Introduction to the Fundamentals of Dogmatic Theology

Treatise of St. John of Damascus “Introduction to the Fundamentals of Dogmatic Theology” is dedicated to John, Bishop of Laodicea, and in its content coincides with the first part of “The Source of Knowledge” - “Philosophical Chapters”. The work consists of 10 chapters, which contain a brief examination of the basic philosophical concepts used by Christian theology: “essence”, “nature”, “hypostasis”, “person”, “energy”, “action”, “will”, etc. The exact date of writing the treatise is unknown. Presumably, it arose before the Philosophical Chapters. * Title of the work in Greek: ταπεινοῦ μοναχοῦ πρὸς ᾿Ιωάννην τὸν ὁσιώτατον ἐπίσκοπον Λαοδικείας. * Title of the essay in Latin: Institutio elementaris. Contents Chapter One. About essence, nature and form Chapter two. About hypostasis, face and individual Chapter Three. About species differences, quality and special properties Chapter Four. About the essential and incidental attribute (difference), or about attribute and accident Chapter five. About separable and inseparable accidents Chapter Six. About what belongs to one or different natures Chapter Seven. About the genus and species Chapter Eight. About energy (action) Chapter Nine. About suffering Chapter ten. About will Among the diverse heritage of Saint John of Damascus, his philosophical treatises occupy a special place. Usually they mention “Dialectics”, the first part of “The Source of Knowledge”. Meanwhile, there is another work of the same nature: “Introduction to the Fundamentals of Dogmatics” (Εἰσαγωγὴ δογμάτων, Institutio elementaris ad dogmata), the translation of which is offered below (based on the edition of J. R. Migne, PG 96). It is necessary to say a few words about the place of this treatise among other treatises and about its significance. Firstly, the question arises about the relationship between “Dialectics” and “Introduction”. It can be answered with confidence that these works belong to the same author. This opinion is supported by the undoubted similarity in the style, content and composition of both works: they begin with a prayer address, then the further course of reasoning is briefly outlined, and then the main part follows, where very much attention is paid to the topic of the relationship between genus and species. The language of both works is very clear, complex syntactic structures are practically never encountered, and some wording and explanations coincide verbatim. Secondly, it is interesting that in all three manuscripts known to the publisher, the “Introduction” precedes three polemical treatises of St. John: “On the complex nature against the acephalians”, “On the properties of the two natures in one Christ” and “Against the Nestorians”. Thus, the “Introduction” plays the same role as the “Dialectics” - the role of a philosophical introduction to the system of Christian dogmatics. However, it places more emphasis on the terminological component; This circumstance allows us to conclude that the task of the “Introduction” is to define terms before starting theological discussions. Accordingly, its content was determined by the content of subsequent treatises (however, some features of this work may indicate its self-sufficiency). So, for example, the polemic with Severianism presupposed precise concepts about the “most particular form,” that is, nature or essence, determined by the corresponding properties (which include will and energy) and countable in hypostases. Meanwhile, the concept of “the most particular kind” also presupposes the concept of “the most general kind”. Finally, the significance of this treatise is not limited only to terminological references. We have already mentioned above the increased attention of St. John to the topic of the relationship between genus and species. Upon careful reading, it is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that both in the “Introduction” and in “Dialectics” in the chapters “On Genus and Species” nominalism and realism are surprisingly intertwined. The problem of medieval Western philosophy did not confront St. John. The fact that in his understanding both the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic traditions did not contradict each other is quite obvious. But how did they unite? This question must be answered taking into account the entire legacy of St. John. At first glance, it may seem that nominalism should explain the existing provisions of realism (for example, the question of being, substance and accident). So, the translation of this treatise is of significant value if it is considered not only as an independent work or an abbreviated version of “Dialectics”, but in the context of the entire diverse heritage of St. John of Damascus. Thus, with its help it will be possible to explain in more detail the uniqueness of the philosophical and, accordingly, dogmatic views of St. John, to reveal the internal connection of his works (which will be useful in the work on their periodization); finally, to more fully imagine the picture of the relationships in the field of philosophical, dogmatic and cultural-historical quests of the late 7th - early 8th centuries. Expounded by 1 the humble monk John to the most holy Bishop of Laodicea John. In the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, the one and worshiped Godhead, the consubstantial and life-giving Trinity, the one God, Whose “every good gift and every perfect gift is from above” (James 1:11). I open my tongue-tied and clumsy lips, pitiful and sinful, in the hope that, through the humility of those who asked me about my judgment, the spirit of wisdom and “the word at the opening of my mouth” (Eph 3:19) will be given to the benefit of those listening by the good Lord, the giver of every good, “who is God blessed above all forever” (Rom 9:5). Amen. Chapter one 2. On essence, nature and form According to the Holy Fathers, essence 3, nature 4, and form 5 are one and the same. Further, hypostasis 6, person 7 and individual 8 are also one and the same. Further, specific difference 9, quality 10 and special property 11 are one and the same. So, the goal for us is to review (disclose) these terms and the like, which Your Holiness has urgently requested. Thus starting our presentation, let's say the following. Indeed, there is a super-existent nature, essence and form, an incomprehensible Deity: His hypostases and persons are the Father, the Son and the All-Holy Spirit. Each of Them is a perfect hypostasis and a perfect person. In addition, every creation of God is a certain essence, because, indeed, creations are numerous and have a significant species difference in relation to each other (species difference). After all, one creation is an angel and a completely different one is a person; one is a bull and the other is a dog; one is heaven, the other is earth; also one is fire, and another is water. In short, creations are divided into many types. Every species is one nature: for example, all Angels constitute one nature. And bulls also constitute one nature, and similarly the rest of creation. Meanwhile, Angels have one nature and people have another, and bulls also have a different nature from the previous ones. The same can be said about other creations. Chapter two 12. About hypostasis, face and individual Since people are numerous, every individual person is a hypostasis. So, for example, Adam is a hypostasis, Eve is a different hypostasis, and Seth is also a different hypostasis from the others. The same applies to others: every person is a hypostasis, isolated from other people; but every bull is a hypostasis, and every angel. Thus, nature, essence and form are something common, a container of consubstantial hypostases. And the hypostasis, the individual and the person are something particular, or rather, a separate representative of everything that is contained in the same form. Chapter three 13. On species differences, quality and special properties We have already said that there are numerous types and different essences, and also that in each type and each essence there are different hypostases. Consequently, each essence differs from another essence, and each hypostasis from another hypostasis: that by which an essence differs from an essence, a species from a species, and a hypostasis from a hypostasis is called species difference, quality, and special property. For example, an Angel differs from a person in that an Angel is immortal, and a person is mortal. This means that immortality, like mortality, is a species difference, quality and special property. Further, Adam differs from Seth in that he is the father of Seth, and Seth is the son of Adam, and in that Adam is unborn, and Seth is born. Thus, paternity and sonship are species differences, since thanks to them Adam and Seth are different from each other, as well as due to being born and unborn 14. Also, everything like that is called a species difference, quality and special property, for example, intelligence and irrationality, bipedality and quadrupedality, the ability and inability to feel, snub and hooked nose, whiteness and darkness, largeness and smallness, and all the like. Chapter Four 15. About the essential and incidental feature (difference), or about the attribute and accident Everything that distinguishes one species from another and one essence from another essence is called essential 16, natural and formative attribute (difference) or quality, also accident, natural property and peculiarity of nature. For example, an Angel differs from a person in immortality and mortality: immortality is an essential and formative sign, or natural property of an Angel; the same is mortality in relation to man. Further, a man differs from a bull in that a man is reasonable, and a bull is unreasonable. So, rationality is an essential and formative characteristic for a person, and unreasonableness is for a bull. Likewise in relation to other species, essences, natures and forms. That by which any hypostasis differs from a hypostasis of the same type that is consubstantial with it is called an accessory 17 attribute or quality, a personal property or a distinctive property, that is, an accident 18 . For example, one person differs from another in that one is tall and the other is short, one is white and the other is dark, one is healthy and the other is sick, one is a father and the other is a son: all this and the like are incidental signs and qualities, or personal, distinctive and accidental properties. In a word, everything that is observed in the same way in all hypostases of one species, and without which the formation of essence and species is impossible, is called an essential feature, and everything that is present in one of the hypostases of the same species, but not in another, is a random and incidental feature, an accident. Chapter Five 19. On separable and inseparable accidents Of the random characteristics (accidents), some are separable, while others are inseparable 20. Those through which one hypostasis differs from another, but not from itself, are inseparable. For example, such and such a person differs from another in that he himself has a snub nose, while the latter has a hooked nose, or in that the first has blue eyes, and the second has black eyes. But he is no different from himself, because a snub nose is always a snub nose, and a hooked nose is always hooked. These signs (accidents) are called inseparable, because as soon as someone has acquired them, they can no longer be taken away from him. Nevertheless, they still remain random signs: it is possible for a person to be and not to be snub-nosed, to have and not to have a hooked nose, since every person does not have one, but every person is necessarily reasonable, and an unreasonable person is not a person. Separable accidents are those that the same person or the same hypostasis sometimes has and sometimes does not have. Such are, for example, illness and health, the state of sitting and standing, joy and sadness, and all the like. Chapter Six 21. About what belongs to the same or different natures Consubstantial 22 , of the same nature, of the same form, of the same type and homogeneous is everything that belongs to the same species and the same nature, for example, Peter, Paul and all other individual people, all bulls, all dogs, as well as others. And those belonging to different essences 23 natures, forms, species and genera are those who have different natures and belong to different species, for example, man and horse, dog and bull, and all the like. Chapter seven 24. About the genus and species The genus is divided into species 25, as, for example, living things are divided into rational and irrational. Thus, the living is a genus for the rational and the irrational, and the rational and the irrational are species of the living. Further, the rational is divided into mortal man and immortal Angel. Consequently, the rational is a genus for the mortal and the immortal, and the mortal and the immortal are species of the rational. To clarify what has been said, let's start the speech again. The most general genus is the first genus, which, although a genus, is not a species, since it is not included in a more general genus. The least general is the latest and most particular species, which, being a species, is not a genus, since it does not include other species. And between the most general genus and the most particular species are species and genera; genera logically precede species, species logically follow genera. For example, the most general genus is existence, 26 and since it is not subordinate to another genus, it is not a species; it itself is divided into body and incorporeal. The body, in turn, is divided into animate and inanimate; animate - capable and incapable of feeling; capable - for the reasonable and unreasonable; reasonable - into mortal and immortal. The incorporeal is thus rational and immortal; Here I call immortal an entity such as, for example, a soul, an angel, a demon; each of them is the most private type. An animal is an animate body capable of feeling; The rational and mortal animal is man, who is the most private species. An unreasonable and barking animal is a dog; it is also the most private type. Further, an animal that is animate and incapable of feeling is a plant. And the body is completely incorporeal and inanimate - earth, air, water, fire; each of them is also the most particular genus 27. For greater clarity, let's say this. The essence which, on the one hand, super-existently contains the uncreated Deity, and on the other hand, the whole creation in an intelligible and comprehensive manner, is the most general genus. She can be either incorporeal, rational and immortal, such as God, Angel, soul, demon; can be an inanimate body, like fire, air, water, earth; it may also be a plant body, like a grape, a palm tree, an olive, and the like; either an animate body capable of feeling, that is, an animal, like a horse, dog, elephant, and the like, or a complex entity made of body and incorporeal soul, like a person. The essence of all the above, being the first and most universal, all-containing essence, is the most general genus. The types of this genus are: a disembodied, inanimate body, a plant body, an animate body capable of feeling, that is, an animal. They are all called genera and subordinate species. They are species insofar as they belong to the same genus, from which they are distinguished. But each of them is divided into other types, contains them and is the most universal for them. Indeed, the incorporeal essence includes God, Angel, soul, demon, and the inanimate body - earth, water, air, fire, the vegetable body - grapes, palm, olive and the like, the animate and sentient body, that is, the animal - horse, bull, dog and the like, in addition - a complex of the incorporeal soul and the human body 28. So, there is a hypostasis, an individual and a person, for example, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the uniting species is the superexistent and incomprehensible Deity. Michael, Gabriel and other individual Angels are also hypostases, and the species containing them is the angelic nature. Peter, Paul and John are also hypostases, as are all other people individually, and the species containing them is humanity. Again, the hypostases are both horses, and the species that unites them is the horse as such. Hypostases are also this or that olive tree, and the species containing them is the olive tree as such. It should, therefore, be known that the container of individuals should be called only the most particular species, for example, man (man in general), Angel, horse, dog, olive, palm tree, and the like; and the container of the most particular species can only be called a genus or a subordinate species, for example, incorporeal, body, inanimate, incapable of feeling, vegetable, animate, capable of feeling, living, rational, irrational, mortal, immortal, biped, quadruped, reptile, feathered, and the like, containing the most particular species and being for them both a genus and formative feature; meanwhile, they are all contained in the most general genus, that is, in essence. You can think about this in another way 29. Everything that is brought into existence by a single command of God belongs to one genus: for example, God commanded fish to appear, and numerous species of fish arose. All fish belong to the same genus, but each (specific) difference between them constitutes a species. Further, God commanded the waters to bring forth birds, and many species of birds arose. Therefore, all birds constitute one genus, but any difference between birds is one species of the whole avian genus. The same applies to reptiles, livestock, wild animals, herbs, vegetables and trees. It is also said that there is one genus for all animals, one genus for all plants, and one genus for inanimate things, which have no nurturing or nutritional power at all. Further, there is one genus for the incorporeal, one genus for the bodies. It is also said that all creation is one genus, and the differences between creations form many species. Also, everything that exists is one kind. Chapter Eight 30. About energy (action) Energy 31 is the active movement of the actor. Natural energy is the active movement of nature, for example, the rational movement of the mind, also life activity, perception, feeding, growth, movement according to impulse, that is, bodily movements, also representation, memory, anger, attraction (passion), desire, that is, aspiration, and the like. The energy itself has five types: either rational, as in the