Sociological morality

Desers Les morales d'aujourd'hui Sociological morality is the most fashionable of modern types of ethical teaching. Well, of course, she did not appear ex abrupto; she is not without her pedigree. It stands in a related relationship with the philosophical theories of free thinkers of the 18th century, with the theory of J. J. Rousseau, who proclaimed that man is born good and is corrupted only by the social conditions of life, with other theories according to which the moral order follows - mechanically, mechanically - from the social order. Modern sociological morality seeks to give these already old opinions a strictly scientific appearance, a scientific justification. It does not stand apart from other modern types of ethical thought. At the very least, Spencer's evolutionary morality and sociological morality provide each other with mutual support. The first is based on social instincts, the second on social facts. There, moral evolution leads to social evolution; here, social evolution produces moral evolution. Like the morality of strength and egoism, the morality of Stirner and Nietzsche, belongs primarily to Germany, and the evolutionary morality, the morality of Darwin and Spencer, belongs primarily to England; So sociological morality belongs primarily to France. Its founder is Durkheim, professor at the Sorbonne, author of the works: La division du travail social and Les regles de la methods sociologique. He developed principles. From these principles one of his colleagues at the Sorbonne, Levy-Bruhl, built his Morale et la science des moeurs: he is the founder of sociological morality, both in the strength of his negative attitude towards traditional morality, and in the sense of a more or less consistent experience in constructing a new morality. Two years after the appearance of the named book, Lévy-Bruhl published the work Morale scienti-fique - Albert Bayet, which set the goal of popularizing this book. This is the initial history of sociological morality. From its first steps, the moral question was declared completely a social question, so that, in the words of Brunetiere about Helvetius, one of the predecessors of the sociological school, “the very vice, such as alcoholism, prostitution, if social benefit is recognized behind it, will become first legal, then moral”... Let us enter into a further discussion of this pretentious theory. And first of all, let us ask how morality is formed within the meaning of sociological theory? How?.. But this theory does not pose this question: it recognizes it as absurd in advance. Morality is not formed. It exists just as physical nature exists. We are born with a physical nature that forces us to see with our eyes, listen with our ears, and touch with our hands. We cannot change this natural organization: we submit to it, we use it - moreover, it is not in our power. In the same way, there is a social nature that becomes ours as soon as we enter this life: it is imposed on us. “Obligations, prohibitions, mores, laws, even customs and decency,” says Lévy-Bruhl, “all these regulations must be complied with under pain of various sanctions, partly external and partly internal; they may be more or less definite, more or less vague, but they always declare themselves, in an indisputable tone, in the results that they produce, in the threats that accompany them.” All the facts in this area constitute the object of observation and study, which is given in the disciplines of political economy, jurisprudence, politics itself, and especially in historical science. It is this empirical study that leads us to the “science of morals,” which is intended to take the place of theoretical morality. And it gives a “rational, scientific art” of life, which will be practical morality. It will be scientific morality because it is based on scientific knowledge. The science of morals has the sole purpose of studying social facts. This is a kind of botany of morals - nothing more. As for moral art, it, as A. Baye says, “due to its essentially social nature, does not mean to regulate inner, individual life. It gives her freedom to develop.” Let's look further at the particulars in which sociological morality is revealed. One cannot pass over in silence the peculiarity of her that she does not want to know the moral problem. The moral problem is to explore what is the good life, the best life. In the words of Corneille, “man is a being who must surpass himself” (l`homme est un étre qui est tait pour se surpasser). This research or finding a way to improve one’s life, to self-improvement, cannot find a place for itself in sociological morality. Sociological morality, as we just said, does not set itself the task of managing intimate life. Everyone is allowed to fill his soul, his intimate garden with all sorts of crazy herbs, all poisonous plants: this is completely unimportant from the point of view of the moralists of the sociological school. But does it really matter if a person harbors in his heart feelings of hatred, envy, jealousy, violence, sensuality, or, under the influence of pride, falsely evaluates himself and others? Undoubtedly, a person with such low intimate morality will not be a good “product” for society. How can he develop a sense of obligation to work for the good of others if he does not feel himself obliged to work for his own good? And what to think – even from a social point of view – about a morality that does not deal with this issue? Such morality does not deserve the name of morality. The moralists of this school are of the opinion that ethics has as its subject not “what should be,” but only “what is” (ce qui est), facts, and only facts. Her job is not to evaluate the facts, but to describe them; she should not judge, but state. They are indignant at the hereditary habit of “reconciling facts with moral concepts”; they say that “there is nothing more contrary to the scientific consciousness.” If you experience moral indignation when meeting with a parricide, a rapist, a traitor, then you are acting “absolutely counter-scientific.” When encountering such phenomena, you need to limit yourself to stating a fact. Curiosity in details, of course, is permissible - curiosity similar to the curiosity with which we examine an insect or the fibers of a plant through a magnifying glass, but the same indifference of judgment is required with which we express observations that the wall is white, the parquet flooring is made of solid oak, and it is warmer in summer than in winter. There is no room for evaluating facts, for making judgments according to the category of value, for placing them on a scale of different denominations. “We ourselves are an object of social science; and yet this object of science must be looked at in the same way as all other objects, with the same eye, as if it were a matter of salts or crystals.” To prevent the application of the principle of moral assessment to facts, this requires not having ideals. And the moralists of the sociological school erase ideals from their vocabulary: the very word “ideal” outrages them. This campaign against everything ideal constitutes the weakest side in the position of the sociological school: irresistible blows are directed in this direction not only from the camp of traditional morality of duty, but also from among moralists who do not take anything for granted and only want objective impartiality. We may refer to the famous Fouillet, who severely condemns this strange aberration of the ethical thought of sociologists. “This indignation against the ideal is nothing more than an indignation against reason itself. The oyster has no ideal, but it also has neither science nor philosophy. Once intelligence appears, it is inevitable to discriminate, classify, discuss, evaluate.” Sociologists want to deal only with facts. But isn’t it a fact that the ideal is imposed on us at every hour of our lives? Without it we can neither think nor act in this world. Isn’t it the ideal that supports us in moments of despondency, like a friend who, shaking our hand, says: “Take courage”! The ideal calls us “forward” and inspires us: “woe are our hearts”! He inspires our soul, gives it strength to fight obstacles, puts it above the sorrows of ingratitude, betrayal, and abandonment. This is a tangible fact, indisputable. And no matter what sociologists tell us, we have the right to think that our actions are the more worthy, sublime, valuable, the higher our ideals. And the universal consciousness will be on our side. On the contrary, the sociological theory of morality cannot resist these facts of human conscience, human reason. We come to the same conclusions when they want to assure us that we usually carry out our actions for reasons of which we cannot give ourselves an account. Take even the most elementary forms of duty, such as “thou shalt not steal,” but we don’t seem to know why we obey these commands. This is an inexplicable mystery of nature, and the motives for this kind of action are “almost as elusive to us as the blood pellets of a mammoth whose skeleton is now being discovered.” This is how Lévy-Bruhl puts it. But it is difficult to accept that we should be so ignorant of the motives of our actions. Let's go even further. Morality is not a luxury item, an adornment of the few, the chosen ones: it is practically obligatory for each of us, for the laborer as well as for the thinker, for the child as for the adult. Suppose that we are appointed to preach sociological morality, that we want to moralize the people. The first condition of moral preaching is a clear presentation of the ideal. But we are forbidden to talk about ideals. We must limit ourselves to the call of our listeners - to observe social facts and act as everyone else does. But listeners will object to us: “We observe and want to act like everyone else. However, we see that some live well and others live poorly. Who should you follow? From the point of view of sociological morality, they need to answer: “Don’t say that. There is neither good nor evil. These are old, unscientific concepts. You should just observe reality, without any prejudices.” – “Just observe reality? But it is reality itself, regardless of our assessment, that presents different paths of life. Which one should I follow? It is the lack of assessment that creates the difficulty. How can we