the law, but only the unbridled carnal lust of the people prompted this, for they could not adhere to the strict legal norm. Hence this very permission, which is what the Lord reveals elsewhere in His answer to their (the Pharisees’) questions. When they said why Moses allowed a bill of divorce to be given, the Lord answers: “Because of the hardness of your hearts, Moses wrote that they should give a book of wickedness; from the beginning it did not come to be like this” (cf. Matt. XIX, 8). Therefore, having taken away this permission, our Lord and Savior rightly restores the rules of His ancient decree. He commands that the immaculate union of marriage (matrimonii castum conjugium) be preserved inviolably (indisso-lubili lege), revealing the original law of matrimony. He says: God has joined together, let not man put asunder (Matt. XIX, 6). With this expression He condemned both the disorderly licentiousness of the Jews and the stupid and pitiful opinion of the Manichaeans that marriage was not from God, since He added that, with the words of an adulteress, it is impossible to let a wife go. Here He shows that those who dare to violate the marriage united by God by illegal separation (illicita separatione) of divorce act against the will of God. Let them know what a grave guilt God brings upon themselves who, having let their wives go out of unbridled desire of lust (without the guilt of fornication), enter into second marriages! They think that they do this with impunity, since it is considered permissible according to human and worldly laws, but they forget that they sin even more and more, for they prefer human laws to divine ones, since what is recognized by God as lawless is found legal because it is freely permitted by man. But how should one not let go of a wife who lives chastely and purely; in the same way, it is permissible to release an adulteress, because she herself becomes unworthy of her husband’s companionship, who, by sinning in her own body, boldly desecrates the church of God” (cf. 1 Cor. VI, 18.19) 185. I think that lengthy explanations for this evidence are unnecessary. Chromatius finds the new union sinful if the old one retains all its power; therefore, with its blessed dissolution, it is completely legal, but adultery gives the right to a perfect divorce. Obviously, then the innocent party can marry or encroach without restraint. All of the above should convince us that the Western tradition is quite contradictory and unstable. This observation involuntarily inspires the suspicion that it did not always have an unshakable basis of apostolic tradition and did not arise from it directly, but was mediated by the individual considerations of the writers, subordinated to their pious zeal for the highest ideal of Christian holiness. Hence, personal rigorism is reflected in the discussion of marriage issues, giving it a subjective coloring of the Tertullian type. Yes, blessed one. Jerome asserted: “According to the saying of the Lord, one should not let a wife go unless it is the word of an adulterer, and one who has been released cannot marry another while the husband is alive” 186 ; “The Lord commands that one should not let a wife go unless it is the word of an adulterer; and if she is released, let her remain single. What is commanded to men, undoubtedly extends to women; therefore, it is unfair to think that an adulterer’s wife should be released, and an adulterer’s husband should be kept” 187. However, along with this, Jerome believed that “it is more tolerable to be a harlot for one than for many” 188, and from the words of the Apostle 1 Cor. VII, 1, 2 deduce: si bonum est mulierem non tangere, malum est ergo tangere 189. This already sounds much harsher than Tertullian (see above on page 70 to note 154), whose ideas were so widespread in the West and captured the thoughts of not only Jerome 190. He himself refers in his justification to St. Ambrose 191, for “he proclaims virginity as a calling to abstinence, and marriage as a cure for incontinence... He considers marriage only for the rejection of a necessary burden (i.e., virginity) and for the expression of the most obvious slavery” 192. After this, it seems not absurd to admit that Western teachers adhered more to the theoretical direction and were less attentive to the judgment of tradition, if in our subject they side with the Carthaginian Montanist, who did not bother himself with references to the voice of the ancient Church. With this attitude, they naturally had to develop and reveal the Christian ideal, and this, in turn, left no room for exceptions. It is clear that further the ideal requirement turned out to be an everyday norm, which is equally without flaw. The early emerging papist tendencies with the absolutism of the personal authority of the Roman bishops finally supplanted the apostolic-ecumenical tradition and contributed to this confusion, so that reservations were almost impossible as contradictions in adjecto. For this very reason, divorce and, especially, a new marriage after it, are mentioned in Western systems randomly and unexpectedly, contradict their basic structure and are not consistent with the most fundamental prerequisites. We readily admit that the West is less inclined to the conjugal freedom of the innocent member of a dissolved marriage, but it does not in the least follow that it is the best witness of the ante-Nicene era, as Lukecock asserts with the energetic stubbornness of a true Englishman; perhaps, on the contrary, because the subjective preoccupation with the theoretical straightforwardness of Western authors imparts to their constructions the character of private views and judgments of the theological mind. It was completely different in the East. On all small points in everyday conflicts they were guided by the rule beautifully formulated by St. Vasily V. regarding perplexities about marriage with his wife’s sister. “So the first thing,” he says 193, “and what is very important in matters of this kind, that we have to offer, is a custom observed among us, which has the force of law, because these decrees were handed down to us from holy men.” This view certainly obligated us to be unswervingly consistent with traditional opinion in all difficult cases of existing reality, and not to solve them on the basis of theoretical speculations, which are always shaky even if the initial principles are correct. The Eastern fathers were not forced to measure everything by the yardstick of ideal requirements and, alongside them, freely allowed exceptions, as far as the ancient church tradition, successively coming from Christ and the Apostles, allowed them. They had no prejudices, which is why they are more reliable in terms of the purity and accuracy of their testimony. But since they were not bound by pedantic and slavish logic, there was no need to sacrifice flaws for the principle or lower the latter for the sake of those, because both of these elements were only perceived by them and were never created original. They live together, as in sacred custom, without crowding out or suppressing each other. Through this, the opportunity opened up to strictly preserve the ideal of Christian perfection in marital relations and regulate them without despotic absolutism by legitimate everyday Christian norms. There is not the slightest mutual negation here, since both elements are borrowed from the apostolic treasury. This means that the first does not destroy the second at all and does not deprive it of its authority, meanwhile, the theoretical-rational mood of Western authors was also reflected in the punctuality of church views: they lost their realistic naturalness and were aligned according to a general template with the chisel of their own thought. With this understanding, the mystery in the difference in tones of Eastern writers is easily explained - and Lucock’s outlandish hypothesis turns out to be both arbitrary and unnecessary. For example, let’s take St. again. Vasily. In his statement of moral rules, he notes: “Neither husband should be separated from his wife, nor wife from her husband; unless someone commits fornication or encounters difficulty in achieving piety. Likewise, “it is not permissible for a husband who has let go of his wife to marry another and for one who has been let go by her husband to encroach on someone else’s behalf” 194 . This is something required by the law of moral holiness, ideally obligatory for believers who need to honor both the purity and inviolability of the marriage union. But since it has been trampled upon, then it is unknown whether “one who lives with a husband abandoned by his wife can be directly called an adulteress: for here the accusation falls on the one who left her husband, for what reason she departed from the marriage” 195; and about the other side it is noted that “he who left his wife, who was legally married to him, and took another” is subject only to penance 196. Moreover, it is very likely that in the second place even divorce is mentioned outside of the guilt indicated by the Lord, although this does not follow with certainty. Did this “transformation” really take place in St. Vasily by his obsequiousness to secular influence? Has he really humbled himself in his admiration for the state to the point that he “began to doubt even the most elementary principles” (Luskosk, p. 119)? However, he did not refuse them and expressed them no less clearly. Of course, he could not help but be aware of the difference in his decisions, because it was too obvious. Therefore, we have the right to think that he deviates from logical rigor due to the moral necessity of obedience to the sacred laws of the fathers, who sanctioned practical deviations due to adultery. This is not a private, specially oriental custom with “local flavor,” but a traditionally solid thesis, independent of personal sympathies. In this way, his authority ascends to the Apostles and Christ and receives its unshakable support in them, acquiring the energy of compulsion for thought. And she easily sees her justification in the Gospel of Matthew, where a non-accommodative formula is given, equally extending to divorce and to a new marriage. Nor have we been convinced otherwise by the newest work on the subject of interest by the Benedictine Dr. Aloys Cigoi, who, on the basis of Scripture and tradition, tries to prove the absolute indissolubility of Christian marriage 197. His extensive (XVI 248 pp.) book has great merit in its systematic and chronological selection of evidence and, being distinguished in this regard by its sufficient completeness 198, can serve as a good guide for orientation in the subject, but its final conclusions remain extremely controversial and are least conducive to the acceptance of Catholic doctrine. There is no need to review the whole matter again and it will be enough to indicate only general characteristic techniques. From this side, it is important to note that the author does not find a single negative voice among all patristic writers and portrays them as unconditional defenders of his view. According to him, Origen supposedly speaks only for separate life (S. 18) and Lactantius speaks only about simple separation (S. 22), and Epiphanius of Cyprus is a decisive advocate of marital strictness (S. 37). Such an observation involuntarily inspires strong suspicion of the impartiality of the researcher, who does not allow even minimal withdrawals. And this cannot be disputed in view of the obvious bias of the work. Cigoi - in the spirit of the papal encyclical of November 18, 1893 - argues that we should not retain everything from individual fathers and later interpreters, but only what they convey unanimously. From this point of view, he thinks in advance that the unanimus consensus is entirely in his favor (S. VII). It is not difficult to understand now that he sees it everywhere in history and is not embarrassed by contradictions, like Lucoc. This is achieved in the simplest way using the theory of the impossibility of any deviations from the Catholic norm. The latter is considered immutable and does not allow fluctuations, which is why everything should be commented on in this sense. The Councils of Neocaesarea and Laodicea seem to favor divorce, but this is still wrong: “if the fathers who arrived at them had declared the second and third marriage legal during the life of the released half, they would have broken it off. This would be in line with all the early tradition, which does not approve of second marriage even after the death of the other spouse” (S. 27). Equally, “it is not probable in itself that the Patrician (in the middle of the 5th century) sanctioned the decrees of the Irish council, the content of which is not compatible with church tradition” (S. 43); in comparison with it, the testimony of “Ambrosiastes” is insignificant (S. 89). Naturally, in this way everything is conveniently adjusted to the given scale, which is presented in advance as the indisputable truth (S. VI). And this is all the easier because the unanimous church judgment for Cigoi is a pure fiction. Where does it lie? – it’s not very clear, but from here there is scope for all sorts of combinations in the desired direction. Thus, the Trullo Council does not fully correspond to the Catholic system, but “its 102 canons, partly edited in a tone hostile to the Western Church, are not recognized in Rome... Its interpretation is arbitrary, because it does not coincide with the words of the Lord in Matt. V, 32. XIX, 9 and with the general teaching of St. Vasily, on whom he relies” (S. 104). What do dissenting opinions mean then? They cannot shake the universal principle, with the confessional zeal (waren wir bemüht) of the author (S. VII). Even “dangerous places” fall before him (S. 218. 220), for they should not interpret the question differently. In the extreme case, they are not entirely definite (S. 75) - and, for example, Augustine, explicitly allowing for the absolution of an adulteress, expresses in darkness whether the husband will be an adulterer through a new marriage, so that it would be fair to consider it an excusable sin (S. 62). When this excuse is also unsuitable, Cigoi refers to an accidental deviation. Origen mentions withdrawals, but these are adaptations to human weakness, to avoid great evils (S. 19–20), which is contrary to Scripture and apostolic teaching (S. 163–164). Vasily V. directly condemns the free practice that has invaded the Greek Church (S. 31); and what follows from Asterius of Amasia is how much discipline in Pontus has fallen at this point (S. 37). Regarding Theodore of Canterbury, it is assumed that a strict marriage code could not be implemented immediately due to the savagery of the people (S. 79). In the excerites of Egbert of York († 766) not all is well, since the influence of civil legislation is conceivable here (S. 81). From the decisions of the synod in Bourges (1031) it only appears that some bishops were inclined to take liberties, contrary to church tradition (S. 96). So: all these are echoes of shattered morals (S. 222), and the thesis of marital indissolubility is unshakable. Therefore, one cannot help but wonder why Cigoi bothers to argue for the undoubted truth. It is also strange how hesitation was possible given such dogmatic and factual innocence? We know that Pollentius made categorical statements in favor of divorce for adultery; however blessed Augustine does not reproach him for his impudent attempt on church norms and tries to protect his understanding without resorting to the protection of church authority. Again the matter is resolved simply, for the Church had not yet proclaimed the inseparability of έπί πορνεί ᾳ by the decree of the general synod (S. 164). Excellent, except for the fact that in this case, until the said moment, there was no strong church principle, and the universal tradition turns into a ghost. He did not have real power and life until the Council of Trent, which therefore will be the source of apostolic tradition in the Catholic sense. Here Cigoi revealed his purely confessional interest and himself testified that for him there was no other history besides the ultramontane-papist one. This is what we see in the analysis of the Eastern Orthodox divorce theory. Where did it come from and how did it become stronger? is completely incomprehensible. After all, even in Euthymius Zigavinus († around 1118) it is debatable whether a second marriage is tolerated and whether it is not, rather, a vice and ongoing adultery, although his writings prepared the later Byzantine doctrine (S. 100–101). As for Zonara and Balsamon, their argument is one-sided and superficial (S. 101 ff.). And Photius in the 9th century. and Michael Cerullarius in the 11th speak for the dominance of fundamental indissolubility (S. 132 if.), which was accepted by the Greeks during the era of Ferraro - the Council of Florence (S. 138) and by the Patriarch of Constantinople Jeremiah in the 16th century (S. 139). After this, the Orthodox view loses all roots and seems to fall from heaven. Indulgence in unclean morals prevailed in him due to the slavish dependence of the (Greek) Church on the state (S. 132). This is an old delusion due to unpardonable condescension to popular passions (S. 136) and in Russia it is maintained by schism and humiliation of the hierarchy (S.V). The last reason is (S. 101), that because of the break with Rome, the Greeks, as Bernard of Clairvaux wrote to Pope Eugene III, wavered in their faith (in fide claudicaverunt). Therefore, all their objections and considerations can only be a lie, which was guided by the vengeful Archbishop of Ephesus Mark Eugenicus in his polemic against the Union of Florence (S. 138). It is difficult to argue with this, because it is most difficult to prove your sanity to someone who is considered crazy. You just need to remember always and firmly that such judges themselves are convicted of mental dullness due to fanatical preoccupation, blinding their eyes to irresistible evidence. The only weapon in such cases is to state their own darkness, which Cigoi did without us with his merciless intolerance. It directly kills him because it confirms party prejudice. It also has a despotic effect on the consideration of the Lord’s words in the Gospel of Matthew. The author does not agree (S. 193 ff.) with critics who deny the authenticity of exclusive clauses 199, does not allow (S. 197 ff.) reinterpretations of the term πορνεία in the spirit of Shegg 200 and Dallinger 201, does not weaken the energy of παρεκτός 202 and is far from sympathizes with the guesses about the temporary-accommodative use of the verses under discussion for some Jews 203. Similar to gr. L. Tolstoy 204 - he only finds them dark, for “who knows how Matt. V, and XIX, 9? Isn’t it the translator’s fault that understanding them is difficult” (S. 157; vgl. 208)? However, we have seen that there is no motive for such hopelessness, and in Cigoi himself it is hardly sincere. Otherwise, it would be necessary to abandon all hypotheses, meanwhile he willingly accepts the conjunction of Maldonat (S. 173), Cornelius a-Lapide (S. 175) and others, which, due to attention to the Hebrew construction, should repeat the relative pronoun and read: ὃ ς ἂ ν ἀπολύσ ῃ ... καί ὃ ς ἂ ν γαμήσ ῃ ἂ λλην, μοιχ ᾶ ται. But, firstly, it would be better, due to the vagueness of the matter, not to go into assumptions, which, being doubtful, only open up limitless scope for exegetical ingenuity, and then, even with the indicated adjustment of light, nothing more is obtained; at least, he is less than ex Roma lux. If we are talking about two persons here, then it will be a blatant absurdity to prohibit marriage for non-divorced people. Let us assume that we are thinking of a subject who has legally freed himself from his former wife: then a new marriage will be permissible for him. In any case, this interpretation is no less possible; why is it being eliminated? The motive is expressed by Cigoi in the remark that “since the infallible Teaching Church (das unfehlbare Lehramt der Kirche) spoke at the Council of Trent about the meaning of both passages in Matthew, they should be revealed from parallels and dogmatic analogies” (S. 224). Scripture is absorbed and suppressed by the Tridentine tradition, which turns out to be the exclusive arbiter in the matter. Isn’t this an obvious addiction, bitter than all human passions, for it denies all healing? As a result, it turns out that with their polemics, Lucock and Cigoi 205 rather defend the Eastern understanding of the subject under consideration. Nor did they prove that Catholic doctrine better ensures the strength of marital ties. Here marriage is defined according to Thomas Aquinas (Cigoi, S. 121), as a contract by which mutual power over the body is acquired (cf. ibid. S. 122, 124. 171. 227. 228–229. 232. 233, 236. 237), and the contractors are given too much freedom. Of course, it is strictly subject to church control, but such a mass of impedimentorum dirimentium has been invented on this score that it is easy to dissolve any marriage. In the event of decisive difficulties, the all-conquering papal dispensation still remains, which removes all obstacles 206. It means that “the popes, on the basis of their supreme power, indicate the conditions under which divine right is effective” (S. 235). Regarding this, only one can say in the words of the Lord Chancellor: “I did not think that the Roman Church had the power of allowing people to violate the law of God” (Luckock, p. XIV)! It goes without saying that with such a view of the Nebuchadnezzar type, everything will be legal and normal. Contrary to this, we find direct restrictions and are not at all inclined in favor of the obligatory nature of divorce, since everywhere and by all authorities the marriage union is considered essentially inviolable. From this point of view, there is less reason to desire complete freedom of divorce and a corresponding weakening of laws. In a vitally practical matter, this aspect is very important, and we allow ourselves to testify in conclusion that such liberalism, being arbitrary, is at the same time extremely disastrous. In such matters, history is the most reliable judge, and it tells us the following. In Prussia, the scope for divorce began under Frederick. under the influence and charm of the “evil genius” of Voltaire and the rationalistic views of the famous scientist Michaelis (Luckock, p. 309. 290), who recognized only the requirements of nature for marriage and therefore denied any other restrictions of Scripture; then, now considered here as causae divortii, disorderly behavior or lifestyle, and denial of maintenance. Since 1875, all union states in Germany have been governed by their own laws in this matter, but in the end, all of them allowed an absolute termination of marital ties on grounds that previously only gave the right to separate husband and wife 207 . In Baden, Alsace-Lorraine and Austria, divorce is permitted - except for adultery - for many "important crimes", for example: arbitrary abandonment of the family for a year, an attempt that threatens life or health, factually proven frequent cruelty of treatment in mutual disgust, unbearable for both parties; Now in the latter, with considerable success, the project of transforming marriage into a purely civil contract is being implemented: after this, one will have to rejoice if, with the fall of Christian norms, Jewish norms are established, although liberals, like the former Hungarian Prime Minister Wekerle, will probably regret that the rule of Maimonides (Hil. Ishuth, cap. 14) - “the sages decided that no one should marry more than four wives" - remains in force for some Eastern Jews, and for Western ones polygamy was prohibited at the Worms “Synod” of 1020, according to the resolution of Rabbi Gershom ben Judah (cnf. Eben Ha-Ezer 1, 10; Kaiisch to Ex., p. 370, and to Lev., p. 374, in Luckock, p. 16). In Hamburg, the imperial law applies with only a few specific restrictions. In Saxony, habitual drunkenness is declared to be a sufficient reason for divorce. In Denmark it’s almost the same; in Sweden, extravagant and violent behavior and “dissimilarity of characters” are also recognized. In Switzerland, things go much further, because there legal “divorce” is unhindered, and two years of non-consent to cohabitation completely destroys the marriage. In Belgium, the mutuus consensus has absolute significance after two years from the time of marriage and at 25 years for the husband and 21 for the wife. In North America, “whatever the city is, it’s noisy,” and here it’s not uncommon to move briefly from state to state in order to rid yourself of an unpleasant burden and replace it with something you like. And if you’re willing, you can always find a suitable area for each case. Only in New York do they stop at adultery, but it’s enough to go to Maryland - there is premarital unchastity of the wife, to West Virginia - there is the debauchery of the husband, to Alabama - there are unnatural vices, Arkansas, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Tennessee etc. - they have serious offenses, in Tennessee - there is “expulsion of the wife from the door” and her refusal to go with her husband to another state to live, Louisiana - public slander, Missouri and Wyoming - illegal vagrancy of the husband, almost everywhere - criminal charges and concealment from court; Washington even authorizes “any reason that is considered sufficient and when it turns out that the parties can no longer live together” (see Lucock, p. 185 sequ.). Therefore, according to statistics from the London News Review (cf. The Wanderer, 1894, No. 11, p. 582), in terms of the abundance of divorces, the palm belongs to the Connecticut county of Tolland, where there are one in six marriages, but also in Berlin 1 in 17, in Vienna 43, in Paris 13 (?). In general, statistical data show that in England there is a case of divorce in 577 marriages, in Scotland - 331, in Austria - 184, in Belgium - 169, in Hungary - 145, in Sweden - 134, in Holland - 132, in France - 62, in Denmark - 36, in Italy - 421. The figures, as we see, are very disappointing, but also very eloquent, since they irresistibly convince that divorce connivance inevitably entails a corresponding frequency of dissolution of marriage bonds, which, thus, falls on the very law, which contributes to the intensity of social demoralization. In this regard, visual illustrations are especially instructive. Thus, for the period from 1860 to 1880, after the introduction of divorce acts in North America, the following proportions of divorces and marriages were obtained: in Massachusetts - 1 in 37, in Vermont - 1 in 17, in Rhode Island - 1 in 12 and in Connecticut - 1 in 10. By 1889, no less disastrous results were presented, since in the first the ratio was 1 in 31, in the second - 1 in 20, in the third (average between 1 in 10 and 1 in 12) and in the fourth (average between 1 in 13 and 1 in 9) - 1 in 11 (Luckock, p. 188). It should be noted (cf. Dr. Allen in the “Churcli Quarterly Review” No. XII, p. 23) that for Catholics divortium a vinculo is not possible, and therefore all numerical combinations turn out to be even more formidable: Massachusetts - 1 to 15, Vermont - 1 to 13, Rhode Island - 1 to 9, Connecticut - 1 to 8. For all North American States in general it is established (see “New Time”, No. 6.591 for July 6, 1894), that in them the number of divorced marriages is equal to 1/5 percent of the total number, while only 35°/0 are married for the entire population. It is not surprising that, given the ease of divorce in fifteen minutes (Luckock, p. 190), in the marital field the state of American morals is qualified by the epithet “depraved” (ibid., p. 199). Now even the government itself has realized this and is forced to resort to curbing widespread demoralization; at least the newspapers (see “Moskovskie Vedomosti” No. 89 for March 31, 1894, “Church Bulletin”, 1895 No. 6, col. 196) reported on his attempts to legislatively limit the reasons for divorce due to adultery. - There is again not commendable information about Germany. S. Baring Gould claims that there, in one city with four thousand inhabitants, no less than 171 petitions for divorce were received at once; in a Saxon village, out of sixteen marriages, only three survived until the end of twelve months, and in Transylvania, two-thirds of married women were divorced before the end of the first year. It is now clear why in England they allowed themselves to declare in an official meeting that “the state of marriage in Germany forces every German to cover his face with his hands in shame” (see Luckock, p. 191. 309). – Not the best description is given about the Protestant cantons of Switzerland. As an example, we give a story about how an Englishman in Vaud once found himself at a table (in a hotel) in the company of Swiss men - four men and four women, their “legal” wives. But de facto the latter belonged to others, as if these “gentlemen” had exchanged their spouses, or vice versa - and yet they all met without the slightest embarrassment, as if the closest friends. - France in no case can be a model for the purity and severity of married life, since here having only one “extraordinary wife” is considered almost a virtue and the “family” is usually included - except for the husband (mon mari) - also amant de coer (“friend of the heart” by attraction) and amant de poche (“friend of the pocket” by material calculations); on the contrary, its free legislation on this subject serves as an impressive warning of how it is necessary to avoid all liberties (Luckock, p. 311). For our purposes, it is enough to recall that the liberal and dissolute trends of the first revolution were directly reflected in disasters. Констатировано что, благодаря им, было совершено не менее 20.000 разводов чуть не в один год. Therefore, when publishing the famous Napoleonic Code, the Minister of Justice (Claude Regnier) severely condemned revolutionary indulgences, adding that freedom of law in 1792 entailed many marital disorders and was “the main cause of demands for divorce” (Luckock, p. 311). – Conservative England remains more stable with a certain firmness of its morals, adherence to strict etiquette and respect for deep-rooted traditions. Nevertheless, here too some relaxations immediately had a rather unfavorable effect. Thus, according to registration for 1892, London accounts for more than one quarter of those divorced for the entire amount of those married (cf. Luckock, p. 204). Naturally, even the question of allowing marriages with sisters-in-law causes great concern there (see Luckock, pp. 312 - 321). - As for Russia, in terms of the merits of marriage morality, the News Review places it in second place (after England) (1: 450). Still, it doesn’t stop her from thinking seriously and holding on. For her, based on new publications of the Central Statistical Committee, Russian Vedomosti (cf. Strannik, 1894, No. 11, pp. 581–582) make such interesting conclusions. In Russia there is an increase in the numbers of both marriages and divorces, but not in equal proportions. From 1867 to 1886 the absolute number of the former among the Orthodox population rose by only 4.4%, and the latter by 22.6%, so that the relative number of divorces increased by 17.3(?)%, while among other Christian denominations it was quite the opposite: the number of marriages grew faster than the sum of divorces, and the relative number (of the latter) among Lutherans was 9%, among Roman Catholics (?) - 19%. The increase in the number of divorces (absolute and relative) among the Orthodox was very wrong, but not downward. For 20 years from 1867 to 1836, the number of marriages did not exceed the level of the initial year, but rose above it? only in the three-year period 1875–1877 and in the four-year period 1883–1886, which gave the greatest evidence. Taking the number of divorces in 1867 as 100, for 1875–1877. the total annual number of them will be 107 and for the next four years - 127. By category of reasons, divorces were distributed as follows: for inability to marry - 1.2%, for unknown absence - 74.9%, for deprivation of rights - 24.1%. Over the decade from 1877 to 1886, the relative number of divorces on the second point decreased and increased on all others: for inability - from 0.8 to 1.8 ° / 0, i.e. too twice, for adultery - from 5.8 to 13.1 ° / 0, or almost 21/2 times, for deprivation of all rights - from 19.7 to 27.8%, which means almost 11/2 times 209. At the same time, it must be remembered that the first two groups mostly coincide in their motives, which is why for cases of disrespect for the sanctity of the marriage bond, an alarming figure of about 15% is obtained. This indicates a significant decline in public morality and forces us to take energetic measures against the impending and developing evil 210. Any leniency would be extremely disastrous here. Protestantism has warmed the viper in its chest with the poison of anti-family and vulgarized “Platonism” and now it itself is denying its creations; He even finds it necessary to strongly emphasize that “Christian ethics does not allow us to remove a single iota from its ideal of marriage and family life, but must insist with all its energy on ridding the actual relationship from the current state of all perversion and licentiousness and again bringing them closer to its ideal” 211. And the reason is understandable, since the belittling or darkening of the norm will inevitably result in the disaster of widespread demoralization. Rome gives a terrible lesson in its destruction before the time of Christ the Savior. He once formulated the principle “nuptiae sunt conjunctio maris et foeminae et consortium omnis vitae, divini et humani juris communicatio” (Dig. XXIII, 2.1 Kormch. book. Chapter XLVIII, side IV, Chapter 1; Instit. I, IX, 1. Cod. IX. 32.4) - with categorical prohibition of polygamy (Cod. V tit. 5. 2), – и общественное сознание древней республики было крайне враждебно к свободе бракорасторжений. But then the infection of moral vacillation penetrated, the laws weakened 212 - and unchanging commitment and marital fidelity became unheard of. Even people like Cato and Cicero were not at all embarrassed to abandon their wives, despite their own convictions that it was better to be a good husband than a famous senator 213. It is impossible to imagine a picture of moral degeneration sadder and more terrible than that which Seneca draws, saying 214 that in his days noble ladies counted their years not by consuls, but by the number of husbands they had replaced... How this order ended and what it led to is known to everyone and serves as a sufficient justification for us to insist on prudent severity in the matter of resolving marriages. Of course, it is hard to tolerate an adulterer and delay the moment of separation from him. It is not easy to determine the very position of a married couple when there is obvious and persistent depravity of one member, when the very root of their mutual and complete union is being undermined. Nevertheless, the latter consists not only in amicable consent, which serves only as a precondition for marriage and does not exhaust its entire essence. Otherwise, this would be a simple carnal cohabitation, but in Christianity it is a sacrament sanctified by God, reflecting the love of Christ for His Church and producing new sons for it, just as our mother, faith, gives birth to the children of God through the Lord (cf. Gal. IV, 26). For this reason, adultery is similar to the sinfulness of a Christian, who is excommunicated only in case of complete and incurable falling away. Accordingly, in a marriage relationship, a break requires an incorrigible oblivion of grace, forever eliminating the guilty party from participation in it. Until this is present, it is necessary to prevent such a difficult moment in every possible way, remembering the words of the prophet Malachi (II, 15. 14. 16): Preserve in your spirit, and do not forsake the wife of your youth, both that which is yours and the wife of your covenant. But if you let go of your hatred, says the Lord God of Israel, “And the Lord Almighty will cover your wickedness,” says the Lord Almighty: “Keep in your spirit, and do not forsake!” Homil. In 1Cor. VII, 39–41, n.3, et ` Εγχω᾿ μιον ει᾿ ς Μα᾿ ξιμον, n. 2: Migne, gr. Ser. T. LI, col. 222, 227. For the Russian translation, see the publication “Conversations on various sacred places.” Scriptures,” vol. II (St. Petersburg, 1862), pp. 489, 501. Homil. V in Math. XIX, 3: Migne, gr. Ser. T. XL, col. 228 D. Russian translation in the appendix to the “Theological Bulletin” 1893, VI, p. 386. For the Latin text, see the classical edition, of which there have been three editions so far containing the Synoptic Gospels, Novum Testamentum Domini nostril Iesu Christi Letine secundum editionem sancti Hieronymi ad codicicum masnuscriptorum fidem recensuit Johannes Wordsworth, episcopus Sarisburiensis, in operis societatem adsumto Henrico Juliano White, societatis S. Andreae collegii theologiei Sarisburiensis vice-principaii.” Partis prioris fasciculus primus: Evangelium secundum Matthaeum, Oxonn 1889, p. 118. It is also given in the Greek manuscripts of the Gospels of the library of the St. Petersburg Spiritual Academy-B1/2 (dated December 30, 1033), fol. 117 vol., and Acad. No. 6, l. 73. For the first, see A.S. Rhodes in “Christian Reading” 1892, I, 90 given, and the second one, broken, has not yet been explored, but there is no doubt that it is also very ancient. Compare, however, A.S. Rodossky “Description of 432 manuscripts belonging to the St. Petersburg Theological Academy”, St. Petersburg. 1894, p. 11 ff. For LXX, see 3 Cr. III, 18. XII, 20 וולָחִי ; 1Ezra 1, 6 (cf. Var. Jud. VIII, 26) לְכַר; Neh. VII, 67 םִל ֽ ּכַר ; Psalm. XVII, 32 ( πλη᾿ ν ) םִכַּלְצרי Sir. XLIX, 5. Franz Delitzsch in his translation of the New Testament (Delitzsch`s Hebrew New Testament 1885, p. 8, 35) uses כִּלְפי in Matt. V, 32 and XIX, 3. πα᾿ ρεξ (Hom. Hdt) is also found in Josephus along with δι᾿ χα ἂ ωευ: cf. in guilelmus Schmidt, De Flavii Josephi elocutione observations criticae, Liosiae 1893, p. 520. Therefore, M. Filaret designed another translation here: “excluding guilt.” See the publication “Works of Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow and Kolomna on the Translation of the New Testament into Russian”, St. Petersburg. 1893, pp. 6, or from prof. N. I. Korsunsky “On the exploits of Philaret, Metropolitan of Moscow, in translating the Bible into Russian” in the 2nd volume of “Filaret’s Collection”, Moscow 1883, pp. 613. So-excepta fornicationis causa-and in Jerome’s translation according to the indicated edition. Wordsworth on pp. 57. Wed. N. F. Fokkov, On the syntax of the Greek New Testament language of the Byzantine language, Moscow 1887, pp. 228 l.). Wed. St. Vasily in Moralia, reg. LXXIII, 1 (Migne, gr. Ser. t. XXXI, col. 849): α᾿ πο᾿ α᾿ νδρο᾿ ς χωρι᾿ ζεσθαι , ει᾿ μη᾿ τις ἂ ν ε᾿ πι ' πορνει 'ᾳ α᾿ λῷ χτλ . These examples are far from superfluous in our country, as shown by the lengthy articles by Mr. A. A. Zavyalov “On Marriage and Celibacy” in the magazine “Strannik” for 1891–1892; see 1891, II, 513, where ει᾿ μη ' the author gives a concessive meaning “at least” and then argues even more recklessly. Wed. Clem. Al. Strom. Lib. III, cap. 23: Migne, gr. Ser. t. VIII, col. 1096 B. See Walton's Polyglot, vol. V, p. 20, 27; 94, 95. For this purpose, which can be fully satisfied only by the expected work of Prof. G.A. Voskresensky, we also looked at: “The Ostromir Gospel” according to the editions of A. Vostokov (St. Petersburg 1843) and V. Hanka (Prague 1853), “Mariinsky Four Gospels” (St. Petersburg 1883) and “Zograph Gospel” (Berolini 1879) in the edition of I.V. Yagich. This interpretation is given in the Syriac translation and by Blessed. Augustine (De conjugiis adùterinis I, 9 ap. Migne, lat. Ser. t. XL, col. 456) non fornicante. In order not to be too replete with quotations, we indicate here the manuals that guided us in presenting the Catholic teaching on divorce according to the writings of the New Testament: J. Perrone, Tractatus de matrimonio, cap. II, prop. V, n. 130 in Praelectiones Theologiae, vol. II, col. 576 sqq. (cf. and De matrimonio chrisl., Romae 1858, III, 206 sqq.). D. Palmieri, Tractatus de matrimonio christ., Romae 1880, p. 171 sqq. Ant. Ios. Binterim, Die vorzüglichsten Denkwürdigkeiten der christ-katholischen Kirche, VI 1, Mainz 1838, S. 92 ff. Oswald, Sacramentenlehre, 4 Aufl., II, 434 ff. H. Schell, Katholische Dogmatik, III 2, Paderhorn 1893, S. 708 ff. Knopp, Vollständiges katholisches Ehierecnt, Regensburg 1869, S. 534. Fr. Heiner, Grundriss des katholischen Eherechts, Münster i. W. 1889, pp. 279–283. J.Fr. Schulte, Handbuch des katholischen Eherechts, Gicssen 1855, S. 430–484. Ferd. Walter, Lehrbuch dos Kirchenrechts aller christlichen Confessionen, Bonn 1871, § 319–320, pp. 713–718. Prof. N. S. Suvorov, Course of Church Law, vol. II, Yaroslavl 1890, § 171, pp. 336–338. Aug. Bisping, Erklärung des Evangeliums nach Matihäus, Münster 1867, S. 143–148. 391 ff. P. Schanz: Commentar über das Evangelium des heil. Matthäus (Freiburg i. W. 1879, S. 191–196. 409), – des heil. Marcus (ibid. 1881, S. 319–320). Fr. X. Pölzl, Kurzgefasster Commentar zum Evanaelium des heil. Matthäus, Graz 1880, S. 65–66. Jos. Knabenbauer (in "Cursus Scripturae Sacrae"), Commentarius in Evangelium secundum Matthaeum, pars 1 (Parisiis 1892), p. 225 sqq.; pars 2 (ibid. 1893), 142 sqq. Hugo Weiss, Der Bergpredigt Christi, Freiburg i. Br. 1892, pp. 45–50. Of the Protestant works on the Discussion on the Mount, Ausführliche Auslegung der Bergpredigt Christi nach Matthäus von Dr. is especially recommended. A. Tholuck, dritte Ausgabe, Hamburg 1845, pp. 211–253. The first point is also recognized by Prof. A.I. Zagorsky (On divorce according to Russian law, Kharkov 1884, pp. 38 ff.), why, not allowing the second, he is forced to balance in a Protestant way. Here Catholics come up against a blank wall with their ex opera operato teaching and, unable to break through the necessary breach, transfer the mysteriously fulfilling effect of marriage onto the couple themselves, which gives church authorities the opportunity to interfere with this act with their influence. If the husband does not know about his bride’s infidelity, this will be a dissolving impedimentum erroris. Prof. N.S. Suvorov (Op.cit., pp. 336–337) sees in this the only support of Catholic teaching about the conditions and nature of divorce, but rather this is only an exception, the least accepted and encouraged. See in the magazine "Katholik", 1889, 2, S. 636-642. Cp. Hermae Pastor, IV, 1 ap. Migne, gr. Ser. t. II, col. 919–920: et is que simulacrum facit, moechatur. Cp. Sviceri Thesaurus, t. II, Amstelaedami 1728, p. 373 b. Cp. y W. Smith A Dictionary of the Bible s 1st volume, and according to the abridged edition - A concise Dictionary of the Bible, London 1880, p.344. It must be remembered that stoning was reserved for an adulteress only if she was caught at the crime scene, as can be seen from the story of John. VIII, 3–11. Wed. at o. N. Stelletsky in “Proceedings of the Kyiv Theological Academy” for 1891, No. 9, pp. 30. Let us also note that we do not know a single example of fulfilling the Mosaic commandment in all its severity, and the story of John. VIII, 3 words. testifies that it was not observed in the age of the Savior. De poenitentia, cap. III (Migne, lat. ser. t. I, col. 1232 B-C), De exhortatione castitatis, cap. IX (Migne, lat. ser t. II, col. 924 B), etc. For patristic judgments on this subject, see below. Wed. Evfimy Zig. To Matt. V, 32 (ap. Migne, gr. ser. t. CXXIX, col. 217 A): σας (cnf. ad. XIX, 10 ibid., col. 517 C-D). Cp. Ios. Zhishman, Das Eherecht der orientalischen Kirche, Wien 1863, S 580–581, 732. “Review of regulations on marriage in the Orthodox Church” in “Orthodox Interlocutor” 1859, III, 331 (Article III Archim. - after † Bishop of Smolensk-John: see in “Right. Sobes.” 1885, III 485 note, and by Prof. P.V. Znamensky, History of the Kazan Theological Academy, issue II, Kazan 1892, p. Prof. A.I. Zagorovsky in the named work, pp. 89 ff., etc. When communicating with an unmarried woman, the husband fell only into a moral transgression - sturpum, φθορα ': cf. at Prof. A.S. Pavlova in “Scientific Notes of Kazan University” 1865, I, pp. 96. Vasily V. in Prop. 9: “The Lord’s saying that it is not permissible to separate unless the word of an adulterer, according to his mind, is equally befitting of both husbands and wives” (see “Rules of the Holy Fathers” in the publication of the Moscow Society of Lovers of Spiritual Enlightenment, Moscow 1884, page 193. Migne, gr. ser. t. XXXII, col. 677). Jerome in Epist. 77 (30), 3 (ap. Migne lat. XXII, 691): “Quidquid viris jubetur, hoc consequent redundant in foeminas... Apud nos, quod non licet foemines, aequq non licet viris.” Augustine in De sermone Domini in monte I, XVI, 43 (Migne lat. XXXIV, 1251): “par forma est in isto jure conjugii inter virum et mulierem.” Likewise, many other patristic authorities, for example. Herm: Pastor, IV, 1 ap. Migne gr. II, 919–920. St. energetically fought against the narrow understanding of μοιχει᾿ α by “external laws”. John Chrysostom in Homil. Ad 1Corinth. VII, 2, n. 4: Migne, gr. ser. t. LI, col. 213, 214. Conversations on various sacred places. Scriptures, vol. II, St. Petersburg. 1862, pp. 471 words Wed. in Asterius of Amasia: Migne, gr. ser. t. XL, col. 237, 240. (homilia V in Matt. XIX, 3); Russian translation from the June book of the “Theological Bulletin” for 1893, pp. 394–395. 1877, II, S. 578–587: Ehebruch als Eheschidungsgrund. Talm. Hieros., Kiddushin, fol. 58, 3. Of course, a letter of divorce, the form of which can be found in Gittin p. 85 V. Antiqu. IV, 8: 23 (“Flavii Iosephi opera edidit Benedictus Niese”, vol. I, Berolini 1887, p. 275, 8–11; see in the Russian translation by Fr. M. Samuylov I, St. Petersburg 1779, p. 196): γοναιχο᾿ ς δε᾿ συνοιχου᾿ σης βουλο᾿ μενος διαζευχθῆναι χαθ ` α᾿ σδηποτοῦν αι᾿ τι᾿ ας , πολλαι᾿ δ `ἂ ν τοῖς α᾿ νθπω᾿ ποις γι᾿ γνοιντο , γρα᾿ μμασι με᾿ ν περι᾿ τοῦ μηδε᾿ ποτε συνελθεῖν ι᾿ σχυριζε᾿ σθω λα᾿ βοι γα᾿ π ἂ ν ο ὔ τως ε᾿ ξουσι᾿ αν συνοιχεῖν ε᾿ τε᾿ ρ ῳ. Antiqu. XVI, 7y B. Niese IV, Berolini 1890, p. 33–34, in M. Samuylov III, pp. 95. Vita §75, 76 (y B. Niese IV, 387, 11–16 . 389, 5–6, and in M. Alekseev On the Jewish War I, St. Petersburg 1786, pp. 51, 53) χαι᾿ τη᾿ ν γοναῖχα μη᾿ α᾿ ρεσχο᾿ μεωος αυ᾿ τῆς τοῖς ῆθεσιν α᾿ πεπεμφαμην τριῶν παι᾿ δων γενομε᾿ νην μητε᾿ ρα . De specialibus legibus ad duo Decalogi capita, scxtum septimmnque, no ed. Thomas Mangey, vol. II (1742), p. 304, 30–31: ` Εα᾿ ν ὂ ε ', φησι᾿ ν α᾿ νδπο᾿ ς α᾿ παλλαγεῖσα γυνη᾿ χαθ ` ἢ ν ἂ ν τυ᾿ χ ῃ προφασιν, ε᾿ τε᾿ ρ ῳ χτλ. Gittin, cap. 9, fol. 90 a Maimon. Ishnth, cap. 10, 14. Cnf. Frankel, Grundlinien des Mosaisch-Talmudischen Eherechts, Breslau 1860, S. 44. Mielziner, Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce, §§ 71–73. They were of two kinds: Berchath Kiddushin or Arusin - during the conspiracy and Berchath Nissuin - during the “wedding” itself, but the marriage was considered legally valid without them: see Maimon, Jshuth, cap. X, 6. Kethuboth, 7; cnf. Maimon . Jshuth, cap. X, 6. For Jewish interpretations of the Mosaic marriage laws, see the Talmudic treatises: Kiddushin - on prohibited degrees and levirate, Gittin - on divorce and Sota - on a wife suspected of adultery; but you can read about this in Lightfooti Horae hebraicae (Lipsiae 1684, p. 273–278. 398–400, and according to the English translation of Gandell's vol. II, Oxford 1859, p. 119–125. 259–263), Schoettgenii Horae hebraicae, Dresdae et Lipsiae 1751, p. 38–39. 157–158, Joh. Jac. Wettenii Novum Testamentum graecum, vol. I, Amstelaedami 1751, p. 303–304, Krebsii Observationes in Novum Testamentum e Flavio Iosepho, Lipsiae 1755, p. 41–43, Nork Rabbinische Quellen und Paralellen, Lpzg. 1839, pp. 36–37. 82, Aug. Wünsche Nene Beiträge zur Erläuterung der Evangelien, Göttingen 1876, S. 55–57. 220 ff. etc. In Russian, see prof. A.P. Lopukhina Legislation of Moses, St. Petersburg. 1882, pp. 84 words., sacred. N. Steltsky. Marriage among the ancient Jews, ch. VI, in “Proceedings of the Kyiv Theological Academy” for 1892, No. 10, pp. 225, and at Fr. Associate Professor A.V. Smirnova. The relationship of the Gospel moral teaching to the Law of Moses and to the teaching of the scribes and Pharisees according to the Sermon on the Mount of Jesus Christ in the “Orthodox Interlocutor” for 1894, No. 2, pp. 118–128, and in a separate publication, Kazan 1894, pp. 38–48. To our great surprise, Mr. A. A. Zavyalov also retains this meaning for παρεχτο᾿ ς, although he uses it differently - however, no less strange and perverse (“Strannik” 1891, II, 512). Ad also admits this. Von Harless? Die Ehescheidungsfrage, Stuttgart 1861, S. 45. The opinion of St. John Chrysostom, see below on page. 43. So does Theophilus (ad Autol. III, 13; M. Gr. VI, 1140), Origen (Comment. In Math. T XIV, 24: M. gr. XIII, 1248 A-B), Chrysostom in XVII, 3 fin. (M. gr. LVII, 259), on 1 Koryu VII, 39. 40 (n. 1) and ε᾿ γχω᾿ μιον ει᾿ ς Μα᾿ ξιμοω, n. 1, 2 (M. gr. LI, 219, 225, 227), St. Vasily V. B right 9 (page 195). St. Basil v. in right 45 (page 307) and Theophylact ar. Migne, gr. ser. t. CXXIII, col. 197. So it is in the handwritten Greek Gospels of the St. Petersburg library. spirit. Academies for No.-rami B 1/59 l. 49 rev. B ½ (see note 2), l. 63 rev. The first manuscript donated by V.K. Sabler, dates back to 985; see about it in A. S. Rodossky in “Bibliographic Notes” for 1892, No. 7, pp. 481–485, and in “Description of manuscripts received by the St. Petersburg library. D. A. in 189 ½”, pp. 5–6, or with an alphabetical index for the same time, pp. 215–216. Wed. Matthaei ibid., p. 74 et not. “To commit adultery is an act of adultery.” In addition to those indicated above by authority, see also Gr. Ya. Kryzhanovsky, Manuscript Gospels of the Kiev Book Depositories, Kiev 1889, p. 292. The importance of these discrepancies is also indicated by † J. B. Lightfoot. Sme in The Revision of the English Version of the New Testament by the late Philip Schaff, p. 73 not. Wed. explanation of Clement Al. (Strom. Lib. II, cap. 23 ap. Migne, gr. ser. t. VIII μοιχευθῆναι. Homil. on 1 Cor. VII, 39, 40, n. 1 app. Migne gr. LI, 218, 219 et passim. Conversations at various places St. Scriptures, II, 481-483. ` Εγχω᾿ μιον ει᾿ ς Μα᾿ ξιμον, n. 2, ibid., col. 227. Conversations II, 501. Without having to go into the details of the teachings on marriage of different Christian confessions, we point out, for general information, the articles of Archpriest. T. Seredinsky in “Christian Reading” for 1869, I, 689–694 (“Marriage is a sacrament”) and 1893, II 3–12 (“On the sacrament of marriage”), without at all confirming the scientific merits of the named “comparative theological studies.” The question of the mysterious meaning and nature of marriage, in my opinion, is not fully disclosed not only in dogmatics courses, even the most authoritative, but also in the special dissertation of Mr. N. Strakhov “Marriage, considered in its nature and from the side of the form of its conclusion” (Kharkov, 1893). This subject is better said by Dallinger (Christenthum und Kfrche, § 105, S. 387 ff.), although somewhat one-sided. Wed. at Prof. I.S. Berdnikov in his university speech “The form of marriage among European peoples in its historical development” in “Uchen. Note. Kaz. Univ. According to legal Fuck." 1887, 36, and in “Prospect. Review." 1888, III, 588. However, Orthodox canonists sometimes say too decisively that “entering into marital cohabitation after a divorce (any?) is actual adultery” and that “the Savior decisively closes the door to a new marriage for both divorced people.” Assoc. Prof. writes more definitely. N.A. Zaozersky (“On divorce proceedings” in “Prav. Review” 1882, XI, 522): “Only one reason is indicated by Jesus Christ why a husband can let go of his wife or his husband’s wife and enter into a new marriage: this reason is adultery.” Wed. Ed. Rosenthal, Die Rechtsfolgen des Ehebruchs nach kanonischem und deutschem Recht, Würzburg 1880, S. 16, 19. We quote from the publication “Sancrosancti et documenici Concilii Tridentini... canones et decreta, Antverpiae 1677”, p. 197. It is only found in the Evangelist Matthew by Prof. A. I. Zagorovsky in the cited book “On divorce according to Russian law”, pp. 41. 42–43. In the dogmatic sense, this is also recognized as the only correct one by Mr. Zavyalov in the articles mentioned above, and, following his example, a Moscow student sharply pursued a similar view in his candidate’s dissertation, but the reviewer, Assoc. N.A. Zaozersky, rightly called such an attempt a “sin.” See “Minutes of the Council of Moscow. spirit. Academy for 1893." at the “Theological Bulletin” 1894, IV, 161–164. Prof. N. S. Suvorov, Analysis of the essay by A. Zagorovsky “On divorce according to Russian law,” compiled on behalf of the Emperor. Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg. 1888, pp. 40 and 43; Church course Law II, § 173, pp. 342. Prof. I. S. Berdnikov, Short course of church law of the Orthodox Greek-Russian Church, Kazan 1888, § 87, pp. 127–128. Die Ehe, ihr Wesen und ihre Weihe nach Gottes Wort und That von Prof. Dr. Watterich, Pfarrer der altkatholischen Gemeinde zu Basel, Nördlin-gen 1876, S. 60 ff. Thus, H. L. Mansel in his commentary on Matt. XIX, 9 (in Speaker's Holy Bible, vol. I, London 1878, pp. 102-103) says: “The Church of England has never positively sanctioned any other separation (of spouses) than a mensa et thoro; this is also in accordance with the direct prohibition (in clause 107) of a new marriage” after divorce; however, this rule is not actually enforced. From this it is clear that Catholics, excessively accusing Byzantine-Orthodox marriage law of being subject to its pagan-state influence (cf. Frenzel, De indissolubilitate matrimonii, p. 128. H. Weiss, Der Bergpredigt, S. 46. Ios. Zhishman, Das Eherecht der orientalischen Kirche, S. 97), in To a large extent, they shift the blame from the sick head to the healthy one. However, see also in the appendix. Therefore, the “Gallican Church” of France does not share this Roman-Papist understanding. Protestants Keil, Achelis, Weiss, Stier, Tiersch, Hengstenberg, Krause also admit this; Wed and English Alford in his "The Greek Testament", vol. I. See his Considerations on the Revision of the English Version of the New Testament, New York 1873, p. 118 not 1 - according to the cited Collection of F. Schaff. “Explanatory Gospel”, vol. I, Moscow 1870, pp. 346. More precisely, Mr. S. V. Kokhomsky says (“Explanation of the most important passages of the Four Gospels,” Kyiv 1891, p. 79): in Matt. XIX, 9 “indicates the innocence of a husband when he not only lets a wife who has not been faithful, but also marries someone else.” Dallinger emphasizes this with particular sharpness (Christenthum und Kirche, § 117, S. 400) in his logical argument: “If He (Christ) taught at the same time that by infidelity marriage is actually permitted and at least the innocent member is allowed to remarry; then a wife rejected for some other reason, but not due to infidelity, is completely free, her husband, who seizes another, is an adulterer, and his wife, who commits another act of encroachment, is accused of adultery just as little as it is. on a person who binds himself in marriage to this wasteland." Wed. 39 rights St. Vasily V. (“Rules of the Holy Father” in the publication of Moscow obshch. loves, spiritual. enlightenment, Moscow 1884, page 285) in epist. 199 (2) ар. Migne, gr. ser. t. XXXII, col. 728: “She who lives with an adulterer is an adulterer throughout her life.” Wed. in Tertullian on pp. 37 to approx. 79. We use this text in the classic (cf. Casp. Ben. Gregory, Novum Testamentum graece etc. III, 1, Leipzig 1884, p. 275–273) edition of F. H. A. Serivener “Novum Testamentum textus Siephanici A. D. 1550, cum variis lectionibus. etc. Editio major 1891 (Cantabrigiae). For this location, see page. 47. It is not found only in some translations (Siric ex edit. Schaafii, Armenian, Persian with Polygl.) and minuscules 1. 2. 28. 262. 2 (i.e. codd. Petropolitani ab ed. de Muralt conlati). It is certainly firm in Latin, for which see partis prioris fasciculus alter (Evangelium secundum Marcum) of the edition “Novum Testamentum Domini nostri Jesu Christi latine secundum editionem sancti Hieronymi ad codicum manuscriptorum fidem recensuit Johannes Wordsworth, episcopus Sarisburiensis, in operis societatem adsumto H. Jul. White", Oxford 1891, p. 236. This is reading by prof. Gr. A. Voskresensky accepts for the first and fourth editions of the Slavic translation of the second Gospel; see “Ancient Slavic Gospel. The Gospel of Mark according to the main copies with discrepancies” Sergiev Posad 1894, pp. 274. 275. Wed. at Ilminsky on page. 137 and in Amphilochius I, pp. 733. In general and brief terms, the paternal view (St. Ignatius the God-Bearer, Justin M., Irenaeus, Clement Al. and Origen) on the sacrament of marriage is set out in the dissertation of prof. A.L. Katansky “Dogmatic doctrine of the seven church sacraments in the works of the most ancient fathers and writers of the Church up to and including Origen”, St. Petersburg. 1877, pp. 73yu 86–87. 119 words 173–180, 396–397. See Ant. Ios. Binterim, Die vorzüglichsten Denkwürdigkeiten der Christ-katholischen Kirche, VI 1, XXII, cap. 2, § 12–13, vol. IX, Halae 1760, p. 301 sqq. Apol. I, 15: Migne, gr. ser. t. VI, col. 349 A–B. Legatio pro Christ. 33: Migne, gr. ser. t. VI, col. 965. 968. Ad Autol. III, 13: Migne, gr. ser. t. VI, col. 1140. Clem. Al. Strom. lib. II, cap. 23 p. fin.: Migne, gr. ser. t. VIII, col. 1096 B-C. Adv. haer. lib. II, t. 1, haer. 59.4: Migue, gr. ser. t. XLI, col. 1024. 1025. Binterim, Op. cit., S. 112. Adv. haer. lib. I, t. 2, haer. 30, 18: Migne, gr. ser. t. XLI, col. 436 A-B. Retract. lib I, cap. XIX, § 6: Migne, lat ser. t. XXXII, col. 616. Adv. Marc. IV, 34: Migne, lat. ser. t. II, col. 442. 443. Wed. De patientia, cap. 12 (Migne, lat. ser. t. I, col. 1268A): Disjuncto matrimonio, ex ea tamen causa, qua licet seu viro, seu foeminae ad viduitatis perseverationem sustineri, haec exspectar, haec exorat poenitentiam quandoque inituris salutem. Quantum boni utrique confert! alteram non adultorum facit, alterum emendat. Ad uxorem lib. II, cap. 1: Migne, lat. ser. t. I, col. 1288 sq. Ibid. lib. I, cap. 6 (M. lat. I, 1283–1284): Quot item, qui consensu pari inter se matrimonii debitum tollunt, voluntarii spadones pro cupiditate regni coelestis. Ibid. lib. I, cap. 3 (M. lat. I, 1278): Prohibenri nuptias nusquam omnino legimus, ut bonum scilicet. Lib. I, cap. 2 col. 1277): Non abnuimus conjunctionem viri et foeminae benedictam a Domino...; unam tamen. Ibid. lib. II, cap. 9 (M. lat. I, 1304): Non licet alitor fidelibus nubere, et si liceret, non expediret. Ibid. lib. 1, cap 7 (M. lat. I, 1288): Quantum fidei detrahunt, quantum obstrepant sanctitati nuptiae secundae discipliuae Ecclesiae etc. Epist.77 (al. 30), 3: Migne, lat. ser. t. XXII, col. 691. 692. Epist 48 (50), 17: Migne, lat. ser. t. XXII, col. 507. For a description of marriage law among the Romans and Greeks during the era of the establishment of Christianity, see H. Geffcken, S. 9–16. Originis Comment. in Math, t. XIV, 23. 24 (Migne, gr. ser. t. XIII, col. 1245. 1248. 1249). S.Ioh. Chrys. in Math, hom. XVII, 4: Migne, gr. ser. t. LVII, col. 259. 260. Wed. in the Russian translation of “Conversations on the Evangelist Matthew,” part I, Moscow 1839, pp. 353–355. Homil. in Math. LXII (al. LXIII), 2: Migne, gr. ser. t. LVIII, col. 597–598. Conversations, part III, Moscow 1839, pp. 60 cl. A. Dallinger (Op. cit. S. 396. 464–465) calls this idea “an invented (by Protestants) theory,” alien to “the teaching and practice of the Christian Church”!?.. Homil. XIX in Eplst. 1 ad Cor., 3. 2: Minge, gr. ser. t. LXI, col. 154. 155. According to the Russian translation of Part I, St. Petersburg. 1863, pp. 330–331. 329. Homil. XXXII ar. Migne, gr. ser. t. LVI, col. 802. Homilia V in Math. XIX, 3 ap. Migme, gr. Ser. t. XL, col. 237 A-B; see Russian translation in the June book of the “Theological Bulletin” for 1893, pp. 393–394. Further, Asterius refers to another of his instructions on the same subject, but it has not survived to us. Migne ibid., col. 226, no. 31. From this we can see how unfair Luckock (pp. 150–151) is, considering, or rather, presenting Asterius as a spokesman for the protest against all marital indulgences, not excluding the guilt of fornication. Migne, gr. Ser. t. LXXII, col. 380, from Cramer Op. cit., t. I, p. 39. Apparently, of course, the saying of Proverbs. XVIII, 23: keep the adulterer, mad and wicked. Cramer ibid., p. 151–152. Blessed One also mentions Theodore and Appollinaris. Jerome (Migne, lat. Ser. t. XXVI, col. 20 B), who also names Theophilus of Antioch, Hippolytus the Martyr and Didimus of Alexandria, but their works for the places in question were not preserved even in the catenas. V. Theodoreti Graec. affect, curatio, IX: Migne, gr. ser. t. LXXXIII, col. 1053 C-D. Migne, gr. ser. t. CXXIII, col. 197. Blagovestnik, part I, Kazan 1855, pp. 108–109. Migne, gr. ser. t. CXXIII, col. 352. Blagovestnik, part I, pp. 331–332. .Comment. in Math. V, 32: Migne, gr. ser. t. CXXIX, col. 217; cp. Russian translation, Kyiv 1886, pp. 72–73. Comment. in Math. XIX, 32: Migne, gr. ser. t. CXXIX, col. 517; cp. Russian translation, pp. 285, 286. Hilarii Comment. In Math V, 31–33: Migne, lat, ser. t. IX, col. 939–940. In the explanation of chapter XIX (ibid., col. 1023–1024), verse 9 is bypassed: it only explains why Adam’s words are assimilated to God, and then the differences between the eunuchs are indicated. Comment. in Math, ar. Migne, lat. ser. t. XXVI, col. 135 In his “prologue” Jerome mentions Victorini, Fortunati (Fortunatiani) opuscula (ibid., col. 20 B), but these works have not reached us. De serm. Domini in Monte, lib. 1, cap. XIV, n. 39: Migne, lat. ser. t. XXXIV, col. 1249. Ibid., I, XVI, 48: Migne, lat. ser. t. XXXIV, col. 1253. Ibid. I, XVI, 48: Migne, lat. ser. t. XXXIY, col. 1253. Wed. in I.M. Milovanov On Church Crimes and Punishments, St. Petersburg. 1888, § 52, pp. 115–116, and about St. Ephraim the Syrian (cf. "Creations" part IV, 30; part II, 334–335) see the city of Porf. Smirnova in “Proceedings of the Kiev Theological Academy” for 1894, No. 11, pp. 327–328. According to Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow (see “Collected Opinions and Reviews,” vol. IV, page 521), the Church “and for all Christians recognizes one marriage as perfect, because Christian marriage, according to the Apostle, is an image of the union of Christ with the church; Christ is one groom, one bride, the Orthodox Church.” Words from Prof. A. S. Pavlova in his study: “Chapter 50 of the Helmsman’s Book”, Moscow 1887, pp. 55 words “Rules of the Holy Apostles, Holy Councils, Ecumenical and Local, and Holy Fathers with Interpretations,” vol. I, 2nd edition Moscow. total loves, spirit. enlightenment. Moscow 1887. Page. 90. This point is somewhat clarified in the dissertation of M. E. Krasnozhen (now a Yuryev professor) “Interpreters of the canonical code of the Eastern Church: Aristin, Zonara and Balsamon” (Moscow 1892) - and this, in our opinion, is the only merit of the book. For a general overview of these Byzantine commentators, see “Essay on Orthodox Church Law” (I, 1, Kharkov 1893, §§ 51–53, pp. 594 ff.) by Kharkov prof. M. A. Ostroumov, who also lists the relevant literature. Wed. also G. V. Demidov “The nature and significance of interpretations on the canonical code of the Greek Church - Aristinus, Zonara and Balsamon” in the “Orthodox Review” for 1888, No. 7, 8 and 9. Strn. 91 publications cited. “Rules of the Holy Fathers” in the Moscow edition. total love spirit. pr., Moscow 1884, str. 195. Migne, dr. ser. t. XXXII, col. 677, 680: rule 9th. It is not useless to cite here the following remark of Metropolitan. Moscow Philaret: “The Word of the Lord, on which this (9th) rule (of St. Basil the Great) is established, is read by the Evangelist Matthew, in chapter 19, verse 9, as follows: “Whoever lets his wife go, unless he commits adultery, and marries another, commits adultery: and marries a prostitute, commits adultery.” . The gender of the pustnitsa is obviously the wife, either willfully separated from her husband, or legally divorced for the guilt of her adultery. But as the word of the Lord, according to the obvious reason of the saying and according to the interpretation of St. Basil the Great, equally condemns husband and wife for the same crime, then it should be concluded that the bride who enters into marriage with a prostitute, i.e. for one who was divorced from his former wife for his adultery, commits adultery.” See in “Collection of opinions and reviews”, vol. II, pp. 270. Ibid., pp. 278. Cnf. Migne, gr. ser. t. XXXII, col. 728. Ibid., pp. 193. Beginning of rule 9th. Migne, gr. ser. t. XXXII, col. 677. Ibid., pp. 238. Migne, gr. ser. t. XXXII, col. 721. By this cf. and Zonara's interpretation of the 87th Trullan Canon in "Rules" III, 2, pp. 555. Ibid., pp. 360. Migne, gr. ser. t. XXXII, col. 804, 805. Ibid., pp. 306. Rule 48th. Migne, gr. ser. t. XXXII, col. 732. “Rules” in the same publication, vol. III, part 2. Moscow 1877, pp. 552–554 rule 87th. "Rules of St. local councils" in the same publication, vol. 2, Moscow 1881, pp. 677–678: Rule 115th. About the pustitsa of St. Clement Al. says (Strom, lib. II, cap. 23 Ar. Migne, gr. ser. t. VIII, col. 1096–1097): “She who committed sin lives in sin, but died for the commandments, and she who repented and, as it were, reborn in the way of life, receives the restoration of life; since the former harlot has died, she who was born comes to life again through repentance.” Let us also remember that Met. Filaret - regarding the petition of a certain Step. Borovskoy wrote about permission to take a spouse from his cohabitant (“Collection of opinions and reviews,” vol. I, page 333): “respecting the intention of the petitioner, who wants to correct her husband by spiritual means and restore the sanctity of the marriage, accept the request.” Let us use the comparison used by St. John Chrysostom in Homil. on 1 Cor. VII, 39–40, paragraph 1: Migne, gr. ser. t. LI, col. 217.-Conversations II, 481. On this score, we accidentally came across very disappointing evidence. At the anniversary of the late (September 6, 1894) Moscow Archpriest I.N. Rozhdestvensky in 1876, Archimandrite. Gregory directly said about him, as a member of the consistory: “in divorce cases, during each interrogation, you tried to instruct spouses in Christian reconciliation and cohabitation, which the law did not require of you; этот сверхдолжный труд вы брали на себя добровольно». See in “Moscow Church Gazette” for 1876, No. 38, pp. 319, et cf. in the obituary of Fr. Rozhdestvensky with Prof. N.I. Korsunsky in “Soulful Reading” for 1894, No. 11, pp. 462–463. Wed. Prof.'s comments A. Zagorovsky in cit. composition, pp. 462 words And Met. Moscow Philaret, recognizing as permissible divorce due to the fault of “the word of an adulterer” (see “Collected opinions and reviews”, IV, 91), also found the case inexcusable “when another marriage is sought from an unhappy marriage” (ibid., vol. V, p. 519). In his opinion, “the sanctity of the sacrament of marriage requires all possible caution so as not to proceed with its disposal unless absolutely necessary.” See page 11 of his resolutions, based on a reprint from “Reading in General.” Love spirit. enlightened." for 1877, book 2. De sermone Domini in monte, lib. I, cap. XVI, no. 43: Migne, lat. ser. t. XXXIY, col. 1251. Apparently, the form established by Roman law was observed here, so that the dissolution of marriage should be performed before a judicium domesticum of friends and relatives. Apolog. II, 2: M:gne, gr. ser. t. VI. col. 444. Thoughts for every day of the year, St. Petersburg. 1880, pp. 470–471. Cp. Gutachten der evangelicsh-theologischen Facultät der rhenischen Friedrich – Wilhelms – Universitäts (i.e. Bonn) über den… gemachten Antrag auf Entbindung der evangelischen Geistlichen von der Verflichten, die neue Ehe geschiedener Eheleute kirchlich einzusegnen in "Allgemeine Kirchen-Zeitung", 1836, Nr. 148, 149, pp. 1209–1215. 1217–1224, and in a separate edition Barmen 1836. De Wette, Kurze Erkiärung des Evangeliums des Matthäus, Lpzg. 1836, S. 67. H. Olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über Schriften des Nenen Testaments, 1 Thl., Königsherg 1853, S. 226–227. 725. You can read about the sighs of Russian publicists in the articles of prof. T.V. Barsova (“On the consequences of divorce in the case of adultery” in “Christian Reading” for 1882, vol. I) and N.A. Zaozersky and in the work of N. Strakhov; we will name at least Gradovsky, Sposobin, Orshansky. See also Archpriest. G.I. Titov “Three Conversations”, St. Petersburg. 1894, pp. 142–159: “a conversation between a priest and a lawyer on the issue of divorce” “Guides. For Rural Shepherds” for 1887. Extracted from Christ. Readings”, published at the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, 1895, II issue, pp. 367–410. “The History of Marriage jewish ami Christian in relation to divorce and certain forbidden degrees” by Herbert Mortimer Luckock, Dean of Lichfield, London 1894. Under the preface the date “St. Jacob", i.e. August 6 (July 25), 1884 Wed. still prof. W. H. Bennett, The Mishna and the Gospels, chap. 6, and T. H. Darlow in Expositor 1893, IV, 294-295. There were a whole lot of them. Eg. in Cittin, cap. 1 says: “let the one who writes a letter of divorce, twelve lines (no more, no less) according to the numerical value of the letters in the word (93) נט (documents, note and-in particular-divorce: בניטא פטך, etc.). It is developed more thoroughly by Dallinger in his book Christenthum und Kirche in der Zeit der Grund`egung, Zw. Auff., Regensburg 1868, which Lucock slavishly uses in the question of the teaching of Christ the Savior; Therefore, further we will have in mind the named German work, where (§§ 107–117, S. 390–400, and Beilage III, S. 461–467) the corresponding arguments are presented more fully and documented. Wed. Prof. Kühl, "Stellung und Bedeutung des alttesamentlichen Gesetzes im Zusammengang der paulinischen Lehre" in "Theol. Studien und Kritiken" 1804, I, S. 120 ff. Of course, on the basis of Dallinger (S. 462), who hardly unintentionally manipulates the evidence when he points to the words of St. Gregory of Nyssa (right 4): τινί τῆς έπιθομίας έκπλήρωσιν μοιχείαν δέ , τήν έπιβουλήν τε καί άδικίαν τοῦ άλλοτρίου и Вальсамона: πορνεία λέγεται ή χωρίς άδικίας έτέρου μίξις, ἢ γουν ή πρός έλευθέραν άνδρός γυναίκα (see “Rules of the Holy Father” according to the publication of the Moscow General. Spiritual Enlightenment, pp. 468–469. 473) - in favor of the idea that “among the Greeks, πορνεία excludes adultery and means only carnal relations between celibates.” But 1) in these places the well-known idea is expressed (see on page 17 to note 24) that the husband is guilty of μοιχεία only in connection with a married woman (see also in Zonara ibid., page 473), and therefore the current concept of adulterium is equated to simple furnicatio; 2) according to St. Gregory, “to those who have studied this subject more strictly, fornication seems to be not far removed from the sin of adultery,” according to 3) according to the condescension of the fathers towards the weaker, a distinction was made (ibid., pp. 468), which is therefore an artificial distinction, understandable only from the view of Roman law on jus thori. It is important to add that Döllinger does not cite other patristic authorities, and those indicated in Suicer Thesaurus II, 808–809 are equally misinterpreted. See above on page. 22; this against the objections of Dallinger, S. 463. Jäger, Untersuchung der Frage, ob die Ehescheidung nach der Lehre der Schrift erlaubt sei oder nicht, Arnstadt und Rudolstadt 1804, S. 19 ff. Dr. Dreher in "Katholik" 1877, S. 587. Withstanding all the grammatical energy of Matthew. XIX, 10, prof. E. Burton (Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek, Chicago 1893, § 264, p. 109; cnf. § 243, p. 102) renders this verse as follows: “if the principle established by Jesus is true, then the general rule follows that one should not marry.” In the matter of divorce, a Jewish wife did not have rights equal to her husband. Josephus mentions that Salome herself sent the licentious book to Kostovar, but to this he adds that this is ού κατά τούς ΄ Βουδαίων νόμους. Antiqu. XV, 7: 10 in Niese III, 378, and in Samoilov III, 38. See page 40–41 to approx. 89. Pastor, lib. III, mand. 1: Migne, gr. ser. t. II, col. 919–920, and cnf. Proleg. Ibid., p. 882–883. Cp. Hermae Pastor grace add. Lat. vers. Recent, e. cod. Palat. Rec. O. de Gebkardt et A. Harnack, Lipsiae 1877, p. 78. De monog, cap. 9–10: Migne, lat. ser. t. II, col. 940–942. Ibid., cap. 3: Migne, lat. ser. t. II, col. 932. Liber de exhortation castitatis, cap. 9 (Migne ibid., col. 925 A): Alloquin quae res et viris et foeminis omnibus adest ad matrimonium et sturpum? Commixtio carnalis scilicet, cujus concupiscentiam Dominus sturpo adaequavit. Ergo, inquis, jam et primas, idest, nnas nuptias destruis? Nec immerito, quoniam et ipsae ex co constant, quo et sturpum. De exhort., cap. 13 ibid., col. 930. De exhort., cap. 9 ibid., col. 924; Wed and below: de forma autem et cultu carnalis concue ingenium sit quae ctiam sturpi causa est: ecquid videtur tibi sturpi adfine esse sccundum matrimonium, quoniam ea in illo deprehendo quae sturpo competent? See Liber de puducitia, cap. 3: Migne, lat. ser. t.II, col. 1000. Luckock, p. 158–159. Cnf. Geffeken, S. 60–61. Wed. about this in A. Cigoi, S. 152–153. 185. See the eighth speech, “The Church in England is not a sect,” in R. E. Sanderson’s What is the Church? London 1894, p. 129–146. This principle was carried out with particular sharpness and justified for the first time by Marsilius of Padua and William of Ockham on the occasion that Ludwig of Bavaria (1314–1347) arbitrarily dissolved the marriage between the Bohemian prince John and Margaret, marrying the latter to his son Ludwig, although she was in the third degree of consanguinity. See “Das landesherrliche Ehescheidungsrecht” von Karl Rieker in “Theologische Studien und Kritiken” 1893, II, S. 363–379. Comment. In Math. T. XIV, 7: Migne, gr. ser. t. XIII, col. 1232 C. This excerpt from Froude's memoirs of a voyage to the West Indies is given by O.A. Novikova in the feuilleton “Moskovskiye Vedomosti” for 1894, No. 303 dated November 4th. Leipzig 1894, S. 82; under the preface the date “September 17, 1894.” Die äitesten Cnristengemein len im römischen Reiche. Reke von Emil Schürer. Kid 1894. S. 19. This phrase on p. 36 to approx. 75 is printed in italics. Epist. 55 (147), 3: Migne, lat. ser. t. XXII, col. 562–563. Epist. 55 (147), 4 ibid., col. 564. Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam, lib. VIII, 4. 6: lat. ser. t. XV, col. 1766, 1767. Commentar. in Epist. ail Corinth, primam VII, 10. 11 ap. Migne, lat. ser. t. XVII, col. 218. The authenticity of this work is rightly disputed, but in any case it is an ancient monument of Latin ecclesiastical writing. Expos. Evang. sec. Luc, lib. VIII, 5 are. Migne ibid., col. 1767. De bono conjugali, VII, 7: Migne, lat. ser. t. XL, col. 378. De conjugiis adulterinis, II, 4, § 4 ibid., coi. 473; see other excerpts from Lukecock on pp. 139 words De fide et cperibus, cap. XIX, § 35 ibid., col. 221 Bestimon. adv. ., lib. III, cap. 90: Migne, lat. ser. t. IV, col. 774. § 5 ibid., col. 822. cp. approx. on page 100. In Evang. Matthaei commentaries, cap. IV, § 22: Migne, lat. ser. t. IX, col. 939–940. Wed. above on page 46 to approx. 108. This is against the publisher ibid's interpretation. under lit. d. Tract. X (y Gallandii Bibl. Vet. Part. VIII, Venetiia 1788, p. 344: tract. IX) ap. Migne, lat. ser. t. XX, col. 351. Epist. 48 (50), 5: Migne, lat. ser. t. XXII, col. 497. Epist. 77 (30), 3 ibid., col. 691. Epist. 48 (50), 8 ibid., col. 499: tolerabilius est uni homini prostitutam esse quam multis. Epist. 48 (50), 8 ibid., col. 503. Cp. Schultzen, Die Benutzung der Schrifien Tertullians de monogamia et de jejunio bei Hieronymus adv. Jovinianum b “Nene Jahrbücher für dentsche Theologie”, herausgeg. Von. Dr. L. Lemme, dritter Bud, viertes Heft, Bonn 1894. Epist. Hieronymi 48 (50), 14 ibid, col. 505: Virginitas abeö (Ambrosio) persaasio contenentiaë nuptiae, remedia incontinentiae pra dicantur… Denique nuptias dieit, quasi necessitates sarecinam declinandas, et definitidentissimae servitatis. Cnf. S. ambrosii Ne viduis, cap. XIII, 81: Non ergo copula nuptialis quasi culpa vicanda, sed quasi necessitauis savcina declinanda... Et dominatui viri sola sabditur copalata, non virgo (Migne, lat. ser. t. XVI, col. 259, 260). See rule 87 in epist.-Diodoro-160 (197), 2: Migne, gr. ser. t. XXXII. Col. 624. "Rules of St. father" in the publication Mosk. total love spirit. enlightenment, str. 387–388. Moraiia, veg. LXXIII, 1, 2: Migne, gr. ser. t. XXXI, col. 849, 852. Epist. II class. 188 (1), can. 9: Migne, gr. ser. t. XXXII, col. 677 B-C. "Rules", pp. 194. Epist. II class. 217 (3), can. 77: Migne, gr. ser. t. XXXII, col. 804.805; cnf. Not. 29. “Rules”, pp. 360. Wed. above on page 51 to approx. 124. Die Unauflösbarkeit der christlichen Ehe und die Ehescheidung nach Schrift und Tradition. Eine historisch-kritische Erörterung vou der apostolischen Zeit bis auf die Gegenwart von Dr. Aloys Cigoi O. S. V., Professor der Theologie in Klagenfurt. Herausgegeben unter dem Protektorate der Leo-Gesellschaft. Paderborn 1895. Wed. note by K. Köhler in “Theol. Literaturzeitung"1895, V, 138–139. However, on page 221 (against Grevë Die Ehescheidung nach der Lehre des N. T., Lpzg. 1873) Cigoi writes: “Where Jerome motivates the prohibition of a second marriage by the fact that “it is not good after an unhappy marriage to be exposed to the danger of a new one,” we do not know. The words “ob secundam copulam nuptiarum veteri crimen inpingere” do not contain this.” The latter is true, and yet one cannot help but be surprised at the ignorance of the author, to whom we remind Hieronymi Com nentarium in Evangelium Matthaei (XIX, 9), lib. III, cap. 19 (Migne, lat. ser t. XXVI, col. 135 A-B; cf. above on page 47 to note 109): “Si non propter libidinem, sed propter injuriam dimittis uxorem: quare expertus infelices priores nuptias, novarum te immittis periculo?” After this, what does Cigoi mean “ist uns unbekannt” when the phrase he named stands immediately before (col. 135 A) the expression we quoted?! Such - except for Hug (who in Commentat'o cxegctica "De conjugii Cristiani vinculo indissolubili", Friburgi 1816, which originally appeared in "Ulmer Jahreschrift fur Theologie und Kirchenrecht", IV-er Bnd, S. 443-475, suggested an insertion only in Matthew V, 32) -Dr. Dreher in "Katholik" 1877, 2-te Hälfte, S. 587, Jäger, Op. cit., S. 19 f. and from the Protestants Bl eek (Komment, zu Matth., herau-g. v. Holzmann, I.pzg. 1862, S. 272) and H. Holzmann (Komment, zi Matth, Freibarg i. B. 1889, 8. 111). This author also spoke out (Evangeliun des hl. Matthaus, I-er Bnd, München 1856, S. 459–460) in favor of the idea of Franeisci Patritii, that the Lord Savior mentions the coujugium fornicarium, qui concubinatus dilitur, quemque dissolvi non licet modo, sed oporcet (De interprotatione Scnipturae lib. 1, n. 169; cuf. Comment. V, 32. XIX, 9, Romae 1844), but Cigoi rightly rejects (S. 190-191). In addition to him, see also E. G. Paulus, Philolog.-kritbch. Komment., I – er Bnd., 2-tc. Aufl., Lpx. 1812, S. 862 ff., and Gratz, Ist nach Schrift die Ehescheidung vcrboten? in "Archiv für das katholische Kirchen-und Schulwecen", III-er Bnd, Frankfurt 1815, S. 33–46. Regarding him, let us add what in 2 Cor. XI, 28 this saying - according to the authority of the inscriptions - can be understood inseparably as a compound word. Wed. Wilhelm Schmid in "Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen", Januar 1895, Kr. I, S. 37, to § 5, 7g G. B. Winer's Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Sprachidoins. Achte Auflage, neu bearbeitet von D. Paul Willi. Schmiedel, 1-er Theil, Gött. ngem 1894, S. 36. Jäger (Op. eil., p. 50), Hug (Op. cit., pp. 14–18), Chr. spoke in this sense. Ries Privatgedanken über die Praxis der katholischen Kirche, das eheliche Band nicht aufzulösen, Bamberg und Würzburg 1817, S. 103. 107, Jos. Zenger Nener Versuch einer Erklärung der Stelle der hl. Schrift und der Tradilionszougnisse der ersten vier Jabrumlerten, Regensburg 1819, S. 74, Job. Kistemaker Kommen!, zu Matth., Münster 1825, S. 84–106, and vgl. Excget. Abband!, über Math. [XVIII, 19 und] XIX, 3–12, Göttingen 1806, Jos. Biuterim Über Ehe und Ehescheidung, Düsseldorf 1819, S. 114 ff. His wisdom on the issue of divorce is outlined and analyzed in detail by prof. A.F. Gusev in his book “The Basic “Religious” Principles of Count L. Tolstoy”, Kazan 1893, pp. 140–168. To eliminate misunderstandings, we consider it our duty to mention Fergus Hume’s book “Whom God hath joined. A question of marriage", London 1894; but its title does not at all correspond to the content, because it contains only instructive stories aimed at strengthening family life. From recent literature we know, by the way, the work of L.A. Desaulles “Les erreurs de l' eglise, en droit naturel et canonique, sur le mariage et le divorce,” Paris 1894, which we did not have at hand, which, however, we have no reason to regret, even if not particularly. On this subject see Sanchez De matrimonio lib. II, disp. 14, Brixiae 1624, p. 149–151, Perrone De matrimonio chistino lib. III, Romae 1858, p. 504 sqq. See details in E. Hubrich, Das Recht der Ehescheidung in Deutschland, mit cinem Vorwort von Prof. Dr. Zorn, Berlin 1891. Wed. also Das Kirchenrecht mit Einschluss des Eherechts von Dr. jur. C. Ney, Berlin 1895, S. 133. Wed. at A. Cigoi, S.240 ff. Here, as in other cases, the figures from the Russian source may raise some doubts, but we do not have time to verify them. Wed. and the word of the Reverend. Ambrose of Kharkov About childbearing in “Moskovskie Vedomosti” No. 350, in Add. to "Church" Led." No. 52 and in the magazine “Faith and Reason” No. 24, all for 1894. See article (S 146–160) by Ludwig Mühlhäusser`s “Moderne socialistischen Theorien über Familie und Ehe” in “Neue Jahrbücher für deutsche Thcologie”, Zw. Bnd, 1-es Hif (Bonn 1893), S. 160. Wed. at Geffcken'a on page. 11–12. See Plutarch. Vita Catonis, cap. 20. De beneficiis III, 16; cnf. Martial VI, 7. 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