Глава LXV. Различные определения

A premise (προτασις) is speech that expresses either the absence of a known object of any attribute, such as, for example, the negation: “Socrates does not laugh” - or the presence of this attribute, such as, for example, the statement: “Socrates laughs.” The term is an integral part of the premise. A syllogism is a speech in which, if one thing is assumed or assumed, another necessarily follows from what is assumed, and, precisely, thanks to the assumption made, for the conclusion is obtained thanks to the assumed premises and does not need any other confirmation from the outside. A question (προβλημα) is an investigation that leads either to a certain choice or to avoiding it, i.e. either to denial or to affirmation, otherwise – knowledge and contemplation. Questioning (πυσμα) is a question that requires a detailed or lengthy answer. A question differs from questioning in that a question is followed by a quick answer composed in a few words, while a question is followed by a lengthy and verbose answer. Speech is called dialogical when it consists of questions and answers. An objection is something that refutes the argument from the very beginning. Refutation (αντιπαραστασις) takes place in the case when what the opponent said is accepted as fair, but it is proven that this does not cause any damage to the position presented. Lemma (λημματιον) is that which is accepted as generally accepted for some specific purpose. Heresy (αιρεσις) is the thought or opinion of a significant number of people who agree with each other but disagree with others. A generally accepted thought is one about which everyone agrees. Such, for example, is the idea that the sun exists. A thesis (θεσις) is a statement of some famous philosopher deviating from the generally accepted opinion, an unusual thought, like the teaching of Parmenides that existence is one, as well as the teaching of Heraclitus that everything moves. The general is that which is contemplated in many things or expressed in relation to many things. The general is said in four different senses. Common is either something that can be divided into parts, for example, land divided between heirs, or something that, without allowing division, is in common use, but not at the same time, - for example, one slave or one horse, owned by two masters and executing the order of one time, another time of the other; or the fact that, although at the very moment of use it belongs to only one, it is nevertheless provided to everyone, for example, a place in the theater or in the bathhouse; or that which, being indivisible, is offered to a common and identical understanding, for example, the voice of a herald. In this sense, the word “common” should be understood in relation to homonyms and synonyms that have a “common name”. In itself (καθ´ αυτο) there is something that belongs to something both first and substantially (κατ´ ουσιαν), and not by chance (κατα συμβεβηκον), as for example, the property of rationality belongs to a person. Universal (καθολον) is something that means many objects, for example, a person, an animal, a substance. What is accidental is something that may or may not belong to an object; just as, for example, illness and health belong to a person. The word “produce” is used in relation to productive arts in which the product is preserved, as is the case, for example, in carpentry and similar arts. So, the bed remains even after it is made. The word “make” is also used in relation to those arts in which what is done, or the product, is not preserved; this occurs, for example, when playing the flute and when dancing. To contemplate (θεορειν) means to reflect when practicing astronomy, geometry and similar sciences. The word επινοια, when understood correctly, has two meanings. Firstly, it is, as it were, a kind of reflection and deepening that simplifies and clarifies a holistic and undivided view of things and knowledge about them. Thus, what appears simple to the senses reveals itself to be complex and varied upon careful examination: for example, a person who immediately appears simple, upon deeper investigation is understood to be two-component, consisting of soul and body. Secondly, it is a fiction that creates, by combining feeling and fantasy, from the existing the non-existent and judging on the basis of the first and the last. Such, for example, are the fabulous tales of centaurs, sirens, and tragelafs. Borrowing its parts from the whole and forming something else from the parts, these legends, using broad arbitrariness and not being constrained by anything, created something that is never found in reality - they created it first in the mind and intellect, and then, giving the fabricated material expression, they turned it into an image. Επινοια in this sense is called simple (θελέ) επινοια. Idle talk occurs when someone contained in a known object speaks about the containing object. Thus, man contains the properties of a bipedal animal, just as Socrates contains the properties of whiteness and musicality. So, if someone expresses these properties about a person or Socrates, saying: a person is a two-legged animal, and Socrates has musicality and whiteness, then such a person is talking idle, saying the same thing many times. This is, in fact, idle talk, since the properties mentioned are contained in man and Socrates, and whoever names these latter will thereby express the former. Relationship is intimacy, love or friendship, possession, participation, union. We call a relationship a connection with a known thing, a habit of it, a disposition towards it, as well as a spatial connection between things, when they either go to one place, or appear from one place, or are in one place. It should be noted that there are six possible relationships between four people: between the first and the other three, there are three relationships; between the second and the other two - there are five relationships; finally, between the third and fourth. Thus, it turns out that there are six relationships between four people. Five people will have ten relationships. The joining (ενωσις) occurs in various ways: either through kneading, as in the case of different types of flour, kneaded and mixed together: or through soldering, as in the case of copper and lead; or through hewing, as in the case of stones and wood; or by alloy, as in the case of meltable substances: for example, wax, resin, etc., and metals: for example, gold, silver, etc., or through mixing, as in the case of liquids, for example, wine and water or wine and honey; or through accretion, as in relation to something that is torn away from its base and then reunited with it; Thus the lamp comes from the fire and is reunited with it again. As for the connection through combination (κατα συνθεσιν), it consists of a nearby position of parts, without any damage to each of them; such is the union of soul and body, which some called mixture (συνκρασις) or fusion (συμφυα). It should be borne in mind that some of the fathers did not accept the term “confusion” (κρασεως) as applied to the mystery of Christ, while the term “through combination” (κατα συνθεσις) was accepted by all. Unity through combination is unity on the part of the hypostasis. So, that which consists of different natures is hypostatically one. And again: that which, consisting of two things, is known in one person is hypostatically one. In the same way, hypostatic unity takes place in the case when nature joins another hypostasis. Mixing consists in the juxtaposition of bodies and the mutual transfer of the qualities of one body to another. On the other hand, mixture is a combination of bodies that mutually exchange their qualities with each other. Mixing is the coexistence of substances that are different from each other and the mutual transfer of properties of one to another. There is unity through simple proximity and, apparently, also through adaptation. Further, unity is called personal when someone, taking the face of another person, speaks for him. Finally, there is unity of attitude, for example, towards each other. Nestorius also invented other types of unity, namely, according to dignity, according to equality, according to the identity of the will, according to goodwill and according to the unity of the name. It should be borne in mind that during a hypostatic union, not only the spiritual is united with that which is capable of receiving it, but also the corruptible. But having united, it remains unfused, indestructible, unchangeable, like that with which it was united; for such is the nature of the spiritual. You might be interested in: