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Since we mean to reason about any purely (απλως) philosophical sound (φώνη), we must first determine what sound philosophy deals with. Beginning our speech with a consideration of sound, we say: the sound is either insignificant (ασήμος) or significant (σήμαντικη). An insignificant sound is one that does not mean anything; significant - one that means something. Further, an insignificant sound, in turn, is either inarticulate or articulate. An inarticulate sound is one that cannot be written; articulate is one that can be written. Thus, there is an inarticulate and insignificant sound, such as that produced by a stone or a tree: for it cannot be written down and means nothing. There is a sound that is insignificant and articulate, for example, “skindaps”: for it can be written, but does not mean anything; There was no skindaps, and there is no. Philosophy does not care about an insignificant sound, both inarticulate and articulate. In turn, a significant sound can be either articulate or inarticulate. An inarticulate significant sound would be, for example, the barking of dogs: it denotes a dog, since there is a dog’s voice; in the same way it denotes someone’s presence; but it is an inarticulate sound, so it is not written. And philosophy has nothing to do with this sound. An articulate significant sound can be either general or particular [single]. A common sound would be, for example, “man”; private - Peter, Pavel. And philosophy has nothing to do with the private sound. But (philosophy deals) with a significant, articulate, conciliar sound, i.e. general, expressed in application to many subjects. This sound, in turn, is either essential (ουσιώδησ) or attached to essence (επουσιώδης). The essential sound is that sound which expresses the substance or nature of things; attached to the essence is the one that expresses accidents. For example: man is a mortal, rational animal. These will all be significant sounds. For if you take any of this away from a person, he will not be a person. And if you say that he is not an animal, then he is no longer a person; and if you say that he is not intelligent, then he is no longer a man; in the same way, if you say that he is not mortal, he is not a man; for every person is an animal, a rational one, and a mortal. Therefore (these sounds) are called essential because they replenish the nature of man, and it is impossible for man to exist outside of them. Likewise, in every thing, that which constitutes its nature is called essential; those attached to the essence are accidents that may or may not be in the subject: a man or a horse, or something else like that, for example, white. For whether someone is white or black, he will nevertheless remain a man. This and the like are called those attached to the essence, or accidents, which we can have either these or their opposites. An essential sound denotes either what a thing is or what that thing is like. For example, when answering the question what a person is, we say: an animal. Then, asked what kind of animal, we say: rational, mortal. The essential sound that shows what an object is is called difference (διαφορα); which shows that there is an object, designates either many species and constitutes a genus, or many individuals, differing among themselves in number, but in no case in type, constitutes a species. First, i.e. a genus, for example, is a substance, for substance designates a man, a horse, and an ox, because each of these creatures is called and is a substance, but one constitutes one species, the other another. The second, i.e. species, for example, is a person, for this word designates many, or rather all individual people, who differ from each other in number - for one is Peter and the other is Paul, and they are not one, but two - in appearance, i.e. by nature, they are not different. In fact, they are all called and are people. Thus, there is a particular [individual, as opposed to genus and species], differing among themselves in number, for example, Peter, the individual, as well as person and hypostasis (προσοπον και υποστασις). It denotes someone specific. So, when we are asked; “Who is this (person),” we say: “Peter.” This is also what the expressions mean: “another” - for one is Peter and the other - Paul - “he”, “this”, “that” - they are applied to an individual who exists on his own - and similar ones. On the contrary, what individuals contain within themselves is called a species and has a greater generality than the individual, since it embraces many individuals - for example, “man”. This word embraces Peter, and Paul, and all individual people. The appearance of the holy fathers is called nature (φυσις) and essence (ουσια), and form (μορφη). That which embraces many species is called a genus, for example “animal,” for (this word) embraces man, ox, horse and is more general than species. The Holy Fathers call both species and genus nature, form, image, essence. Through species—in other words, nature, essence, form—it is not this or that individual that is posited, not this or that difference, but this or that substance. So we call a person one entity, a horse another, but not one or the other individual. In relation to the species it is said: this, it, that and the like, i.e. answering the question: “What is an object?” Difference posits a difference between objects - one thing is a rational animal and another - an irrational animal - and “such”, and “which”, and “which is”. As for what is attached to an essence, it belongs either to one species or to many. If it belongs to one species, it is called a property; for example, the ability to laugh, which belongs to one person, the ability to neigh, which belongs to one horse. If it belongs to many species, then it constitutes an accident - for example, whiteness, for it belongs to man, and horse, and dog, and many other species. These are the five names to which every philosophical name comes down, and we need to know what each of them means and in what ways they are similar to each other and in what ways they differ. These names are: genus, species, difference, property and accident. Gender is that which is expressed, i.e. is said and called, in relation to many objects that differ in appearance, to the question: what is an object? For to speak means to be told about something. A species is something that is expressed in relation to many objects that differ in number, in response to the question: what is an object? Difference is what is expressed in relation to many objects that differ from each other in appearance, in response to the question: what is the object? and is accepted into the definition as an essential feature. The difference cannot be and not be in the same form, but must necessarily be in the form to which it belongs. Being present in it, it preserves it; by being absent, it destroys it. In the same way, it is impossible for both difference and its opposite to be combined in one form. For example, rationality cannot but belong to a person, because an irrational being is no longer a person. Being present, rationality constitutes the nature of man, and when absent, it destroys, for an unreasonable being is no longer a person. It should be noted that the difference is called essential, natural (φυσικη), component (συστατικη), separating, as well as species difference, essential quality and natural property of nature. Philosophers very aptly call it difference, since it is the most special and is an expression of the essence to which it belongs. A property is something that belongs to one species, to everything and always, and can be inverted [can exchange place with the subject] - for example, the ability to laugh. Indeed, every person is capable of laughing, and every creature capable of laughing is a person. An accident is something that is expressed regarding many objects that differ in appearance, in response to the question: what is the object? It is not accepted into the definition, but it may or may not belong to the object. An accident, being present in an object, does not preserve it and, being absent, does not destroy it. Accident is called inessential (επουσιωδης) difference and quality. An accident can be either separable or inseparable. A separable accident is something that is sometimes present and sometimes absent in the same person, such as sitting, flying, standing, illness, health. An inseparable accident is something that is not part of the essence, since it is not contemplated in its entirety; however, as soon as it belongs to a known person, it can no longer be separated from him. These are, for example, a flattened or humped nose, blue eyes, etc. Such an inseparable accident is called a distinctive feature (χαρακτερικον ιδιομα), for this difference constitutes a hypostasis, i.e. individual. As for the individual, he is composed of substance and accidents and exists on his own, differing from those similar to him in appearance by number, and showing not “what”, but “whom”. But we, with God’s help, will get to know this in more detail later. You might be interested in: