Глава XLVII. Разделение субстанции

Substance is the most general genus. It is divided: So, substance is the most general genus, body is a type of substance and a genus of animate; animate - the type of body and the gender of the sentient; a sentient animal is a species of animate and a genus of rational; rational - the species of animal and the genus of mortal; mortal - the species of reason and the race of man; man is the lowest species, for man is a species in relation to a mortal and a species in relation to Peter and Paul. According to the holy fathers, this, precisely, is nature, form and substance. Those members of the division that are between the most general genus, i.e. substance, and the lowest species, that is, man, ox, are subordinate genera and species. They are called essential and natural differences, as well as qualities, divisive in relation to the higher members, formative in relation to the lower members, and specific (ειδοποιοι) in relation to the lowest species, since they form them and separate one nature from another. Nature is determined from the lowest species. So, it is said what is substance, nature, form and what is hypostasis, individual, person, hypostatic and non-hypostatic, and what is the difference between substance and accidents, and that substance is more important than accidents, since accidents have their existence in it. It has also been said about the division of substance and how it differs from essential differences - precisely in that the substance formed by them receives a certain form and becomes one way and not another. It is also said about what nature, form, hypostasis, person, individual are, as the pagan sages thought about this and as the holy fathers, disciples and teachers of truth and true philosophy defined it. Now we will talk about the properties of substance. The property of a substance is that it does not exist in any substrate. On the contrary, it itself forms the basis of the existence of accidents and does not have its existence in another. This property also belongs to significant differences. For that which has its existence in any substratum does not preserve a thing by being present in it, and does not destroy it by being absent, which is why it is not included in the definition, since it is an undoubted accident. Essential differences are not accidents. By being present, they preserve the thing; by being absent, they destroy it. Therefore they are included in the definition. The property of a substance is that it is expressed synonymously, i.e. conveys both the name and the definition and has nothing contrary to itself - for the stone, i.e. There is nothing contrary to the substance of the stone itself - and does not accept the definition of “more” and “less”. This property also belongs to significant differences. Thus, a person is no more than a horse a substance or an animal, just as a horse is no more than a person. Finally, substance has the property that it accepts opposite determinations, each separately, without remaining the same, but undergoing change. By opposite definitions I mean accidents. Essential opposite qualities are never accepted by the substance. Thus, the reasonable does not allow the unreasonable. But the body heats up, and, changing, becomes cold. Likewise, the soul sometimes acquires virtue and sometimes vice. You might be interested in: