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Exaltation (Elevation) of the Precious Cross

Land and property according to the laws of Moses

Земля и собственность по законам Моисея
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The question of laws regarding land and property is important and interesting on the merits of the subject in any folk law, and is of even more interest in the Mosaic law, based on exclusive principles. Among all other peoples, laws regarding land and property - the most important part of public-state law, constituting the material basis of people's life - are the product of ordinary natural-historical conditions, and therefore bear the indelible stamp of imperfection, abnormality and all sorts of inevitable shortcomings in a human creation or institution. The matter is different in the Mosaic law. Here the laws on land and property are removed from the influence of natural-historical conditions and constitute the work of Jehovah, who Himself establishes both the general principle for them and specific definitions. Hence, these laws here acquire a special character that distinguishes them from similar laws of other nations and are of particular interest to the researcher. The general view of the Mosaic legislation on land, as the main subject of ownership, is purely theocratic in nature. Here, instead of the natural principle of ownership, expressed in seizure, by virtue of which, as Rousseau says, a person, as it were, arbitrarily encloses a part of the land and says: “this is mine,” without paying attention to whether others will get as much as he captured or not, although they have the same right with him, here in the Mosaic legislation the theocratic principle predominates, excluding any seizure. According to this legislation, the land is the property of Jehovah alone, as its full-fledged manager by the right of the Creator in general and by the right of the donor of the Palestinian land to the chosen people in particular. “My land,” says Jehovah, “you are strangers and settlers with Me.” 1 If the land is the complete and exclusive property of Jehovah alone, then this already excludes the possibility of unauthorized seizure of it into private ownership. It can become such only with the permission of its rightful owner, and in this case the injustice that is natural with unauthorized seizure is eliminated. A similar view of land, as the exclusive property of some common principle, appears to be found in some other legislation, such as. in Egyptian, where the land also did not constitute anyone’s private property, but belonged to one pharaoh (Gen.47:20,21). Based on this apparent similarity, Michaelis suggests that the Mosaic law of the exclusive ownership of the earth by Jehovah is an imitation of the Egyptian social orders to which the Israelites were accustomed from childhood. But in this opinion of Michaelis, in addition to the lack of a common explanation for the well-known beliefs or institutions of one people by borrowing them from another, there is an attempt to compare phenomena that are essentially incomparable, although similar in appearance. There is a fundamental difference between the Egyptian social order and the Mosaic legislation. Among the Egyptians, this social order is the result of natural-historical conditions, the brainchild of a national disaster, which gave the pharaoh the opportunity to seize the land into his own property, dispossess small owners of land and become the sovereign, sole owner of all Egyptian lands. Consequently, this order, by its very origin, is an abnormal phenomenon. Further, this abnormal phenomenon led to other abnormalities: landless small owners, of necessity, became slavishly dependent on the pharaoh, surrendered to him to the fullest of his will, became his slaves “from one end of Egypt to the other,” and this slavish dependence was expressed by a heavy tax in favor of the pharaoh, equal to a fifth of the income. Since the land was then given to farmers for rent, it is natural that it was given unevenly to everyone, depending on the wealth of each. Hence the new abnormality, by virtue of which the wealthier farmers could in turn seize the land, leaving the less wealthy either without land or with very little of it, and thus plunging them into all sorts of miseries of poverty. Thus, the Egyptian social order of land ownership, as a result of popular disaster, led to even greater national disasters, to a terrible development of poverty. The view of the Mosaic legislation on land ownership is completely different. According to this view, the land is the property of Jehovah alone, not by virtue of its seizure from the previous owners, but by right of the Creator. Jehovah freely chooses to give this eternal property to the people of Israel, imposing on them for this the well-known obligations specified in the treaty. In giving land to the people of Israel, Jehovah does not leave it to all the accidents of personal seizure, as was the case with the Egyptians, a seizure that necessarily introduces inequality and injustice, but introduces an equal distribution of the land “according to the number of names” of the male sex. Thus, just as the social order of land ownership among the Egyptians is dominated by the completely natural-historical law of seizure with all its injustices and disasters, so, on the contrary, in the Law of Moses the theocratic principle dominates, by virtue of which the highest idea of ​​justice subordinates the natural-historical law and, in place of the unauthorized seizure of land, introduces the principle of equal distribution of land into possession. The essence of the theocratic principle in this case is the equal right of all members of the Mosaic state to the land. When the people of Israel were numbered by generation and family in the male line, Jehovah said to Moses: “The land must be divided according to the number of names as an inheritance.” “The land must be divided by lot; according to the names of the tribes of their fathers they shall receive inheritance.” These commands contain the essence of the agrarian laws of Moses, which determine the economic situation of the people. A more specific definition of this general law is expressed in the following command: “Whoever is more numerous, give him more inheritance, and whoever is fewer in number, give him less inheritance; everyone should be given an inheritance in proportion to the number included in the count” 4 . So, the main provision of the agrarian laws of Moses is the uniform distribution of land “according to the number of names,” alien to any bias in favor of any influential classes or individuals. But with such clarity of the general principle of land distribution, there are, however, several difficulties in determining how the distribution was made in particular. The law is vaguely expressed: “according to the number of names” 5. What is meant here by “name” and what is the “number” of them? The law is obviously in connection with the calculation of the people of Israel, and therefore its meaning must be determined by the way in which the calculation itself was carried out. The counting, as can be seen from Numbers 26:2, was ordered to be carried out by “families” or literally “by the house of their fathers” (ad domum patrum suorum), meanwhile it was carried out, as can be seen from further verses, by tribes and by generations, since first of all the ancestor of the tribe was named, and then the generations descended from him were listed (mischpachat). Families, precisely those units by which the calculation was ordered, are not named in the law. It is difficult to explain such an inconsistency between the command and its execution, and yet such an explanation would shed significant light on the subject under consideration. Apparently, this difficulty can only be explained by the assumption that the calculation was also carried out by families, but they are not named in the table due to their inconvenient number for a genealogical table: instead of families, only larger units are indicated - tribes and generations, each of which includes several families. This assumption is confirmed by the fact that among the commands there are also some families that for some reason attracted attention. Thus, by the way, the family of Zalpaad is indicated, belonging to the generation of Hepher, a family that gained fame thanks to the famous case raised by the daughters of Zalpaad. And that indeed Salpaad was the ancestor not of a generation, but of a family, this can be deduced with sufficient thoroughness from Numbers 27:4, where his daughters say: “Why should the name of our father disappear from his tribe?” From these words it is clear that the tribe or generation (mischpachath) to which Salpaad belonged could exist without Salpaad and his heirs, therefore, he is not the ancestor of this tribe, but only a representative of one of the families belonging to this tribe. - The calculation in this way, presumably, was carried out according to all degrees of division of the national body - by tribes, tribes and families, and the names of representatives of all of them were named, although the names of representatives of only the first two degrees were included in the table. If now the law, after the calculation, says: “The land must be divided into inheritance according to the number of names,” then it is clear that what is meant here is the “number of names” that was included in the calculation made—the number of names of tribes, generations and families. The lowest degree of division of the folk organism according to this calculus is the family; consequently, the family was taken as the lowest unit to which the division of the earth descended. This order of division is again confirmed by the case of the daughters of Zalpaad. They ask for “an inheritance among their father’s brothers” (Num. 27:4), i.e. that inheritance that is due to the family of Salpaad, among other families belonging to their uncles, who, as can be seen from the text, received allotments for their families. Since the law does not indicate other units when dividing the land, one can think that the division was limited only to these three and the allotment determined for the family, as a smaller unit, should be considered the lowest land unit, beyond which the division defined by the law no longer extended. But this does not mean that the division did not extend further in reality. The specified land unit is the lowest only in socio-legal terms, and is established in accordance with the lowest degree of division of the national body - the family. But just as the family was naturally divided into several private houses or farms, there is no reason to deny that the family’s allotment was divided according to the number of these farms, although at the same time, just as these individual houses or farms were not taken into account by the legislation, they equally did not take into account these small plots allocated for individual houses or farms from the general allotment belonging to the family. The law left such private division to the discretion of individual communities and customary law - and it could go down to the lowest unit - the allotment of each individual. The difference between this private division and the legalized or official one apparently consisted in the fact that the units of the latter division were stable and constant, while the units of private division were constantly changing in accordance with changes in the number and composition of the existing owners. There are many references to personal land ownership in the law. Thus, for example, personal ownership of land is presupposed by the law of the year of jubilee, which talks about the sale and redemption of private properties belonging to individuals 6 . Since individuals are organically included in families, tribes, tribes, then land ownership from a number of plots that constitute personal ownership is correctly formed into land units that constitute the communal property of families, tribes and tribes. But these latter, with their right to land, should not have served to limit the rights of personal ownership, but on the contrary, as social units that were more durable in comparison with the individual, should have served as a guarantee of personal ownership, strictly monitoring the integrity of their possession. The integrity of the tribal ownership was legitimized by the definition “so that the inheritance of the children of Israel should not pass from tribe to tribe” (Num. 36:7), which was achieved by a law that did not allow the possibility of inheritance passing from one tribe to another. Equally, the tribe had to strictly monitor its possession (Num. 33:54), which was expressed in the special appointment of goels, whose duties were to preserve the integrity of the tribal possession through ransom. This gradation of rights to land ownership excellently ensured the inviolability of both communal and personal property. In this order of things, and in view of the fact that the Mosaic state was supposed to be predominantly agricultural and that, as was self-evident, each Israelite would cultivate the plot of land that fell to his lot, the members of the state would consist of free farmers-owners, all residents of the state, in view of the fertility of the Palestinian soil, even if they could not be too rich, could have a significant, approximately equal degree of well-being and material contentment. But, as the scientist, researcher of Mosaic law Saalschütz 7 notes, such is the nature of human relations that such uniformity of condition and the personal independence associated with it cannot be completely preserved for a long time. Natural disasters, family and personal misfortunes, unequal degrees of enterprise and frugality in different members of society and many other reasons quickly lead to the fact that from equally wealthy people more wealthy and less wealthy begin to stand out. With the further development of this relationship, individuals are identified among the less wealthy who, not having enough funds to properly cultivate the land and at the same time having an oppressive need to satisfy their needs, are forced to sell their plot, which naturally passes into the hands of the wealthier and makes them rich. Thus, under the unlimited dominance of natural economic conditions for the distribution of wealth or under the dominance of the principle of uncontrolled development known in economic science (received the technical name of the principle of laissez passer, laissez faire), initial economic equality is replaced by unevenness in the distribution of material wealth. While some become more and more poor, others accumulate more and more wealth, and in the end there appear astonishing extremes of poverty (pauperism) on the one hand, and excessive wealth (plutocracy) on the other. Such an abnormal distribution of material goods is the greatest social evil and causes internal unrest, weakening and destruction of the state, as it was, for example, in the Roman Empire and as is partly noticeable in the states of Western Europe at the present time. Many legislators tried to put a barrier to the development of this evil, but their efforts were mostly in vain. This great attempt is also found in the Mosaic legislation, but here it has the character not only of an attempt, but also of an existing law. To prevent the development of this social evil, the Mosaic legislation limits the right of personal exclusive property. This limitation is achieved by various laws, which, while providing significant freedom to personal ownership, tend to place next to it, without contradicting or harming it, within certain limits, the general use of personal property. This is the definition according to which everyone is granted free use of the fruits of someone else’s field or vineyard, although this use is limited to personal consumption at a given time, with the prohibition of stockpiling: “When you enter into your neighbor’s vineyard, you can eat the berries to your fill, as much as your soul desires, but do not put it in your vessel. When you come into your neighbor’s harvest, pluck the ears of corn with your hands, but you shall not bring a sickle into your neighbor’s harvest” (Deut. 23:24,25). This definition, of course, refers to strangers and the poor, but it could also serve as a counterweight to the desire to accumulate excessive wealth. But this measure was only of secondary importance in countering the development of extreme poverty. Of greater importance in relation to maintaining economic equality and preventing the development of extremes of pauperism and plutocracy is another legalization that also limits the right of personal ownership. This is the legalization of the inalienability of land ownership. “The land should not be sold forever; for the land is Mine (says Jehovah); you are strangers and sojourners with Me." 8 The theocratic meaning of this law is that Jehovah, as the sole owner of the land and the giver of it to the chosen people, does not provide the use of the land to all accidents of natural-historical conditions that necessarily lead to the specified social evil, but subordinates these conditions to the principle of supreme justice, according to which the originally established equality must be constantly maintained and developed. Theocratically, the principle in this regard corresponds to another political-economic theory, the theory of state intervention, according to which the state should take upon itself the task of regulating the economic relations of citizens. Mosaic legislation, as stated above, achieves this by limiting the right of personal property. A Jewish owner could sell his plot only for a certain time, after which the plot again, according to the law, without any compensation, had to return to the original owner or his heirs. This law was practically implemented in the famous institution of the Sabbath Year system. The system of Sabbath years has the greatest theocratic-economic significance in the system of Mosaic legislation. Based on the general meaning in the Old Testament worldview of “Saturday” as a day of rest from activity, in remembrance of the completion of Jehovah’s creative activity and as a day of witnessing the “goodness” of creation, the system of Sabbath years had its highest purpose to serve as a periodically correct point for the return of social relations, which in their development deviated from the norm, to their original state. It, so to speak, was called upon to serve as a regenerating force, bringing disordered human relations to the norm in which they were placed when they were initially established and from which they deviated under the influence of natural-historical conditions. This system is unparalleled in world history and its establishment was possible only in a theocratic state, where the theocratic principle, the principle of the highest idea of ​​justice, dominated over the principles of sinful, natural-historical conditions that completely suppressed the development of the rest, extra-covenantal humanity. The system of Sabbath years consisted of a double gradation, which, beginning with the seventh year, ended with the fiftieth, which completed the week of seventh years (7X7) and served as a dividing point, after which a new week of seventh years began. Every seventh year is called a “Sabbath year,” and every fiftieth year is called a “Year of Jubilee.” The main decree of the Mosaic legislation regarding the Sabbath year is the requirement of rest for the earth. “The earth must rest on the Sabbath of the Lord. Six years thou shalt sow thy field, six years thou shalt prune thy vineyard, and gather in the produce thereof; and in the seventh year there shall be a Sabbath of rest for the earth, a Sabbath of the Lord; You shall not sow your field, and you shall not prune your vineyard.”9 Theocratically, the meaning of this law is indicated above: it is determined by the general meaning of the Sabbath, and in relation to the land is expressed in the restoration of that integrity, that virginity (so to speak), which it had at creation (in relation to the Jews during the distribution of the land), but which it lost during the continuation of its cultivation and depletion. But the theocratic meaning of the Sabbath year was associated with many other meanings of a socio-economic nature. Thus, the “rest of the earth”, repeating periodically, in agronomic terms had the meaning of steam, fertilizing the earth. Soil fertilization (in the proper sense) was unknown in ancient times. Therefore, leaving the land alone with the significant development of cattle breeding, which supplied natural material for fertilizing the soil (since the herds could constantly remain in the fields for the whole year), served as the best means of restoring the depleted plant power of the land. Even more important and more characteristic in relation to the general view of the Mosaic legislation on land and property is another law on the Sabbath year, or, more precisely, an addition to the first law on the rest of the earth. Having prohibited the cultivation of the land and sowing on it in the seventh year, the law continues: “Whatever grows in your harvest you shall not reap, and you shall not remove the grapes from your unpruned vines: let this be a year of rest for the earth. And this shall be food for all of you throughout the Sabbath of the land, for you and for your manservant and your maidservant, and for your hired servant, and for your sojourner who lodges with you; and to your livestock and to the beasts that are in your land, all its produce shall be for food” (Lev. 25:5-7). By this law, all the products of the land that have grown 10 without artificial care for it are provided for general use - to everyone who needs them, even to those who in ordinary times, limited by the conditions of property rights, do not have the right to use them, without the permission of the owner or possessor. The theocratic significance of this law lies in the fact that it seemed to restore that period of human life when people, not yet corrupted by sin and not infected with narrow egoistic instincts that isolate a person into the sphere of personal interests, often obscure even the consciousness of universal human brotherhood, - not yet divided into classes by gender and condition, lived a common life and enjoyed the benefits of nature on the rights of complete equality. From this theocratic significance of this law, its social significance is also clear. By providing private property for general use, the law achieved a double benefit - in socio-economic and socio-moral terms. Natural-historical conditions, no matter how they were suppressed and no matter how their action was regulated by the theocratic principle, quickly led to an uneven distribution of material wealth and little by little led to the separation of the rich from the poor, producing socio-economic inequality with all its disasters. The law in question smoothed out, to a certain extent, the resulting inequality. By abolishing for a whole year the right of exclusive use of the fruits of the land on the part of the owners and providing the use of them to everyone who needs them, making them a common property, the law thereby deprived rich owners of the opportunity to accumulate wealth for a whole year (which, of course, for them, using a significant number of labor hands and land plots, was incomparably more convenient and easier than for the poor). Meanwhile, the poor and all those dispossessed in the harsh struggle of life, having lost their plots of land, being forced to sell them to the rich, could now freely enjoy the products of all fields and vineyards. This idea is clearly expressed in another form of the same law: “In the seventh year, leave the land alone, so that the poor of your people may feed, and with the remains after them,” adds the law, “the beasts of the field will eat,” as we know, which, thanks to man’s greed, are also often deprived of the necessary food assigned to them by nature. “Do the same to your vineyard and your olive tree” (Ex. 23:11). In social and moral terms, this law had the beneficial effect that the provision of fruits for common use contributed to the maintenance and stimulation of the consciousness of the brotherhood of people, often obscured by the developed inequality in position and condition, and prevented the strong development of narrow, self-interested selfishness, which secludes a person from all the noble impulses of philanthropy into the sphere of personal interests. This is the theocratic and social significance of the Sabbath law we are considering. But the question arises: could economic difficulties arise from this law, which prohibits the cultivation of the land and the sowing of grain 11 in the seventh year? In other words: could the Palestinian soil, without cultivation and sowing, produce enough food to feed the people? This is a serious question, and many researchers have dwelled on it. For us, it is all the more important because the above theory of the social significance of the law of the Sabbath year receives all its force only with a positive answer to the question, i.e. that the Palestinian soil could sufficiently produce food without tilling or sowing. To avoid the difficulties presented by the law, Michaelis constructed a whole theory according to which the law on the Sabbath year supposedly had educational significance, with the goal of accustoming the people to saving in case of a hungry year. “Consideration of the difficulties (that could arise from the law on the peace of the earth), says Michaelis, led me to the idea that this was a very wise law and was aimed at saving, a supply of grain, in order to protect the people in case of famine. Moses could have known the great benefits of saving bread from Egypt, where Joseph presented an example of such savings, which, in all likelihood, was imitated by the Egyptians for many centuries. Hence it is quite likely that he tried to introduce this saving measure - savings - among his people" 12. To confirm his thought, Michaelis “cannot free himself from the assumption that the text in which Jehovah promises to send a blessing to the people in the sixth year (Lev. 25:21) was read not in the sixth year, but in six years 13. Saalpütz partly adheres to the same idea in its general form. “Although the changes in the text,” he says, proposed by Michaelis, cannot be accepted, a similar meaning can be deduced from the text. It cannot be understood as if God’s blessing will be sent down only in the sixth year, but in such a way that this year, just as fruitful as the previous years, will only replenish the previous supply so much that it will last for three years 14. Ehler 15 partly holds the same opinion. Without going into a detailed analysis of these assumptions about the stock from previous years, assumptions not motivated by the direct meaning of the text, and without denying that there could still be stocks from previous years, we will turn to a simpler solution to the question in which the matter is explained on the basis of the plain sense of the text and data regarding the characteristics of Palestine. Prohibiting sowing, the law, however, speaks of the use of the products and fruits of the earth and so significant that after the satisfaction of the owners with all their households, workers, livestock, and after the satisfaction of the poor and settlers, who obviously do not have their own fields and therefore have to use the fruits from the same fields of the property owners, it also presupposes the leftovers (Ex. 23:11), which are provided as food to the beasts of the field. It is clear that the law assumes a good harvest without sowing, and historical and geographical data fully confirm this assumption. It is known that biblical, classical and generally ancient writers who wrote about Palestine unanimously, with the exception of Strabo, who knew little about Palestine, speak with admiration about its climatic conditions and extraordinary fertility. This, in the words of Jehovah, is “a land flowing with milk and honey” (Ex. 3:8), “the beauty of all lands” (Ezek. 20:6), “a good land, as described by Moses, where there is wheat, barley, vines, fig trees and pomegranate trees, olive trees and honey, a land in which the people will eat bread without scarcity, and will lack nothing” ( Deut.8:7-9). The fertility of Palestine is depicted in the same colors by Tacitus 16, Ammianus Marcellinus 17, Josephus 18, Justin the Philosopher 19 and others. Such testimonies of the ancients are confirmed by the latest researchers and travelers. Thus, Graetz notes: “It is true that the land that once flowed with milk and honey has changed - the gaze sees devastation everywhere. But even now, where only the human hand cultivates the soil, extraordinary fertility appears” 20. If we take into account such luxury and fertility of the Promised Land, then it is not surprising that even without artificial sowing, rich fields grew solely from the randomly dropped 21 grains, the more significant the harvest, the greater the number. And this phenomenon is not unprecedented: according to Strabo 22, in Albania it was possible to reap two or three harvests from one sowing. In Numidia, from the fallen grains, ordinary harvests grew the next summer, and in Hyrcania, where there was not even proper agriculture, bread was born from the grains that fell during the harvest 23. The likelihood of this phenomenon in Palestine is even greater if we take into account the law that prohibited reaping the field to the edge and gleaning the rest 24 . Under such conditions, the harvest could be significant even without sowing, not to mention the orchards and vineyards that could bear fruit without care even in countries less fertile than Palestine. But, explaining in a natural way the possibility of a harvest without sowing, we thereby do not exclude the special effect of the “blessing of God” here. which Jehovah himself promised in the sixth year. On the contrary, it seems to us that the particular fear of difficulties that could arise from the law of the peace of the earth, which forced the learned researchers we mentioned to resort to various theories and stretches (Michaelis), stemmed from a one-sided, narrowly naturalistic view of the subject, ignoring or even completely excluding 25 the miraculous element in the fate of the chosen people. This is all the more necessary to say regarding the anniversary year, where, on the occasion of the confluence of two years of peace for the earth, naturalistic theory comes into even greater confusion, but where the miraculous element appears all the more clearly. The Jubilee year constitutes the highest level in the development of the idea of ​​the Sabbath and a further gradation in the Sabbath system according to the Mosaic laws of land and property. “Count yourself seven Sabbath years, seven times seven years, so that in the seven Sabbath years you will have forty-nine years. And sanctify the fiftieth year. Let the fiftieth year be your jubilee." 26 If we follow the literal meaning of the text of this law, then there can be no question about when this year was celebrated. The direct, literal meaning of the law is that the jubilee was set on the 50th year after a successive series of seven weeks of years and was different from the seventh sabbatical year. But with this understanding, there is the possibility of an even greater economic difficulty than that presented in the law on the Sabbath year, since then it would have to be assumed that the land remained uncultivated for two years in a row. Finding it difficult to reconcile such an understanding with legislative wisdom, some scientific researchers argue that the anniversary could only take place in 49, i.e. it was nothing less than the seventh sabbatical year, as the final point of the entire sabbatical circle. To reconcile this opinion with the text, it is usually assumed that the Sabbath year began in the spring, and the Jubilee year in the fall, with the other half covering the first half of the first year (fiftieth) of the new Sabbath period, which is why it is called in the text, in contrast to the seventh Sabbath year, the fiftieth 27 . But not to mention the fact that such an assumption and explanation is based on an artificial understanding of the text, not justified by its direct meaning, it introduces confusion into the chronology, suggesting it is ambiguous in relation to two years of one Sabbath system. Moreover, antiquity, with the exception of some later scholars, is not in favor of this opinion. Philo and Josephus clearly speak of the year of jubilee as the fiftieth 28 . The main motive for this far-fetched explanation lies, as stated above, in the fear of economic difficulties from leaving fields without cultivation and sowing for two years in a row. The naturalistic tendency of this theory was indicated above and its inconsistency was also shown. Here we will only supplement what has been said, indicating the reasons for the inconsistency of such a theory in its particular application to the anniversary year. The fear of the possibility of economic difficulties arising, given the complete dominance of normal economic conditions, is assumed by the legislator himself, 29 but he also eliminates it: “If you say: what will we eat in the seventh year, when we will neither sow nor gather our produce? “I will send My blessing upon you in the sixth year, and it will bring fruit for three years” 30. Consequently, here, in addition to the natural means of eliminating the economic difficulties of Palestine that we discussed above, the theocratic principle receives full significance, the essence of which includes, among other things, the subordination of natural conditions to a higher leadership principle. The predominance of such a principle, understandable in the establishment of the Sabbath year, even becomes necessary in the establishment of the jubilee year, which, in terms of the greatness of its tasks, is a completely unprecedented phenomenon in history. The essence of Mosaic legislation regarding the year of jubilee lies in the requirement to restore the order of things that was established during the division of the land into the possession of the Israelites and from which it deviated in its development under the influence of natural historical conditions. And since this order consisted of an equal distribution of land into ownership and personal freedom for each member of the theocratic state, its restoration had to consist in the return of land ownership and personal freedom to those who had lost them in the harsh struggle of life during a fifty-year period. “In the year of jubilee, each of you return to his possession” and “until the year of jubilee, let (your brother) work for you, and then let him leave you, he and his children with him, and return to his tribe, and enter again into the possession of his fathers” 31. These few words express the essence of the laws regarding the year of jubilee, and from them one can see the great significance of these laws in theocratic and social terms. According to the meaning of this law, the anniversary year was supposed to serve as a specific time during which the once established order of socio-economic relations, an order whose main principle was equality, was again restored to its previous state. The Sabbath year was intended to restore only the earth to its previous state, while the jubilee year embraced both the earth and people. “The specific meaning of the jubilee year, in contrast to the Sabbath year, lies in the idea of ​​salutary restoration and the return of theocracy to the primitive divine order, in which everyone is free and everyone is guaranteed his earthly well-being. God, having once delivered his people from Egyptian slavery and taken them into his own property, is now a savior to restore the personal freedom of those who fell into slavery and return to the impoverished that share of participation in earthly goods that they were deprived of” 32. Socially, the institution of the anniversary year had as its task to counteract and destroy those abnormalities that are inevitable in the life of human society during its ordinary, left to itself socio-economic development. In this regard, the establishment of the jubilee year represents a happy, as Saalipütz puts it, 33 a solution to a problem on which the legislators of various nations worked. It has already been said what this world problem was: it consisted in achieving such a regulation of human relations in which the emergence or at least strong development of social evil would be impossible - an extremely uneven distribution of material wealth, excessive wealth on the one hand and extreme poverty on the other. The institution of the Jubilee Year achieved this goal as far as possible. The fifty-year period, while giving the owner considerable freedom in the disposal of his property, at the same time limited this freedom, putting necessary limits on it, beyond which it would serve to the detriment of the owner himself, exposing him to all the contingencies and dangers of losing his possession forever. Only this institution served as a reliable means of counteracting this evil and was precisely adapted to prevent the division of the people into various classes according to wealth, into rich nobles and poor workers, and to constantly maintain equality between them, as free landowners. The institution of the jubilee year derives its practical force from the theocratic principle on which it rests. The essence of this principle in this case is the limitation of property rights in relation to land, as the exclusive property of its one sovereign owner - Jehovah. He, as a sovereign owner, gives it into the possession of his people, but retains his rights over it, which, putting a necessary limit on the freedom of disposal of land on the part of secondary, so to speak, owners, serve as a regulating force in the development of socio-economic relations of the people. This restriction is primarily expressed in the law on the sale of land. “The land should not be sold forever; for the land is Mine; you are strangers and sojourners with Me" 34. Such a legal provision, defining the inalienability of land ownership, ensures forever for each member of the theocratic state a certain share of the material contentment possible with a given plot of land, and, consequently, eliminates the possibility of the emergence and development of that social evil, which, appearing in the form of pauperism or the proletariat, has always served and to this day serves as a sore spot of social organisms, convulsively shaking their healthy parts. According to this legal provision, no one has the right to arbitrarily dispose of their land property in such a way that this disposal would be contrary to Jehovah’s institutions that ensure the public good 35 . The owner is the sovereign manager of his land property only within a fifty-year period - from one anniversary year to the next. He can sell his plot, but not later than the jubilee year, in which what was sold again free of charge had to return to the previous owner. But even within this period, the sale of property, as the law clearly expresses (Lev. 25:25), is determined solely by poverty, extreme, oppressive need, and any sale for other reasons, such as, for example, from profiteering, is either not assumed by law, or even, as the rabbis think 36, is completely prohibited. Further, the sale, even in case of need, was limited 37 to only part of the property (“if your brother becomes poor and sells his property” ... - as the law puts it). Consequently, according to the assumption of the law, the landowner, even after the sale of part of his property, caused by the need to satisfy an oppressive need, will still have his land from which he can eat. Of course, the law presupposes the possibility of selling all the land, followed by complete poverty and the prospect of slavery, but the very bleakness of the prospect after such a sale naturally limited this possibility to the realm of rare, exceptional cases. A sale determined by law for a certain, definite period, after which what was sold again returns to the previous owner, naturally loses the essential character of the sale in the proper sense, as the transfer to another of the entire amount of utility that can be extracted from the thing sold. In this case, the sale is like transferring to another not the entire amount of the usefulness of the thing being sold, but only that part of it that can be extracted at a given time. Hence, the cost of the item being sold varies according to the amount of time during which the item is expected to be used. In relation to land, its value during temporary sale is equal to the number of years during which the buyer expects to reap the harvest from it. And since this quantity within a fifty-year period is determined by the number of years remaining until the year of jubilee, the value of the land sold is determined by the number of harvests that can be collected before the year of jubilee. The law strictly defines this ratio of the value of land to the number of years of its use: “According to the calculation of the years after the jubilee, you must buy from your neighbor, and according to the calculation of the years of income, he must sell to you. If there are many years left, multiply the price; and if there are few years left, reduce the price: for he sells you a certain number of harvests” (Lev. 25:15–16). Such a sale takes on the nature of giving the land for temporary use, the nature of leasing. There has been much debate about the benefits of such legislation. According to some researchers, it, turning the sale into a simple lease and reducing the value of the land to the level of rent, therefore reducing it according to the limited number of years of its use, supposedly did not represent any significant benefit to either the seller or the buyer 38 . But this opinion does not clearly recognize and does not sufficiently appreciate the motives of the legislation. Of course, says Wiener 39, a voluntary seller selling his plot out of speculation and self-interest would gain nothing in this order of things, because he could sell it only before the anniversary, and therefore could receive no more than rent for it before that date. But, firstly, the law does not presuppose such a speculator seller: the law presupposes a seller of necessity as the only seller of his plot, a person who is forced to sell his property by some great, oppressive misfortune, personal or family, that plunged him into grave distress, the only outcome from which was the sale of the land. It is these unfortunate people that the legislation is designed for. Although they also received a reduced payment for the land, the unhindered return of possession gave them a real benefit, since they received their plot without being burdened with any debt obligations that would be inevitable when returning the plot in the event of its complete sale, and the debt obligations were all the heavier the more urgent the need that forced them to sell or mortgage their plot. Under this procedure, the owner freely, without any ransom, returned to the state in which he was before the misfortune that forced him to sell. The opinion according to which those who sold their plot within the fifty-year period, during their non-possession, being actually in the position of leaseholders, in the jubilee year received only what they essentially already owned, is unfair. What is not taken into account here is that each landowner, cultivating his fields himself, would have derived incomparably more benefit from them than what the temporary owner could pay him - therefore, the first in the jubilee year would again enter into full use of his property. On the other hand, the temporary sale and the return of the land that determines it is a legal benefit in the sense that the owner, forced by the oppressive need to sell his plot, would, of course, not receive its full value; but even this pure capital, which he would be able to receive for the sold land, in a state where it was impossible to give money from interest, could not serve as a constant source of income, as a plot of land can always serve, because the capital, without generating income, would soon be consumed (especially if difficult circumstances continued). In inalienable real estate, capital remained inviolable, serving as a constant source of income, whether the owner personally extracted this income from the land or was forced to take a reward for it, giving the use of the income to another. This legislation also contains a guarantee against personal arbitrariness of some in relation to others, who are most likely to suffer from this arbitrariness 40 . He who is free to dispose of his property without any doubt, so that he can sell it forever, undoubtedly receives a greater benefit at the moment than he who can only rent out the harvest until the year of jubilee. But the legislator in this case is the guardian of children and descendants, whom a frivolous father, carried away by temporary gain, by selling the land forever, could plunge into the misery of eternal poverty. In addition, according to Saalschütz, the legal provision in question is also important in relation to the increase in the general value of fields, since prices for real estate are constantly determined by their immediate usefulness, and above all by that which they can represent during the life of the buyer, than, for example, by a hundred-year or even longer periods of calculated use of them, and, therefore, the sum of the sale price is always less than the sum of a whole series of rentals for anniversary periods. True, with temporary letting for use there may be a disadvantage that the temporary owner will try to figure out how to extract more benefits from the land and spend less on cultivating it, i.e. there seems to be a disadvantage to shameless, extreme exploitation of the land, inevitably leading to its depletion and infertility, as was the case, for example, in the Samara province, where tenant exploitation brought the land to extreme depletion, which was followed in 1878 by the well-known catastrophe - famine 41. But even this inconvenience could not have brought as much harm in ancient Palestine as it could have done in other countries and under other conditions. First of all, the temporary owner could only in rare cases have a direct benefit in exploiting the land until exhaustion, and especially before the jubilee year, when he had to return the land to the previous owner. But even here, his selfish exploitation could be paralyzed by the deeply rooted view of the people on the earth, as if it were an animated, sentient being, and therefore itself requiring rest after labor 42 - hence fertilizer after exhaustion. But even if this moral motive were powerless to moderate the predatory exploitation of the temporary owner, then even in this case its harm was paralyzed by the institution of the Sabbath year, which we have already discussed, the agronomic significance of which consisted in the restoration of the depleted plant power of the earth. Given the extraordinary fertility of the Palestinian soil, such legalized peace was enough to erase the traces of predatory exploitation. All the more important in this regard was the two-year rest (during the Sabbath and Jubilee years), which coincided with the return of the depleted land to the previous owner: after such a long rest, the land returned to the previous owner with all the wealth of its plant powers and its fertility. But the Mosaic legislation also conditions the temporary sale with such definitions that only in exceptional cases could the land remain in the hands of the buyer until the year of jubilee. And here it, always true to its basic principle, comes to the aid of a poor man destitute by fate, forced by disaster to sell his plot, protecting it from exploitation by wealthier people. This assistance is expressed in legislation in the broad right of redemption of sold property. “Allow the ransom of the land throughout all the land of your possession,” proclaims the law (Lev.25:24). The ransom obligation rests with a close relative (goela). “If your brother becomes poor and sells what he has, his close relative will come and buy back what his brother sold” (Lev. 25:25). However, it is impossible to determine from the text what kind of obligation this is: whether it simply arises from a sense of kinship or legal. According to Saalschütz, the law simply gives a relative the right to buy the land in order to turn it into his own use 43 . But such an opinion is hardly grounded, although apparently more understandable for our selfish times. By granting the right of redemption, the law does not mean the benefits of a whole family, among which there may be rich members who bought up the plots of the poor, but exclusively the benefits of the victim himself, who is forced to sell his plot. This idea of ​​the law clearly appears in granting the right of redemption to the seller himself, as soon as he gets the opportunity. “If there is no one to redeem him, but he himself will have wealth and will find how much is needed for the ransom; then let him calculate the years of his sale, and return the rest to the person to whom he sold, and take possession of it again” (Lev. 25:26-27). The most likely idea of ​​the law here is that a wealthy relative is obliged, if not legally (which, however, is nothing impossible), then out of a sense of kinship, to buy back the plot sold by his brother and return it to him 44 . This understanding can with good reason be based on the strength of the kinship connection, which is common among Eastern peoples, where it often serves as a strong guarantee of mutual services in relations in which only the coercive power of legitimation can serve as such a guarantee in our time. In understanding this duty of the goel, it is also significant that the lowest, legally defined unit that received the land was, as shown above, the house or family in the broad sense, as a division of the generation; members of this family had to protect their common property; the sale of one plot to a member of another family detracted from the land allotment of the entire family to which the poor man belonged. Hence, the repurchase of the sold land, in addition to the motives of family feeling, was also caused by the common interest of the entire family. - The particular definition of the law on redemption - “to calculate the years of the sale of one’s property and return the rest to the one to whom the redeemed was sold” - constitutes a simple calculation of justice, according to which it is necessary to return to the buyer his payment only for those years that he had left to use the field before the year of jubilee, and to withhold for those years 45 in which he had already used it since the time of purchase. “If his (the poor man’s) hand does not find how much to return to him, then what he sold will remain in the hands of the buyer until the year of jubilee, and in the year of jubilee it will go away and he will again take possession of it,” the law concludes its definitions on the right of redemption of sold land (Lev. 25:28). Along with the field in relation to the right of redemption and return in the year of jubilee, the law supplies rural houses that do not have strong artificial protection. “A house in villages around which there is no wall should be considered on a par with a field of land; You can always redeem them, and they go away on the anniversary” 46. “Houses in a walled city” are another matter. In relation to them, the right of redemption is limited, and the essential law of the year of jubilee - on the inalienability of real estate - does not apply to them at all. “If someone sells a residential house in a walled city, then it can be redeemed before the expiration of a year from its sale; You can buy it back within a year. If he is not redeemed before the end of the whole year; then the house that is in a city that has a wall will remain with him who bought it throughout his generations, and at the jubilee it will not depart from him” (Lev. 25:29-30). The difference in the attitude of the law on the right of redemption and inalienability to the two types of real estate - land and houses (in a fortified city) is explained by the different degrees of the owner's right to one and the other type of ownership. Meanwhile, in relation to the land, which for its owner is only a temporary gift from Jehovah, its real owner, this law is expressed in limiting the arbitrariness in its disposal, in relation to the house (in a fortified city), as the complete product of the owner himself and therefore the full owner by right of producer, the law less or even does not limit the freedom of disposal at all and therefore, giving the owner the right to full sale, assigns only a one-year period for redemption, after which the sold house becomes full property buyer. As for the actual difference established by law in the treatment of houses in villages and cities, the former being quite suitable under the category of land laws, and the latter receiving special laws, this is explained by the fact that houses in villages are in closer connection with fields than houses in the city. The Mosaic legislation takes on a somewhat different character in relation to the houses of the Levites. But this is determined by their special socio-economic position among the Israeli people. It is known that the entire possession of the Levites consisted of 48 cities, given to them during the division of the land (Num. 35: 1–8). These cities, with a small number of surrounding fields, were supposed to serve as the basis for their economic well-being, instead of land plots, and for this reason they had the same meaning for them as land plots had for ordinary Israelis. Hence the legislation applies to the houses of the Levites in their cities the same definitions that it makes regarding the land plots of ordinary Israelites. “The cities of the Levites, the houses in the cities of their possession, the Levites can always be redeemed” 47. (Lev.25:32). The law regarding the return of land to its former owners in the year of jubilee also applies to the houses of the Levites. “And whosoever of the Levites does not redeem, the house that was sold in the city of their possession shall go away at the jubilee; for the houses in the cities of the Levites are their possession among the children of Israel 48.” The direct meaning of the above text (according to the Synodal translation) is clear: it speaks of the jubilee right, according to which the sold real estate, if not redeemed, will return to the previous owner on the anniversary. But there is a difficulty in explaining one particular part of the law, since according to the Hebrew text it is read differently - without the negative particle “not”: et qui redimet a levitis 49. A periphrasis of this text with a similar meaning is presented by Saalschütz: “If one of the Levites themselves redeems, then the sold house, or even the whole city, will go down as a jubilee.” He accompanies this reading with the following explanation: “If one Levite was forced to sell a house, or a whole family of Levites - a city, and other Levites buy them out, then between the Levites there are not general laws about houses (v. 30), but general laws about land ownership, therefore, so that the possession of Levite A, which he sold out of poverty to Levite B, and which Levite C bought from the latter, in the year of jubilee returns again from C to the first owner - Levite A 50. But such a reading and the witty explanation that accompanies it, despite its predominance in ancient translations, does not fully correspond to the context of the speech and feels artificial; Meanwhile, the text of the Synodal translation 51 fully corresponds to the context, the natural, logical flow of speech. The law, having given the Levites a broad (compared to ordinary Israelites) right of redemption (“Levites can always redeem”), immediately makes the natural assumption that, due to exceptional circumstances, the Levites may not take advantage of such a wide right of redemption. In this case, “the sold house in the city of their possession” will naturally remain in the hands of the buyer until the anniversary, and on the anniversary, according to the general jubilee law, it will “go” to the previous owner. The acceptance of such a reading and explanation is all the more natural since the reading and meaning of verse 28, which contains a similar law on the redemption and return of sold land, completely corresponds to it and with almost literal accuracy. Further, the law regarding the sale of fields around the cities of the Levites is somewhat vague. “The fields around their cities cannot be sold, because this is their eternal possession” - (Lev. 25:34), or as this law is expressed in an interlinear translation from the Hebrew: et ager suburbii civitatum eorum non vendetur,” which can be translated as follows: “and the pasture field around their cities must not be sold.” It is not clear from the text in what sense the sale of these fields is prohibited: whether it is that they cannot be sold further than until the year of jubilee, or that they cannot be sold at all, even before the year of jubilee. In the first case, says Saalipütz 52, the law would only be a repetition of what it had already determined for ordinary Israeli land holdings. If we accept the latter meaning, then again it is difficult to say why such an exceptional law was given regarding Levitical land holdings, prohibiting any sale even for several years, while it does not extend to the houses of the Levites. He thinks to resolve this difficulty in the following way: “in all likelihood, the law here also attaches relatively greater value to land ownership than to ownership of city houses. In this case, the ascending gradation of laws would be as follows: 1) the city houses of the Israelites could be sold forever with the right of redemption within one year; 2) the land ownership of the Israelites could only be sold before the year of jubilee with the right of redemption during this entire time; 3) the houses of the Levites are sold as land holdings of ordinary Israelites; 4) the land holdings of the Levites could not be sold at all, so the Levite could not let go of what could barely feed him, therefore his field, of course (cf. v. 31) with the buildings belonging to it, out of his hands” 53 . No matter how harmonious the apparently presented gradation of laws may be, it does not explain with sufficient thoroughness the law on the unconditional inalienability of Levitical land holdings. The categorical statement of the law that “the fields around the cities of the Levites cannot be sold,” motivated by another categorical statement that “this is their eternal possession,” where the epithet “eternal” can easily be understood in the sense of “permanent,” “continuous” possession, speaks quite clearly of the unconditional inalienability of the Levitical fields; but explanations for this law must be sought in the special conditions of the socio-economic position of the Levites. The Levites, as singled out from the people for a special service, did not receive land plots on the same basis as the other tribes: personal engagement in field work with their petty everyday concerns was considered inconsistent with their special service - they had to be supported by remuneration for this service. But they nevertheless received several cities with an insignificant, strictly defined number of fields adjacent to them. “The cities,” says the law, “will be for them to live in, and the fields will be for their livestock and for their possessions and for all their everyday needs 54.” (Numbers 35:3). If we take into account that the main source of support for the Levites was income from service, that the land given to them near each city, which they themselves did not cultivate, was inconvenient for division due to its limited quantity, and that, finally, the law directly indicates the purpose of this land - for cattle breeding and herding livestock, then we must think that this land was the common possession of the Levites, designated to serve as the closest, available means of satisfying their common everyday needs. In this case, the definition of the law on the absolute inalienability of the common Levitical possession is understandable; meanwhile, houses that were the private property of individual Levites could be sold, although with a limitation of this sale - until the year of jubilee. The prohibition to sell the fields of the Levites is motivated by the communal nature of their ownership, the absence of private ownership of them, which provides the possibility of arbitrary disposal of ownership. In this case, the law remains true to its basic view of property, according to which arbitrariness in the disposal of ownership is gradually limited as it acquires a communal character, as was evident above from the difference in laws regarding land and city houses of ordinary Israelis. The law regarding the right of redemption and the return of property to the former owner in the year of jubilee also applies to real estate dedicated to Jehovah, although here it undergoes some changes in accordance with the peculiarities of this type of property disposal. At the consecration to Jehovah, the possession is transferred not to any "sojourner and settler" by another "sojourner and settler" who themselves possess this possession only due to the special favor to them of the true owner of this possession, but to the true owner himself, and not by right of sale, but as a thanksgiving offering for some special favors. Hence the difference in the right to the transferred possession. If, after selling the property to an ordinary buyer, the seller retained the right to it, expressed in the free right of redemption for the same price that was taken at the sale (with a deduction for the time of use), then here this right was limited to an increase in the cost of redemption. But such a restriction is explained not by the fact that the legislator, as Saalypütz thinks, 55 generally looked disapprovingly at initiations and vows and by this measure wanted to keep the Israelis from them, but by sublime moral motives. The owner, who sold his estate out of necessity, when redeeming it was guided by an economic calculation of personal gain, sometimes even to the detriment of the buyer, who suddenly lost, perhaps with great effort, the acquired estate. During initiation, no selfish calculations of personal gain should have taken place. Therefore, if the one who dedicated his possession would want to redeem what was dedicated, based on the calculation of profit, the increase in the cost of the ransom should have served as a deterrent and brought to the consciousness that the dedication to Jehovah must be made with full determination to refuse the use of the dedicate in favor of Jehovah. “Increasing the payment for redemption,” says Knobel, “is a kind of morally motivated punishment for the fact that the one who dedicated the thing to God does not refuse to use it, but wants to have it again 56.” The dedication is made according to the assessment of the priest: “If anyone dedicates his house as a shrine to the Lord; then the priest must evaluate him, whether he is good or bad, and as the priest evaluates him, so it will happen” 57. In accordance with this assessment, the payment for the redemption is made with the addition of a fifth of the value of the initiate according to this assessment: “If the one who dedicated wants to redeem his house; then let him add a fifth of the silver of your valuation, and then it will be his” (Lev. 27:15). Similar determinations regarding valuation and redemption extend to the dedicated field. But here the assessment is made in a more precise way, according to the legal norm determined by the sowing of the homer. “If someone dedicates a field from his possession to the Lord, then your assessment should be according to the amount of sowing; for sowing a homer of barley, fifty shekels of silver” (v. 16). Those. the valuation of the dedicated field should be made according to how many homers 58 according to the ordinary calculation should be sown on the dedicated field; Allowing for each homer fifty shekels of silver, the whole amount of the assessment was thus determined by the product of the number of homers by 50. The very estimate of the homer at fifty shekels is determined by the income from the harvest, which usually comes from the sown homer of barley. Consequently, the sum of the valuation of the dedicated field presented by us is only an annual sum, but it was all determined by the number of years for which the field was dedicated. Therefore, the assessment was sometimes higher, sometimes lower, depending on the number of years remaining until the year of jubilee, since before that only the year the dedication had power. “If anyone dedicates his field from the year of jubilee; must take place according to your estimate” (v. 17), i.e. if the field is dedicated in the first year after the jubilee, statim ab anno incipientis jubilaei, as the Vulgate clearly expresses 59, therefore for a full period of fifty years, then the amount of its assessment should be complete - for fifty years according to the specified calculation. “If after the jubilee someone dedicates his field; then the priest shall calculate the money according to the years remaining until the year of jubilee, and shall deduct it from your estimate” (v. 18). The reduction is made according to the number of years remaining (from the time of dedication) until the anniversary. If the dedicator wants to buy back the dedicated field, i.e. That is, as Knobel says, to release him from any obligation towards the sanctuary, in order to sell or rent it out of economic calculations of benefit, then he must pay the amount determined by the priest during the assessment, adding to it a fifth of it on the same grounds as are indicated for this increase when considering the law on the redemption of a dedicated house. “If the one who dedicated it wants to redeem the field, then let him add a fifth of the silver of your valuation, and it will remain his” (v. 19), - this is how the law formulates this definition. The redemption, of course, was not obligatory, but was subject to the will of the dedicator and was carried out within a fifty-year period, since according to the general legislation of Moses on land ownership, plots of land temporarily alienated from the owners (whether by sale or dedication) were returned to the previous owner in the jubilee year without any redemption. Therefore, in the case under consideration, the general principle of Mosaic legislation should apply, but here, apparently, it deviates from it. The right of redemption here seems to turn into an obligation, the failure of which leads to the complete deprivation of the dedicated possession. “If (the one who dedicated) does not redeem the field and the field is sold to another person, then it can no longer be redeemed” (v. 20). And further: “That field, when it is gone on the Jubilee, will be holy to the Lord, as if it were a cursed field; the priest will have it as his possession” (v. 21). By the first definition, the dedicator loses the right to redeem the field if it is “sold to another person.” It is not clear who will sell it. According to the synodal translation we cited, the sale, apparently, is assumed not by the dedicator, but by someone else, since the first sentence contains an active form, and the second a passive form. The Vulgate has a similar form: “Si autem noluerit redimere, sed alteri cui libet fuerit venumdatus.” Saalschütz adheres to the same reading, who, on the basis of this reading, directly expresses the opinion that the sale was carried out by the priestly economic and administrative authority 60. But such a reading and understanding of it does not explain the important consequences that such a sale entails for the dedicatee, namely the deprivation of the right of redemption and the jubilee right - the gratuitous return of his possession. In addition, this law, so understood, could give rise to important abuses on the part of the priestly economic-administrative power, which, in view of the fact that the dedicated field sold to it in the jubilee year “the priest will take possession of,” would always, in the interests of the class, try to sell the dedicated field as soon as possible and thus deprive the dedicator and his heirs of their ancestral, legally inalienable land property. The LXX text has a different meaning: “’Εὰν δὲ μὴ λυτρῶται τὸν ἀγρὸν, καὶ ἀροδῶται τὸν ἀγρὸν ἀνθρώπφ ἑτέρφ, οὐκέτι μὴ λυτρώσηται ἀυτὸν. According to this reading, the sale is assumed on the part of the dedicator, 61 as is clearly indicated by the active form of the two verbs with one subject 62. This reading and understanding conveniently explains the important implications of a short sale. If the seller here is the dedicator himself, i.e., who has temporarily renounced all rights to the dedicate, and if he sells the dedicate as his own property, without having any right to do so, without ransom, then the sale in this case constitutes a crime, the theft of what belongs to the shrine, sacrilege. From this point of view, it is also understandable to deprive the dedicator of the right of redemption and the jubilee right to return possession. Only the gravity of the crime can explain the severe deprivation of the initiate of those rights that constitute the essence of the Mosaic legislation regarding real estate. And the extent to which the law, having allowed an exception in the case under consideration, values ​​the principle of inalienability of immovable property, is shown by the following legalization, which determines the manner of dedicating to a shrine not one’s ancestral, but purchased property. “If anyone dedicates to the Lord a field he has purchased, which is not from the fields of his possession; then the priest must calculate for him the amount of the assessment before the year of jubilee, and he must pay according to the calculation on the same day, as if it were holy to the Lord. But in the year of jubilee the field will pass again to the one from whom it was purchased, to whom the possession of that land belongs” (vv. 22–24:). According to this legalization, anyone who wanted to dedicate a field that he had bought from an “impoverished brother” did not have the right to transfer the field itself to the shrine, but only its value according to the priestly assessment; the field itself was to remain with him in order to pass to the previous owner in the year of jubilee. The estimated amount was transferred “on the same day,” that is, on the day of dedication. The considered decrees exhaust the content of the Mosaic laws on real estate 63, which constitutes the main source of economic well-being in the life of the people. The characteristic features of these laws are presented in the following form. The land belongs in the proper sense to Jehovah, but it was given by Him to the possession of Israel and in this sense constitutes the common possession of all members of the people. As the common possession of the entire people, it is distributed among tribes, generations and families, depending on the number of members included in them, so that upon further division, each household will receive an equal allotment, and after that, in its parts, it becomes the inalienable property of the indicated social units - tribes, generations and families, and individuals. The inalienability of ownership of these common units is guaranteed by laws on inheritance, which do not allow its transfer to another tribe, generation or even family, and the inalienability of ownership of a person is guaranteed by limiting his rights to dispose of his property. The restriction is expressed in the laws on the sale of immovable property. But this limitation of individual rights in the disposal of one’s property, according to the laws of Moses, is not an idle, blindly logical consequence of the communal (based on the land belonging to Jehovah and no one else in particular) nature of land ownership, sacrificing the benefits of the individual to the abstract benefit of the general, as was the case primarily in the states of the ancient world; here, on the contrary, it serves to the benefit of the individual, placing him in a normal relationship to the general, since this limitation ensured that each private member constantly had an independent source of economic well-being and, because of this, constantly maintained his personal independence, without becoming economically dependent on society. The correct attitude of the individual to society establishes the correct attitude of one individual to another. Such a relationship between individuals according to the Mosaic legislation was determined by their possible economic equality among themselves, which was supported by legalization that eliminated the possibility of excessive elevation or enrichment of one person at the expense of another or radically restored the broken equality. These are the laws of Moses regarding land and real estate. Regarding another type of property, namely movable property, the Mosaic legislation does not present any special features. The law, as the complete product of man himself, is not constrained by any special definitions and its disposal is left to the full will of the owners, who act in this case according to the instructions of ordinary experience, custom and calculations of personal benefit. Interesting features appear only in debt laws. Elsewhere, Michaelis himself indirectly recognizes the shortcoming of the borrowing explanation. Saying that Moses borrowed the basis of his agricultural state from the Egyptians, he adds with bewilderment: “but it is known, however, that for some reason the state of the ancient Romans had a similar structure,” Erster. Theil, S. 161. In numero (interlinear translation), juxta numerum vocabulorum (Vulgate), ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ὀνομάτων (Greek LXX), juxta numerum nominum (Syriac and Targum of Onkelos), secundum numerum nominum (Samaritan and Arabic translations) Saalschütz, Mos. Recht, Kar. 12, s. 140. Lev.25:2,4; Ex.22:10,11. And they, as we will see below, are very significant. Mosaisches Recht. Zweiter Theil. S. 32. Saalschütz, D. Mosaische Recht. S. 143. Herzog, Real-Encyclopadie, T. XIII. Sabbath und Jobeljahr. Cp. his Theologie des Alten Testaments, S. 536, Anmerk. 6. Tas. Hist b, 6. Uber solum; fruges nostrum ad morem praeterque eas balsamum et palmae. Palmetis proceritas et decor. Tas. Hist b, 6. Uber solum; fruges nostrum ad morem praeterque eas balsamum et palmae. Palmetis proceritas et decor. Ammian. Marc. 14, 5: Palaestina cultis abuhdans terris et nitidis. Bell. jud. Γαλιλαία πίων πασά καὶ εὓβοτος καὶ δένδπεσι παντιοίοις κατάφυτος, ὥς ὑπό τῆς εὐπαθείας προσκαλέσασθαι καὶ τὂν ἤκιςα γῆς φιλόπονον, and about Samaria in Judea 4: εἰς τε γεωργἱαν μαλθακαὶ καὶ πολύφοροι, καταδενδροι καὶ ὀπώρας ὀρεινῆς καὶ ἡμέρου μεσταὶ. Ant. 8, 2; 15, 5. Geschichte der Juden. V or wort, S. IX. According to travelers, even in present-day Palestine, a very large part of the grains are sown by themselves from ripe ears and in many places bread grows without processing. Schubert, Reise, III, S. 115, 166. Cp. Knobel, Leviticus, S. 561. Strab. XI, 4.3; Herzog, Real-Encycl. Bd. HSH. Art. Sabbath und Jobeljahr. Cp. Knobel, 1. c. S. 561. Knobel, Ezeg. Handbuch zu Leviticus, 1. c. This view is clearly evident in the works of Michaelis and Saalschütz. See eg. Mich. 2 Th., S. 31, Saalschütz, Mos. Recht, S. 142–143 and others. This is, by the way, the opinion of Ewald. See Alterthumer d. Volkes Isr. 1 A. S. 385, 3 A. S. 496. Saalschütz gives a slightly different explanation. He suggests that the jubilee year began with Nissan and was composed of the second (summer) half of the hoary sabbatical year and the first (winter) half of the first year of the new sabbatical period Archaol. Der Hebraer II, S. 229. Cf. Mosaisches Recht, S. 145. Oehler, Theologic d. A. Testam. Philo, Opp. II, 391, Jos., Ant. 3, 12. 3. Oeh1er, Theologie d. A. Testaments, pp. 540–541. Mosaisches Recht, S. 154. Saalschütz, Mos. Recht, s 154. Ibidem, Kar 13, Anm. 166. Raumer, Vorlesungcn 1. 130 in the village. Winer, Biblisches Realworterbuch, 1 Bd. Jubeljahr, s. 736, 2-te Aufl. Saalschütz, Mos. Recht, Kar. 13, Anmerk. 201. “Orthodox. Review." 1874, Aug. Gusev’s article “Moral conditions of economic well-being.” This view, by the way, is visible in Lev.26:33,34 and 2Chron.36:21, where it is said that the land, which was deprived of legalized peace before the Babylonian captivity, had to rest and satisfy itself during the captivity. Mos. Recht, Kar. 107, § 4. Wed. Knobel, Kurzgef. exeget. Handbuch. Leviticus, S. 567. According to rabbinic law, the purchase of a field in the interests of the buyer was allowed no earlier than two years of actual use of it. And in the text, notes Zavlschutz, the law, apparently, must also be understood, since Lev. 25:13 speaks of many years of harvest that the buyer will have to take advantage of. S. 118, Anm. 190. According to the Hebrew text, this verse can be translated as follows: “and whoever redeems from (from) the Levites, and the house that was sold and the city that was sold will go away for the jubilee.” It is remarkable that the same reading without the particle “not” was adopted by almost all ancient translations. According to the LXX translation, this text reads like this: καὶ ὄς ἂν λυτρωσηται παρα τῶν λενιτῶν, according to the Targum of Onkelos: et qui de levitis redemerit, in Hebrew-Samaritan: ideo qui redemerit a levitis, in Syriac: et si quis ex levitis redimat redemptione, and in Arabian: ac proinde qui emerit talia ab ipsis. Waltonus, Biblia Polyglotta, 1. c. The Vulgate text is identical with it: si redemptae non fuerint etc. This is the reading, by the way, that Ewald – Alterth adheres to. S. 421, Knobel – Kurzgef. exeg. Handbuch, 1. p. Mosaisches Recht S. 150. The options for other translations are remarkable in this case. In the Greek translation of LXX, the last half of the verse "for all their everyday needs" reads: "καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τετρἁποσιν αὐτῶν", in the Syriac: cunctis que eorum animantibus, in the Targum of Onkelos: et omnibus animalibus suis. Both the Hebrew-Samaritan and Arabian translations agree with this. The interlinear translation from the Hebrew is expressed in a similar way: “et omni bestiae eorum” (Waltonus, Biblia Polyglotta, 1. c). Knobel, Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zum A. Test. XII Liefer. S. 585, 1. p. “According to Tenius, a homer contains about 225 pounds” (Knobel, S. 586). Polyglotten-Bibel, von Stier und Theile, 3 AufI 1 Bd.,S. 607, - if, however, the expression “jubilaei” is understood in the sense of the jubilee period. Mos. Recht, S. 151. A direct confirmation of his opinion is the Arabian translation: “Et nisi redemerit eum, vendideritque ilium sacerdos alii viro.” Waltonus, Biblia Polyglotta, 1. c. The Slavic text has the same meaning: “If he does not redeem the field (the one who sanctified it), he will give the field to another person, let no one redeem it.” Stereotype, ed. 1824 This law has the same form in the interlinear translation from the Hebrew and in some ancient translations. In an interlinear translation it reads: “Et si non redemerit agrum, et si vendiderit agrum viro alteri”; in Syriac: “At si non redemerit agrum, eumque vendiderit alteri viro”; even more clearly in the Samaritan: “Si autem non redemerit agrum, sed vendiderit agrrum homini alteri,” where the opposition sed clearly and expressively indicates the identity of the subject. Waltonus, Biblia Polyglotta, 1. p. In addition to the laws on inheritance, the consideration of which we have already done partly in the stat. “Family relationships according to the laws of Moses,” Christ. Reading", 1678 September–October. You might be interested in:
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