Angels and all incorporeal beings who think by simple inversion of the mind (intuition), or rational, as in people made up of soul and body and thinking not with simple, but complex and rational (dialectical) inversion of the mind, or animal, as in irrational animals, having a sense, but not reasoning and not thinking, or vegetative, as in those who are incapable of feeling, although they have plant and productive forces, or completely lifeless, like earth and stone, which have neither vital, nor nutritional, nor plant forces and, of course, not involved in any natural energies. Chapter Nine 32. About suffering Natural suffering 33 is the passive movement of the nature of the person undergoing suffering, which is the energy of nature, since suffering refers to that in relation to which there can be energy, for example, birth, joy, sadness, anxiety, restlessness, fear, timidity, fatigue, sleep, pleasantness, suffering, anger, attraction, dissection, expiration, decay (destruction), and all the like. So, this and all the like are natural sufferings, but at the same time blameless, since they are not in our power; only sin, being voluntary and the most evil suffering and corruption for the soul, is contrary to nature. Chapter Ten 34. About will Will 35 is a natural and rational desire. Further, will is a natural, rational and voluntary desired movement of the mind, and irrational animals are aroused to desire involuntarily. Therefore, when their nature is aroused to desire, they, having no rational ability, follow it, obeying its desire. As a result, they immediately rush to action, unless something else prevents them. As a result, they are not free, but subject (to nature). And rational nature has the ability to either follow the desire of nature, or refuse it and prevail over it. Nature itself shows this, on the one hand, striving for life, on the other hand, obeying reason, since many, having defeated it under the guidance of reason, voluntarily went to death, rejected the desire for food, sleep, and also everything else, commanding nature with the help of reason, and not obeying it. So, insofar as natural desire is inherent in nature capable of feeling, freedom is inherent in every rational nature, therefore everything rational is free, and this is the image of God. So, desire is a natural, rational and free impetuous force and movement. That which is the object of the will, and to which it extends, is called gnomic will, 36 since, with the help of its own opinion, the mind is excited to use it, while remaining independent. And this itself, for example, the decision to eat or not to eat, to drink or not to drink, to go or not to go, to marry or not to marry, as well as everything like that that is in our power, we can make, both one and the opposite. The Greek text also states "ὰπὸ φωνῆς", "viva voce", that is, "vocally, in the form of speech." Thus, the “Introduction” turns out to be a literary treatment of a speech once delivered on a dogmatic topic. Perhaps, when compiling this treatment, the treatise became a preface to three other treatises: “On a complex nature against the acephalians”, “On the properties of two natures in one Christ” and “Against the Nestorians”. Corresponds to IV, XXX, XXXIX-XLI chapters of Dialectics. The essence is οὐσ ί α, a rather late concept meaning “property”. Later it was used as a philosophical term by Plato and Aristotle (the latter has the first and second essences). The Holy Fathers also actively used it: in a general sense, by Clement of Alexandria, Leontius of Byzantium, Leontius of Jerusalem, etc.; contrasted with accidents by Leontius of Byzantium; hypostases - with St. Basil the Great and St. Gregory of Nyssa. Nature, φύσις; this word denoted the result of emergence and formation; later in philosophy οὐσ ί α was contrasted as a particular to a more general one. For the Holy Fathers, these concepts coincided, for example, with St. Basil the Great, St. Gregory of Nyssa, Leontius of Byzantium, St. Maximus the Confessor, etc. However, sometimes these concepts were opposed - with Clement of Alexandria, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Anastasius of Sinaite. It is also interesting to note that in the 4th century φύσις was both identified with ὑπὀστασις (St. Gregory the Theologian, St. Cyril of Jerusalem) and differentiated (St. Gregory of Nyssa). Shape, µо ρφ ή; this word first denoted appearance, then became fundamental in Aristotle's system. The Holy Fathers have used the meaning of “nature” mainly since the end of the 4th century: St. Gregory the Theologian, Blessed Theodoret of Cyrrhus, St. Leo the Great, Leontius of Jerusalem. Hypostasis, ὑπ ό στασις, a polysemantic word with a complex history, in philosophy meant essence, substance, coinciding in meaning with οὐσ ί α. This understanding was also among the Holy Fathers right up to St. Epiphanius of Cyprus, and was sometimes used in this meaning in the future (by St. Maximus the Confessor). As something individual, it began to be used first by the holy martyr Methodius of Olympia, then by the Cappadocians and the Fathers who followed them. φύσις and οὐσ ί α were contrasted by St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Cyril of Alexandria, both Leontius, St. Maximus the Confessor, etc. In the meaning of “essence with signs” it was used by both Leontius, Eulogius of Alexandria, Anastasius of Antioch The face, πρ ό σωπον, has always been understood as an individuality, but at the same time it is closely associated with the actions of this individuality (hence the possibility of the meaning “mask”), see: Chapter XLIII of “dialectics”. In the sense of individuality, it was used very often in Christian theology, for example, by Blessed Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Leontius of Jerusalem, and Saint Anastasius of Sinaite. Leontius of Byzantium identified πρ ό σωπον with ὑπ ό στασις and φύσις. Individual, ἄτομος; this word was introduced into philosophical use by Democritus, but in the meaning of “individual” it began to be used by Plato and Aristotle. Among the Holy Fathers, the term “particular” was used by Blessed Theodoret of Cyrrhus, the author of “De Sections”, Leontius of Byzantium, and St. Maximus the Confessor. The author of the treatise "De Trinitate", attributed to St. Cyril of Alexandria, identified ἄτομος with ὑπ ό στασις and φύσις. Species difference, διαφορά, a word that generally denoted differences, difference, even discord. The meaning of logical distinction acquired from Plato and Aristotle. In this meaning, the Holy Fathers used it very actively: in triadology it referred to the distinction of the Persons of the Retinue of the Trinity (St. Basil the Great, St. Gregory of Nyssa, the author of “De Trinitate”, St. Maximus the Confessor) and was denied when pointing to Their consubstantiality (St. Gregory of Nyssa, author of “De Trinitate”). With its help, the specific difference between the two natures in Christ was pointed out, starting with Theodore of Mopsuestia. Quality, ποι ό της, is a purely philosophical term, introduced into use since the times of Plato and Aristotle (the latter has one of its categories). Of the Fathers, they contrasted quality with nature: Origen, Hieromartyr Methodius of Olympus, St. Gregory the Theologian, St. Gregory of Nyssa, pseudo-Dionysius, and others. They distinguished the quality of natures in Christ: Leontius of Jerusalem, St. Maximus the Confessor. Severus of Antioch distinguished in Christ not natural (φύσεων, οὐσιῶν) qualities, but natural (φυσικαὶ ποιότητες). The special property, ἰδίωμα, is also a purely philosophical, and henceforth a grammatical concept. First used by Aristotle, more actively by the Stoics and Neoplatonists. Saint Gregory of Nyssa identified it with διαφορά; in the same sense it was used by St. Maximus the Confessor, St. Anastasius the Sinaite, and others. St. Basil the Great considered it a property of nature, inherent in individuals - Alexander of Alexandria, St. Athanasius the Great, St. Cyril of Alexandria. Corresponds to chapters V, XI, XIX, XXX, XLII-XLIV of Dialectics. Corresponds to IV, V, XII-XIV, XXI-XXVIII, LI chapters of “Dialectics”. However, this does not mean at all that Adam and Seth belong to different species and have different natures. Comparing this chapter with Chapter X of Dialectics, we can say that this example, nominalistic in nature, clarifies the above position. In addition, here one can see an indication of the concept of “generic Adam”, as in St. Gregory of Nyssa. Corresponds to IV, V, XII-XIV, XIX, XXI-XXVIII chapters of “Dialectics”. Essential, οὐσιώδης, sign (difference), late philosophical term. Used by Aristotle. In Christian theology, this definition was used in relation to properties: St. Gregory the Theologian, Leontius. Byzantine, Saint Sophronius of Jerusalem and others, in relation to διαφορά - Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Leontius of Jerusalem, etc. In Christology, this term characterized the hypostatic union of natures in Christ (Leontius of Byzantium, Saint Sophronius of Jerusalem). Advent, έπουσιώδης, sign, is also a late philosophical term used by Porphyry, then by John Philoponus. It was used in this meaning by the Fathers approximately from the 6th century: by both Leontiev, St. Maximus the Confessor, author of the Doctrina Patrum. Accident, συμβεβηκός, a term introduced by Aristotle (contrasted κατὰ συμβεβηκός and καθ ῾ αὑτό); among the Epicureans it denoted an essential property, among the Stoics it meant the consequence of a specific cause. In Christian theology it was used in the meaning of “accident”, first by St. Gregory of Nyssa, then by both Leontius, the author of “Doctrina Patrum”. Corresponds to chapters V, XIII, XXII, XXV, XXVII, XXVIII of Dialectics. Separable, χωριστόν, and inseparable, ἀχωριστόν, accidents; the concept of separable and inseparable characteristics was used by Plato, and in relation to accidents - by Aristotle. In Christian theology, these terms were used quite rarely. The concept of ἀχωριστόν was sometimes referred to the Persons of the Holy Trinity and the natures in Christ (in the latter case, by Theodore of Mopsuestia, Nestorius). This chapter does not have an exact correspondence in Dialectics. However, its content is covered by Chapters X, XXXI and XXXVII of Dialectics. Consubstantial, ὁμούσιος, a polysemantic word used in different contexts, in different meanings. It received philosophical significance from the Neoplatonists: Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Simplicius. Since the 10th century it has been of particular importance for Christian theology, pointing to the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son. The eye also pointed to the consubstantiality of all the Persons of the Holy Trinity (Leontius of Jerusalem, St. Maximus the Confessor). In Christology it was used in the context of polemics with Apollinarianism and Monophysitism, pointing to the consubstantial Body of Christ for all people (St. Ambrose of Milan, Blessed Theodoret of Cyrrhus, St. Cyril of Alexandria, etc.). Belonging to a different nature, a philosophical term introduced by the Neoplatonist Porphyry. In Christian theology it was used by: Origen, St. Maximus the Confessor, St. Anastasius Sinaite. Leonty of Jerusalem used it most actively. Corresponds to V, IX, X, XIX-XXIII, XXVI-XXVII chapters of “Dialectics”. Genus, γένος, species, ε ἷ δος, ambiguous words that received philosophical meaning from Plato and Aristotle. Eἷ δος, originally meaning “appearance”, partly coinciding with µо ρφ ή, became the main concept of Plato’s philosophy. Later, these elephants received the meaning of logical gender and species. At the same time, ε ἷ δος was identified with φύσις or οὐσ ί α, as consisting of individuals (author of “De Sections”). On the division of existence, see also chapters XXVI – XXVII of “Dialectics”. The nominalistic part of the chapter ends here. According to the Greek text (πρὸς δὲ πλε ί ονα σαφ ή νειαν, “for greater clarity”) it prepares the reader for the further realistic part. Here ends the realistic part, which has the same plan as the nominalistic one. Next comes the part that explains the relationship between hypostasis and species, or nature, which is a synthesis of the two previous parts. In its content, this part of the chapter is strongly reminiscent of chapter VII of “Conversations on the Sixth Day” by St. Basil the Great: in it, creation is also the creation of species. Corresponds to Chapter LII of Dialectics. Action, ἐνέργεια, a polysemantic word that became one of the categories in Aristotle, was used in the same meaning by Epicurus and Galen. Of the Holy Fathers in the general sense of action, activity, it was used by: St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Maximus the Confessor, author of the Doctrine Patrum, etc. Meanwhile, the distinction between ἐνέργεια and οὐσ ί α, δύναμις was made by: Athenagoras the Athenian, Clement of Alexandria, St. Maximus the Confessor, pseudo-Dionysius, etc. Suffering, πάθος, in the philosophical meaning of opposition to energy, was used by Apollonius Discolus. In the same meaning - in Nemesius of Emesa. In Christian theology it was understood as a consequence of the Fall (St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Maximus the Confessor, etc.). Therefore, since this meaning took into account the close connection with sin, it was denied in relation to Christ (St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Athanasius the Great, etc.). This chapter has no correspondence in Dialectics. Will, θέλησις, was introduced into philosophical use by the Stoic Philodemus. In the meaning of the ability to act in Christian theology, it was also used by the Hieromartyr Irenaeus of Lyons and Saint Clement of Alexandria; Blessed Theodoret of Cyrrhus identified him with the object of will. Distinguished from βούλησις by St. Maximus the Confessor. Gnomic will, a term introduced by St. Maximus the Confessor during a polemic with monothelitism.