prevent the worker from following the example of those who drink away all their earnings and leave their families to starve? We do not dare talk about his duties in relation to others and, in particular, in relation to the family, since according to the sociological theory of morality there is no duty or responsibility. “To make an individual responsible for his actions is as ridiculous as to blame a rotten tree and praise a strong one, and any attempt to weaken the rigor of this conclusion is unscientific.” There is no freedom, no personal responsibility. This is decisive determinism. The life of individuals and all humanity goes on like a stone that falls from the top of a mountain, crushing plants and animals without the slightest consciousness of its fall. Sociological morality can point to social interest as the only motive capable of determining the individual will. Without a doubt, this is an important idea. But she lacks certainty. A drunkard, for example, could say that he is not harming social interests by causing damage only to his wallet - on the contrary, by supporting the wine trade, he is complying with state interests. And who dares to call this idea absurd? Is it not expressed by statesmen? In view of these difficulties, the more outspoken sociologists, such as Lévy-Bruhl, are forced to say: “in the name of what principle should questions of conscience be resolved?” And how do they answer this question? They answer that the difficulties arise from the too rapid evolution of our society, and that we must be content with approximate solutions. But what is an approximate solution and what is its practical value? One could be satisfied with an approximate solution only if the ethical problem were an armchair issue. In fact, morality is as necessary for the soul as air is for the body. Every day we have to think about maintaining bodily life, and every day we all need to worry about maintaining spiritual life, about spiritual perfection. It is not difficult to see how this morality is immoral, because it itself, in the person of its authoritative representatives, agrees that it does not have principles for governing life and behavior, that it is still at the lower stages of development and that it is far from scientific maturity. Is it not, indeed, childish language when we are told that living well means conforming to customs, and that propriety is the only rule to be followed? As if it were a question of fashion for hats and coats. This implies moral relativism, the variability of morality in place and time. Where infanticide is permitted, it is moral; where it is customary to kill elderly parents, killing parents does not go against morality. It is necessary not to judge these facts, but to understand them from the conditions of place and time, and nothing more. If anthropophagy were to become part of our customs, it would at the same time become a moral act, and no one would have the right to be indignant at it, with the exception, of course, of the victims of anthropophagy, and even they, according to these moralists, would be wrong. The final aim of the moralists of the sociological school is to substantiate the belief that the law should be the final judge. “Moral art, thus understood,” says Beye, is no different from politics.” This is where the speeches now so often heard from the people's tribune come from that the law must be given unconditional respect, that conscience itself must bow to its voice. Where, then, will there be room for the absolute aspirations of the spirit? Does this not mean renewing the ancient principles that man is for the Sabbath, and not the Sabbath for man, that each individual has a relative value as a fraction of the whole by which the people or the state is recognized? But along with this, the personal progressive principle dies, and the opinion of the majority, the voice of the crowd, is placed above all else. Not only that. And we can’t stop there yet. After all, the law can seem to be an instrument of morality. According to Spencer, “the purpose of law is to inspire respect for the moral principles which underlie social life.” There remains, of course, the possibility of disagreement in the understanding of moral principles, and here we see a vicious circle. But even if this were not the case, respect for the law, when it is opposed to the voice of conscience, would be limited to appearance alone. When it is said with absolute certainty that “the question of duty or moral obligation is not a scientific question,” that the latter goal or ideal also does not belong to the realm of science, that there is no room for any sanction except that of the gendarme, who can draw up a report at the scene of a crime; then there is complete opportunity to be content with appearances in moral matters. The last concern should be reduced to the dexterity with which the gendarme’s attention is lulled, and in the secret cell, in intimate life, there is complete scope for unbridled desires. This naturally leads us to the morale of solidarity (morale de la solidarite), which can be called a surrogate of sociological morality: it is the same sociological morality, but without scientific pretensions. The complex and subtle arguments of sociological theory are here replaced by one promising word: “solidarity.” L. Bourgeois, one of the supporters of this morality, confirming that this word has become fashionable, does not hesitate to admit that it “may have aroused unconscious enthusiasm.” Indeed, there are quite a few ordinary people who think that these issues can be solved with one word and that a loud formula is enough to heal the wounds of humanity. And we know how often this formula is abused: there are few other words that are also often repeated, appropriately and inappropriately. This fascination with the formula of solidarity has a deeper basis in the fact that it was taken under the protection of socialism, which has now embraced such wide circles: socialism hopes to find its morality precisely in the theory of solidarity, which in itself has a sufficient basis, based on a scientifically verified social fact - hopes to build on this basis the entire pyramid of human duties. On this path they think to gain double benefit, and first of all they consider it possible to banish Christian love forever. Pierre Jlepy, the first to use this word, clearly expressed this hope: “I wanted to replace Christ’s love with human solidarity.” The second benefit is the opportunity to base progress on democratic fraternity. But this is a sentimental hope that must dissipate like smoke. L. Bourgeois believes that the principle of solidarity fully embraces the motto: “freedom, equality and fraternity.” For all the sophistication of his argument, he must be reproached for the fact that in this way he turns the question around, since solidarity, with this understanding, is not much different from Christian love. So, the theory of solidarity does not have a solid basis if it is limited to the denial of Christian ideas. If solidarity is a moral bond that unites us all and from which arises the duty of mutual assistance, then we declare ourselves to be supporters of such solidarity. But in the theory we are talking about, solidarity has a different meaning. We will see this now, and we will also see that it cannot satisfy moral consciousness. The first observation that representatives of the moral theory of solidarity make is that solidarity is a scientifically established fact: solidarity is the mutual dependence of cells in the body, individuals in society. However, there is a difference between biological solidarity and moral solidarity. In the first, everything follows with fatal inevitability, in the second, personal freedom reigns, and personal free decision is a new element that posits an impassable line between biological and moral types of solidarity. The cells of the body are bound by an inevitable harmony, individuals in society collide in mutual struggle, these conflicts can only be overcome by the free efforts of individuals. Brunetière rightly notes: “if solidarity were a scientifically established fact from which we could not escape, and if it were discovered as a biological function, then what need would there be to preach it? They would not rebel against it and would not stand for it, just as they are not divided on the issue of blood circulation. And in matters of moral solidarity we would all agree, since here too everything would come down to stating a fact.” Moreover, ties of mutual dependence do not themselves create private obligations. In view of the attempts of solidarity theorists to liken moral solidarity to biological, natural solidarity, we can draw attention to the fact that a person, by all means available to him, tries to free himself from the natural ties that constrain him - this constitutes one of the serious tasks of culture. He is connected with nature, that’s true, but his usual concern is to tame it, to make it serve his desires, his goals. In this way, distances are shortened, and the natural connection of the pedestrian with the land that carries him is replaced by those means of transportation that testify to the clear victory of man over natural solidarity. On the other hand, does solidarity of interests create agreement? Capital and manual labor have joint interests. The more money a capitalist has, the more workers he could support and the more he could pay them. However, capitalists, for the sake of their own benefit, seek to reduce the number of workers and lower wages. Obviously, mutual dependence and solidarity do not lead by themselves to harmony and unity. Solidarity in itself is nothing; it is modified according to the principles it professes. Two convicts assigned to the same job are in solidarity with each other, but this solidarity is still far from heartfelt affection. If a shipwreck victim challenges his fellow sufferer for a piece of debris to which both of them are clinging, then he, of course, acts from the point of view of solidarity as logically as that person who, under the same conditions, gives up the life-saving plank to another. And indeed, what principle can be derived from the theory of solidarity - if we leave feelings aside and stick to one logical side of this doctrine? In this case, would it not be necessary to simply state that solidarity equally inspires in a person both self-preservation and help to others? And in any case, can the doctrine of solidarity provide a rationale and justification for self-sacrifice, which cannot be dispensed with in this world and which serves as the touchstone of the highest nobility of the human soul? Let us not be told, as the defenders of the theory of solidarity do, that “we are working for the future, for the moral future of the human race” (Mapion). This, no doubt, is a thought that can excite and lead good hearts forward, but how poorly does this sublime principle apply to particular cases of our life, in which invisible self-sacrifice, modest virtue is required! In cases of conflict of passions, in the struggle between heavy unselfishness and fascinating interest, the “future of the human race” means very little. This ideal is too elusive, distant and even, one might say, ridiculous for the vast majority of people. The thought of the future fate of the human race cannot serve as the basis of human morality. The same must be said about the principle of O. Comte: “live for others.” They will tell us: what a sublime plan of life! We don't argue against this. But the whole point is to find a way for this principle to reach the human heart. This is what is difficult. “What is humanity, says the philosopher (Paul Janet Philosophie du bonheur)? Is this not a series of shadows like me, destined to appear on the surface of the earth for a short moment and then disappear into eternity? And what do I care about these shadows, what do I care about their happiness? And why should I sacrifice my personal happiness for them? When we frankly pose these questions to ourselves, leaving aside all rhetoric, all truisms, when we talk to ourselves - only in the face of our conscience, when we experience the impulses that people usually follow - we comprehend the whole truth of Lamenais' words: “man is just as little inclined by nature to make sacrifices in the name of the public good as to be amazed at the beauty of a machine that is ready to crush him from minute to minute.” To spice up this doctrine of solidarity, which is not without reason called “a vague and indefinite concept of morality,” they try to find a fulcrum for it in the legal idea of ​​contract. Our time, they say, differs most importantly from previous times in the outstanding role that the treaty now plays. “Orders of power” no longer have the same meaning that they had before - their place is now being replaced by “contractual acts”. These thoughts are developed by L. Bourgeois in his work Solidarite. Here he diligently rejects the suspicion of following the ideas of J. J. Rousseau in his Contrat social. And yet he ends his book with these words: “thus the doctrine of solidarity is, in the history of ideas, a kind of development of the philosophy of the 18th century.” And of course, it is necessary to note the significant coincidence of the thoughts of Rousseau and Bourgeois. Why does the latter need the idea of ​​a contract? He sees a close connection between the fact of solidarity and the law of contract. This is how he reveals his thought: “A contract, freely made and faithfully executed on both sides, is the final basis of human law. Where necessity establishes intercourse between men, so that they could not enter freely into a preliminary discussion of the terms of the intercourse, there the law establishing the terms subsequently established between them must be nothing other than the interpretation and expression of that agreement which would have previously arisen between them, if equal and free discussion had been available to them: but the only basis of law will be this implied consent of both parties. The bourgeois makes an excursion into the legal field. We will not follow him here, although he makes several mistakes along the way that undermine the theory of solidarity. The final results to which he strives are obvious to us - laying a legal foundation for the doctrine of solidarity, and for us the connection between the morality of solidarity and pure sociological morality becomes indisputable. Both there and here we are called upon to adapt to facts, to laws, to social customs. And here personal freedom and the absolute principle of morality are seriously threatened. But beyond this, can the entire system of moral duties be based on the shaky idea of ​​a contract? Already our birth, we are told, our entry into the family of humanity, which bestows upon us many of the benefits of culture and the modern system, imposes on us a long series of obligations. Obligations, but to whom? To the entire human race? How are we going to pay off this debt? If we could resort to Christian love, which embraces everyone, which does not take into account the rights of everyone, it would be easy for us to accomplish this task. But science does not allow us to talk about Christian love. She wants us to remain on a strictly legal basis, not to go beyond the limits outlined by the concepts of contract and duty. But if on the path of Christian love it is easy for us to find those to whom we should turn our hearts, to whom we should show our favor, then it is not so easy to find creditors on the path of natural solidarity, to find those to whom we must pay our natural debt. Debt, as a legal concept, is a strictly defined thing, so there should be no ambiguity either regarding the creditor or the means of payment. In this case there is no such certainty. And a principle so obscure could not serve as a moral guide for our conscience. Under the pressure of these objections, the proponents of the doctrine in question retreat into the realm of purely social conditions of life, into the realm of associations, syndicates, property rights, inheritance, where solidarity can undoubtedly give rise to explicit obligations. But the trouble is that all morality cannot be squeezed into this area - and to reduce it to this area means narrowing the concept of morality, replacing morality with a narrower area of ​​positive law. L. Bourgeois speaks directly about legitimistic sanction. This is what the doctrine of solidarity ultimately leads to. F. Buisson put JI in one of the debates. Bourgeois’s objection: “By pointing out the fact of natural solidarity, can a child be convinced that he has a duty to act in a spirit of moral solidarity? You will have to be content with empty words: in vain you will understand the inevitable consequences of natural solidarity, because you need to instill in the child a living sense of his duty to implement justice in spite of that mechanical and animal solidarity, which indifferently produces both good and evil. L. Bourgeois yielded to the strength of this objection. However, it is possible to completely escape from it only on the path of idealistic or Christian morality; Representatives of scientific morality cannot enter this path without betraying their principles. Scientific morality... Let us pose the last question: can there be scientific morality? Is it worth making any sacrifices to this new idol, this phantom? This question can be answered in the negative. But it is dangerous to pass off such an answer as a personal opinion. It is necessary to refer to authorities, of which, fortunately, there is no shortage. This is what we read in A. Poincaré’s book “The Value of Science”. “If I am talking about truth, then there is no doubt that I first of all want to talk about scientific truth; but at the same time I want to talk about moral truth, in relation to which what is called justice is only one of the types. It seems that I am abusing words and, under the same name, connecting two things that have nothing in common; that scientific truth, which is proven, cannot in any way come close to moral truth, which is felt. Nevertheless, I cannot separate them, and those who love one cannot help but love the other. In order to find one, just as in order to find the other, you need to try to completely free your soul from prejudice and bias, you need to achieve absolute sincerity. These two kinds of truth, once discovered, lead us to equal admiration; both of them, as soon as they are seen, shine with the same light, so you either need to see them or close your eyes. It should be added that he who is afraid of one will also be afraid of the other; for such people in every matter are primarily concerned about the consequences. I bring the two truths together because the same motives make us love them, and the same motives make us fear them. If we should not be afraid of moral truth, then we should not be afraid of scientific truth. First of all, it cannot be at odds with morality. Morality and science have their own areas that touch each other but do not penetrate each other. The first shows us what goal we should pursue; the second - given a goal - reveals to us the means to achieve it. Therefore, they can never be in conflict with each other - since they cannot collide. There can be no immoral science, just as there can be no scientific morality.” We will make only a small addition to these beautiful words of Poincaré. He says: “if we should not be afraid of moral truth, then even more so we should not be afraid of scientific truth.” You could say to the representatives of pure science: “if you are not afraid of scientific truth, then have the courage not to be afraid of moral truth.” We could also refer to Duclos, director of the Pasteur Institute, who writes: “I did not want to say that science provides a solution to social problems. She never promised this, because she never promises anything. And those who accuse her of not keeping her promises mistake farcical tricks for science.” After such reviews, we can no longer be embarrassed by the hasty statements of Berthelot, the famous chemist, who claims that “science alone provides the unshakable foundations of morality”... Let us note one more interesting observation. We have already said that A. Baye's book popularizes Lévy-Bruhl's book, and the latter is based on data in Durkheim's study of the sociological method. But it is noteworthy that Durkheim openly declares “that there is a science of morality, but there is no scientific morality.” Thus his sociological method is misused in the short history of sociological ethics. There cannot be scientific morality because science deals with what is, and morality deals with what should be. You might be interested in: