I. Состояние учения о Св. Троице до времени Оригена в связи с философским учением об отношении первого и второго начала

The teaching of the Church on the Holy Trinity in the Creeds and Statements of Faith The doctrine of the Holy Trinity was briefly formulated by Jesus Christ Himself in the following words He addressed to the apostles: “Go therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit (Matthew 28:19).” These words can have the meaning that there are three members of the Holy Trinity, three Persons, according to the established tradition from the 4th century. terminology - indeed, there are unmerged and indivisible three independent indivisibles - and the fact that God deigned to reveal himself to the world in three forms, as the Father, as the Son and as the Holy Spirit. In the first case, the dogma of the Trinity points to the internal self-revelation of the Divine, to the image of the existence of God (τρόπος τής ύπάρξεως), speaks of the immanent, ontological Trinity (die immanente, ontologische [Wesens-] Trinität); in the second case, dogma is a doctrine about the image of revelation in the proper sense (τρόπος τής άποκαλνψεως), about the trinity of the Divine in His relation to the world (die transeunte, öconomische [Offenbarungs-] Trinität). By the second quarter of the 3rd century, i.e. By the time when Origen’s literary activity began, 38 the teaching of the Orthodox Church about the Holy Trinity had found its expression, was formulated and, to a certain extent, revealed in the so-called symbols and rules of faith, i.e. monuments authorized by the church itself - on the other hand, in monuments of Christian literature, which represents a number of attempts by private individuals to reveal one or another side of church dogma. The ancient creeds, used in various churches, set out the doctrine of the Holy Trinity in expressions that are similar to each other to the point of literalism. All symbols of Western churches approach the so-called Roman form of the apostolic symbol. Here is the shortest example of this type: “I believe in God the Father almighty, and in Jesus Christ, His only begotten Son, our Lord, born and suffered, and in the Holy Spirit” 39. The eastern form of the symbol differs from the western one only by the insertion of the word “single” in the first and second members of the symbol. The shortest symbol of the eastern type reads as follows: “I believe in one God the Father almighty and in one our Lord Jesus Christ, His only begotten Son, born of the Holy Spirit from the Virgin Mary, ... and in the Holy Spirit” 40. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity is presented no more fully in the rules of faith of St. Irenaeus and Tertullian (to the extent that the text of the latter’s rules represents expressions actually authorized by the church, and not his own composition 41. The dissemination of the term about the Holy Spirit (in St. Irenaeus this term is read this way: “and in the Holy Spirit, who through the prophets proclaimed the economy (τάς οικονομίας) and the coming... of Christ Jesus" ...) represents the only material difference between the "rules of faith" and the briefest symbols in relation to the presentation of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. From this content of the ancient symbols and rules of faith, it is clear that the church in the monuments it authorized indicated only the relationship between the immanent Trinity and the Trinity of revelation; the trinity in the inner life of the Divine placed the basis of His threefold relationship to the world and thus combined both possible views on the meaning of the famous saying of the Savior (Matthew 28:19). But the main side of the dogma, the doctrine of the immanent Trinity, in these monuments of faith of the ancient church is formulated in almost the same words in which Christ formulated it, that is, it is not revealed at all 42. Philosophical doctrine of the first and second principles Following the teaching of the church about the Holy Trinity, let us consider the philosophical ideas that prevailed in the first centuries of Christianity, which have some analogy with this church dogma. Their influence on the thought of Christian writers began so early and continued with such stability that a review of these views becomes as important for understanding the teachings of Origen as those of most of his predecessors. Directly or indirectly, through direct study of philosophical works or through the sum of philosophical ideas that was assimilated by educated society, Christian writers became involved in one way or another with the philosophy of their day and usually succumbed to its influence. If the teaching of the church gave content to their views, then philosophy was the prism through which it passed. The influence of philosophy was not only formal: it was reflected not only in the language, not only in the form of presentation, but also introduced something into the very content of the teachings of church writers. At the same time, there is no need to assume that these imported elements were borrowed directly from philosophy: having become familiar with the range of questions that philosophy solved, church writers with similar questions turned to church teaching and in it they found those points in which their view came into contact with the philosophical ideas of that era, but they found these points only due to the fact that they had adopted a certain form of view from philosophy 43 . For our purpose, two philosophical systems are of particular interest, the teachings of Philo and Plotinus. The first, a remarkable representative of Judeo-Alexandrian philosophy, wrote in the first half of the 1st century. according to R.X. His teaching was all the more easily accessible to Christians because it was apparently based on the Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament. The famous representative of Neoplatonic philosophy, Plotinus (204–270 AD) lived later than Origen himself and therefore, of course, could not influence him with his system. But both Plotinus and Origen were students of Ammonius Sacca 44 , whose system must necessarily be judged by the philosophy of his famous student, Plotinus 45 . In relation to Christian writers who lived before Origen, the philosophy of Plotinus is not without interest because its affinity in general with the system of Philo 46 serves as a good indicator of how long the dominance of ideas of this kind was and, therefore, how homogeneous was the philosophical influence to which Christian writers were exposed. Philo's philosophy is based on dualism, although it is far from strictly adhered to 47. The visible world appears to Philo’s consciousness in such features that stand in diametric opposition to the idea of ​​God to which both religion and philosophy led him. From this point of view, God and the world can only be two poles, between which there should be no contact, no direct relationship 48 . Meanwhile, the religious element, one of the distinctive features of the philosophy of that era, sought precisely in God to seek an explanation for the existence of the world. On the other hand, the world itself, with all the contrast of its main features with the idea of ​​God, amazed Philo with the harmony of its structure. For the Jewish philosopher, this was obvious proof that the world not only must find its explanation in God, but actually stands in some relation to Him 49 . It was necessary to find a point at which these opposing views on the world would be reconciled, so that God would stand above relations with the world and the world would have communion with God. Such a reconciling point was the doctrine of the lower divine principle, mediating between the world and God. To understand the relationship of this mediating principle to God, let us outline some features of Philo’s idea of ​​God. Viewing the world as God's creation apparently clarified for Philo some positive signs of the Divine. Thus God, the creator of the world, could be thought of as the supreme mind 50; the author of everything beautiful in the world, God must be higher than the best ideas of human thought: He is higher than virtue and knowledge, higher than goodness itself, simpler than the one, and more original than the monad 51. The idea of ​​the world as opposite to God also provided several negative traits for clarifying the concept of God. If the essential feature of the world is that it came into being, then God must be conceived as unborn 52 ; if everything in the world is subject to change, everything depends on the conditions of time and space: then God is unchangeable and always, unconditionally, equal to Himself and is not subject to the laws of time and space 53. But, on the other hand, this opposition between the world and God should have most strongly developed in Philo the conviction that God is unknowable to man. In fact, in order to form any positive idea of ​​​​God, a person will transfer the best traits of his nature to Him; Meanwhile, they are not applicable to God: He is not only not like a person, but does not even have any qualities 54. The very conditions of human knowledge are such that God must necessarily, in all respects, be unknowable. To know something, we must compare it with something else, therefore everything individual lies outside the scope of human knowledge; and God is absolutely individual, there is a unique being, to whom there is nothing like 55. Completely unknowable, God naturally does not have a name in the proper sense. No matter how many names we have adopted for God, none of them will be His exact designation 56 . Therefore, when God, when asked about His name, answers: “I am seven.” He teaches us by this that, in contrast to the non-existent, it is characteristic of Him, as the only existing thing, to be, and not to be called, that God in the proper sense does not have a name at all 57. We can call Him Existing (about ών, then ον), truly Existing 58: but this name will not replace our own name, will not bring us closer to comprehending the mystery of the essence and existence of God, because the very content of the idea contained in the word “Existing” is inaccessible to our understanding. In general, in human knowledge about God there is only one firm point: this is the conviction that God exists; and the question of what God is by His very essence lies outside the sphere of human knowledge 59 . Thus, God is completely different from the world and unknowable, in essence and in His being. Such a concept of God clearly clarifies to what extent a divine mediator is necessary, but obviously does not contain a firm point on which this latter doctrine could be substantiated: there is no visible possibility of making a logical transition from the concept of God, who is essentially unknown to His essence, to the concept of a mediator between the world and God, a being that itself must be explained from the concept of God. And indeed, the philosophical foundations of the idea of ​​​​a divine mediator are far from solid: Logos in Philo’s system is a conclusion from the idea of ​​​​God as the supreme mind, which itself requires strong evidence, since it is very difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of the unknowability of God. Philo's Logos is more a bold step from the world to God than a cautious, logical movement from God to the world. The following analogy, which is far from free from anthropomorphism, leads to Philo’s doctrine of the divine mediator: An architect, intending to build a city, first creates a mental city in his mind, draws out in his mind a plan of the city in its entirety and in detail, and then, according to this plan, builds an actual city. In the same way, God, wanting to create a great city - the visible world and foreseeing that it would be beautiful only if it was created in the image of a mental idea, first outlined a mental, invisible world and created this visible world in its image. But just as the mental plan of the city takes place in the very soul of the artist, and not outside it, so the mental world of ideas has no other place except the divine word - the Logos, which harmoniously distributed them 60. Or - to put it more clearly - this mental world is nothing other than the Word (Logos) of God, already creating the world; for the mental city is nothing other than the mind of the architect, who already proposes to build a visible city in accordance with the mental one 61 . This is how Philo imagines the divine Word at this primary moment of his existence. The Word is connected most closely with God. But even at this moment it is already doubled in Philo’s view. On the one hand, Logos is the place of the mental world, just as the soul of an architect is the place of the imaginary city. Here the Logos is only as different from God as the soul is opposed to the architect himself. On the other hand, Logos is already the mental world itself, just as the mental city is only a certain moment of the architect’s thinking. Thus, Logos, on the one hand, is the containing, on the other, the content; on the one hand, it is identical with the very thought of God, as a formal ability, on the other hand, with the result of its activity, with its content. The content of the mental world consists of ideas, or “mental genera,” generic concepts according to which objects of the visible world are created. The attitude of the Logos to this ideal world is also not without some duality. On the one hand, Logos is the world itself, as if the collective unity of these ideas; on the other hand, Logos is an idea, a prototype of ideas, an idea of ​​ideas 62; if other ideas represent really existing generic concepts, then Logos is the most general of them 63 . The creation of the visible world in the image of the ideal world is mediated by the Word 64. God speaks His Word, and at the same moment the world is a fact realized; because the Word of God is already the deed itself: between one and the other there is nothing in between. These words give a new shade to Philo’s idea of ​​the Logos: until now the Logos was outlined only as a thought, now it is likened to an ordinary, spoken word, and this word, apparently, is identified with its result - deed. At this point we are faced with the question of how important Philo himself attached to this new shade in the idea of ​​the Logos. There is an opinion that the difference between Logos - thought and Logos - word was of decisive importance in the philosophy of Philo. Everyone recognizes that the famous doctrine of the double word in Philo’s system is applied, in fact, only to the human word, that in relation to the divine Word he never used the classical terms “Λόγος ενδιάθετος” and “Λόγος προφορικός" and that, therefore, Philo was not literally the creator of this theory. But some find that Philo was so close to it that it can be considered given already in his writings, if not in letter, then in meaning. This theory is formulated this way: “There are two Logos, one transcendent, the other immanent to the world; in the first case it is the mind of God, i.e. a divine property, in the second it is the mind (and its content, the world of ideas) emanating from God, i.e. sent into the world through the word" 65. “Logos for Philo is the divine mind, which is partly hidden in the being of God as its property, partly, like human mind, emerges from the Existing through the medium of the word and exists for itself in a certain separation from the Existence, so that if we consider it only in its separation from God, the Logos from the material side is the divine mind, from the formal side - the divine word” 66. Thus, by the name “Λόγος ένδιάθετος” we mean only one moment in Philo’s view of the Word, the Logos as containing - in contrast to its content, as a formal property in God; and Λόγος προφορικός combines the two subsequent points in Philo’s view, Logos as content, as a result of the activity of the divine mind, and Logos as word. Λόγος ένδιάθετος does not have an independent existence, Λόγος προφορικός appears with the features of a hypostasis. Thus, the difference between one and the other is very significant. To prove that Philo also distinguished between Λόγος ένδιάθετος and Λόγος προφορικός in the divine Word, they refer to the place where he brings the divine Word closer in this regard to the human. He says that both in the world 67 and in man there is a double word. In the world there is the Logos of ideas, of which the mental world consists, and the Logos of visible objects, imprints of those ideas 68. In man there is a word hidden in thought 69 and a word pronounced by the tongue 70 . The comparison of the human word with the divine is here so clear that readers could very easily draw the conclusion about the dual divine Logos, and it would not be at all strange if the Christian writers who adhered to this theory considered themselves faithful followers of Philo 71; however, in reality this theory is not here, at least not in the form in which the latest scientists find it in him. Let us admit that the Logos of ideas can be called ένδιάθετος, and the Logos of visible objects exactly corresponds to what in man is called λόγος προφορικός: we will still be forced to formulate differently the difference between these two moments in the divine Word. Logos as a word does not have a special meaning in this representation of Philo: it is not thought, as a formal ability, that is opposed to the word with its content, but rather the content itself in its original form - its reflection; Logos, as an ideal world, is contrasted to the visible world, insofar as it constitutes a reflection of the first, to the extent that Logos is immanent to it, as the world-ruling law. In a word, here we are dealing with the same difference, which elsewhere in Philo is given in the form of the opposition of two sons of God, the eldest, who is with God, and the younger, who is sent into the realm of being; the first of them is the divine Logos, the last is the visible world 72. As a mediator between the world and God, the Logos must, to a certain extent, combine the features of both. This is clearly expressed in the following words spoken by the Logos: “I stood in the middle between the Lord and you (mortals), being neither unborn, like God, nor begotten, like you, but representing the mean between the extremes and mediating between both” 73 . Thus, one of the highest definitions of God, ungeneracy, is not applicable to the Logos; but the Logos is not born, and therefore can be thought of as a being of divine nature 74 . Other definitions of Logos also have a somewhat dual character. God is the cause; His Logos is also a reason, but the reason is second: the world is not from him, but through him; Logos is only υπηρέτης του Θεοΰ. In relation to the world, the Logos is a prototype, but in relation to God he is only a shadow and an image. For the world, Logos is the most necessary being between beings, the beginning of being; he is above time, older than all those who received being 75. But at the same time, he is only the son of God and in this capacity he already becomes, as it were, a brother to the visible world. God in His essence is unknowable and has no name, while the Logos is αρχάγγελος πολυώνυμος: he is both the beginning, and the Word, and even the very name of God 76 . The Logos is a knowable God, but the goal of human aspirations does not lie in it, but above it: man would like to know God himself, and only because this is impossible, he sets as his goal the knowledge of the Logos, so that he is, as it were, the God of the imperfect 77. Close to God are His two primary powers, goodness and power, so that they constitute, as it were, two shadows of Him and together with Him they give a threefold representation of one object; however, the Logos is closer to God than His powers, and higher than them: the Logos stands in direct relation to the one Being, so that there is no gap between Them 78 . But, despite this, the Logos is not God in the proper sense: he is only a second God. “Why does the scripture not say: “In My image I created man,” but: “In the image of God I created man”? This is a beautiful and wise saying. Nothing mortal could be imprinted with the image of the Most High and Father of all, but only with the image of the second God, who is His Word. God, who is before the Word, is higher than all verbal-rational nature" 79. Likewise, the scripture says: “I am God (o Θεός), who appeared to you in the place of God (Θεοΰ),” and not “in My place.” This is because “the true God is one, but those who have become gods in an improper sense are many. Therefore, the sacred word, in the present case, abolished the true God with a member, saying: “I am God” (ό Θεός), and speaks of God in an improper sense without a member: “He who appeared to you in place is not του Θεού, but simply Θεού” 80. This Θεός is the Logos. And Abraham came to the place that God showed him, and saw this place from afar, i.e. came to the Word and saw that the place to which he had come was far from the unnameable and ineffable God 81 In a word, “Logos is the average divine nature, he is higher than man, but lower than God” 82. Finally, one wonders: can Philo’s Logos be considered personal? A wide variety of answers have been given to this question: some solve the question in a positive sense, others in a negative sense, recognizing the Logos not as personal, but only personified; still others reject the question itself, believing that Philo himself probably did not even think of solving it, since the idea of ​​personality was still too vaguely presented to the minds of the ancient philosophers, who did not even have a term for it; finally, according to the fourth opinion, Philo’s very system required that these opposite features be combined in the Logos: it must be personal in order to be a real mediator between the world and God, so that, acting on the world through His Word, God would stand outside the possibility of direct contact with matter; on the other hand, through the mediation of the Logos, God must be really present in the world, and this goal would be most easily achieved with the weakest and most indecisive distinction between God and the Word 83. This variety of answers already suggests that the controversial point could not have been important for Christian writers. Let the Logos not even be a personal being: it remains indisputable that he is personified so often that Christian writers, without any difficulty, could connect with the Logos the idea that was desirable for them. Philo's teaching about God and His Word is more cosmological in nature than theological in nature. The dualistic basis of this system could not help but highlight the question of the relationship between the world and God. Her main interest focused precisely on this question; the connection between the world and God is that unknown, finding which was the main task of Philo’s system. This connection is the Logos. He must stand in the middle between both poles, but logically he is closer to the world than to God. The expedient order of the world is sufficiently explained by the teaching of the Word, but God as the Existent is unknowable, and the existence of the Word has not in the least cleared up this mystery. One can even say that the doctrine of the Word did not establish any relationship between God in His more precise definition, i.e. God as Being, and the world. The Logos is not a being necessarily presupposed by the very existence of God, and therefore the Word, conceived in God, is not the moment of internal self-revelation of the Being, but only the beginning of external revelation. The very content of the divine Word is already the mental world, the prototype of the visible world, and if the Logos is the thought of God Himself, then, in any case, it is not His thought about Himself, but about the world. In a word, Philo’s Logos exists for the world, and not for God, and outside of its purpose as a mediating principle it turns out to be superfluous. Such a Logos, naturally, must be lower than God: Philo’s idea of ​​the Word is not an answer to a purely theological question: under what signs should the Son of the Supreme God be thought of? Philo needed a being higher than the visible world, but not so superior to it that relations between them became impossible, and the Logos, subordinate to the Father, is a result that well meets this previously set goal. Plotinus’s philosophical doctrine of the One and the mind is a remarkable phenomenon for the extraordinary consistency with which the basic view of the first principle is carried out here, and for the clarity with which the details of the relationship between the first and second principles are determined. The difference between the finite and the infinite in Plotinus's system comes down to the basic opposition between the one and the many. “How did many things (come) from one?” 84 - this is the main question in the teachings of Plotinus. In what direction should we look for definitions of the first beginning? For Plotinus, this issue is resolved not only by the fact that one precedes all numbers 85, but also by the high significance of unity in being itself. Everything that exists exists to the extent that it maintains its unity; that which is deprived of unity perishes 86. Thus, the beginning of everything that exists must be one. Philo had already arrived at this view of the first principle, but Plotinus has the advantage that he remained faithful to this view to the end. Sharing with Philo the idea of ​​the unknowability of the first principle 87, Plotinus tries to clarify it in a negative way and, following the instructions of his basic view, firmly, without hesitation, denies all definitions that disagree with him. Both concepts, from which the formula “the first principle is one” is composed, receive the most complete and strict meaning from Plotinus. The very concept of the beginning also contains the idea that it, as the beginning of everything, has no beginning 88 . By this definition, the first principle is placed independently of any dependence on anything else. It must, of course, be self-sufficient 89. It owes nothing not only its existence, but even its most insignificant definition: everything is in one, and for it nothing is outside it. Therefore, no aspirations, no needs, and even no relationships with anything are conceivable in him 90 . In this regard, Plotinus gave the following grandiose definition of the first principle: it is higher than self-sufficiency itself; everyone needs it, but it has no need even for itself 91. Apparently, there was no way to maintain the height of such abstraction, and Plotinus himself contradicts himself, arguing that the first beginning should not be thought of in relation to anything else: as a beginning, i.e. cause, it stands in a logical relationship with its effect - with that which is dependent on the beginning. Plotinus rejects this objection, demanding that we consider the relation of causality as our own characteristic, and not as a sign of the first principle: we stand in causal dependence on it, and it is not in relation to us in relation to cause and effect. Plotinus equally consistently explains the concept of “one.” The first principle is one not only in the sense of the unity of the object, but in the sense of the opposition to all plurality, all diversity. The One must be unconditionally simple, alien not only to material, but even to logical complexity: as soon as something simpler than the first beginning is conceivable, it ceases to be the beginning 93. Thus, a requirement is created - to think of the first principle under such a sign that would not allow any further logical fragmentation. Equally, this requirement excludes any plurality in the definition of the unity, even if it depends only on the difference of points of view on it. In this respect, Plotinus is so consistent that without embarrassment he denies the most sublime ideas about the first cause, remaining confident that the One is more superior than anything that man can invent. Apparently, an exception has been made for one concept - the concept of “good”; but in fact, Plotinus gave it such an original meaning that it is resolved without a trace into the concept of the beginning or the one. “Good” is not a property of the one, does not characterize any specific side in the first beginning, but is identical with it itself 95; it is good not in the sense that it is aware of the highest properties of its nature and, as it were, feels blessed: the one is good not for itself, but for others 96. The word “good” in Plotinus loses its natural, moral meaning and acquires a metaphysical meaning: it is one good because everyone depends on it, but it has nothing to do with anything 97 . If “good” is thought of with a different meaning, which jeopardizes the idea of ​​the One as the beginning, then Plotinus is disposed to deny the applicability of this attribute to the One 98 . Having completely identified the concepts of “one” and “good,” Plotinus gives a remarkable example of the care with which he removes everything that can cast a shadow on the unconditional simplicity of the first principle: Plotinus considers even such an expression as “it (the one) good” to be incorrect; because here the concept of “good” is attributed to the first principle, as something different from it, relates to it as a predicate to the subject, whereas in fact “good” is the one itself, and the imaginary predicate is only a repeated subject 99 . With such a cautious attitude towards his main idea, Plotinus naturally had to settle on the idea that “one” is the only definition of the first principle 100. There is no need to point out that in his first principle Plotinus denies relations in time and space, everything quantitative and qualitative, all accidents 101: such denials are too elementary for a philosopher with such a tendency. Let us limit ourselves to reviewing only those points at which denial becomes especially original. The One is neither a being nor an existing 102. It is higher than being 103. Every essence presupposes a certain form, and form is already a limitation; every limitation presupposes something limiting, while the one is limitless: there is nothing else that could limit it, and it itself cannot limit itself, because for this it would have to split into two. The One is not a being. Plotinus was predisposed to deny this also because he did not quite clearly distinguish between the concepts of being and existence and believed that to exist means to have some form, and the one has no form 105. But in addition, the very concept of being seemed complex to Plotin: what exists, lives, and what lives, is not dead; For the fullness of being, the mind is also required. Therefore, beings are plural 106. At the same time, existing is derivative: all existing needs one; Thus, by calling the one thing existing, we would place it in the series of those descended from it 107 . The first beginning is not the mind either. Therefore, neither thinking nor self-awareness can be attributed to him 108. Having put forward this bold position, Plotinus made every effort to prove it. The conclusions that could be drawn from this position put it in conflict with the unconditional perfection of the One: if it does not think, it is not free from ignorance, and this is already a deficiency, a deprivation. Plotinus is trying to prove that thinking for the first principle is both unnecessary and impossible. Let us assume that the one will know itself. In this case, the question must be posed: is the unitary thinker higher or lower than the unitary thinker? If we say that the one as a conceivable object is higher than the one as a thinking subject, then we will come to deny the perfections of the one; if we speak out for the opposite relation, then we will do the right thing: the one conceivable thing is only a similarity to the one existing thing; but in this case, thinking aimed at the less perfect will add nothing to the perfection of the one; and in any case, no matter how we solve the question posed, we would need to think of the One as both perfect and at the same time inferior to it 109. Thus, thinking in one is aimless and unnecessary. But beyond that, in the first beginning thinking is—so to speak—physically impossible. In the very nature of thinking there is an element of duality, opposite to the unconditional simplicity of the one. In thinking, the opposition between the thinker and the thinkable is inevitable. This duality is already the beginning of multiplicity. And in fact, it is not difficult to notice a third element in thinking: this is thinking itself as a process or state; it is not identical with either the thinking or the thought 110. This multiple nature of thinking is reflected in its very forms, and, as a result, self-consciousness in a single is impossible. For example, it cannot recognize itself as good, because the only possible formula for this self-consciousness would be this: “I am good”; but in this case the One would distinguish itself from the good, i.e. from myself. But there is not and cannot be another, simpler formula for self-consciousness: if the One thinks only about the good, then this will be thinking, and not self-consciousness; and if in the first formula the identity of the one and the good does not find adequate expression, then here the identity of the conscious and the thinkable is not expressed at all 111. Thus, thinking in the one is impossible due to the inevitable difference between subject and object: in order to think about itself, the one must, as it were, strive towards itself; But is this possible where there is neither spatial nor qualitative difference between the person rushing and the object towards which it is directed? 112 This absolute identity of the One also contains the answer to the fear whether we will attribute ignorance to the first principle, denying thinking in it. The One is not involved in ignorance. We can talk about ignorance only when there is an object that can be known, and there is a subject who, however, does not know it; but for the one there is no such object 113. Thus, the One is not the mind: it is above the mind and thinking. The One does not think, but this only shows its perfection: even the eye would not look like that if it were also the light to which it strives 114. The One is above thinking, and at the same time the cause producing thinking 115 just as the sun is not identical with those objects that it produces and makes visible, and yet serves as the cause of their existence and visibility 116. Denying thinking in the unified, Plotinus does not recognize volition in it, because volition is possible only where there is thinking 117. At the same time, he denies freedom as a whole. This does not mean that in the one there is a place for chance or compulsion, but only that everything in it is unconditionally in accordance with its nature 118. This predetermines the answer to the question of what determined the first beginning for the creation of everything that exists. Of course, the world does not need one; it remains completely indifferent to everything that has happened 119, but, as indifferent and all-satisfied, it does not harbor envy towards the existence of everything that exists 120. Therefore, the first cause cannot pose any obstacle to the discovery of the limitless completeness of its own nature; the one, as it were, overflowed 121 and without any intentionality produced everything that exists 122 . The first in the series of those descended from the One, its first generation, is the mind 123. Plotinus says the following about his origin from the one: The One, remaining completely motionless, turns to itself and contemplates (itself?). This contemplation is the mind 124. The genesis of the mind is presented in more detail by Plotinus in the following terms: In what happened there is a natural attraction to the one. Driven by this indefinite, formless and meaningless gravitation, the mind rushes towards the one, looks at it, but unconsciously (άνοήτως), and does not yet see it. This is not contemplation of the one, but a simple causal dependence on it, as if attraction to it. At this moment of being, the mind was not yet a mind, but only an existing one. But as he looked at a single, indefinite attraction became definite, the meaningless was filled with conceivable content, vague vision (δφις) turned into vision (ορασις). This was the beginning of the thinking. But another remarkable point coincides with this: filled with content, the mind turns to contemplation of itself and through this, from being, it becomes mind 125. Translated into the language of modern psychology, this apparently means that beings, having received content from a single entity, achieve self-consciousness. This must seem to be the highest point in the development of the mind; but Plotinus doesn’t look at it that way: he is inclined to see this as a turning point for the worse. Existence becomes defined, but to the detriment of its unity; it began as one, but ended as many, it received content, but at the same time it became complicated, it felt as if burdened and wanted to develop into many, to embrace everything, although it would have been better not to want this, because, developing, existence became mind, but through this it seemed to dare to retreat from the one and became the second 126. Thus the element of duality penetrates deeply into the very being of the mind. To achieve perfection, the mind must go through two such different phases of development as unconscious contemplation and conscious contemplation, contemplation of the one and consciousness of itself. In the very nature of the second principle, two sides are distinguished: it is both existence and mind 127. His activity is thinking - with an inevitable distinction between the thinker and the thinkable 128. The mind is constantly directed in two opposite directions - towards the one and towards itself 129. True, many aspects of this duality are softened: it is the identity of being and thinking, like being and mind 130; the opposition between the thinker and the thought is brought to unity by the fact that the mind itself is both the thinker, the thinkable, and thinking 131; difference (έτερότης) is balanced by identity (ταυτότης), and movement, this necessary condition of thinking, is opposed in the mind by standing as the position of oneself identical to oneself 132: but all this does not in the least impart to the mind that unconditional simplicity that distinguishes the one. The mind must be many (πολύς) 133, many (πλήθος) 134, dual (διπλούς) 135; it comes from the indefinite two and the one 136 ; it is not simple (απλούς), but many (πολλά), representing mental complexity 137; he is one - both, one and two 138, he must be simple and uneasy 139. This internal plurality of his nature is reflected in the entire content of his thinking: when he contemplates the one good thing, he sees it not as one, but as not one, but as many; this contemplation is - so to speak - deposited in the mind in the form of a multitude of ideas 140. The contents of the mind are ideas, a diverse set of ideas, a whole ideal world 141. Each of the ideas retains some independence, but they are all united in the mind, as in the center, and relate to it as species to a genus, as parts to a whole 142. Ideas differ from one another, but together they are identical, because they are united in the mind, their carrier 143; he, in relation to them, is more than their simple container: every idea is mind; ideas are not different from its very essence 144. Therefore, Plotinus has every reason to say that the mind is not only one, but one and many, one and all 145. Since good is identical with the One, it is natural that the mind differs from the first principle in this respect: it is only similar to good (άγαθοειδής), because it thinks good; he is a diverse good, good among the good 146. The same difference between the one and the mind can be seen from another point of view. The One is neither a being, nor energy, mind - both 147. The One can be considered rather as the first force, the most perfect potentiality (δύναμις), the mind is the first energy. If, as an example, we allow ourselves to call the first principle a being, then the mind will not be the energy of the being, but the energy from the being. The energy of a being is the integrating part of it; such, for example, is the heat due to which the fire itself is hot, the energy from the being is the heat that develops due to the fact that the fire produces an effect in accordance with its nature. So the one, giving birth to the mind, retained its nature intact, since the mind is energy, born from the energy inherent in the nature of the one, and developed into being and being 148. Plotinus tries to give the highest possible idea of ​​the mind and its relationship to the one. The mind has the most perfect thinking without effort and search 149; he thinks only of the One and himself 150, and his thinking is distinguished by the most perfect reality; he is the truth 151. His birth is not in time (the eternally perfect One can only give birth to the eternal 152 and he himself is above all time: for him there is no past or future, he exists in the eternal present 153. The mind is the most sublime being among beings 154 and best of all 155; it is more united than everything else, and stands closest to the first beginning 156 and only needs it 157. The mind is the image of the one, preserving in itself many of the features of its prototype, similar to the one, just as the light is like the sun. It is as inseparable from the one as the bright radiance that is always born from it and spreads around itself is inseparable. God 160. But, despite all these perfections, the mind is undoubtedly below the one 161. Plotinus even raises to a principle the proposition that what is born can be neither better than the one who gives birth, nor identical with him; what is born is always more complex and therefore must always be lower than what gives birth 162 . Thus, this philosopher consciously establishes a decisive, fundamental subordination of the second principle to the first. In comparison with the philosophy of Philo, the philosophy of Plotinus undoubtedly represents the highest degree of development. The main task of both philosophers is identical - to bring the first principle into connection with the world that depends on it; but the methods used by Plotinus in solving it reveal a very noticeable success of philosophical thinking in comparison with the degree to which it is presented in Philo’s system. The difference between the first principle and the world in Plotinus is reduced to one formula - to the opposition of the one and the many. The concept of the first beginning is outlined incomparably more decisively than in Philo. The idea of ​​the second principle, of course, was already outlined in advance in its main features by its very purpose - to be an intermediary link between the one and the many; but it is impossible not to recognize Plotinus’ advantage over Philo, that while the latter, introducing the Logos into his system, descends from the height of the idea of ​​God to which the main tendency of this system led, and looks at the divine Word rather from the point of view of the world than of the Existing One, Plotinus tries, although unsuccessfully, to create an intermediary link, retaining his abstract concept of the first principle, and is directed to the second principle from the one. Plotinus justifies the mediocre position of the mind much more deeply than Philo, since the confusion in the very essence of the mind of the main opposites, unity and plurality, appears with all its force and is presented as naturally necessary. At the same time, subordinationism takes on a more decisive character. But the entire progress of philosophical thinking will appear in a different light if we look at the main provisions of Plotinus’ system from the point of view of church teaching. Philosophical thought is progressing, but in the direction opposite to Christian. Philo’s God, precisely thanks to the inconsistency of the Jewish philosopher, resembles the Christian God incomparably more than Plotinus’s first principle, presented with all dialectical consistency: there the abstract Being very often appears with the features of a living and personal God, here the abstract unity is striking in its vacuity, so that even with special vividness of thought it is difficult to bring him closer to the Christian God; identification, of course, is out of the question. The same difference is noticeable in the doctrine of the second principle. Plotinus posits the principle of the existence of the mind in the very nature of the unity. This idea certainly deserved the full attention of Christian writers. But in general, the Logos of Philo stands in a closer relationship to God than the Νους of Plotinus to the One. Philo's God thinks, and the Logos is His thought; between Them does not lie that deep line of indifference that separates from the one a mind that needs it, but is completely unnecessary to it. Philo did not clearly imagine how God gives birth to His Word; but it is possible, without falling into severe exaggeration, to say that the one Dam gives birth to the mind as a blind elemental force. The Logos of Philo, as far as we know, thinks only the world; Νους Plotina thinks both himself and the One. Apparently, the famous Neoplatonist came closer to the high mystery of Christian doctrine than the Jewish philosopher; but it is remarkable that in Plotinus the mind, having begun as one, still ends in the world: the idea of ​​the one is fragmented in the mind into many ideas and, in the second beginning, develops a gravitation towards the lower, so that the ideal world is the only intelligible content of the mind. Thus, neither one nor the other philosopher presented any happy explanation of the mystery of the inner, immanent self-revelation of God. In Philo, Logos is subordinated to God; in Plotinus’ system this feature reaches its highest development: there subordinationism is only a fact, it is noticed, however, at many points, but its logical basis does not appear clearly; here this subordination is elevated to law and is observed in such a way that forms the basis of the entire philosophical system. If we admit that between the systems of Philo and Plotinus lay a series of intermediate degrees of development of philosophical thought, then we will have to admit that the later Christian writers lived under less favorable philosophical influences than the more ancient ones, because as philosophical constructions became more refined, they diverged more and more from the content of Christian teaching. Philosophical ideas, alien to the idea of ​​Christian doctrine, display remarkable stability and ability to develop; Dogmatic significance in philosophy acquires such forms of views into which it was especially difficult to invest Christian content. Therefore, we have to agree that the philosophy of the first two centuries of Christianity was far from a favorable factor in the development of the forms of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity; at least that side of philosophical teaching, which represents the very essence of the relationship between the first and second principles, could influence Christian thinkers in the least beneficial way, and if they could take advantage of some excellent philosophical ideas, then these ideas relate only to secondary points of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity 163. Disclosure of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity in Christian writing before Origen We turn to those experiences in revealing this teaching that Christian literature represents. The first writer to set out the doctrine of the Holy Trinity with significant completeness was St. Flavius ​​Justinus the Philosopher († 166) 164 . “We honor,” he writes, “the creator of the universe, the existing God; we know His Son and have Him in second place, and we have the Spirit of the Prophet in third place, and we have reason to honor Them” 165. “In the beginning, before all creation, God gave birth from Himself to an intelligent power, which the Holy Spirit calls sometimes the glory of the Lord, sometimes the Son, sometimes Wisdom, sometimes an angel, sometimes God, sometimes the Lord and the Word” 166 . “This power was born from the Father, by His power and will, but not through cutting off - not in such a way that the Father’s being was divided - not as happens with other objects, which, as a result of division and cutting, become not what they were before the cutting, but like what we see when other fires are lit from one fire: no matter how many fires are lit from it, it does not decrease in the least, but remains the same” 167. “We see something similar in ourselves: when we pronounce a word, we give birth to the word, but not through cutting off - not so that the word that is in us decreases as a result of its utterance” 168. Thus, the birth of the Son of God is an act alien to any quantitative change in the being of the Father. It is difficult to determine the true purpose of such an expression as: “The Son is born by the power, will, and desire of the Father.” Did St. Justin thereby rejects the idea that the birth of the Son was caused by physical necessity - this cannot be insisted on due to the lack of data in the text itself; but they recognize as indisputable that he himself does not consider this expression to exclude the idea of ​​​​the birth of the Son from the being of the Father 169. It cannot be stated decisively that, according to St. Justina, the Son of God is born from the Father from eternity in the highest sense of the word. Regarding this point, St. Justin does not express himself entirely clearly. “The Father of all, as the unbegotten, has no proper name, because whoever is called by name must have someone older than him, who gives him a name... But His Son (the unbegotten Father), the only one who is called Son in the proper sense, the Word before creation, and co-existent and begotten, when in the beginning He created and adorned all things through Him, is called Christ, because He is anointed, and God adorned all things through Him, and the name Jesus means and man and Savior" 170. In this place, the Father is thought to precede the Son, because the Son has a name, and therefore also has One who is older than Him and gave Him a name. But, not to mention the fact that from this place it is not clear whether the very name “Son” can be considered as a name, this is the eternal definition of the second Person of the Holy. Trinity, or names are considered only the names “Christ” and “Jesus”, relating to the temporary moment of the existence of the Son - the very difference between the “elder” who gives the name and the Son who receives it can be understood so subtly that it does not exclude the co-eternity of the Father and the Son. Another expression is more important: “The Son... is born when God in the beginning created all things through Him.” Here the birth of the Son precedes the creation of the world, but at the same time it is in close relationship with the latter, and therefore - strictly speaking - does not stand above all temporal determinations. But, according to St. Justin, if only he expresses himself accurately here, the birth of the Son is preceded by another moment of His existence - His existence with the Father. By this, the existence of the Son moves away from the temporal limit and is transferred to the realm of the eternal. Thus St. Justin apparently distinguished the internal Word from the manifested Word; but it is hardly possible to fully explain his thought and resolve all the questions it raises 171 . The Word is power, as St. repeatedly calls Him. Justin 172. But from this name one cannot in any way conclude that the Son is only a property or activity of the Father: St. Justin most decisively rejects the assumption that the Son of God, as a force, has no independent existence. “Some say that this power is inseparable and inseparable from the Father. “Just as the light of the sun on earth,” they say, “is inseparable from the sun that is in the sky, so that when the sun sets, the light also disappears: so the Father, when He wants, manifests His power and, when He wants, returns it again to Himself.” They teach the same thing about the creation of angels. But it has already been proven that angels exist and always remain and are not resolved into that from which they originated. So that power, which the prophetic word calls both God and angel, is not only taken into account by name, like sunlight, but also by number is something else - by number, I say, but not by the direction of thought and will” 173. “The Son is born of the Father; and that the one who is born is different in number from the one who gave birth, everyone will agree with this” 174. Thus, the independent existence of the Son and His difference from the Father is expressed with all clarity, and the term “other in number” 175 can be considered fully consistent with the expression “other in hypostasis” 176 among later writers. But “γνώμη,” the word for meaning the unity of the Father and the Son, is far from a complete analogy with the word “being” and, in its literal meaning, does not lead further to the conclusion about the moral unity of the Father and the Son, 177 although, of course, it does not stand in any contradiction with the idea of ​​Their consubstantiality. Deity of the Son of St. Justin proves with a number of texts from the Old Testament St. books. The Holy Spirit does not call anyone except God the creator and His Son, Christ, God and Lord 178, and only to His Son will God give His glory and to no one else 179. These are the most powerful expressions about the divinity of the Son that are found in St. Justina. But it is hardly possible to find in him the doctrine of the perfect equality of the Son with the Father in the very formulation in which it appears among the later fathers of the church. In saying this, we touch upon the issue of subordinationism, traces of which are found in the works of many of the most ancient church writers and which therefore calls for some preliminary remarks. The Submission of the Son to the Father can take three different forms. The Son can be considered as God incarnate, or at least as God appearing. In the first case, the Son has a dual nature: He is both an infinite God and a finite man, and on this latter side, naturally, lower than the Father and subordinate to Him. In the second case, the Son is the infinite God, hiding His divine nature under some finite form: appearing in the image of an angel or man, the Son sometimes speaks and acts as the finite being whose image He bears would speak and act; thus the Son is subordinate to the Father. In both cases, subordinationism has only a casual relation to the Son as the second Person of the Holy Trinity and, of course, does not deserve special attention. In both last forms, subordinationism stands in actual relation to God the Son, but the grounds for His subordination to the Father are different. In one case, it is assumed that the Son is lower than the Father in essence. The Son is unequal to the Father in any essential determination of His nature - such is usually a particular manifestation of this form of subordinationism; but developed logically to its final conclusions, it ends by denying the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son and, consequently, the very divinity of the Son. It is clear that this type of subordinationism is directly opposed to Orthodox teaching. But there is a third, very subtle form of subordination of the Son: it is assumed that the Father is greater than the Son, but only in the sense that the Father is the cause of the Son. Since this characterizes only Their hypostatic relationship, the last form of subordination is called, in contrast to subordinationism in essence, subordinationism by hypostasis. It is very difficult to make a decisive comment on this subtle and careful subordination of the Son. There is an opinion that this subordinationism is an integral part of the Orthodox Nicene doctrine 180, and indeed the understanding of the words of the Savior: “My Father is greater than Me” 181 in the sense of such subordination has representatives among the great fathers of the church 182; however, even those of them who allowed such an interpretation treated the formula itself with extreme caution: “The Father is greater than the Son.” “I want to call the Father great, because from Him those equal to Him (the Son and the Holy Spirit) have both being and the fact that They are equal to Him, and yet I am afraid that I might make the beginning the beginning of the lesser ones” 183. In these words one can see the normal, most refined expression of subordinationism by hypostasis, its highest form, the only one in which it is reconciled with the Orthodox consciousness, and at the same time a lesson in attitude towards this view. From what has been said, it is clear how one should treat the traces of subordinationism in the works of ancient church writers: first of all, one must determine under what form of subordinationism these dubious expressions fit, and, ignoring as unimportant those in which either the accidental or hypostatic subordination of the Son to the Father is expressed, dwell only on those in which subordinationism in essence shines through. In the writings of St. Justina is celebrated in quite a few places with a hint of subordinationism. Thus, the divine Persons differ among themselves in place and rank; The Son appears to be the second power after the Father, is called a “servant” of the Father’s will and in this sense “subordinate” to Him; The Father is called Lord of the Lord (Son); The will of the Father sometimes appears to be the principle of the Son's existence. But as for the first two places, in themselves they do not even contain a hint of subordinationism: the Father, in any case, logically precedes the Son 184. The expression “The Son is the servant of the Father’s will” can take on various shades, determined only by the subjective view of the writer, but in itself it “indicates only that the Son is the organ of revelation of the Father,” a thought in which there is no subordination of the Son to the Father; and if He is subordinate to the Father as a servant, then nothing prevents us from seeing in this the expression of only accidental subordinationism 185. The Father is the Lord of the Lord, but, as St. himself explains. Justin, this expression has the meaning that the Father is the cause of the Son, the author of both being and His divine perfections 186; therefore, if in this expression there is any shade of subordination of the Son, then this is subordinationism by hypostasis. In the words “The Son is born by the power, will, and desire of the Father” they see “the strongest subordinationian expression” 187 in St. Justina, “decisive subordinationism” 188; but, in essence, their meaning is completely unknown: we see that St. Justin affirms, but we absolutely do not know what he denies with them. The notoriety that these words received during the era of Arian disputes is entirely based on the fact that the Arians contrasted “birth by will” with “birth from a being,” while St. Justin directly states that “the Father begot the Son from Himself”; and this expression is incomparably easier to interpret in the sense of “birth from a being” than in the sense of the Arian “birth by will.” Thus, none of the above expressions gives the right to assert that St. Justin was essentially a supporter of subordinationism. But there is one point that cannot be reconciled with the idea of ​​the perfect equality of the Son with the Father: the Son appears in St. Justin is not to the same extent omnipresent and unlimited in space as the Father. Namely, attributing all the Old Testament theophanies to the Son, St. Justin resolutely speaks out against the very assumption that God the Father could appear to the patriarchs. “Neither Abraham, nor Isaac, nor Jacob, nor any other person, saw the Father and the ineffable Lord of all in general and Christ Himself in particular.” The Son of God - it was He who appeared in the form of fire to Moses and talked with him from a thorn bush 189. “No one who has the least bit of intelligence will dare to say that the creator of everything and the Father, leaving everything that is above the sky, appeared in a small space of the earth” 190. “Do not think that the unborn God Himself came down from somewhere. The ineffable Father and Lord of all does not come anywhere, does not walk, does not sleep and does not get up... He is motionless, uncontainable even in the whole world... And how could He speak to anyone, or appear to anyone, or reveal himself in the smallest space of the earth, when the people at Sinai could not even look at the glory of what He had sent? 191. Such argumentation is impossible with a clearly conscious thought about the perfect equality of the Son of God with the Father 192. Omnipresence and non-spatiality are definitions of the essence of God and therefore belong in absolutely equal measure and in the same sense to both the Father and the Son, consubstantial with Him, and therefore the limitation of these definitions in application to the Son, consistently revealed, must lead to dangerous conclusions 193. But since nothing proves that St. Justin was aware of the possibility of similar conclusions from his argumentation, then we can recognize this weak point in the teaching of St. Justin’s “amazing inconsistency” 194, an oversight on his part, and without denying the full justice of the strict verdict 195 that is made about this point on its merits, as far as it is discussed as a theological view, one can only suspect the justice of such an assessment of this view as a historical fact. This teaching, of course, reveals essential subordinationism, the last word of which can only be the denial of the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, the idea of ​​the Son as a being of a lower nature than the Father; but to attribute this idea to St. It would be unfair to Justin: it is only a conclusion from his view and, as a conclusion, cannot be considered its necessary characteristic 196; Logically correct and inevitable from the point of view of a later theologian, this conclusion might not have been so for the father of the church of the 2nd century. 197. The teaching of St. Justin about the Holy Spirit is very incomplete. It comes down to the following few points: The Holy Spirit is the source of inspiration for sacred writers; He speaks in St. scripture; He is the prophetic Spirit. He has the third place in the Holy Trinity 198. He is called an angel and the power of God 199 . There is no reason to think that when applied to the Holy Spirit these names have a different meaning than when applied to the Son of God; and therefore in them one can see an indication that the Holy Spirit has its own independent (hypostatic) existence, like the Father and the Son. And the high authority of inspired books can serve as an indicator (as an argumentum ad hominem) of the divine dignity of the Holy Spirit. Tatian. Athenagoras. St. Theophilus of Antioch For St. Justin the Philosopher is followed by his disciple Tatian († 170) 200, Athenagoras the Philosopher (c. 177) 201 and St. Theophilus of Antioch († 181). They are united into one group not only by the time of their lives, but also by the remarkable similarity of their basic view of the Word; and if the first trace of this view can be found already in St. Justin, then in all fairness they can be called his successors. Let us first dwell on what constitutes, although perhaps only an accidental difference between them. St. Justin said that the Son is not born through cutting off, 202 but he did not go further than this negative definition and did not give any term directly opposite to the word “cutting off.” In explaining how the birth of the Son is possible without a quantitative change in the being of the Father, St. Justin referred to the analogous fact of the utterance of a human word without changing its completeness in the mind of the one who pronounces it 203. Tatian took advantage of these thoughts of his teacher and created a positive term, which St. does not have. Justina. This term is μερισμός, probably not “division” but “communication”; but its explanation is rather vague 204. In the “Petition for Christians”, Athenagoras the Philosopher outlines a remarkably complete program for a dogmatic treatise on the Trinity. “Christians strive only to know God and His Word, and what is the unity of the Son with the Father, what is the communion of the Father with the Son, what is the Spirit, what is the unity and difference of the united Spirit, Son and Father” 205. Unfortunately, this program is far from being fulfilled in the work of Athenagoras (which, however, is sufficiently explained by the very nature and purpose of the “Petition for Christians”), and only short answers are given to the questions posed here. “The unity of God the Father, God the Son and the Holy Spirit is in unity and strength of spirit, Their difference is in order” 206. The unity and inseparability of the Father and the Son attracts Athenagoras's attention more than their difference 207. He speaks more clearly about the eternal existence of the Word than St. Justin 208. In the message of St. Theophilus to Autolycus for the first time the word “Trinity” (Τριάς) 209 appears. Unlike Athenagoras, Theophilus dwells not on the unity, but on the difference of the three Persons of the Trinity; but Theophilus does not yet have a term corresponding to the later ύπόστασις or πρόσωπον to designate the side in which God is trinitarian. The difference between the Father and the Son is carried to the same limits as in St. Justin, - to some limitation of the omnipresence of the Son 210. We turn to the view common to all three writers, which is consistently developed by them, so that the one who lived later complements his predecessor. Here are the words in which it appears in Tatian: “God was in the beginning, and this beginning - as we accepted - is the power of reason. Lord of all. Himself being the foundation of everything, there was one, since creation did not yet exist; and since He Himself was the power and foundation of what is visible and invisible, then everything was with Him. For with Him, through rational power, existed the Word Himself, which was in Him. By the will of His simple being the Word is manifested. And the Word did not come into being in vain: It becomes the first-born work of the Father 211... The Word, begotten in the beginning, in turn produced our world.” “The Son of God,” writes Athenagoras, “is the Word of the Father, as an idea and active force, for by Him and through Him everything happened, 212 because the Father and the Son are one, and the Son in the Father and the Father in the Son according to the unity and power of the spirit; The Son of God is the mind and Word of the Father. If you would like to know what the Son is 213, then I will say briefly: He is the first birth of the Father, not because It happened - (no!) God, as an eternal mind and eternally verbal, from time immemorial had the Word in Himself 214 - but because He came (from Him) to be the idea and effective force 215 for all material things that were still in the form of qualityless nature. Finally at St. Theophilus, this view appears with the terminology that has forever remained with him in science 216. “Before anything happened, God had as an adviser the Word hidden in His heart, the Word, which is His Son, since He is His mind and thought. When God wanted to create what He had determined: then, having His internal (ένδιάθετον) Word in His own depths, He gave birth to Him, manifesting Him together with His Wisdom first of all - He gave birth to this (i.e. ένδιάθετον) Word, externally manifested (προφορικόν), the firstborn of all creation, but He Himself did not lose the Word, but gave birth to the Word and always converses with His Word. Therefore, we are taught by the sacred scriptures and all the spirit bearers, of which John says: “in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God,” showing that from the beginning there was only God and in Him the Word 217; Then he says: “And God was the Word; all things came into being through Him.” Thus, all the writers under consideration distinguish two periods in the existence of the Word; the approximate border point between them is the fact of the creation of the world. In relation to the Word, this is an external fact, but in close connection with it stands the fact of the internal life of the Word Himself - His birth from the Father: in order to create the world, the Word is born from the Father. From this it is clear that the writers in question understood the act of birth of the Word differently from other teachers, whose view is recognized as the only correct and ecclesiastical one. Two points in which the difference between one and the other view is revealed have already been outlined. The ancient writers under consideration present the birth of the Son not as a moment of internal self-revelation of the Divine, necessarily presupposed by the very being of the Father. That God, by His very essence, and not because of His relation to the world, must have a Word, this is clearly stated (by Athenagoras); but that God would have given birth to the Son even if there had been no world, that in the very essence of God, and not in His relation to the world, lies the basis for the birth of the Son, this thought, at least, remains completely in the shadows; on the contrary, another idea appears in full light: God wanted to create the world - and begat the Son, and He came from the Father to be an idea and creative force to create the world. It seems that this says more than what is required by a practical religious worldview, which is not defined by the idea of ​​God outside of His relationship to the world: the importance of the world in the views of the writers under consideration is somewhat exaggerated, and the similarity between their view and that pursued by the philosophy of that era is so noticeable that one can assume the dependence of the former on the latter. Then, according to them, the birth of the Son is not an eternal act, like the very existence of the Word; it is not even the first logical (initial) moment of His existence: before being the birth of the Father, the Word already exists in Him. But, as a result of this, the internal meaning of the act of birth of the Word becomes completely incomprehensible. This act, of course, does not change either the identity of the Word with Himself - Λόγος προφορικός is that very Word that already exists as Λόγος ένδιάθετος - nor His relationship to the Father, as far as it is understood by these writers - the Father is not deprived His Word and always converses with Him, and It is not separated from the Father. But what is most remarkable is that the very relationship of God and the Word as Father and Son, apparently, is not made completely dependent on the fact of the birth of the Word: at least it is not clear that Athenagoras and St. Theophilus was called Son only Λόγος προφορικός. Thus, everything that is determined by the fact of birth comes down to the fact that Λόγος ένδιάθετος became Λόγος προφορικός, i.e. The inner, hidden word appeared and became related to the world; but this only intelligible side of the fact already lies beyond the doctrine of the immanent Trinity, and then only a simple change of technical names remains. In a word, to understand the meaning of the difference between Λόγος ένδιάθετος and Λόγος προφορικός outside the fact of the revelation of the Word, outside His relationship to the world, to understand the meaning of the birth of the Word in His inner being, in the immanent life of the Trinity God, seems to be impossible. There is not enough clear data to resolve the deeply important question of whether Λόγος ένδιάθετος had a hypostatic existence. It is not resolved categorically in a positive sense by what St. Theophilus Λόγος ένδιάθετος is called “adviser of the Father” 218; in turn, the fact that Tatian apparently does not believe any difference between the ideal existence of the world before its creation and the existence of the Son διά λογικής δυνάμεως before His manifestation does not authorize the decisive conclusion that for Tatian Λόγος ένδιάθετος really and hypostatically existed as little as the world before creation 219. It is indisputable that these writers, in their teaching about the Word, start from the idea of ​​Him as that property of the spiritual nature of the Father, by virtue of which He is a rational being: to separate His Word from God means to present God as an unreasonable being (άλογον). The Word, therefore, is a property or activity (as φρόνησις) of the spiritual nature of the Father. This, apparently, also says that the Word is non-hypostatic, impersonal. It cannot be denied that such a view of the Word is not free from such danger 220. But let us not forget that the “father of Orthodoxy” Athanasius the Great stood for this view and was a zealous defender of the hypostatic existence of the Word 221. Consequently, the supposed dangerous side of this view does not constitute its necessary affiliation. If we turn to the writers themselves, we will not find anything in them that would lead them to deny the hypostasis of the Word in the first moment of His existence. The idea that Λόγος προφορικός can also be a hypostasis seems acceptable. However, even at this secondary moment of His existence, the Word does not cease to be in the Father as His property: the rationality of the nature of God is still made dependent on the presence of the Word in Him. Thus, it is not clear that the idea of ​​the Word as a property of the divine nature stands in diametric opposition to the other view of the Word as existing for itself. And if the hypostatic character in the manifest Word (προφορικός) appears more clearly than in the internal Word (ένδιά-θετος); then there is still no reason to elevate this difference into opposition, to make a genetic difference from a gradational difference and, attributing a hypostasis to the manifest Word, to deny it in the internal Word. – All this forces us to refrain from any decisive judgments on this issue. And a decisive affirmation and a decisive denial will hardly be appropriate when it comes to the opinions of writers who, to express the concept of being - let's say - hypostatic, do not know another word other than the obscure “τάξις”, who give the strongest expression of this concept only in the form of analogy 222. The teaching of the writers in question about the Holy Spirit is both incomplete and unclear. In Tatian, everything more important in this regard lies in one phrase: “The souls who rejected the servant of the suffering God” (from the previous it is clear that this servant is the Holy Spirit) “showed themselves to be more God-fighters than God-worshippers.” 223 Athenagoras speaks about the Holy Spirit in the very expressions against which the Holy Spirit polemicized. Justin 224. “We affirm that the Holy Spirit Himself, acting in the prophets, is the outflow of God, flows out and returns like a ray of sunshine” 225. If these expressions do not hide the idea that St. refuted. Justin, - a denial of the independent existence of the Holy Spirit, it is still impossible to call them both accurate and satisfactory. - Finally, St. Theophilus at this point deviates from his usual precision: replacing the name “St. Spirit" with the word "Wisdom", he, however, continues to call the Son Wisdom 226. The Spirit-Wisdom, like the Son-Word, exists in God and, together with the Son, was manifested before the creation of the world 227. For St. Theophilus († 181) in time, but not in direction in the teaching of the Word, follows St. Irenaeus of Lyons († 202), who wrote “The Exposure and Refutation of False Gnosis.” The way of thinking of those with whom St. polemicized. Irenaeus, also had a negative impact on his own presentation of the church’s teaching about the Holy Trinity. He dealt with people who, with great originality, took advantage of the idea of ​​​​the fullness of the life of the Divine: they sought its expression not in three hypostases, but in a number of beings, in varying degrees of perfection, pouring out from a single divine essence, of which the Gnostics numbered tens and even hundreds. Further, wanting to understand the secret of these births, the Gnostics used all the means that human insight provided, and spoke, for example, about the birth of the Son from the Father so decisively, “as if they themselves were obstetricians” 228 . These features of Gnostic systems on the material side of the teachings of St. Irenaeus was reflected in the fact that he proves primarily the unity of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and not Their actual existence as three independent indivisible ones, on the formal side by the fact that St. Irenaeus is extremely distrustful of the human word and avoids using expressions with the nature of terms, and, having a negative attitude towards Gnostic expressions, does not replace them with positive formulas of church teaching. According to St. Irenaeus should reverently bow before such a lofty mystery of faith as the dogma of the birth of the Son of God, without trying to investigate how the Son was born from the Father (quomodo ergo Filius prolatus a Patre est?). Quomodo no one knows this fact: neither angels, nor archangels, nor principalities, nor powers; only the Father who gave birth and the begotten Son knows, and all human efforts to comprehend this secret are useless to the point of stupidity 229. Whether we call the birth of the Son prolatio, or emissio, or nuncupatio, or adapertio, the essence of the matter will remain the same: we have used a new word, but we do not have the right to use its meaning to clarify dogma, to transfer this meaning to the birth of the Son: precise and meaningful when applied to man, to his complex and passionate nature, the word loses its meaning when it is applied to God. Let's take the word "emissio". It evokes the idea of ​​a complex and corporeal being, leading to the idea that the producer is separated from the produced 230. “But the Father is very far from the feelings and passions that people have: He is simple, uncomplicated, equal, and all similar and equal to Himself” 231. Further, “emissio”, in its precise meaning, is the discovery of what is produced outside the producer, 232 is closely connected with the idea of ​​space into which the producer emits what he produces. “But what existed before the Mind of God, into what could He come out? And how big is the place that could contain the Mind of God? 233. In a word, one of two things must be assumed: either God is enveloped in emptiness, if He really produces (emittit) His Mind, or the Mind is not produced outside the Father (extra Patrem), but in the Father Himself (in ipso Patree). But the first is impossible, and the second makes the very word “emissio” 234 meaningless. The explanation of the birth of the Son by analogy with the utterance of a word leads equally little to the goal. Who does not know that a person sometimes rests and is silent, sometimes he speaks and acts? 235 Who does not know that the word is born from thinking (ex cogitatione)? 236 All this is true, but only regarding human nature. Its limitations determine that the human word does not have time to follow the rapid flight of thought, and thus the difference between the human logos, as a thinking principle, and the logos, as an organ of expression of the mind 237 is revealed, and the sequence of words after thoughts in time 238 is established. But such a distinction between word and reason loses its meaning when one wants to transfer it to God. “God, being all Mind and all Word, says what he thinks, and thinks what he says. For liro thought is His Word, and the Word is Mind, and the all-encompassing Mind is the Father Himself” 239. “He is the whole Mind and the whole Word, and in whatever respect the Mind is, in such a way the Word is also, and has in Himself nothing older or later, nothing different, but remains completely equal to Himself, identical and united, and therefore in God there is no place for the creation (of the Word) in such gradualism.” The Word of God is eternal (aeternum Verbum) and has no beginning or order of production. Otherwise, “how will the Word of God, or, better, God Himself, who is the Word from whom the Word is different, differ from the word of man, if It has the same order of birth”? 240 Thus, criticism of the concept of “emissio” leads to the conclusion that the birth of the Son is alien to the spatial nature, and criticism of the ideas caused by viewing the Son as the Word of God gives the result that the Word of God is eternal, that the Son always exists with the Father 241. Never before have previous Christian writers presented these thoughts with such completeness as they are developed in the work of St. Irenaeus: his predecessors, one might say, only express what he proves. In addition, the doctrine of the eternity of the Word as presented by St. Irenaeus is not obscured by the idea of ​​the difference between Λόγος προφορικός and Λόγος ένδιάθετος; St. Irenaeus is completely free from this opinion and even undermines it at its very root, exposing its anthropomorphic lining. Unfortunately, this bright side of St. Irenaeus did not become the common property of subsequent Christian literature, and its very prominent representatives return to the point of view of Tatian, Athenagoras and St. Theophilus, who introduced nothing into Christian theology except confused concepts about the birth and even the very essence of the Son. In the teaching of St. Irenaeus on the birth of the Word draws attention to another point of high importance. Polemicizing against the Gnostic idea of ​​eons as beings emanating from one divine principle, but, nevertheless, very different from each other in the degree of their perfection and knowledge, St. Irenaeus firmly expresses the idea that the birth of aeons, no matter how various forms it may be represented, can only be a birth from the essence of the Father, therefore, the aeons must be consubstantial with their origin and possess at least the basic features of the perfections of his nature 242. Will we imagine the birth of aeons as analogous to the birth of man from man? It is necessary to admit that the aeons are either of the same being with the Father and, therefore, similar to Him in their properties, or, if they are dissimilar to Him, they are a different being than the Father, 243 but in this case an insoluble question arises: how could this other being appear in the pleroma? If we compare the relation of the aeons to the Father to the relation of the branches to a tree, or the stars to the light from which they were formed; then even then only a quantitative difference will result, and not a qualitative and not substantial one - not one that would give the right to attribute impassibility and immutability to the Father, but opposite properties to the eons 244. Let us finally agree to imagine the origin of the aeons from the Father under the image of the kindling of lights from light, torches from torches; but this will not change the result at all: the eons will be of one essence and similar to the Father; the torches will differ only in the time of ignition, and this difference does not in any way affect the very nature of light, which is identical in all torches 245. The question is: is it possible to look at this view, so persistently developed in the polemics of St. Irenaeus with the Gnostics as an element of his own theology? Is it possible to assert that for him, too, the birth of the Son is imaginable only as a birth from the being of the Father and, as such, necessarily determines the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son? The fact that St. Irenaeus does not use these expressions when he speaks of the birth of the Word in a purely ecclesiastical sense; but, on the other hand, it is also true that the Logos of the Gnostic systems and the Logos of church dogma were not for St. Irenaeus, of course, are different from each other: he compared the Gnostic teaching about the emanation of the Word with the church teaching about the birth of the Word-Son and refuted the first not only in a purely dialectical way, but also directly on the basis of church dogma 246. Therefore, it is also likely that in this case St. Irenaeus considers the birth of the aeons as originating from the being of the Father, not only because this was required by the fundamental principles of the system being refuted, and not because this point of view gave the polemicist good argumenta ad hominem, but also because the saint was obliged to take this point of view. Irenaeus is the teaching of the church, and he could not have spoken differently even when his immediate task was not to refute the Gnostics, but to positively reveal the truth. This assumption is not at all contradicted by other expressions of St. Irenaeus about the unity of the Father and the Son. “One and the same God the Father and His Word” 247. Son and Holy Spirit, or, according to the usual usage of St. Irenaeus, the Word and Wisdom are the hands of the Father, and Their ministry does not violate the divine advantage of self-sufficiency, according to which the Father does not need the ministry of extraneous organs; Therefore, we can say that “The Father created everything Himself, through Himself, i.e. through His Word and Wisdom" 248. All these expressions are so clear that they would be quite appropriate in a system where the idea of ​​the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son is systematically pursued. The same height of the nature of the Word is also indicated by the fact that the immeasurable Father is measured in Him, because the Son is the measure of the Father and contains Him, so that the Father is the invisible of the Son, and the Son is the visible of the Father 249; that neither the Lord, nor the Holy Spirit, nor the apostles would ever definitely and unconditionally call anyone God who was not truly God; and they would not call anyone else Lord on their behalf except the One who rules over everything, that is, except God the Father and His Son 250. Such passages so clearly and energetically express the reality of the unity of the Father and the Son that they can give reason to fear for the reality of their hypostatic difference 251, and these fears, apparently, are all the more justified because sometimes St. Irenaeus calls God Himself the Word 252. And, it seems, it should be assumed that they cannot be dispelled by one classical passage from St. Irenaeus, that it is impossible to indicate a quotation, which, in terms of the clarity and energy of expression of the hypostatic difference, could be compared with the above testimonies about the unity of the Father and the Son 253. Such fears can be countered with great success by indirect evidence: one can refer to the unnatural light in which many of the expressions of St. Irenaeus, if we try to consistently carry out the assumption through his entire teaching about the Word, that he does not recognize the real difference between the Father and the Son. They tried to create a counterbalance to too strong expressions about the unity of the Father and the Son in another way - emphasizing all expressions in which one could assume a shade of subordinationism 254; but it can hardly be said that this attempt to graft subordinationism into the theology of St. Irenaeus was completed successfully: the collected material is too scanty, 255 and even a more remarkable place does not lead directly to the goal. Regarding the words of the Savior: “about that day and hour no one knows, not even the Son, but only the Father” 256 St. Irenaeus remarks: “If the Son was not ashamed to attribute the knowledge of that day only to the Father, but spoke the truth; then we should not be ashamed to leave the highest questions to God.” “For if anyone seeks the reasons why the Lord said that the Father, who has fellowship with the Son in everything, alone knows the day and hour of judgment, then now he will not find another more suitable, decent and safe reason than that we should learn through Him that the Father is above all. For “the Father,” He says, “is greater than Me.” And our Lord has ascribed to the Father superiority in knowledge, so that we, while we remain in the form of this world, may present perfect knowledge to God.” Such words obviously do not provide a strong support for subordinationism: in what respect the Father is greater than the Son, this, at least, is not clearly defined, and the words of the Savior are given a mainly edifying meaning 257. About the Holy Spirit the theology of St. Irenaeus speaks mostly in connection with the doctrine of the Son: They are both hands of the Father 258, serving Him 259, and yet in such a way that the world created by Them was created by God the Father Himself 260. Figuratio Patris, His Wisdom, the Holy Spirit, is as co-eternal with the Father as are His progenies, the Son-Word 261. Finally, one may wonder: what is St. Irenaeus believed the principle of the Trinity being in God? Previous writers did not say anything that would prevent us from looking for the basis of the Trinity in the very being of God, but the theory of the difference between Λόγος ένδιάθετος and Λόγος προφορικός predisposed them to see this principle in the will of the Father and even more particularly in the will of the creator of the world. St. Irenaeus, having abandoned this theory and standing very close to the doctrine of birth from a being, was naturally predisposed to see the principle of trinity in the being of God and saw it, it seems, in the concept of God as an all-satisfied being: God has no need either in the world or in man, because He has a Son from eternity 262. The last years of St. Irenaeus († 202) coincide with the activities of Titus Flavius ​​Clement († c. 217) in the rank of catechist at the Alexandrian school. Its significance in the history of Christian thought is undoubtedly high; but the same cannot be said about the position that it occupies in the particular history of the dogma of the Trinity. The nature of Clement's teaching about the Word is more philosophical than theological. The famous catechist devotes all his attention to the problems that Alexandrian philosophy posed at the points of its contact with Christian teaching, but does not seem to notice the specifically theological movement of thought that gave rise to the heresies of the Theodotians, Artemonites and Praxeans; at least it is not visible that he responded to it in any way 263. Clement's theology is rich in considerations of an epistemological nature. This is quite natural: Clement is specifically concerned with the question of true gnosis. The Word in Clement's teaching is even directly called the teacher and educator of humanity 264. This type of mediatorial ministry of Christ has a firm foothold in Clement's idea of ​​God. The first cause of everything that exists, God, is an object of faith, and not of logical knowledge 265. For a person, the beginning of any object is unknowable, and even more so the very beginning. The reason for this lies in the very nature of human thinking: it starts from what was given before, while there cannot be anything previously unborn 266. He is above all the categories in which human thought revolves: He is not only above place and time, but also not a genus, or a species, or an individual, or an accident, or something to which something relates as an accident, or a part or a whole; He is infinite not because He appears so to the human mind, but because He really has no limit 268. There is no species or relationship in it. In a word, He always seems to elude human knowledge, and people cannot hope to dispel with their own means the mysterious darkness that surrounds Him 269 . He is above name and above thought. He must be honored in silence combined with sacred horror 270. Human thought, of course, ascribes to God various names, for example, one, good, mind, self-existent, Father, God, Lord, creator, but these are not names of God in the proper sense, but only names, better than which human thought knows nothing and therefore stops at them; and all of them together point only to the power of the Almighty 271. But what man cannot achieve with his own means, God gives him, revealing Himself through the Word. The Word-Son is wisdom, knowledge, truth, idea, thought of God 272. There is one feature in the characterization of the Word, with which Clement apparently tries to explain why It can be an object of knowledge, while God is unknowable: the Word does not have that unconditional simplicity that characterizes the Father. In the Son all the powers of the spirit are brought to unity. Therefore, the Son is neither absolutely one nor many in the sense of being made up of parts, but He is “all one” and therefore “all.” For He is the circle of all forces united in Him, and therefore alpha and omega, beginning and end 273. Clement describes the process of cognition in this way: let’s imagine some material object and abstract from it both its physical properties and geometric ones (three spatial dimensions). The point remaining after this is a unit, but - so to speak - has a position. Let us abstract this position from it, and we will think of a unit (in the unconditional sense). Thus, having renounced the idea of ​​everything corporeal and the so-called incorporeal, we will cast ourselves before the greatness of Christ, and from here we will reach the idea of ​​the Almighty, knowing not what He is, but what He is not 274. Here we encounter a reflection of the very philosophical ideas that found their completion in Plotinus’ system. The starting point in the idea of ​​God as a creator is the definition of Him as a good monad 275. God is God (Θεός) and therefore one, because in Him there is an immutable property of always being a source of goods 276. Good is the purest, non-relative definition of God, logically preceding His definition as a creator 277. That is why He wanted to be the creator and the Father, because He is good, and in His very goodness He is free, not subject to physical necessity 278. Before the creation of the world, the Father's adviser was His Word and Wisdom 279. Through the Word the world was created 280. It is the beginningless beginning and the beginning of the existing. The Word came into existence and became the author of creation 281. This Word is not Λόγος προφορικός, but the revealed wisdom and goodness of God, the all-powerful and truly divine power, the will of the Almighty 282. Through the Word God created the world and rules it. In His essence, God is far from the world, because what is born cannot approach the unborn; but He is close to the world by His power 283. It seems that in these words Clement expresses the basis on which he attributes direct control of the world to the Word: the power of the Almighty is precisely the Word 284. The relationship between goodness and justice according to Clement is characteristic. Goodness is the original property of God: He is good in Himself (δι’ έαυτόν); on the contrary, justice is already determined by God’s relationship to the world: God is just for our sake (δι’ ήμάς). Therefore, although both goodness and justice are attributed to both the Father and the Word, the Word is the predominant bearer of justice, and the Father is called good 285. These are the outstanding features of Clement's teaching about God and the Word in Their relation to the world. Regarding the question of Their immanent relationship between Themselves, Clement offers little new data. Some particular points of his teaching about the Word are high, but general, basic questions are not resolved clearly enough. The Word is called the Father's own Son, the perfect Word, who came from the perfect Father 286. The Word comes from the Father for the creation of the world, but it seems that Clement does not consider this moment the birth of the Word-Son, and in this respect Clement's Λόγος προελθών indeed differs from the Λόγος προφορικός of the apologists 287 . The divine nature of the Word is evidenced by such expressions as “the most obvious God in truth, equal to the Lord of all,” “the most perfect, most holy, most royal and beneficent nature, closest to the one Almighty” 288. But we have no right to conclude from the last place about the unity of the nature of the Father and the Son, even because Clement himself posits some difference between the nature of the Son and the Father 289. The significance of this testimony is further weakened by the fact that here Clement speaks of the gradational superiority of some creatures over others, angels over people, the Word over angels. If the Son is called God, then this name cannot have a decisive meaning in view of the wide scope that the concept of “God” received in Clement’s system 290. But in general, in Clement, like St. Irenaeus, the doctrine of the unity of the Father and the Son is expressed more strongly than the thought of their difference. “Grant,” said the prayer to the “Educator,” that we may thank the one Father and Son, Son and Father, educator and teacher of the Son, with the Holy Spirit” 291 . Elsewhere it is said that the Father and the Word are “both one God” 292 . The idea of ​​the real difference between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit can only be deduced from those places where Clement names all three Persons side by side. For example, speaking about the incarnation of the Word, he exclaims: “a mysterious miracle! The Father of all is one, the Word of all is one and the Holy Spirit is one and the same everywhere, and one mother is the Virgin” 293. Elsewhere, Clement calls the Father first, the Son second, and the Holy Spirit third 294. Given this state of Clement’s teaching about the Word, it is natural that the only conclusion that can be drawn about the Holy Spirit is that the Holy Spirit is one with the Father and the Son and has an independent existence, and this conclusion will be valid only as much as the conclusion about the Son. The happy opposite of Clement is his famous Western contemporary, the founder of the African school and the father of church Latin literature, Quintus Septimius Florence Tertullian († 220–240). A man of a different mentality than his famous Alexandrian contemporary, Tertullian valued very little, not to say, he despised philosophy and therefore did not care at all about how the content of Christian dogma would relate to its principles and forms, and if he was ready to use its means, then only in order to more fully, clearly, concisely present the content of the dogma in all its simplicity, without softening - at least consciously - and without closing those points in which it diverged from the range of philosophical views and which for Tertullian himself, it seems, were all the more attractive. This “anti-Gnostic spirit” of Tertullian made him an ecclesiastical writer par excellence. He writes, bearing in mind the needs of the church life of his time, accepts the question in the very formulation that this life gave him, illuminates in the dogma precisely those aspects that its course brought to the fore and made a question. End of the 2nd century noted in church history by the so-called monarchist movement. It was directed - so to speak - against the very center of the dogma of the Holy Trinity, and did not touch it only on the side. The monarchists' program was simple and logical; their best representatives transferred their operations to an area that had been little explored by previous Christian literature. The polemic with the monarchians therefore promised rich results for the presentation of dogma. It was led by Tertullian and in his treatise “Against Praxeus” he gave an exposition of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity so complete, multifaceted, in general, clear and coherent that his work constitutes an epoch in the history of this dogma 295. One can even say that only from Tertullian does Christian literature begin to reveal the doctrine of the Holy Trinity: previous writers only touch on this dogma and usually touch only as much as is necessary to present the doctrine of the Word, and do not at all go into any detailed exposition of the most essential side of the dogma, the doctrine of the relation of the trinity to the unity of the Divine. In his treatise, Tertullian asks three essential questions: does the Son exist, who is He, and how does He exist? Answering them, Tertullian traces the genesis of the Son, starting from the pre-eternal state, or the mood of God, until the very birth of the Son 296. “First of all, 297 God was alone, being to Himself both the world and the place and everything. He was alone because there was nothing else outside and besides Him. However, even then He was not alone: ​​He had with Him precisely His Reason, which He had in Himself; and God is a rational being, and in Him is Reason before (everything), and thus everything comes from Him.” Such a view is more consistent with reality than another similar, but not identical to it, - than the view that in God, first of all, the Logos as the Word: Reason as meaning, as the principle of conscious existence (sensus) precedes the word, its revelation; the word has its basis (substantiam) in the mind; thus, God is primarily a rational being, and not a verbal one. However, between one and the other definition the difference is insignificant: “God, even then, when he had not yet uttered His Word, already had It within Himself with the very Reason and in the Reason itself, when silently He pondered with Himself and destined what He would soon (gloh) say through the Word; because, reflecting and destining with His Reason, He posited Reason itself as (efficiebat) the Word, setting His (Reason) in motion by the Word.” To understand the mystery of this mood of God, Tertullian refers man - a being created in the image and likeness of God, “animated even from the substance of God” - to his own mental experience 298. Reason and speech respond in man to every movement of his thought, to every wave of his consciousness (sensus); he necessarily thinks through words even when he silently goes deep into himself; in his word he finds within himself an interlocutor who is different from himself. This explanation has at the same time the significance of proving that such a state in God is a real fact. If this phenomenon occurs in man, then how much more fully should it be accomplished in his prototype God? So, even before the creation of the world, God was not alone: ​​He had in Himself the Mind-Word, or Wisdom, as something second, not identical with God Himself. Thought and delineating with the Word and through the Word the future universe, God considered His Word second in relation to Himself, gave birth and created His Wisdom, but only in His consciousness (sensu) and ad cogitatum; but this birth of the Word was not perfect: only when the Father wanted to give real being, being in kind and substance, to everything from which the universe is composed, only then did He pronounce first of all His Word-Mind-Wisdom, in order through Him to create the universe predestined in Him 299 . Only at this moment is the Word born and ad effectum; only when God said: “Let there be light!” His Word received His form and decoration, His sound and voice; only now does It truly coexist with God, stands next to Him in the very separation from Him, creates the universe according to His will, rejoices in His presence, and only now does God become the Father of the Word, and the Word the only begotten Son. In this discussion of Tertullian we encounter the doctrine of Λόγος ένδιάθετος and Λόγος προφορικός in a more developed form than in all previous writers. The line separating the two moments in the existence of the Word is drawn deeper. The internal Word is contrasted not only with the spoken Word, but with the Son. Previous writers, however, called the act in which the Word enters a new moment of His existence “birth”; but since they assimilated to the Word and at the first moment of His existence the name of the Son, and to God the name of the Father, the inner meaning of the very act of birth was obscured; Apparently, he did not establish any new relationship between God and the Word in Their inner life, and the expression: “The Word is born” in this case also meant that “The Word is sent into the world.” Tertullian retains the specific meaning of the moment of “birth” - as far as this was possible: from this moment God and the Word enter into the relationship of Father and Son 300. Tertullian not only made visible this difference between the Word and the Son - on the one hand, and God and the Father - on the other, and adhered to his terminology very consistently, 301 but also foresaw the logical conclusions to which this new point of view led him: he directly stated that the name “God” refers to substance, and the name “Father” expresses only the incidental relation of God to the Son, and therefore the name “Father” is not as eternal a definition of God as the name itself "God"; There was a time when there was no Son, through whom God became the Father 302. The Word, as the Son, is undoubtedly what was subsequently designated by the term “ύπόστασις.” To the question: “So, do you admit that the Word is substance?” Tertullian answers with a resounding “yes.” The substantiality of the Son for Tertullian is beyond any doubt for two reasons. Firstly, the Son created a world full of substances, and to say that, nevertheless, the Son Himself has no substance means to admit such an absurdity as the origin of being from absolute “nothing”. Secondly, the Son came from the Father, i.e. beings undoubtedly and absolutely real; and if the world, created not from the essence of God, but only according to His will, consists of visible and invisible substances, then much more the Son, who originated from the very essence of God, cannot be without substance 303. So, the Son has substance, is “res” 304 and, moreover, “res substantiva”; only on this assumption can He be considered as the second 305, as other than the Father 306. Tertullian calls this substance of the Word-Son a person (persona) and in this sense distinguishes it from substance as nature, common and united in the Father and the Son 307. Thus, Tertullian expresses himself very precisely about the hypostatic existence of the Word, as the Son, as Wisdom, “coexistent with the Father in its very separation from Him.”308 Tertullian expresses himself very precisely. But since the existence of the Word as the Son is, according to Tertullian, a secondary moment in the existence of the Word, one should ask: how did the Word exist before He became the Son, was He a hypostasis even before His “perfect birth”? Tertullian does not give a categorical answer to this interesting question either. The data for solving it in the affirmative sense - one must admit - are scarce. It can be pointed out that Reason in the pre-world moment of existence is already called “substance” in relation to the Word. But whether this word is used in the given place in the sense in question is, at least, not obvious. Perhaps Reason is called so because It precedes the Word, which develops from It 309. Further, God “by His activity made the Word second from Himself.” But Tertullian says something similar about the human word. “Your word is something (quodammodo) second in you.” “The word itself is (that) other (interlocutor) with whom you are having a conversation” 310. Then it is said of Wisdom that “She was created as a second Person. Firstly, the Lord created Me as the beginning of the paths to His works... before all the hills He gave birth to Me, that is, creating and giving birth in His thoughts.” But Tertullian continues: “She then exists with Him as separate from Him. “When He prepared heaven, I was with Him” 311. Therefore, it cannot be affirmed decisively that Wisdom became a Person precisely at the first, and not at the second, moment of Her existence 312. The data of the opposite nature is the following: Before His birth, the Word did not come from the Father 313 and did not stand apart from Him. Until this moment, God gave birth and created His Word in His thought; but the world itself, insofar as it was determined to be by the thinking of God, was already created in His thought, and yet at that moment the world lacked objective (coram) existence in species and substances. And the Word Itself received His appearance and decoration, sound and voice, only when God said: “Let there be light”! 314. Against this, one can only notice that Tertullian says about the Word that It “received Its form,” but does not add: “and Its substance,” while the world from that time begins to exist “in forms and substances.” Finally, only the Word-Son is attributed such a sign of independent spiritual existence as joy 315. These negative data are significant, but not so strong that the question posed can be considered resolved in a negative sense. One might think that, based on his idea that in God the internal difference between His “I” and His Mind should be revealed incomparably more fully than in the human soul, and that God is the fullness of substantiality, Tertullian could have recognized the internal Word as a substance, but did not come to a clear representation of such a result: because then it would have been impossible to so consistently draw a distinction between the Son and the Word 316. The Son is God 317, but Tertullian does not think to say by this that the Son is completely equal to the Father; on the contrary, Tertullian finds it possible to recognize the difference between the divinity of the Father, the God of the philosophers, and the divinity of the Son, as He revealed Himself: the Father is invisible, unapproachable, meek; The Son was visible, was heard, became man; precisely what philosophy considers unworthy of God, unthinkable in Him 318 belongs to Him. Tertullian realizes that such features, unusual for the Divine, characterize, in fact, either human nature in Christ, or (in the Old Testament) the form of appearance accepted by Him - that in His essence the Son is invisible and is not limited to place, as omnipresent inseparably from the Father 319; but, nevertheless, for Tertullian this visibility and spatial limitation is not a feature that is certainly external and therefore in no way characterizes the very divine nature of the Son; on the contrary, in the very Line of the Son lies the basis for the possibility for Him to be visible, even if only as a “mirror and fortune-telling,” while in the Father this possibility is not allowed. Facts unusual for the deity of the Son should not, of course, be believed, Tertullian thinks, if Scripture did not speak about them; but if something similar had been told about the Father, then perhaps the scriptures 320 should not have been believed. That it is not the Father, but the Son who appears on earth, Tertullian connects this with the birth of the Son from the Father. “In economy itself (i.e., both external and internal revelation) God willed that the Son should appear on earth.” But this will fully corresponds to the definitions of the very essence of the Son 321. At this point, all the inconvenience of Tertullian’s visual view of the relationship between the Father and the Son appears with all clarity. The difference between Them in Tertullian's view often takes on a quantitative nature. “The Father and the Son are not one and the same, but they differ from each other modulo. For the Father is the whole substance, and the Son is the outflow and part of the whole, as He Himself testifies: the Father is greater than Me” 322. “The Word of God is God, because It is from the substance of God Himself and, as it were, some part of the whole” 323. On such a comprehensive relationship between the Father and the Son, Tertullian substantiates the idea of ​​​​the belittlement of the Son with the Father 324. Essentially similar to this is the basis on which the idea is directly based that only the Son, and not the Father, can appear to people. “God became visible not according to the fullness of divinity, but according to the measure of human receptivity, so that we think of the Father as invisible because of the fullness of greatness, and we recognize the Son as visible because of the measure of the outflow - just as we are unable to look at the sun, at its highest substance (in its entirety), which is in the heavens, while our eye endures that limited measure of light that in a solar ray reaches to the earth” 325. However, Tertullian was not entirely consistent in his subordinationism and once even declared “that the Son is no less than the Father” 326. The third member of the Trinity is the Holy Spirit. Tertullian ascribes to Him a hypostatic existence, like the Son, and calls Him a Person 327. The Holy Spirit has its existence from the Father through the Son, and therefore quite naturally occupies third place in the Trinity 328. But since the Son Himself received existence only before the creation of the world, then the procession of the Holy Spirit naturally coincides with this time. It is possible to attribute eternal existence to Him only in a sense even less strict than to the Son, since Tertullian, apparently, did not have so much speculative power to indicate the logical necessity of the existence of the Holy Spirit in the very eternal mood of God. Thus, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit really exist as three res, three different Persons from each other. To say this meant to state the fact of complete inconsistency at the very foundation of the monarchist theory, which Tertullian refutes, but then all those fears for the unity of the Divine that caused the monarchist movement itself were awakened again. In response to them, Tertullian proposes an agreement between the monarchy and the trinity of Persons, and this agreement constitutes the best part of his work. Monarchy, says Tertullian, is nothing more than unity of power 329. With this definition of the concept, little is needed to maintain the monarchy in full force. For Tertullian, the state in which the father shares his power with his son does not cease to be monarchical; the government would lose its monarchical character only if another power, independent and unique, intervened in it as a rival 330. Divine power does not cease to be a monarchy, despite the fact that God faces tens of thousands of angels who carried out His will 331; only the dualism of the Gnostic systems is in conflict with the monarchy 332. Meanwhile, the teaching of the church offers more than what is needed for the preservation of the divine monarchy, it offers not only the unity of will, but also the real unity of the substance of the three Persons 333; Church dogma is alien only to that narrow monism that requires the singularity of the number 334. God is one, and, relying on this dogma, the monarchians demand the identity of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as if They are not all one even in the case when They are all from one, precisely because of the unity of substance. Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three not in state, but in degree, not in substance, but in form, not in power, but in appearance; They are of one substance, one state and one power, because there is one God, from whom these degrees, forms and species, signified by the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, are thought to originate 335. Each of Them is indeed different from the other, but this difference is not yet a division of Their substance; its unity is a real fact 336. “I would not hesitate to call the Son a stem from a root, a river from a fountain, and a ray of the sun; however, neither the stem is separated from the root, nor the river from the source, nor the ray from the sun, nor the Word from God. So, I declare that by analogy with these examples I also speak of the Father and His Son as two. For the root and the stem are two objects, but connected, and the source and the river are two types, but inseparable, and the sun and the ray are two forms, but touching (cohaerentes). Everything that comes from something else must necessarily be second in relation to that from which it comes; but it does not follow from here that it must be separated from it”... And in the Trinity the species occurs, “but, however, it is by no means alienated from the spring, from which it borrows its properties, and the spring itself remains whole”... 337 “One substance in three contacting”, and all of them are one God 338. Each of Them, speaking about Him separately, I will call God, just as I call the sun and a ray when I speak only about him, without mentioning the sun; but, speaking about Them together, I will not talk about the Gods at all, just as I will not make two suns from a ray and a sun, speaking about both of them together, but I will list both the Father and the Son, and the sun and the ray as two objects and two types of one inseparable substance 339. Thus, the Trinity, descending from the Father in coherent degrees, does not at all contradict the monarchy, and favors the conditions of economy (oeconomiae státům) 340. Apparently, all those places in Scripture where the one God is opposed to all others and appears as the only God spoke in favor of the monarchians. Such evidence was all the more important because the words of the creeds could be interpreted in the sense that one God is God the Father. Tertullian tried to resolve these difficulties 341. He agrees that in St. Scripture in such places understands God the Father and that, therefore, He is the one and only (unicus) God 342; but, as their context shows, God is contrasted here not with the Son, but with false gods 343. And if in such cases it is the Father who is called the one God, then this is because He is the first Person. “His name must precede the name of the Son, because the Father is known first, and after the Father the Son is called” 344. But even where the Father is considered as the only God, He is conceived not apart from the Son, but together with Him: insofar as the Son is inseparable from the Father, so He (the Son) is implied in the Father, although not called by name. This is how a ray is meant when one speaks only of the sun 345 . And if it said: “I am the sun, and besides me there is no other, except my ray,” then it would be a meaningless, unnecessary phrase 346. Thus, the Father also calls Himself the only God, but together with the Son 347. How high the significance of what Tertullian did for the disclosure and defense of the church teaching about the one God in the Trinity is, this can be seen from how many firm dogmatic points he established. 1. Each of the Persons of the Holy Trinity is God 348, but at the same time 2. and all three Persons are one God 349. 3. They differ from each other as Persons, but Their essence is one and one origin 350. 4. The essence of all Persons is indivisible and whole, and Their unity is not abstract, but concrete 351. 5. The primary bearer of the Trinity unity is the Father 352, but together with the Son. As for the principle of the Trinity being in God, then - if this question can be considered somewhat predetermined in some of Tertullian's expressions - this principle is the will of the Father 353. In the divine economy there are as many names as God willed 354. And indeed, Tertullian should have come to this logical conclusion after he so consistently developed the doctrine of Λόγος ενδιάθετος and Λόγος προφορικός. Since the Father and the Son have existed only since the creation of the world and there was a time when there was no Son; The Trinity in its entirety begins to exist only from the beginning of the world. There is no way to explain from the very essence of God why God is threefold only from a certain moment. From this sketch of Tertullian's teaching it is clear that he was not a completely pure organ of church truth. Not wanting to know anything about Athens and the academy, he, without noticing it himself, mixed into pure church dogma precisely the philosophical, and not the church, idea of ​​​​the difference between the internal Word and the manifest Word and revealed it from its dark side more consistently than his predecessors. Subordinationism in Tertullian, due to the peculiarities of his presentation, appears more sharply than in previous writers, and - most importantly - for the first time it is expressed, undoubtedly, consciously and even justified. But these dark sides had no influence on the rest of Tertullian's polemical treatise. Whatever the shortcomings of his premises, but from them he drew the conclusion that the types, forms, degrees of the Holy Trinity are real Persons, and only this conclusion was used in solving his second (harmonistic) problem. He agrees on the monarchy with the trinity of the Divinity with a completely clear consciousness of the entire reality of both: the certainty with which he expresses himself about the unity of substance, which does not allow for reinterpretation, is equal only to the certainty of his expressions about the real difference of Persons. The very terminology of this first Latin writer presents a remarkable phenomenon: to signify the unity of the Divine, He also uses the word “substantia”; in God there are three not only “gradus” or “species”, but also “personae”. Thus, Tertullian introduces into Christian literature terms that the Western Church retained even when the dogma of the Holy Trinity appeared in the completed formula of the post-Nicene era. Tertullian's younger contemporary, St. Hippolytus († c. 235) 355 reveals a very significant similarity with him in the expression 356. Free from some of the shortcomings 357 of his predecessor, he did not fully assimilate his advantages 358, and developed some weak points even further than Tertullian. Sharing with him his point of view on the Word, St. Hippolytus outlines not two (like Tertullian), but three phases in the existence of the Word: His existence as the Word, thought by the Father, born by Him in the form of Λόγος ένδιάθετος, i.e., the internal thought of the Father about everything 359, the existence of the Word as Λόγος προφορικός (τέλειος Λόγος μονογενής) from the moment of the utterance of the first creative word by the Father until the moment of the incarnation of the Word (in this phase Λόγος was the Son only in the foreknowledge of the Father 360 and, finally, being The Word as the perfect Son from the moment of the Incarnation. This was, perhaps, a concession to monarchist terminology, but an unnecessary concession, which could, however, lead to a spiritualized view of the birth of the Word, but at the same time obscured the concept of “Son of God” 361. Finally, the doctrine of the Holy Trinity of the Roman bishop Callistus, known only 362 in a tendentious transmission in the Philosophumena, if it does not give a decisive right to classify Callistus himself as a monarchian, then, in any case, can only be considered as a step back in the expression of the dogma of the Trinity 363 . Extra-church forms of teaching about the Holy Trinity Along with the works of these church writers in the 2nd century. Several attempts have been made to understand the doctrine of the Trinity, or, more precisely, of God in His relation to Christ, in a different direction. Attempts to bring to rational clarity the idea of ​​the relationship of trinity to unity in the Divine, or - in other words - to understand the relationship of the dogma of one God to the dogma of the divinity of Christ, ended in an easily understandable failure. But this led some to the idea that this mystery of the Divine is incomprehensible because it hides an internal contradiction, that the relationship of the dogma of the unity of the Divine (monarchy) to the doctrine of the divinity of Jesus Christ (economy) does not fit into rational forms, because economy is a hidden negation of the monarchy. The dilemma seemed insoluble, and in order to get out of it, it was necessary to sacrifice one of its members. The choice between them was not difficult: for people who philosophized it, of course, the only thing that decided was that, in fact, in economy, in the trinity, the whole difficulty lies hidden, while monarchy is such a view to which thinking people who stood outside of supernatural revelation have risen; For the majority, for simple people, the issue was resolved by the fact that the church symbol certainly begins with the words: “I believe in one God,” and that this particular dogma stands in direct opposition to pagan polytheism. “Monarchiam tenemus,” said people of this way of thinking, proudly contrasting themselves with other Christians 364. But, calling themselves monarchians, they did not think of completely separating from the Christian Church and did not want to deny economy completely and unconditionally. Therefore, it was necessary, at least, to cover up this denial or to keep the economy in a different formula, in a different formulation - to give it such an interpretation that it would not stand as an objection to the monarchy. Two methods could equally lead to this goal: the denial of the deity of Jesus Christ and the denial of His personal, hypostatic difference from the Father. Whether they say in one or another covert form that Jesus Christ is not God, or whether they begin to assert that He is precisely the one God Himself, the monarchy will be established equally indisputably firmly. The monarchist movement quite logically took these opposite paths 365. Monarchians of the first class are called dynamists, the second - modalists. Monarchianism dynamic Representatives of dynamic monarchianism at the end of the 2nd century. there were the Byzantine Theodotus the Tanner, Theodotus the Banker and Artemon 366, with whom the Roman bishops Victor (192–202), Zephyrinus (202–217) and Callistus (217–223) successively fought. The crudeness of the methods with which these monarchians carried out their program corresponded only to its internal meaning, in which there was so little Christian: it was impossible to put the denial of the deity of Jesus Christ into a more transparent form 367 . Jesus Christ was a simple (nudus, solitarius, ψιλός) man and, as such, of course, did not exist before the time of His appearance on earth - did not exist, at least, otherwise than in the predestination of God. He was born, however, in a supernatural way from a virgin during the overshadowing of her by the Holy Spirit; but, nevertheless, only man was born, and there can be no talk of any incarnation of the Divinity in Him: it was not said to Mary: “The Spirit of the Lord will be born in you,” but: “The Spirit of the Lord will come upon you” 368. The highest piety is what, in fact, distinguished Christ from other prophets 369. However,” Theodotus the Younger added to this scheme common to all named monarchians 370, “Jesus Christ is not even the highest phenomenon in history. Above Him stands His archetype, the priest Melchizedek. He is higher than Christ by nature: Christ was still a man, but Melchizedek is higher than Christ, the blessed heavenly power; Christ was born - albeit from a Virgin and in a supernatural way - and Melchizedek - “without father, without mother, without genealogy, has neither the beginning of days nor the end of life.” Melchizedek is higher than Christ in another respect: Christ is the mediator between God and people, while Melchizedek is the mediator between God and the heavenly powers. Dynamic monarchianism, as it is presented in the doctrine of the Theodotians and Artemonites, was complete unitarianism: it denied not only the Trinity of hypostases, but, it seems, left no room for the Trinity of revelation, resolved its trinity into an indefinite plurality, and it is difficult to understand what meaning the words could have for these monarchians: “in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit.” Monarchianism is modalistic Following these dynamist monarchians, modalist monarchians also appeared in Rome. Rarely do parties so opposite, so antipathetic to one another, act under the same banner as these two factions of monarchists. The contrast in the means by which they achieved a common goal in the sphere of dogma corresponded to the contrast in the personal character of their representatives. Dynamic monarchianism found its first preacher in the apostate from Christ, modalistic monarchianism in the confessor; Monarchians of the first class tended to prove that the church glorifies Christ too much, representatives of the second found that it glorifies Christ too little 371; The doctrine of the first dynamists offended people with a living and deep religious feeling; they could even be sympathetic to modalistic doctrines. And in fact, if we understand modalistic monarchianism as an insistent demand for the exact expression of the perfect equality in divinity of the Son with the Father, as a reaction against that note of subordinationism that is sometimes heard in the words of even Orthodox writers, then this monarchianism has its share of truth. The first historically known representative of modalistic monarchianism was Praxeus. For this man, the entire Old Testament boiled down to one proposition: “I am God, and there is no other besides Me,” and the words of the Savior: “he who has seen Me has seen the Father,” “I am in the Father and the Father in Me.” “I and the Father are one” was a contraction of the entire New Testament 372 . But regarding the meaning of Praxeus’s own teaching, Tertullian gives different testimony. Praxeus thought that there was no other way to believe in one God than by assuming perfect identity, considering the Father, Son and Holy Spirit to be one Person 373 . The same God - let us agree to call Him Father, as the first and only beginning - is called both the Holy Spirit and the power of the Most High, so Luke 1:35 means the same thing as “God will come upon you and the Most High will overshadow you” 374 . But the question arises: why is the Father called both the Son and the Holy Spirit? Does this only mean that the Father appeared, revealed himself outwardly both as the Son and as the Holy Spirit, or that the Father is both the Son and the Holy Spirit? In the first case, these names indicate an exclusively external fact, they relate to the Trinity of revelation, in the latter they characterize some aspect of the inner life of the one Father. Tertullian makes a guess that speaks in favor of the latter assumption: he seems to be ready to think that Praxeus will explain such expressions as “let us create man” by saying that the Father is both the Son and the Spirit 375. In addition, the Praxeans themselves said that the Father “made Himself His Son” and, in explaining the possibility of such a fact, pointed to the omnipotence of God 376. Further, regarding the words spoken to Moses: “man cannot see My face and live,” the Praxeans noted: if the Son speaks to Moses, then He Himself called His face invisible, because the invisible Father was in the Son. From these words, it apparently follows that the Praxeans recognized the Son as a manifestation (modus) of the Father, which was revealed before the incarnation, so that the Son is the God of revelations in general 377. Finally, the Praxeans said: The Son of God is God 378. Judging by these data, Praxeus was indeed a modalist and saw in the name “Son” an indication of some fact in the inner life of the Father. But in this case, Tertullian was not entirely right in calling Praxeus’ system patripassianism, since it does not follow from it that the Father Himself became man and suffered: from the point of view of the modalist, the Father, however, became man, but not as a Father, but in the mode of the Son. But other data cast doubt on the fact that Praxeus’s teaching was modalism, so that the name “patripassianism,” as far as it does not imply theopaschytism, accurately expresses the meaning of this teaching. Praxeus thought that Jesus Christ is the Son not in divinity, but only in humanity. After all, the angel announced: “The Holy One who is to be born will be called the Son of God,” but flesh was born; the flesh, therefore, will be the Son of God. Thus, in one Person of Christ, Praxeus distinguished between the Father and the Son, saying that the Son is flesh, i.e. person, i.e. Jesus, and the Father is spirit, i.e. God, i.e. Christ 379, and the generalization of Praxeus’ system in the formula: “one and the same is the Father and the Son” turns out to be far from accurate. Standing on the point of view of the difference between the Father and the Son, Christ and Jesus, God and man, Praxeas resolutely rejected the accusation of patripassianism as theopaschism. “When we say that the Father died, we do not blaspheme the Lord God, because we connect with these words the same meaning as you do with the words: “The Son died” - He died not by divine nature, but by human nature” 380. And if Praxeus allowed himself the expression: “if the Son suffers, then the Father will have compassion for Him” 381, then, after such a clear definition of the meaning of the words: “The Father is dead,” and this expression should be understood in the sense that the suffering of the man Jesus for Christ the Father was not indifferent, was not what the suffering of any other person who was not hypostatically united with the Father would have been. The discrepancy between these words and the previous ones is clear; but if we assume that either one or the other expresses Praxeus’ thought inaccurately, then these are precisely the previous ones 382: there Praxeus speaks abstractly, here he revolves in the field of concrete concepts; Those expressions are fragmentary, not connected in any way, but here we have a complete, coherent view. Therefore, the latest data should be given more weight and the modalism of Praxeus’ teaching should be considered doubtful. Indeed, modalistic monarchianism is expressed in the teachings of Noet. One, as a Person, God appears at different times in opposite modes, as invisible and visible, as unborn and begotten, as Father and Son. The basis for this modification is the will of God Himself. In the mode of the unborn and the Father, God appears from the beginning to His incarnation; and when He deigned to undergo (ύπομεϊναι) birth from the Virgin, He accepted the mode of the Son not according to humanity, but according to divinity, “he himself became his own Son, and not the Son of another.” During His earthly life, He declared Himself to all who saw Him as the Son, but He did not hide from those who could contain Him the fact that He was the Father 383 . Modalistic monarchianism found its completion in the system of Sabellius. It leaves behind all previous experiences both in its completeness - Sabellius knew how to introduce the Holy Spirit into the sphere of his speculations and fully retain the Trinity of revelation - and in the elegance of its construction 384. The general theoretical basis of Sabellius' system was as follows: The visible world presents examples of the trinity of phenomena with the unity of the subject. The sun, for example, acts on us sometimes as a spherical form, sometimes as a luminous body, sometimes as a warming one, but it is one object (ύπόστασις), despite the triplicity of its actions (ένέργιαι) 385 . In the same way, in one person we distinguish body, soul and spirit 386. In the moral world a similar phenomenon occurs: the gifts are different, but the Spirit is the same 387. Therefore, if in sacred scripture we find speech about various Persons of the Divine 388, then it does not follow from this that these Persons are hypostatic, that each of Them corresponds to an objective object (υποκείμενον). This only means that the one God in hypostasis, the one divine Being-Personality, time by time, depending on the demands of the world government at the moment, is transformed, re-clothed, takes on this or that person (mask) and conducts a conversation corresponding to this person. “The Trinity,” in the language of Stoic philosophy, “is a monad extended into a triad in order to then contract again into a monad and extend again 389.” In applying this theory to fact, Sabellius speaks in a language that is not easily translated into ecclesiastical terminology. He distinguished five aspects in the existence of God: the existence of God as a monad, as the Word, as the Father, as the Son and as the Holy Spirit 390. The Monad is not the “Father” of church terminology. This is God Himself in Himself, in absolute - so to speak - concentration in Himself - God only as a Hypostasis, outside of actions and all relationships 391. The Monad is the sun as pure matter, abstracted from form, light and heat. The monad is not a modus or a πρόσωπον. Based on this absolute self-closure, God puts Himself in relation to the external, begins to speak, appears in the mode of the Word, as an active God; as Logos, God creates the world 392. The Logos of Sabellius is again not identical with the Word of church dogma: Sabellius wants to distinguish Him from the Son 393. And in fact, the relation of the Word to the world is of such a general nature that it applies to both the Father and the Son, and it is even doubtful whether Sabellius considered this mode to be πρόσωπον. The relation of the Word to the world is rather a general framework in which the subsequent trilogy of divine economy develops, and πρόσωπα in the proper sense, that is, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, are modes of the mode of the Word 394. The development of this trilogy corresponds to the consistent course of church history. The Old Testament is answered by the first conversation of God, or rather the Word, in the person of the Father. The central point of this period is the Sinai legislation. The New Testament opens with a new conversation of God in the person of the Son, or incarnation. The third period and third conversation begins with the descent of God in the person of the Holy Spirit on the apostles 395. According to Sabellius' theory, έκτασις should be followed by συστολή, each role ends when the need for it has passed; therefore the name of the Son and the Spirit 396 must cease. The Πρόσωπον of the Father probably ceased to exist with the advent of the New Testament 397, the ascension of Jesus Christ to heaven was the limit of the existence of the person of the Son 398, πρόσωπον of the Holy Spirit will end its existence as soon as its goal is achieved - the sanctification of humanity 399, bringing it to God. This must be followed by the “contraction” (συστολή) of the Word, this mode, which invariably continued to exist despite the change of persons of the Trinity 400. For us, in order to give us existence, the Logos, flowing from God, returns after us to God. But His return is the return of the monad to its primitive silence and unity, tantamount to the cessation of all extension and, consequently, the end of the existence of the world. What will happen next is unknown. Maybe God will fall silent forever, or maybe he will speak again and create another, new world, which will face the same end - being replaced by a new one, and so on ad infinitum. Let us briefly summarize what Christian literature understood in the dogma of the Holy Trinity in the pre-Origen period. All writers of this period speak mainly about the Son-Word of God. They designate the act of His origination from the Father by various names, for example, "birth" 401, "speaking" 402, "utterance" 403, "utterance" 404, "indication" 405, "message" 406, "creation" 407 and even "creation" 408. No one denied, some (especially St. Irenaeus) assumed, and Tertullian directly stated that the Son is born from the being of the Father. This did not exclude the fact that the Son is born according to the will of the Father. From this we can understand that the question of the principle of the trinitarian self-revelation of the Divine did not receive a firm formulation: it remained almost not touched upon at all. Everyone who has written in any detail argues that the birth of the Son does not have a spatial character. Not so unanimously do they answer the question: when is the Son born? True, they all more or less clearly attribute to the Word an eternal existence with the Father; but only from the point of view of St. Irenaeus’s question does not make sense. All others (with the exception of Clement of Alexandria, who on this point occupies an uncertain position) are more or less carried away by the idea of ​​the difference between Λόγος ένδιάθετος and Λόγος προφορικός, and therefore are predisposed to answer the question posed along with Tertullian: not from eternity, but immediately before the creation of the world (Hippolytus’ answer would have been even more original). In connection with this doctrine of the dual Word there are also some other peculiar views of ancient church writers. When asked about the purpose of the birth of the Word, they answer: The Word is born for the creation of the world, so the principle of birth is not based on God’s relation to Himself, but on His relation to the world. To the question about the moment from which the Word is the Son of God - about whether the sonship of the Word is not determined by His birth from the Father, some do not give a definite answer, others answer in the affirmative. Finally, on the question of the actual (hypostatic) difference of the Word before His birth from the Father, the data from the writers under consideration are so vague that we must limit ourselves to the negative result that they do not say anything that would authorize us to resolve this question in a negative sense. The relation by which the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are not one, but three, is denoted by the writers under consideration with unequally precise expressions; these are, for example, “something different in number” 409, “number” 410, “order” 411, “type”, “object”, “really existing” 412, “person” 413. The last word, which became technical in the post-Nicene period, is found in the Western writers Tertullian and Hippolytus. The word “hypostasis” in its precise post-Nicene sense is not yet used by anyone. To signify the relationship in which the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are not three, but one, various names are used, such as “spirit” 414, “power” 415, “power” 416, “state” 417, “disposition” 418, “direction of the will” 419, “consent” 420, “being” 421. The last word is applied to the explanation of the unity of the Divinity in Tertullian and, moreover, in such a relation to the word “person”, which was finally established in the post-Nicene era. Other writers either do not use any technical words to express unity, or are content with less precise ones, which - strictly speaking - give the idea only of the moral unity of the Father and the Son, indicate the unity of Their will and activity. The usual formula for the doctrine of one God, found among the writers under consideration, assigns this name to one Father; this presupposes the existence of the Son and the Holy Spirit; but Their concrete (numerical) unity is not expressed with sufficient completeness. Tertullian did more than others to reveal this teaching. The Son is God; but, asserting this, some admit an idea that resonates with essential subordinationism and somewhat limits the divine nature of the Son: it is the ability to appear in the world that is attributed only to the Son and in no case to the Father. In a strange way, Tertullian brings this idea to its highest development and gives the most decisive expression of the equality of the Father and the Son. Writers of pre-Origen's time generally speak little about the Holy Spirit and in expressions that are not always clear; but the idea that He comes from the Father through the Son already has its representative in Tertullian. Such was the state of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity in church literature at the time in which Origen’s work began. But not only this literature was to determine the direction of the writer of that time: the struggle against monarchism in the first quarter of the 3rd century. could not be considered complete, and the writer, capable of responding vividly to contemporary issues of church life, could most naturally set his immediate practical task precisely as polemics with the monarchians. This negative phenomenon in church life could have a most beneficial effect on the theological thought of that time. Monarchianism was a phenomenon of a complex nature: having branched into several systems, and at the same time being in contact with the theology of church writers of that era, monarchianism opened up the possibility of quite diverse polemics, combining elements that were capable of causing energetic activity of theological thought on almost all points of church teaching in which it was not sufficiently illuminated in the previous period. The polemicist could look at monarchianism from two points of view: he could pay attention primarily to the external, obvious side of this movement, to its results, expressed in a number of theological systems, the inconsistency of which had to be proven by all means available to the polemicist; he could, on the other hand, consider these systems as views that, despite their disagreement with church teaching, arose not without the influence of the latter in the formulation that church writers gave him. In the first case, the controversy took on a direct character, in the second - indirect; in the first case, the polemicist set his task to undermine one or another monarchist doctrine; in the latter, he had to turn his attention to the disclosure of positive church teaching, to clarify in it those points that monarchianism - so to speak - emphasized by the very fact of its existence. On the one hand, an insufficiently clear representation of the hypostatic difference in the Divine, on the other hand, elements of subordinationism, a not entirely clear expression of the essential unity of the Father and the Son and the incompleteness of the very formula of the doctrine of the one God - these are the points on which Monarchianism could rely, which constituted its strong side both when it came under their protection, and even when it denied them. To clarify them, to fill in scientific theology what was missing in it, to eliminate what was superfluous in it, and thus to undermine the most healthy roots of monarchianism - this should have been the task of the polemicists of the second direction. In any case, the polemic was supposed to make more or less rich contributions to dogmatic theology. Both in direct and indirect directions, it could not but lead to a more complete disclosure of one point in theology - the doctrine of the hypostatic difference between the Father and the Son. The very essence of the matter required this. Both factions of monarchianism had one common weakness: they proceeded from the assumption that, apart from one Person of the one God, from eternity there was and is not a second divine Person; No matter how far the dynamists and modalists diverged in their views on the Person of Jesus Christ, they thought the same about God in His pre-eternal, pre-temporal existence. Therefore, to prove that a second Person exists with God from eternity meant depriving the monarchians of their foundation. This technique was quite expedient and appropriate in the fight against any monarchist system. Another equally important practical interest aroused a detailed disclosure of the doctrine of the hypostatic difference between the Father and the Son. The fight against the monarchians had to be waged not only for the purpose of denouncing them, but also because it represented the best protective means in relation to those who remained faithful to church teaching. The ranks of the monarchians, no doubt, were replenished to a very significant extent by unconscious elements - such followers who adhered to this movement because they did not see in the new teaching any noticeable difference compared to the one in which they were brought up: the monarchians did not think of standing out from the church; they wanted to remain members. It was therefore very important to understand the difference between church teaching and monarchist teaching; and this was easiest to do precisely at the point where this difference turned into a diametric opposite; It was precisely the doctrine of the hypostatic difference in the Divinity that was to become the banner of the faithful of the church, because everyone could distinguish it from monarchist ideas. Let alone the fact that one extreme naturally causes another, and that, therefore, church writers, even without falling into one-sidedness, had to pay attention to the point from which a transition to the extreme opposite to monarchianism was possible. In a word, the revelation of the hypostatic difference in the Divinity from the time of the advent of monarchianism could be considered assured; the firm statement of this theological point cannot even be viewed as something desirable in every polemical work: it was both logically and psychologically necessary. But the polemic, given its direction, even if it does not allow any exaggeration and does not fall into dogmatic extremes, does not have a particularly high value. Such polemics, in essence, only destroy, but do not create: in the happiest case, it would only give the result that it would return the monarchians to the point of their departure, again confronting them with the dilemma that confuses them, presented, moreover, in a clearer light than before. The more difficult task of the polemicist was not to destroy the false convictions of the intelligent monarchians, but to calm their troubled consciences. For a polemicist with a deeper view of the nature of monarchianism, it could not be a secret that the denial of the hypostatic difference in the Divine does not constitute the essence of monarchianism: it is only a means to achieve the highest goal - the firm establishment of the doctrine of the one God, and this goal is no less dear to church theology, as well as to sectarians who separated from the church. Thus, a detailed disclosure of the doctrine of the unity of the Divine is the highest task that the heretical movement set for the Orthodox theologian; its solution would be a great merit both for the fight against the monarchians and for the positive development of theological thought and constitutes a desirable element (desideratum) in the polemic. Of course, this is a more difficult task than what ordinary polemicists could undertake: it was necessary to touch upon the dogma not from the side in which it is far from monarchist constructions, but from the side in which it comes into contact with them, and where the teachings of the church and monarchist views apparently coincide with each other to the point of identity, to indicate the difference between the first and the latter, without omitting from sight all the data that could to enrich theological thought of polemics in the first, negative direction. With a happy resolution of this highest task, which could be expected from a highly gifted theologian, the result of the polemic would be different from that which was achieved by ordinary polemical techniques: negative polemics defeated opponents, instilled in them the conviction that they had not solved the task they had taken upon themselves; polemics with a higher direction convinced the monarchians of the truth of church teaching, as one that solved this problem only satisfactorily, showed that their dogmatic constructions were not only untenable and erroneous, but also unnecessary, had no justification for their existence, because the dilemma that caused them did not exist in reality. Apparently, outside the scope of anti-monarchist polemics, there was a question about the difference between Λόγος ένδιάθετος and Λόγος προφορικός. However, its widespread development could also affect this point of theology. A negative attitude towards this theory could be part of the interests of even that polemic, which only sought to isolate church teaching from the monarchist one: to the extent that the features of the hypostatic difference between Λόγος ένδιάθετος from the Father were unclear, so much did this theory bring church teaching closer to the monarchist one. The idea of ​​God from eternity having in Himself the Word, which is so indefinite as a Person that He can even be represented as a property of the divine nature - such a view does not have a significant difference from the monarchist doctrine of the one God. - From a different point of view, but to the same negative attitude towards this theory, the polemic that set as its highest task the revelation of the doctrine of the unity of God led. This unity is only complete and perfect when the Son is considered essentially equal to the Father. Eternity, one of the perfections of the divine nature, must be attributed to the Son, and if His existence as a Son, as Λόγος προφορικός, should be considered as the most perfect form of existence, then He must exist in this way from eternity. The artificial connection between this philosophical idea and church teaching had to be broken. Dialectically substantiating the eternal existence of the Son, the theologian approached the question of the principle of trinity in the Divinity. Church writers who stood on the point of view of the difference between Λόγος ένδιάθετος and Λόγος προφορικός were predisposed to a dual view on this subject. The basis of the existence of the Logos in the first sense was believed to be in the nature of the Father; the existence of the Logos in the last sense was apparently made dependent on the will of the Father. Λόγος ένδιάθετος exists - in the strict sense - for God, Λόγος προφορικός is placed, at the very beginning of its existence, in a relationship in the world, exists - one might say - for the world. The same motives that could have disposed the polemicist to have a negative attitude towards this theory should have led to a more definite formulation of the question of the principle of trinity. If the Son must be eternal, then He is not born for the world: the creator of everything that exists must be pre-temporal, but may not be eternal. If the Son does not exist for the world, then, of course, for God. The doctrine of the eternity of the Word logically led to the fact that His existence was based on the concept of the essence of the Father, and if the principle of trinity in God was His will, then the concept of it should have received a unique formulation, revealed from a special point of view. Finally, the most perfect monarchist system, Sabellianism, also has the peculiarity that here the doctrine of the Holy Spirit received the same firm statement as the doctrine of the Son. This could also challenge the polemicist to an analogous experience of presenting church teaching. These are the possibilities that presented themselves to theological thought at the end of the first quarter of the 3rd century. Many of them have already moved into the realm of realized facts. Tertullian did especially a lot in this regard: in his treatise against Praxeus, he gave an example of a very meaningful anti-monarchist polemic; Tertullian's method was quite correct; and the negative side, i.e. the doctrine of the Trinity God, and positive, i.e. the doctrine of the unity of the Divine, developed harmoniously and brought to a very significant height. In a word, Tertullian’s program is so consistent that even from the most gifted polemicist writer one can wish not for something completely new, but only for a more tactical implementation of it. One could wish that the mass of dogmatic content given by Tertullian would be clothed in less “anti-gnostic” forms, that it would undergo a new processing from the logical side, that a connection of a philosophical nature would be established between such aspects of dogma, which in Tertullian are given in the form of separate provisions, barely united by his not particularly demanding logic. A more rigorous systematization, a justification more worthy before the court of human thinking, an improvement in detail - this is the path along which church writers could surpass the father of Latin church writing. According to Redepenning (Redepenning. Origenes. Eine Darstellung seines Lebens und seiner Lehre. Bonn. 1841. I. S. 372. 381) “the first-born of the works” of Origen, the first volume of his interpretation in Hebrew. John (in loh. t. I. n. 5. cfr. n. 4. πασών των κατ’ ευχήν ημών πράξεων έσομένων απαρχήν ποιούμεθα εις τήν απαρχήν τών γραφών) written in 223. Hahn. Bibliothek der Symbole u. Glaubensregeln. Breslau. 1842. This symbol is read in the Sacramentary of Gelasius. The most important additions probably belong to a later period. This is, for example, the insertion read in the Gallican missal (Hahn, S. 36): Filium ejus unigenitum sempiternum. The addition to the first member in the Aquilean symbol: credo Deo Patri... invisibili et impassibili, according to Rufinus, is directed against the Sabellians (Hahn, S. 30.31). This symbol was recorded by Rufinus and combines common features of other eastern symbols (Hahn, S. 44–48). The latter are more complete than this symbol, but the insertions made in them date back, perhaps, to the 3rd century. Hahn, S. 63–64. 68–72. The words of Tertullian himself should be recognized, for example, in the following passages: “Unicuni quidem Deum credimus, sub hue tumen dispensatione, quam οικονομίαν dicimus, ut uničí Dei sit et Filius etc. (adv. Prax. c. 2); Filium (misisse) vicariam vim Spiritus sancti (de praescr. p. 13). A notable exception in this regard is the baptismal symbol in Book VII. “Apostolic Constitutions” (Hahn. S. 40). The following expressions of this symbol are remarkable: “I believe and am baptized in the one unborn, the only true God (εις ένα άγέννητον, μόνον αληθινόν Θεόν) Almighty Father Christ... and in the Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten His Son., born before the age by the good pleasure of the Father (εΰόοκία του Πατρός).” It is hardly possible to prove that this symbol, recorded in a monument from the end of the 3rd century. (Hahn. S. 41) or even the beginning of the 4th century (Schaff Geschichte der alten Kirche. Leipzig. 1867. S. 367), dates back to the 2nd century; but if this were proven, then the baptismal symbol could be looked at as a direct source of expressions similar to the above by ancient Christian writers. In any case, these words of the monument, authorized by the church itself, represent one of the important data for the correct representation of the attitude to church teaching of some experiments in understanding the dogma of the Holy Trinity. for a correct assessment of the tone of the form of views on the unity of the Divine, which dominates in ancient Christian literature. As a remarkable example of such an influence of philosophy on the ideas of Christian writers, one can point to one passage from the book “To Autolycus” (ad Autolyc. 1. 2. n. 22). Here St. Theophilus of Antioch distinguishes Αόγος ενδιάθετος from Αόγος προφορικός and adds: “Therefore St. scriptures and all the spirit-bearers, of which John says: “in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God,” showing that from the beginning there was only God and in Him (έν αύτω) the Word (i.e., as Αόγος ενδιάθετος): then he says: “and God was the Word; all things came into being through Him.” (i.e. as Αόγος προφορικός).” Such a difference in the words of the evangelist could only be noticed by a thought brought up in a certain mental atmosphere, akin to the philosophical idea of ​​a twofold Word. Wed. Origenis in loh t. 2.n. 7. p. 65. The question of whether Origen was a student of Ammonius Sacca is controversial. Redepending solves it in a positive sense (I, S. 421 f.). Only two passages have survived, those of Ammonius himself; for our purpose they do not matter. The inevitable conclusion from the philosophy of the student to the philosophy of the teacher seems in this case all the more legitimate because Plotinus felt completely satisfied with the philosophy of Ammonius, and subsequently the decision to publish the philosophy of his teacher was a very prominent event in the life of Plotinus: from then on his literary activity began. Porphyrius, Vita Plotini, η. 3.in Opp. Plotini, ed. Kirchhoff. Lipsiae. 1856. Vladislavlev, M. Philosophy of Plotinus, founder of the New Platonic school. St. Petersburg 1868. p. 288. “It is enough... to compare Philo’s teachings with Plotinus’s to see the influence of the former on Plotinus. At very different, and, moreover, very decisive points for the system, we notice a connection between concepts.” In order to maintain a decisively dualistic character, the philosophical system must represent matter as an independent principle, independent in its existence from the first cause. On the contrary, for Philo God is more than the formator of matter (ό κοσμοπλάστης, who τήν ουσίαν ατακτον... εις τάξιν εξ αταξίας... μορφοϋν ήρξατο, de plantat. Noae ρ. 214 (ed. Francofurti. 1691) Ar. He is its creator. Ibid, de somniis I. 577. καί ό Θεός τά πάντα γενήσας, ού μόνον εις τούμφανές ήγαγεν, άλλά καί ά πρότερον ούκ ήν, έποίησεν, ού δημιουργός μόνον, άλλα καί κτιστής αυτός ών. Keferstein (S. 4) points out nine points in which God and matter are diametrically opposed to each other; eg de cherubim, 121 ίδιον δέ γενητού τό πάσχειν. legis allegoriar. 1. II, 62. θεόν καί γένεσιν, άντιπάλους φύσεις, quis rer. divin. haeres sit. 509, where God and the world are considered as τά άκρα. – De sacrificantibus, 857. έφαπτόμενος αύτόςούγάρήν θέμις απείρου... ύλης ψαύειν τον... μακάριον, άλλάταΐς άσωμάτοις δυνά- μεσιν, ών έτοιμον όνομα αί ίδέαι, κεχρήσατο προς τό γένος έκαστον τήν άρμόττου- σαν λαβεΐν μορφήν. Cf. de nominum mutat. 1048. Several times Philo expresses this in the sense that God is είργάζετο (quod Deus sit immutabilis, 302), and yet, in contradiction to himself in de mundi opificio, 4. asserts that God created the world ούδενί παρακλήτω, directly Himself, μόνω δ’ έαυτώ χρησάμενος ό Θ. έγνω... εύεργετεΐν... τήν φύσιν. Keferstein, S. 98. Dähne, Darstellung der jüdisch-alexandrinischen Religions-Philosophie. Halle. 1834. I. S. 164.de monarchia 1, 815. τεχνικώτατος δέ ό κόσμος ώς υπό τίνος άγαθού καί τελειοτάτου πάντως δεδημιουργήσθαι. Τούτον τόν τρόπον έννοιαν έλάβομεν ύπάρξεως Θεού. ό τών όλων νους, de mundi opif. ν. Keferstein. S. 32. 33. κρείττων ή αρετή καί κρείττων ή επιστήμη καί κρείττων ή αυτό τό αγαθόν καί αυτό τό καλόν, de m. opif. 6... Dähne, 450. de vita contempl. p. 890. μονάδος άρχεγονώτερον. Dähne, I, 120. ό αγέννητος, de sacrif. 140. 147. Ibid. I, 166. leg. alleg. II. 1093. de sacrif. 131. ών έαυ- τω. de cherub. 111. φύσει στρεπτόν. – Wolff, Die philonische Philosophie. Gothenburg. 1858. S. 34. de posteritate Caini. 7. ού έν χρόνω τό αίτιον, ουδέ συνόλως έν τόπο), άλλ' ύπεράνω καί τόπου καί χρόνου. Dähne, I, 124. leg. alleg. I, 47. Ibid. I, 133. de ebriet. 267. συγκρίσεως γνωρίξεσθαι δοκεΐ. Leg. alleg. II, 1087. μόνος καί καθ’ αυτόν, εις ό5ν, ό Θεός, ούδέν δέ όμοιον Θεω. de somniis I,575 κατά πάσας ιδέας ακατάληπτος. de sacrif. 147. ονομάτων έστι παρηγορούσα τήν ήμετέραν ασθένειαν. Keferstein. 23. de vita Mosis, 614. προσαναδιδαχθώσιν, ώς ούδέν όνομα έπ’ έμού τό παράπαν κυρολογεϊται (de somn. I. 599. σαφώς čyvojv, δτι (του οντος ονομα) κύριον μέν ούδέν), ώ μόνίυ πρόσεστι τό είναι (quod deter, potiori insidiari soleat. 184. ό Θεός μόνος έν τω είναι ύφέστηκεν, οὗ χάριν άναγκαίως έρεϊ περί αύτοΰ, έγώ είμι ό ών ώς των μετ’ αύτόν ούκ όντων κατά τό εἶναι, δόξῃ δέ μόνον ύφεστάναι νομιζομένων). de nom. inutat. 1045. εἶναι πέφυκα ού λέγεσθαι. Dähne, I, S. 140. 141, τό ὄντως όν (de gigant. 295), τό προς άλήθειαν ὄv (de Vita Mos. 664). Dähne, I, S. 135. de monarch. 815. διάνοια τού φιλοσοφούντος... ἔν μέν εί έστι τό θειον ἔνεκα τῶν έπιτηδευσάντων άθεότητα... ἔτερον δέ τό τί έστι κατά τήν ούσίαν. Τό μέν ούν πρότερον ού πολύς πόνος ίδεϊν, τό δέ δεύτερον ού χαλεπόν μόνον, άλλα καί ἴσως αδύνατον. de mundi opif. 5. λόγον, τόν ταϋτα διακοσμήσαντα. Ibid. ούδέν αν έτερον εϊποι τόν νοητόν είναι κόσμον, ή Θεοΰ Λόγον ήδη κοσμοποιοΰντος. ουδέ γάρ ή νοητή πόλις έτερόν τί έστιν ή ό του άρχιτέκτονος λογισμός, ήδη τήν αισθητήν πόλιν τη νοητή κτίζειν διανοουμένου. Keferstein, 54. de somn. II, 1114. de special, leg. 809. πρός αρχέτυπον ιδέαν τον άνωτάτω λόγον, d. opif. 5. αρχέτυπον παράδειγμα, ιδέα των ιδεών,ό Θεοΰ Λόγος. de m. opif. 5. γένη... νοητά. Leg. allegor. III, 93. τω γ ε ν ι κ ω τ ά τω αύτοΰ (του Θεοΰ) Λόγω. de sacrif. 140. Λόγος έργον αύτοΰ. ibid. 131. ή νίκα τελευτάν έμελλεν (Moses)... διά ρήματος τού αιτίου μετανίσταται, δι’ ού καί ό σύμπας κόσμος έδημιουργεϊτο. Soulier, La doctrine du Logos chez Philon d'Alexandrie. Turin. 1876. p. 92. “II y aurait deux Logos, Tun transcendant, et l’autre immanent dans le monde; Tun serait la raison de Dieu, c. a d. l'attribut divin, et l'autre, la raison (et son content! le monde des idées), émanée de Dieu, c. a d. portée dans Lunivers par la parole.” Keferstein, S. 36. “Der L. bei Philo ist die göttliche Vernunft, welche theils als Eigenschaft im göttlichen Wesen verborgen ist, theils wie die menschliche Vernunft durch die Sprache aus dem “Ov heraustritt, u. in einer gewissen Abgeschiedenheit von ihm für sich besteht... dass er, wenn wir ihn in seiner Lostrennung von Gott allein betrachten, materiell als göttliche Vernunft, und formell als göttliche Rede anzusehen ist.” de vita Mos. 672. ἔν τό τω παντί. ὅ τε (Λόγος) περί των άσωμάτων καί παραδειγματικών ιδεών, έξ ών ό νοητός έπάγη κόσμος, καί ό περί τών ορατών, ά δή μιμήματα καί άπεικονίσματα των ιδεών εκείνων έστίν. ό εν διανοίςι ένδιάθετος. προφορά ή από στόματος καί γλώττης. The view of the utterance of the divine Word as its birth may also have been borrowed from Philo. In his opinion, the human word, while it represents only νοήματα or ενθυμήματα, hidden in thought (διάνοια), is, as it were, in its infancy and is born only when pronounced (ό νους... κυοφορεί τε και ώδίνει τά νοήματακαί βουλόμενος άποτεκεϊν άδυνατεΐ μέχρις αν ή διά γλώττης... ήχή, δεξαμένη μαίας τρόπος, εις φώς προαγαγή τά νοήματα, quod deter. sol. 178. I. S. 211). quod. D. sit immut. 298. γάρ πρεσβύτερον ούδένα είπε, νοητός δ’ έκεϊνος, πρεσβειών δ’άξιώσας παρ’ έαυτώ μένειν διενοήθη. In this dark place, Dane (I, S. 252) notes the opposition of the verbs είπε and διενοήθη and sees in the first an indication of A. προφορικός, in the latter of Λ. ενδιάθετος. It can be added that if the world and the Logos here are like brothers, since they are the children of one Father, then thought (διάνοια) and speech (προφορά), according to Philo, are sisters, children of one mother, rational nature (μιας άμφοΐν οΰσης τής λογικής φύσεως μητέρος άδελφά δήπου τά γεννήματα έπίσταμαι. Dähne, I, 210. de migrat. 400). That the visible world in Philo is not identified with the Logos as a word (ρήμα), this is clear from the above passage de sacrif. 131 (p. 16. note 3). Keferstein, 102. quis rerum divin. haer. S. 509. Θεός ών, ούτε γεννητός ώς υμείς, άλλα μέσος τών άκρων, άμφοτέρους όμηρεΰων. Dähne, I, 120. de humanit. 699. Αναγκαιότατο ν άφηρη μένος άϊδιότητα. Dähne, I. 205. 206. 251. Keferstein, 53. 54. 56. 66. Keferstein, 110. de confits. ling. 341. καί γάρ άρχή, καί όνομα Θεού, καί Λόγος κ. τ. λ. The relation of this definition of the Word to the idea of God as a monad (Dähne, 1, 125. de special, leg. 805. μονός μέν έστιν είκών αιτίου πρώτου, leg. alleg. III, 69. quod D. s. immut. 295. κατά τό εν καί τήν μονάδα) and is not clear from Philo; but, perhaps, άρχάγγελος πολυώνυμος was no longer for this philosopher a being as simple and united as Being. de conf. ling. 334. leg. alleg. III, 99. de migr. Abrah. 366. de profug. 464. Λόγος θεϊος... ό έγγυτάτω, μηδενός οντος μεθορίου διαστήματος, τού μόνου δ έστιν άφευδώς, άφιδρυμένος. de quaest. et solution. (Keferstein, 116). διά τί, ώς περί έτέρου Θεού φησι τό· έν εικόνι Θεού έποίησα τόν άνθρωπον...; Θνητόν γάρ ούδέν άπεικονισθήναι προς τόν... Πατέρα... έδύνατο, άλλα προς τόν δεύτερον Θεόν, ος έστιν ί κείνου Λόγος... ό προ τού Λόγου ... ούδέν θέμις ήν γενητόν έξομοιοϋσθαι. de somniis I, 599. πλείους- διό καί ό ιερός λόγος èv τώ παρόντι ( Gen 31, 13 ) τόν μέν αλήθεια δια τοΰ άρθρου μεμήνυκεν, είπών, Έγώ είμι ό Θεός· τόν δέ καταχρήσει χιορίς άρθρου, φάσκων ό όφθείς σοι έν τόπα) ού τοΰ Θεοΰ, άλλ' αυτό μόνον Θεοΰ. Dorner, I, 32. de somit. II. ed. Mangey t. I, 683. εί τό. αληθές είπών δεϊ. μεθόριός τις Θεοΰ φύσις τοΰ μέν έλάττων, ανθρώπου δέ κρείττων. Soulier, ρρ. 160–164. Keferstein recognizes Philo’s Logos as personal (SS. 118. 122), relying on those places where the difference between the Logos and God seems significant, and however, there is no real reason for the personification of the Logos. These are, for example, the places where he is called an archangel (de conf. ling. 341) or a second God (de quaset. et solut.). Wed Keferstein. 94. de coni, ling '29 ό δι (Λόγος) μιμούμενος τάς τοΰ Πατρός όδοί'ς προς παραδείγματα αρχέτυπα εκείνοι βλέπων, έμορφου εϊδη. – A strong objection to the personal character of the Logos is that it appears to be a union of ideas, or λόγοι, private logoi, which are also called angels (de profug. 481). Therefore, Dorner (I. S. 24) makes a trace, a remark: “Ja, da der Logos auch wieder die Einheit dieser δυνάμεις od. άγγελοι ist, so kann man, statt zu schliessen: die Engel sind persönlich, also auch der Logos, mit gleichem Rechte umgekehrt schliessen: entweder ist der Logos persönlich, dann sind es für ihn die Engel nicht, sondern sie sind die unpersönlichen Kräfte, deren Einheit er ist; od. die Engel sind persönlich, dann ist der Logos nicht mehr ihre persönliche Einheit.” Dorner admits that the concept of personality lies outside the circle of Philo’s ideas. Zeller also thinks the same, who, however, assumes that Philo’s Logos is a personal being. The opinion that the Logos is both a personal and impersonal being belongs to Soulier himself. Wed. Thomasius, Origenes. Nürnberg. 1837.SS. 334–342. M. Vladislavlev, Philosophy of Plotinus. St. Petersburg 1868. pp. 65–107. – Plotin. Enn. 3. lib. 9. η. 3; ed. Kirchhoff, vol. 1. p. 128. πώς ούν έξ ένός πλήθος; 5. 3. 12; 2, 367. δει γάρ δή προ του πολλοϋ το εν είναι, άφ’ ού καί το πολύ έπ’ αριθμού γάρ παντός το εν πρώτον. 5. 5. 5; 2. 23. ώστ’ είναι τό είναι ίχνος ένός. 6. 9. 1; 1. 78. λέγεται ούκ έστιν έκείνα. 5.3.14; 2. 370. ουδέ νόησιν έχομεν αυτού... καί γάρ λέγομεν ο μή έστιν. δ δέ έστιν, ού λέγομεν. 6. 8. 11; 2, 160. το δέ διά τί αρχήν άλλην ζητεί. αρχής δέ τής πάσης ούκ έστιν αρχή. 5.3.16; 2, 373. 6. 9. 6; 1, 86. τό αύταρκέστατον. 6. 8. 11; 2, 160. ώ συμβέβηκε μηδέν. 2, 161. ούδέ τό προς άλλο. 6. 7. 40; 2, 143. 144. 5.3.17; 2, 374. έπέκεινα αύταρκείας. 6. 7. 41; 2, 145. ταΰτα (τα άλλα) γάρ καί δεϊται αύτοΰ, αύτό δέ ούκ αν δέοιτο εαυτού- γελοΐον γάροΰτω γάρ αν καί ῖ νδεές ήν αύτοΰ. 6. 9, 6; 1, 86. τό δέ ού δεϊται εαυτού αύτό γάρ έστι. 6. 9. 3; 1, 83. ιύτω, άλλ’ ήμΐν, οτι έχομέν τι παρ’ αύτοΰ εκείνου οντος έν αύτω. 2. 9. 1; 2. 33. άπλούν. 5.3.16; 2, 372. εί γάρ και αύτό πολύ, ούκ αρχή τούτο, ά/λ' άλ?.ο προ τούτου. 1.8. 2; 2, 389. καί επέκεινα τών άριστων. 5. 5. 13; 2. 32. ' τάγαθον είναι, ήν δε αυτό άπλούν καί μόνον αγαθόν, τό αρα πρώτως καί τάγαθον υπέρ τι πάντα τά όντα. 2. 9. 1; 2, 33. τούτο άλλο, είτα άγαθόν- όταν λέγωμεν τό εν καί όταν λέγωμεν τάγαθον, τήν αύτήν δει νομίζειν την φύσιν καί μίαν λέγειν ού κατηγοροϋντας έκείνης ούδέν. 1.7. 1; 2, 431. άλλ αύττι τή μονή τάγαθον είναι. 6. 7. 41; 2, 145. ού τοίνυν ούδ' αγαθόν αύτώ. άλλα τοϊς άλλοις. 6.9.6, 1, 87 1.7. 1; 2, 431. (ώσπερ κύκλος προς κέντρον), αυτό όέ είς μηδέν. 5. 3. 11; 2, 366. τούτοεί δε τό προ πάντων, έστω ούτως ώνομασμένον. 6. 7. 38; 2, 141. κατηγορούντες, ότι αύτω υπάρχει, άλλ’ ότι αύτόείτα ούδ' έστιν άγαθόν λέγειν άξιούντες... ϊνα μη άλλο, τό δ’ άλλο ποιώμεν, ώς μή δεΐσθαι τού έστιν έτι, ούτω λέγομεν τάγαθόν. 5.3.15; 2, 371. αύτό έν. ού κατ' άλλου, άλλ' οτι τούτο (ib. η. 12; 2, 368 αύτοέν). άρχή γάρ έν όντως καί άληθώς έν. 3. 8. 10; 1, 345. τό άπλώς έν. 6. 9. 5; 1, 85. ϊνα μή καί ένταύθα κατ’ άλλου τό έν, ώ όνομα μέν κατ’ άλήθειαν ούδέν προσήκον, εϊπερ δέ δει όνομάσαι, κοινώς άν λεχθέν προσηκόντως έν, ούχ ώς άλλο, είτα έν... ούχ ούτως έν λέγοντες καί άμερές, ώς σημεΐον ή μονάδα... η. 6; 1, 86. μεγέθει, άλλά δυνάμει... καί άπειρον αύτό... τω άπεριλήπτω τής δυνάμεως. 6. 9. 3; 1, 82. ούτε ποσόν... ούδέ κινούμενον ούδ’ αύ έστώς ούκ έν τόπω, ούκ έν χρόνω, άλλά τό καθ' αύτό μονοειδές, μάλλον δέ άνείδεον προ είδους ον παντός. 5.3.17; 2, 374. αυτό ούκ ον ουσία. 6. 9. 2; 1, 81. ουδέ τό ον τό γάρ ον τα πάντα. 5.3.17; 2. 374. έπέκεινα ταύτης (ουσίας). 1.7. 1; 2, 431. έπέκεινα ούσίας. 5. 5. 6; 2, 23. ουσία... επέκεινα άρα ὄντος. η. 11; 2, 29. τφ γάρ εν είναι ού μεμέτρηται... ούτ’ ούν προς άλλο ούτε προς αυτό πεπέρανταυ έπεί ούτως άν εϊη καί δύο. 6. 9. 3; 1, 82. ούδέ ον. καί γάρ τό ον olov μορφήν τήν τού οντος έχει· άμορφαν δέ έκεϊνο. 6. 9. 2; 1, 80. ον. cfr. 5. 6. 6; 1, 199. σκιάν, άλλ’ έχειν πλήρες τό είναι, πλήρες δέ έστι τό είναι, όταν είδος τού νοεΐν καί ζήν λάβῃ. 6. 9 6; 1, 86. 6. 9. 2; 1.81. ούδέ νούς· καί γάρ άν ούτως εϊη τά πάντα τού νού τά πάντα οντος. η. 6; 1, 87. ούδέ νόησις, ϊνα μή έτερότης. 6. 7. 40; 2, 143. εν αύτω ούσίαν μήτε νόησιν. 6. 7. 40; 2.144. άγαθοΰ αν εϊη. ή εν έσται όρου τάγαθόν καί το ελαττον αύτοΰ... εί δε κρεϊττον ή νόησις, το νοητόν χείρον εσται. η. 35; 2, 139. 5. 6. 1; 1, 195. άλλο το νοούν, άλλο το νοούμενον. 6. 7. 41; 2, 145. ούδ’ έστί δύο, μάλλον δέ πλείω, αύτός, ή νόησιςού γάρ δή ή νόησις αύτόςδεΤ δε τρίτον και τό νοούμενον είναι. 6. 7. 38; 2, 141. εί δε μή, αγαθόν μέν νοήσει, ού παρέσται δε αύτω τό ότι αυτός έστι τούτο νοεϊν. δει ούν την νόησιν είναι, ότι αγαθόν είμι. 6. 7. 39; 2, 141. εσται. άλλ’ ούκ όντος οίον διαστήματος τίνος ούδέ διαφοράς προς αύτό, τό έπιβάλλον έαυτω τί αν εϊη ή αύτό; 6. 9. 6; I, 87. εσται ή γάρ άγνοια ετέρου όντος γίνεται, όταν θάτερον άγνοή θάτερον τό δε μόνον ούτε γινώσκει ούτε τι έχει ό αγνοεί, εν δέ ον συνόν αύτω ού δεϊται νοήσεως εαυτού. 6. 7. 41; 2, 145. ό δ’ οφθαλμός τί άν δέοιτο τό ον όράν φώς αύτός ών; 6. 9.6; 1. 87. νόησιν. νόησις δέ οώ νοεί, άλλ’ αιτία τού νοεϊν άλλω. 6. 7. 16; 2, 117. αίτιος ών αίτιός πως καί τής όψεώς έστιν- ούκουν ούτε όψις ούτε τά γινόμενα, ούτω καί ή τού αγαθού φύσις αίτια ούσίας καί νοϋ ούσα... ούτε τά όντα ούτε νούς έστιν .. 6. 8. 6; 2, 154. ή δέ βούλησις ή νόησις, βούλησις δ' έλέχθη δτι κατά νοϋν. 6. 8. 8; 2. 156. cfr. η. 7; 2, 155. άξιοι τότε είναι τό έλεύθερον, όταν παρά φύσιν ποιή. 5. 5. 12; 2, 31. αύτφ μή γενομένουέπεί ούδ’, εί άλλφ δυνατόν ήν γενέσθαι έξ αύτού, έφθόνησεν άν. 5. 4. 1; 1.71. πώς άν ούν τό τελεότατον καί τό πρώτον αγαθόν εν αύτφ σταίη ώσπερ φθόνησαν έαυτοΰ ή αδυνάτησαν, ή πάντων δύναμις; 5. 2. 1; 1, 109. καί τό ύπερπλήρες αύτού πεποίηκεν άλλο. 5. 4. 1; 1.71. έτερον ποιούν, ού μόνον ο τι άν προαίρεσιν έχη, άλλα καί οσα φύει άνευ προαιρέσεως· οίον τό πύρ θερμαίνει καί ψύχει ή χιών. 5. 2. 1; 1, 109. τ. λ. There is no talk here about the genetic difference between the birth of the mind and the creation of the world; on the contrary, the birth of the mind is only the first moment in the origin of everything that exists. Having given birth to the mind, the One only gives an impulse to the formation of the world: in the existence of the mind the existence of the world is already given. 5.1.7; 1, 103. πρώτης άρχής φύναι, γενόμενον δέ ήδη τά δντα πάντα σύν αύτφ γεννήσαι, παν μέν τό τών ιδεών κάλλος, πάντας δέ θεούς νοητούς. It is curious that Plotinus, although he calls the mind the creator (δημιουργός, ποιητής), but limits all of its participation in the formation of the world to the generation of the ideal world, and recognizes the third principle that received its existence from the mind - the soul - as the direct creator of the visible world. 4. 2. 3; 1.51. ψυχήν δ’ αύ καί έπί τοΐς τέτρασι (four elements) τήν κόσμου μορφήν δούναι, ταύτη δέ νούν χορηγόν τών λόγων γεγονέναι. 5.1.7; 1, 103. πώς ούν νουν γεννά; ή δτι τη έπιστροφή προς αυτό έώρα ή δέ ορασις αύτη νους. This turning to oneself and self-contemplation contradicts what Plotinus says about the impossibility of self-consciousness in the One, and one could think that it is not the One, but the mind that turns to itself; but the trace, place: 5. 1.6 does not allow these words to be interpreted in this sense; 1, 101. έκείνω μηδενός μή τιθώμεθα αυτό κινεϊσθαι, άλλ’ εϊ τι μετ’ αυτό γίνεται, έπιστραφέντος αεί έκείνου προς αυτό άναγκαϊόν έστι ??? γάρ κινηθέντος αύτοΰ τι γίνοιτο, τρίτον απ’ έκείνου τό γινόμενον μετά τήν κίνησιν αν γίνοιτο καί ού δεύτερον, δει ούν ακινήτου οντος, εϊ τι δεύτερον μετ’ αύτό, ού προσνεύσαντος ούδέ βουληθέντος ούδέ δλως κινηθέντος ύποστήναι αύτό. 5. 6. 5; 1, 198. έκινήθη τε καί είδε, καί τοΰτ’ έστί νοεϊν, κίνησις προς άγαθόν έφιεμένου έκείνου. ή γάρ έφεσις τήν νόησιν έγέννησε καί συνυπέστησεν αυτή – έφεσις γάρ οψεως ορασις. 6. 7. 16; 2, 117. άρα, δτε έώρα προς τό άγαθόν, ένόει ώς πολλά τό έν έκεϊνο καί εν ον αύτός ένόει αύτό πολλά μερίζων αύτό παρ’ αύτφ τώ νοεϊν μή δλον όμού δύνασθαι; άλλ’ ούπω νους ήν έκεϊνο βλέπων, άλλ’ έβλεπεν άνοήτως. ή φατέον ώς ούδ’ έώρα πώποτε, άλλ’ έξη μέν προς αύτό καί άνήρτητο αύτοΰ καί έπέστραπτο προς αύτό, ή δέ κίνησις αύτη πληρωθεϊσα... έπλήρωσεν αύτόν... έξης δέ πάντα έγένετο καί έγνω τούτο έν συναισθήσει αύτοΰ καί νοΰς ήδη ήν, πληρωθείς μέν, ϊν’ έχη, δ δψεται, 5.3.11; 2, 366. άλλο άεί λαμβάνων έν αύτφ πληθυνόμενον ώστε ώρμησε μέν έπ’ αύτό ούχ ώς νοΰς, άλλ’ ώς δψις ούπω ίδοΰσα, έξήλθε δέ έχουσα δπερ αύτή έπλήθυνεν ώστε άλλου μέν έπεθύμησεν άορίστως, έξήλθε δέ άλλο λαβοΰσα έν αυτή αυτό πολύ ποιήσασα... ούτος δέ πολύς εξ ένός έγένετο καί ούτως γνούς είδεν αύτό καί τότε έγένετο ίδοΰσα ο'ψες. τούτο δέ ήδη νούς, δτε έχει καί ώς νούς έχει προ δέ τούτου έφεσις ... έχων ούδέ νούς ούπω νοήσας. 5. 2. 1; 1, 109. προς αύτό βλέπων καί νούς ούτως, καί ή μέν προς έκεΐνο στάσις αύτοΰ τό ον έποίησεν, ή δέ προς αυτό θέα τόν νούν. έπεί ούν εστη προς αύτό, ϊναϊδη, όμοΰ νούς γίνεται καί ὄν. 3. 8. 8; 1, 342. έν ούν ον τα δύο πώς αύ πολλά τούτο τό έν; ή δτι ούχ έν θεωρεί, έπεί καί, όταν τό έν θεωρή, ούχ ώς έν· εί δέ μη, ού γίνεται νούς. άλλα άρξάμενος ώς έν ούχ ώς ήρξατο έμεινεν, άλλ’ έλαθεν έαυτόν πολύς γενόμενος, οίον βεβαρημένος, καί έξείλιξεν αυτόν πάντα έχειν έθέλων, εί καί βέλτιον ήν αύτώ μη ί’Οελήσαι τούτο, δεύτερον γάρ έγένετο οίον κύκλος έξελίξας αύτόν γέγονε και σχήμα... καί περιφέρεια καί κέντρον. 6. 9. 5; 1, 85. πως τού ένός τολμήσας. 5. 3. 11; 2, 366. 5. 6. 1; 1, 195. 196. ποιούν αύτό δύο, μάλλον δέ δν, δτι νοεί, δύο καί, δτι αύτό, έν. 5.1.4; 1.99. δύο όντα τούτο τό έν όμοΰ νούς καί δν καί νοούν καί νοούμενον, ό μέν νούς κατά τό νοεΐν, τό δέ δν κατά τό νσούμενον. ού γάρ αν γένοιτο τό νοεΐν έτερότητος μή οϋσης καί ταυτότητας δέ. γινεται ουν τά πρώτα νους, öv, έτερότης, ταυτότης· δει δέ και κίνησιν λαβεϊν καί στάσιν, καί κίνησιν μέν, εί νοεί, στάσιν δέ, ϊνα τό αυτό, την δέ έτερότητα, ϊν’ ή νοούν και νοουμενον. 5. 3. 10; 2, 365. έν δυσίν είναι καί ή έξω θάτερον ή έν τω αύτώ άμφω καί άεί έν έτερότητι την νοησιν είναι, καί έν ταυτότητι δέ εξ άνάγκης· καί είναι τά κυρίως νοούμενα προς τον νούν καί τά αυτά καί έτερα... ή τί νοήσει, ö μή έχει άλλο καί άλλο; 6. 9. 2; 1.81. τόν νούν άνάγκη έν τω νοεΐν είναι καί... νοεΐν τό προ αυτού· εις εαυτόν γαρ έπιστρέφων. εις άρχήν επιστρέφει, καί εί μέν αυτός τό νοούν καί τό νοούμενον, διπλούς έσται καί ούχ άπλούς ουδέ τό έν. εί δέ προς έτερον βλέπει, πάντως προς το κρεϊττον καί προ αυτού, εί δέ καί προς αυτόν καί προς τό κρεϊττον, καί ούτω δεύτερον. καί χρή T ο V νούν τοιούτον τίθεσθαι, οίον παρείναι μέν τω άγαθώ καί τω πρωτω καί βλέπειν εις έκεϊνο, συνεΐναι δέ καί έαυτώ νοεΐν τε έαυτόν όντα τά πάντα. 5. 4. 2; 1.73. νούς δή καί ον ταύτόν. 5. 3. 5; 2, 358. νοητον... καθ’ έκάτερον άρα έαυτόν νοήσει, καθ’ ο τι καί ή νόησις αύτός ήν καί καθ δ τι τό νοητόν αύτός, οπερ ένόει τή νοήσει, ο ήν αύτός. 6. 4. 4; 1, 165. νούς πολύς έτερότητι, ού τόπω, όμού δέ πας... τό ον πολλά... παν τόόν. 6. 7. 39; 2, 142. πολύς. 6. 3. 11; 2, 367. πλήθος. 6. 9. 2; 1.81. διπλούς έσται καί ούχ άπλούς ούδέ τό έν (η. 5; 1.85. ένοειδής). 5. 4. 2; 1. 72. 6. 6. 8; 2, 106. δυάς ή πρώτη. 5. 4. 2; 1, 72. ούχ άπλούς (ό νούς) άλλά πολλά μέντοι. 5.3.15; 3, 371. έν άρα πολλά. 6. 7. 14; 2, 144. έν πολλά. 6.2.22; 2, 247. εις πολλά. 6. 7. 8; 2, 106. 5. 6. 1; 1, 195. 5. 6. 1; 1, 195. 5. 5. 4; 2, 21. ό μεν νοητός κόσμος καί ό νους. 5.3.16; 2, 372. 5. 9. 6; 1, 54. νους έστιν όμοΰ πάντα καί αύ ούχ όμοΰ, δτι έκαστον δύναμις ιδία, ό δέ πας νους περιέχει ώσπερ γένος εϊδη καί ώσπερ δλον μέρει. 5.1.4; 1, 100. δέ, έπεί εν έαυτώ, καί κοινόν δέ τι έν πάσι. 5. 9.6; 1, 54. άλλ’ ώς αύτόν έχων καί έν ών αύτοϊς. η. 8; 1, 55. έκάστη νους, καί δλος μέν ό νους τά πάντα εϊδη, έκαστον δέ είδος νους έκαστος, η. 5; 1.52. εί δέ παρ' αύτού καί έξ αύτοΰ νοεί, αύτός έστιν ά νοεί, εί γάρ ή μέν ούσία αύτοΰ άλλη, ά δέ νοεϊ έτερα αύτοΰ, αύτή ή ούσία αύτοΰ άνόητος έσται. 3.2. 1; 2, 320. πρώτος, ού διαστάς άφ' έαυτοΰ. 4. 8. 3; 1, 64. 6. 7. 8; 2, 106. ήν τοίνυν ούχ ώς νοΰς εις, άλλά πάς. 5. 6. 4; 1, 197. 6. 7. 15; 2, 116. 6. 9. 3; 1, 82. 5.1.7; 1, 103. καί τελειοΰται εις ουσίαν παρ’ έκείνου και έξ έκείνου. 5. 4. 1; 1, 71. 1. 7. 1; 2, 431. 5. 3. 12; 2, 368. ή πρώτη ένέργεια ό νους. 5. 4. 2; 1, 72. ή ή μέν έστι της ουσίας, ή δ’ έκ της ουσίας έκαστου· olov καί έπί τοΰ › ? ... οικείφ ήθει έκ τής έν αύτώ τελειότητας καί συνούσης ένεργείας ή γεννηθεϊσα ένέργεια ύπόστασιν λαβούσα, άτε έκ μεγάλης δυνάμεως (έκεϊνο μέν δύναμις πάντων) εις τά είναι καί ούσίαν ήλθεν. 5.1.4; 1, 99. νοεί δέ ού ζητών, άλλ’ έχων. 5. 3. 9; 2, 363. πάρεστι γάρ άεί αύτώ. 5. 5. 1; 2, 17. τον νούν, τον άληθή νουν και όντως, άρ’ αν τις φαίη ψεύδεσθαί ποτέ καί μή τά δντα δοξάρειν; ούδαμώς... δει άρα αύτάν άεί εΐδέναι... ούδέ δι’ άποδείξεως. η. 3; 2, 20. νους, τά όντα πάντα, ή αλήθεια. 5. 1.6; 1, 101. άεί δντων ποιουμένοις... τά δέ άεί τέλειον άεί καί άίδιον γεννά. 5.1.4; 1. 99. και ουδέ τό παρεληλυθός. 6. 9. 5; 1, 85. τό έν τοΐς ούσι τιμιότατον. 5. 1. 4; 1, 99. 5. 1.6; 1, 102. δεύτερον. 5. 5. 4; 2, 21. ού μήν τό καθαρός έν. 5. 1. 6; 2, 102. τούτου ούδέν. 5.1.7; 1, 102. εκείνο τό γεννώμενον καί άποσώζειν πολλά αύτοΰ καί είναι ομοιότητα προς αύτό, ώσπερ καί τό φως τοΰ ήλιου, n. 6. περιθέον, έξ αύτοΰ άεί γεννώμενον μένοντας. 5. 1.6; 1, 102. - όταν δέ καί τό άριστον ή τό γέννησαν, έξ άνάγκης σύνεστιν αύτω, ώς τή έτερότητι μόνον κεχωρίσθαι. 5. 5. 3; 2, 20. θεός αΰτη ή φύσις καί θεός δεύτερος. 5. 1.6; 1, 102. γεννά. 5. 2. 2; 1, 109. νωμένου άλλην τάξιν λαμβάνοντος τήν χείρονα. 5.1.7; 1, 104. ένταΰθα τό γεννώμενον, άλλ’ έλαττον ον εϊδωλον είναι αύτοΰ. 3. 8. 9; 1, 344. 5.3. 15; 2, 371. ή ου ταύτόν έμελλε τό έξ εκείνου έκείνω- ει ούν μή ταύτόν, ούδέ γε βέλτιον τί γάρ αν του ενός βέλτιον ή επέκεινα ολως; χείρον άρα· τούτο δέ έστιν ένδεέστερον. This is, for example, the doctrine of the non-spatiality of the first principle (Plot. 3. 9. 3; 1, 128. ούν πληροί, έπεί δέ και ούδαμοΰ, γίνεται μεν τα πάντα δι’ αυτόν, οτι πανταχοΰ εκείνος, ετερα δέ αύτοΰ, οτι αυτός ούδαμοΰ. αύτός ού μόνον πανταχοΰ, άλλ’ αύ προς τούτω καί ούδαμοΰ; πάντων έν είναι, πληρούν ούν δει αύτόν καί ποιεϊν πάντα, ούκ είναι τά πάντα ά ποιεί. 5. 5. 9; ? μήν ούδ’ ολον ώδί ώστε δλον πανταχοΰ ούδενός έχοντος αύτό ούδ’ αύ μη έχοντος έχομένου άρα ότουοΰν) or about the eternal birth of the mind and its independence from the conditions of time. Kurtz, Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte. Mitau. 1858. Bd. I. 1. S. 334. Die bedeutendsten Momente des Fortschrittes (im trinitarischen Lehrbildungsprocess) knüpfen sich an die Namen Justinus, Tertullianus, Kallistus, Origenes, Dionysius v. Rom u. Athanasius. S. Justini opr. (Migne, Patrol, s. gr. t. 6). Apol. 1.n. 13. άθεοι... οΰκ έσμεν, τον δημιουργόν τοΰδε του παντός σεβόμενοι... Illustration χώρα έχοντες, Πνεΰμά τε προφητικόν έν τρίτη τάξει, ότι μετά λόγου τιμώμεν, άποδείξομεν. Dialogue, cum Tryph. n. 61. έαυτοϋ λογικήν, ήτις καί δόξα Κυρίου... καλείται, ποτέ δέ Υιός... ποτέ δέ Θεός, ποτέ δέ Κωριος καί Λόγος. Dialogue, cum Tryph. n. 128. (η. 61. θελήσει) αύτοΰ (cf. ευδοκία τοϋ Πατρός in the baptismal symbol), άλλ’ ού κατά άποτομήν, ώς άπομεριξομένης τοΰ Πατρός ούσίας, όποια τά άλλα πάντα μεριζόμενα καί τεμνόμενα ού τά αύτά έστιν ά καί πριν τμηθήναε καί παραδείγματος χάριν παρειλήφειν τά ώς άπό πυράς άναπτόμε- να πυρά έτερα όρώμεν, ούδέν έλαττουμένου έκείνου, έξ ού άναφθήναι πολλά δύνανται, άλλα ταύτοΰ μένοντος. Dialogue, cum Tryph. n. 61. ώς έλαττωθήναι τόν έν ήμΐν λόγον προβαλλόμενοι. Dorner, Lehre von der Person Christi. I, 425. 426. Allein würde das strenge genommen (γεγεννήσθαι... βουλή), wie die Arianer thaten, so wäre das gegen die Sätze, die dem Justin selbst unläugbar eine viel ursprünglichere Bedeutung haben, nämlich dass der Logos aus Gottes Wesen (γεγέννηκε έξ έαυτοΰ) sey. Cfr. Meier, Lehre von der Trinität. 1844. Bd. I, 60. 61. Apol. 2.n. 6. 'Όνομα δέ τω πάντων Πατρί θετόν, άγεννήτω οντι ούκ έστιν. ' Ο γάρ αν και όνόματι προσαγορεύηται, πρεσβύτερον έχει τον θέμενον τό όνομα... Ο δέ Υιός έκείνου, ό μόνος λεγόμενος κυρίως Υιός, ό (Dorner ex conjecture: ότι) τήν άρχήν δι’ αύτου πάντα έκτισε καί έκόσμησε (cod. regius: έκόσμησε καί ' αύτοϋ τόν Θεόν, λέγεται. Recognizing God the Father as unnameable, St. Justin becomes close to Philo. Wed. page 13. Comparison of this passage with the teachings of other apologists gives us the right to assume that St. Justin puts the birth of the Word in connection with the creation of the world, therefore, the correct reading is not ὄτι, but ὄτε. The sequence of verbs, which is not entirely ordinary from the point of view of later theology: καί συνών καί γεννώμε νος, also completely agrees with the prevailing view of that era. St. Justin could give these words precisely the meaning that the Son first exists by the Father, and then, before the creation of the world and for the creation, is born. This understanding of the text, however, is not indisputable: it is contrasted (Moritz von Engelhardt, Das Christenthum Justins des Märtyrers. Erlangen. 1878. S. 119) with the parallel passage Dial. c. Tr. η. 62, where St. Justin says that God did not address angels when he said: “Let us make man”; αλλά τοΰτο τό τω δντι από του Πατρός προβληθέν γέννημα προ πάντων των ποιημάτων συνήν τω Πατρί, καί τούτω ό Πατήρ προσομιλεΐ. There is no reason to doubt the identity of the fact signified by the words προβληθέν and γεννώμενος; but are the moments indicated by the words συνήν and συνών really completely identical? Despite the most decisive similarity of expressions in both places, it can be assumed that the Word, according to St. Justin, before creation exists with God, before creation he is born of Him, and after birth exists with Him before all creation. It is possible, of course, that συνών καί γεννώμενος is an inaccurate expression, which from the point of view of St. Justin, the coexistence of the Word does not precede His birth, just as the decoration of the world does not precede its creation (cf. reading: έκόσμησε καί έκτισε); but allow this assumption, agree that only Dial. With. Tr. n. 62. correctly expresses the thought of St. Justin, would mean to present his view as isolated from the dominant view of that era, which is consistently developed in the writings of those following St. Justin writers. But assuming that, according to St. Justin, the Word existed with the Father before His birth, we do not consider it possible to answer the very important question of whether the Word had a coexisting independent (hypostatic) existence. Kurtz (S. 385) answers negatively, Dorner (S. 425) positive; but the first does not have any data for itself in the text, the second relies only on the etymology of the word συνών. This basis would be completely valid only with perfect accuracy in expression; but compare Dial. With. Tr. n. 128. όταν δύση (ό ήλιος), συv – αποφέρεται τό φως in a tirade, which sets forth an opinion aimed at a decisive denial of the hypostatic existence of the Word; Wed also Tatian., adv. graec. n. 5. σύν αύτω τά πάντα, where there can be no talk of the actual existence of the world. We will touch upon the question of the hypostatic existence of the Word before His birth from the Father after expounding the teachings of Tatian, Athenagoras and St. Theophilus of Antioch (pp. 59. 60). Dial. With. Tr. n. 128. ύπάρχειν, ονπερ τρόπον τό τοΰ ήλιου φασί φως έπί γης είναι άτμητον καί άχώριστον άντος τοΰ ήλιου έν τω ούρανφ καί δταν δύση, συναποφέρεται καί τό φως. ούτως ό Πατήρ, όταν βούληται, λέγουσι. δύναμιν αύτοΰ προπηδάν ποιεϊ καί όταν βούληται, πάλιν άναστέλλει εις εαυτόν. – Κατά τούτον τόν τρόπον καί τούς άγγέλους ποιεϊν αυτόν διδάσκουσιν. Άλλ’ οτι μεν ούν είσιν άγγελοι, καί άεΐ μένοντες, καί μή άναλυόμενοι εις εκείνο έξ ούπερ γεγόνασιν. άποδέδεικται· καί οτι δύναμις αύτη ήν και Θεόν καλεΐ ό προφητικός λόγος και άγγελον, ούχ ώς τό τού ήλιου φως όνόματι μόνον άριθμεϊται, άλλά καί άριθμω έτερόν τί έστι... έξήτασα. Dial. With. Tr. n. 56.... ποιήσαντος Θεού, άριθμω λέγω, άλλά ου γνώμη. Dial. With. Tr. n. 129. των κτισμάτων ό Δόγος έδήλου, καί τό γεννώμενον τού γεννώντος άριθμω έτερόν έστι, πας όστισούν όμολογήσειε. έτερόν τι (έτερον) άριθμω. The presentation of hypostatic difference in the form of a difference in number among the Greek fathers is very common. See Braun, Begriff "Person" in seiner Anwendung auf die Lehre v. d. Trinität u. Incarnation. Mainz. 1876. SS. 23. 25. 29. Hanp., John of Damascus (Dial. p. 43) defines πρόσωπον as άριθμφ διαφέρον. Cfr. S. Cyrilli alexandr. ex interpret, in Joh. Πώς ούν ούχ έτερος έσται (ό Υιός) παρ’ αυτόν (τον Πατέρα), ώς εν ύποστάσει καί άριθμφ; (1. c. in Panoplia Zigab. tit. 10, Migne, s. g. t. 130). Thus, St. Justin gives one of the most precise expressions that theological language has. In this sense, St. himself explains the word “γνώμη”. Justin. Having said that the Son is different in number, but not γνώμη (Dial. p. Tr. n. 56), he continues: ούδένγάρ φημι αυτόν πεπραχέναι ποτέ, ή άπερ αυτόν ό τόν κόσμον ποιήσας Θεός βεβούλη- ται καί πράξαι καί όμιλήσαι. Cfr. Origenis contra Cels. 1. 8, n. 12. p. 751, where the unity of the Father and the Son is posited in Their όμονοία καί συμφωνία. Dial. c. Tr. n. 68. ταϊς γραφαΐς νοείτε είναι, πλήν τού τούτο ποιήσαντος τό παν, καί τού Χριστού; Ibid. n. 56. Dial. With. Tr. n. 65. ό θεός λέγει (Isa.42:5–13) δώσειν τούτω (τώ Χριστώ αύτού μόνω) τήν δόξαν, καί ούκ άλλω τινί. St. Justin is referring to the passage of Is. 42:8, to which Tryphon refers: “I am the Lord, this is My name, and I will not give My glory to another.” Schaft, Geschichte der alten Kirche. Leipzig. 1867. S. 974. Die nicänischen Väter lehren, wie die vornicänischen, noch einen gewissen Subordinationismus, welcher mit der Lehre von der Honionsie im Widerspruch zu stehen scheint. Aber man muss zwischen einem Subordinationismus des Wesens u. einem Subordinationismus der Hypostase... unterscheiden. Der erstere wurde geläugnet. der letztere behauptet. Io Kuhn, Katholische Dogmatik Tübingen. 1857. Bd. II. S. 123. S. Basilii Magni adv. Eunom. 1. 1. n. 25. Having said that the Father can be greater than the Son either in the sense of reason, or in strength, or in superiority of dignity (κατά την τοΰ αξιώματος υπεροχήν), or finally in volume (κατά τήν των όγκων περιουσίαν), and showing that the last three points of view are inappropriate, St. Vasily continues: της αρχής, λέγω, καί αίτιας. Ibid. 1. 3. n. 1. ό Υιός τάξει μέν δεύτερος τοΰ Πατρός, οτι άπ’ έκείνου καί άξιώματι, οτι αρχή καί αιτία, τω είναι αύτοΰ Πατέρα (the difference in this respect with the previous place is explained by the fact that there the throne of God is accepted as an indicator of dignity, and he who sits at the right hand of the Father is recognized as equal in honor Him, τό όμότιμον της αξίας), φύσει δέ ούκέτι δεύτερος, διότι ή θεότης έν έκατέρω μία. S. Cyrilli alexandrini thesaurus de s. Trin. 11. p. 85. col. Pair. Migne. 141. B. όταν λέγη Χρίξονα, έσται τή άνθρωπότητι πρέπων ό λόγος, ού τής θείας ούσίας αύτοΰ κατηγόρημα. This is the same explanation of St. Kirill repeats it on the next page (p. 89, col. 144. V.). But here (p. 86. col. 141. D.) we also encounter another interpretation. “’Ίσος τοιγαροΰν κατά τόν τής ούσίας λόγον υπάρχων ό Υιός τω Πατρί καί δμοιος κατά πάντα, μείξονα αύτόν φησιν ως άναρχον, έχων άρχήν κατά μόνον τό έξ ού, εί καί σύνδρομον αύτω τήν ΰπαρξιν έχει.” The same thing is repeated on the next page (p. 87. col. 144. D) γεννήματος. S. Gregorii Theol. orat. 40 in s. baptisma n 43 p. 725 col. 420. καί τό είναι· τούτο γάρ παρά πάντων δοθήσεται καί δέδοικα τήν άρχήν, μή έλαττόνων άρχήν ποιήσω... ού γάρ κατά φύ-σιν τό μεϊξον, τήν αιτίαν δέ. Cfr. s. Hilarii pictav. de Trinitate. 9, 54 (1. pp. Dorner. I, 1063). Major Pater Filio est, et plane major, cui tantum donat esse, quantus ipse est; cui innascibilitatis (άγεννησίας) esse imaginem Sacramento nativitatis impertit. Apol. 1.n. 13. (see note 1 p. 39) ibid, δευτέραν χώραν μετά τόν άτρεπτον καί αεί. οντα Θεόν... διδόναι (To Christ), ibid. η. 60. ibid. n. 32. Υιός ό Λόγος έστίν. Regarding the last expression, Dorner (I, 425) notes that it does not need to be interpreted in the Arian sense (ist desshalb nicht nothwendig arianisirend), weil jedenfalls logisch in der Trinität der Vater dem Sohne vorangeht. He (I, 426) disputes the subordinationism of the above quotations on the grounds that in the context “we are talking about the liturgical sequence” of names. This explanation can be considered unnecessary: ​​the expression: “The Son has second place, and the Holy Spirit has third place (τάξιν) according to the Father” and in the dogmatic sense is so impeccable that, for example, St. Vasily V. did not consider it necessary to abandon it even in polemics with the Arians, even in view of the abuses to which it was subjected in Arian dialectics. The above passage (p. 45 pr. 1) is directed against the words of Eunomius: μαθόντες, τρίτον είναι και τη φύσει πεπιστεύκαμεν, (n. 5) τρίτη χώρα τιμώμενον. Vasily V. rejects only the conclusion that from the difference of order one should conclude to the difference of nature, but admits that the Son is second in rank and dignity and the Holy Spirit is subordinate to the Son (ύποβέβηκε τόν Yíòv) in this regard. Dial. With. Tr. n. 57. δλων Θεού. η. 126. δι’ ών (talking about the epiphanies to Moses, Jacob and Abraham) τεταγμένος, καί υπηρετών τη βουλή αύτού, ούτος δς ώφθη... τοΐς... πατριάρχαις... άγγελος παρά τού Πατρός πεπεμ μένος. η. 127. n. 128. φαινόμενος πρό- τερον ώς άνήρ, καί άγγελος, καί έν πυράς δόξη. This is the range of ideas of St. Justin regarding this point. The idea of ​​the subordination of the Son stands in close connection with the idea of ​​His ministry; this thought comes close to the thought of the messengership and appearances of the Son in the form of various finite beings. How St. himself looked at the “ministry” of the Son. Justin, whether he saw in the very possibility of this service a sign of the Son’s humiliation before the Father is not clear from the passages cited. Therefore, Dorner’s explanation (I, 426) that the Son is called a “servant” because “He is the organ of revelation of the Father” has no evidence against it. Dial. With. Tr. n. 129. επί γης όντα, τόν δέ έν ούρανοΐς υπάρχοντα· ός καί τού έπί γης Κυρίου Κύριός έστιν, ώς Πατήρ καί Θεός, αίτιός τε αύτω τού είναι καί δυνατω καί Κυρίω καί Θεω. Dorner, 1, 425. Dieser Ausdruck nun, dass auch die Zeugung des Logos Gegenstand eines göttlichen Rathschlusses und Willens sey, ist der stärkste subordinatianische Ausdruck bei Justin. That, however, according to Dorner this expression does not have a decisive meaning, see page 40 pr. 1. Kurtz, I, 1, 335. Die Zeugung des Sohnes stellt er (Justinus) als ein Resultat des göttlichen Willens dar. So ist auch Justinus entschieden im Subordinationismus befangen. Dial. With. Tr. n. 127. άρρητον καί αύτοΰ τού Χριστού· άλλ’ έκεΐνον τον κατά βουλήν τήν έκείνου καί Θεόν άντα Υιόν αύτοΰ, καί άγγελον έκ του ύπηρετεϊν τή γνώμη αύτοΰ. Dial. With. Tr. n. 60. άπαντα, έν όλίγω γης μορίω πεφάνθαι πας όστισοΰν, κάν μικρόν νοΰν έχων, τολμήσει είπεϊν. Dial. With. Tr. n. 127. ποθέν. ό γάρ άρρητος Πατήρ καί Κύριος των πάντων ούτε ποι άφΐκται, ούτε περιπατεϊ, ούτε καθεύδει ούτε άνίσταται, άλλ’ έν τή αύτοΰ χώρα, οπού ποτέ μένει (n. 56. τού έν τοϊς ύπερουρανίοις άεί μένοντας), οξύ όρων... γινώσκει... ούτε κινούμενος ό τόπω τε άχώρητος, καί τω κόσμω ολω, δς γε ήν καί πριν τόν κόσμον γενέσθαι (in n. 57 this definition is also introduced (τόν καί προ ποιήσεως κόσμου όντα Θεόν), apparently in the same sense, i.e. as an element that strengthens the improbability of the Jewish opinion that God (the Father) Himself appeared to Abraham). Πώς άν ούν ούτος ή λαλήσειε πρός τινα, ή όφθείη τινί, ή έν έλαχίστφ μέρει γης φανείη, οπότε γε ουδέ τήν δόξαν τού παρ’ αύτοΰ πεμφθέντος ϊσχυεν ό λαός ίδεϊν έν Σινά; This view is based on a misconception about the conditions of theophany. Meanwhile, according to the teachings of the Church, God, revealing himself visibly in a certain place with His whole being, is at the same moment present with His whole being everywhere: St. Justin, relying on the letter of the anthropomorphic expressions of St. scriptures (eg Gen. 7:16; 11:5; 17:22; 19:24. Psalm 28:7), believes that in order to appear at a certain point on earth, God must leave the place of His heavenly presence. This idea is further complicated by the correct thought that God cannot be spatially inherent in the world and only the world, because He exists before the world (probably it is assumed that if God existed in the conditions of earthly space, then He could not have existed before the creation of the world; cf. a similar view in Plotinus; see p. 38 pr. 1), but from here the arbitrary conclusion is drawn that therefore God can never appear in the world. But in this case, given the unity of the essence of the Father and the Son, it is equally impossible for the Son to appear in the world, and yet He appears. This is seen (Möhler, Kuhn, Schwane) as an obvious contradiction of St. Justin in his own words: he teaches that the Son exists decisively before all creations (Dial. c. Tr. n. 129 p. 42 pr. 3), that the Word was and is in everything (Apol. 2. n. 10. Λόγος γάρ ήν καί έστιν ό έν παντί ών). But Kuhn rightly notes that although the Son is born before all creations, it is for the purpose of creation, and this is the basis for the possibility of revelations of the Son in the world (op. cit. S. 139); at least there is a contradiction in the words of St. Justin is weakened by this to some extent. Equally the place from Apol. 2.n. 10. does not present such decisive evidence of the omnipresence of the Word as Kuhn and Schwane find here: in the context, we are talking only about the fact that the Word is a universal teacher who spoke in the prophets, preached on earth after the incarnation, and was known in part by Socrates. There are, however, experiences of agreement between this view and the doctrine of the equality of the Son with the Father. D. Gusev, Heresy of the Anti-Trinitarians of the 3rd century. Kazan. 1872. p. 74. “From this place (D. p. Tr. n. 127) there can be only one conclusion, that God the Father is the principle or beginning in the Divinity, and that to bring Him from heaven to earth” (as if this is necessary in order to present the Father as the God of the Old Testament revelations!) “means to bring the whole Divinity with Him” (as if the same thing would not happen if we “bring him from heaven to earth” and Son!),” “which would be completely contrary to the revealed truth. But both from this place, and in general from the entire teaching of Justin about the manifestations of God, it does not at all follow that the revealed and visible God, the second Person of the Holy Trinity, is lower in His nature than the non-revealed and invisible God, the first Person of the Trinity, the principle of the Divinity.” - Maran (from the congregation of St. Mavra) in his edition of the works of the apologists (1742), in a note to the passage in question, tries to explain the difference between the invisible God and God, who is only the personal relationship of the Father and the Son: if the Father Himself descended and ascended, it would be impossible to point out in explanation of this that He was sent to others; meanwhile the Son is sent from the Father (Quidquid ergo discriminis Patrem inter et Filium ponit, hoc uno nititur quod memorati in scripturis ascensus et descensus cum divina immensitate et immutabilitate conciliari non possint, si Patri tribuantur; secus vero, si Filio. Cur enim Pater descenderit et ascendent, illud causae afferri non potest, quod ab alio missus sit... Quae de Filio dicta facile conciliantur cum natura divina, quia Filius a Patre mittitur). This explanation is weak both historically (since in the quoted words of St. Justin there is not a single word about what is necessary for the one who appears to be sent) and dogmatically (in many manifestations of God the one who appears acts on His behalf; therefore, the Father Himself could appear at His own will and was actually revealed in the New Testament theophany). However, Catholic scholars are not all trying to agree with this passage with the teaching of the perfect equality of the Son with the Father. Schwane (Schwane, Dogmengeschichte der vornicänischen Zeit. Münster. 1862. S. 90) admits that it is not possible to explain everything in the sense of only hypostatic subordinationism, that St. Justin expresses himself here at least imprecisely and does not clearly exclude (ausdrücklich) the idea of ​​essential subordinationism. “Seltsame Inconsequenz,” as Thomasius calls this opinion of the apologists (Origenes. S. 61). Dionysius Petavius, de theolog, dogmat, t. 2, p. 21. Quae omnia demonstrant, Justinům inferioris cujusdam conditionis putasse Filium, etiam antequam homo fieret; ac minorem esse Deum, qui pes ubique esset, et spatio circumscriberetur aliquo, et paternae voluntati serviret. In relation to St. This is all the more true for Justin, since he also contains other expressions that are so inaccurate that a formally correct conclusion from them would be pure Arianism. Dial. With. Tr. n. 5. καί οίά τε έξαφανισθήναι καί μή είναι έτι. Μόνος γάρ αγέννητος καί άφθαρτος ό Θεός, καί διά τούτο Θεός έστι· τα (in this place we are talking about the world itself). Apol. 2, no. 7. Polemicizing against the Stoic doctrine of fate (ειμαρμένη), St. Justin says that both angels and people are gifted with freedom (αυτεξούσιον), and this lies the possibility of their falls and punishments. Γεννητού (Engelhardt, op. cit. 116. “in all likelihood, together with Otto, one should read γενητού”) δέ παντός ήδε ή φύσις, κακίας καί αρετής δεκτικόν είναι.” On this occasion Engelhardt (S. 116) notes: “he (Justin) could call the Son γενητόν, although he said that everything that happened was by its nature susceptible to evil; however, all this does not exclude the fact that he distinguishes the Son of God by His essence from all creatures, and explains this difference in His essence in a special way of His origin - by the fact that He is the Son and the first birth (πρώτον γέννημα) of God. He is neither δεκτικός κακίας nor φθαρτός. He is a divine being." When assessing such views of ancient Christian writers, the following remark of St. Basil the Great (adv. Eunom. 1. 1. n. 4. r. 211): πίστιν έκτίθεται (Εύνόμιος) έξ άπλών καί αδιόριστων λέξεων συγκειμένην, ή έχρήσαντο καί τινες των πατέρων, ούχί προς ζητήσεις ύποκειμένας ά π ο τ ε ι ν ό μ ε ν ο ι, άλλ’ απλώς ?? φασι, σοφιζόμενος τόν ’Αλέξανδρον, ταύτην αύτώ προετείνατο. Apol. 1, n. 13. Πνεύμα τε προφητικόν έν τρίτη τάξει... τιμώμεν. cfr. n. 60. These words so clearly define the place of the Holy Spirit that they are not weakened by what is in Apol. 1.n. 6. St. Justin puts the Holy Spirit, apparently, in fourth place. “’Εκείνον τε, καί τόν παρ’ αύτού Υιόν έλθόντα καί διδάξαντα ήμάς ταϋτα (to the sublime concept of God) "" The idea that here the Holy Spirit is included among the created spirits, angels in the proper sense, suffers from arbitrariness, although attempts to reject this conclusion cannot be considered satisfactory: they suggest (for example, Schaff, 245) that τόν στρατόν here depends not on σεβόμεθα, as Πνεύμα, - but from διδάξαντα; but in this case the construction of the sentence becomes very artificial - The clearly expressed idea that the Holy Spirit has a third place, and the Son three times, is also significant in the sense of an objection to the opinion that St. Justin identifies the Son and the Spirit: it is very difficult to put one and the same Person in two places after we know that the Father and the Son differ from each other not as a being and its non-hypostatic manifestation, but as έτερος αριθμώ and έτερος αριθμώ. The grounds for this opinion are very weak and boil down to two points: in the prophets both the prophetic Spirit speaks (Dial. c. Tr. n. 56) and the Word (Apol. 2. n. 10); then the Holy Spirit and the power of the Most High, which overshadowed the saint. Virgo, is identified with the Word (Apol. 1, 33. άλλο νοήσαι θέμις, ή τον Αόγον, δς καί πρωτότοκος τφ Θεώ έστι... τούτο, έλθόν επί τήν Παρθένον); but in this case, Tertullian also identifies the Holy Spirit with the Word, who stands above all suspicions in such a confusion of the second and third Persons of the Holy Trinity (adv. Prach. p. 26. 27), i.e. in this case he takes the name “St. Spirit" not in the narrow sense of a third Person, but in the general meaning of a spiritual being of divine nature, - This is the opinion about the teaching of St. Justina at the present time, it seems, has already been abandoned by everyone. Engelhardt, op. cit. 143. “Of course, the opinion that Justin identifies the Holy Spirit with the Word is erroneous.” Dial. With. Tryph. n. 116. καί άφίσταται άφ’ ήμών. Here the Holy Spirit is not clearly spoken of, but Neander (Allgemeine Geschichte der christlichen Religion und Kirche. Gotha. 1864. Bd. 2. S. 353) and Schwane (S. 98) believe that the angel here means the Holy Spirit. Engelhardt (S. 144), following Semisch, disputes this on the grounds that Justin nowhere attributes to the Holy Spirit the protection of Christians in the fight against evil and the significance of the principle of moral life. But this is hardly fair; in the very fact of baptism in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit there is already a moment of the fundamental relationship of the Holy Spirit to the moral life of a regenerated person (see Apol. 1. n. 61). And the above passage is taken from a place where St. Justin, in application to the prophecy of Zechariah (chapter 3), reveals a teaching that comes into contact with the idea of ​​​​rebirth. According to the will of the Father, by the grace of Jesus Christ, those who believe in Him put aside the unclean garments of sin. The devil tries to attract believers to his side; an angel sent by Christ supports them in the fight against evil, and, finally, morally purified, they put on the clothes prepared by Christ and are awarded the eternal kingdom. This putting off of unclean garments for the purpose of putting on new ones is analogous to the putting off of the old man and the putting on of the new in baptism. The Father and Son are mentioned; It is natural to introduce a third person. Alzog. Grundriss der Patrologie. Freiburg im Breisgau. 1869. S. 72. Works of the ancients. Christ apologists, trans. priest Preobrazhensky. Moscow. 1867. p. 6. Here the death of Tatian is supposed to be around 175. Alzog, S. 76. Seine πρεσβεία wurde im Jahre 176 oder 177 den Kaisern Μ. Aurelius u. Commodus übergeben. U o. Preobrazhensky (p. 63) puts the time of appearance of the “petition” between 166 and 177. Dial. With. Tr. n. 128. Dial. With. Tr. n. 61. (p. 39 pr. 4). Tatiani Assyrii oratio adv. graecos (Migne, s. gr. t. 6) n. 5. γέγονε δέ κατά μερισμόν, ού κατά αποκοπήν. Τό γάρ άποτμηθέν του πρώτου κεχώρισται· τό δέ μερισ θέν οικονομίας την αϊρεσιν προσλαβόν, ούκ ένδεά τόν οθεν εϊληπται πεποίηκε. The word “μερισμός” is understood differently: Dorner (I. 438): Abtheilung, nicht Abschneidung; Daniel (1. s.ar. Dorner): Mittheilung; Kuhn (S. 143) and Alzog (S. 75): Theilhaftwerden, nicht Trennung; Preobrazhensky: message. The word “μερισθέν” Baur (Lehre v. d. Dreieinigkeit u. Menschwerdung Gottes. Tübingen. 1841. I. 178) translates: das als Theil unterschiedene. The least clear place is “οικονομίας την αϊρεσιν προσλαβόν” Baur translates: “das durch freie Selbstbestimmung die Ökono mie, die Vielheit in der Einheit hinzunimmt”, and, thus, economy considers the innermost revelation of the Divine; Dorner understands the word “οικονομία” in the sense of revelation (die Offenbarung), Kuhn in the sense of world rule (der Haushalt der Welt), Fr. Preobrazhensky in the sense of service. The meaning of the expression: “what happened through a message does not produce a deficiency in where it was received from” is explained by Tatian himself: δυνάμεως, ούκ άλογον πεποίηκε τον γεγεννηκότα. καί γάρ αυτός έγώ λαλώ, καί ού δήπου... κενός ό προσομιλών λόγου γίνομαι. This is the trace, the places are given in the translation of Fr. Preobrazhensky. Athenagorae legatio pro christianis (Migne, t. 6) n. 12. ον ίσως Θεόν καί τόν παρ’ αύτού Λόγον είδέναι, τίς ή του Παιδός προς τόν Πατέρα ένότης, τίς ή του Πατρός προς τόν Υιόν κοινωνία, τί τό Πνεύμα τίς ή των τοσούτων ένωσις, καί διαίρεσις ένουμένων, τοΰ Πνεύματος, τού Παιδός, τού Πατρός. n. 10. αύτών καί την έν τή ενώσει δύναμιν καί τήν έν τή τάξει διαίρεσιν. The word τάξις is the only one that Athenagoras uses to signify the difference in the Trinity; It is curious, however, that while he put all the differences in order, he did not adhere to them strictly in listing the names of divine Persons: in the above place (n. 12) They are listed in reverse order. n. 10. καί Πατρός έν Υίώ, ένότητι καί δυνάμει πνεύματος. Bn. 18 The Son is called inseparable from the Father ύποτέτακται). Meanwhile, St. Justin does not use another, more precise and strong expression to signify the eternity of the Word than “The Word is before all creatures” (Apol. 2. n. 6), Athenagoras says the following (n. 10): πρώτον γέννημα τώ Πατρί, ούχ ώς γενόμενον (έξ άρχής γάρ ό Θεός, νούς άΐδιος ών, είχεν αύτός έν έαυτφ τόν Λόγον, ά ιδίως λογικός ών). S. Theophili ep. antioch. (Migne, t. 6) ad Autolyc. 1. 2. n. 15. τύποι είσίν τής Τριάδος, τού Θεού, καί τού Λόγου αυτού, καί τής Σοφίας αυτού. ad Autol. 1. 2. n. 22. “You will tell me: God, according to you, should not be limited to place (τον Θεόν έν τόπω μή δεϊν χωρεΐσθαι); but how do you now say that He walked in paradise? – Listen to what I tell you: God and the Father of all is immense and is not located in any place, for there is no place for His rest (about μέν Θεός καί Πατήρ των όλων αχώρητος έστι, καί έν τόπφ ούχ εύρίσκεται· ου γάρ έστι τόπος τής καταπαύσεως αυτού). His Word, through which He created everything... taking the form of the Father and Lord of all, It walked in paradise and talked with Adam (ό δέ Λόγος αυτού, δι’ τα πάντα πεποίηκεν... άναλαμβάνων τό πρόσωπον τού Πατρός... ούτος παρεγένετο εις τόν ... Adam heard a voice. And what is another voice if not the Word Boni, who is also His Son? (" αύτού;)... So, the Word, which is God and begotten of God (Θεός ουv ών ό Λόγος, καί έκ Θεού πεφυκώς), the Father of the universe, when he wants, sends to any place (πέμπει αύτόν εις τινα τόπον), and It... when it is sent, it is both audible and visible and is in a known place (έν τόπω εύρίσκεται).” Maranus (nota ad. h. loc.) again tries to explain everything only by the personal relationship of the Word to the Father. Pater ergo in loco inveniri non potest, quia non potest esse vox sive Verbum alterius personae, nec Deus ex Deogenitus (dici)... quia Pater mitti non potest, but the explanation is fully shared by Kuhn (S. 151), who attributes to the view of St. Theophilus has that high advantage that, meanwhile, St. Justin, intending to prove the independent existence of the Word, as distinct from the Father, bases the difference between the God of phenomena and the invisible God on the absolute eminence of the Father of all over everything spatial, and thus gives his thought a subordinate appearance, in St. Theophilus, this specter of subordinationism is completely dispelled, since the entire difference between the non-revealed and revealed God is based on the fact that the God of revelation is the Word (Indem er (Justin)... die Behauptung hinstellte: der Vater des All könne vermöge seinet über alles Räumliche nicht erscheinen; so umgab er jene Wahrheit mit subordinatianischen Schein; indem er die Persönlichkeit des Logos aufhellte, h i hulíte er seine Göttlichkeit. Schwane admits that Maran's explanation does not apply to this case. And indeed, the content of this section can be conveyed in the following scheme: no, God the Father is above every place, cannot and does not exist in any space; It is not He who appears spatially, but His Son, the Word. That the Word really appeared to Adam is proven by the fact that he heard the voice, that is, the Word. And if It spoke as God, appeared in the form (έν προσώπω) of the Father, then this is natural: the Word is truly God, because it was born of God. Thus, those expressions that Maran emphasizes, that the Son is the Word of the Father and begotten of Him, prove only that God, who appeared to Adam, was the Son, and not the Father, and it is not at all clear that they contain the reason that the Father does not appear in space, and the Son does: this difference between the Father and the Son is stated simply as a fact, and its reasons remain unknown. Orat. adv. n. 5. Ό γάρ δεσπότης των όλων, αυτός υπάρχων του παντός ή ύπόστασις, κατά μέν την μηδέπω γεγενημένην ποίησιν, μόνος ήν καθό δέ πάσα δύναμις ? γάρ διά λογικής δυνάμεως αυτός καί ό Αόγος, δς ήν έν αύτω, ύπέστησε. θελήματι δέ τής άπλότητος αύτού προπηδά Αόγος. ό δέ Αόγος ού κατά κενού χωρήσας έργον πρωτότοκον τού Πατρός γίνεται. Τούτον ϊσμεν τού κόσμου την άρχήν... n. 7. Αόγος γάρ ό έπουράνιος, πνεύμα γεγονώς άπό τού Πατρός (n.4. πνεύμα (n. 5. ό τής τού Πατρός δυνάμεως), κατά τήν τού γεννήσαντος αύτόν Πατρός μίμησιν, τόν άνθρωπον έποίησεν. In this not entirely clear presentation, the following main points can be distinguished: God is spirit, and one of His most important definitions is the power of reason, δύναμις λογική (n. 5, n. 7; n. 5 λόγου δύναμις). In the beginning - He is alone: ​​the world does not yet really exist. But at the same time, God is not alone: ​​everything is with Him. because in His rational power the world itself already exists ideally, in possibility (God – πάσα δύναμις; Alzog: insofern Alles... potentialiter (und idealiter zugleich) in ihm seinen Grund hat.). Due to the same rational power of God (διά λογικής δυνάμεως, although perhaps not in the same sense as everyone else) His Logos exists with Him and in Him. By the will of God, the Logos emerges from Him and creates the world. At this moment of His existence, the Logos that came forth (προελθών), was born (n. 5. έν άρχή γεννηθείς. n. 7. γεννήσαντος), is the spirit that came from God, is the Logos έκ τής λογικής δυνάμεως (not διά τής λογικής δυνάμεως). He creates man in imitation of His Father. In a word, at this moment the Logos is characterized by features that distinguish Him as a special hypostasis, not identical with the Father. Let us note one more feature: the Logos is not called the Son anywhere, but God in relation to Him is called the Father with remarkable consistency from the moment the Logos emerges from God and becomes the original work of the Father. All these features are reminiscent of Tertullian. Legat, n. 10. Προς αύτοΰ (fort, legend, αυτόν) γάρ καί δι’ αύτοΰ πάντα έγένετο, ένός οντος τοΰ Πατρός καί τοΰ Υίοΰ. See page 54 pr. 3. ώς... ιδέα και ένέργεια είναι προελθών. Athenagoras’s success in presenting the doctrine of the Logos is found on two points: the existence of the Logos is most clearly based on the definition of God as mind, then in the Logos Himself two sides are clearly distinguished: He is the idea and the energy, i.e. the bearer of the ideal prototype according to which (προς αυτόν γάρ) the world was created, and the active force by which (δι’ αύτοΰ) it was created. ad Autol. I. 2. n. 22. ν Λόγον, τόν όντα διαπαντός ενδιάθετον έν καρδία Θεοΰ. Προ γάρ τι γίνεσθαι, τούτον είχε σύμβουλον, έαυτοΰ νοΰν καί φρόνησιν όντα. (n. 10. έχων ούν ό Θεός τόν έαυτοΰ Λόγον ένδιάθετον έν τοΐς ίδίοις σπλάγχνοις, έγέννησεν αύτόν μετά τής έαυτοΰ Σοφίας έξερευξάμενος προ των όλων), τούτον τόν Λόγον έγέννησεν προφορικόν, πρωτότοκον πάσης κτίσεως, ού κενωθείς αύτός τοΰ Λόγου, άλλά Λόγον γεννήσας, καί τω Λόγω αύτοΰ διαπαντός όμιλών (n. 10. ού γάρ ήσαν οί ‘προφήται οτε ό κόσμος έγίνετο, άλλ’ ή Σοφία ή έν αύτω ούσα ή τοΰ Θεού καί ό Λόγος ό άγιος αύτοΰ όάεί συμπαρών αύτω). n. 22. δτι έν πρώτοις ήν ό Θεός μόνος και έν αύτώ ό Λόγος. V. Snegirev, The Teaching about the Face of I. Christ. 1871. p. 154. “The expression σύμβουλος“ attached to the Word, called ένδιάθετος by Theophilus, clearly shows that he represents the Son as existing personally and pre-eternally begotten and begotten of the Father." Meanwhile Petavius (op. cit. p. 22) comes to completely opposite to the conclusion and thinks that Λόγος ένδιάθετος ipsa Dei est essentia, sive mens illius, unde habet, ut λογικός nominetur And in fact, in the word “σύμβουλος” on. What comes first is not the fact that the one who advises is a special person, not identical with the one to whom he advises, but the fact that the “adviser” is “thought and mind” (see p. 57, pr. 5). Θεός, and Λόγος ένδιάθετος only Λόγος έν Θεώ (p. 58, pr. 1). V. Snegirev, p. 149. Perhaps, from Tatian’s point of view, it should be said that the ideal world is a conceivable object of the Father’s rational power, and Λόγος ένδιάθετος is contained in it as its integrating moment. S. Athanasii M. With. arian. oratio 4, n. 1.2. 4. Here Athanasius V., concluding from the definition of God as wise and reasonable (λογικός) to the existence of Wisdom and the Word, also foresees that the Wisdom of God can be considered a non-hypostatic quality of the nature of the Father Himself (n. 4. εί δέ φήσαιεν, ώς ποιότητα είναι έν τώ Πατρί τήν σοφίαν, π. 2. όνομα μόνον έστί – σοφία, ούχ ύφέστηκε δέ). Orat. adv. c. arian. 4.n. 2. πώποτε ήν ή έστιν. n. 4. καί ούκ άλογός έστιν άσοφος καί άλογος. Ει μέν ούν τό δεύτερον, αύτόθεν έχει τήν άτοπίαν εί δέ τό πρώτον, έρωτητέον, πώς έστι σοφός, καί ούκ άλογος- πότερον έξωθεν έσχηκώς τον Λόγον καί τήν Σοφίαν, ή έξ έαυτοΰ; However, St. Athanasius disagrees with the fact that wisdom is a quality of God: God is wise, but He is not wisdom and does not have wisdom in Himself as a non-hypostatic property of His nature; because this would be inconsistent with the highest simplicity of the being of God, to which quality (ποιότης) would relate as an accidental sign (συμβεβηκός), and God would turn out to be composed of essence and quality (n. 2. εύρεθήσεται γάρ ?? τεμνομένη εις ουσίαν καί συμβεβηκός). But since God, as the wise one, presupposes the existence of wisdom and must have it; then it is necessary that it be hypostatic Wisdom, ουσιώδης Σοφία, καί ένούσιος Λόγος, καί ών Υιός. See page 55. St. Theophilus continues: η Θεός, Λόγος, Σοφία, άνθρωπος. Διά τούτο καί τη τετάρτη ήμέρςχ έγεννήθησαν φωστήρες. Or. adv. graec. n. 13. πειθόμεναι καί τόν διάκονον τοΰ πεπονθότος Θεοϋ παραιτούμενοι θεομάχοι μάλλον ήπερ θεοσεβείς άνεφαίνοντο. In general, Tatian’s teaching about the Holy Spirit has a very unique character. There are two different spirits: the world spirit, passing (διήκον) through all material nature, and the divine spirit, or God Himself (πνεύμα ό Θεός. n. 4). From God is born the Word, which is also spirit (n. 7). The Word creates a person in whom there are two spirits: the soul, in which the connection between man and material nature is expressed, and the spirit, according to which he is a being higher than the material; this spirit in its own sense is the bearer of the image and likeness of God in man (n. 12. καλείται ψυχή· τό δέ μεϊζον μέν τής ψυχής, Θεού δέ είκών καί Έκάτερα δέ παρά τοΐς άνθρώποις τοΐς πρώτοις ύπήρχεν, ϊνα τό μέν τι ώσιν υλικοί, τό δέ άνώτεροι τής ύλης). The first spirit is identical with the very nature of man, the second does not constitute its integral part: it is the divine Spirit given to the soul for moral guidance, and therefore with the fall of man through disobedience, the Spirit is separated from the soul (n. 13. θείου Πνεύματος, άνέρχεται δέ προς άπερ αύτήν οδηγεί χωρία τό Γέγονε μέν ούν συνδίαιτον άρχήθεν τό πνεύμα (so in Min; but this distinction is made without sufficient grounds, and therefore it should, as further, write "τό Πνεύμα") τή ψυχή· τό δέ πνεύμα ταύτην έπεσθαι μή βουλομένην αύτω καταλέ λοιπεν. χωρισθέντος άπ’ αύτού τού Πνεύματος τού δυνατωτέρου, θνητός γίνεται). The whole task of the moral life of fallen man, therefore, is to restore this broken, but once existing union of the soul with the spirit, that is, the Holy Spirit, and through His mediation to enter into communion with God (n. 13 (ψυχή) ζητούσα τόν Θεόν n. 15. καί χρή λοιπόν ή μάς δπερ έχοντες άπολωλέκαμεν, τούτο νύν άναζητεΐν, ζευγνύναι τε τήν ψυχήν τφ Πνεύματι τω άγίω, καί τήν κατά Θεόν συζυγίαν πραγματεύεσθαι... κατοικεΐν έν αύτω (τω άνθρώπφ) Θεός διά τού πρεσβεύοντος Πνεύματος). All this gives us the right to conclude without hesitation that for Tatian the human spirit, in which the image of God is reflected, appears not as an inseparable part of the human being itself, but as the Holy Spirit, a servant of the suffering God, a mediator between God and the human soul, akin to it. n. 10. Πνεύμα άπόρροιαν ειναί φαμεν τού Θεού, άπορρέον καί έπαναφερόμενον, ώς άκτΐνα ήλιου. ad Autol. 1. 2. n. 10. ούτος (ό Λόγος) ούν, ών Πνεύμα Θεού (cfr. Tatian. adv. graec. n. 7), καί αρχή καί σοφία, καί δύναμις Ύψίστου κατήρχετο εις τούς προφήτας. n. 22. παράδεισον. However, in n. 10 and n. 15 (see p. 57 pr. 5) Wisdom-Spirit is so clearly different from the Word that it is incomprehensible how Petavius ​​(p. 23) could think that Theophilus the Holy Spirit merged with the Son. If we are based on the confusion of names, then we would have to say that Athenagoras merges the Father with the Son and the Spirit, because the Son is called Λόγος and the Holy Spirit - Πνεύμα, and in legat. n. 16 it says: πνεύμα, δύναμις, λόγος. n. 10. see page 57 ex. 5. adv. haeres. 2, 28, 6. Non ergo magnum quid invenerunt, qui emissiones exco, neque absconditum mystérium, si id quod ab omnibus intelligitur, ilaiistulcruunt in Unigenitum Dei Verbum: et quem inenarrabilem et innominabilem hunc quasi ipsi ohstetricaverint, primae generationers ejus prolationem et gene rationem enunciant, adsimilantes eum hominum verbo emissionis (προφορικό. Gieseler). adv. haer. 2, 28. 6. quicunque nituntur generationes et prolationes enarrare non sunt compotes sui, ea quae inenarrabilia sunt, enarrare promittentes. adv. h. 2, 13, 5. compositus est et corporalis intelligitur, ut sit separatim quidem qui emissit, Deus, separatim autem qui emissus est, sensus. adv. h. 2, 13, 3. multum enim disstat Pater ab his, quae proveniunt in hominibus affectionibus et passionibus; et simplex et non compositus et similimembrius et totus ipse sibimet ipsi similis et aequalis est. adv. h. 2, 13, 6. emissio enim est ejus, quod emittitur, extra eminentem manifestatio. adv. h. 2, 28, 5. Deus autem totus existens mens et totus existens Logos (2, 13, 8) eus, totus Nus et totus Logos quum sit), quod cogitat, hoc et loquitur, et quod loqui cogitat. Cogitatio enim ejus Logos, et Logos mens, et omnia concludens mens est. adv. h. 2, 13, 8. totus ille sensus et totus verbum, et in quo sensus est in hoc et verbum... In eo (Deo)... nec aliud antiquius nec posterius, aut aliud alterius habente in se, sed toto aequali et simili et uno perseverante, jam non talis hujus ordinationis sequitur emissio... Et in quo distabit Dei Verbum, imo magis ipse Deus, quum sit Verbum (a quo Verbum), a verbo hominum, si eamdem habuerit ordinationem et emissionem generationis? 2, 25, 3. Non infectus es, o homo, neque semper coëxistens sicut proprium ejus (Dei) Verbum. 2, 30, 9. Semper coëxistens Filius Patri... Verbum, i. e. Filius, semper cum Patre erat. adv. h. 2, 17, 2. Quaeritur, quemadmodum emissi sunt... aeones? Et utrum ejusmodi substantiae exsistebant his, qui se emiserunt, an ex-altera quadam substantia substantiam habentes? 2, 17, 7. Non enim ut compositum animal quiddam est omnium Pater praeter Nun... Sed Nus Pater, et Pater Nus. Necesse est itaque et eum, qui ex eo est Logos, immo magis autem ipsum Nun, quum sit Logos, perfectum et impassibilem esse; et eas quae ex eo sunt emissiones, ejusdem substantiae quum sint, cujus et ipse, perfectas et impassibiles et semper similes cum eo perseverare, qui eas cmisit. adv. h. 2. 17. 3. vel generationes Patris erunt ejusdem substantiae ei et similes generatori; vel si dissimiles parebunt, ex altera quadam substantia confiteri eas necesse est. adv. h. 2. 17. 5. et si quis Stellas dicat eos (aeones), nihilominus eadem universi apparebunt natura participants. Etenim si Stella a Stella in claritate differt, sed non secundum qualitatem, nec secundum substantiam, secundum quam passibile aliquid vel impassibile est; Sed aut universos, ex lumine quum sint paterno, naturaliter impassibiles et immutabiles esse oportet, aut universi cum paterno lumine apparebunt et passibiles et commutationum corruptionis capaces sunt. 2. 17. 6. Haec autem cadem ratio sequetur etsi velut ab arbore ramos dicant a Logo natam esse emissionem aeonum; quum Logos a Patre ipsorum generationem habeat: ejusdem enim substantiae omnes inveniuntur cum Patre tantum secundum magnitudinem, non secundum miturarn differentes abinvicem, et magnitudinem complentes Patris, quemadmodum (lípliі complent manum. adv. li. 2. 17. 4. si autem velut a lumine lumina accensa sunt aeones a Logo, Logos autem a No, et Nus a Bytho, veluti verbi gratia a facula faculae; generatione quidem et magnitudine fortasse distabunt abinvicem: ejusdem autem substantiae quum sint cum principe emissionis ipsorum, aut omneš impassibiles perseverant, aut et Pater ipsorum participabit passiones. Neque enim quae postea accensa est facula alterum lumen habebit, quam illud quod ante earn fuit. Quapropter et lumina ipsorum composita et unum, in principálem unionem recurrunt, quum fiat unum lumen quod fuit et a principio. Quod autem juvenius et antiquius est, neque in ipso lumine intelligi potest (unum enim lumen est totum) nec in ipsis quae perceperunt lumen faculis (etenim ipsae secundum substantiam materiae id tempus habent; una enim et eadem est facularum materia), sed tantum secundum accensionem, quoniam altera quidem ante pusilium tempus, altera autem nunc accensa est. Hanp., adv. h. 2, 28, 5. “That. whoever ascribes to the Word a third place in descent from the Father (tertiam prolationem a Patře) - and therefore does not know His greatness - separates the Word very far from God (porro et longe Logon a Deo separavit). The Prophet says about Him: “Who will tell His birth?” (Isaiah 52:8).” And in the next paragraph we are talking about the Son in a purely ecclesiastical sense: St. Irenaeus speaks of the only-begotten Word of God, while, according to the Valentinian system, from the “Depth” (Βυθός) are born the “Mind” (Νους), which is called the “Only Begotten” (Μονογενής), and “Truth” (’Αλήθεια), and from this pair (συζυγία) the “Word” (Αόγος) and “Life” (Ζωή) originate, so there could be no talk of the “Only Begotten Word” among the Valentinians. adv. h. 4. 28. 2. unus et idem Deus Pater et Verbum ejus. adv. h. 4, 20, 1. non ergo angeli fecerunt nos... nec alius quis praeter Verbum Domini, nec virtus longe absistens a Patře universorum. Nec enim indigebat horum Deus ad faciendum quae ipse apud se praedefiniebat fieri quasi ipse suas non haberet mantis. Adest enim ei semper Verbum et Sapientia, Filius et Spiritus. 2, 2, 5. Proprium est hoc supereminentiae Dei, non indigere aliis organis ad conditionem eorum quae limit; et idoneus est et sufficiens ad formationem omnium proprium ejus Verbum. 2, 30, 9 hic Pater, hic Deus, hic conditor... qui fecit ea (omnia) per semetipsum, hoc est, per Verbum et per Sapientiam suam. 4. 8.bene qui dicit, ipsum immensum Patrem mensuratum in Filio; mensura enim Patris Filius, quońiam et capit eum (cfr. 4, 20, 1. (speaking of created beings) igitur secundum magnitudinem non est cognoscere Deum, impossibile enim est niensurari Patrem. 4, 20, 5. incapabilis enim est Pater). 4, 14. invisibile Filii Pater, visibile Patris Filius. adv. h. 3, 6, 1. Neque igitur Deus, neque Spiritus S., neque apostoli eum, qui non esset Deus, definitive et absolute Deum nominassent aliquando, nisi esset vere Deus; neque Dominum appellassent aliquem ex sua persona nisi qui dominatur omnium, Deum Patrem et Filium ejus. Cp. Kurtz, op. cit. 342. Irenäus und Clemens v. Alex, hatten die kirchliche Entwickelung der Christologie fast bis zur Erfassung der absoluten Homousie gesteigert, – freilich aber um den Preis steigender Verdunkelung des hypostatischen Unterschiedes, (S. 336) obwohl sie im Allgemeinen den Hypostasianismus entschieden festzuhalten bemüht sind. adv. h. 2, 28, 5; 2, 13, 8. See page 65 pr. 7, p. 66 pr. 1. Here are some of the clearer places: adv. h. 4, 6, 7. ab omnibus accipiens testimonium, quoniam vere homo et quoniam vere Deus, a Patře, a Spiritu, ab angelis, ab ipsa conditione, ab hominibus... ab inimico... ab ipsa morte. This passage would be decisive if it were not about Christ the God-Man, but about God the Son. 3, 6, 1. (Ps. 109, 1). Patrem enim collocutum Filio ostendit. – (Ps. 44, 7) utrosque enim Dei appellatione significavit Spiritus, et eum qui ungitur, Filium et eum qui ungit, i. e. Patrem. – 3, 18, 3. in Christi nomine subauditur qui unxit, Pater, – et ipse qui unctus est, – Filius, – et ipsa unctio in qua unctus est, – Spiritus. But in 3, 9, 8. the anointing already refers to the human nature of Christ: (Esai, 61, 1) nam secundum id quod Verbum Dei homo erat ex radice Jesse et filius Abrahae... ungebatur ad evangelizandum. L. Duncker, Des h. Irenäus Christologie. Göttingen. 1843. S. 54. 55. Here Duncker indicates eight places with a touch of subordinationism. Sie zerstören jeden Schein, als ob unser Kirchenvater die Realität des Unterschiedes in Gott geläugnet (S. 56). Here is the most significant thing in the places collected by Duncker. adv. h. 4, 6, 7. Filius revelat... Patrem, quibus vult... Pater. 3, 16, 7. Praecognita quidem omnia a Patre, perficiuntur autem a Filio. 4, 20, 7. Verbum dispensator paternae gratiae. 3, 6, 2. Patre testimonium perhibente Filio et Filio annuntiante Patrem. Since the subordinationism of this place is elusive to the naked eye, we also quote Duncker’s words: und wenn er den Vater verkündigt, erhält er von diesem Zeugniss. 4, 6, 3. mittit Pater, mittitur autem Filius. 3, 6, 1. Filius dominium accepit a Patre. 5, 18, 2. Pater conditionem simul et Verbum suum portans... ipse (Pater) est caput Christi. 2, 28, 8. et secundum agnitionem itaque praepositus esse Pater annunciatus est a Domino nostro. This place is given in the text. Duncker himself says the following about these expressions (S. 53): kommt er (Irenäus) in manchen seiner Aeusserungen zu der ausdrücklichen Behauptung eines wirklichen Subordinationsverhältnisses des Sohnes zum Vater, das streng genommen die gleichfalls von ihm vertheidigte Einheit beider aufheben müsste. Dorner sees it differently (S. 473). Am leichtesten wäre freilich sein Gegensatz gegen das Sabellianische zu erweisen, wenn man eine Subordination des Sohnes fände. Allein was man dafür anführen kann, nämlich dass Irenäus dem Sohn nicht Allwissenheit zuschreibt, beweist nichts, da die Stelle auf den Menschgewordenen sich bezieht oder doch beziehen kann. Dorner considers equally untenable such data as the expressions: Filius mantis Paths (Baur (S. 178 f.) saw in the name of the Son and Spirit manus Paths and progenies et fìguratio an expression of subordination to Their Father) or: Filius administrans Patri. As for the “ministerium Filii,” it should be noted that even in its very term it differs from the ministry of angels (4. 7. 4): The Son serves (ministrat) the Father, but rules (principatum tenet) over the angels, and they work (serviunt) the Son. Cfr. 4, 20, 2. adv. h. 2, 28, 6. 8. Dorner's cautious judgment that this passage refers, or at least may refer, to the Son incarnate is more just than any more decisive review. If the indication that this answer is the best for the present time, when we are in the image of this world, gives some right to conclude by analogy that Christ, only because he was in the image of this world, attributed to the Father alone knowledge of the day of the end of the world: then can it be said that from this point of view the fear that St. Irenaeus, arguing that only the Father really knows this day? If these words of the Savior refer only to His human nature, then how can we explain the reference to the fact that the Father has communion with the Son in everything (in omnibus Pater communicans Filio)? adv. h. 4, 20 1. (see p. 69 ex. 2). 5.6, 1; 5, 1,3. adv. h. 4, 7, 4. ministrat ei ad omnia sua progenies et figuratio sua, i. e. Filius et Spiritus, Verbum et Sapientia. adv. h. 2, 30, 9. see page 69 ex. 2 adv. h. 2, 30, 9. see page 69 ex. 2. adv. b. 4, 17; 2, 30, 9. quoniam autem et sapientia, quae est Spiritus, erat apud eum (Patrem) ante omnem constitutionem, per Solomonem ait: Dominus sapientia fundavit terrain etc. adv. h. 4, 14, 1. igitur initio non quasi indigens Deus hominis plasmavit Adam... Non enim solum ante Adam, sed et ante omnem conditionem glorificabat Verbum Patrem suum, manens in eo. et ipse a Patře glorificabatur. Between the works of Clement (Migne, S. G. t. 8–9) there is "Excerpta ex scriptis Theodoti" διδασκαλίας κατά τούς Ούαλεντίνου χρόνους έπιτομαί). In this Theodotos, Neander and Dorner (I, 505) recognize Theodotos as a money changer, but Demmer (Laemmer, Clementis alex. de Λόγω doctrina. Lips. 1855. p. 10) writes: de Theodoto isto nihil certi traditum est; liber ipse continet Valentini et Basilidis opiniones gnosticas. Paedag. 1. 3. c. 12. p. (edit. Potteri) 310. γνήσιος, άγιασμα γνώσεως... Πάντα ό Λόγος καί ποιεί, και διδάσκει, καί παιδαγωγεί. Paed. 1, 7, 132. παιδαγωγός τής άνθρωπότητος. Going into the presentation of Clement's teaching about the Logos in His relation to the world, we, of course, deviate from our program, which includes a review of the teaching only about the immanent Trinity. This inconsistency has its justification in the fact that Clement was Origen’s teacher, and, moreover, one whose influence is beyond dispute, since some points of Clement’s teaching are repeated by Origen; therefore, the teaching of the first should be presented as completely as possible. Further, Clement’s teaching about the revealed Logos contains elements that should probably characterize His ontological side, but it is hardly possible to separate them from the teaching about the revelation of the Word and group them into the teaching about the immanent Trinity. Strom. 4, 25, 635. (p. ed. Paris. 537). ό μέν ούν Θεός, αναπόδεικτος ών, ούκ έστιν επιστημονικός. Str. 5, 12, 695. έστιν. Έπεί γάρ άρχή παντός πράγματος δυσεύρετος, πάντως που ή πρώτη και πρεσ βυτάτη άρχή δύσδεικτος, ήτις καί τοϊς άλλοις άπασιν αιτία τοΰ γενέσθαι καί γενομένους είναι. Ibid. 696. και γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται, τού δέ άγεννήτου ούδέν προϋπάρχει. Str. 5, 11, 689. χρόνου, καί ονόματος, καί νοήσεως. Str. 5.12, 695. είδος, μήτε άτομον, μήτε αριθμός άλλα μήτε συμ- βεβηκός τι, μηδέ ω συμβέβηκέ τι; Ούκ άν δέ ολον εΐποι τις αύτόν όρθώς έπί μεγέθει γάρ τάττεται τό ολον, καί έστι τών όλων πατήρ. Ουδέ μήν μέρη τινά αύτοΰ λεκτέον άδιαίρετον γάρ τό εν διά τούτο δέ καί άπειρον, ού κατά τό άδιεξήτητον. (leg. άδιεξήγητον) νοούμενον, άλλά κατά τό άδιάστατον καί μή έχον πέρας. Str. 5, 12, 695. άσχημάτιστος. Τά γάρ λεγόμενο ή έκ τών προσόντων αύτοΐς ρητά έστιν, ή έκ τής ? ’Αλλ’ ουδέ έπιστήμη λαμβάνεται κ. τ. λ. Str. 2, 2, 431. χρήμα καί δυσθήρατον, έζαναχωροΰν άεί καί πόρρω άφιστάμενον τοΰ διώκοντος... Εις τόνγνόφον, ού ήν ή φωνή τοΰ Θεοΰ, είσελθεϊν βιάζεται (ό Μωυσής), τουτέστιν, εις τάς άδύτους καί άειδεΐς περί τοΰ οντος έννοιας. Str. 7, 1, 829. άνωνόμαστον), σεβάσματι δέ καί σιγή μετά έκπλήξεως άγιας σεβαστόν, καί σεπτόν κυριώτατα. Str. 5, 12, 695. τάγαθόν, ή νοΰν, ή αυτό τό ον, ή Πατέρα, ή Θεόν, ή δημιουργόν, ή Κύριον, ούχ ώς όνομα αυτού προφερόμενοι λέγομεν, ύπό δε άπορίας όνόμασι καλοϊς προσχρώμεθα, ϊν’ έχη ή διάνοια, μή περί άλλα ??? τού Θεού, άλλα άθρόως άπαντα ενδεικτικά της τού παντοκράτορας δυνάμεως. Str. 5, 11, 689. διά τού Υιού. 5, 12, 696. άγνωστον νοεΐν. Str. 4, 25, 635. άλλα τούτφ συγγενή. Str. 7, 2, 831. όλος νούς. Str. 5, 3, 654. τού Θεού. Str. 4, 25, 635. (ρ. Paris. 537). μεν ούν Θεός ούκ έστιν έπιστημονικός ό δε Υιός σοφία τέ έστι κ. τ. α. καί δή καί άπόδειξιν έχει, καί διέξοδον· πάσαι δε αί δυνάμεις Πνεύματος, συλλήβδην μεν έν τι πράγμα γενόμεναι, συντελούσιν εις τό αύτό, τόν Υιόν άπαρέμφατος δέ έστι τής περί έκάστης αύτού των δυνάμεων ίννοίας. Καί δή ού γίνεται άτεχνώς έν ώς έν, ούδέ πολλά ώς μέρη ό Υιός, άλλ’ ? εις έν і ίλουμένων καί ένουμένων διά τούτο καί “Α καί Ω” ό Λόγος εϊρηται· ού μόνου τό ιίλος άρχή γίνεται. This view has features reminiscent of Plotinus; however, the direct source of this view for Clement could have been Plato. Plotin. 5, 1.8; 1, 105. άλλήλων τό πρώτον έν, δ κυριώτερον έν, καί δεύτερον έν πολλά γων καί τρίτον έν καί πολλά. On this unique view of Logos as a unifying principle, Clement builds an original definition of faith and unbelief: faith is unity, unbelief is discord. Str. 4.25, 635 (537). Διό δή καί το εις αυτόν (τόν Λόγον) καί δι’ αύτοϋ πιστεΰσαι μοναδικόν έστι γενέσθαι, ένούμενον έν αύτφ τό δε άπιστήσαι διστάσαι έστί, καί διαστήναι, καί μερισθήναι. This practical conclusion from the definition of Logos shows that it is of no small importance for Clement. Str. 5, 11, 689. άφελόντες μεν του σώματος τάς φυσικός ποιότητας, περιελόντες δε τήν εις τό βάθος διάστασιν είτα, τήν εις τό πλάτος· καί επί τούτοις τήν εις τό μήκος· Τό γάρ ύπολειφθέν έστι σημεΐον μ ο ν ά ς , ώς είπεϊν, θέσιν έχουσαής εάν περιέλω- μεν τήν θέσιν, νοείται μονάς. Εί τοίνυν άφελόντες πάντα όσα πρόσεστι τοϊς σώμασι καί τοϊς λεγομένοις άσωμάτοις, άπιρρτψωμεν έαυτοΰς εις τό μέγεθος τοΰ Χρίστου· κάκείθεν εις τό άχανές άγιότητι προΐοιμεν, τη νοήσει του Παντοκράτορος άμηγέπη προσάγοιμεν, ούχ ö έστιν, ο δέ μή έστι γνωρίσαντες. Cohort, ad gent. With. 9. r. 72. ή άγαθή μονάς. Str. 4. 23, 633. άγαθά έξιν. Str. 6, 16, 813. είναι παύσεταί δπερ ουδέ είπεϊν θέμις. Paed. 1, 9,150. άγαθός μέν ό Θεός δι’ έαυτόν, δίκαιος δέ ήδη δι’ ήμάςκαί τούτο οτι άγαθός... πριν γάρ κτίστην γενέσθαι. Θεός ήν, άγαθός ήν καί διά τούτο καί δημιουργός είναι καί πατήρ ήθέλησεν. Str. 7, 7, 855. εκούσιος δέ ή των άγαθών μετάδοσις αύτω. Str. 7, 2, 832. Πατρός. Αϋτη γάρ ήν σοφία... δύναμις γάρ τοΰ Θεού ό Υιός. Str. 5, 14, 710. Υιός... δι’ ου πάντα έγένετο κατά βούλησιντοΰ Πατρός. Str. 7, 1, 829. και άπαρχήν τών οντων, τόν ΥΙόν. 7, 2, 832. άρχικώτατος Λόγος τοΰ Πατρός καί σοφία αύτοΰ. 6, 16, 810. 6, 7, 769. έν μέν τύ άγέννητον, έν δέ και τό προγεννηθέν, δι’ ού τα πάντα έγένετο. Str. 7, 3, 837 (708). Λόγος αιώνιος. These are the most sublime expressions of Clement about the eternity of the Word; as proof of the co-eternity of the Words to the Father, they refer (Thomasius) to an even stronger expression. Str. 5, I, 643. It is possible, of course, that Clement connected an ontological meaning with these words; but in context we are talking only about cognition. 1. p. ήδη δέ ούτε ή γνώσις άνευ πίστεως, οΰθ’ ή πίστις άνευ γνώσεως. Ού μήν κ. τ. λ. και ϊνα τις πιστεύση τώ Υίώ, γνώναι δει τόν Πατέρα, πρός δν καί ό Υιός... έκ πίστεως γάρ είς γνώσιν διά Υίοΰ Πατήρ. That the birth of the Word does not have a spatial character, Clement does not say directly anywhere about this, but this is assumed by itself, since the Logos is above spatial definitions. Str. 7, 2, 831. μεταβαίνων έκ τόπου είς τόπον, πάντη δέ ών πάντοτε, καί μηδαμή περιεχόμενος. Str. 5, 3, 654. Str. 7, 2, 833. πρω- τουργός κινήσεως. Str. 5, 1, 647. προφορικός, σοφία δέ καί χρηστότης φανερωτάτη τοΰ Θεού, δύναμίς τε αύ παγκρατής καί τώ δντι θεία· θέλημα παντοκρατορικόν. From these words it is clear that Clement is not polemicizing with the idea of ​​Λόγος προφορικός that is found among apologists. Str. 7, 2, 833. η τούτου πρόνοια. Ibid. 831. άριστα οιακίζει. Ibid. 832. παντοκράτορας θελήματι Πατρός. Str. 2, 2, 431. ό δέ αύτός μακράν ών, έγγυτάτω βέβηκε, θαύμα άββητον. Θεός έγγίζων εγώ, φησί Κύριος (Jerem. 23, 23). π ό r ή ω μέν κατ’ ουσίαν· πώς γάρ αν συνεγ γ ί σ α ι ποτέ το γεννητόν άγεννήτω; ’Εγγυτάτω δε δυνάμει, ή τά πάντα έγκεκόλπισται. καί δή πάρεστιν άεί τή τε έποπτική, τη τε ευεργετική, τη τε παιδευτική άπτομένη ήμών δυνάμει δύναμις τοΰ Θεοΰ. Cfr. Str. 5, 1, 647, (p. 77 pr. 4). Str. 7, 2, 833. έθέλη, ουδέ τό μικρότατον άπολείπων τής έαυτοΰ διοικήσεως άφρόντιστον. Ibid. έχει, καί έστιν, ώς είπεΐν, πατρική τις ενέργεια ό Υιός. The similarity of this view with philosophical ideas is obvious. The Son is πατρική ένέργεια. Plotinus calls Νους ή πρώτη ένέργεια. God, according to Philo, has no relation to anything and influences the world through His powers (δυνάμεις). See page 34 ex. 2; p. 11 pr. 1. The importance that Clement attaches to the difference between what has happened (born) and the unborn also reminds us of Philo (see p. 11 pr. 1) and at the same time makes us assume that Clement, not without purpose, defines the Logos not only as the beginningless beginning (άρχή), but also as the firstfruits of everything that exists (άπαρχή τών δντων Str. 7, 1, 829); Perhaps, from Clement’s point of view, this is a detail that explains the mediatorial ministry of the Word. But if this assumption is true, it is still not easy to decide how deliberate such expressions of Clement as (Str. 5, 14, 699) “ή σοφία ή πρωτόκτιστος τώ Θεώ”, (in epist. 1. loh. adumbr. p. 999) “hae namque primitivae virtutes (Filius et S. Spiritus) ac primo creatae (πρωτόκτιστοι?) immobiles exsistentes secundum substantiam et cum subjectis angelis et archangelis, cum quibus vocantur aequivoce, diversas operationes efficiunt.” Cfr. Redepenning, I, 110. Photii cod. 109. τον Υιόν εις κ τ ί о μ α κατάγει (sc. Clemens). However, Clement also says there that “Verbum, h. e. Filius Dei secundum aequalitatem substantiae unum cum Patre consistit, sempiternum est et infectum"; but these words can be considered an insertion (doctrina purificata) by the translator Cassiodorus. Vid. Migne, Patrol, s. gr. t. 9. col. 730. Paed. 1, 9, 150. καί τούτο δτι άγαθός. The άνωθεν, δθεν γέγονε πατήρ· πριν γάρ κτίστην γενέσθαι... άγαθός ήν καί διά τούτο καί δημιουργός είναι καί πατήρ ήθέλησεν καί ή τής άγάπης έκείνης σχέσις, δικαιοσύνης γέγονεν άρχή. Ibid, καί ό αυτός δίκαιος καί αγαθός, ό όντως Θεός. Paed. 1, 8, 142. δημιουργόν, Υιόν έν Πατρί. Ibid. 140. Πατήρ νοείται, άγαθός ών, αυτό μόνον κέκληται άγαθός καθό δέ Υίός, ών Λόγος αύτού, έν τω Πατρί έστι, δίκαιος προσαγορεύεται έκ της προς άλληλα (judging because God is δίκαιος δ ι ’ ή μ ά ς , one would expect the word “άλλα” here, and then the idea of the text would be clearer) σχέσεως· αγάπης ίσότητι μεμετρημένον όνομα δυνάμεως. Str. 5, 13, 697. γορευμένους, τόν δέ Κύριον, υιόν όντα γνήσιον. Paed. 1.5, 112. ώ τού μεγάλου Θεού, ώ τού τελείου παιδιού. Paed. 1.6, 113. Cohort, ad gent. With. 10. rub. 86. ξ ι σ ω θ ε ί ς. Str. 7, 2, 831. έν ούρανφ άγγελος, πλησιαίτερον κατά τόπον καί ήδη καθαρώτερον τής αιωνίου καί μακαρίας ζωής μεταλαγχάνων. Τελειωτάτη δή καί άγιωτάτη... καί βασιλικωτάτη, καί εύεργετικωτάτη ή Υιού φύσις. ή τω μόνω παντοκράτορι προσεχεστάτη.4 ύτη ή μεγίστη ύπεροχή, ή τά πάντα διατάσσεται κ. τ. λ. Lemmer (ρ. 60) notes, however: caeterum natura maximě regia, principalis, perfectissima et sanctissima nonne Deo ipsi non solum propinquissima est, verum etiam eadem atque illiusT Credo. Dorner, I, 443. Anmerk. Den Namen Θεός hat er (Λόγος) unzähligemale bei Clemens, der freilich nicht ganz sparsam mit diesem Worte umgeht. Jedoch wenn Geschöpfe ihm Götter heissen, heissen sie so nur um der Theilnahme am Logos willen. Str. 7, 2, 831. τούτω (τω Λόγω) πάσα ύποτέτακται στρατιά αγγέλων τε καί θεών. Paed. 3, 12, 311. παιδαγωγώ καί διδασκάλω Υίώ, συν καί τω άγίω Πνεύματι. Paed. 1, 8, 135. άλλ’ ουδέ υπό του Λόγου· έν γάρ άμφω, ό Θεός· οτι είπεν, Έν άρχή ό Λόγος ήν έν τώ Θεω· καί Θεός ήν ό Λόγος. Cfr. Paed. 1, 8, 142 (see p. 78 ex. 2). Paed. 1, 6, 123. Πνεύμα τό άγιον έν, καί τό αυτό πανταχοΰ· μία δέ μόνη γίνεται γάρ μήτηρ παρθένος. Str. 5, 14, 710. In the words of Plato (epist. 2. ad Dionys): “περί τόν πάντων βασιλέα πάντα έστί. "Clement sees a reference to the Holy Trinity. Ούκ άλλως έγωγε έξακούω ή την αγίαν Τριάδα μηνύεσθαι· τρίτον μέν γάρ είναι τό άγιον Πνεύμα τόν Υιόν δέ δεύτερον. Kurtz. KG. I. 1. 334 (see p. 38 ex. 2). adv. Prax. (Migne, Patr. s. lat. t. 2. Tertull. opp. t. 2) c. 5 col. 159. Sed quia duos unum volunt esse, ut idem Pater et Filius habeatur, oportet et totum de Filio examinari, an sit, et qui sit, et quomodo sir, et ita res ipsa formám suam scripturis et interpretationibus earum patrocinantibus vindicabit. Aiunt quidem et Genesim in hebraico ita incipere: "In principio Deus fecit sibi Filium." Hoc ut firmum non sit, alia me argumenta deducunt ab ipsa Dei dispositione, qua fuit ante mundi constitutionem, adusque Filii generationem. adv. Prax. c. 5 col. 160. Ante omnia enim Deus erat solus, ipse sibi et mundus et locus et omnia (cfr. c. 16 col. 175. Pater ille Altissimus, in quo omnis locus, non ipse in loco; qui universitatis extrema linea est). Solus autem, quia nihil aliud extrinsecus praeter ilium. Caeterum ne tunc quidem solus; habebat enim secum, quam habebat in semetipso, rationem suam scilicet. Rationalis etiam Deus, et ratio in ipso prius; et ita, ab ipso omnia. Quae ratio sensus ipsius est (Domer: “Diese Vernunft ist seine Intelligenz.” Meier, I, 84. “Sein Sinn, als Princip seiner Innerlichkeit und Persönlichkeit, Gott ist nicht blosses Sein, sondern wesentlich Selbstbewusstsein”), Hane graeci Λόγον dicunt, quo vocabulo etiam sermonem appellamus. Ideoque jam in usu est nostrorum. per simplicitatem interpretationis, sermonem dicere in primordio apud Deum flösse, cum magis rationem competat antiquiorem haberi; quia non sermonalis a principio, sed rationalis Deus etiam ante principium; et quia ipse quoque sermo ratione consistens, priorem earn ut substantiam suam ostendat. Tarnen et sic, nec (al. nihil) interest Nam etsi Deus nondum sermonem suum miserat, proinde eum cum ipsa et in ipsa ratione intra semetipsum habebat, tacite cogitando et disponendo secum quae per sermonem mox erat dicturus. Cum ratione enim sua cogitans atque disponens, sermonem earn efficiebat, quam sermone tractabat (Dorner: “in Bewegung setzte”). Ibid. Idque quo facilius intelligas, ex te ipso ante recognosce, ut ex imagine et similitudine Dei (Gen. 1, 26), quam habeas et tu in temet ipso rationem, qui es animal rationale, a rationali scilicet artifice non tantum factus, sed etiam ex substantia ipsius animatus. Vide cum tacitus tecum ipse congrederis, ratione hoc ipsum agi intra te, occurrente ea tibi cum sermone ad omnem cogitatus tui motum, et ad omnem sensus tui pulsum. Quodcunque cogitaveris, sermo est; quodcunque senseris, ratio est. Loquaris illud in animo necesse est; et dum loqueris, conlocutorem pateris sermonem, in quo inest haec ipsa ratio, qua cum eo cogitans loquaris, per quern loquens cogitas. Ita secundus quodammodo in te est sermo, per quern loqueris cogitando, et per quern cogitas loquendo. Ipse sermo alius est. Quanto ergo plenius hoc agitur in Deo, cujus tu quoque imago et similitudo censeris, quod habeat in se etiam tacendo rationem, et in ratione sermonem? Possum itaque non temere praestnixisse, et tunc Deum ante universitatis constitutionem solum non fuisse, habentem in semetipso proinde rationem, et in radone sermonem, quem secundum a se faceret agitando se. Tertullian speaks about two forms of the birth of the Word twice in a row and therefore not entirely clearly, adv. Rg. With. 6 col. 161. Naes vis et haec divini sensus dispositio, apud scripturas etiam in sophiae nomine ostenditur... Itaque sophiam quoque exaudi, ut secundam personam conditam. Primo, Dominus creavit me initium viarum in opera sua ... ante omnes colies generavit m e (Prov. 8, 22), in sensu suo scilicet condens et generans. Dehinc assistentem earn ipsa separatione cognosce. Cum pararet, in quit, coelum, aderam illi simul... ego eram cum illo compingens; ego eram ad q u a m gaudebat: quote autem oblectabar in persona ipsius. Nam utprimům Deus voluit ea quae cum sophiae ratione et sermone disposuerat intra se, in substantias et species suas edere, ipsum primům protulií sermonem, habentem in se individuas suas, rationem et sophiam, ut per ipsum fierent universa, per quern erant cogitata atque disposita; imo et facta jam, quantum in Dei sensu. Hoc enim eis deerat, ut coram quoque in suis speciebus atque substantiis cognoscerentur et tenerentur. c. 7. Tunc igitur etiam ipse Sermo speciem et ornatum suum sumit, sonum et vocem, cum dicit Deus: Fiat lux! Haec est nativitas perfecta sermonis, dum ex Deo procedit; conditus ab eo primům ad cogitatum in nomine sophiae: Dominus condidit me initium viarum. Dehinc generatus ad effectum'. cum pararet coelum. aderam illi simul. Exinde eum parem sibi faciens, de quo procedendo Filius factus est, primogenit us (Coloss. 1, 15), ut ante omnia genitus; et unigenitus (loh. 1, 18), ut solus ex Deo genitus: proprie de vulva cordis ipsius, secundum quod et Pater ipse testator: Er netavit cor meum sermonem optimum (Ps. 44, 2). Ad quern deinceps gaudens proinde gaudentem in persona illius (Ps. 2, 7): Fі1іus metis es tu, ego hodie genuite. Et: ante luciferům genuite.” Based on these words, the following firm points can be established: 1) Nativitas perfecta of the Word is the final moment of His birth, when the Word proceeds from God. 2) Filiatio of the Word (as Dorner puts it), or in the proper sense His birth from the Father, is identical with nativitas perfecta. 3) Definitions of the Word as sermo generatus ad effectum, sermo procedendo Filius factus, gaudens in persona illius (sua? cap. 7), as well as Sophia ipsa separatione assistens Patri, creans, sophia, quae oblectabatur in persona Patris (cap. 6), - refer to the same, secondary moment of His existence, characterize Him in the state of sonship (the external sign common to these definitions is the particle dehinc, as well as exinde and deinceps, and the words: “when He took over heaven, I was with Him”). 4) The expressions: “sermo conditus ad cogitatum (p. 7)” and “sophia quae generatur in sensu Patris (p. 6)” define the Word also at one moment of His existence (their external mark is “primo” and “primum”, as well as the words: “The Lord made Me the beginning of His ways”) The question remains to be decided: whether to posit this last moment, like the one mentioned above, after "perfect birth" of the Word? The letter of the text (p. 7) apparently requires an affirmative invocation: "haec est nativitas perfecta sermonis, dum ex Deo procedit: conditus ab eo primům ad cogitatum." sensu Patris" is too strongly reminiscent of other expressions of Tertullian, for example, "universa per ipsum (sermonem)... erant cogitata atque disposita" (p. 6); "cogitans... sermonem... secundum a se faceret agitando se" (p. 5); Therefore, it seems more correct to understand all expressions starting with “conditus ab eo primum”, without grammatical connection with the sentence “ex Deo procedit”. Tertullian, however, also calls the primary moment of the existence of the Word “birth” p. 6. in sensu suo scilicet condens etgenerans; but this expression is completely lonely and does not weaken the position that, speaking about birth, Tertullian places logical emphasis precisely on the moment of the Son’s procession from the Father. See previous note; cfr. With. 7 col. 162 A. qui Filius factus est Dei, de quo prodeundo generatus est. adv. Prax. c. 7 col. 162. ita capiat (Filius) secundus a Deo constitutus duos efficere, Patrem et Filium, Deum et Sermonem, p. 8. col. 163. profiteor me duos dicere, Deum et Sermonem ejus, Patrem et Filium ipsius. c. 13. col. 170. quam Deum et Sermonem ejus, quam Patrem et Filium. adv. Hermogen. c. 8 col. 199. 200. Dei nomen dicimus semper fuisse apud seme- tipsum, et in semetipso, Dominum veto non semper: diversa enim utriusque conditio: Deus substantiae ipsius nomen, i. e. divinitatis; Dominus veto non substantiae, sed potestatis; substantiam semper fuisse cum suo nomine, quod est Deus; postea Dominus, accedentis (al. accidentis) scilicet rei mentio... Quia et Pater Deus est, et judex Deus est; non tarnen ideo Pater et judex semper, quia Deus semper. Nam dog Paterpotuit esse ante Filium, nec judex ante delictum. Fuit autem tempus, cum et delictum et Filius non fuit, quod judicem, et qui Patrem Deum faceret. adv. Pax. With. 7. col. 162. “Ergo, inquis, das aliquam substantiam esse Sermonem, spiritu et sophiae traditione constructam?” – Plane... “Quid est enim, dices, sermo, nisi vox et sonus oris, et... aër offensus, intelligibilis auditu, caeterum vacuum uescio quid, et inane, et incorporation?” – At ego nihil dico de Deo inane et vacuum prodire potuisse, utnon de inani et vacuo prolatum; nec carere substantia, quod de tanta substantia processit, et tantas substantias fecit... Quale est ut nihil sit ipse, sine quo nihil lactum est? ut inanis solida, et vacuus plena et incorporalis corporalia sit operatus? Nam etsi potest aliquando quid fieri diversum ejus per quod fit, nihil tarnen fieri potest per id quod vacuum et inane est... Quis enim negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus spiril us est? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis sua effigie. Sed et invisibilia ilia quaecumque sunt, habent apud Deum et suum corpus et suam formám, per quae soli Deo visibilia si i nt; Quanto magis, quod ex ipsius substantia missum est, sine substantia non erit! adv. Pr. c. 13 col. 170. duas res... numerabo... Patrem et Filium. Ibid. c. 7 col. 162. Non vis enim eum (Sermonem) substantivum habere in re per substantiae proprietatem, ut res et persona quaedam videri possit, et ita capiat secundus a Deo constitutus duos efficere, Patrem et Filium, Deum et Sermonem, p. 16 col. 189. Deus Dei tanquam substantiva res. Ibid. c. 12 col. 168. habes duos, alium dicentem ut fiat, alium facientem. c. 7 col. 162. quaecumque ergo substantia Sermonis fuit, Ulam dicopersonam, et ilh nomen Filii vindico; et dum Filium agnosco, secundum a Patre defendo. c. 12 col. 168 alium autem quomodo accipere debeas professus sum; personae, non substantiae nomine. Ibid. c. 6 col. 161. dehinc assistemem earn (Sophiam) ipsa separatione copnosce (see page 84 ex. 1). One cannot, of course, point to expressions like “habebat secům, quam habebat in semetipso, rationem (p. 5)” as positive authorities. They lose all value if we compare them with the following expressions: “eum (Sermonem) cum ipsa et in ipsa ratione habebat (p. 5); cfr. c. 6. “(Sermonem) habentem in se individuas suas, rationem et sophiam.” It is clear that in Tertullian the preposition “cum” has a meaning that is too elastic and sometimes indicates only a mental, abstract difference in the same subject, and therefore represents too shaky ground for concluding a real difference. Kuhn (op. cit. 190) finds that already in the very words: “rationalis etiam Deus” more is said than that Reason is a property of God: the statement that God is a rational being does not seem strangely unnecessary? (Dass dies nicht in dem eigenschaftlichen Sinne gemeint sei, ist unzweifelhaft. Wie abgeschmackt wäre doch die ausdrückliche Bemerkung, dass Gott gleich von vorneherein (ne tunc quidem solus) vernünftig gewesen!) This remark has its true side, but is still too subtle so that the data on which it relies can be considered strong evidence, especially in view of Tertullian’s peculiar psychological views. However, Kuhn does not think of asserting that Tertullian’s Λόγος ενδιάθετος was a Person. Kuhn's view, see page 89 pr. 4. adv. Rgah. With. 7. haec est nativitas perfecta Sermonis, dum ex Deo procedit, cfr. c. 5. Deus nondum sermonem suum miserat. See page 85 ex.; p. 82 pr. 2. ) s. 6. Nam ut primům Deus voluit etc. See page 84 ex. 1. Cfr. adv. Prax. c. 12 col. 168. primům quidem, nondum Filio apparente, Et dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est: ipse statím Sermo, lux vera, quae illuminat hominem... et per ilium mundialis quoque lux. Exinde autem, in Sermone Christo assistente et administrate Deus voluit fieri... c. 6. ad quem deinceps gaudens proinde gaudentem in persona illius: Filius in eusestu. See page 85 ex. Wed. Kuhn, op. cit. S. 192. Diese Unterscheidung des Ich von seinem Logos, die im Menschen nur quodammodo stattfindet, hat ihre volle Wahrheit in Gott; ist sie dort eine bloss ideelle, so ist sie hier eine reelle (cap. 7); der göttliche Logos (ratio et sermo) ist keine blosse Eigenschaft in Gott, sondern wirkliche Person, zunächst (als ratio) zwar bloss potentiell, so lange er noch in Gott ist, sofort aber, aus Gott herausgesetzt als wcltschöpferisches Wort, auch actuelle Person... Der Logos ergreift und erweist sich als selbstständiges Princip, insofern er die Welt denkt, oder Gott sie mit ihm und durch ihn denkt; er erweist sich als Person, sofern er das Universum... in Wirklichkeit setzt. Thus, according to Kuhn, only Tertullian’s Λόγος προφορικός is a real Person; Λόγος ένδιάθετος is not a Person in reality, but it is not a simple property of the being of God; He is independent only in principle, a Person only in possibility, but what is different from God is not only ideal (as our “I” is different from our mind), but also real. Here are given elements that are very difficult to synthesize. It is not easy to form any clear concept of the Word, which is really different from the Father and yet is not a Person, unless we assume here a very unlikely similarity with Plotinus’s idea of ​​the mind, which contemplated unconsciously. In general, these arguments of Kuhn almost sin in that he tries to present as clear and definite and to formulate what, apparently, was not entirely clear to Tertullian himself; it is especially boldly said that for Tertullian the difference between the “I” and the mind in man was supposedly only ideal and only real in God. adv. Prax. With. 26. col. 180. hactenus Deus, quia ex ipsius Dei substantia, c. 12. col. 168. qui (Sermo) ipse Deus est. adv. Marc. 1. 2. c. 27. col. 317. quaecunque exigitis Deo digna, habebuntur in Patre invisibili, incongressibilique, et placido, et (ut ita dixerim) philosophorum Deo. Quaecunque autem ut indigna reprehenditis, deputabuntur in Filio, et viso, et audito, et congresso, arbitro Patris et ministro, miscente in semetipso hominem et Deum, in virtutibus, Deum, in pusillitatibus, hominem. adv Prax. c. 26. col. 190. Hie (Filius)... ignorans et ipse diem et horám ultimam soli Patri notam; disponens regnum discipulis, quomodo et sibi dispositum dicit a Patre... exclamans quod se Deus reliquisset, in Patris manibus spiritum ponens. adv. Prax. c. 14. col. 171. 172. dicimus enim et Filium suo nomine eatenus invi- sibilem, qua Sermo et spiritus Dei ex substantiae conditione jam nunc, et qua Deus, et sermo, et spiritus: visibilem autem fuisse ante carnem... in visione, et somnio, et speculo, et aenigmate, quia Sermo et spiritus nisi imaginaria forma, fideri non potest. adv. Rgah. With. 16. col. 175. 176. scilicet haec dog de Filio Dei credenda fuisse, si scripta non essent; Fortasse non credenda de Patre licet scripta. Ibid. c. 23. col. 184. caeterum scimus Deum etiam intra abyssos esse, et ubique consistere, sed vi et potestate. Filium quoque ut individuum, cum ipso ubique. Tarnen in ipsa oeconomia Pater voluit Filium in terris haberi, se vero in coelis... minoravit l ilium modico citra angelos, ad terram demittendo... What is most directly meant here is the fact of incarnation; but the word “oeconomia” is used by Terjullian in a broader sense, indicating not only the fact of revelation (τρόπος της άποκαλνψεως), but also the fact of trinitarian existence (τρόπος της ύπάρξεως) Deities. Cfr. adv. Rgah. With. 13. col. 169. duos quidem definimus. Patrem ct Filium, et jam třes cum Spiritu sancto secundum rationem oeconomiae, quae facit mimerum (cfr. c. 12. si te adhuc numerus scandalizat Trinitatis, quasi non connexae in 111 iitate simplici, etc.), c. 2. col. 157. et nihilominus custodiatur oeconomiae sacramentinn, quae unitatem in Trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens, Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum. Cfr. adv. Marcion. c. 27. col. 317. ipsum congressum cum patriarchis et prophetis, I ilium creatoris, sermonem ejus, quem ex semetipsoproferendo Filium fecit, et (al. ut) exinde (exinde in Tertullian means “since” rather than “later”, or - better - expresses not a sequence in time, but the logical dependence of the effect on the cause; cf. p. 7 (p. 85 etc.), where “exinde eum (Patrem) párem sibi Linens etc.” refers to the same moment as the previous “generatus effectum”) omni disposition! suae voluntatique praefecit, diminuens ilium modico ( it і a angelos...: qua diminutione in haec quoque dispositus est a Patre, quae ut humana icpichenditis, ediscens jam inde a primordio, jam inde hominem, quod erat futunis in hue In і gl poison of Tertullian it is possible, therefore, imagine in the following terms God, by His will, revealed Himself in Himself as trinitarian; but this internal self-revelation of the Divinity (the immanent Trinity) was not without relation to the external decision (to the economic Trinity). Therefore, giving birth to the Son, the Father determined at the very birth the Son’s relationship to the world. As a result of His birth, determined to be the God of revelation, the Son, for this purpose, was slightly humiliated by the Father before the angels already at His very birth, and not only at the moments of His actual revelation to the world. Thus, Tertullian’s subordinationism directly relies on the fact of the humiliation of the Son and indirectly, as its final basis, on the fact of the birth of the Son; and if this, according to its findings, is essential subordinationism, then it is still based on hypostatic subordination. adv. Pax. With. 9 col. 164. quia non sit idem Pater et Filius, vel modulo alius ab alio. Pater enim tota substantia est: Filius vero derivatio totius et portio, sicut ipse profitetur, Quia Pater major me est (Joh. 14, 28). For the meaning of the word "modulus" see de anima, c. 37. simul crescunt, sed diversa ratione pro generum conditione, sago modulo, anima ingenio, sago habitu, anima sensu. Regarding the meaning of the word "portio" cf. index, latinit. Tertull. Schultzii (Migne, Patrol, s. lat. t. 2) s. v. "Portio", i. e. par, similis. Tertull. opp. t. I, 293. A. “Portio Neronis de crudelitate”: sic “edicti portio” (I, 326. A) pro “simili edicto”. But these examples can hardly convince that in the above passages “portio” means only “equal, similar”, and not “part” as opposed to “whole”. adv. Pax. With. 26 col. 189. hactenus Deus, quia ex ipsius Dei substantia... et ut portio aliqua totius. The above location with. 9 col. 164 continues like this: a quo et minoratus canitur in psalmo (8, 6) modicum quid citra angelos. Sic et Pater alius a Filio, dum Filio major, dum alius qui generat, alius qui generatur, dum alius qui mittit, alius qui mittitur, alius qui facit, alius per quem fit. Kuhn (S. 187), relying on this passage, notes: so erklärt Tertullian doch in so bestimmter Weise die Unterordnung des Sohnes als ausserhalb des Wesens in einem andern Momente begründet, dass eben diese Stelle (Joh. 14, 28) vielmehr einen neuen Beweis für die obige Auffassung liefert. Es ist die hypostatische Unterordnung des Sohnes gemeint. Ebenso, wenn Tertullian... den Sohn als sichtbar bezeichnet, bezieht er diesen Unterschied wiederum nicht auf das Wesen, sondern auf den hypostatischen Charakter (adv. Prax. p. 14). One can agree with this idea only to the extent that hypostatic subordination here appears to be only the basis of such expressions. It was the starting point; but it is more than doubtful that Tertullian, even in his very conclusions, kept within the boundaries of hypostatic subordinationism; at least, it is not at all clear that the words “dum Filio major” contain no more than the following: dum alius qui generat etc., and Kuhn understands them precisely in this sense. However, Kuhn recognizes (in principle) the possibility of mixing these two forms of subordinationism. S.123. absoluten Homousie nicht zu Stande kommen. So bei den Apologeten und den meisten vomicänischen Vätern. adv Prax. c. 14col. 170. 171. visum quidem Deum secundum hominum capacitatem, non secundum plenitudinem divinitatis,... ut invisibilem Patrem intelligamus pro plenitudine majestatis, visibilem vero Filium agnoscamus pro modulo derivationis: sicut nec solem nobis contemplari licet, quantum ad ipsam substantiam summam (al. substantiae summam) quae est in coelis; radium autem ejus toleramus oculis pro temperatura portionis, quae ad terram inde porrigitur. Cfr. Apologet, c. 21. radius ex sole porrigitur, portio ex summa. adv. Marcion. 1.4 c. 25 col. 422. omnia sibi tradita dicit (Christus) a Patře... qui non minori se tradidit omnia Filio creator, quae per eum condidit. Meier, I, 86. nach Bull. def. fid. 2,7,4. adv. Prax. c. 12. jam adhaerebat (at the creation of man) illi (Patři) Filius, sccunda persona, et tertia, Spiritus in Sermone. adv. Prax. c. 4 p.m. 159. Filium non aliunde deduce, sed de substantia Patris... Spiritum non aliunde puto, quam a Patře per Filium. c. 8. p. 164. protulit enim Deus Sermonem... sicut radix fruticem, et fons fluvium, et sol radium... secundus ubi est, duo sunt. Et tertius ubi est, tres sunt. Tertius enim est Spiritus a Deo et Filio, sicut tertius a radice fructus ex frutice. Et tertius a fonte rivus ex flumine. Et tertius a sole apex ex radio. Thus, Tertullian formally only reached “per Filium”, but not “Filioque”. It is curious that despite the fact that the whole structure of this tirade led him to the expression “a Deo ex Filio,” the reading “a Deo et Filio” is the only one; there are no options. But how close was Tertullian to the Filioque? The strict Petavius ​​found that this text does not talk about the procession of the Holy Spirit (non de Spiritus s. origine), but only about the order of divine Persons (de personarum ordine). This is indeed the literal meaning, this is the immediate purpose of the text; but can it be said that it means only this and nothing more, that it leads only to this goal and no further? The context says the opposite: the relation of the stem to the root, the river to the source, the ray to the sun, according to Tertullian’s intention, should represent not only the relation of the Son to the Father in the order of Their Persons, but also by origin, and it would be a real miracle if with the expressions: “fruit from the stem”, “stream from the river”, “peak from the ray” Tertullian did not at all connect ideas about a similar relationship of the Holy Spirit to Son and by origin. Therefore, Westerners rightly assert that the dogma which is meant to be conveyed by the Filioque is not appreciably different from the dogma which Tertullian expresses by his per Fiilium. adv. Prax. c. 8 col. 158. singulare et iinicum imperium. Ibid, eversio enim monarchiae ilia est tibi intelligenda, cum alia dominatio suae conditionis et proprii status, ac per hoc aemula, superducitur. Ibid, nec ideo unius esse desiit, ut desinat monarchia esse, quia per tanta millia virtutum procuratur. Ibid, tunc male, cum plures, secundum valentinianos...; tunc in monarchiae cversionem, cum in creatoris destructionem, cum alius Deus infertur adversus creatorem. Ibid, quale est, ut Deus divisionem et dispersionem pati videatur in Filio et in Spiritu s., secundum et tertium sortitis locum, tarn consortibus substantiae Patris, quas non patitur in tot angelorum numero, et quidem tarn a substantia alienorum?! Cfr. c. 4 col. 159. caeterum, qui Filium non aliunde deduco, sed de substantia Patris, nihil lacientem sine Patris voluntate, omnem a Patre consecutum potestatem, quomodo possum de fide destruere monarchiam, quam a Patre traditam in Filio servo? Ibid. c. 25 col. 188. numeri singularitatem. Ibid. c. 2 col. 157. unicum Deum non alias putat (Praxeas) credendum, quam si ipsum eumdemque et Patrem et Filium et Spiritum s. dicat: quasi non sic quoque anus sit omnia, dum ex uno omnia, per substantiae scilicet unitatem... Tres autem non statu, sed gradu; nec substantia, sed forma; nec potestate, sed specie: unius autem substantiae, et unius status, et unius potestatis; quia imus Deus, ex quo et gradus isti et formae et species, in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus s. deputantur. Ibid. c. 9 col. 164. ecce enim dico alium esse Patrem, et alium Filium, et alium Spiritum (inseparatos ab alterutro... testor). Male accipit idiotes quisque aut perversus hoc dictum, quasi diversitatem sonet, et ex diversitate separationem protendat Patris et Filii et Spiritus... non tarnen diversitate alium, sed distributione, nec divisione alium, sed distinctione (=dispositione). c. 25 col. 181. alium, sed jam praemisimus quomodo alium... Pater et Filius in sua proprietate distinguuntur. c. 2 sub fin. numerum sine divisione patiuntur. Ibid. c. 8 col. 163. nec dubitaverim Filium dicere et radicis fruticem, et fontis fluvium, et solis radium... nec frutex tarnen a řadiče, nec fluvius a fonte, nec radius a sole discernitur, sicut nec a Deo Sermo. Igitur secundum horum exemplorum formám profiteer me duos dicere, Deum et Sermonem, Patrem et Filium ipsius. Nam radix et frutex duae res sunt, sed conjunctae. Et fons et flumen duae species sunt, sed indivisae. Et sol et radius duae formae sunt, sed cohaerentes. Omne quod prodit ex aliquo, secundum sit ejus necesse est de quo prodit, non ideo tarnen separatum (p. 93 pr. 4)... Et tertius a sole apex ex radio. Nihil tarnen a matrice alienatur, a qua proprietäres suas ducit. Apolog. c. 21. et cum radius ex sole porrigitur, portio ex summa, sed sol erit in radio, quia solis est radius, nec separatur substantia, sed extenditur: ita de spiritu spiritus, et de Deo Deus, ut lumen de lumine accensum: manet Integra et indefecta matrix, etsi plures inde traduces qualitatum metueris: ita et quod de Deo profectum est. Deus est, et Dei Filius, et unus ambo: ita et... de Deo Deus: modulo alterum, non numero (sic); gradu, non statu fecit: et a matrice non recessit, sed excessit. adv. Prax. c. 12 col. 168. ubique teneo unam substantiam in tribus cohaerentibus. c. 31 col. 196. Quod opus evangelii, quae est substantia novi testamenti... si non exinde Pater et Filius et Spiritus, tres crediti, unum Deum sistunt? Sic Deus voluit novare sacramentum, ut nove unus crederetur per Filium et Spiritum, ut coram jam Deus in suis propriis nominibus et personis cognosceretur... Cfr. Apolog. c. 21. et unus ambo. adv. Prax. c. 2. unus sit omnia. adv. Prax. c. 13 col. 169. duos tarnen Deos... nunquam ex ore nostro proferimus: non quasi non et Pater Deus, et Filius Deus et Spiritus s. Deus, et Deus unusquisque. Ibid. col. 170. itaque deos omnino non dicam, nec dominos; sed apoštolům sequar, ut si pariter nominandi fuerint Pater et Filius, Deum Patrem appellem, et Jesum Christum Dominum nominem. Solum autem Christum potěro Deum dicere, sicut idem apostolus (Rom. 1, 7) (cfr. s. Gregor. Naz. orat. 25 ad Heron, n. 15. ένα δέ γεννητόν Κύριον τον Υιόν Θεόν μεν, όταν καθ’ έαυτόν λέγηται προσαγορευόμενον, Κύριον δέ, όταν μετά τού Πατρός όνομάζηται, το μεν διά την φύσιν, τό δέ διά τήν μοναρχίαν). Nam et radium solis seorsum solem vocabo; sólem autem nominans cujus cst radius, non statím et radium sólem apellabo. Nam etsi soles duos non faciam, tarnen ct sólem et radium ejus tam duas res, et duas species unius indivisae substantiae numeiabo, quam Deum et Sermonem ejus, quam Patrem et Filium. adv. Prax. c. 8 col. 164. ita Trinitas (de pudic. c. 21. col. 1026. Trinitas unius divinitatis) per consertos et connexos gradus a Patre decurrens, et monarchiae nihil obstrepit, et oeconomiae statum protegit. Cfr. adv. Prax. c. 25 col. 188. ita connexus Patris in Filio, et Filii in Paracleto, tres efficit cohaerentes, alterum ex altero. Previous writers have nothing similar, and in general there is very little data on the question of the formula for the doctrine of one God. For example, St. Justin proves that in St. Scripture mentions another God besides God the Father of all; but how to express the doctrine of the unity of the Divine, so that this formula retains in its entirety the essence of this dogma and at the same time does not leave aside the truth that the Son is God - such is the question of St. Justin doesn't put it. He assigns the title “one God” to the Father, but in such a way that no conclusion can be drawn from this in relation to the Son. Apol. 1 n. 14. ήμεΐς μετά το τω Λόγφ πεισθήναι, εκείνων μέν (δαιμόνων, i.e. false gods) άπέστημεν, Θεω δέ μόνω τω άγεννήτω διά του Υίοϋ έπόμεθα... άγαθω καί άγεννήτφ Θεω έαυτους άνατεθεικότες. From this it is clear that “μόνω” does not refer to “τω άγεννήτω”, but to “Θεω” and precisely to That God who is defined as the unborn; but it is equally clear that the one God is contrasted here not with the Son, but with many false Gods. Ibid. p. 16. Χριστός), είπών Marc. 12, 30... Ibid. n. 17 οθεν Θεόν μέν μόνον προσκυνοΰμεν. These expressions are also directed only against polytheism, and if from the context it is clear that the Father is called God here, it is still unclear to what extent the Son is included in the concept of one God - Athenagoras, who especially revealed the doctrine of the unity of the Father and the Son, nevertheless calls the Father one God, legat. n. 10. τό μέν ούν άθεοι μή είναι, ένα τόν άγέννητον... ύφ’ ού γεγένηται τό παν διά του αύτοΰ (al. δι’ αύτοΰ) Αόγου, Θεόν άγοντες, ίκανώς μοι δέδεικται. Νοοΰμεν γάρ καί Υιόν τοΰ Θεοΰ. cf p. 54 pr. 3. Thus, here too the dogma of the unity of the Divinity and the divinity of the Son does not find expression in one formula. With all the height of the teaching of St. Irenaeus about the unity of the Father and the Son (adv. haer. 4, 28, 2. unus et idem Deus Pater et Verbum ejus), he calls the Father one God. adv. h. 2, 1, I. quum sit solus Deus et solus Dominus, et solus conditor, et solus Pater et solus continents omnia. 3, 8, 3. ita ut is quidem, qui omnia fecit cum Verbo suo juste dicatur Deus et Dominus solus; Quae autem facta sunt, non jam... juste id vocabulum sumere debere, quod est creatoris. Kuhn (S. 164) makes the words “cum Verbo suo” dependent on “juste dicatur”; the meaning is as follows: the Father is one God, but together with His Word. But if the words “cum Verbo suo” are attributed not to “dicatur”, but to the previous “fecit”, then the meaning of this place, however, will not change, but will be somewhat obscured. In any case, it receives all its meaning and significance only when looking at it retrospectively, when illuminating it on the basis of the teachings of Tertullian. – Clement of Alexandria calls one God and one Father (Paed. 1.9, 150. αυτός τα πάντα, καί τά πάντα ό αυτός· δτι αυτός Θεός, ό μόνος Θεός..., and below God is different from the Word) and Father and Son (Paed. 1, 8, 142. see p. 78 pr. 2). adv. Pax. With. 18 col. 177. habet rationem (scriptura), et cum unicum Deum statuit, et cum duos Patrem et Filium ostendit; et sufficit sibi... Salvo enim Filio recte unicum Deum potest determinasse, cujus est Filius. Ibid, igitur unus Deus Pater, et alius absque eo non est. Quod ipse inference. non Filium negat, sed alium Deum: caeterum alius a Patre (al. add. Deus) Filius non est Denique, inspice sequentia hujusmodi pronuntiationum, et invenies fere ad idolorum... cultores defmitionem earum pertinere… Ibid, non enim desinit esse qui habet Filium ipse unicus, suo scilicet nomine, quotiens sine Filio nominatur: sine Filio autem nominatur, cum principaliter determinatur ut prima persona, quae ante Filii nomen erat proponenda; Quia Pater ante cognoscitur, et post Patrem Filius nominatur. Ibid, unus Deus Pater... ut multitudinem falsorum deorum unio divinitatis expellat, habens tarnen Filium quanto individuum et inseparatum a Patre, tanto in Patre reputandum, etsi non nominatum. Cfr. s. Basil. Magn. ep. 38 ad ad. Gregor, fratr. έπί τής άγιας Τριάδος ό τόν Πατέρα νοήσας αυτόν τε έφ’ έαυτοΰ κατενόησε, καί τόν Υιόν τή διανοία. ? Cfr. adv. Prax. With. 31 col. 196. caeterum judaicae fidei ista res, sic unum Deum credere, ut Filium adnumerare ei nolis, et post Filium, Spiritum. Ibid, atquin si nominasset ilium (Filium), separasset, ita dicens: “Alius praeter me non est, nisi Filius meus.” Alium enim etiam Filium fecisset, quern de aliis excepisset. Puta sólem dicere: “Ego sol, et alius praeter me non est, nisi radius meus”, norme denotasses vanitatem, quasi non et radius in sole deputetur? Ibid, qui se unicum, sed cum Filio ostendit, cum quo coelum solus extendit. Cfr. s. Irenaeus, adv. h. 3, 8, 3 (see p. 98 ex.). In this sense, Tertullian understands the content of the church rule of faith, and this view is considered (Kuhn, S. 445 ff.) to be the type of presentation of the dogma of one God among all the most ancient church writers. adv. Prax. With. 2 col. 156. Nos vero et semper et nunc magis... unicum quidem Deum credimus: sub hac tarnen dispensatione, quam oeconomiam dicimus, ut unici Dei sit et Filius Sermo ipsius etc. Christians believe in one God (the Father), but it is necessarily implied that the one God is the Father of the Son. The bearer of the unity of the Divinity is the Father, but not as one Hypostasis (the first), taken in Itself, in contrast to the second and third, but as the beginning of the Divinity, a source, whose very existence presupposes the existence of other Hypostases emanating from it, so that the Father, the one God, is at the same time the bearer of the trinity, but as *s in a hidden state. This view can be expressed in the following formula: we believe in one God the Father, therefore we believe in both the Son and the Holy Spirit. The side of this view that is difficult for rational assimilation appears by itself and largely explains the appearance of monarchianism. Tertullian contrasted him with another formula of dogma, which is fully explained in the works of the post-Nicene church fathers. adv. Pax. With. 13 col. 169. et Pater Deus, et Filius Deus, et Spiritus s. Deus, et Deus unusquisque, is an expression that raises us to the heights of the Athanasian symbol; but in the mouth of Tertullian it could not contain the depth of meaning with which it appears in the subsequent fathers of the church, for example. St. Gregory the Theologian (or. 40, in s. baptisma n. 41. το πλεΐον διέφυγεν) or bl. Augustine (de Trinit. 1. 6 n. 12), which clearly express that each of the Persons of the Holy Trinity is God entirely, and all three Persons are no more God than each of Them, conceived separately. For Tertullian, on the contrary, Pater tota substantia est: Filius vero totiiis portio (p. 9). adv. Prax. c. 2. unus sit omnia, c. 31. tres crediti unum Deum sistunt. This expression perfectly complements the view according to which one God is the Father. Cfr. S. Gregor, naz. or. 42 n. 15. τα δέ καθ’ έκαστον, αναρχον, καί άρχή, καί τό μετά τής αρχής, εις Θεός. Augustin, contr. šerm, arian. With. 2 n. 4. I. s. ar. Meier, unus quippe Deus est ipsa Trinitas. adv. Prax. c. 12. alium... personae, non substantiae nomine... una substantia in tribus cohaerentibus... c. 2. sic unus sit omnia, dum ex uno omnia, per substantiae scilicet unitatem. Apolog. c. 21. manet integra et indefecta matrix... a matrice non recessit, sed excessit. The desire to more clearly present the unity of the Divine as a real fact entices Tertullian even beyond what is proper, adv. Prax. With. 2. unus Deus, ex quo... species in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus s. deputantur. Here the one God is seen as something more original than the Father; Father, Son and Holy Spirit are, as it were, concepts of the same order (notiones coordinatae), subordinate (subordinatae) to the higher (logical) concept of “one God”. This view, however, has its real meaning from the point of view of Tertullian (see pp. 85. 86). His desire for the most concrete representation of the Trinity unity is expressed in the fact that the three Persons are not only sint, non unus (adv. Prax. c. 25 col. 188), but also omnia unus (p. 22). cfr. c. 2. unus etiam singulars numeri significatio videtur. Thus, Tertullian is at least very close to the doctrine of the so-called numeric unity as opposed to the unity of the genus (unitas specifìca. Kuhn. S. 445). This view is also found among the church fathers of the post-Nicene period. (Gregor. naz. or. 42 n. 15. φύσις δέ τοΐς τρισί μία, Θεός, ενωσις δέ ό Πατήρ, έξ ού, καί πρός ον άνάγεται τα έξης, ούχ ώς συναλείφεσθαι, άλλ’ ώς έχεσθαι. adv. Prax. s. 23 (see p. 91 ex. 2). Ibid. s. 4 col. 159. dispositio et dispensatio ejus (monarchiae) in tot nominibus constituta, in quot Deus voluit. Alzog. S. 102. According to Ivantsov-Platonov (Heresies and Schisms. Moscow. 1877. p. 86. 128) Ippolit † c. 257. For example, St. Hippolytus introduces the word “πρόσωπον” in the sense of “persona”, contra Noët. (Migne, Patrol, s gr. t. 10) c. 14. δύο μέν ούκ έρώ θεούς, άλλ’ ή ένα· πρόσωπα δέ δύο. Wed. c adv. Prax. With. 5 (see p. 82 ex. 2) contra Noët. With. 10. Ό κόσμον έννοηθείς, θελήσας τε καί φθεγξάμενος έποίησεν... Ούδέν πλήν αύτός ήν αύτός δέ μόνος ών πολύς ήν. ούτε γάρ άλογος, ούτε άσοφος... Πάντα δέ ήν έν αύτω, αύτός δέ ήν τό παν. οτε ήθέλησε, καθώς ή θέλησε ν (cfr. adv. Prax. p. 4; see p. 101 pr. 3; p. 6. see p. 84 pr. 1) έδειξε τόν Λόγον αυτού καιροΐς ώρισμένοις παρ’ αύτω (cfr. adv. Hermog. p. 3. fuit autem tempus etc. see p. 86 pr. 3). δι’ ού τά πάντα έποίησεν. He seems to be free from subordinationism in essence (cfr. p. Noël. p. 8. ω (τω Λόγω) πάντα Πατήρ υπέταξε παρεκτός έαυτού καί Πνεύματος άγιου); Hippolytus’s presentation does not suffer, like Tertullian’s, from excessive clarity; for example, the Father is called "all" in a sense at least close to Tertullian's "tota substantia", but for the Son there is no name parallel to the word "portio". With. Noet. With. 11. ώς φως έκ φωτός... ή ώς άκτινα άπό ήλιου (έτερον λέγω) μία ή έκ τού παντός· τό δέ παν Πατήρ, έξ ού δύναμις Λόγος. Hippolytus justifies the unity of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit primarily on the fact that the beginning of the Divinity is one. Father. With. Noet. With. 3. κ. τ. λ. With. 8. είς γάρ Θεός έστιν, ώ δεϊ πιστεύειν. άλλ’ άγένητος κ. τ. λ. With. 11. Πάντα δι’ αύτοΰ, αύτός δέ μόνος έκ Πατρός. Τις τοίνυν άποφαίνεται πληθύν θεών παραβαλλομένην κατά καιρούς; και γάρ πάντες άπεκλείσθησαν (valentiniani, marcionitae etc.) είς τούτο άκοντες είπεΐν οτι τό παν είς ένα ανατρέχει. On the origin of the Son from the being of the Father, St. Hippolytus speaks quite clearly (Philosoph, (ex recens. Dunckeri et Schneidewini. Gottingae. 1859) 1. 10. c. 33. p. 540 (p. ed. Milled 336). τούτου ό Λόγος μόνος έξ αύτού διό καί Θεός, ούσία ύπαρχων Θεού- ό δέ κόσμος έξ ούδενός· διό ού Θεός), but to explain the unity of the Father and the Son he does not use the doctrine of Their consubstantiality at all, but returns to such vague expressions as “power”, “disposition”, “harmony”, “unanimity”, and even contrasts them with the idea of consubstantiality. With. Noet. With. 14. δύο λέγεις θεούς; Δύο μεν ούκ έρώ θεούς, άλλ’ ή ένα· πρόσωπα δέ δύο, οικονομία (al. οικονομίαν) δέ τρίτην τήν χάριν τού αγίου Πνεύματος. Πατήρ μέν γάρ είς, πρόσωπα δέ δύο, οτι καί ό Υιός, τό δέ τρίτον τό Swete. συμφωνία) συνάγεται είς ένα Θεόν ό γάρ κελεύων Πατήρ, ό δέ ύπακούων Υιός, τό δέ συνετίζον άγιον Πνεύμα. Ibid. With. 7. τό γάρ έσμεν (Joh. 10, 30), ούκ έφ’ ένός λέγεται, άλλ’ έπί δύο πρόσωπα έδειξε, δύναμιν δέ μίαν. Αύτός (ό Χριστός) δέ αύτό άπέλυσεν, είπών περί μαθητών προς τόν Πατέρα... ϊνα ώσιν έν, καθώς ήμεϊς έν έσμεν (Joh. 17, 22). Τί προς ταύτα έχουσι λέγειν οί νοητιανοί; Μή πάντες έν σώμά έστι κατ’ τήν ούσίαν;ή τή δυνάμει καί τή διαθέσει όμοφρονίαςέν γινόμεθα; Τόν αύτόν δή τρόπον ό Παΐς ό πεμφθείς... ώμολόγησεν είναι έν τώ Πατρί δυνάμει καί διαθέσει. Είς γάρ νούς Πατρός ό Παϊς. With. 8. καί τούτους είναι ούτως τρία· Εί δέ βούλεται μαθεϊν. πώς είς Θεός άποδείκνυται, γινωσκέτω οτι μία δύναμις τούτου. Καί οσον μέν κατά τήν δύναμιν, είς έστι Θεός οσον δέ κατά τήν οικονομίαν, τριχής ή έπίδειξις. From the above passages it also becomes clear that Hippolytus’s teaching about the Holy Spirit is not free from uncertainty: He is nowhere called πρόσωπον. (Redepenning, II, 84. Man sieht, Hippolytiis will den h. Geist nicht πρόσωπον nennen. Swete, op. cit. p. 69. his allusions to the Person of the H. Spirit are few and large). Philos. 1. 10. c. 33. άπογεννά, ού Λόγον ώς φωνήν άλλ’ ενδιάθετον τού παντός λογισμόν. With. Noel. With. 10. Λόγον ον Λόγον έχων έν έαυτώ αόρατόν τε όντα τώ κόσμω ορατόν ποιεί, (cfr. Tertiill. adv. Prax. p. 6. 7. 12) προήκε τη κτίσει Κύριον, τόν ’ίδιον νοΰν. Philos. 1. 10. p. 33. γενόμενος φωνή, έχει εν έαυτω τάς έν τώ Πατρί προεννοηθείσας ιδέας, όθεν κελεύοντος Πατρός γίνεθαι κόσμον... άπετελεϊτο. With. Noet. With. 11. λέγω, άλλ’ ως φως έκ φωτός κ. τ. λ... Ούτος δέ νούς, δς πρόβας έν κόσμω έδείκνυτο Παϊς Θεού, p. 15. › ... κατέπεμψεν, άλλ’ ή τόν Λόγον, ον Υιόν προσηγόρευε διά τό μέλλειν αύτόν γενέσθαι; καί τό κοινόν όνομα τής εις ανθρώπους φιλοστοργίας αναλαμβάνει ό Υιός καλούμενος (p. 4. καλούμενος άπ’ άρχής Υιός άνθρώπου διά τό μέλλον) ούτε γάρ άσαρκος καί καθ’ έαυτόν ό Λόγος τέλειος ήν Υιός· καίτοι τέλειος Λόγος ών μονογενής ούθ’ ή σάρξ καθ' έαυτήν δίχα τού Λόγου ύποστήναι ήδύνατο διά τό έν Λόγω τήν σύστασιν έχειν ούτως ούν ε ί ς Υιός τέλειος Θεού έφανερώθη. In addition to those data regarding the teaching of St. Hippolytus about the Holy Spirit, which are collected above (p. 102 pr. 3 and 4), only a little can be said. Hippolytus does not speak definitely about the manner of the procession of the Holy Spirit; We do not encounter Tertullian’s decisive “per Filium”. In what respect the third Person stands in the monad, Hippolytus does not attempt to explain; but he has a hint that leads the reader to connect the Holy Spirit with the Father through the Word (Swete, op. cit. p. 70. How the existence of the third Person consists with the Unity, Hippolytus does not undertake to explain: but a hint is dropped which leads the reader to connect the H. Spirit with the Father through the Word), c. Noet. c. 11. 12. δύναμις Λόγος… διά Πνεύματος αγίου ήνάγκασε τούτους φθέγξασθαι, όπως τής πατρώας δυνάμεως τήν άπόπνοιαν λαβόντες τήν βουλήν... τού Πατρός καταγγείλωσιν. Έν τούτοις τοίνυν πολιτευόμενος ό Λόγος έφθέγγετο περί έαυτού. But if here τής πατρώας δυνάμεως ή άπόπνοια refers to the Holy Spirit - which is quite probable - then the meaning of the speech is sufficiently explained by the fact that the Son sends the Holy Spirit; and whether He proceeds through the Son is completely unknown (the words however are obscure). Testimony of Theodoret (haer. fab. comp. 1. 3. c. 3. ταύτης (τής αίρέσεως) μετά τόν Νοητόν ύπερήσπισε Κάλλιστος, έπιθήκας τινάς καί ούτος έπινοήσας τη δυσσεβείςι τού δόγματος) is too short to be included among the sources, suggesting the identity of this Callistus with the Roman bishop. According to Philos. 1. 9 rub. 438 (Mill. 278) Θεοδότου αϊρεσιν, έτέραν καινοτέραν αϊρεσιν συνέστησε [1. 9 p.m. 12 ρ. 458 (M. 289) Θεοδότου ούκ αίδεΐται]. Callistus spoke (1. 9 p. 11 ρ. 450 Μ. 285); “έγώ οίδα ένα Θεόν Χριστόν Ίησοϋν, καί πλήν αύτού έτερον ούδένα γενητόν καί παθητόν,” and sometimes asserted (ποτέ δέ λέγων) that ούκ ό Πατήρ άπέθανεν. άλλα ό Υιός. The main features of his teaching are as follows (1. 9 p. 12 p. 458): μέν καλούμενον, εν δέ ον τό πνεύμα άδιαίρετον. ούκ άλλο είναι Πατέρα, άλλο δέ Υιόν, εν δέ καί τό αύτό ύπάρχειν 1. 10 p. 21 p. 530 Μ. 330. παρά τόν Λόγον ή ό Λόγος παρά τόν Θεόν, έν ούν τούτο πρόσωπον, όνόματι μέν μεριξόμενον, ούσιςι δέ ού. (1.9 p. 12 ρ. 458. τόν Πατέρα, άλλα έν καί τό αύτό). Καί τόν μέν κατά σάρκα όρώμενον καί κρατούμενον (I. 9 p. 12. άνθρωπος) Υιόν είναι θέλει, τόν δέ ένοικούντα (1. 9 p. 12. τό δέ έν τω Υίω χωρηθέν πνεύμα τούτο είναι τόν) Πατέρα 1. 9. p. 12. ού γάρ, φησίν, έρώ δύο θεούς, Πατέρα καί Υιόν, άλλα ένα. ? ένώσας έαυτω, καί έποίησεν έν, ώς καλεϊσθαι Πατέρα καί Υιόν ένα Θεόν, καί τούτο έν ον πρόσωπον μή δύνασθαι είναι δύο, καί ούτως τόν Πατέρα συμπλει λέγειν τόν Πατέρα πεπονθέναι καί έν είναι πρόσωπον... (blank in the text) έκφυγεϊν τήν εις τόν Πατέρα βλασφημίαν. – Based on these data, some scientists (Jacobi, Bunsen, Gieseler, Baur, Volkmar ar. Kurtz. S. 345 and Schaff) classify Callistus as a monarchian, others (Döllinger and Kuhn, on whose side Kurtz himself takes the side) per fas et nefas defend his Orthodoxy. From the above presentation of the teachings of Callistus, it is clear that for the former it is enough just to accept this teaching as it is given in its only source, while the latter must reject a lot, must prove that the author of the Philosophumena completely misunderstood Callistus. These scientists present his doctrine in this form: Father and Son - one God, one spirit, one being (in the sense of the fathers of the 4th century); that Callistus allowed only a nominal difference between Them, this is a tendentious interpretation of the author of the Philosophumena; Callistus did not at all deny the real, hypostatic difference between the Father and the Son (indeed, it is difficult to decide whether he called Them έν πρόσωπον) and rejected only their difference in essence; therefore, the idea that the Father Himself became incarnate, and His human nature is called the Son, is unfairly attributed to Callistus. Therefore, Kuhn (S. 271 ff.) characterizes his teaching as der höhere Standpunkt in comparison with all previous writers, and Kurtz attaches such high importance to it that he puts the name of Callistus on a par with the names of Justin, Tertullian, Origen, Dionysius of Rome and Athanasius. The meaning of Kallista Kurtz (S. 343) defines as follows: Kallistus glaubte auf beiden Seiten (both among the monarchians and among their opponents not free from subordinationism) Wahrheit, aber auch auf beiden Seiten Irrthum zu erkennen. In dem Bestreben, die beiderseitige Wahrheit zu einigen und den beiderseitigen Irrthum auszuscheiden, stellte er die ersten Anfänge eines hypostatischen Homousianismus auf. But the most important thing remains unproven - that Callistus’s Homousianism was hypostatic, and Kurtz himself admits that er (Homousianismus) oft genug noch in das Gebiet des Modalismus hinüberschwankte. Tertull. adv. Prax. c. 8 col. 157. 158. simplices enim quique, ne dixerim imprudentes et idiotae, quae major semper credentium parsest, quoniam et ipsa regula ftdei a pluribus diis saeculi ad unicum et Deum verum transfert, non intelligentes unicum quidem. Sed cum sua oeconomia esse credendum, expavescunt ad oeconomiam... "Monarchiam, inquiunt, tenemus." Et ita sonum vocaliter exprimunt etiam latin... Origen, in Joh. t. 2 n. 2 p.m. 50. δύο άναγορεύσαι θεούς, καί παρά τούτο περιπίπτοντας ψευδέσι και άσεβέσι δόγμασιν ήτοι άρνουμένους ιδιότητα Υιού έτέραν παρά την τού Πατρός, όμολογούντας Θεόν είναι τον μέχρι ονόματος παρ’ αύτοϊς Υιόν προσαγορευόμενονή άρνουμένους την θεότητα τού Υιού, τιθέντας δέ αύτοΰ τήν ιδιότητα καί τήν ούσίαν κατά περιγραφήν τυγχάνουσαν έτέραν τού Πατρός, εντεύθεν λύεσθαι δύναται. We omit the movement of alogs as too dark in meaning. Theodotus the elder was also prompted to do this by a personal motive - to more fully justify his renunciation of Christ. Epiphan. cypr. adv. liaer. 1. 2 haer. 54 n. 1. εις έαυτού δέ δήθεν κακήν απολογίαν έπινενόηκε τουτί το κενόν δόγμα, φήσας, δτι Θεόν εγώ ούκ ήρνησάμην, αλλά άνθρωπον ήρνησάμην... Χριστόν ήρνησάμην άνθρωπον. – Apparently, these monarchians are characterized by Origen (in Ep. ad Tit. fragm. p. 695), saying that heretics should be considered eos, qui primogenitum eum (J. Christum) negant, et totiiis creaturae Deiim, et Verbum, et Sapientiam... ante saecula fundatam, sed hominem solum dicentes. Origen, in any case, distinguishes these heretics from the Ebionites and Valentinians. Onion. 1, 35. Epiph. haer. 54 n. 3. Pseudo-Tertull. de praescr. haeret. c. 58 col. 72. accedit his Theodotus haereticus byzantius: qui posteaquam Christi pro nomine comprehensus negavit in Christum blasphemare non destitit. Doctrinam enim introduxit, qua Christum hominem tan-tummodo diceret (Theodoret. haer. fabul. comp. 2, 4. ψιλόν. Epiph. 54 n. Χριστόν. 1. 10 pp. 526 (Μ. 328) πάσιν. 1. 7 p. 406 Μ. ex Spiritu quidem sancto natum ex virgine (Philos. I. 10 c. 23. παρθένου, έπισκιάσαντος τού αγίου Πνεύματος), sed hominem solitarium atque nudum, nulla alia prae caeteris, nisi sola justitiae auctoritate (Philos. 1. 7 p. 35. εύσεβέστατον γεγονότα). Meier, I, 112. Christus ist... grösser als die Propheten (Theodoret. 2, 4 de Artem, haer. τόν Χριστόν... των προφητών αρετή κρείττονα), ihnen also doch spezifisch gleich... Damit soll der grössere Einfluss Gottes nicht geleugnet werden, es ist aber nur der offenbarende (= die bedeutendere Inspira- zion), wie er sich auch in den Propheten des A. T. findet, so dass Christo auch nur eine ähnliche Bedeutung bleiben kann. de praescr. haer. c. 53 col. 73. 74. Alter post hunc (Theodotum byz.) Theodotus haereticus erupit, qui et ipse introduxit alteram sectam, et ipsum hominem Christum tantummodo dicit ex Spiritu s. ex virgine Maria conceptum pariter et natum; sed hunc inferiorem esse, quam Melchisedech (Epiph. haer. 55 n. 1. ως είναι αυτόν έτι ύποδεέστερον τού Μελχισεδέκ), eo quod dictum sit de Christo: Tu essacerdos in aeternum secundum ordinem Melchisedech (Ps. 109). Nam ilium Melchisedech praecipuae gratiae coelestem esse virtutem (Philos. 1. 7 p. 36 r. 406 Μ. 258. δύναμίν τινα τον Μελχισεδέκ είναι μεγίστην. Theod. 2.6. advocatus ipsorum factns; Melchisedech facere pro coelestibus angelis atque virtutibus, nam esse ilium usque adeo Christo meliorem (Epiph. h. 55 n. 1. μειζότερον τού Χριστού), ut apator sit, amelor sit, agenealogenus sit, cujus neque initium neque finis comprehensus sit aut comprehend! possit (Hebr. 7, 3). Noet spoke to the council of elders (Hippolyt, p. Noet. p. 2): τί κακόν ποιώ δοξάζω v τόν Υιόν; Origen describes modalists in general (in Matth, t. 17 n. 14 p. 789) as φαντασία τού δοξάζειv αύτόν (in ep. ad Tit. p. 695) qui superstitiose magis, quam religiose.. unam eamdemque subsistentiam Patris ac Filii asseverant. adv. Prax. c. 20 col. 179. nam sicut in veteribus nihil aliud tenent quam, Ego Deus, et alius praeter me non est (Is. 45, 5), ita in evangelio responsionem Domini ad Philippum tuentur (citt. Joh. 10, 30; 14, 9. 11). His tribus capitulis totum instruments turn utriusque testamenti volunt cedere. Ibid. c. 2 col. 157. unicum Deum non alias putat credendum, quam si ipsum eumdemque et Patrem et Filium et Spiritum s. dicat. Ibid. c. 26 col. 189. “Nempe, inquiunt, Filius Dei Deus est, et virtus Altissimi Altissimus est”... Quern enim verebatur (Deus), - Tertullian objects, - ut non aperte pronuntiaret: “Deus superveniet in te, et Altissimus obumbrabit te”?... Spiritus Dei Deus... Ibid. c. 12 col. 167. an quia ipse erat Pater, Filius, Spiritus, ideo plurálem se praestans, pluraliter sibi loquebatur? Ibid. c. 10 col. 164. 165. “Ipse se, inquiunt (vanissimi isti monarchiani), Filium sibi fecit”... (p. 11 col. 166. porro qui eumdem Patrem dicis et Filium, eumdem et protulisse ex semetipso facis et prodiisse, quod Deus est)... “Ergo (post citt. Matt. 19, 26. 1 Cor. 1, 27), inquiunt, difficile non fuit Deo ipsum se et Patrem et Filium facere, adversus traditam formám rebus humanis, nam et sterilem parere, contra naturam, difficile Deo non fuit, sicut nec virginem.” Ibid. c. 14 col. 171. et illud adjiciunt ad argumentationem: Quod si Filius tune ad Moysen loquebatur, ipse faciem suam nemini visibilem pronuntiaret, quia scilicet ipse invisibilis Pater fuerit in Filii nomine. Ibid. c. 26. "Filius Dei Deus est"... Ibid. With. 27 col. 190. undique obducti distinctione Patris et Filii... conantur, ut aeque in una persona utrumque distingnant, Patrem et Filium, dicentes Filium carnem esse, i. e. hominem, i. e. Jesum; Patrem autem spiritum, i. e. Deum, i. e. Christum. Etqui unum eumdemque contendunt Patrem et Filium, jam incipiunt dividere illos potius quam unare. Si enim alius est Jesus, alius Christus, alius erit Filius, alius Pater; quia Filius Jesus, et Pater Christus... “Ecce, inquiunt, ab angelo praedicatum est: Propterea quod nascetur sanctum, vocabitur Filius Dei; Sago itaque nata est, sago utique (al. itaque) erit Filius Dei.” Ibid. c. 29 col. 194. “Ergo, inquis, et nos eadem ratione Patrem mortuum dicentes qua vos Filium, non blasphemamus in Dominum Deum: non enim ex divina, sed ex humana substantia mortuum dicimus.” Ibid. c. 29... compassus est Pater Filio... Filius quidem patitur, Pater vero compatitur. In this sense, all the most famous researchers decide. But Gieseler (Dogmengeschichte. Bonn. 1855. S. 132) speaks out for modalism. Praxeas nahm nämlich an,... dass also dasselbe göttliche Wesen als Vater unermesslich und unbegreiflich, sich als Logos in der Welt geoflfenbart habe und in Christo Mensch geworden sey. Neander (KG. Gotha. 1864. II, 320) states the fact that, based on the data from Tertullian, a double understanding of the teachings of Praxeus is possible, and suggests that either Tertullian did not sufficiently understand the meaning of Praxeus’ system or there were different views among the Praxeans. Neander considers the most compelling evidence for the modalism of the system (for the difference between the invisible God and the Word, God revealed) adv. Rgah. With. 14 (see p. 111 ex. 3). But this place seems easier than with. 10 (p. 111 pr. 2), agree with the opposite data. Let us pay attention to some indecision in the tone of the words of the Praxeans (pronuntiaret, fuerit). Perhaps this is not a statement of their teaching, but only a response to the objection of their opponents, and the real meaning of the passage is as follows: Let us assume, as you wish, that the Son (Hypostasis, distinct from the one God) spoke to Moses; but in this case, it means that the Son Himself calls His lipo invisible, and this, from your point of view, leads to the conclusion that the Son is identical with the one God. – The expression “The Son of God is God” can also be understood in the sense that He, whom the gospel undoubtedly speaks of as the Son of God, is God. Theodoret. haer. fab. comp. 1. Z s. 3. ένα φασίν είναι Θεόν και Πατέρα, των όλων δημιουργόν, άφανή μέν όταν έθέλη, φαινόμενον δέ ήνίκα άνβούληται. καί τον αυτόν αόρατον είναι καί όρώμενον, γεννητόν καί άγέννητον άγέννητον μέν έξ αρχής, γεννητόν δέ οτε έκ παρθένου γεννηθήναι ή θέλησε (Philos. 1. 10 c. 27 ρ. 528 Μ. 329. απαθή καί αθάνατον, οτε μη πάσχη μήτε θνήσκη, έπάν δέ πάθη προσέλθη, πάσχειν καί θνήσκειν). Απαθής γάρ ών. φησί, τό του σταυρού πάθος έθελήσας ύπέμεινε. Philos. 1.9 c. 10 ρ. 448 Μ. 284. προσηγόρευτο-οτε δέ ηύδόκησεν γένεσιν ύπομεΐναι, γεννηθείς ό Υίός έγένετο αυτός έαυτού, ούκ έτέρου. Ούτως γάρ δοκεΐ μοναρχίαν συνιστάν, εν καί τό αυτό φάσκων ύπάρχειν Πατέρα καί Υιόν καλούμενον, ούκ έτερον έξ έτέρου, άλλ’ αυτόν έξ έαυτού, όνόματι μέν Πατέρα καί Υιόν καλούμενον κατά χρόνων τροπήν (Theodoret. 3.3. κάκεΐνο καλούμενον. Philos. 1. 10 pp. 27. νομίζουσι κατά καιρούς καλούμενον προς τά συμβαίνοντα). This last expression is perhaps the most accurate: the name “Father” is the subject, the name “Son” is the predicate; The Father is sometimes called the Son. Consequently, the Father is God in Himself, the Son is the Father in modo, in relation to the world; Apparently, in addition to its special meaning, the Son also has something in common: according to the first, it is the Father born of the Virgin; according to the second, it is the mode of the Divine, a general name for all manifestations of the Father for the purpose of revelation. Philos. 1. 9. p. 10 rub. 450 Μ. 284. ύπομείναντα καί έν άνθρώποις άνθρωπον άναστραφέντα, Υιόν μέν έαυτόν τοϊς όρώσιν όμολογούντα διά την γενομένην γένεσιν, Πατέρα δέ είναι καί τοϊς χωρούσιν μή άποκρύψαντα. In this harmonious form, the Savelli system was restored by Baur, who in this follows Schleiermacher (Baur. Lehre v. d. Dreieinigkeit. Tübingen. 1841. I, 257. Es ist ein besonderes Verdienst der Schleiermacherschen Abhandlung (Ueber den Gegensaz zwischen der Sabellianischen und Athanasianischen Vorstellung von der Trinität.) diesen wichtigen Punct (question about the relationship between the monad and the Father) zuerst genauer ins Auge gefasst zu haben). Sabellius Neander presents the teaching differently (II, 334 ff.). In his opinion, the “monad” of Sabellius and the “Father” are one and the same. This is God in Himself, apart from the world. The basis of all being is Logos, i.e. The Father, who emerged from His absolute, irrespective existence. (Nach dieser Lehre ist das Sichselbstentfalten des aus der Einheit seines einsamen absoluten Seyns heraustretenden göttlichen Wesens Grund der ganzen Schöpfung). The Logos is already the second person of the Trinity, which in the incarnation appears as the Son. The third person, not identical with the Logos, is the Holy Spirit. More than one piece of evidence can be cited in favor of this representation of Sabellius’ system: the most important must be recognized as the passage indicated by Dorner (S. 718) from the expositio fìdei attributed to Gregory the Wonderworker (Mai, Coll. nov. 7, 170; Migne, s. gr. t. 10. col. 1109, 1. c. ap. Swete): άποφεύγομεν τόν Σαβέλλιον λέγοντα τόν αύτόν Πατέρα, τόν αύτόν Υιόν Πατέρα μέν γάρ λέγει είναι τόν λαλούντα, Υιόν δέ τόν Λόγον έν τώ Πατρί μένοντα, καί κατά καιρόν τής δημιουργίας φαινόμενον. Some evidence from Athanasius V. (eg or. 4 n. 25) also speaks in favor of Neander. But despite all this, his idea cannot be recognized as the only correct one: it contradicts other places in St. Athanasius and the data given by Vasily V., Epiphanius and Theodoret, which are completely consistent with each other. Baur's idea is recognized as more justified and is shared by other researchers (Meier, Domer); it is suggested in our text. But from what has been said it is clear that the difference in the views of Neander and Baur is based on disagreement in sources, which, in turn, has its objective reason in Sabellianism itself. Dorner (S. 709) explains this by the inconsistency of Sabellius himself: the discovery of the Philosophumena made it possible to explain this differently (Kuhn; D. Gusev): Neander reproduces the view that Sabellius held while he was a follower of Noetus (Philos. 1. 9 p. 438. cfr. 1. 10 p. 27. cfr. 1. 6 p. 12. p. 458 (see p. 105), where the teaching of Sabellius is recognized as equivalent to Noetianism); Baur gives Sabellius' system in its completed form, which he later gave it. Epiphan. haer. 62 n. 1. ή ώς έάν ή έν ήλίφ δντι μέν έν ύποστάσει, τρεϊς δέ εχοντι τάς ένεργείας φημί δέ τό φωτιστικόν, καί τό θάλπον, καί αυτό τό τής περιφέρειας σχήμα. Καί είναι μέν τό θάλπον, εϊτουν θερμόν καί ζέον, τό Πνεύμα, τό ? τής ύποστάσεως. Ibid. καί ψυχή, καί πνεύμα. Καί είναι μέν τό σώμα, ώς είπεΐν, τόν Πατέρα, ψυχήν δέ, ώς είπεΐν, τόν Υιόν, τό πνεύμα δέ ώς άνθρώπου, ούτως καί τό άγιον Πνεύμα έν τή θεότητι. Athanas. c. arian. or. 4 n. 25. ώσπερ διαιρέσεις χαρισμάτων είσί, τό δέ αύτό 11 νεύμα (1 Cor. 12:4) ούτω καί ό Πατήρ ό αύτός μέν έστι, πλατύνεται δέ εις Υιόν καί Πνεύμα. Theodoret, haer. fab. comp. 2, 9. άγιον Πνεύμα, καί εν τριώνυμον πρόσωπον (of course, in the sense of ύπόστασις), καί τόν αυτόν, ποτέ μεν ώς Πατέρα καλεϊ κ. τ. λ. Basil. Magni er. 214 n. Z p. 322. προσωποποιεΐσθαι δε υπό της γραφής διαφόρως κατά τό ιδίωμα τής ύποκειμένης έκάστοτε χρείας καί νΰν μέν τάς πατρικός έαυτω ??? Υίω πρέπουσας, όταν προς τήν ήμετέραν έπιμέλειαν ή προς άλλας τινάς οικονομικός ένεργείας ύποβαίνη νΰν δε τό τοΰ Πνεύματος ύποδύεσθαι προσωπεΐον, όταν ό καιρός τάς άπό τοΰ τοιούτου προσώπου φωνός άπαιτή. Epist. 210 ρ. 317. παρητήσατο είπών τόν αύτόν Θεόν ένα τω ύποκει μένω όντα προς τός (ep. 235 n.6. Athan, c. arian. 4. 25. άρμοζόμενον) νΰν ώς Πατέρα, νΰν δέ ώς Υιόν, νΰν δέ ώς Πνεύμα άγιον διαλέγεσθαι. Savelli, apparently, is presented with theater, a change of masks, costumes and roles. Athanas. With. arian. 4, 13. στωϊκών ύπέλαβε, διαβεβαιουμένων συστέλλεσθαι καί πάλιν έκτείνεσθαι τόν Θεόν. Ibid. 4, 21. εις τετράδα, Πατέρα, καί Αόγον, καί Υιόν, καί Πνεύμα άγιον. The exact translation of these names into church terminology was already difficult for Athanasius V.: usually (for example, 4, 25. 13) he takes the monad for the Father (4, 13. ή δέ μονάς έστιν ό Πατήρ); but does not insist that this identification is accurate (4, 13. γέγονε καί Υιός καί Πνεύμα κατά Σαβέλλιον εκτός εί μή ή λεγομένη παρ’ αύτω μονός άλλο τί έστι παρά τόν Πατέρα); He also confuses the Logos with the Son. With. arian. 4, 11. αύτόν βούλονται· εϊγε σιωπών μέν ούκ ήδύνατο ποιεϊν, λαλών δέ κτίζειν ήρξατο. That the Father is not identical with the monad is clear from the following considerations: the monad is God in the moment της συστολής, opposite τώ πλατυσμώ (cfr. c. ar. 4, 13. καί τριάς μέν ??? This is how Afanasy V. himself represents the relationship between these moments; but he directly puts πλατύνεσθαι and συστέλλεσθαι in analogy with λαλεϊν and σιωπςίν (cfr. 4, 13; the first words of paragraph 13: Τούτο δέ ϊσως άπό των στωϊκών κ. (see p. 116 pr. 2); and above (p. 11. 12) we are talking only about λαλεϊν and σιωπςιν moments, πρόοδος and άναδρομή, and almost the last words of paragraph 12 are the following: ή τί καί έλάλει ό Θεός, ϊνα μετά ταΰτα σιωπήση); therefore, the monad is God έν τη συστολή, i.e. σιωπών, and, as such, άνενέργητος; Meanwhile, the Father, according to the testimony of Vasily V., speaks (er. 214. πατρικός φωνάς; ερ. 210. διαλέγεσθαι; see p. 116 pr. 1), and according to Epiphanius - Sabellius compared the Father, the Son and Spirit with three energies of the sun (see p. 115 pr. 1). With. arian. 4, 12. Ibid. 4, 15. καί λέγειν άλλον μέν είναι τόν Λόγον, έτερον δέ τόν Υιόν, καί πρότερον μέν είναι τόν Λόγον, είτα τόν Υιόν. 4. 21. Υιός ό Λόγος. 4, 22. τότε ώνομάσθαι Υιόν προ γάρ τής έπιφανείας μή είναι Υιόν, άλλα Λόγον μόνον καί ώσπερ ό Λόγος σαρξ έγένετο, ούκ ών πρότερον σάρξ, ούτως ό Λόγος Υιός γέγονεν, ούκ ών πρότερον Υιός. 4, 23. φασί δή, διό τό μή είρήσθαι έν τή παλαιςί (διαθήκη) περί Υιού, άλλα περί Λόγου, καί διά τούτο νεώτερον ύπονοεΐν τού Λόγου τόν Υιόν διαβεβαιούνται, δτι μή έν τή παλαιςί, άλλ’ έν τή καινή μόνη περί αύτού έλέχθη. Polemicizing against Sabellius, Athanasius V. does not want to recognize this difference between the Logos and the Son (4, 15. Λόγον, άρνούνται αύτόν Υιόν εϊναι) and therefore sometimes confuses these names (eg 4, 25). Thus, according to the system of Sabellius as presented by Baur, the Father Himself is the modus of the Logos; Logos is a higher concept than the Father. This is the weakest point in Baur's entire presentation, not supported by any direct evidence. Neander, naturally, paid attention to this side and noted that to represent the Logos as independent of the Father, but prior to Him, means to go against all analogies in the views of that time (S. 336 English. 8. Es wäre ganz gegen alle Analogie der Anschauungsweise dieser Zeit, dass der Begriff des Logos unabhängig von dem Begriff des Vaters sollte aufgefasst, als ein diesem vorangehender sollte betrachtet werden). Dorner also speaks out in this sense (S. 710 Anm.). The weight of this remark cannot be denied: indeed, the prevailing view of the time produces the Logos from the Father, the Father prior (at least logically) to the Word. But Sabellius was not completely alone in his view, and in the Philosophumena one can find indirect confirmation of Baur’s hypothesis. Under the influence of Callistus, Sabellius remained faithful to Noetianism, although he could have corrected himself and adopted the Orthodox view (Philos. 1. 9 pp. Ir. 450 Μ. 285); but later, having become a Roman bishop, Callistus, out of fear of Hippolytus, excommunicated Sabellius for his unorthodox way of thinking (Phil. 1. 9. p. 12 p. 456 Μ. 289. τόν Σαβέλλιον άπέωσεν ώς μή φρονοΰντα όρθώς, δεδοικώς εμέ). By this, however, he did not reconcile Hippolytus with himself and only brought upon himself accusations from Sabellius of betraying his convictions. Under the influence of such circumstances, Callistus invented his dogmatic system (Ibid, καί διά τά υπό του Σαβελλίου συχνώς κατηγορεϊσθαι ώς The last word seems to indicate that that what follows will be stated as accurately as possible, in Callistus’s own words). He taught that the Logos is both the Son and the Father (αυτόν καί Πατέρα. See page 104). Perhaps in this phrase there is already an element borrowed from Sabellius in unional forms, but if, according to Callistus’s intention, it should mean nothing more than that both the Father and the Son are one spiritual, rational being, then nevertheless its construction is such that the Logos appears here as the highest primary concept to which both the Son and the Father are subordinate; Logos is the subject of the subsequent concepts of Father and Son, which relate to it as its predicates; therefore, we can say without noticeable error that Logos here is υποκείμενον, ύπόστασις, and the Son and Father are ονόματα, modi. From the words of Basil the Great (see p. 116 pr. 1) it is not clear that the change of persons of the Sabellian Trinity corresponds to the history of the religious development of mankind, but that he does not deny this, this is clear from Theodoret. 2, 9. ώς άγιον Πνεύμα. Based on these words, one might think that all three πρόσωπα can change within one day, but Theodoret continues: καί έν μέν τη παλαιφ ώς Πατέρα νομοθετήσαι, έν δέ τη καινή ώς Υιόν ένανθρωπήσαι· ώς Πνεύμα δέ άγιον τοΐς άποστόλοις έπιφοιτήσαι. Theodorit’s testimony that the Father acts in the Old Testament and is revealed as God the lawgiver fundamentally undermines Neander’s idea that Sabellius’s “Father” is identical with the monad and, as such, is God in Himself, and not God appearing: this idea is valid only in relation to the previous phase of the development of Sabellianism. Theodoret's expression: έν τη παλαιό may have the meaning that the Father acted throughout the Old Testament period, and not just at the moment of legislation; but from Athanasius V. we know that, according to the Sabellians, the Old Testament speaks of the Logos (4, 23; p. 117 pr. 3). This can be seen as an argument, albeit a weak one, in favor of Baur's hypothesis that the Father is the Logos. Baur (S. 261) and Meyer (S. 124) believe that the Father is also the creator of the world; Dorner (S. 711) thinks that the world was created not by the Father, but by the Logos. The evidence from the sources speaks in favor of Dorner, but it is such that it cannot speak against Baur and Meyer either. In order to resolve the controversial issue on the basis of the consistency of the system itself, it is necessary to know the Sabellian view of the relationship of the Word to πρόσωπα better and more accurately than we know it. Only one thing can be said: if for every private revelation of the Divine, for every His word (φωνή), it is necessary that it be spoken from a person in a close sense (από προσώπου, από προσωπείου, see p. 116 pr. 1), then at least for the first revelations to man, and perhaps to create the world with the word, God the Logos must put on Himself πρωσοπεϊον; but this condition is far from being based on hard data.—The exact meaning of the title "Son" was a controversial issue among the Sabellians themselves. Athan, p. ar. 4, 15. έστι δέ τούτων διάφορος ή τόλμα, οί μέν γάρ τον άνθρωπον, δν άνέλα- βεν ό Σωτήρ, αυτόν είναι τόν Υιόν λέγουσιν οίδέτό συναμφότερον, τόν τε άνθρωπον καί τόν Αόγον, τόν τότε γεγενησθαι, οτε συνήφθησαν. ’Άλλοι δέ είσιν οί λέγοντες, αυτόν τόν Αόγον τότε Υιόν γεγενησθαι, δτε ένηνθρώπησεν. Ibid. 4, 25. της χρείας πληρωθείσης. Ibid. 4, 25. ατήρ. Epiph. h. 62 n. 1. πεμφθέντα δέ τον Υιόν χαίρω lote, ώσπερ αχτίνα, καί έργασάμενον τα ??? - φθείσώς ακτίνα, καί πάλιν εις τον ήλιον άναδραμοΰσαν. Words (c. ar. 4, 12): “δι’ ημάς γεγέννηται, καί μεθ’ ημάς άνατρέχει”, in which Kurtz sees evidence in favor of Neander’s opinion that The συστολή of the Son can follow only after achieving the final goal of redemption - they do not refer to the Son, but to the Word. Neander himself bases his opinion mainly on the word “πληρωθείσης” (Ath. pp. 4, 25. See note 2 p. 119), translating it: nachdem der Zweck... ein Ende nehmen wird, and rejects the testimony of Epiphanius, suggesting that he did not quite correctly understand Sabellius (er nicht ganz recht in dessen Sinne verstand). Dorner (S. 722) agrees with Baur. Epiph h. 62 n. 1. το δέ άγιον Πνεύμα πέμπεσθαι εις τον κόσμον, καί καθεξής, καί καθ ... καί θερμαίνειν... Athan, p. ar. 4, 12. (Ibid. 4, 14. άναιρεθήσεται καί ή κτίσις... παυόμενου του πλατυσμοΰ, παύσεται καί ή κτίσις)... Τί δέ πάλιν έσται, άδηλον. “Η γάρ σιωπήσει αει, ή παλιν γεννήσει, καί έτεραν κτισιν έπινοήσει ού γάρ τήν αυτήν ποιήσει· ή γάρ αν διέμεινεν ή γενομένη· άλλ’ έτεραν. άκολούθως δέ καί ταύτην παυσει, καί έτεραν έπινοήσει, καί τοΰτο είς άπειρον. γέννησις, the most common (given in the forms γεννςί, έγέννησε) special form “άπογέννησις” by St. Hippolyta (“άπογεννςϊ”); "generatio", "nativitas" in St. Irenaeus and Tertullian. προπήδησις (in the form “προπηδςί” in Tatian; the same meaning in “προελθών” of Athenagoras); processio (“procedendo” in Tertullian). έξέρευξις (in obvious connection with Ps. 44:2 “έξερευξάμενος” in Theophilus). missio (“miserat” in Tertullian). This is not only γένεσις, which is obtained, for example, from the “γέγονε” of Tatian and Clement, but “conditio” (“condita” in Tertullian); compare ή πρωτόκτιστος in Clement. creatio (“creatae” in Clement). ετερον τι άριθμώ in Justin. τάξις from Athenagoras; gradus in Tertullian. species, forma, res, substantivum in Tertullian. πνεύμα - especially clear in Athenagoras. δύναμις by Athenagoras and Hippolytus. όμοφρονία, συμφωνία by Hippolytus. substantia in Tertullian. You might be interested in: