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The species is one of the homonyms and is used in two senses. The form is called the form, as well as the figure of each thing, for example: the appearance of a statue. Accordingly, it is said: the first kind is worthy of the kingdom. A species, on the other hand, is that essential thing that is subordinate to a genus. And again: a species is something in which the genus is expressed in the form of an answer to the question what an object is, or something that is expressed in the same form about many and numerically different objects. But the first two definitions of species differ from each other only relatively, like the upward direction and the downward direction, and are suitable for any species. The third, perfect, definition is suitable only for the lowest type, the general concept closest to individuals, embracing individual essences; in this sense we, for example, say: a species of man. We said that the name genus is used in three senses: in the sense of origin from a parent, in the sense of origin from the fatherland - in both cases in a double sense (close and distant) - and, thirdly, the genus means that to which the species is subject. Likewise, species has two meanings: firstly, species means the figure of each thing and, secondly, that in relation to which the genus is expressed and what is subordinate to the genus, as a member of its division. Philosophers talk about this genus and species. Since, when discussing the genus, we mentioned the species, saying: the genus is that which is divided into species, and again: when discussing the species, we mentioned the genus, saying: the species is that into which the genus is divided, therefore it should be noted that, just as when speaking about the father, we necessarily mention the son - for the father is the one who has the son, and, speaking about the son, it is necessary to mention the father, for the son is the one who has the father, so and in this case it is impossible to talk about the genus without touching the species, or about the species without touching the genus. For a genus is necessarily divided into species, and that which does not have species into which it is divided is not a genus; Likewise, species are that into which a genus is divided, and that which does not have a genus is not a species. The first person, i.e. Adam is not called a son because he had no father, but is called a father because he had sons. Seth is called both a son in relation to the one who gave birth to him - for he had a father - Adam - and a father in relation to the one born from him, for he gave birth to Enos. On the contrary, Abel is called a son, because he had a father, Adam, but is not called a father, because he did not have a son. The same must be said regarding genus and species. The first genus, since it is not something into which another genus is divided and does not have a genus preceding it, is only a genus and is no longer a species; this genus is called the most general genus (γενικωτατον γενος - genus generalissimum), and, defining it, we say: the most general genus will be the one that, being a genus, is not at the same time a species, not having a higher genus above it. As for the members of the division of this genus, which have under them other species into which they are divided, then these members in relation to what precedes them, i.e. what they are subordinated to and what is divided into them will be species, and in relation to what they themselves are divided into, i.e. lower concepts - genera; therefore they are called subordinate genera and species. The latter and lower types, which do not have other types under them, i.e. which embrace not species, but individuals and hypostases (ὑποστασεις), are no longer called a genus, but only a species. The reason for this is that, as I said, they have no basis in other species into which they are divided; for something cannot be called a genus if it does not embrace species or does not have under it species into which it is divided. Therefore, that which contains not species, but hypostases is called a lower species, because, being a species, it is not at the same time a genus, just as a genus that does not at the same time serve as a species is called a higher genus. It should be borne in mind that species necessarily take both a name and a definition of the genus, and a genus takes the name and definition of its own genus, and so on up to the highest genus; but one species cannot accept the definition of another species. And to make what has been said clearer, we turn to such examples. Substance is the first and highest kind. In fact, although being (ον) is divided into substance (ουσια) and accident (συμβεβηκος), being will not be a genus for them, since they accept the name of being, but do not accept definitions. An existing thing is either a self-existent thing that does not need another for its existence, or a thing that cannot exist on its own, but has its existence in another. Substance is only a self-existent thing that does not need another thing for its existence. Thus, substance does not accept the entire definition of being. Because of this, a being is not a genus of substance, just as a substance is not a species of a being, for a species takes on the entire definition of its genus without remainder. But accident is not a type of being. In fact, it does not accept the entire definition of existence, but half, for an accident is only a thing that cannot exist on its own, but needs another for its existence. Thus, neither substance nor accident accepts the entire definition of being, but substance accepts one half, and accident the other. Therefore, although being is divided into substance and accident, it does not constitute their genus. Substance, in turn, is divided into body and incorporeal being. Here body and incorporeal being are types of substance, for each of them receives the name and definition of substance. From this it follows that substance is not a species, since it has no genus above it, but it is the first and highest genus. In turn, the body is divided into animate and inanimate. Here again the body, being a species in relation to substance, is a genus for the animate and the inanimate. The animate is again divided into sentient and non-sentient. A sentient being is an animal that has life and the ability to sense. A non-sensing plant is a plant, since it does not have the ability to sense. A plant is called animate because it is capable of nutrition, growth and reproduction. The animal is again divided into rational and unreasonable; reasonable - into mortal and immortal; mortal - for a person, horse, ox, etc.; Of these, some are no longer divided into other species, but are divided into individuals and hypostases. Thus, man is divided into Peter, Paul, John and other individual people, who are no longer species, but hypostases. In fact, species, as we said, do not accept the definition of each other: for example, the body does not accept the definition of an incorporeal being, man does not accept the definition of a horse. Peter, Paul and John accept one definition, the definition of man. The situation is similar with other individual people, so that they are not species of man, but individuals, or hypostases. Then the species, when divided, gives to that which is subordinate to it both a name and a definition. Peter, if he is divided into soul and body, does not communicate his name and definition to either the soul or the body, for Peter is not only the soul and only the body, but both in combination. In addition, any division of a genus into species reaches two, three, rarely four species; for it is impossible for a genus to be divided into five or more species. A person is divided into all individual people, of which there is an unlimited number. Therefore, some refuse to call the division of a species into individuals division, but call it calculus (απαριθμησιν). From this it is clear that Peter, Paul and John are not species, but individuals, or hypostases. Likewise, man is not a race of Peter and other hypostases, but a species. As a result of this, man is a lower species. It is a species in relation to the higher, insofar as it is embraced by it, and a species in relation to the lower, insofar as it embraces it, for that which is embraced by a genus is a species, just as that which embraces individuals, i.e., is a species. hypostases. Thus, the lower type will be the type that serves as the closest higher concept for individuals, which is why it is defined as follows: the lower type is that which is expressed in relation to many and numerically different objects, answering the question: what is an object? Likewise, a horse, a dog, and other animals are lower species. What lies between the most general genus and the lowest species are subordinate genera and species - species in relation to the higher and genus in relation to the lower. They also constitute essential and natural differences and qualities, which are called, on the one hand, dividing, and, on the other, formative; They are called separating in relation to higher concepts, and forming in relation to lower ones. Thus the body and the incorporeal being share the substance: likewise the animate and the inanimate share the body; in like manner the sentient and the non-sentient separate the animate. But the same concepts form an animal. In fact, if I take an animate, sentient substance, I will get an animal, for an animal is an animate, sentient substance. If I take an inanimate, non-sensing substance, I will get a stone. Further, the rational and the irrational separate the animal, the mortal and the immortal divide the rational. Therefore, if I take an animal, which serves as a genus for these concepts, as well as a rational and mortal animal, then I form a person, for a person is a rational, mortal animal. And if I take an animal and add: unreasonable, mortal, earthly, then I create a horse, a dog, etc. And if I take an animal and add: unreasonable, mortal, aquatic, then I form a fish. These concepts are called essential and natural differences because through them one species is distinguished from another species and one essence from another essence and nature. You might be interested in: