Часть вторая. Учение святителя Амвросия

Having outlined the biography of St. Ambrose and having given a general description of his literary works, in this part we intend to analyze the teachings of Ambrose. We will turn our main attention to his dogmatic views and his attitude to issues of church morality. But as a preparatory introduction to these main sections, we preface a special section on the attitude of St. Ambrose to the sources of church teaching and methods of theological research. Sources of church doctrine and methods of their interpretation by St. Ambrose of Milan 721 On the question of the sources of church doctrine, the Western Church by the 4th century. has already managed to create a very definite and strong position. Even in the second half of the 2nd century. Irenaeus of Lyons, in addition to the Holy Scriptures, pointed to Church Tradition, which was transmitted by the apostles to the ancient Churches they founded as the norm of church teaching and structure. This Tradition is per successiones presbytorum in Ecclesiis custoditur [preserved in the Church through the succession of presbyters] 722, so that the uninterrupted succession of the episcopate serves as a reliable guarantee of the preservation of Tradition in an intact form. Only under the guidance of this Tradition can Scripture and the teaching of the Church be correctly understood; in the event of disputes arising in the Church on any issues, Irenaeus recommends that the disputing parties turn to the antiquissimas Ecclesias [to the most ancient Churches], in which the apostles themselves taught personally 723. Of the Western writers proper, almost simultaneously with Irenaeus, these same thoughts were expressed by Tertullian, who, in this case, may have been influenced by the Asia Minor tradition of Irenaeus, as Lofs claims 724. In addition, legal practice could provide him with an analogy for this. It is noteworthy that Tertullian substantiates his point of view precisely by considerations of a legal nature. For him, the sources of church teaching are, on the one hand, the Holy Scripture, which is most often designated by the legal term lex [law] 725, as in St. Cyprian - the word censura [censorship] 726, and on the other - non scripta traditio [unwritten tradition], also known as consuetudo 727, a term that in the language of Roman law denoted jus non scriptum, or customary unwritten law 728. “Just as in civil matters, consuetudo [custom] replaces the law if the latter is insufficient,” so in the Church this consuetudo can exist along with the written law, but only it must be verified by Holy Scripture and contain exclusively that quod Deo congruat [what corresponds to God] and quod disciplinae conducat [what is useful for teaching] 729. The authority of this unwritten tradition is asserted mainly on two grounds: on its original prescription, while everything new that appeared subsequently is a heresy 730; then, like Irenaeus, on the successio episcoporum [succession of bishops], a number of which go back to the very times of the apostles 731. In addition to Scripture and the apostolic tradition, sometimes in the history of the Church data from science and philosophy were also used, however, in no case as a primary source equal to Scripture and tradition, but in the sense of an indirect auxiliary means in the scientific development of issues of church doctrine and morality. As for the Western Church, it was partly, perhaps, out of opposition to Gnosticism, which created a weapon against the Church from science and philosophy, in the person of Tertullian, it reacted to this science with complete condemnation and called philosophy the mother of heresies 732 . Extra-church philosophy does not deserve the attention of a Christian simply because it is the product of demons 733; but then, by its very essence, any philosophical research is incompatible with the title of a member of the Church: faith is the opposite of knowledge and research; while we are researching, we do not yet believe, and whoever believes already has everything necessary and does not need any further research 734. It follows from this that in the Church nemo sapiens, nisi fidelis [no one is wise except the faithful] 735, and for a Christian adversus regulam nihil scire, omnia scire est [to know nothing contrary to the rule means to know everything] 736. The famous Alexandrian writers followed an almost completely opposite path to this. The Alexandrian Christian school stands in the closest relationship with the main traditions of learned Alexandrian Judaism. Living in the center of classical education and being under its influence, the latter, in the person of Philo, tried to indicate the ideological points of contact between philosophy and the Old Testament Revelation. This was achieved in two ways: firstly, by the idea of ​​a Logos constantly operating in the world, from which both Revelation and, in part, philosophy originate; secondly, and primarily, the theory of the dependence of philosophy on the Bible. Everything that is true in paganism was gleaned by philosophers from sacred writers. So, for example, according to Philo, Heraclitus borrowed the main ideas of his philosophy from the books of Moses 737. Be that as it may, since the ideological similarity between philosophy and Revelation was fundamentally recognized, it goes without saying that the importance of philosophy was highly valued and great importance was attached to it in the matter of interpreting the truths of Revelation. Just as individual sciences serve as preparation for the study of philosophy, so philosophy itself is an intermediate step to real religious wisdom, the final goal of moral activity 738 . This relationship between philosophy and Revelation is illustrated by the biblical figures of Sarah and Hagar. If the barren lady Sarah allowed Abram to have offspring from the maidservant Hagar (Gen. 16:1-2), then this circumstance in its internal meaning means that a person can enjoy the fruits of virtue and wisdom only after preliminary exercise in philosophy and other service sciences 739. Philo's thoughts were then taken up and developed further by the Christian Alexandrians. Thus, Clement of Alexandria bases his teaching on the idea of ​​the presence of the Divine Logos in the universe and His beneficial actions in all phenomena of the life of this universe. The seeds of the Logos are scattered throughout the world, and in particular are also inherent in people who, due to this internal connection with the Logos and in their natural state, are capable of good 740. From this point of view, Clement also views classical philosophy. Compared to Philo, his idea of ​​Divine pedagogy is new. Preparing people for the New Testament, God first gave them two preparatory covenants: He sent prophets to the Jews, and among the Hellenes He chose virtuous men, making them, as it were, prophets of the pagan world 741; Thus, the preparation for Christ, which the Old Testament served for the Jews, was their philosophy for the pagan peoples 742. Both of them had the same goal in the essence of the matter. It goes without saying that with such a point of view, classical philosophy in the eyes of Clement could not be a complete error, but contained grains of truth: pagan philosophers, although they did not have an accurate and firm concept of the true God, but, so to speak, sensed His existence, although they worshiped Him in false forms 743. These grains were then replenished by borrowing from the sacred writers, a theory which Clement puts forward as strongly as Philo: the philosophers borrowed a great deal from the Old Testament prophets 744 ; their moral code was modeled after the Mosaic legislation 745 ; the doctrine of the creation of the world by God was communicated to them by the Jews 746. But even with all this, philosophy still has not achieved the relative completeness of the Old Testament Revelation. Based on this, Clement attached great importance to philosophy and science not only in the matter of knowing the truth, but also in the religious and moral life of man in general. The allegorical explanation of the images of Abraham, Sarah and Hagar is reproduced by him in the same sense in which we find it in Philo 747. These preparatory sciences are important simply because they exercise the mind, generate ardor and develop insight 748 . Clement develops the indivisible unity of science and faith in his famous theory of Christian πίστις [faith] and γνῶσις [knowledge]. Man cannot do without faith and divine authority, because the ultimate foundations of things are inaccessible to his reason 749. Holy Scripture should serve as our only criterion in resolving these issues 750. This belief in truth in the name of the Authority that has witnessed it is πίστις. But above it is the level of γνώσις’a, which is the ideal of research for the Alexandrians. A Gnostic, or a scientifically and philosophically educated person 751, first of all, unlike pistis, is able to comprehend the content of Revelation and correctly understand it with inner conviction of its reasonableness 752; on the other hand, at his disposal, science and philosophy not only do not destroy faith and do not lead to heresies 753, but, by justifying and explaining faith, make it stronger and protect it from deception and error 754. In general, the famous successor of Clement, Origen 755, held the same views on the relationship of science to Revelation. But he, perhaps, resolved the issue much more clearly and more accurately delineated the areas of scientific-theological research proper and the Holy Scriptures with church tradition. In the preface to his "Περὶ ἀρχῶν" ["On the Beginnings"] he speaks as the main source of his research about ecclesiastica praedicatio per successionis ordinem ab Apostolis tradita, et usque ad praesens in Ecclesiis permanens [church teaching transmitted from the apostles through the order of succession and abiding in the Churches even to this day] 756. The dignity of any teaching is determined precisely by the degree of agreement with this Tradition 757. Origen, however, believes that the fundamental truths of the faith are stated in Tradition only briefly; and many questions are not answered at all. Therefore, a detailed explanation of what is briefly stated and filling in what is missing constitutes the task of independent scientific and theological research 758 . However, Origen did not remain faithful to this principle. In the rather free flight of his own theological thought, he limited himself little within the framework of this church tradition, constructing the edifice of his system almost exclusively on the basis of Scripture, in an original way and without the guidance of Tradition, interpreted by him. St. Ambrose, in the respect that interests us, is not entirely aligned with either the representatives of Western theology or the typical Alexandrians; standing in the middle between both, he borrows only a few features from them. Thus, he uses Clement’s idea of ​​Divine pedagogy. The Divine Word acted in the Old Testament, so that the Old Testament Revelation was His Revelation and the Old Testament prophets were His servants 759. By this he prepared people for the coming of the New Testament times: the Old Testament law was therefore a teacher who led people to Christ 760. But Ambrose is already deviating from the Alexandrians and going over to the side of Tertullian, since he does not recognize classical philosophy as a revelation of the Logos, does not consider classical philosophers to be servants of the Logos, and generally does not attribute any importance to it in the matter of salvation. It is characteristic that the allegory of Hagar and Sarah, beloved by the Alexandrians, is also found in Ambrose, but is significantly reinterpreted by him. Like the Alexandrians, Sarah, in the understanding of Ambrose, means true virtue, true wisdom (Sarra virtus vera est, vera sapientia), and Hagar - resourcefulness (versutia), which is, as it were, a handmaiden of a more perfect virtue: the first is sapientia spiritalis [spiritual wisdom], and the second is sapientia hujus mundi [the wisdom of this peace]; Hagar is called an Egyptian (Gen. 16:1) because philosophical science (philosophica eruditio) flourished in Egypt. But in assessing this wisdom, Ambrose does not agree with the Alexandrians: its low value is proven by the fact that Moses, having mastered all the wisdom of Egypt, still considered himself completely unprepared to accept the divine calling, so the Lord taught him again. At the same time, Hagar is considered the image of the synagogue, the law, and Sarah is the image of the Church. The fact that barren Sarah allowed Abraham to have offspring from Hagar is explained by St. Ambrose differs significantly from the Alexandrians: the Church and faith, which Sarah personified, were predetermined by God at first, but until time God hid them, as if he had concluded them, making them barren, in order to show by experience that man is not justified by himself, but by the calling of God; This explanation undoubtedly presupposes the futility of the wisdom of the age in the knowledge of Divine truth and religious perfection 761. St. Ambrose, however, agrees that classical philosophy also possessed a small particle of truth, but in explaining this he borrows from the Alexandrians exclusively the theory of borrowings from sacred writers and pursues it more consistently than anyone before him. So, for example, the doctrine of the four cardinal virtues, in his opinion, was transferred by the classical sages from the Bible into their writings 762. Plato, who was in Egypt, could himself read the books of Moses or get acquainted with them, like Socrates, through the persons who read them and use their ideas for his philosophical system 763. The main position of the Stoics, that a true wise man is satisfied with everything and does not feel lacking in anything, is reminiscent of the divine promise to Abraham to give him and his descendants the ownership of the whole earth, of course, if we understand the promise in a spiritual sense 764. Having become familiar with the prophet Ezekiel's vision of animals and moving wheels, Plato himself came to the idea of ​​imagining the sky under the image of a fast-moving chariot 765. The requirement of ancient orators to refrain from anger and irritation during speeches and to maintain peace of mind originates from the words of the psalmist: “restrain your tongue from evil” 766. The famous “know thyself” is taken from Deut. 15:9 767 . Panetius and Aristotle drew their doctrine of duties from the Psalms of David 768. Usually these statements are not proven; the most that Ambrose does is point out that sacred writers lived long before the philosophers. If Solomon is older than Zeno the Stoic and Plato 769, if Ezra lived before Plato 770, and David and Isaiah are older than Pythagoras 771, then this, according to Ambrose, already proves that the philosophers drew from their sacred predecessors; in reality, finding similarities between them is very problematic, often it is even only apparent, external. Denying philosophy to have any significance in the matter of salvation, St. Ambrose had to deny its significance in the study and presentation of the truths of faith. In this respect, he goes, perhaps, even further than his predecessor Tertullian; the latter, at least, considered the soul to be Christian by nature and, therefore, could not believe that there was an impassable gap between truth and reason; Ambrose, apparently, states the complete failure of reason in the matter of knowing the truth. Philosophically, no one can find Christ 772. “We,” he says, “have nothing in common with philosophy”; it can only move us away from the truth, as is what happened with the Arians, who abandoned faith in Scripture and became carried away by Aristotle and dialectics 773. “Dialectics” is now powerlessly “silent in its gymnasiums”; its representatives no longer enjoy the trust that after Christ passed to fishermen and publicans. Therefore, for salvation we need non disputationum controversia, sed praeceptorum veritas, nec argumentationis astutia, sed fides mentis [not the contradictions of disputes, but the truth of the commandments, not the cunning of argumentation, but the faith of the mind] 774. Such faith is opposed not only by the teaching of philosophers, but also by the methods of their research: where faith is contained, there should be no arguments 775. Dialectics only gives rise to harmful disputes and raises fruitless questions, and philosophy even excludes the apostolic truth 776. Ambrose, like Western writers before him, indicates two sources for this only faith obligatory for members of the Church: scriptura divina [Divine Scripture] and traditio majorum [ancestral tradition] 777; there are also references, again in the spirit of Western writers, to regula veritatis [rule of truth] 778. But despite this external similarity, Ambrose differs significantly from his Western predecessors. Firstly, he extremely rarely deals with traditio majorum [ancestral tradition], even only by chance calling it. Secondly, his very concept of church tradition is too general in nature: we would look in vain for indications of the hierarchical nature of this tradition, the successio episcoporum [succession of bishops], as its conditio, sine qua non [mandatory condition]; he does not talk about the apostolic character of this tradition, nor about the Church as its guardian, nor about its significance for believers. In all his writings, St. Ambrose deals only with scriptura divina [Divine Scripture] and expounds his doctrine on the basis of the evidence of Scripture. This feature in him may also be explained by the influence of the Alexandrians. It lacks Ambrose, but also its historical significance. By significantly pushing scriptura [Scripture] ahead of traditio [tradition], he initiated a new direction in the history of Western theological thought. The high authority of Holy Scripture is based on its Divine origin: it is the Revelation of God, written by sacred authors under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and is the actual Scripture of God. Regarding the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, before Ambrose, the West did not have time to develop a definite and detailed theory. We only know Tertullian’s view of this question, compiled by him under the strong influence of Montanism. He says: in spiritu constitutus homo... necesse est excidat censu [when a person is in the spirit... he must go beyond [the limits of all] judgment] 779, obviously considering the state of the sacred writers at the moment of inspiration to be a state of frenzy, ecstasy and attributing to them a purely passive role as blind instruments of Divine Revelation. We also cannot say about Ambrose that he gave the West such a completely complete theory; however, he still dwelled on the issue at hand and resolved it somewhat differently than Tertullian. And here, as in the previous case, he reminds us of the Alexandrians and quite strongly. The founder of the Alexandrians, Philo, under the influence of the views on inspiration of Platonism, identifies the state of inspiration with an ecstatic, unconscious state 780. For sacred men, in moments of inspiration, external senses stopped their activity for a while, so as not to interfere with the eyes of the soul 781; speech became slower, and the mind became faster 782, and this was associated with a dullness of consciousness (γεγονὼς ἐν ἀνοίᾳ) 783. In this sense, Philo compares the personality of every prophet to a musical instrument that passively produces certain sounds under the influence of the blows of the Logos 784. It goes without saying that in this case the inspiration of Scripture had to acquire a strictly verbal character and extend not only to the content of Revelation, but also to its external verbal form 785. The Christian Alexandrians made several rather significant amendments to this theory: in contrast to Gnosticism, which in principle denied freedom of human action, they recognized the presence of some initiative among sacred writers at the moment of inspiration. Therefore, Clement, on the one hand, recognizes that the prophets were organs of the Divine voice (ὄργανα ϑείας φωνῆς) 786 and compares them with a musical harp emitting sounds under the influence of extraneous blows 787, and on the other, claims that the prophets conveyed in their writings not only what was revealed to them by God, but they often added what they themselves felt: thus, in their writings they convey personal impressions about the attitude of the people to the revelations communicated through them 788. Thus, sacred writers are credited with a certain degree of activity in the composition of their writings. Origen puts forward the importance of the Divine factor more strongly than Clement; the main thing in inspiration belongs to the Divine Actor: the reflections of the prophets are actually the thoughts and words of God Himself, Who speaks in the prophets 789. Based on this basic position, Origen adheres to verbal inspiration and in his comments on the Books of Holy Scripture dwells not only on expressions, but even on individual letters and errors, as divinely inspired 790. However, he also admits that the Divine factor did not act overwhelmingly on the writers. The very possibility of inspiration completely depends on the moral disposition of the latter, since God gives this inspiration only to souls, ἃς εὑρίσκει ὁσιας [whom he finds holy] 791; then, in the very act of inspiration, their personal consciousness, unlike the pagan soothsayers, remained undulled 792. This determines another very characteristic feature in Origen’s idea of ​​inspiration. Distinguishing the degrees of inspiration depending on the moral dignity of the writers, he distinguishes the scriptures according to the degree of their significance: some Holy Books are recognized as more inspired, others less; the teaching of Jesus is superior to the teaching of the apostles 793, the personality of Paul is superior to his disciples Timothy and Luke 794; the difference exists, according to him, even between the writings of the same author (for example, the various letters of the Apostle Paul) 795. Ambrose adopted the most characteristic features of all of the listed theories, as a result of which his own ideas about divine inspiration turn out to be somewhat contradictory. Directly dependent on Philo, he very much puts forward the ecstatic moment of inspiration. During inspiration, the prophet’s thought becomes indignant, loses its temper, and becomes covered in some kind of darkness ignorantiae et imprudentiae [ignorance and imprudence]. This state is compared with the state of the Apostle Paul at the moment of his miraculous conversion to Christ 796. The prophets represented the organ of the Divine voice (divinae vocis organum), which God used for His Revelations to people 797. Therefore, in Scripture everything belongs to God, since the apostles and prophets did not dare to say anything other than what was communicated to them in Revelation (nonnisi ex revelatione demonstrata sibi loqui ausi sunt) 798. And the writers themselves looked upon themselves as simple transmitters of the commands of God; the Apostle John, for example, was afraid to attribute to his own abilities what he received from God 799. But to this series of thoughts of St. Ambrose adds another, essentially Origenistic. Despite all the power of the influx of the Holy Spirit that gripped the prophets, the activity of their own thoughts not only did not cease, but even exalted, because God “with the brilliance of Divine wisdom ignited the strength of their souls and illuminated their minds” 800 and, moreover, the higher their moral dignity was. The higher the face of the prophet, the higher and more complete his prophecy; in this respect the words of Mary, Mother of the Lord, are higher and more important than other scriptures 801. But not only is there a difference in the dignity of the individual and the works of various authors. Just like in Origen, in Ambrose, different works of the same author and even different passages of the same work are not equivalent in terms of the degree of inspiration: if the prophet Moses generally described not his own, but what was poured into him and revealed to him (infusa et revelata), then this must be recognized in particular regarding his narrative about the creation of the world 802 1; although all Scripture is Dei gratiam spiret [breathes with the grace of God], but especially psalmorum liber [Book of Psalms] 803. The difference between Ambrose and Origen concerns only their views on the person of the Divine Subject of Inspiration. Origen considers this issue from the point of view of the general Neoplatonic basis of his system and the sharply expressed subordinationist tendency of his doctrine of God, trinity in Persons. Since, according to Origen’s general Neoplatonic scheme, God enters into communication with creatures through the mediation of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and creatures rise to God from the Holy Spirit through the mediation of the Son, then the Mediator of inspiration for him is the Holy Spirit itself 804. In Ambrose, under the changed circumstances of the time and with a significantly different formulation of the Trinitarian problem, we encounter a different view. In his teaching about the Holy Trinity, the predominant motive is not subordinationism, but the possible complete equality of Persons while maintaining their individuality and independence. Proving that all the Persons of the Holy Trinity have one substance, one operatio [action] and one potestas [power], St. Ambrose considers all three Persons of the Holy Trinity to be the active Subject of inspiration, so that prophetia et divinum munus [prophecy and Divine gift] is sent to people from the Father, Son and Holy Spirit 805. “As the Apostle Paul heard a voice addressed to him: I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting (Acts 9:5), so the Holy Spirit forbade Paul and Silas to go to Bithynia (Acts 16:7); and just as the Father spoke through the prophets, so exactly about the Spirit the prophet Agabus testifies: Thus says the Holy Spirit: the man to whom this belt belongs will be bound in Jerusalem (Acts 21:11). And just as Wisdom sent the apostles, saying: Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature (Mark 16:15), so the Holy Spirit says: Set apart for me Barnabas and Saul for the work to which I have called them (Acts 13:2)” 806. Therefore, if in some other places St. Ambrose considers only one of the Persons of the Holy Trinity 807 to be the giver of Revelations and says that the Lord spoke in the prophets 808, or that the Holy Spirit descended on the prophets 809, then all of this kind of passage should probably be understood precisely in the light of his basic view: since inspiration comes from all three Persons due to the inseparability of their being and power, it can be attributed to each of them separately. The divinely inspired Scriptura divina [Divine Scripture] contains utrumque testamentum, testamentum vetus et testamentum novum [both Testaments, the Old Testament and the New Testament]: Ambrose simply calls the Old Testament vetus Scriptura [old Scripture] 810; to designate the entire Old Testament he sometimes uses the word lex [law], while the New Testament as a whole is designated by the name Evangelium [Gospel] 811. Despite some differences between the two Testaments, the latter are essentially the same thing, two different forms of the same content. Here St. Ambrose reproduces some of the ideas revealed by Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria in the struggle against the Gnostics who denied the similarity and agreement of the Testaments, especially against Marcion. As with Irenaeus 812 and Clement of Alexandria 813, so with St. Ambrose, the unity and agreement of the Old and New Testaments is proved mainly by the unity of their Author, God, Who cannot contradict Himself: utrumque advertis unius auctoris Testamentum [...you comprehend both Testaments of the One Author] 814. Then, like Irenaeus and Clement, Ambrose, in his enthusiasm for the thought of the unity of the Testaments, loses sight of the most significant differences between them and dwells on differences of a rather external, formal nature. According to Irenaeus, the Old Testament law kept people in bondage to obedience to external regulations, so that in this way a person would learn to servire Deo [serve God]; and in the New Testament, when man, after a long school of obedience, had learned to sine vinculis sequi Deum [to follow God without bonds], the vincula servitutis [bonds of slavery] were abolished, in place of which the decreta libertatis [definitions of freedom] 815 were granted. Similarly, in Ambrose, the lex [law] was given to the Jews, as weak people, as children in religious and moral terms, in order to educate them in this way to accept Christ 816; so that the Jew, bound by the literal fulfillment of the precepts of the law, is in servitute est [is in slavery], and the Christian, freed from the yoke of the letter, received libertatem [freedom] 817. Irenaeus sees the most significant difference between the Old and New Testaments in their content in the fact that in the New Testament the teaching is revealed not only about God in general, but mainly about the Son, whom people did not know before 818. In the same way, in Ambrose we can very often find the remark that the Jews are fari Verbum Deum nesciunt [do not know the Word of God], while in Christians Christus est Dei virtus [Christ is the power of God] 819, that the Christian is precisely per agnitionem Filii Dei [through the recognition of the Son of God] from an Old Testament slave turned into a perfect husband 820. Clement drew the attention of St. Ambrose for some more features. According to him, the Old Testament, with its instructions and threats of punishment for violating them, aroused in people mainly a feeling of fear (φόβος), through which it leads them to Christ (εἰς Χριστὸν παιδαγωγήσας) 821; the predominant mood of the New Testament is love 822. Accordingly, we find in Ambrose that the law-paedagogus served as an object of fear (timetur), and Christ opened the way of salvation to us; timor [fear], thus, led people ad libertatem [to freedom], libertas ad fidem [freedom to faith], and fides ad caritatem [faith to love] 823. In the spirit of the Alexandrians, Ambrose defines the relationship between the Testaments as the relationship of part to the whole, less perfect to more perfect, less complete to more complete: in lege igitur portio, in Evangelio perfectio est [in the law - part, in the Gospel - fulfillment] 824; vetus Scriptura [old Scripture] is like a deep and dark well, from which one could only draw with difficulty; it is also incomplete (non plena), since the one who filled it has not yet appeared 825. With the appearance of Christ, inferiora [lower] ceased to exist and perfecta [perfect] 826 began. Having established the unity of both Testaments, Ambrose treats both with equal respect and uses evidence of both in his writings. If some point out that he seems to pay great attention to the Old Testament, which with its darkness gave great scope to the allegorical method, and most of his works were written on themes from Old Testament history, 827 then this can hardly be seen as a deliberate preference: Ambrose himself does not express this anywhere, and the abundance of works on Old Testament themes is easily explained by the fact that behind the vastness of the Old Testament material, he did not have time to move on to commenting on the New Testament Scriptures. In particular, from the Old Testament he uses almost all its books as Scriptura divina [Divine Scripture]. In one place he names the five Books of Moses, Regnorum libros, prophetarum scripta, Esdram, psalmos, Proverbia, Ecclesiasten, and Cantica Canticorum 828. From the Regnorum libros [Books of Kings] he quotes all four. Of the prophets, he knows all twelve minor ones and especially often quotes the Books of the prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Daniel. Regarding the psalms, he shares a fairly widespread opinion at that time, according to which David was the author of all the psalms known to us; for example, he considers Psalm 43 of the sons of Korah to belong to David; the inscription “sons of Korah” is explained in the sense that David composed it for musical performance by the sons of Korah 829. Proverbia [Proverbs], Ecclesiastes [Ecclesiastes] and Cantica canticorum [Song of Songs] are considered the books of Solomon 830. In other places we then encounter references to both Books of Chronicles 831, to the Book of Joshua 832, the Book of Ruth 833, Job, to the explanation of which our author even devotes a special essay. It is also worthy of attention that Ambrose does not always draw the proper line between canonical and Deutero-canonical books and uses the latter along with the former; the word “canonical” itself is unknown to him. The book of Tobit is called a prophetic book 834; Some passages from Book IV are quoted. Ezra 835: IV Maccabees is very often used, as we have seen, in the work “De Jacob et vita beata” [“On Jacob and the Blessed Life”]. Only the Book of III Maccabees is not quoted by Ambrose, although from this one can hardly conclude with certainty, as Kellner does 836, that Ambrose did not recognize it at all. The New Testament canon is equally complete in the works of Ambrose. The first place here is occupied, of course, by the four Gospels: Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. The religious symbols of the calf, lion, man and eagle are applied to them, and in two editions: according to one of them, the listed symbols characterize the distinctive features of the gospel narratives; and according to another, the Lord Himself in the Gospels is depicted quattuor formis animalium: idem homo, idem leo, idem vitulus, idem aquila [by four types of living beings: He is a man, He is a lion, He is a calf, He is an eagle]: homo [man], as Born of Mary, 1eo [lion], as Strong, vitulus [taurus], as Victim, aquila [eagle], as Resurrection; in each of the Gospels, the life of Christ is depicted primarily from one of the indicated sides 837. It is difficult to say where Ambrose borrowed this symbolism from; probably from the ideas that had already become current at that time, but hardly directly from its founder, Irenaeus of Lyons, since there is a significant difference between the latter and Ambrose: in Irenaeus, the eagle serves as a symbol not of resurrection, but of “the gift of the Spirit hovering over the Church” 838. Then in Ambrose comes the Book of the Acts of the Apostles and all fourteen Epistles of the Apostle Paul; The Epistle to the Hebrews, for the purposes of Christian typology, is especially often used in the Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam [Exposition of the Gospel of Luke]. Finally, 1 John, 1 and 2 Peter, James, Jude and the Apocalypse are quoted; The Epistle of James is quoted with the remark ut apostolus dicit [as the apostle says] 839, The Epistle of Jude is accepted as epistula Judae 840. All Books of Holy Scripture are usually quoted by Ambrose according to the Latin translation of Itala, but in some cases Ambrose also brings into consideration different readings of other texts. He refers least often to the Hebrew text 841; and since, by his own admission, he did not know the Hebrew language 842, then, undoubtedly, he borrowed this type of information from other authors, most likely from Origen. In addition to the Hebrew text, he also knows some Greek translations: Aquila 843 and Symmachus 844 and, comparatively less, Theodotion 845. Ambrose pays special attention to the Greek translation of the Seventy, which is known to him as Septuaginta 846 or Septuaginta virorum 847. In Ambrose's attitude to this translation, we are again probably dealing with the influence of the Alexandrians on him. The translation of the Seventy, made for the needs of Alexandrian Judaism, has long been highly respected in Alexandria; sometimes it was valued here even higher than the Jewish original. At the same time, the properties of true Scripture—divine inspiration and divine revelation—were also transferred to it. For Philo, the translators are not only ἑρμηνεῖς [interpreters], but also ἱεροφάνται καὶ προφῆται [hierophants and prophets], who in everything agreed with the purest spirit of Moses 848. Origen, recognizing the translation of the Seventy as the Revelation of God, in the event of a disagreement between this translation in reading and other texts, was more likely to admit the corruption of these latter, and even the Gospels, than an error in the translation of the Seventy 849. It cannot be said that Ambrose fully adopted these views. But nevertheless, high respect for the translation of the Seventy passed on to him: when comparing different texts, and in general in all difficult cases, he gives preference to the translation of the Septuaginta, as such, the sententias [behind the sayings] of which the magis seguitur Ecclesia [more follows the Church], the meaning of which is clearer (planior est) 850, and the authority is stronger (potior est) 851; if the translation of the Seventy coincides with any reading of the Septuaginta virorum videtur convenire, then this alone already serves as a reliable guarantee of its correctness 852. It should be noted, however, that all these references to different readings are unlikely to be borrowed from primary sources. Probably, in this case, he was helped by the works of Origen. In one place, comparing different readings of the word, he chooses the one followed by Origen, since the latter multorum interpretationes diligenter discussit [carefully examined many interpretations] 853. Another basis for this assumption may be the fact that Ambrose’s commentaries on the psalms predominantly abound in such comparisons of texts, and these commentaries were generally created under the great influence of Origen. Exegetical techniques of St. Ambrose differs in many ways from those currently accepted: he usually cares little about the exact and textual interpretation of this or that passage of Holy Scripture. Very often the place chosen for explanation is taken out of context and considered without any connection with the previous and subsequent ones. The biblical story only gives him a reason for reasoning, often completely extraneous: having started in the essay “De Isaac” [“About Isaac”] with the story of the Book of Genesis about Isaac, he later completely loses sight of this story, devoting almost all his attention to commenting on the Book of Song of Songs. Ambrose's favorite exegetical method was the allegorical, pneumatic method. From this side, his exegesis is of very great importance in the history of Western exegesis in general. We will look separately at his exegesis of the Old Testament and the New. 1. Old Testament exegesis The Western Church in earlier times generally preferred a literal and simple understanding of the Old Testament. Nevertheless, for a long time there was no shortage of examples of pneumatic exegesis. Most often, however, only one of its forms is used, namely the typological one, according to which Old Testament events and persons are considered as types or images of New Testament persons and events. We find many relevant examples in the works of St. Cyprian of Carthage. In his explanation, Isaac fuit typus Christi [was a type of Christ], Leah, distinguished by painful sight, was a typum synagogae [a type of a synagogue], and the beautiful Rachel was a typum Ecclesiae [a type of the Church]; Patriarch Joseph was typus Christi [type of Christ] 854. In Cyprian we also encounter established terminology: the Old Testament, as an image, is called imago, and the New Testament is given the name of truth (veritas); the Old Testament Passover lamb, which prefigured Christ the Savior, represented an imago [image], and Christ was the truth for this image 855. Novatian in this sense speaks of the Old Testament phenomena as umbras et figuras [shadows and figures] of the New Testament, and the Gospel considers praesentia corporatae veritatis [real incarnate truth] 856. The unknown author of the work “De montibus Sina et Sion” [“On Mounts Sinai and Zion”] knows a slightly different terminology: much in the Old Testament is written figuraliter [figuratively] and therefore per Novum Testamentum spiritualiter intelligenda sunt [must be understood spiritually through the New Testament] as fulfilled in Christ in veritate [in truth] 857; Along with the designations figura and typus, in relation to the Old Testament he uses the concept of praefiguratio [pre-image] 858. Next to this typological form of Old Testament pneumatic exegesis, very early in the West we encounter its second form - allegory in the broad sense of the word: if typology deals only with New Testament prototypes, then the allegory behind the outer letter generally reveals the internal meaning, no matter what truths it concerns. The basis for the use of allegory was, for the most part, all sorts of ambiguities, mystery, figurativeness of the story, and difficulties that arose in the literal understanding of some biblical stories. This was all the more natural because in Greco-Roman literature, for all such cases, allegory had long been used on the widest scale. We find examples of this kind of allegory already in Tertullian, if by the earth he sometimes means human flesh created from the earth, or the expression of the psalmist: “The Lord reigns, let the earth rejoice” is understood in relation to the flesh of the saints in the Kingdom of Heaven 859. The already mentioned author of “De montibus Sina et Sion” [“On Mounts Sinai and Zion”] devotes even more space to the latter. In him, it seems, for the first time in the West we encounter more or less developed symbolism of proper names - a common accessory and companion of allegory. Thus, the name Sinai is interpreted in the sense of tentatio aeterna [eternal temptation] and odium [hatred], and Zion - tentatio exacerbationis et speculatio [temptation of irritation and observation] 860; the name Abel means fratris interfectio [murder of a brother] and parentium luctus [crying of parents], Enoch - innovatus [renewed], Job - carissimus Dei [the most beloved of God], Abraham - pater multorum populorum [father of many nations] 861. The name Adam is explained in particular detail in the sense of terra caro facta [earth made flesh], because all the letters of this name are borrowed from the names of the four countries of the earth: A from the word ἀνατολή [east], d from δύσις [west], and from ἄρκτος [north] and m - from μεσημβρία [south]. In addition, these letters, being translated into their corresponding numbers, give a total of 46: a means μία [one], δ - τέσσαρα [four], a - again one and μ - τεσσαράκοντα [forty]; and this number indicates Christ, Who suffered in the year 6000 and at the 6th hour, and on the 40th day after the Resurrection ascended to heaven 862. This method is also found in Novatian. If he is in the words of the psalm: He (the Lord) sits on cherubim (Ps. 98:1), by cherubim he means the variety of the works of God, if by an outstretched crystal he understands the entire sky covering the sky (Ezek. 1:22), and in the four wheels in the vision of the prophet Ezekiel (Ezek. 1:15) he sees images of the four seasons 863, then in all these cases we have allegory in its broad sense. Regarding pneumatic and especially allegorical exegesis in the considered stage of its development in the West, two general remarks should be made. Firstly, this exegesis is still too simple, the theory of its application to the Bible is still very little developed. Secondly, it still has very limited application; it is an exception, while literal exegesis remains common. The prophets do not have all figures, but they also have reality; not all shadows, but they also have bodies, notes Tertullian 864. Prophets use allegories only occasionally and under certain circumstances, he objects to the Gnostics 865. The techniques of allegorical exegesis exhibited by Tertullian: 1) each biblical image must be understood in the sense that Scripture itself gives it in other places 866 and 2) to explain part of the text from the whole 867, the essence of the matter was aimed at limiting, if possible, the arbitrariness of the allegory and not giving it the opportunity to deviate too far from the original text. A further step in the development of Western Old Testament exegesis is represented by commentaries on the psalms of Hilary of Pictavia. His difference from the writers of earlier times lies in the fact that his pneumatic exegesis is carried out on a wider scale; For almost every psalm, in addition to the literal meaning, he also tries to determine the spiritual, internal meaning, and even mainly this last one. In a series of exegetical terms, Hilary uses many old concepts already noted in the West, but partly introduces new designations. The Old Testament for him is umbra futurorum [the shadow of the future], and the New Testament is veritas corporis umbrae [the truth of [this] shadow] 868; the Old Testament institutions and accessories were umbram [shadow] and were imaginaria [figurative] in their essence 869; in Scripture secundum intelligentiam nostram per corporales species divinarum rerum sensus exponitur [according to our understanding, divine things are depicted through bodily images] 870; the law was futurorum bonorum umbra [a shadow of future goods] 871. Hilary most often calls the direct, literal meaning of the psalms littera [letter] 872, and the spiritual – intelligentia [understanding] 873, spiritualis sensus [spiritual meaning] 874, spiritualis intelligentiae sensus [meaning of spiritual understanding] 875, simply allegoria [allegory] 876. Recognizing, as before, two main types of sensus spiritualis [spiritual meaning], Hilary seems for the first time to strictly distinguish between their designations: he distinguishes allegoricae and typicae virtutes [allegorical and typical powers] 877, prophetica (obviously the same as typica) intelligentia [prophetic (prophetic) understanding] 878. Like the author of “De montibus” [“On the Mountains”], he uses the symbolism of names, in some cases partially agreeing with him in small details; for example, the name Abimelech in his explanation means fratris mei imperium [the dominion of my brother] 879, Ziphi (Ps. 53:2) - oris adspersio [sprinkling of the face] 880, Ephraim - assumptio [acceptance] 881, Bashan - pudor, confusio [shame, embarrassment] 882, Zion partly like from the author of “De montibus” - speculatio [observation] 883, etc. However, in this regard, Hilary was still far from achieving the art that we find in Ambrose. Although theoretically he distinguishes the allegorical and typical or prophetic meaning of Scripture, in practice he does not make a significant distinction between them, and his Old Testament exegesis is mainly typological exegesis or closely bordering on it. By allegory, he usually means prophecies about the Birth in the flesh of the Only Begotten Son of God, about His suffering, death, Resurrection, reign with those who believed in Him and judgment over all people 884. The law, under the veil of words, spoke about the Birth, Incarnation, Suffering and Death of Our Lord Jesus Christ 885. Without the New Testament, before the coming of Christ the Savior, the Book of Psalms was completely incomprehensible to people; Christ is the key to this book, who by his appearance into the world revealed to us all its secrets 886. As a result, the pneumatic exegesis of Hilary revolves within the limits of moderation: it does not yet contain either the variety or the artificiality that characterizes the exegesis of St. Ambrose. Already the initial position of the exegesis of St. Ambrose, although in general the same as that of his predecessors, is peculiar in one respect. The Old Testament hid secrets that were revealed with the coming of Christ to earth 887. The Jews understood and followed their law literally, but with the advent of the New Testament, its spiritual meaning 888 was revealed. Now a literal understanding even harms a person, because it prevents him from understanding the mysteries revealed by Christ. If Christ denounced the Pharisees with the words: the scribes (scribae) sat in the seat of Moses, then He reproached them for following the letter of the law, leaving the understanding of its spirit 889. The letter kills, but the spirit gives life 890. In accordance with this, the Old Testament receives from Ambrose, as well as from his Western predecessors, the name umbra, figura, imago [shadow, figure, image], and the New - veritas [truth] 891; less often he contrasts them as lux [light] and umbra [shadow], veritas [truth] and figura [figure] 892. But very often he develops a concept hitherto unknown in the West and, apparently, borrowed from Origen, according to which umbra [shadow] refers to the Old Testament, imago [image] to the Gospel, and veritas [truth] is now only the destiny of the other world and other life that we still expect. In further views of St. Ambrose on the nature of the spiritual meaning of the Holy Scriptures, we again encounter the influence on him of the Alexandrians, who informed him of a detailed theory of the allegorical method. Alexandrian science, both Jewish and Christian, having inherited it from classical writers, mainly from the Stoics 894, has long used it on the widest scale. She strictly distinguished in Scripture between the literal meaning, publicly available, and the internal meaning, which is the lot of only a few. We already note this trait in Ambrose. He fully agrees with Philo that the secrets hidden behind the letter must be most carefully hidden from the imperfect and vicious, so that they are not desecrated by their dirty and vicious ears. The biblical image of this order for both is the loaves that Sarah, by order of Abraham, made to treat the three strangers (Gen. 18:6); The Greek name for these breads, by its etymological origin, means something hidden. Such views of the inner meaning of Scripture as the property of only a few did not exist in the West before Ambrose. Then, both the classics and the Alexandrians distinguished several categories of spiritual understanding. In addition to the literal meaning, which in essence was not denied by any Alexandrian in principle, although in practice it was very often completely ignored, thanks to which the entire biblical story turned into a system of allegories, Philo distinguishes three types of contemplations: λογικῶν καὶ ἡϑικῶν καὶ φυσικῶν 895. For Clement, this threefold division takes on a slightly different character if he divides the highest meaning into three types: mystical (σημεῖον ἐμφαίνουσαν), moral (ἐντολὴν κοροῦσαν εἰς πολιτείαν ὀρϑήν) and prophetic (ϑεσπίζουσαν ὡς προφητείαν) 896, prophetic identifies with typological 897, moral with ἠϑικός Philo, and the mystical with his φυσικός 898. In Origen we encounter another new modification. Just as a human being, he says, consists of body, soul and spirit, so Scripture has a bodily, or literal meaning (σάρξ τῆς Γραφῆς), which is accessible even to the simplest believers, a spiritual (ψυχὴ αὐτῆς), suitable for people more experienced, but not completely perfect, and, finally, a spiritual law, the shadow of future blessings 899 ; Moreover, only some passages of Scripture have a carnal meaning, but the spiritual and spiritual meaning, apparently, extend to the entire Revelation 900. In essence, we find the same thing in Ambrose, although he puts forward the need for a literal meaning more strongly than his Alexandrian mentors, and his spiritual interpretation does not replace the literal one, but exists in parallel with it. He distinguishes in Scripture litteram [letter] and intelligentiam spiritualem [spiritual understanding] 901 - a term with which we have already met in Hilary, secundum litteram [literally] and sensus spiritualis [spiritual meaning] (again in Hilary), intellectus profundior [deeper understanding] 902, secundum litteram [literally] and altior sensus [higher meaning] 903, altior et profundior interpretatio [higher and deeper interpretation] 904, secundum historiam [according to history] and secundum aenigmata [mysteriously, allegorically] 905, altitudo mysteriorum [height of the sacraments] 906, littera [letter] and altior et interior significatio [higher and internal meaning] 907, sometimes simply per allegoriam [allegorically] 908. In listing individual types of higher meaning, St. Ambrose reminds us most of Philo in distinguishing sensus naturalis, mysticus and moralis [natural, mystical and moral meaning] 909; the concept mysticus [mystical] is sometimes replaced by the word rationalis [speculative], probably in parallel to λογικῶς 910. As for typology, Ambrose retains its meaning, since, according to him, the Old Testament fuisse typum futuri [was an image of the future] 911, however, it loses its independent meaning, merging with all three types of higher meaning; in accordance with this, the word typus acquires a very widespread interpretation, denoting not only the Old Testament prototypes of New Testament events, but in general everything that is allegorically denoted by the letter of Scripture: the action of the global flood, for example, is the typus of the moral cleansing of our soul 912. It is difficult to say whether Ambrose attributes to each passage of Scripture all three listed meanings together or connects only one with each of them. Apparently, he is inclined to the latter assumption, as evidenced by the idea passed down to him from Origen that some individual books of Scripture are examples of only one of the three types of spiritual understanding of the Bible. He considers the example of the sensus naturalis to be the Book of Genesis, which tells the origin of heaven and earth, the mysticus [mystical] - Leviticus, which speaks of the Old Testament priesthood, which prefigures the New Testament priesthood of Christ, and the moralis [moral] - Deuteronomy with its instructions regarding the way of life and behavior. Origen also pointed him to the example of the books of Solomon, who in Ecclesiastes speaks about the world and earthly life, in the Book of Song of Songs he foresaw future sacraments, and in Proverbs he acted as a preacher of morality 913. It is further difficult to say whether Ambrose gives preference to any of the three types of spiritual meaning or whether he considers them equivalent. He only occasionally leans towards the side of the mystical meaning for the sake of its special importance 914. After these preliminary remarks, we turn to the question of what St. Ambrose means by his terms sensus naturalis, mysticus and moralis [meaning natural, mystical and moral]. He found the definition of these terms almost ready in the writings of Philo, which, as we have already said, he mainly follows in his Old Testament exegesis. He depends on the latter not only in general concepts, but also in the application of these concepts to specific examples. Judging by these examples, our writers understand by sensus naturalis [natural meaning], or φυσικός, a technique through which in any event or phenomenon one can discover an indication of the structure of the world, its accessories and constituent elements. Naturalem secundum mundi creationem [Natural (meaning established) in accordance with the creation of the world] 915. Both Ambrose and Philo give an example of this meaning when explaining God's command to Abraham to sacrifice a three-year-old heifer, a three-year-old goat, a three-year-old ram, a turtle dove and a young dove (Gen. 15:9); the names of these animals are explained in relation to the main constituent elements of the world: the calf serves as an image of the earth, the goat - water, the sheep - air 916. Another similar example of sensus naturalis [natural meaning] is Philo's explanation of Noah's ark and its structure. This ark represented a humani figuram corporis [figure of a human body] 917. Just as the ark had a square shape, the most perfect of all, so the human body is distinguished by the same perfection of external form: the chest, for example, has the same width and length, and all other members are built approximately the same 918. Just as in the ark, at the command of God, special nest-like compartments were made (nidos facies in area - Gen. 6:14), so our body is created from separate parts in the form of a nest, and the vital spirit penetrates into all parts of our insides and pours into individual joints. Nests also resemble individual members of the body: nests, for example, eyes, in which vision is located, nests - the depths of the ears, in which the sense of hearing is concentrated, nests - nostrils, attracting smell, etc. Bones also have nests, containing voids inside filled with the brain 919. The ark was tarred with resin to better consolidate the parts inside and outside, and the individual parts of the body were closely knitted into one whole 920. The Ark had several compartments, or floors, the analogy of which is also presented to us by our body: the lowest compartment is a container for food (gesertacula ciborum), that is, the insides that absorb food; if this compartment is at the very bottom, then this is because we feed on perishable food, and the very structure of the body indicates to us that everything perishable can only be compared with the lower, but not with the highest 921. Another kind of higher meaning - sensus mysticus, or rationalis [mystical or speculative meaning], apparently, is contained in all those places of the Bible that, under the cover of the outer letter, contain any religious ideas or reveal the doctrine of religious persons and actions. This is the meaning of all the passages of Scripture with instructions regarding the Old Testament liturgical ritual and clergy. Therefore, more often than other types of spiritual understanding, it leads us to dogmatic truths and explanations, usually known as typological ones. Thus, the stone on which Gideon’s stew was engulfed in flames, in a mystical sense, means the flesh of Christ, nailed to the Cross and destroying the sins of the whole world 922. Cain and Abel mystice [mystically] prefigured the Jewish synagogue and the Church of Christ, because just as the sacrifice of Abel was preferred to the sacrifice of Cain, so the Church triumphed over the synagogue 923. If the burial place of Moses remained unknown to the Jews, then this circumstance reminds us that the great prophet was still only awaiting the resurrection due to the redemptive suffering of the Son of God, that in general everything earthly cannot avoid corruption and remain forever, to be known 924. Finally, sensus moralis [moral meaning] is not a simple moral edification, but an explanation of persons or events in the sense of the moral world order, the interpretation of some particular fact in the sense of the implementation, the embodiment in it of one or another moral idea; If we assume sensus naturalis [natural meaning] everywhere where the physical world in general is depicted under the allegory, then we have sensus moralis [moral meaning] in those cases where the spiritual being of man, his life and way of activity are depicted under the form of some object or phenomenon. Several examples of this meaning can be given, common to both Philo and Ambrose. This is, first of all, the allegorical explanation of paradise in which God settled the primordial man. Paradise, located in Eden, which actually means τρυφή [pleasure] for Philo or voluptas, delectatio for Ambrose, serves as a symbol of the blissful state of a virtuous soul; individual trees of this paradise symbolize individual virtues, and the most important thing among them, the tree of life, means the main virtue on which all others depend; the only difference is that while Philo calls this fundamental virtue (ἡ γενικωτάτη ἀρετή) ἀγαϑότητα [righteousness] or ϑεοσέβεια [reverence for God], Ambrose means by it the hypostatic Wisdom of God (Sapientia), the beginning of all virtue 925. In relation to the main idea, the names of the heavenly springs are also explained. The main river of paradise, which came out of Eden and irrigated the entire paradise (Gen. 2:10), in Philo again means ἡ γενικὴ ἀρετή [the main virtue] flowing from ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐδέμ, τῆς τοῦ ϑεοῦ σοφίας [from Eden, the wisdom of God], and in Ambrose, as above, refers to Sapientia Dei [Wisdom of God], as the Source of gratiae spiritualalis [spiritual grace] 926. Having their origins from this main river, four others serve as an image of the four main virtues 927. The first of these was the Pishon River, which flowed around the entire land of Havilah, which abounded in gold (Gen. 2:11–12); for both writers it means the first of the four main virtues - prudence (φρόνησις, prudentia) 928. The second river Geon flowed around the land of Ethiopia (Gen. 2:13); when explaining this name, Philo and Ambrose disagree in detail: for Philo Geon means the second of the virtues - ἡ ἀνδρία [courage]; if Geon flows around the land of Ethiopia, the name of which actually means ταπείνωσις [baseness], and ταπεινόν is all cowardice, then this means that ἀνδρία is something hostile to ταπεινώσει καὶ δειλίᾳ [baseness and cowardice] 929; in Ambrose, the name Geon means hole (hiatus) and serves as a symbol of moral purity (castitatis): just as all impurities are hidden in the holes of the earth, so castitas destroys all the passions of the body; in this light, the word Ethiopia means something despicable (abjecta) and vile (vilis), or our body, insofar as these qualities characterize the material side of our being, in the moral struggle with which castitas [purity] lies 930. The third river Tigris flowed before Assyria (Gen. 2:14). The symbol that Ambrose applies to Geon is associated by Philo with the Tiger and vice versa: for Philo the Tiger is σωφροσύνη [prudence], for Ambrose it is fortitudo [strength, courage]; although the explanation of the word “Assyria” for both is, in general, the same (for Philo the Assyrians are εὐϑύνοντες [correcting], for Ambrose - dirigentes), but the meaning associated with it is again different: if the Tigris flows against Assyria, then in Philo’s explanation this means that σωφροσύνη [prudence] resists pleasure, with which people in their error hope to correct human weakness 931; and for Ambrose this trait means every person who, captivating, suppressing the vices of his own body, is directed to the highest (dirigens ad superna); Due to such a mysterious significance of Assyria, treacherous Israel was taken captive to it for correction 932. The name of the fourth river Euphrates is accordingly explained by our authors in the sense of abundance (καρποφορία, or foecunditas, abundantia fructuum) in relation to the last of the virtues - justice (δικαιοσύνη and justitia, aequitas). The very word production of Euphrates from τὸ εὐφραίνεσϑαι [to rejoice], indicating the property of justice, preferably before other virtues, to serve as a source of amusement for a person, was probably borrowed by Ambrose also from Philo, who expresses himself regarding δικαιοσύνη [justice], as about εὐφραίνουσα τὴν διάνοιαν [(about what) pleases the mind] 933. Closely related to this is another detail in the explanation of heaven. If paradise with all its accessories under the pen of our writers turned into an extensive allegory of man, then the people who lived in it also acquire for them the significance of images for the phenomena of moral life. Adam is a symbol of the mind (νοῦς), the dominant part in man, and the wife is the faculty of feelings (αἴσϑησις), a necessary but subordinate part of the same nature 934. Animals and birds, which the Lord brought to man to give them names and among which man could not find a suitable helper, are also explained by the method of sensus moralis [moral meaning]. The difference between Ambrose and Philo is only that in the latter both animals and birds together symbolize passions (τὰ πάϑη), wild and unbridled, like animals, and hovering, like birds, over the ability of reflection (πτηνῶν τρόπον ἐπιπετᾶται τῇ διανοίᾳ) 935; and in the first, animals and birds have different meanings, since the first refers to our unreasonable movements and various passions of the body, and the second refers to empty thoughts (inanes cogitationes) 936. Both agree to interpret the image of the tempter-serpent in the sense of sensual pleasure, pleasure (ἡδονή, delectatio), in obedience to whose voice lies the essence of moral decline 937. It should be noted here that, in addition to the explanation of heaven presented now in relation to the sensus moralis [moral meaning], in the history of church literature there was also another explanation, as an example of the sensus naturalis [natural meaning]. It is precisely this understanding that we find in the “Stromata” of Clement, who in the biblical paradise saw the image of the world, and by the trees of paradise he understood all the creations that God grew in this world paradise with His creative power. The tree of life in this case is Divine providence (φρόνησις ϑεία), especially fully revealed in the Divine Logos, Who, having become incarnate, bore abundant fruit 938. This explanation in its pure form is not found in Ambrose, since he preferred Philo’s moral explanation to it. But perhaps the influence of this Clementine concept can be seen in the fact that Ambrose, unlike Philo, identifies the tree of life with Sapientia - the Son of God. Another example of moral meaning is Ambrose's explanation, borrowed from Philo, of God's command to Abraham to leave his land, his father's house, and his relatives (Gen. 12:1). In its inner meaning, this command of God contains a call to break with the entire previous direction of one’s life, to break with attachments to the body, feelings and words. The earth serves here as an image of a body created from earth and the passions sitting in it. By relatives we must understand our ability of external feelings (animae nostrae corporis sensus, αἴσϑησις), which constitutes the second half of our soul, consisting of two parts - rational and unreasonable, and in this sense is called our relative; to leave your relatives with this understanding means to separate the unreasonable movements of the soul from the reasonable ones. Finally, by father's house we must understand the word in which our thought lives. The word is a kind of house of thought: just as the father of a family lives in his house, which he controls with his power, so our mind lives in speeches, which it controls, and its power shines through in our words; God pointed out to Abraham that the righteous should not be attached to words that, while pleasing the ear, are capable of misleading. These are examples of the allegorical meaning of Scripture in the works of Ambrose. Until now we have dealt with its general characteristics. But the question is, how can one reach this or that type of spiritual understanding? How do you know that a given passage of Scripture is not to be understood literally, but allegorically? To this we must first of all note that allegorical exegesis, for all its apparent arbitrariness and groundlessness, was an art that was subject to rather complex and varied rules. Philo in this sense speaks of the canons of allegory (κανόνες τῆς ἀλληγορίας) 939, the laws of allegory (νόμοι τῆς ἀλληγορίας) 940 . Following the example of classical writers, he points out a fairly extensive range of particular techniques related to this. Many of them went to Ambrose. a) one of the rules applied by Philo, logically connected with the concept of verbal inspiration, in all those cases where in Scripture there are expressions that are apparently superfluous for a literal understanding, in these superfluous expressions one must see an indication of the highest meaning. This rule, learned by Philo himself from midrash 941, is formulated by him in the following statement: the law of allegory does not allow a single superfluous word in Scripture (περιττὸν ὄνομα οὐδὲν τίϑησιν) 942. Undoubtedly, Ambrose knew this rule. Explaining the words of God to Abraham that we have already discussed (Gen. 12:1), he draws attention to the expressions: from your kindred and from your father’s house. If these words, he notes, had only a literal meaning, then it would be enough to say simply: get out of your land, because, leaving his land, a person at the same time leaves both his relatives and his father’s house; Wanting to indicate that what is meant here is the internal mood, Scripture lists the objects of affection separately, so that somehow by chance either his words do not seem unreasonable, or through a false understanding they do not somehow distort the heavenly commandments 943. b) For the meaning, the order of the words cannot be indifferent, especially when listing names: if the same names in different places of Scripture are listed in different orders, then it should be assumed that in these different orders the Scripture expresses different thoughts. Ambrose draws attention, for example, to various listings of the sons of Noah. When it comes to their birth, they are listed in this order: Shem, Ham and Japheth (Gen. 6:10), and when talking about their descendants, Japheth is called first, Ham second, and third, and finally Shem (Gen. 10:2, 6:21). This is no accident if you look at it from the point of view of the sensus moralis [moral sense]. The sons of Noah serve as representatives of good, evil and morally indifferent (quae nomina significant bonum, malum et indifferens) 944, as in Philo Σὴμ ἐπώνυμός ἐστιν ἀγαϑοῦ [Shem is the eponym of good], Ham ἠρεμούσης κακίας ἐστὶν ὄνομα [is a name for hidden evil], Japheth – ὁ καὶ τὰ σώματος καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς πλεονεκτήματα ἀγαϑὰ ἡγούμενος [considering bodily goods and external advantages (the only good)] 945. When Shem is mentioned in the first place, and Japheth in the last, this means that bonum naturae [natural goodness] is inherent in everything and is not destroyed either by the temptations of evil, which immediately follows it in the enumeration, or by moral indifference. In addition, evil, contained in the middle between two other qualities, is, as it were, compressed from two different sides and does not have the opportunity to spread 946. A completely different meaning is hidden in the second order of listing the sons of Noah. In the history of moral development, evil thoughts of the mind appear only later; as if imprisoned within, they are initially gestated in the womb of the mind. When they finally break out, then, in order to prevent them from spreading widely, righteous providence appears, changing its previous place (in the case discussed above) and generally constantly appearing with its help where there is a great need for it 947. c) In the same way, the difference in individual expressions used by Scripture to denote the same phenomenon in different places is also essential - a rule already known to Midrash 948. These are synonymous expressions for which Philo sets out a rule: Moses usually used the most apt and most expressive names (ὀνόμασιν εὐϑυβολωτάτοις καὶ ἐμφαντικωτάτοις εἴωϑε χρῆσϑαι) 949 . Following Philo, Ambrose very often used this rule for his own exegetical purposes, and, moreover, even in relation to those very passages of the Bible to which Philo applied it. The latter points out that Scripture uses the word γεωργός [farmer] when talking about the cultivation of the land by Noah (Gen.9:20), and uses the expression ἐργάτης τῆς γῆς [cultivator of the land] when talking about the cultivation of the land by Cain (Gen.4:12) 950, indicating by this the completely different moral qualities of both: if Cain is called ἐργάτης, then this indicates his lower dignity, because the word ἐργάτης, by the way, means such a hired farmer who cares most about payment for his labor and, moreover, working as a mercenary, does not put much care into the good cultivation of the land 951. Similarly, Ambrose distinguishes operatorem terrae [cultivator of the land] and agricolam [farmer]: the first - servile [slave] - is the occupation of a mercenary (mercenarii), the second - liberum [free] - the landlord (patrisfamilias); the first seeks reward most of all (mercedem quaerit e terra), and the second - to make his field more fruitful, capit gratiam disciplinae; one is concerned mainly with cultivating his own body, while the other strives to acquire moral qualities 952. Philo distinguishes between the expressions πονεῖν [to work] and φυλάττειν [to protect] and understands the first in relation to a person who is still morally imperfect, but still striving through the efforts of his own will to acquire perfection, and applies the second to the already perfect, insofar as the latter tries most of all to preserve what he previously acquired through cares and labors 953. In this very sense, Ambrose distinguishes between laborare [to work] and vigilare [to stay awake] and applies the first to those people who, through self-activity, are still only creating their perfection (qui in operis sunt aedificationisque processu), and the second to those who protect their perfection (qui jam custodiam perfecti operis receperunt) 954. d) To determine the meaning of Scripture, no less important are the features of the grammatical forms used in each given case: the same noun or verb means something else in the plural and something else in the singular. Philo uses this rule when he draws attention to the fact that God, allowing Adam to eat fruit from the trees of paradise, says: “Eat” (Gen. 2:16), and, forbidding the use of fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, said: “Do not eat from it” (Gen. 2:17). This is because everything good (τὸ ἀγαϑόν) is very rare (τὸ σπάνιον), and evil (τὸ δὲ κακὸν), on the contrary, spreads very abundantly; the wise and faithful exist only in isolated units, and the foolish in countless numbers, and therefore God commands one to feed on virtues, and commands many to abstain from evil deeds. In addition, virtue is a matter of the mind alone (τοῦ λογισμοῦ), while vice affects the mind, feelings, and body 955. Ambrose uses this rule when explaining the same biblical words, but in the details of the explanation he differs somewhat from Philo. If in one case God says singulariter [using the singular], and in another - pluraliter [plural], then this means that the good (bonum) is harmonious and united (consonans et adhaerens), and the shameful (turpe) is disharmonious, disorderly and separate (dissonans, incompositum atque discretum est); good promotes connection, and evil separates. Then, when God said to Adam: “Eat” from every tree of paradise, He knew that the husband would have a desire to keep His commandment, and when forbidding, he said: “Do not eat,” foreseeing the woman’s treachery 956. f) Numbers themselves have a deep inner meaning. In history, allegory has often been associated with elaborate symbolism of numbers. Having initially received its treatment in the Pythagorean school 957, this symbolism was then cultivated by the Stoics for the purpose of their allegorical explanation of Homer and mythology 958. Writers of the Alexandrian school also use it very widely. In the writings of Ambrose we find detailed explanations of the following numbers: two, four, seven, eight, ten, fifteen, forty and partly three hundred and eighteen. Some of them resemble Philo's explanations. The number two in Philo’s symbolism serves as an example of sensory nature, divided and dissected into its component parts 959. Ambrose two also has numerus divisus [divisible number] 960. The number four for Philo acquires significance as the number of perfection (ἀριϑμὸς τέλειος), since it serves as the source of ten, an even more perfect, all-perfect number (δεκάδος τῆς παντελείας): what ten is in its essence (ἐντελεχεία), then four represents potentially (δυνάμει); this is because ten is made up of all the numbers from one to four added together, with the number four here being the very last and decisive 961 . And in Ambrose, tetras [quaternary] is the most decent of all other numbers (omnibus numeris apta sit) and together the root and base of ten (radix quaedam decimae ac fundamentum). To do this, you need to add up all the numbers from one to four inclusive: add two to one and get three; this sum of three and the next number three after two will give six, and six combined with four forms ten 962. Due to its perfection, the number four is important in the structure of the world: accordingly, with it there are four world elements, from which the whole is created, the four seasons 963. In Ambrose, this number is also embodied in religious subjects and church-historical events: the complete and perfect Gospel is divided into four separate books; there are four mystical animals; the universe consists of four parts, from which are collected the sons of the Church, who came from the east and west, north and south 964. The number seven was the subject of Philo's special sympathies. This number is sacred, occupying a completely exclusive position in the series of other numbers within the ten: the remaining numbers either give birth to a new number, but do not themselves come from another, or they themselves come from another, but do not produce a new one, or, finally, together they both come from and give birth: one, for example, gives rise to all the other numbers of the ten, but itself does not come from any of them; eight consists of two fours, but does not serve as the source of another number in ten; four together comes from two taken twice, and, being multiplied by two, gives eight. Only one septenary (ἑβδομάς) has neither one nor the other, nor the third property. Therefore, some philosophers likened her to Victory, who had no mother and was a virgin, who came out of the head of Zeus 965. Ambrose adopted exactly the same view of the nature of the septenary; even the word hebdomas [seven] itself is used very often by him. Seven is a pure and sacred number (mundus et sacer septimus numerus); it itself is not mixed with anything and does not come from anything else; and, as something that does not give birth to anything, it is rightly called a virgin (virgo); and, as completely unrelated to the maternal birth and intercourse of a woman, although it bears a female name (hebdomas), it has the grace of male sanctification (virilis habet sanctificationis gratiam) 966. As a result, the septenary acquires in the eyes of Ambrose the same exceptional significance in the system of the world order that Philo attributes to it. Following the example of the latter, Ambrose points to the seven planets that illuminate the world, to the constellation Ursa (ἄρκτος, septentrio), which consists of seven stars 967. In particular, the septenary shines in man himself. His head has seven members: two eyes, two ears, two nostrils and a mouth; even abnormalities in a person, if only they are associated with the seventh month, do not cause harm: a human fetus miscarried in the seventh month turns out to be capable of further life, while an eight-month miscarriage is not viable 968. Then, the further life of a person, according to the theory of some (Hippocrates), is decomposed into seven ages: childhood (παιδίον and infantia), adolescence (παῖς and pueritia), the first period of youth (μειράκιον and adolescentia), the second period of adolescence (νεανίσκος and juventus), maturity (ἀνήρ and virilis aetas, vir), old age (πρεσβύτης and aevi maturitas, veteranus) and, finally, old age (γέρων and senectus, senex). Others, like Solon, although they recognize ten ages in human life, but define the duration of each age at seven years: the first continues until the appearance of teeth, the second - until the ability to erupt a fertilizing seed (σπέρμα γόνιμον) and to bear children (ad annos pubertatis procedit et genitalia tentamenta), the third - until the appearance of the first beard fuzz (γενείων αὔξησις and usque ad barbae lanuginem), the fourth - until the full discovery of strength (πρὸς ἰσχὺν ἐπίδοσις and ad perfectae virtutis processum), the fifth - maturity, capable of marriage life throughout its entire seven-year period, the sixth is characterized by prudence (συνέσεως ἀκμή and ad prudentiae processum habili et ad agendum strenuae), the seventh - by the growth of reason and speech and their complete improvement (νοῦ καὶ λόγου ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τελείωσις) or maturity of spiritual life, flourishing feeling and pleasant speech (aevi maturum, et sensu vigentem, et sermonem non insuavis alloquii gratia praeditum), the ninth is distinguished by the flourishing of moral qualities - softness and meekness of passions (ἐπιείκεια καὶ πρᾳότης τῶν παϑῶν), and in Ambrose it is somewhat different - it still retains some remnants of strength (reliquias adhuc habet aliquas virium), is distinguished by the flexibility of language and wisdom (lingua ac sapientia mollior); tenth – last age 969. Further, both from the outside and from the inside, the human body is structured according to the eudomad; it has seven internal parts: stomach, heart, lung, spleen, liver and two kidneys, as well as seven external members: head, chest, belly, two arms and two legs 970. Finally, even the nature of the human soul is organized according to it, since the latter in its irrational part has seven abilities: five external sense organs, a vocal organ and the ability to fertilize 971. However, in parallel with this Philonian interpretation, Ambrose gives another explanation of the number seven, completely Christian, adaptable to new religious concepts. It serves as a symbol of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit 972, a symbol of the entire Old Testament in general, which is primarily called eudomada 973. The symbolism of the number eight in Ambrose is predominantly of the New Testament interpretation. If the eudomada symbolizes the Old Testament, then the octave, or number eight, signifies the New Testament; therefore, the Old Testament circumcision, which prefigured the sacrament of the New Testament, is prescribed by law to be performed on the eighth day after the birth of a baby 974. Eight are higher and more complete than seven, by how much the New Testament is higher and more complete than the Old Testament: in the Gospel the fullness (plenitudo) of salvation was given, while in the law there was only half-perfection (semiperfectio) 975. Eudomad created the man of this world, and the octave made him above the world; in the eudomad we lived for ourselves, and in the octave we live for Christ 976. The explanation of the number fifteen is of the same nature. Just as its components seven and eight each designate the Old and New Testaments separately, so fifteen serves as a symbol of the Church: in the Old Testament the Jewish people were called to salvation, in the New - the pagans; and fifteen signifies the Church to which both the first and the second are called 977 . The number forty, within which the global flood continued, serves as a symbol of the destruction of created things (delendae creaturae), just as the number seven appears to be a symbol of the establishment of peace. For this reason, the Old Testament law was given to Moses on the fortieth day of his stay at Sinai, so that the prescriptions for the remission of sins (declinandorum peccatorum praecepta) were given on the same day on which satisfaction for guilt was given by punishment, and so that we learned that at the same time in life praise should be acquired by correction (debeat ex correctione laus comparari), in which guilt is remitted. At the same time, the original meaning of the number forty changes: from the last day of punishment, as it was in the days of the Flood, now, especially due to the Resurrection of Christ, it becomes the first day of life and thus the previous number of death turns into the number of the perfection of the world and the liberation of the human race 978. As for, finally, the number three hundred and eighteen, Ambrose knows the explanation put forward by the author of the Epistle of Barnabas, which was then reproduced by Clement of Alexandria 979 and has now become widespread, in the sense of the symbol of the Cross of Jesus: Abraham with his 318 slaves who defeated their enemies (Gen. 14:14), serves as an image of victory in cruce Christi et in Jesu nomine [by the power of the Cross Christ and the name of Jesus] 980 . But at the same time, the number 318 often takes on a mystical meaning for him due to its mere connection with the number of victorious slaves of Abraham, without any relation to the Cross and the name of Jesus. If the Council of Nicaea consisted of three hundred and eighteen fathers, then this was the number of victors who triumphed over the Arian wickedness 981. f) In the same way as numbers, allegorical writers used the names of various objects, plants, animals. Ambrose did the same. We have already seen that, depending on Philo, he sees symbols of the four main virtues in the trees and rivers of paradise. The first of these rivers - Pishon - flowed through a land abounding in gold and precious stones (Gen. 2:12), which are also explained by Philo in terms of the first of the virtues - φρόνησις [prudence]: gold, as the most noble metal, relates to φρόνησις itself, as the most valuable of the virtues (ἡ δοκιμωτάτη ἀρετή), and two precious stones, the carbuncle (ἄνϑραξ) and the prasine stone (πράσινος) mean two particular properties of φρονήσεως [discretion]: the first - a person who has prudence (ὁ φρόνιμος), and the second - the one who uses it in practice (ὁ φρονῶν) 982. Ambrose probably has this explanation of Philo in mind, if by gold he means not the gold from which coins are made, not corruptible and earthly gold (non monetale quod corruptibile ac terrenum est), but the wise men (pro inventis prudentibus frequenter accipimus); one of the stones for him means prudentiam [prudence, prudence] in itself, as it exists in man (in quo quidam animae nostrae vivit igniculus), and the other, lapis prasinus, a green stone, depicts something green, blooming and living (viride quiddam atque vitale coloris sui specie ostentare videtur), obviously the same as φρονῶν Philo 983. Ambrose's explanation of biblical wells should also be included in this category of allegorical devices: by the well of Abraham (Gen. 26:15) he means the height of deep teaching (profundae altitudo doctrinae) 984, which also recalls Philo, for whom the well was a symbol of knowledge (σύμβολον εἶναι τὸ φρέαρ ἐπιστήμης) 985 . The well dug by Isaac and unjustly contested by the shepherds of Gerar (Gen. 26:20) signifies injustice (injustitia); another well of Isaac, which also served as a subject of contention, is called enmity (inimicitia); the third well of Isaac, never the subject of controversy (Gen. 26:22), is a symbol of joy (laetitudo), and at the same time represents de naturalibus disciplinam [natural teaching]; finally, the last well of Isaac, the well of the oath (juramenti), dug by him at the place where God appeared to him (Gen. 26:24–25), doctrina jam mystica est [is already a mystical teaching] 986. Apparently, the details of this symbolism belong to Ambrose himself, but the general provisions were probably still borrowed from Philo, who also explains all the listed wells in the sense of untruth (ἀδικία), enmity (ἔχϑρα), space, as a reason for the absence of hostility (εὐρυχωρία) and oath (ὅρκος) 987 . We also encounter animal symbolism in Ambrose. Here we must include, first of all, the idea that we have already mentioned about the serpent as a symbol of pleasures and passions in general, and in Philo the chest and belly (στέρνον and γαστήρ) of the serpent symbolize separate types of passions: anger (ϑυμικόν), as far as the womb was considered his seat, and lust in a broad sense (ἐπιϑυμητικόν), which was localized near the womb 988; We see this very symbolism in the words of Ambrose that by the belly and breast of the serpent are meant people who live for the belly and throat (qui ventri et gulae vivunt), for whom the belly serves as a god, whose glory is in shame, who think about earthly things (Phil. 3:19) and, burdened with food, bow down to the earth 989; but if Ambrose, in addition, sees in the serpent the image of the devil (in serpentis autem figura diabolus est) 990, then he already stands on the biblical and church point of view. In the book “De Cain et Abel” [“On Cain and Abel”], the sheep are understood as the feelings and pleasures of the body (sensus corporis ac voluptates), and the shepherd of the sheep is a person capable of dominating both, defeating anger, reconciling the constantly warring laws of the flesh and mind; therefore, Moses the lawgiver himself was a shepherd of Jethro's sheep 991. This also reminds us of Philo, since the latter sees in the entire animal world the symbols of the creations of the irrational part of the soul (τῶν τοῦ ἀλόγου γεννημάτων) 992. g) As a consistent representative of the allegorical method, Ambrose uses to a large extent the symbolism of proper names, which was a favorite technique of all allegorical writers in general and examples of which we have already noted in some Western writers of earlier times. At the same time, it is remarkable that the symbolism of Ambrose in many ways reminds us of the symbolism of Philo, but does not resemble the symbolism of the work “De montibus” [“On the Mountains”] and Hilary. For example, the name Abel in Ambrose, as in Philo, means a person who attributes everything to God (ἀναφέρων ἐπὶ ϑεὸν πάντα and qui omnia referret ad Deum) 993, Abram is equivalent to the concept of “arrogant father” (πατὴρ μετέωρος and pater vanus), Abraham is the chosen father (πατὴρ ἐκλεκτός and pater electus) 994, Capa is my dominion (ἀρχὴ μοῦ and potestas mea, vel principatus meus), and Sarah is dominant (ἄρχουσα, or quae regat) 995; Isaac - laughter (γέλως and risus) 996, Rebecca - patience (ὑπομονή and patientia) 997, and for Clement of Alexandria - the glory of God (Θεοῦ δόξα) and incorruptibility (ἀφϑαρσία) 998 - a clear sign that Ambrose became acquainted with Philo not only through the writings of Clement; Ephraim - fertility (καρποφορία and fecunditas fidei) 999, and in Hilary, as we have already seen, assumptio 1000. h) Finally, the last technique of Ambrose’s exegesis is the symbolism of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet, which was also not new in Christian literature, and we have already noted above that, in all likelihood, Ambrose borrowed this symbolism from Origen. The first letter aleph signifies doctrine (doctrina), because the section of Psalm 118 for which it serves as the title is full of doctrine 1001; bet – confusion (confusio) – an indirect indication of the need to correct one’s own life, because whoever corrects his life will avoid confusion 1002; gimel - reward (retributio) 1003, since it is common for every immaculate conscience to ask for a reward from the One Whom it serves 1004; dalet - fear (timor) or birth (nativitas), which, however, is the same thing, because here we mean earthly or bodily birth, and fear is born from everything bodily and material 1005; ge – is (est) or I live (vivo): whoever exists (est) lives, and whoever lives exists 1006; vav – he is the one, and not another (ille est, et non alius) 1007; zain - govern yourself (due te) or a call to govern yourself and direct your life to rest in the Divine word 1008; het - reverent awe (pavor), characteristic of saints 1009; tet - exception (exclusio): just as a person expelled from home is deprived of the right to enjoy hospitality, so one who is excluded from the Kingdom of God is also deprived of the benefits of this kingdom 1010; iod - confession (confessio) or ruin (desolatio) - again meanings that are not mutually exclusive, since the ruined are more capable of confession 1011; kaf - bent (curvati sunt), and such are generally called all those bending towards the earth, having an addiction to it 1012; lamed – heart (cor) or serve (servo), which indicates the need to intelligently (prudenter) understand the contents of the department and carefully carry out its instructions 1013; mem–viscera (viscera) 1014; nun - the only one (unicus) or their pastures (pascua eorum) - expressions relating to the Only Begotten Son of the Father - Jesus Christ 1015; samekh - listen (audi) and firmament (firmamentum) - a call to listening, necessary for everyone and accessible to everyone by the very right of nature 1016; ain – eye (oculus) or source (fons) 1017; fe- sinned (erravi) or opened his mouth (os aperui) 1018; tsade - consolation (consolatio), because after tears of repentance consolation should follow 1019; kof - conclusion (conclusio) or look (aspice), since the one who faces the conclusion must be very careful 1020; resh – head (caput) or primacy (primatus), because the head controls all members and senses 1021; shin - over the wound (super vulnus), which expresses a very simple idea that in order to avoid spiritual death you need to apply appropriate medicines and bandages to your spiritual wounds 1022; finally, the last letter of the alphabet - tav means: sinned (erravit) or committed, finished (consummavit), which can also easily be reconciled with one another, because the one about whom it is said only in the past form has already stopped sinning and corrected his error 1023. In order to put an end to the Old Testament exegesis of St. Ambrose, let's take a look at his very interesting explanation of the history of the Old Testament patriarchs. In his works, as in the works of Philo, the Old Testament patriarchs and their history are transformed into a history of moral development and symbols of moral life. It is based on the idea adopted by Philo from classical philosophy (Aristotle and Diogenes Laertius) 1024 that virtue can be acquired in three ways: 1) through learning (ἐκ διδασκαλίας), 2) through exercise (ἐξ ἀσκήσεως) and, finally, 3) due to a special, innate disposition (ἐκ φύσεως). Specific examples of all three possibilities are given in the history of the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, with Abraham being the representative of διδασκαλίας [learning], Jacob of ἀσκήσεως [exercise], and Isaac of φύσεως [natural disposition] 1025. From this point of view, the story of Abraham, in the almost consistent portrayal of our writers, receives such a unique light. Living initially in Chaldea, famous for its astronomy, Abraham also shared all the Chaldean errors; together with the Chaldeans, he studied the created world, looked for God, who stands above the world, among the works of this world, and therefore the true knowledge of God, which he could not learn anywhere, was completely inaccessible to him 1026. Further, Philo presents the matter in such a way that Abraham, having moved to Harran, the image of our external senses (αἱ τῶν ἡμετέρων αἰσϑήσεων χῶραι), rose to the next stage of development and, by observing the activity of his own senses, came to the conclusion about the existence of a Supreme Being separate from the world Creatures: just as external senses act only thanks to a mind existing separately from them, so the life of the world presupposes the existence of its king 1027; finally, God Himself, coming to meet every soul seeking Him, revealed Himself to Abraham 1028. Ambrose conveys this story more simply: Abraham began to see God only when, having left Chaldea, he moved to Canaan, that is, he accepted a new and true religion, intended by God for every humble person, which is what Canaan actually means 1029. Isaac achieved the same goal not through gradual learning, but possessing virtue and knowledge of God already by virtue of his descent from Abraham. Philo compares him to the firstborn of animals, which, as perfect, the law prescribed to be sacrificed; therefore, God ordered Isaac to be sacrificed as μηδενὸς πάϑους φϑοροποιοῦ μεμοιραμσνον, i.e., as alien to any corrupting passion 1030. By virtue of his simple, alien to any vicious admixture and pure nature (φύσεως ἁπλῆς καὶ ἀμιγοῦς καὶ ἀκράτου), without needing either exercise or instruction, he received τὸ καλόν from heaven, accepted by him, so to speak, due to its immediate evidence and persuasiveness (αὐτομαϑὲς καὶ αὐτοδίδακτον) 1031. The same elevated view of the patriarch Isaac is also maintained by Ambrose, who, in the same context of speech as Philo, considers him as an example of pure firstborns; untouched by a single movement of human passion (nullius motu passionis inflexus humanae), he was offered by his father to God as a pure sacrifice, free from fear and free from bodily lust 1032. In the eyes of Ambrose, Isaac is par excellence the righteous man, who embraced the irreprehensibilem viam inoffenso mentis vestigio [(i.e., walked) easily the impeccable path of the mind], which cum virtutibus [with the virtues] had familiare consortium [close fellowship] 1033. Finally, the third of the patriarchs, Jacob, achieves virtue through independent work on himself and struggle with himself. In this sense, Philo interprets the circumstance from the life of Jacob that at one time he was a shepherd of Laban’s flocks, since animals generally mean the irrational movements of the soul 1034. In explaining this detail, St. Ambrose fully agrees with him 1035 1. In the same sense, in addition, he calls Jacob full of exercise (plenus exercitationis) 1036, an exercised man (vir exercitatus), explaining that exercise alone without the gifts of nature cannot bring perfection and that the gifts of nature can be lost in the absence of exercise 1037. 2. Turning to New Testament Exegesis As far as we know, the techniques of pneumatic exegesis were applied to the New Testament relatively later than to the Old. The first writer to do this was Irenaeus of Lyons, who used the allegorical method, however, only occasionally, mainly when analyzing some New Testament texts as evidence of the truth of the resurrection of the dead against the Gnostics: in the beatitude about the meek inheriting the earth (Matthew 5:5) under the earth, of course, is the flesh created from the earth, which the righteous inherit after the resurrection 1038; Lazarus, raised from the dead and emerging from the cave, “wrapped hand and foot in burial shrouds,” also appears before us “as a symbol of a man bound by sins” 1039. The example of Irenaeus was occasionally followed by some other Western writers. St. Cyprian explains the request of the Lord's prayer for the fulfillment of God's will on earth and in heaven in the sense of the fulfillment of the will of the Lord in our bodily and spiritual natures 1040. The author of the book “De montibus” [“On the Mountains”] in the thieves crucified with Christ sees the image (figuram) of two peoples: the Jews who slandered the Lord, and the pagans who confessed His Divinity 1041. Still, such cases remained an exception in the West for a long time, without acquiring the significance of a general rule. Literal exegesis of the New Testament remained common and widespread. Tertullian speaks out especially energetically in his defense. Responding to the objection that Christ always spoke in parables, so that His words must be understood allegorically, he recalls that the Savior spoke in kind only sometimes, mostly in conversations with Jews, less often in conversations with disciples, and each time he accompanied his parables with explanations; everything else must be understood in the sense in which it is said 1042. New Testament exegesis receives a significantly different imprint from Hilary, who applied the techniques of allegory to the Gospel on a very large scale. For this he owes most probably to Origen. We can judge Hilary's New Testament exegesis primarily on the basis of his commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. Favorable ground for the use of pneumatology was his basic Christological point of view, according to which the Word, revealed in Christ, acted invisibly in all even the smallest circumstances of the Savior’s life, so that in each individual action of His, in each individual fact of His life, an invisible Actor should be assumed behind the external side: in a visible matter, says Hilary, explaining the fact of the miraculous feeding with five loaves, an invisible force acted, and the Lord of heaven secrets (arcanorum coelestium Dominus) revealed some secret in any of his affairs. The power of the One who acted surpasses all nature, and its goals surpass any ability to understand the given fact, so that for us there remains only one surprise at the power manifested in it 1043. On this basis, Hilary distinguishes in the Gospel, in addition to the literal meaning, a higher meaning (sensus superior) 1044. The nature of the sensus superioris [higher meaning] is sufficiently clarified by such names attached to it as the order of spiritual understanding (spiritalis intelligentiae ordo), the typical meaning (typica ratio) 1045. Hilary gives very noticeable preference to the latter over the former: he generally does very little to clarify the literal meaning; the literal text of the Gospel does not seem to present any difficulties for him, or at least the latter carefully circumvent it. But he very consistently pursues the point of view of the highest meaning, applies it to almost all facts and circumstances, so that under his pen the gospel story turns into a series of allegories, as additions to history. For example, by a city standing at the top of a mountain (Matthew 5:14), he understands the body of Jesus Christ: just as a city consists of many different inhabitants, so in the flesh of Christ, identical in nature with our bodies, is contained, as it were, all of humanity 1046. By dogs and pigs, which are spoken of in the Gospel (Matthew 7:6), Hilary means pagans and heretics, of whom the former, like dogs, bark ferociously against God, and the latter, like two-hoofed but not ruminant pigs, are not capable of internally assimilating the truths of the knowledge of God 1047. Analyzing the gospel narrative about the healing of the demon-possessed in the country of Gergesin, he means by the city that did not accept Christ into its borders (Matt. 8:34), the Jewish people, who, hearing about the works of Christ, did not accept Him, by two demon-possessed people who lived outside the city, pagans who lived outside the law and the prophets, and by the city that accepted Christ (Matt. 9:1), the people of believers 1048. As for St. Ambrose, then, in our opinion, in the field of New Testament exegesis he occupies a middle place between Tertullian and Hilary. Like the first, he pays great attention to the study of the literal meaning of the Gospel text and does not lose sight of it even when presenting the most distant allegories. But, on the other hand, like Hilary, he also recognizes the importance of the internal meaning, which is designated either as altior ratio 1049 or as spiritualis intellectus 1050; at the same time St. Avmrosius still admits that this spiritualis intellectus can be discovered in almost all Gospel passages 1051. The basis for the application of spiritual meaning in the Gospel is somewhat different for Ambrose than for Hilary. Apparently, he proceeds from an Origenistic view of the historical life of the Church as a separate, albeit important moment in the historical development of mankind. In Origen, the basis of this view is the Platonic idea, according to which only a pure spirit, freed from any external shell, can contemplate the truth as it is, while the bodily shell of earthly life creates many obstacles for it in this matter; as long as a person is connected to this shell, the truth in its pure form is inaccessible to him. Therefore, the righteous, while they live in this world, see the truth only, as it were, in a mirror and in fortune telling (per speculum et in aenigmate) 1052; Our present life, in comparison with the truth, is nothing more than a shadow (umbra), and only after the fullness of times has come will we be able to possess res ipsas coelestes [the heavenly things themselves] 1053. It is precisely this basis for the application of allegory to the Gospel that St. Ambrose. Since in real life the body serves the spirit, the spiritual (spiritalia) here can only be perceived in a mirror and in fortune telling (per speculum et in aenigmate), and only at the end of the world do we recognize the truth face to face (facie ad faciem). Hence, umbra Judaeis carnalibus, imago nobis, veritas resurrecturis [shadow for the fleshly Jews, image for us, truth for those who will rise] or umbra in Lege, imago in Evangelio [shadow in the law, image in the Gospel] and veritas in judicio [truth in judgment] 1054. Since the Gospel, after all, is an imago [image], the task arises for the exegete to interpret its images in one way or another. But just as in his explanation of the Old Testament Ambrose distinguished three separate types of spiritual understanding, so in the Gospel he distinguishes between sensus naturalis, sensus moralis and sensus rationalis [natural meaning, moral meaning and speculative meaning] (the same as mysticus [mystical]). Then, just as with respect to the Old Testament he recognized that each of his books conceals in itself primarily one of the three types of spiritual meaning, so with respect to the New Testament he asserts that in the Gospel of John there is sapientia naturalis [natural wisdom], in the Gospel of Matthew - moralis [moral], in Mark - rationabilis [speculative] and in Luke - historia, sensus historicus [history, historical meaning]. But while in the Old Testament the sensus naturalis [natural sense] has the task of revealing the secrets of all nature in general (naturae), in the New Testament it reveals the life of the Divine nature alone: ​​The Gospel of John is considered an example of the sensus naturalis [natural sense] because it speaks of God, Who naturaliter [by nature] is the Father of His Son, etc. Sensus moralis [moral meaning] retains its previous meaning: the Apostle Matthew, depicting the human life of the Savior, edidit nobis praecepta vivendi [gave us the commandments of life]; rationabilis [speculative], obviously, concerns the means of a religious and godly life: the Apostle Mark, outlining the story of John the Baptist, taught us that through humility, abstinence and faith we must placere Deo [to please God]; finally, the Apostle Luke can be called a historian in the sense that he revealed to us many miracles, the works of God 1055. Thanks to the fact that St. Ambrose pays very great attention to the literal meaning, his commentary is much higher than that of Hilary. He knows how to take into account the difficulties of the text, although he does not always provide a sufficient explanation for them. He knows that Matthew traces the genealogy of Christ from Abraham to Joseph, and Luke traces the genealogy of Christ from Joseph to Adam 1056. While outlining the genealogy of Joseph, the evangelist at the same time sets out the genealogy of Mary, because, according to the law, the Virgin Mary had to belong to the same tribe to which Joseph belonged 1057. If Mary is called a relative of Elizabeth, this is because all Jews are relatives among themselves, and also because they both came from the tribe of Judah 1058. The visible disagreements between the evangelists also do not escape Ambrose’s attention: Matthew counts 42 generations from Abraham, and Luke – 50 and leads them through other persons. This is explained by the fact that Matthew leads the genealogy through Solomon, and Luke through Nathan, and thus the first depicts the royal, and the second the priestly genealogy of Christ; hence Matthew has more ancestors from Abraham to Christ than Luke 1059. When reconciling geneological differences, Ambrose also uses the law of coexistence, explaining to them, for example, the fact that Matthew calls Jacob, the father of Joseph, the son of Matthan, and Luke considers Joseph, to whom Mary was betrothed, the son of Elijah, and Elijah the son of Melchia; it should be explained this way: Matthan gave birth to Jacob, who died without leaving children; after his death, Melchia took his wife and gave birth to Elijah; then, when Eli, having married, also died without leaving any offspring, Jacob took his wife, from whom Joseph was born 1060. It is not for nothing that Matthew divides the genealogy of Christ into periods: from Abraham to David, from David to the Babylonian captivity and from the latter to Christ: from Abraham to David (excluding the times of Saul), the Jewish people lived without kings - the righteous kingdom began from David; under the kings, the Jewish people remained intact until the Babylonian captivity; after the Babylonian captivity, his glory began to decline. As for the fifty generations that the Apostle Luke counts from Abraham, the mystical number is also preserved here: both 10 and 7 are mystical numbers and, repeated each three times, they denote the sacrament, and Pentecost, which Luke adheres to, and Pentecost, the grace of which Matthew followed, sufficiently and highly express the mystical number 1061. One should not be tempted by the fact that Matthew included in the genealogy of Christ such women as Tamar and Ruth, and passed over Sarah, Rachel and Rebekah in silence. As for Tamar, she was not a harlot, but always remained a righteous woman, because she did not seek the satisfaction of her own lust, but offspring, since before the coming of Christ the grace of virginity and widowhood had not yet adorned man; in this regard, Tamar, according to Judah himself, was superior to him (Gen. 38:26) 1062. Ruth, who, being a foreigner, married a Jew, is included in the genealogy because of the kinship of the mood, and not the body (propter cognationem mentis electa, non corporis) 1063. Internal meaning is also sought for almost every historical fact. Ambrose does not make an exception even for such facts of primary importance for a Christian as the birth of the Savior, which, on the one hand, is understood literally, and on the other, spiritually, in the sense of birth in the hearts of believers 1064. The star that showed the way to the Magi meant Christ, who became for us a guiding star secundum incarnationis mysterium [according to the mystery of the incarnation] 1065. If the Magi came one way and returned another, it was because they saw Christ, whom they did not know before; there are two roads, one of which leads to death, and the other leads to the kingdom of 1066. On the night of the Nativity of Christ, the Bethlehem shepherds were awake; this circumstance marked the beginning of the Church, since with the coming of Christ to earth, His spiritual sheep received shepherds who must watch and protect their flock from spiritual beasts prowling in the darkness of the world 1067. In the fact of the apostles plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath (Luke 6:1) there is also non mediocre mysterium est [there is a considerable mystery]: the field is the whole world, the harvest is the countless number of saints, the ears are the fruits of the Church 1068. Even the fact that Christ was buried not by the apostles, but by Joseph and Nicodemus, is not without internal meaning: the name Joseph means “righteous” (justus) and constant (constans), and Nicodemus means the one in whom there was no guile (in quo dolus non erat); and these qualities characterized the burial of Christ, which had no lies and untruths (quae fraudem iniquitatemque non habet) 1069. Despite the great similarity in method with Hilary, Ambrose appears to be independent of him. This can be seen from a comparison of the explanations of both authors of the same passages in the Gospel. Take, for example, Matthew 10:29: “Are not two little birds sold for an assar? And not one of them will fall to the ground without the will of your Father.” According to Ambrose's interpretation, these two birds mean body and soul, because the body, in obedience to the law of God, by the purity of its feelings passes into the nature of the soul and on spiritual wings (alis spiritualibus) rises to heaven; but pleasure burdens the soul with food of evil and tilts it towards the flesh. The will, without which these birds do not fall to the ground, is Divine knowledge (Dei cognitio est), for by the will of God no one falls. In support of comparing the soul to a bird, Ambrose refers to Ps.123:7, Ps.10:2 and Ps.101:8 1070. Then, if these birds are sold for a cheap coin, then this sale must be understood as slavery to the devil, from which Christ redeemed us at a dear price 1071. Ilarius gives a slightly different explanation. Birds are corpus et anima [body and soul], which are sold to sin, but Christ is the Redeemer of soul and body 1072. The center of gravity of the explanation lies on the expression “none.” Body and soul together form a unity, which is capable of both rising in height and falling down: they rise together in height if, under the influence of the dominant soul, the weight of earthly matter is destroyed and our flesh is to some extent transformed into a spiritual body; on the contrary, they fall together when, under the influence of many sins, the soul coarsens to the level of the body 1073. There are no references to the Book of Psalms in Hilary. Both of them, therefore, reveal one common thought in different ways. The similarity in general is explained, perhaps, by the unity of the source that both of them used, most likely the commentary of Origen. But, unfortunately, the corresponding passage from Origen’s commentary on the Gospel of Matthew has now been lost. Even more clearly, perhaps, the relationship between Ambrose and Hilary can be seen in their explanation of the Lord’s parable about the leaven that a woman put into three measures of flour (Matthew 13:33). Ambrose knows two explanations for this place. According to one of them, the leaven is Christ, the woman is the Church, and the torment is we, the believers: the Church must hide Christ in the interior of our mind (in interioribus nostrae mentis) until the inner recesses of our spirit are illuminated by heavenly wisdom. According to another interpretation, the leaven is also Christ, and the three measures of flour are the law and the prophets, in whom the Son of God was once hidden, and the Gospel, which revealed Him to the world 1074. Hilary also gives two explanations, neither of which completely coincides with the explanations of Ambrose. According to the first explanation of Hilary, the leaven serves as an image of Christ, the wife - the synagogue that hid Christ by condemning Him to death, three measures of flour - the law, the prophets and the Gospel 1075. According to the second, three measures of flour are a symbol of the unity of the Persons of the Holy Trinity or the calling into the Church of the peoples, the descendants of Shem, Ham and Japheth; however, Hilary only mentions the latter interpretation, disagreeing with it, since, in his opinion, in the act of calling the peoples, Christ did not hide, but, on the contrary, revealed himself (non absconsus sit, sed ostensus), and the Holy Trinity is one and without the help of any leaven 1076. There are even fewer points of contact between Ambrose and Hilary here than in the previous case. Regarding some passages of the Gospel, we fortunately have fragments of Origen’s commentary and have the opportunity to determine the attitude of Ambrose and Hilary to Origen, on the one hand, and the attitude of Ambrose to Hilary, on the other. Let's take for example the Gospel story about the miraculous feeding of five thousand people with five loaves and two fish (Matthew 14:15–21; Mark 6:38; Luke 9:13; John 6:9). Here the direct connection between Ambrose and Origen cannot be subject to any doubt. While Hilary makes no attempt to compare the accounts of this miracle of different evangelists, Ambrose makes such a comparison, and as if even in the original words of Origen himself. Then, in particular, the five barley loaves (John 6:9), according to Origen’s interpretation, mean the sensual meaning of Scripture (εἶναι τοὺς αἰσϑητοὺς τῶν Γραφῶν λόγους), which is already indicated by the number five, the number external feelings 1077. We notice undoubted echoes of such an explanation in Ambrose, if he considers the five loaves of miraculous saturation to be food suitable only for bodily-minded people (escam istam esse habilem corporalibus), if he understands here the lowest kind of spiritual food and if he sees in the saturated the image of carnal people (carnales) and walking on a person (secundum hominem ambulamus) 1078. They, quasi quinque corporis sensus [as if the five bodily senses], perceived bodily food from Christ 1079. Hilary understands completely differently from them the five books of the law 1080 by the five loaves. Origen sees confirmation of his view on the meaning of fish and the character of the saturated in the detail of the miracle that the Lord ordered the gathered people to lie down on the grass (Matthew 14:19); referring to Is.40:6, where the flesh of a person is compared to grass, he sees in this detail evidence of the attachment of the saturated to their flesh 1081. In the same way, according to Ambrose’s explanation, among the saturated there are only sensus corporales [bodily feelings], a desire for everything sensually pleasing is noticeable; They rest on the grass because omnis caro faenum [all flesh is grass] (Isa. 40:6) 1082. According to Hilary, grass is an image of a person’s deeds: just as the earth is covered with grass, so a person is decorated with the fruits of his deeds, which is why it is said that the saturated lay not just on the ground, but on the grass; Hilary has no reference to Is.40:6 at all 1083 . Two fish, according to Origen, symbolize τὸν προφορικὸν καὶ ἐνδιάϑετον λόγον [pronounced and internal word], representing, as it were, a seasoning for the letter of Scripture, or the doctrine of the Father and the Son, which is already reached people at the saturated level of spiritual development 1084. It probably only needs to be attributed to the fact that Ambrose understood this thought of Origen in his own way if, according to his explanation, the image of the two Testaments is to be seen in the fish (in piscibus quoque duplicis Testamenti figuram intelligendam putaverunt) 1085 - the only point in which he more or less noticeably deviates from Origen. For Hilary, the two fish mean the teaching of the prophets and the preaching of John the Baptist 1086. In the fact that before distributing bread to people, Christ, looking up to heaven, blessed them (Matthew 14:19), Origen also sees an indication of the lower state of the saturated 1087, which is indicated by the fact of blessing in Ambrose’s commentary (benedictio igitur super nos, qui inferiores sumus) 1088; in Hilary this detail remains without any explanation. Based on this comparison, we thus come to the conclusion that in the most important idea all three of our writers agree with each other, since by saturated they understand people who are at a relatively low level of spiritual development; but while Ambrose develops this idea in almost exactly the same way as Origen, Hilary presents much that is special in detail. To explain this, it can be assumed that Hilary revealed the thought completely independently, or that in the original form of Origen’s commentary several possible interpretations were proposed, one of which was used by Ambrose, and the other by Hilary. In some cases, one can note the close dependence of Hilary on Origen to the same extent as Ambrose, but even this does not reveal Ambrose’s acquaintance with Hilary. In this regard, the explanation of the parable of the vineyard is interesting (Matthew 21:28–32). For Origen, the owner of the vineyard is God, the vineyard is the people of Israel, which, by the way, is proven by reference to the book of the prophet Isaiah (Is. 5: 1–2); the fence means the Scripture given to the people, the tower - the Old Testament church, or, since the tower had a top, it symbolized in particular the highest thing in Scripture - the word about God; winepress - a place for libations; winegrowers - elders and teachers of the people; the time of harvesting the fruits - the time when the winegrowers had to show by their lives that they had received this law; the slaves sent by the owner to the winegrowers to gather fruit for the first time are the first prophets (οἱ πρῶτοι προφῆται); slaves sent a second time in larger numbers than before indicate the appearance of a whole series of prophets; the owner's son is the Lord Jesus Christ; the intention of the winegrowers to kill and take possession of his inheritance indicates the desire of the bishops, scribes and elders to remain masters of the Jewish people; the vinedressers, whom the coming Master placed in the place of the former, are the apostles, to whom the Lord entrusted those who believed from among the people 1089. This interpretation of Origen also seems to underlie Hilary's explanation. The owner of his vineyard is also God the Father, the vineyard is the people of Israel, although the quotation from Is. 5:1-2 is not given, but the fence is the holiness of the name of the fathers of Israel, the merits of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; winepress - prophets; the tower is the pinnacle, the highest part of the law (eminentia legis), and the winegrowers serve as an image of the priests and Pharisees, who were entrusted with the power to instruct the people; the first row of ambassadors - a varied and often repeated series of prophets (varius et saepe repetitus progressus est prophetarum), the slaves of the second row - the massive appearance of prophets among the people (plurimus in unum prophetantium numerus emissus est), the embassy of a son - the Coming and Passion of our Lord (Domini nostri et adventus, et passio est), the council of winegrowers - the vain hope of the Jewish teachers to preserve the glory of the law through death of the Savior (inanis spes est gloriam Legis, perempto Christo, posse retineri), finally, new winegrowers - the apostles, who received the inheritance of the law. The meaning of the time of picking fruits remains unclear in Hilary 1090. Ambrose's explanation is much closer to Origen's than to Hilary's, and in some details differs significantly from the latter. For Ambrose, the vineyard is the house of Israel belonging to the Lord, and the owner who planted this vineyard is God; fence - strengthening of the Divine guard (divinae custodiae munitione vallavit) - very close to Origen, but completely different from Hilary; the winepress is defined similarly to Hilary, but still independently of him: based on the fact that some psalms (8, 80:83) are inscribed about winepresses, Ambrose understands by winepress the psalms that contained the sacraments of the Lord’s suffering; the tower is the pinnacle of the law (verticem scilicet Legis attollens), the slaves of the first time are prophets in general (generaliter prophetae), among other things, Naboth is indicated, a prophet not in word, but in deed, who prophesied with his own blood; the owner's son - Jesus Christ 1091, etc. It seems that even in those cases where Ambrose deviates from Origen towards Hilary, he still does not depend on him, citing considerations (the inscription of the psalms) and examples (Naboth) not known to Hilary; Probably in these cases he supplemented Origen’s commentary with some other sources. Ambrose himself gives grounds for such an assumption, showing that he knew many different interpretations of the parable of the Lord 1092 analyzed. Dogmatic views of St. Ambrose 1093 Dogmatic material in the works of St. Ambrose is quite extensive: they touch on almost all questions of dogma and each of them is given one answer or another. But as everywhere else, so here too is a significant shortcoming of our author - the lack of philosophical education, the lack of dialectics. As a result of this, in Ambrose we would look in vain for any semblance of a complete theological system, strict logical connection and consistency in the development of individual points of teaching. Dogmatic questions arise for the most part by chance, each of them is considered in isolation, as something completely independent; all of them are scattered throughout different places of creation and are buried in a mass of various extraneous material. Moreover, it often happens that at different times, due to different sequences of presentation and different literary influences, one and the same issue is resolved differently. This gives rise to many contradictions, the reconciliation of which the author himself usually makes no attempt and which are often irreconcilable in their essence. But out of the whole mass of heterogeneous dogmatic questions, the main attention of St. Ambrose is attracted to issues of immediate practical importance. The practical interest that generally animated Ambrose encouraged him in this area to dwell in more detail on the subjective side of religious life, on the state and legal capacity of man in this area, on his relationship to the Divine, the supernatural and on the conditions of this relationship. Anthropology, understood in the broadest sense of the word, occupies the most extensive place in Ambrose's theology; Ambrose is guided by this anthropological interest when solving all other dogmatic issues. This interest brought to the fore questions about sin and grace and their relationship - questions that we encounter in almost every work of Ambrose. The general character of all the dogmatic views of St. Ambrose is determined and explained by the same influences we have indicated that he was under. These include, firstly, the traditions of Western theology that preceded him, and secondly, the main tendencies of the Alexandrian school, as expressed by Philo, Clement and Origen; if Ambrose, in addition, also took advantage of the dogmatic heritage of Didymus and the Cappadocians (mainly St. Basil), then this must also ultimately be attributed to Alexandrian influences, since both the theology of Basil the Great and the teachings of Didymus in general are based on the same Origenistic tendencies, in some places only somewhat weakened, and in others supplemented. Both representatives of the West and the Alexandrians, in essence, explore the same problem - the essence of salvation accomplished by Christ and preached by the Church, a problem that is the subject of all patristic writing, but they approach it from different sides. In the salvation of humanity as a historically realized fact, one can distinguish, on the one hand, its statics, those elements from which it is composed, and those features by which it is characterized, and on the other, its dynamics, when the main attention is paid not to its essence, but to the history of its gradual implementation, to the conditions with which it is associated, and to the phases that it goes through in its implementation worldwide (in the history of mankind in general) and individually (in the life of each believer). It seems to us that if the difference between Western and Alexandrian theology is conditionally expressed for clarity in these terms, then the first can be called the doctrine of salvation in its statics, and the second - the doctrine of salvation in its dynamics; they consider the same problem from different points of view. Indeed, in Western theology, which preceded Ambrose, the idea of ​​salvation is presented as something historically given once and for all, and its essence is understood nomistically, as a set of Divine instructions and a certain kind of religious means established for the good of man; looking for a guarantee of preserving this historically already realized salvation intact, Western theology postulates the concept of the Church, which, although correctly, but somewhat one-sidedly, it considers primarily from the side of its externally legal organization, as an externally established institution for the purpose of preserving salvation in its true, divinely revealed, undistorted form; finally, everyone seeking salvation is required to use these saving means preserved by the Church, together with the observance of certain also definitely specified conditions, in the presence of which the objective means of salvation should lead a person to achieve salvation. Given this general character of Western theology, many religious concepts very early received widespread use in the West: the dependence of salvation solely on God-established means led to the recognition of the unconditionality of grace as the most important and even the only agent in the salvation of mankind; the existence of means of salvation and the need for the Church to guard them, in turn, postulated the recognition of the sinfulness and perversity of humanity. But due to the one-sided external direction of theology, the very concepts of grace and the universal sinfulness of mankind could not acquire their psychological depth here, since the writers did not have the motivation to delve into the internal roots of the second and the psychological strength of the first. Alexandrian theology, as it was known to Ambrose, explored the religious problem in a completely different way. One-sidedly ignoring the external religious organization and external church forms of manifestation of religious life, it explores religious life mainly as an internally developing phenomenon and process. Placing at the forefront of her entire system the dualistic opposition of the uncreated and the created, characterized by the complete opposition of their basic properties, she saw in this opposition the root of all religious life; the essence and development of religious life is defined as the gradual penetration of the created by the Uncreated and at the same time as the process of the gradual approach of the created to the state of God-likeness accessible to it. Internal motives and content are strongly emphasized here to the detriment of its external forms. Western theology undoubtedly gained a lot if St. Ambrose, these two previously existing separate directions came into the closest contact with one another. Western tradition gave him a definite and strictly fixed dogmatic scheme together with precise dogmatic formulas; The Alexandrians helped him deepen the content of these formulas and diagrams, reveal their internal psychological content, and establish their connection with human spiritual experiences. Through Ambrose's Western formulas, in places a stream of living religious feeling breaks through, which makes up for the lack of systematicity and originality; It was precisely this feeling that suggested to him such points of view on the question, which, although not revealed in detail by himself, but once put forward, could not go unnoticed subsequently. God in His Being and Properties Around the time Christian apologists around the half of the 2nd century. for the purpose of substantiating their famous logology, they put forward the Judeo-Philonian idea of ​​​​the Divinity as a Being infinitely elevated above the world, but at the same time completely without quality; this idea in its most general terms was established in Western theology. Already Minucius Felix speaks of God as an absolutely incomprehensible Being (nec comprehendi potest, sensibus major est), infinite and innumerable (infinitus, immensus), in his being unknowable and therefore inexpressible by any human name: even the names Father, King, Lord in the proper sense cannot be applied to God 1094. They thought of Him only as an absolute being and from this absoluteness deduced His other properties. The most essential feature was considered His eternity (aeternitas, aeternitatis status), i.e. endless existence in the past and in the future, the absence of beginning and the cessation of ever being; then the absolute perfection of His being postulated His absolute unity, because what is perfect must be one, and nothing can compare with Him 1095 . However, in detail, Western theology was very soon forced to change this idea of ​​\u200b\u200bcomplete baseness and sublimity, prompted partly by the Stoic ontology ingrained in it, and partly by the habit of expressing all theological concepts in legal terms. As a result, the idea of ​​God, in apparent contradiction with the above, begins to be filled with quite extensive anthropological content, so that in reality the sublimity and lack of quality of the Deity was thought of as infinity and perfection in the possession of those qualities that form the real content of the human spirit. In accordance with the tendency of Stoicism to materialize everything, in Tertullian the Divinity, although considered spirit, is interpreted in the sense of a peculiar corporeality, because the spirit is a body of a kind 1096. Then, the legal tendency narrowed the concept of God almost exclusively to the concept of the Supreme Lawgiver and Judge and, accordingly, put forward features associated with this feature of understanding. Already in Tertullian, greatness (magnitudo) is synonymous with Divinity itself; it is in this sense that the name Deus [God] 1097 is explained, while Dominus [Lord] serves to designate the manifestation of this greatness in the world, or potestatis est nomen [is the name of power] 1098. In a series of attitudes towards him on the part of a person, a feeling of fear strongly comes to the fore; namely, the greatness of the Judge, in the words of St. Cyprian, should make the servant who serves Him tremble (judicis majestate metuendus est) 1099. Fear is a feeling that a person must have in relation to God 1100. This feature in the concept of God is expressed especially clearly in Lactantius, for whom God is mainly the rector universi [Lord of the Universe] 1101, the administrator of the world (mundi administrator) 1102, which He rules, as a governor rules in his area 1103. Lactantius even makes a direct reference to jus civile [civil law]. God is actually the Father (Pater) of the world, insofar as the world is His creation; and since, according to the provisions of juris civilis [civil law], the father of the family, by right of birth, has the power of master over him, therefore God, as the Father of the world, is at the same time its Lord (Dominus), and to Him belongs the power to correct and punish (castigandi ac puniendi habet maximam potestatem) 1104. But power and dominance are maintained only by fear, so all nature must tremble before the greatness of its Master. Fear in subordinates can only arouse the anger of the Manager, therefore ira Dei [the wrath of God] for Lactantius serves as the most dominant feature in the concept of God 1105. At the same time, the whole concept takes on an extremely anthropomorphic character: God is embarrassed by our vices, while he is delighted (delectatur) by our virtues; He loves the righteous (diligit), and hates the wicked (odit) 1106. Turning now to the concept of God, St. Ambrose, we also encounter some of the listed features in him, although in their already weakened form, alien to extremes. The names Deus [God] and Dominus [Lord] serve as expressions of greatness and power (nomen magnificentiae, nomen est potestatis) 1107; In relation to the world, God is not only the Father (Pater), but also its Governor (gubernator), ruler (rector), guardian (tutor) 1108 - all terms of a legal order. Nevertheless, a closer acquaintance with eastern writers and, above all, with Philo helped him avoid excessive specificity in the concept of God and significantly deepen the concept of Him. This affected, first of all, a complete break in this case with the principles of Stoic ontology, so that in the person of St. Ambrose we have a defender not only of the absolute spirituality of the Divine, but also an ardent opponent of any traces of anthropomorphism. God is not only spiritus [spirit], but also purissimus spiritus [purest spirit] 1109. That the word spiritus [spirit] is understood by Ambrose in a sense that excludes any semblance of corporeality cannot be subject to any doubt: in contrast to the complexity of the material world, he speaks of the substance of the trinity as completely alien to any material complexity (materialis compositionis immune); in this very sense he calls it pure and simple (pura ac simplex), having a nature alien to any admixture 1110. God naturae simplicis est [simple nature], alien to the combination of separate parts and complexity (non conjunctae atque compositae) 1111. He is incorporeal (incorporeus) 1112. Regarding the tendency of some to represent God in humanoid form, St. Ambrose notes: “Some, reading about the hands or fingers of God, think that God is formed bodily, but they lose sight of the fact that all this is written not because the Divine is inherent in the form of a body, since in Him (in divinitate) there are no members or separate parts, but because of the unity of the Divinity (propter unitatem divinitatis)” 1113. Indeed, by declaring war on anthropomorphism, Ambrose brought the concept of God closer to Philon’s concept than it was in the West before him. In accordance with Philon’s idea of God as a completely qualityless (ἄποιος) Being 1114, which is such precisely because of its infinity and comprehensiveness, according to which it fills everything that exists 1115, and, however, does not mix with the world 1116, and Ambrose attributes to the Divine Being such characteristics as incomprehensibility (incomprehensibilis) 1117: God, filling everything, is not penetrated by anything; being present all at the same time in heaven, on earth or in the extreme reaches of the sea, He, however, remains completely incomprehensible to sight (visu incomprehensibilis), inaccessible to human insight, not subject to evaluation of the senses (sensu inaestimabilis) 1118. “The Holy Trinity,” says Ambrose in another place, “has nothing prescribed to Her, nothing limited, nothing measured and countable. It does not lie in any place, does not change according to age, does not fit within the limits of human judgment and human assessment” 1119. With this property of the infinity and immutability of the Divine as true being, Philo associates Plato’s proof of His eternity from His immutability and constancy: the invisible and intelligible (τῷ ἀοράτῳ καὶ νοητῷ) by its very nature belongs, as something very related, to the eternity of existence (ἀϊδιότης), while everything sensible exists in the form of birth and transformation (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ αἰσϑητὸν ἐν γενέσει καὶ μεταβολαῖς... ὄν) 1120. This attribute is introduced into the concept of the Divine nature by Ambrose, for whom also invisible being serves as a synonym for eternal being, and visible being (quod videtur) is thought to be subject to time (temporale) 1121. On the other hand, the concept of the infinity of the Divine is associated with His complete unknowability in his being: our mind is powerless to know anything definite about God; all the names we apply to God do not express His essence; the self-revelation of God is the only source of true knowledge of God 1122. This trait in St. We meet Ambrose in a slightly modified form. Powerless to comprehend God with his mind, man still has the opportunity to acquire knowledge about Him that approaches the truth in faith, in religion (fide sequendus, religione venerandus) 1123. Thus, while for St. Ambrose, the source of knowledge of God is Revelation in its exclusively ecclesiastical sense; for Philo, Revelation in the broadest sense has this meaning, not only as a set of Holy Books, but also as the fruit of personal inspiration and ecstasy. In addition, the very meaning of Revelation in this case is assessed by Ambrose much higher than by Philo: in the names of God revealed in Scripture and the teaching of the Church, he sees not bare names, as with Philo and the Alexandrians in general, but actual designations of Divine properties corresponding to the essence of the matter 1124. The property of the infinite Divine nature to fill everything with itself is a necessary condition for the very existence of the world in the minds of the Alexandrians; God is the only reason for life in the world. Among the different types of being, Philo argues, there are two kinds of causes: active (God) and passive (τὸ δραστήριον αἴτιον, τὸ παϑητικόν); The first kind of cause is the world mind (ὁ τῶν ὅλων νοῦς), and the second is the world, itself inanimate and motionless, but moved, formed and animated by the mind 1125. Due to this property of reviving with itself the entire area of ​​existence, the Deity also receives from Philo the name of the world soul (ἡ τῶν ὅλων ψυχή), but by no means, of course, in the pantheistic sense 1126. Ambrose also endows the Deity with similar attributes. In direct dependence on Philo, he distinguishes in the world an active principle, incapable of suffering (impassibile), and capable only of accepting suffering (passionis receptabile); the first is God, and the second is the world, which does not have a soul and its own movement, but received movement, soul and image (motum et animam, et figuram) from its Creator 1127. In this sense, God is, in relation to the world, the Highest Source of life in it, giving life to everything that exists (ex quo vivendi substantia ministratur omnibus) and possessing an original life 1128. The idea of ​​God as the universal mind, noted in Philo, is also found in Ambrose. God is reason (νοῦς), which pours out into the world in the fullness of its greatness and, filling everything and penetrating each thing separately, sees the sky, the air, the earth, and the sea; there is nothing that does not consist in Him (quod non consistat in eo), does not depend on Him and is not complete with Him. A partial analogy to this Divine Reason is νοῦς hominis [human reason] 1129. At the same time, the entire concept of God expands and deepens significantly. God is no longer presented exclusively one-sidedly in terms of his dynamic properties (greatness, power) as Dominus [Lord], but the concept of Him acquires a richer and more diverse ethical content. In the language of St. Ambrose God is the Highest Nature (summa natura), fullness of virtues (plenitudo virtutum) 1130, Perfect Being (perfectus) 1131. The concept of Him must include all the best and sublime that is only accessible to human thought: He is perfect beauty and to Him belongs everything that is most excellent in regard to beauty (quidquid praestantius ad decorem) 1132; He is good in all respects (Deus universitate bonus), while a person can only be good in part (homo ex parte) 1133. At the same time, goodness characterizes not only the providential activity of God in the world, but belongs to Him substantially, and is, as Revelation taught us this, an essential sign of the Divine nature: God cannot but be good, since the Divine nature (natura Dei) is the fullness of goodness (plenitudo bonitatis) 1134. In these properties, God is for man not only the Almighty Power that dominates him, but also the Highest Good desired for him - Summum Bonum: “From Him we receive everything, but we ourselves cannot deliver anything to Him, because He does not need anything... For what can He need, Who Himself abounds and generously gifts us with everything, provides everything for our benefit without any lack?” 1135 In particular, God, as Summum Bonum [Supreme Good], is for us the Source of spiritual life, kindling in us love and desire (caritas et desiderium); approaching Him and uniting with Him brings pleasure 1136. This feature in the idea of ​​God is very important in Ambrose’s worldview, but among early Western writers it is almost completely invisible. In itself, it does not represent anything original for his time, since it was revealed no less by the ancient representatives of Alexandrian theology themselves. Philo's deity has an all-perfect nature (τελειοτάτη ἡ τούτου φύσις); being the source of beauty (ἡ τοῦ καλοῦ πηγὴ), it does not need anything for its own perfection, but from the infinity of its perfection it bestows particles on everything that exists 1137. As the ever-acting Cause of the universe, It constantly creates all that is best in it (τὰ κάλλιστα) 1138. This is prompted by His infinite goodness, the concept of which is very important in Philo’s system. God created everything with his goodness (ἀγαϑότητι) 1139; out of generosity, He bestows His blessings on everyone (χαρίζεται τὰ ἀγαϑὰ πάσιν) 1140; He is the Source of every good and every virtue among men 1141 ; goodness is the oldest (πρεσβυτάτη) of all the charites of Being 1142. However, while in Ambrose the fullness of goodness belongs to the Divine nature itself, Philo’s ἀγαϑότης is only the first of the many powers (δυνάμεων) of God 1143, which does not relate to the indeterminability of the essence of God, which he consistently pursues. But this does not prevent him from calling the Divinity itself the Supreme Good (τὸ ἀγαϑόν) as the goal of human aspirations. We do not find a clearly expressed Neoplatonic coloring in the concept of God, which is stronger in comparison with what has been stated, as it was, for example, especially reflected in the works of Origen, in Ambrose. The Divine Being, with its absolute unity, is thought of as trinitarian (Trinitas). This point of church dogma was the subject of very detailed studies by St. Ambrose, more than a question about the being of God in general; when we get acquainted with his biography, we can see that the defense of the church teaching about the Holy Trinity in general and about the Divinity of the Son in particular, caused by the need for anti-Arian polemics, was one of the most important and vital tasks of his activity. In the fight against Arianism, Ambrose himself definitely took the side of the first Ecumenical Council and accepted its dogmatic definition of religion 1144. His own extensive commentary on this definition is indeed quite Orthodox in its essentials. But still, the lack of detailed acquaintance with the features of the dogmatic parties of the post-Nicene period, as far as can be judged from his works, due to the lack of inclination towards abstract philosophizing and analysis, left a rather strong imprint on this commentary: firstly, as formed under various and often random literary influences, it combines the features of rather heterogeneous writers and schools, which is why it suffers from a lack of consistency and harmony; secondly, since the author was not at all aware of many of the difficulties of the Trinitarian problem that emerged in the process of dogmatic struggle, he naturally could not make any attempt to resolve them, and from this side his own Trinitarian scheme is not only completely imperfect in detail, but even significantly backward compared with the teaching of the most famous Eastern writers of the 4th century. The central place in the Trinitarian scheme of St. Ambrose is occupied with the question of the Second Person, the Divine Word. Ambrose first of all transfers to this Word all the features that characterize the Divine nature in general, and mainly the property of absolute spirituality and incorporeality. “If there cannot be a material voice (vox corporalis) in the Father, then the Son is also not a word consisting of material parts (nec Filius verbum est corporale)” 1145. The analogy between the Divine Word and the human word is denied very definitely and decisively: our human word is a spoken word and in its essence lifeless, while the Word of God is a living and unspoken word. “Our word, as spoken (prolativum est), consists of syllables and represents a sound; by itself, without the thought of our mind hiding behind it, it is incapable of performing any actions. The Divine Word constantly acts, lives and heals” 1146. The Divine Logos stands in a certain relationship to the world and God the Father. As for His relationship to the world, Ambrose characterizes it with features that in some respects remind us of Philo. Thus, the Logos supports the life of the world in general. From this side, Philo applies to Him the name of the connection of everything that exists (δεσμὸς ὢν τῶν ἁπάντων), which unites together, connects the individual parts of the world, so that the world as a whole does not collapse 1147. Ambrose also knows about the vinculum Verbi [connection of the Word], which determines the stability and existence of the world: “Everything exists, being fastened (constricta) by the connection of the Word and supported by His power; and what the Word has bound can no longer be destroyed” 1148. On the other hand, identifying the Logos with the Force that binds parts of the world, Philo sees in Him a separating force that separates the elements of the world, causing opposites and giving rise to individualities; for this purpose, he uses the idea of ​​λόγος τομεύς [Logos Divider] 1149, accepted in classical philosophy since the time of Heraclitus. It is characteristic of Philo that he connects this idea with Genesis 15:10, finding the basis for it in the fact that, according to the command of God, Abraham, when sacrificing a part (τμήματα) of dissected sacrificial animals, “put one opposite to another (ἀντιπρόσωπα ἀλλήλοις)". The essence of this idea boils down to the following. The world consists of opposites, and this law of opposites equally embraces both inorganic life and organic nature. In the world, warm exists along with cold, dry - together with wet; In it, light is opposed to heavy, light is opposed to darkness, night is opposed to day. In the air sphere, clear weather is the opposite of cloudy, calm is the opposite of wind, winter is the opposite of summer, and autumn is the opposite of spring. Water can be sweet and bitter, land can be barren and fruitful. The corporeal in the universe exists together with the incorporeal, the inanimate with the animate, the rational with the irrational, the mortal with the immortal, the sensible with the intelligible, the beginning with the end, appearance with destruction, life with death, illness with health, etc. 1150 Our body and soul are also divided into many separate parts and members 1151. In the moral sphere we observe vice and virtue, truth and injustice, prudence and folly, courage and cowardice, moderation and intemperance; the same law also remains in force regarding the sciences and arts 1152. We find something similar to this idea of ​​the Logos in the teaching of St. Ambrose on the Word. At the same time, in the sense of illustrating the relationship of Ambrose to Philo, it is important to note that he also connects his teaching about the Logos Divider with Gen. 15:10, while Clement of Alexandria, if he shares this idea (this is how, at least, one can interpret his expression about the Logos κρίνων τε ἅμα καὶ διακρίνων ἔκαστα [(Who) judges everything and, discerning, divides]) 1153, then without any connection with this place; and essentially what he means here is the moral division of people according to their moral dignity and not so much in this life as on the day of future judgment 1154, while Ambrose, like Philo, speaks of a division not only moral, but also cosmological. “Our body,” he says, “by definition of God has all its members separate. It has two eyes, two ears, two cheeks and nostrils, and a double row of teeth. Breasts, shoulders, arms, sides, thighs, knees, legs, shins - all these members also exist in a dual order, so that all our functions enjoy double support. Likewise, our soul is characterized by a division of parts, insofar as it is divided into rational (rationabile) and unreasonable (irrationabile) parts; in the first of them, in turn, it is necessary to distinguish between the mind (mentem) and the word (sermonem), and in the second, hearing and sight, which increase the pleasantness of real life” 1155. What is observed in man exists throughout the world. The latter is arranged, as it were, in the form of some double members and ἀντιπρόσωπα [paired to them]. Thus, the earth is divided into mountains and fields, just as in our body some parts are more or less elevated, while others are relatively flat... Water in the sea can be salty, but in rivers and springs it can be sweet. The air is cold in winter, moderate in the spring months, and hot in summer 1156. Similar to the designation λόγος τομεύς [Logos Separator] of St. Ambrose applies to the Word the expression divisor [Divider]: λόγος enim divisor est animarum atque virtutum [Logos is the divider of souls and virtues] 1157. Due to these close relations of the Logos to the world, Philo sometimes uses the image of the Logos dressing with the world as clothing (ἐσϑής) 1158. The same image suggested to him another comparison of the Logos with the high priest (ἀρχιερεύς, precisely in a special, cosmological sense), and the cosmos with the clothes of the high priest, decorated with spiritual and sensual powers 1159. We find echoes of these ideas in St. Ambrose in those cases where he ascribes to the Word a magnum sacerdotium [great priesthood], and in the world he sees the image of His high priestly garment: “The Word of God has a great priesthood (in the world), a spiritual garment (indumenta intelligibilia), which Moses described under the image of the garment of the high priest” 1160. Ambrose sometimes also changes the relationship, calling the Word the clothing of the world: It has clothed the world with its power and shines in it, like a beautiful garment 1161. He calls Christ, in particular, the garment of believers (indumentum credentium), the garment of the faithful (amictus fidelium) 1162. In addition to these cosmological features of the Logos, Philo also points out many religious and moral ones, depending on the closest relationship of the Logos to man; some of the comparisons of this kind also became very common among Ambrose. If the latter likes to call the Word such designations as Advocate and Representative for man before the Lord (advocatus et Domini deprecator) 1163, Great Priest (magnus sacerdos), as the Redeemer of mankind 1164, then, in addition to the already strong traditional church ideas, for him in this case Philo could serve as a model, who also often represents the Logos as a high priest (ἀρχιερεύς), propitiating God for the sins of people 1165. Finally, we cannot ignore one more feature in Ambrose’s idea of ​​the Word, which concerns both His relationship to the world in general and to man in particular. In addition to the Logos, as the Firstborn Son of God (πρωτόγονος υἱός) 1166, Philo also knows secondary logoi, subordinate to Him, but united in Him (λόγοι), through which He, apparently, enters into communication with man. Thus, Philo speaks of two logoi as the leaders of man (οἱ ἡγεμόνες ἐν ἡμῖν ἀγελάρχαι λόγοι), of which one cleanses him from sins, and the other nourishes and fills his soul with virtues 1167; these λόγοι [logoi] seem to govern imperfect human knowledge 1168, and their rays weaken when God illuminates the soul with His own light, and intensify again when He departs 1169. We find something similar to this in St. Ambrose, who knows the human word (verbum humanum), the heavenly word (verbum coeleste), the angelic word (verbum angelorum), the word of Dominions and Powers (verbum Dominationum et Potestatum), the word of truth (justitiae), purity (castitatis), wisdom (prudentiae), piety (pietatis), virtue (virtutis); further he calls the word apostolic (apostolicum), prophetic (propheticum), evangelical (evangelicum). But in this case, two features separate him from Philo: he puts forward more strongly than the latter the unity and complete identity of partial words with the One Hypostatic Word, the Son of God: “The One Word represents many words and many form the One Word”; “this One Word of the Father is poured out into multitudes (se diffundit in plurima), insofar as we receive everything from His fullness”; “in separate individuals the One Word of all is manifested, of which we become partakers to the extent of our ability (cujus pro captu nostro participes sumus)” 1170; then, the subordinate, servant character of not only the logoi, but also the One Logos, penetrating the entire system of Philo, is completely alien to Ambrose, as follows from his teaching about the relationship of the Word to God. The relationship of the Word to the Divine nature is characterized by Ambrose with concepts that in earlier times, although they were known in the West, were almost not used there at all in solving the Trinitarian problem; in the East, most of them were initially philosophically revealed and applied to dogmatics already by Origen; since then they have become the common property of Eastern dogmatic schemes of the most diverse directions, through which they passed to Ambrose. Thus, the Divine Word in Ambrose is called God (Deus), Son (Filius), Wisdom (sapientia), Power (virtus), Truth (veritas), Life (vita) 1171. Most of these concepts, however, are usually not subjected to philosophical analysis. The more frequent and deepest of them is his concept of the Son as the image (imago) of God the Father. This concept is used by Ambrose in the sense purified from Origen-Neoplatonic subordinationism in which it appears among Didymus and the Cappadocians, namely in the sense of a complete reflection of the nature of the Father. “Holy and perfect is the Father, holy and perfect is the Son, as the image of God (imago Dei). He bears the name of the image of God in the sense that everything that exists in God also belongs to the Son, namely: eternal Divinity, Omnipotence and Majesty (sempiterna divinitas, omnipotentia atque majestas).” The relationship between the Father and the Son is conceived in this concept as so close that, if something is diminished in the image, the One to whom this Image refers is necessarily diminished; or, if we consider the Image to be lesser (si minorem imaginem credas) in comparison with the Prototype, then the God reflected in it must appear lesser (in comparison with his actual nature - minor Deus apparebit in imagine) 1172. In this precise sense, the concept of image (εἰκών) is used in the works of Didymus, according to whom “God the Word, by his nature, without beginning, unchangeably and with all possible accuracy (ἀπαραλλάκτως καὶ ἀπηκριβωμένως) (ἐξεικονίζει) entirely (εἰς ὅλα) simple, uncomplicated and homogeneous Father Deity (πατρικὴν ϑεότητα); for it is obscene to think that the Word is the image of God only in some relation and in comparison with something (else): an image is not an image of something that is incomparable with it, and the true prototype (ἀρχέτυπον), greater and self-ruling (αὐτεξούσιον) cannot be revealed through the incomparable (τοῦ ἀνομίου) or less (μικροτέρου)" 1173. But this concept retains the same meaning among the Cappadocians. For St. Basil the Great, the word εἰκών precisely shows that God completely depicted Himself in the Son (ὅλον αὐτῷ ἑαυτὸν ἐντυπώσας) 1174 that the image possesses everything that belongs to the Father (πάντα, ὅσα πρόσεστι τῇ πρωτοτύπῳ μορφῇ) 1175 ; likewise St. Gregory the Theologian considers the image not a simple imitation of the prototype (μίμημα τοῦ ἀρχετύπου), but a whole image of the Whole (ὅλον ὅλου τύπον εἶναι). However, as a characteristic detail, one must keep in mind that St. Gregory already finds the concept of image weak, since the Son resembles the Father more than a simple cast (ἢ ἀφομοίωμα); in addition, he explains the complete similarity of the image with the prototype by their nature, as simple hypostases (τῶν ἀπλῶν φύσις), which precisely because of their simplicity cannot have similarity in one respect and difference in another 1176 - an argument completely unknown to Ambrose. St. Ambrose uses the concept imago [image] to express the relationship of the Son to the Father also in a slightly different sense in connection with some other concepts. Thus, the Son is called splendor (splendor), because in Him abides the glory of the Father's light (quod claritas paternae lucis in Filio sit); a perfect mirror (speculum sine macula), since the Father can be contemplated in the Son (Pater videatur in Filio); the image of goodness (imago bonitatis), indicating that not the body in the body, but the integral power is contemplated in the Son (sed virtus in Filio tota cernatur), that (between the Father and the Son) there is no (essential) difference (docet non esse dissimilem); character (character), meaning the idea of ​​the Son as an expression, impression (expressum esse significat) before us of God the Father; splendor, as a designation of eternity (signat aeternum) 1177. “The Son is called image (imago), brilliance (splendor) and character (character), insofar as all these images reveal to us in the Son the incomprehensible and unsearchable Divinity of the Father’s Majesty (incomprehensibilem et investigabilem paternae majestatis divinitatem in Filio) and His imprinted likeness (expressam similitudinem)” 1178. All these are images that are very common among Eastern writers of the 4th century. Didymus speaks of the Son as the radiance of glory (ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης) and the character of the hypostasis (χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως) 1179. St. Basil the Great, in addition, uses the image of a mirror (κάτοπτρον), although specifically to designate the relationship of the will of the Son to the will of the Father: The Father's will is communicated to the Son, like the reflection of an image in a mirror 1180. But Ambrose does not seem to apply to the Son the concept of the Father's seal, which is very common among Didymus and the Cappadocians, who speak of the Son as the seal of the Archetype (σφραγὶς τοῦ ἀρχετύπου) in the sense of the sameness of their nature (Didemus) 1181, as a seal (σφραγὶς), imprinting the entire nature of the Father (St. Basil) 1182. Ambrose applies this concept mostly in a completely different connection. Further, the relationship of the Son to the Father is defined by St. Ambrose, as the relationship of the Born to the Begotten. The act of Birth itself is considered by Ambrose to be an essential and integral moment and property of the Divine nature. This act is beyond any comparison with human birth. The categories of freedom or necessity are not applicable to him at all: it cannot be said that the Father gives birth to the Son by virtue of the free decision of his own will, just as it cannot be said that He gives birth to Him by force of necessity. “In eternal birth there is neither desire nor unwillingness (nec velle, nec nolle): the Father cannot be called the One who gives birth under compulsion (invitum), nor can He be recognized as the One who gives birth at will (nec volentem), because birth (generatio) is based not on the ability of the will (non in voluntatis possibilitate est), but on some right and property (in jure quodam et proprietate) of the Father’s nature. For just as the Father is good neither by will nor by necessity, but by nature (natura), which is higher than both, so He does not beget the Son by will or necessity” 1183. This already determines the immanent character of the Trinity of St. Ambrose: God is trinitarian in Persons not due to the need to reveal Himself in the world, but trinity is determined by the very essence of the Divine nature, and the concept of it is analytically derived from the very concept of God. Those Eastern writers whom Ambrose generally follows in this case take the same point of view. Only among the Cappadocians can we note one minor feature in comparison with him: under the influence of Origen, who, among other things, thought of the birth of the Son by the analogy of the emergence of will from the will of the Father 1184, they partly introduced the concept of will into the explanation of the Divine Birth: St. Basil the Great argues for the eternity of the Birth from the concept of the unconditionality and unlimited will of the Giver, since nothing could prevent its implementation 1185. In the same way, Gregory the Theologian knows the Divine desire to give birth (ἡ τοῦ γεννᾶν ϑέλησις), although he stipulates that since in God will and birth coincide in an incomprehensible way for us, then we can say about the Divine Birth that it is higher than desire 1186. Even more than from the contemporary Cappadocians, Ambrose differs in this case from his Western predecessors: among these latter, in accordance with their idea of ​​the revealed Trinity and the birth of the Son, as the organ of the Revelation of God in the world, the act of the Birth of the Son is not at all thought of as a constitutive moment of the Divine nature and in most cases is motivated by a simple decision of the Divine Will: “From the Father, when He wanted, the Word (Sermo) - the Son” was born; “The Son, when the Father willed (quando Pater voluit), came out of the Father (processit ex Patre)” 1187 - this is how Novatian usually explains the birth. And according to Hippolytus, the origin (γσνεσις) of the Word has its only explanation in the act of decision of the Divine Will: God the Father gave birth to Him according to His will, as He desired (βουληϑεὶς ὁ Θεὸς Πατὴρ ἐγέννησεν ὡς ἡϑέλησεν) 1188 . As Begotten from the Divine nature, the Son eternally exists in the Father. This idea is motivated differently by Ambrose. Thus, very often he justifies it with the concept of the immutability of the Father. “If God was in the beginning simply God and subsequently (after the Birth of the Son) began to be the Father, then,” Ambrose objects to the Arians who denied the eternity of the existence of the Son, “how can God be recognized as unchangeable (quomodo ergo immutabilis Deus)? Indeed, if from the beginning He was simply God, and subsequently (became) the Father, then by the addition of birth He changed (generationis accessione mutatus est)” 1189. “If the Son did not always exist, then it means that the Father has changed; but the Son has always existed, therefore, the Father has never changed and remains unchanged from eternity (immutabilis semper est)” 1190. In exactly this form we encounter this argument in the writings of Didymus, from whom it probably passed on to Ambrose. “In his being,” argues Didymus, “the Father, neither in time nor in essence, differs from His Son and Spirit. For if He gave birth subsequently, then He changed (μετεβάλλετο ἄν) or became perverted (ἐτρέπετο), which is completely alien to the Divinity; In this case, we will have to admit that at one time, as He had not yet given birth to a Son, He was simply God, without being the Father." by virtue of which the property belonging to him to be the Father belonged to Him from the very beginning (ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ πρέπον αὐτῷ παρῦν) 1192 . This idea is not used by Ambrose. Likewise, we do not find in him what is characteristic of St. Gregory’s proof of the eternity of birth from the logical analysis of the concept “Father”: The Father could not become a father later (ὕστερον), because He is in the proper sense the Father (κυρίως Πατήρ), therefore, the Son always existed 1193. Another reason given by Ambrose to prove the eternity of the Son is the fundamentally Origenistic concept of the Son as the Word, Wisdom and Radiance of the Father. “Do not allow a moment,” he says, “when God would exist without Wisdom, or the light would not have brilliance” 1194. “Light always generates shine (splendorem generat), and it is impossible to understand whether shine arises later than light and whether light exists before shine; because where there is light, there is shine, and where there is shine, there is light. Thus, light cannot exist without brilliance, and brilliance is unthinkable without light; light lies in brilliance, and brilliance exists in light. Therefore, the Apostle called the Son the Radiance of the Father’s Glory, since the Son in relation to the Father’s Light is a coeternal Brilliance (coaeternus) because of the eternity of power (propter virtutis aeternitatem), inseparable (inseparabilis) because of the unity of glory (propter claritudinis unitatem)” 1195. At the time in question, this is perhaps the most common motif and analogy that we can find in almost all church writers. It is very often used for the same purpose by Didymus, who deduced the co-origin of the Son with the Father from His Birth from the Father as ὑποστάσεως [the radiance of glory and character of the hypostasis] 1196, and equally from the concept of Him as the Word: the Father cannot be thought before his Hypostatic Logos (ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὑποστάτου Λόγου) 1197 . “What absurdity,” says St. Basil, - to assert that the Glory of God did not have Radiance (τὴν δόξαν τοῦ Θεοῦ μὴ ἔχειν ἀπαύγασμα) and that the Wisdom of God was not once inherent in God (τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ μὴ συνεῖναί ποτέ τφ Θεῷ)" 1198 . For the same purpose, Ambrose also uses the concept of the Son as the Power (virtus) inherent in God. “God's Power and Divinity are eternal; The Power of God is Christ... Therefore, if Christ is the Power of God, and the Power of God is eternal (sempiterna), then Christ is eternal (sempiternus)” 1199. “If Christ is God's Power, then did God ever exist without (His) Power? Was the Father ever without the Son? If always the Father, then always the Son, (Who) is the perfect Son (perfectus filius) of the perfect Father (perfecti Patris). For whoever subtracts (derogat) something from the Power, he also subtracts from Him (ei derogat) to Whom the Power belongs (cujus est virtus)” 1200. We find this, also quite popular, argument in Didymus: “If the Son is called the Power and Wisdom (εἰ δύναμις καὶ σοφία ὁ Υἱὸς) of God, then He is co-eternal with the One who gave birth (συνάναρχός ἐστι τῷ γεννήσαντι), since there was no time when the Father existed (ὑπῆρχεν) without them, and it is impossible to say that, (once) not having, the Father acquired (them) sometime later” 1201. Then Ambrose argues for the eternity of the Birth also with the concept of the perfection of God, by virtue of which He must always have His Son. “If, according to some, the Son did not once exist, then in God there was once no fullness of Divine perfection (non fuit ergo in Deo perfectionis aliquando plenitudo divinae)” 1202. But, like Didymus, Ambrose reveals this idea only occasionally, and even then very weakly and superficially. They do not have the idea revealed by the Cappadocians, at least by Gregory the Theologian, of the Son as constituting with Himself the fullness of Divine life and perfection and therefore belonging to the Father from the beginning. If the Father exists from the beginning (ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς), then, according to St. Gregory, together with Him all Three necessarily exist (τὰ τρία), since otherwise the Divinity must turn out to be imperfect and even, as imperfect, cannot be called Divinity (μᾶλλον δὲ τίς ϑεότης, εἰ μὴ τελεία) 1203 . The last argument is how St. Ambrose uses to prove the doctrine of the eternity of the Son, representing a kind of reductio ad absurdum 1204. The Arians, actually the Eunomians, analyzing the concept of birth (γέννησις) in general, as the emergence from another in time, saw in the act of the Birth of the Son proof of his origin in time. Ambrose tries to destroy the force of this objection by carrying it to extreme, absurd conclusions. “When you say that the Father existed before the Son, you point me to the example of human birth, but discuss whether the examples of earthly birth are consistent with the Divine Birth. After all, if we are talking about the human birth, then you cannot deny that in a person the father has passions (passiones) before the son. The father first grows, first grows old, first grieves, first cries. So, if the son is less in time, then the father is older in suffering. If he did not free himself from the age of birth, then this one did not escape the shame of birth” 1205. “If the Divine Birth was subject to time, as is assumed on the basis of the example of human birth (then it would also have to be assumed, following this example), that the Father carried the Son in the bodily womb, being burdened with him for nine months. And how (in this case) is birth possible without (the assistance of) the other sex? You see that (in God) the series of ordinary births did not begin, and for all this you consider the fetus to be subject to some bodily necessity. But in this case, since you are looking for the custom (usus) of birth, I will look for gender; you require time, and I require order (ordinem); You pay attention to the end, but I’m looking for the beginning” 1206. These arguments remind us of some remarks of the Cappadocians, whose Trinitarian views developed mainly in the struggle with the same Eunomians. St. Basil, wanting to refute the objection about the Birth of the Son in time, draws the attention of his opponents to the fact that God cannot wait, like people and animals, for the onset of mature age in order to give birth to the Son, but has within himself a fatherland co-extended with His eternity (ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀϊδιότητι συμπαρεκτεινομένην ἔχει τὴν... πατρότητα) 1207 ; in addition, bodily action is always associated with a certain amount of labor and tension, and to allow the possibility of something like this in the Divine nature is just as wicked as to subject the Divinity to the most shameful passions 1208; it is equally senseless to allow in God the gradual development of the fetus following the example of human birth 1209. General conclusions to which based on the presented argumentation of St. Ambrose comes concerning the Divine Birth, these are: 1) The Divine Birth is sublime, infinitely superior to human birth and incomprehensible to the human mind; St. Ambrose refuses to define more closely the nature and character of this birth. “Do not make a temptation, heretic, from the custom of human birth... for if you strive to determine human birth, you are discovering time; The Divine Birth is above all: mysterious, above all thought and feeling” 1210. “It is impossible for me to know the secret of Birth (generationis scire secretum): thought becomes impoverished, the voice is silent, and not only mine, but also the angel’s. (It is) above the Powers, above the Angels, above the Cherubim, above the Seraphim, above every feeling” 1211. “One must know that (the Son) was begotten (natus sit), but one cannot examine how he was begotten (quemadmodum natus sit)” 1212. “Incomprehensibly (incomprehensibiliter) the Son is born, dispassionately (impassibiliter) the Father gives birth” 1213. To indicate the incomprehensibility of the Birth of St. Ambrose uses the word arcanum, arcanum generationis [mystery, secret of Birth] 1214, intimum quoddam paternae caritatis naturaeque secretum [the innermost secret of the Father's love and nature], spirituale interior arcanum [spiritual inner secret] 1215, even simply mysterium [sacrament] 1216. Such a strong emphasis on the incomprehensibility of Birth was common among Orthodox writers of the 4th century: this was required by polemics with extreme Arianism, which introduced excessive specificity into the concept of birth in order to deprive the Orthodox of support. Didymus insists on this incomprehensibility 1217, denoting it with the term μυστήριον [sacrament] 1218; St. Vasily considers the image of birth inexpressible and unthinkable (ὁ τρόπος ἄῤῥητος καὶ ἀπερινόητος παντελῶς) 1219; St. Gregory sees in it a mystery that exceeds reason (ὑπέρ λόγον) 1220, as incomprehensible in comparison with human birth, as God Himself is unknowable in comparison with man 1221. 2) The Son exists eternally and His birth is outside and above time: “the Son of God, who was in the beginning, never received a beginning; and He who is the Beginning of everything and the End will have no end (qui est principium universitatis et finis).” “Since the Divine birth is not a temporary birth, it does not find time either before itself or in itself (nec ante se, nec in se tempus invenit)” 1222. Ambrose especially often speaks of generatio sine tempore [Birth without time] 1223, warns nec videatur coepisse ex tempore, qui ex Patre nascendo prodit [lest it seem that He who proceeds from the Father in birth began to be in time] 1224, calls the Son co-eternal (coaeternus) with the Father 1225. These thoughts, already from the time of the Old Niceans, were, of course, among the generally accepted, but in particular St. Ambrose had before him the example of Didymus, who speaks especially strongly and persistently about such predicates of the Son as beginningless, cobeginning, coeternal (ἄναρχος, συνάναρχος, συναΐδιος) 1226. 3) The timeless Birth of the Son, different from human birth, is closely connected by Ambrose with the perfection of the Son. The Son was born perfect from the Father and, having been born, remains unchanged. Ambrose reveals this idea in polemics with the Eunomians, who concluded from the concept of the birth of the Son about His origin in time. But, he objects to his supposed opponents, if the Son is born in time, then, reasoning consistently, it would be necessary to recognize Him as also subject to the process of gradual development of created beings. If we follow the example of human birth, we must admit that when (the Son) was born from the Father, He was a child (parvulus fuit), crying as a baby in the cradle, passing through certain moments of age. For if He had the weakness (weak, imperfect side) of birth, then it is necessary that he was subject to the weakness not only of birth, but also (imperfection) of life 1227. With this thought, Ambrose stands equally close to both Didymus and the Cappadocians. Didymus, for example, also derives the perfection of the Son from the contrast to the perfection of the Divine Birth and human imperfection. “What is born from a creature is born as a result of the communication of one with another and is not (is) closely united (συμφυές) with the one who gave birth. It neither turns out to be immediately perfect (τέλειον) nor is it accomplished dispassionately (ἀπαϑῶς). In the Divinity, on the contrary, precisely: if a creature (gives birth) in this way (i.e. in the described manner), then its Creator (gives birth) in the opposite way (ἐναντίως) and not like his creations, but as only the Divine Trinity knows this” 1228. All of Ambrose’s listed ideas about the properties of the birth of the Son contradict the views of ancient Western writers. The economic current in the doctrine of the Trinity not only did not favor the idea of ​​the Birth of the Hypostatic Son as an internal act, inextricably linked with the Divine nature itself, but also did not necessarily put forward the eternity of birth: if the existence of the Hypostatic Son was determined only by the purpose of peacemaking, then it was possible to think of the existence of God without His hypostatic Word, although, of course, not without the Word in general. This was expressed by the most consistent and decisive of Western writers, Tertullian. Everyone knows his classic expression: there was a time when there was no Son (fuit autem tempus, quando filius non fuit) 1229. In organic connection with this, Tertullian, like other Western writers of his time, has an idea of ​​the process of gradual development and elevation of the Word in its dignity; the property of His immutability in this case was little taken into account. Tertullian apparently recognizes only two moments in the process of this development: the existence of the Word in God as the hypostatic Divine Mind inherent in God from all eternity, and the existence of this Mind separately from God in the form of the independent Hypostasis of the Son; God was never alone (solus) in the proper sense, insofar as He constantly had in Himself Reason (ratio) and in Reason the Word (sermo) 1230; this Word receives its form and decoration (speciem et ornatum suum sumit), comes out of God (ex Deo procedit), when God uttered his creative “Fiat lux” [“Let there be light”], this is the perfect birth (nativitas perfecta) of the Son 1231. The expression perfecta [perfect], as well as the name Son (Filius), which from this moment Tertullian gives to the Word 1232, indicate that at the second moment, in his opinion, the development of the Word ends; now God also received the name Father (Pater) 1233. In this, Novatian, who stands in great, but not exclusive, ideological dependence on him, agrees with him, who knows the Word in Patre [in the Father] and separately from the Father, when It processit ex Patre [came from the Father] 1234. But Novatian differs from his teacher in that, firstly, he does not hesitate to attribute to the Word the title Filius [Son] already in the first moment of His existence in Patre [in the Father], obviously with the aim of preserving the absolute immutability of the Father (semper enim in Patre, ne Pater non semper sit Pater); and secondly, instead of Tertullian’s very definite “Fiat lux” [“Let there be light”], he designates the moment of the complete Birth of the Word with an indefinite quando [when] the will of the Father 1235. However, the West did not always recognize only the two indicated moments in the existence of the Word. Thus, for Hippolytus, although the Word after the perfect birth by God (the second moment) exists hypostatically, nevertheless, for now It is not called a son, but solely for the sake of its future incarnation (Υἱὸν προσηγόρευε διὰ τὸ μέλλειν αὐτὸν γενέσϑαι); only in the incarnation did He reveal Himself to be the perfect Son of God (Υἱὸς τέλειος Θεοῦ ἐφανερώϑη) 1236. The teaching about the third Hypostasis of the Holy Trinity, about the Holy Spirit, was revealed by St. Ambrose no less detailed than the teaching about the Son; from this point of view, his creation “De Spiritu Sancto” [“On the Holy Spirit”] is of very great importance in the history of church literature, especially Western. In its essence, however, it is very little original, strongly reminding us of the ideas of Didymus, revealed by him in the treatise “De Spiritu Sancto” [“On the Holy Spirit”]. The question of the Divinity of the Holy Spirit is considered by both in detail and is motivated in the same way. Ambrose makes the main point of all discussions about the Spirit the service of the creature and the non-service of the Holy Spirit: if all creation serves, then the Holy Spirit cannot be counted among the creatures 1237. Further this idea is revealed in more detail in this way. The Holy Spirit cannot be counted among either corporeal or incorporeal creatures; to the first - because into them (corporalibus) He pours His incorporeal grace (incorpoream infundit gratiam); to the second - because they themselves receive the sanctification of the Spirit and thereby surpass the rest of the creations of the world; whether we take angels, dominion, power - all of them and, in general, all creation awaits the grace of the Holy Spirit 1238. In Didymus we also encounter this thought, although it is revealed differently in him: all creatures, he says, are divided into visible and invisible, or corporeal and incorporeal; The spirit does not belong to corporeal creatures, because He is the inhabitant of their soul and feelings (animae et sensus habitator), the producer for them of words, wisdom and knowledge (sermonis et sapientiae, et scientiae effector); yet incorporeal substances receive from the Spirit the substance of sanctification; The Holy Spirit Himself is not only not the bearer of someone else's sanctification (non est sarah sanctificationis alienae), but the Creator and Giver of sanctification from above (insuper attributor est et creator) 1239. Another proof of the Divinity of the Holy Spirit for Ambrose is the immutability of the Spirit in contrast to the changeability of the creature. The whole creation is changeable, not only that which has already changed due to sin or the quality of the elements (quae jam peccato aliquo aut elementorum conditione mutata est), but also that which can still be subject to corruption due to the vice of nature (vitio naturae), although it has not yet been subjected to it due to fidelity to discipline (nondum est studio disciplinae) 1240. But, while all creation is changeable, the Holy Spirit remains good and unchangeable, and cannot be changed by any vice. He who destroys the vices of all (creatures) forgives sins. And how could He turn out to be changeable, Who, by sanctifying, changes others to grace, but Himself does not change? 1241 How do we change He Who remains always good? For in no case is the Holy Spirit evil (malus), Who always gives us good 1242. In Didymus, the concept of immutability is also of great importance as proof of the Divine nature of the Holy Spirit. If the Holy Spirit is the Sanctifier (sanctificator), then He is not changeable, but an unchangeable substance; He is immutabilis et inconvertibilis [immutable and inconvertible]; and since the unchangeable substance, according to the testimony of Scripture, belongs only to God and His Only Begotten Son, yet all creatures have convertibilem et mutabilem substantiam [transformable and changeable substance], then the Holy Spirit is not ὁμοούσιος [consubstantial] of creation 1243. The concept of the substantial goodness of the Holy Spirit has the same evidentiary significance for Ambrose. “The Spirit is the Source and Origin of goodness (fons sit principiumque bonitatis); for as the Father has goodness and the Son has goodness, so the Holy Spirit has goodness” 1244. “What is the Holy Spirit if not full of goodness (plenus bonitatis)? Although He is of an inaccessible nature (inaccessibilis nature), He is perceived by us because of His goodness (receptibilis tamen propter bonitatem suam nobis est)” 1245. “So the Holy Spirit is good, but good not as one who acquires (acquirens), but as one who communicates goodness (quasi impertiens bonitatem). And does not perceive (anything) from creatures, but the Holy Spirit perceives; just as He is not sanctified, but He Himself sanctifies: the creation is sanctified, but the Holy Spirit sanctifies” 1246. This is essentially a brief summary of what was set out in Didimus in much more detail. The Holy Spirit is substantialiter bonum est [substantially good] and cannot be a participant in extraneous goodness, since He Himself distributes goodness to everyone else 1247; Divine Nature, in contrast to created nature, is fons and principium bonorum [the source and beginning of goods], makes others good by communicating itself (quibus se impertit), but the goods itself are not from another, but original (subsistens) 1248. What is not in Didymus's treatise, we also do not find in Ambrose. We have seen that the method of proof in Didymus and Ambrose differs, so to speak, in its empirical character: by analyzing the various properties attributed to God and creatures in Scripture, they prove the difference in nature by the difference in these properties. But both of them make no attempt to construct the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit from the very concept of the Divine nature, which places their teaching about the Holy Spirit significantly lower than the teaching of the Cappadocians, who deductively deduced the existence of the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit from the very concept of the essence of God. This idea is expressed especially clearly by Gregory the Theologian, for whom the Holy Spirit is hypostasized, existing in the form of an independent Hypostasis, Divine holiness (ἡ ἁγιότης); without this holiness the Divinity cannot be perfect 1249. But also St. This idea is not alien to Basil, since he calls the Spirit holy (ἁγιασμός) 1250, recognizes holiness as the nature of the Spirit (φύσις ἡ ἁγιωσύνη) 1251, believing that in the Spirit holiness replenishes nature 1252 ; Moreover, all these terms serve as distinctive names for the Holy Spirit. Thus, while among the Cappadocians the existence of the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit is sufficiently motivated, among Ambrose and Didymus we do not find such motivation, and the nature of the Spirit is placed only in external relations to the existence of the other two Persons of the Holy Trinity. As for Didymus, he, however, somewhat supplemented his teaching about the Holy Spirit in his work “De Trinitate” [“On the Trinity”], written under the noticeable influence of the Cappadocians after the treatise “De Spiritu Sancto” [“On the Holy Spirit”]; there we already meet τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος ὁ ἀγιασμός [sanctification of the Holy Spirit] 1253; This idea remained alien to Ambrose forever. Then, when presenting the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, both Ambrose and Didymus in their work “De Spiritu Sancto” [“On the Holy Spirit”] missed a whole series of evidence that at that time had already gained great importance in the church consciousness. In the history of dogmas, we encounter the phenomenon that long before they began to talk philosophically about any religious truth, the undoubted existence of this truth was already assumed by church consciousness and practice; subsequently, when the truth in question became the subject of dogmatic dispute or research, the recognition of it by the Church has since ancient times been seen as evidence in its favor. This is precisely the fate that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit suffered. Long before the 4th century, when the doctrine of the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit became a special subject of theological research, the name of the Holy Spirit as God had already been invoked in the Church from its very foundation, and many church rites were imprinted with this name. On this, by the way, Basil the Great built his argument about the Divinity of the Holy Spirit. For him, the Divinity of the Spirit follows from the fact that baptism, according to the tradition of the Lord, is performed in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit 1254; doxology to all Persons of the Holy Trinity ἐκ τῆς τοῦ βαπτίσματος παραδόσεως [based on the baptismal tradition] convinces him of the same 1255. St. Ambrose does not use this type of evidence and, in our opinion, this is not by accident or oversight on his part: the concept of churchliness, the evidentiary power of church tradition in his mind are generally very weak. But with all these shortcomings and incompleteness in the method of argumentation, the Divinity of the Holy Spirit for Ambrose is still beyond any doubt. The independence of His Hypostasis seems equally undeniable to him, as a result of which He cannot be identified with the Father and the Son. In this regard, Ambrose speaks out much more decisively and definitely than his Western predecessors. Among the latter, at least some of them, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is distinguished by one feature that the writers of the Eastern Church did not know. Lofs, a well-known recent author on the history of dogma, first noted this feature regarding the author of the book “The Shepherd”. This author shows a tendency to identify the names υἱὸς Θεοῦ [Son of God] and πνεῦμα ἅγιον [Holy Spirit], expressing that πνεῦμα [Spirit] is υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, πάσης τῆς κτίσεως προγενέστερος [Son of God, the most ancient of all creation] 1256. Regarding the writers of subsequent times, Macholz set out to verify Lofs’s observation in his brochure, and, in Lofs’s sense, came to conclusions that leave no doubt 1257. Thus, he found this feature, known in science under the name of binitarianism, very strongly expressed in Tertullian, who sometimes identifies the Divine Word (Sermo) and the Spirit (Spiritus), so that the Son of God until the moment of the Incarnation is equally called by him both Sermo [Word] and Spiritus Dei [Spirit of God] 1258: Spiritum [Spirit] is understood in mentione Sermonis [in the mention of the Word] and Sermonem [the Word] is known in nomine Spiritus [in the name of the Spirit]; for both Spiritus substantia est Sermonis [Spirit is the substance of the Word] and Sermo operatio Spiritus, et duo unum sunt [The Word is the action of the Spirit, and the Two are One] 1259. Then, it characterizes a whole series of works by Pseudo-Cyprian, who, for example, calls the Holy Spirit Christ our Lord, who came from the Father 1260. But Lactantius expresses himself especially classically: before the creation of the world, “God gave birth to a holy, incorruptible and incomprehensible Spirit (sanctum, et incorruptibilem, et irreprehensible spiritum), whom he called the Son (Filium nuncuparet)” 1261. It now remains for us to analyze the works of St. from this point of view. Ambrose. From a review of the works of St. Ambrose follows that, firstly, traces of the noted tradition continue to be preserved in the West even in his time, and that, secondly, it is already undergoing quite a significant reinterpretation. At St. Ambrose, the word spiritus [spirit] from the individual concept for Sermo-Filius [Word-Son] becomes a general name for Trinitas [Trinity] in general: Filius [Son] is Spiritus spiritus [Spirit], but Pater [Father] is also Spiritus [Spirit], since Spiritus [Spirit] is in general everything that is not the body of creation (quod non est creaturae corpus, hoc spiritus est). This gives him the opportunity to very definitely defend the non-merger of the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit with the other Persons: “the Holy Spirit is not merged with the Father and the Son, but is separated from both the Father and the Son (non confusus cum Patre et Filio Spiritus Sanctus, verum et a Patre distinctus et a Filio)” 1262. In all these cases, St. Ambrose stands above any suspicion of binitarianism. However, the influence of the latter affects him in other ways. Thus, depending on binitarianism in the West, a special view of the sacrament of the Incarnation was formed. What God was born in the flesh, asks Tertullian and answers: Sermo et Spiritus, qui cum Sermone de Patris voluntate natus est [The Word and the Spirit, Who with the Word was born from the Father's will] 1263. Perhaps one can discern the remnants of this kind of ideas in the fact that Ambrose, when discussing the mystery of the Incarnation, puts Filium [Son] and Spiritum [Spirit] in the closest relationship to each other: caro enim Domini Spiritu in virginem superveniente generata [for the flesh of the Lord was born through the influx of the Spirit onto the Virgin] 1264; The Holy Spirit, therefore, participated in the Incarnation. Then, having said that Christ died in that quod suscepit ex Virgine [that he received from the Virgin], and not in that quod habebat ex Patre [that he had from the Father], died in that quo crucifixus est Christus [in which Christ was crucified], Ambrose directly continues: Spiritus autem Sanctus non potuit crucifigi, qui carnem et ossa non habuit [But the Holy Spirit, Who did not have flesh and bones, could not be crucified], is proof that, completely in the spirit of ancient Western writers, the concept Spiritus [Spirit] is still applied by them in relation to the Person of the Incarnate. But who is this Spiritus [Spirit]? Undoubtedly, not Filius Dei [Son of God], because, having said that the Holy Spirit could not die, Ambrose immediately adds: sed crucifixus est Dei Filius, qui carnem et ossa suscepit [but the Son of God was crucified, who took on flesh and bones]. So it is clear that in Christ there was both Spiritus [Spirit] and Filius Dei [Son of God], as two different Subjects; then, Filius Dei [Son of God] stood in closer relation to humanity than Spiritus [Spirit], because the first was carnem et ossa suscepit [took on flesh and bones], and the second was carnem et ossa non habuit [had no flesh and bones] 1265. Ambrose says the same thing a little higher: “The Spiritus Sanctus [Holy Spirit] did not die (in the Incarnate), who could not die because he did not take on flesh, and there could not be a participation in death sempiterna divinitas [the eternal Divinity], but Christ died secundum carnem [according to the flesh] Christ” 1266. The Spirit in Christ obviously stood only in external relations to humanity. Ambrose does not go into further explanation and the meaning of his words is not entirely clear. But still, in his words we can seem to see the remnants of binitarianism, adapted to the new contemplation. Further, the ancient Western identification of Sermo-Spiritus [Word-Spirit] in Tertullian is associated with the idea that Spiritus [Spirit] is separated from Sermo [Word] from the moment of the Resurrection and Ascension of the Incarnate One to heaven 1267, existing then in the form of a completely different and non-merging Hypostasis with Him; therefore Tertullian, identifying, on the one hand, Sermo-Spiritus [Word-Spirit], on the other, speaks of Spiritus [Spirit] as tertium nomen divinitatis et tertium gradus majestatis [the third name of the Divinity and the third degree of [Divine] greatness] 1268. Probably, on this idea of ​​the original identity of Sermo-Spiritus [Word-Spirit], Western writers developed the doctrine of the origin of the Holy Spirit not only from the Father, but also from the Son, and precisely for the most part from the Father through the Son: The Holy Spirit, according to Tertullian, non aliunde [from some other place] comes quam a Patre per Filium [as from the Father through the Son] 1269. In Ambrose, on the issue of the procession of the Holy Spirit, there is ambiguity and uncertainty, and this, as in the previous case, is explained by the fact that several traditions converged in his teaching. It is unclear, first of all, when the Holy Spirit came out: then, claiming that Trinitas coaeterna atque perfecta [The Trinity is co-eternal and perfect] 1270, he recognizes the existence of the Holy Spirit, as a special Hypostasis, eternal; then, on the other hand, it speaks of the procession of the Holy Spirit in connection with the words: “He will glorify Me, because He will take of Mine” (John 16:14), and precisely not in the sense of a temporary embassy into the world, but in the sense of the ontological conditionality of existence; this is clear from the fact that Ambrose also speaks here about the birth of the Son from the Father 1271. In this way he reminds us of Tertullian. In general, the question of the procession of the Holy Spirit is almost not considered by him. The same must be said on the question of from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds: sometimes Ambrose simply says that the Holy Spirit in general is ex Deo [from God] 1272, sometimes simply a Patre [from the Father] 1273. But at the same time, he encounters the idea of ​​​​the dependence of the Holy Spirit in his being on the Son: bonus Spiritus, qui accepit ex Filio [the good Spirit who received from the Son...] 1274; in this regard, we are already talking about the procession of the Holy Spirit not only from the Father, but also from the Son: Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Patre et Filio [The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son] 1275, or simply from the Son: procedit ex Filio [comes from the Son] 1276. Having set out separately the teachings of St. Ambrose about God the Son and the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit, we can now turn to the most important question of the entire Trinitarian scheme, namely, the question of how three separate hypostases can be thought of as united in one being. But before expounding his views on this, St. Ambrose, let’s understand the terminology established in the West on this matter. It seems to us that in this regard, representatives of Western theology of the previous time developed two not entirely consistent schemes. One of them was created for the first time by Tertullian and is based on a strict distinction between two related concepts: substance (substantia) and nature (natura). “There is another substance,” says Tertullian, “and another natura substantiae [nature of substance], since each thing has its own substance (substantia est rei cujusque), but nature can be common (natura vero potest esse communis). Let's take an example. Substantia is stone, iron; the hardness of stone and iron is natura substantiae est [is the nature of substance]. Hardness unites, but substance divides” 1277. It is obvious, therefore, that natura [nature] for Tertullian is a common quality belonging to many similar things in some respect; substantia, on the contrary, means any single concrete thing with all the diversity of its individual properties and qualities. By the way, we note that Tertullian very rarely uses the concept of natura [nature] when presenting his doctrine of the Trinity, since it was unnecessary for him given his specific understanding of substance, and he operates almost exclusively with the word substantia. Next. Substantia, as a thing, has its own special qualities that characterize it, and these qualities are of two kinds: general and particular. Fides nominum salus est proprietatum. Etiam cum demutantur qualitates, accipiunt vocabulorum possessiones [Fidelity of names expresses the preservation of properties. If their qualities change, then they receive different names]. Note that proprietas [general quality, essence, lit.] are distinguished here. property] and qualitas [(private) quality], with proprietas being made dependent on nomen [name], and nomen on qualitas. Tertullian illustrates his idea with an example: clay can exist in its natural state and bear a known name (namely the name of clay); but once the same clay changes its natural qualities, for example, by firing, then it receives a new name (name of the vessel) 1278. What does it mean? And the fact that a thing is characterized by certain qualitates [qualities], and the entire set of these qualitates [qualities], giving the thing a certain individual physiognomy, forms its proprietatem, expressed in the name of the thing; therefore, in the language of our time, the proprietas of a thing is the form of existence of a thing; in each thing there can be only one proprietas, while it can have several qualitates. This strict distinction between proprietas and qualitas, noted by Tertullian, does not have much significance in his doctrine of the Trinity and is not always maintained by him, but we consider it our duty to note it, since later, for example, in Ambrose, it acquired very great importance. The best illustration for understanding the Trinitarian scheme are those analogies that Tertullian points out. Namely: the Father gives birth to the Son, as a root gives birth to a trunk (radix fruticem), a source - a river (fons fluvium), the sun - a ray (sol radium); and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as fruit comes from a root from a trunk (a radice fructus ex frutice), as a stream flows from a source from a river (a fonte rivus ex flumine), as light comes from a ray from the sun (a sole apex ex radio) 1279. In the language of Tertullian, the root with the trunk and the fruit, and the source with the river and stream, and the sun with the ray and light, as internally connected and inseparable from each other, form one indivisible substantiam [substance], which has only one proprietatem [property] peculiar to it. The substance itself is indivisible (indivisa) 1280. But both in the above analogies, and in the Divine substance, there are separate, but not separable from each other, moments: the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, and these separate moments are called indifferently either species [species] or forma [form]: and fons et flumen duae species sunt [the source and the river represent two species], but are indivisible (indivisae), and sol et radius duae formae sunt [the sun and the ray are two forms], but connected (cohaerentes); one species [species] or one forma [form] is inseparable (non est separatum) from another species [species] or another forma [form] 1281. Since in the Divine essence these species are rationally conscious beings, they are also called personae. In the Trinity one must thus distinguish between alium [other], alium [other] and alium [other]; but alium, non quasi separatum, sed dispositione alium, non divisione [other not as if separated, but different in order, and not in the sense of division] 1282; the connection of the Father in the Son and the Son in the Paraclete creates tres cohaerentes, alterum ex altero [Three united One to Another] and these tres unum sint, non unus [Three are One, not One]. The existence in the Trinity of separate species [species], or personae [persons], excludes their singularity (singularitas); but their existence in one substance (unitas substantiae) adequately determines their unity in essence 1283. Note that a term equivalent to the concept of unitas substantiae [unity of substance] for Tertullian is also the concept of similitudo [similarity]: this is unitas [unity] and conjunctio [connection] 1284, which has nothing in common with the later Homianism. If the unity of Persons is already sufficiently ensured by the unitate substantiae [unity of substance], then to the same extent it is guaranteed by the interrelation of species [species] among themselves. From this point of view, the Father is the whole substance, and the Son is a part and outflow of it: Pater enim tota substantia est, Filius vero derivatio totius et portio 1285. The Father alone has no beginning (initium), while the rest received their beginning from Him 1286. In this regard, if a unit exasperates the Trinity (unitas ex semetipsa derivans trinitatem), then it is not destroyed in so far as the singulare et unicum imperium [sovereignty of one] continues to be preserved in it 1287. The Son and the Holy Spirit are subordinate to the Father, since they act ex auctoritate Patris et voluntate [according to the authority and will of the Father] 1288. This position of Persons according to the conditionality or unconditionality of their existence, as well as according to their significance in the Divine Monarchy, is denoted by the term gradus [degree] 1289, and the whole quintessence of Tertullian’s Trinitarian scheme is expressed in the formula: tres autem non statu, sed gradu; nec substantia, sed forma; nec potestate, sed specie: unius autem substantiae, et unius status, et unius potestatis; quia unus Deus, ex quo et gradus isti et formae et species, in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti deputantur [They are three not in essence, but in degree; not in substance, but in form; not in power, but in kind: one substance, one nature, one power, because there is one God, from whom come these degrees, forms and species under the names of Father, Son and Holy Spirit] 1290. To complete this scheme, let us add that, despite the strong emphasis on unitas substantiae [unity of substance], the individual characteristics of the species are very poorly understood and are determined not ontologically, but almost exclusively economically, by gradus [degrees], by position in the monarchy, and then without a clear distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit. Another trinitarian scheme is presented to us by Novatian’s treatise “De Trinitate” [“On the Trinity”]. In appearance and formally, it has a lot in common with the previous one, almost always using the same terms and basic concepts. Thus, Novatian knows in God personarum distinctio, diversitas personae [difference of Persons] 1291. He also characterizes the relationship between the Persons of the Holy Trinity in a sharply subordinate sense: the Father is the One, not knowing the origin (solus originem nesciens), the One who (stands) outside the origin (extra originem est). In an ontological sense, in relation to the Son, He is His principle (principium); The Son received from Him the beginning of his birth before all time (principium nativitatis ante omne tempus accepit) and, thus, owes his origin to the Father (Patri suo originem suam debens) 1292. In the economic sense, the Son is an imitator of all the Father’s deeds (imitator est Filius omnium operum paternorum) 1293, obeys all the Father’s commands and instructions (imperils paternis omnibus et praeceptis obedit), is a servant of the Father’s will (paternae voluntatis, ex quo est, minister) 1294; if He has power (potestatem), it is exclusively in the capacity of devotion (traditam), entrusted (indultam) to Him from the Father 1295; even His divinitas [Divinity] is divinitas [Divinity] transmitted and bestowed (tradita et porrecta) by the Father 1296. But Novatian puts his own special content into all these formulas, which is not consistent with the spirit of Tertullian. Namely, he, much less than his teacher, defends the idea of ​​the numerical unity of the Divine substance and conditions it by the agreement of communication (societatis concordiam), like-mindedness and communication of love (concordiam et eamdem sententiam, caritatis societatem), agreement, love, unity of agreement (per concordiam, per amorem, per dilectionem, concordiae unitatem) 1297. Consequently, while the unity of the Trinity in Tertullian appears to be ontological (to put it roughly, one might even say physical) and has an absolute character, in Novatian, on the contrary, it has a more moral character. If the first Tertullian Trinitarian scheme can be recognized as specifically Western, then the second Novatian, although revealed in the West, in some respects reveals points of contact with Eastern theology; it was probably created under the influence of the theology of Irenaeus, on which Novatian generally depends greatly; An indirect confirmation of this can be the fact that the motivation of the birth of the Son by the will of the Father, which we noted above in Novatian, belongs to quite characteristic features of the Irenaeus system. If we now turn to St. Ambrose, then without much difficulty we note that his own scheme is essentially the same as Tertullian’s. An analysis of his basic Trinitarian terms should confirm this. Let's start with the word natura [nature]. “All flying creatures belonging to the same genus (ejusdem generis) also have the same nature (ejusdem utique et nuturae sunt), so that all eagles have one genus and one nature (unum genus et una natura est), as do kites and the rest of the flying creatures according to their genus” 1298. It is clear that, in the opinion of St. Ambrose, natura is that which belongs to many individuals of the same genus (generis) and in its content and volume is no different from the genus [genus]; and this is essentially the same as what we noted in Tertullian. Natura is a general concept under which each particular concept is subsumed in order to explain the latter. “If I generally say: Son and do not add whose Son, then we can understand (by this) the son of man and the son of unrighteousness, and the son of destruction, and the son of the devil... And therefore in the name of sons there is no expression denoting the nature. But if I want to designate naturam [nature], then I will either name a person, or I will name a horse, or a bird, so that one can understand what kind of nature we are talking about” 1299. Ambrose connects a completely different meaning with the concept of substantia [substance, essence]. “What is οὐσία,” he asks, “if not οὖσα ἀεί, that is, that which always abides? But that which exists and always exists is God, and therefore the always abiding οὐσία is called divina substantia" 1300. Here, for now, the material content of the concept is only determined, but its relationship to the subject is not yet indicated. The same meaning is found in “De incarnationis Dominicae Sacramento” [“On the Mystery of the Lord’s Incarnation”]: “When the οὐσία of God is spoken of, what else does this signify, if not that God always exists? The letters themselves express this, because vis divina [Divine power], as οὖσα ἀεί, that is, as always occurring, is called οὐσία (a word derived from οὖσα ἀεί) by changing the order of the letters for the sake of euphony, brevity and beauty of speech" 1301. But the bishop’s next words sound significantly different: “Perfect is the Father, Who always abides. Therefore, in Greek we speak of His οὐσία due to the fact that He always exists, or in Latin we speak of His substantia, since He abides by His own power and does not exist with the help of others” 1302. Here substantia is already clearly identified with the Hypostasis of the Father, and Ambrose’s words resemble Tertullian’s famous Pater tota substantia [The Father is all substance], only in a somewhat softened form. Both in understanding the word natura [nature] and in defining the concept substantia [substance, essence], Ambrose thus follows a completely different path than the Cappadocians: firstly, using the concepts of φύσις [nature] and οὐσία [essence] indifferently, they, unlike Ambrose, do not try to distinguish them in a certain way 1303; secondly, if for Ambrose substantia is identified with the Hypostasis of the Father, then for the Cappadocians οὐσία is a generic concept that stands above the concept of Hypostasis and subordinates it to itself. For all people, says St. Vasily, there is οὐσία μία [one essence]; οὐσία [essence], therefore, is a material subject (τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον), which becomes an individual thing, an individual being only due to the addition of certain distinctive properties to it (ἰδιωμάτων) 1304 , it is the common, τὸ κοινόν of every thing 1305. In its meaning, the Cappadocian concept of οὐσία [essence] coincides with Ambrose’s idea of ​​natura [nature]; he sometimes uses the expression communis [common] in relation to the naturae [nature] of the Persons of the Holy Trinity 1306, but nowhere does he speak of communis substantia [common substance]. His substantia [substance, essence] is to some extent covered by what St. Vasily calls ὑπόστασις [hypostasis]; this hypostasis for him is τὸ κοινὸν καὶ ἀπερίγραπτον ἐν τῷ τινὶ πράγματι [general and unlimited in some thing], depicted through ἰδιώματα [distinctive properties] 1307; we say: only to a certain extent, because the Cappadocian ὑπόστασις [hypostasis] is οὐσία [essence] together with its individual characteristics. As for Didymus, he stands here closer to Ambrose than St. Basil: mixing in the spirit of the Old Nicene the concepts of οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, he sometimes speaks of πατρικὴ οὐσία [Father's essence] of the Holy Trinity 1308. But in view of the above, the significance of this similarity should not be overestimated, since, completely independently of Didymus, St. Ambrose had a very authoritative precedent in the West for his Trinitarian scheme. A further point in the concept of the word substantia [substance, essence] constitutes its proprieties [property]. “If you call created or created, which is sometimes said about the Son (of God), then in view of the fact that many are created or created, this signifies non proprietatem substantiae [not a property of a substance], but speciem qualitatis [a type of quality]. Aliud enim substantia, aliud qualitas est [For one is substance, and the other is quality]" 1309. These words of St. Ambrose cannot leave any doubt that 1) the individual image of the existence of this or that thing must be strictly distinguished from the proprietatem substantiae [properties of the substance] of this thing; So what 2) this proprietas [property] in the essence of the matter is nothing other than the substantia [substance] itself. Elsewhere, Ambrose identifies proprietatem substantiae [property of substance] with the unity of the being of God, 1310, obviously showing that proprietas refers to those properties of a substance without which it loses its character of Divinity. That the Father and the Son are one is determined per substantiae proprietatem [property of substance] 1311. Sometimes, instead of proprietas substantiae [properties of substance], we are talking about proprietas divinitatis [property of divinity], since in God divinitas [Divinity] and substantia [substance, essence] coincide, and the meaning remains exactly the same as in the previous case: et virtus Dei in divinitatis proprietate est [and the power of God is in the property of Divinity] 1312. Further, proprietatem deitatis [property of the Divine] is formed by the concepts: generatio [birth], Deus [God], Filius [Son], Verbum [Word] 1313 - again proof that proprietas is not an individual property of individual hypostases, since it combines such different properties in the hypostatic sense as generatio [birth] and Filius-Verbum [Son-Word], and therefore stands above these characteristics. Since in Ambrose we encountered Tertullian’s identification of substance with the Hypostasis of the Father, now we have the right to expect from him an identification of proprietatis substantiae [properties of substance] with proprietas [properties] of the Father alone. And we actually encounter such an identification: generatio [birth], which was declared above as proprietas divinitatis [the property of Divinity], is considered paterna proprietas [the Father's property], - generatio autem paternae proprietatis est [Birth belongs to the Father's property] 1314. The conclusion from all this is obvious: as with Tertullian, the proprietas [property] of the Divine substance is what makes this substance precisely the Divine substance; the whole set of its most essential and necessary properties; Among them, by the way, is the property of giving birth to the Son, being One, etc. Actually, in Tertullian, such an act of Divine life as generatio [birth] is not yet considered proprietas substantiae [property of substance], although the concept of proprietas [property] was put forward by him; Yes, this could not have happened by the very essence of his Trinitarian position. From the example of Ambrose, we can now observe how, as at the height of the anti-Arian polemic, the concept of Divine birth rose to the height of the concept of the immanent properties of the Deity, in the West it was included as a separate sign in the broader concept of proprietas substantiae [property of substance]. Ambrose proves his point with the analogy of human birth: “From the example of human birth, we observe that the weak can have sons, and the stronger can not have them; slaves can have, but masters cannot; the poor may have it, while influential people may not have it” 1315. “Between people themselves, to have or not to have sons is not a matter of power (non potentiae esse), but of paternae proprietatis [of paternal quality]; for the ability to give birth is not in the power of our will, but in the corporis qualitas [the quality of the body]: if this were a matter of power, then the more powerful would have many (sons)” 1316. Due to the identification of substance with the Father and the attribution of birth to the number of proprietas [properties] of this substance, Ambrose very often speaks of the birth of the Son from the substance of the Father: The Son ex Patris processit substantia, et in ipso est semper [came from the substance of the Father and abides in Him forever] 1317; speaks of the Father as the root of the Son: Father – radix est Filii [root of the Son] 1318; calls the Father the Source of the Son and His Root: Pater fons Filii est, radix Pater Filii est [The Father is the source of the Son, the Father is the root of the Son] 1319. Such expressions in Ambrose are not applied to the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit and there is no talk at all about His proceeding from the Father, as a proprietas substantiae [property of substance]; but this only reveals a weak side in his teaching about the Holy Spirit, which he, we repeat once again, did not closely connect with the Divine substance. The above expressions of Ambrose about the Son somewhat remind us of the Old Nicenes and after them Didymus, who, with his characteristic instability of dogmatic terminology, along with the expressions that the Son was born ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ πατρός [from the Hypostasis of the Father] 1320, mixing ὑπόστασις [hypostasis] with οὐσία [ousia, essence], also uses expressions about birth ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας πατρός, ἐκ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας πατρός [from the Father’s ousia, from all the Father’s ousia] 1321; he also speaks of ῥίζα τῆς πατρικῆς οὐσίας [the root of the Father's ousia, essence] 1322. St. has Ambrose in this case also has something in common with the Cappadocians, although to a much lesser extent: we mean all those cases where St. Basil speaks of the Father as the beginning and cause (αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχή) of the Son 1323, as of the source (πηγή) of the Son 1324 - concepts are not unknown and St. Gregory the Theologian 1325. However, in essence, neither the Old Nicenes, nor Didymus, nor the Cappadocians could have had much significance in the formation of Ambrose’s ideas. The main significance in this case must be attributed exclusively to Tertullian. This is further confirmed by the fact that Ambrose, among many other trinitarian analogies, cites the same ones that we have already noted in Tertullian: the Father begat the Son, and the Son did not beget anyone from himself, because et fons fluvium generat, et fluvius fontem ex se ipse non generat [a source gives birth to a river, but a river does not give birth to a source from itself] 1326; this analogy also applies to the Holy Spirit, who is compared to a river flowing from a source 1327. If, in addition, there is a similarity between him and the Old Nicenes and Didymus, then it can be explained, quite the opposite, by the influence of Western writers on the latter. This, of course, is only an assumption, but it still has some basis in the fact that in the East the struggle for the Nicene symbol was carried out with the full sympathy of the West, and sometimes even with its assistance. As for the Cappadocians themselves, unlike them, Ambrose not only does not show a tendency to use terms that literally correspond to their concepts αἰτία [cause] and ἀρχή [beginning], but also puts the Son in completely different relationships to the Divine essence than they did. After all, among the Cappadocians, the Son is the product not of the Divine substance, as with Ambrose, not of οὐσία [ousia, essence], which has the meaning only of what is mentally represented in individual hypostases, but only of a special ἰδιότητος, ἰδιώματος [properties] of this essence - πατρότητος [fatherhood] (St. Basil). The Cappadocians do not know the formula for the birth of the Son ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας πατρός [from ousia, the essence of the Father], invariably pointing to the birth of the Son simply from the Father: ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ ὁ πατήρ [the beginning of the Son is the Father] 1328. Therefore, while at St. Ambrose, the participation of the Son in the Divine substance turns out to be very clear and obvious; in St. Basil, as Hall rightly put it, “it remains unclear how, if πατρότης [fatherhood] is not the definition of οὐσία [ousia, essence] itself, πατήρ [Father], how exactly πατήρ [Father], through birth (γέννησις), can produce ϑεότης [Divinity] of the Son" 1329. The attitude of the Cappadocians to the Tertullian analogies adopted by Ambrose is also characteristic. We learn about this from St. Gregory, who does not dare to use the analogy of a spring, a key and a stream (ὀφϑαλμόν, καὶ πηγήν, καὶ ποταμόν), by the way, and for fear of introducing numerical unity into the Trinity, since the spring, the spring and the stream constitute one in number (ἕν ἐστιν ἀριϑμῷ), being only depicted in different ways (διαφόρως σχηματιζόμενα) 1330; Ambrose built his entire scheme on this. The divine substantia [substance, essence], despite its unity, still contains several separate moments: these moments, introducing diversity into it, in the language of Ambrose, as in the language of Tertullian, are called its qualitates, qualities. The difference in qualitates depends on the difference in the manner in which the various moments of substance arise. “When I call the Son, I designate by this the Begotten, in the same way, when I name the Father, I declare (by this) that He gave birth. So, do not allow in this case a difference in nature (naturae discretionem), since this is the designation (significatorium) of the One who gave birth and the Begotten; and the designations (significatoria) of this kind express substantiae qualitatem [the quality of the substance]” 1331. In exactly the same sense as the term qualitas substantiae [quality of substance], Ambrose also uses the term species substantiae [kind of substance], and in this case, remaining completely faithful to the spirit of the Tertullian tradition. Having said that each kind of flying has its own general nature, he immediately after this continues: “(Concerning) how they began to exist (quemadmodum ... autem coeperunt esse) flying, we discover (between them) tres species [three species] and learn that the reasons for their origin are different (ortus eorum causas legimus esse diversas)... Thus, those belonging to the same genus began their existence in different ways (diverso modo esse coepisse): some (emerged) from water, others from earth, others through sexual fertilization, etc.” 1332 This quomodo coepisse [how they began (to exist)], as a condition for the formation of individual species, applies to the Persons of the Holy Trinity: “Οὐσία means that God always exists; The name (appellatio) of the unborn (ingeniti), as you wish (against the Arians), or the born (geniti) explains quomodo sit [how He exists], that is, that the Father does not exist ex alio [from Another], and not ex se [from Himself] the Son. Here species [species] are different (diversa). However, although the species are separate (distincta), Divinity remains indivisible (sed indistincta divinitas)” 1333. If, in addition, Ambrose also uses the term persona [Person], then by it, in the essence of the matter, he means the same species [type] - qualitas substantiae [quality of substance]. It should be noted that Ambrose’s trinitarian position, common with Tertullian, namely his concept of substantia [substance], was far from conducive to a precise definition of the individual characteristics of each of the hypostases. Here his position was even less favorable than that of Tertullian, because if the latter could not find a strong metaphysical support, he still found it in his doctrine of Divine economy or monarchy; for Ambrose this last motive no longer mattered. Moreover, we will very soon see that he, as sharply as only a few of the church writers, defended the absolute equality of the Hypostases and the identity of their actions. To some extent, the Cappadocians, who stood on solid ground in the matter of distinguishing Hypostases, helped him get out of this helplessness. Already from them, probably, comes the principle adopted by Ambrose for distinguishing the Hypostases, as quomodo sit [how they exist]. It is St. Basil the Great, in contrast to the Eunomians, who derived from the difference between the concepts “born” and “unborn” the difference in the essence of the Born and the Unborn, put forward the position that these names mean not what God is (τί ἐστιν), but how God exists (ὅπως ἐστίν) 1334. Ambrose depends on Vasily partly in the field of terminology expressing hypostatic differences in properties. But even with all this, in determining the distinctive features of the Hypostases, he did not manage to catch up with the Cappadocians. St. Basil, although he is suspicious of the concept “unborn” (ἀγέννητος), nevertheless considers it to be close to Orthodox concepts and therefore uses it in relation to the Father in the sense that the Father does not come from anyone else (μόνος ἐξ οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐτέρου) 1335 ; Likewise, Ambrose condemns this term as not attested by the authority of Scripture (ingenitum in Scripturis divinis nusquam invenio) 1336, but still sometimes uses it in the same sense as Basil 1337. The expression of Basil regarding the Son “Born” - γεννηϑείς 1338, γεννητός 1339 in general in Ambrose corresponds to genitus, generatus in the sense of descent from the Father 1340, although it must be borne in mind that the term genitus has been used since ancient times in the West and is very often found, for example, in Novatian: genitus [Born] 1341, genitus a Patre [born of the Father] 1342. We do not find anything corresponding to Basil’s expression about the Son γέννημα [begetting] 1343 in Ambrose, just as we do not find traces of Basil’s famous ἰδιώματα in him: πατρότης [fatherland], υἱότης [sonship] and ἀγιαστικὴ δύναμις [sanctifying power] 1344. Even less can we find in him the very usual designation of Hypostases in St. Gregory: ἀγεννησία [unbornness], γέννησις [birth] and ἐκπόρευσις [origin] 1345. In some terminological dependence, Ambrose also stands on Didymus: just as the latter, to designate the Hypostasis of the Father, preferably uses the participial form γεννήσας [Giving birth] 1346, so Ambrose uses the participial form generans [Giving birth] 1347. Along with these, ancient Western expressions are often used for the Hypostasis of the Son: natus [Born] 1348, ex Patre natus [Born from the Father] 1349, as in Novatian - ex Patre natus [Born from the Father] 1350; or ex Patre nascendo prodit [comes from the Father through birth] 1351 the same in the spirit of Novatian 1352. But the extent to which Ambrose failed to achieve clarity in this case can be seen from the fact that the same concept processit [came out] is used indifferently by him both in relation to the Holy Spirit and in relation to the Son: Filius a Patre processit [The Son came from the Father] 1353; this is again explained by the fact that for a long time in the West the term processit [came] was used in such an indifferent sense, as can be seen from the writings of the same Novatian 1354. So, it is clear that Ambrose affirms the unity of the Divine substantiae [substance, essence] and the trinity of Persons. In his words, in the Trinity there is unitas [unity], but there is no singularitatis [uniqueness, loneliness], because unitas denotes the unity of substance, and singularitas refers ad personam [to the Person], the same as we have already met in Tertullian; the absence of singularitatis does not violate the unity of essence, because plura [plurality] exists where diversae substantiae sunt [different substances] 1355. As far as essence is concerned, there is una atque eadem substantia Trinitatis [one and the same substance of the Trinity] 1356; plenitudo divinitatis in Filio, non discrepans, sed una divinitas [the fullness of the Godhead in the Son, not different [any], but one Godhead]; nec confusum, quod unum est: nec multiplex, quod indifferens [that which is one is not disordered, and that which is indifferent is not plural] 1357. Sempiternae divinitatis in Patre et Filio inseparabilis unitas [The indivisible unity of the eternal Divinity in the Father and the Son] 1358. Father and Son distinctionem habent [have differences], like Father and Son, but do not have separationem divinitatis [distinctions of the Godhead] 1359. In the Father and the Son nulla distantia divinitatis [there is no difference of the Godhead] 1360. Trinitatis una deitas [One Deity of the Trinity] 1361. Deltas [Divinity] of the Father and the Son una et eademque [one and the same] 1362. God the Father inseparabilis [undivided] to the Word, inseparabilis [undivided] by power, inseparabilis [undivided] by wisdom per divinae unitatem substantiae [thanks to the unity of the Divine substance]; To them belongs non duae divinitates, sed una divinitas [not two divinities, but one divinity] 1363. Indistincta distinctae incomprehensibilis et inenarrabilis substantia Trinitatis [Indistinguishable substance of the discernible incomprehensible and inexplicable Trinity]. One should know the distinctionem [difference] of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, but not the confusionem [mixture]; distinctionem [difference], but not pluralitatem [plurality] 1364. The Persons of the Holy Trinity represent unum in unitate substantiae, sed distinctione uniuscujusque personae [one in the unity of substance, but with the difference of each Person]. Trinitas [Trinity] means distinctio personarum [difference of Persons] 1365. In the Trinity there is sola divinitas [one Godhead]; alius [other] Father, alius [other] Son and alius [other] Holy Spirit; solum [one (God)] makes divinitas [Divinity], a generatio [Birth] – Father and Son 1366. Unus Deus, quia una Deitas [One God, because there is one Deity] 1367. Between the Father and the Son there is a generationis distinctio [difference of Birth] 1368. The technical terms for expressing this unity of substance with the existence of separate hypostases in Ambrose are the words ὁμοούσιος [consubstantial] and similis [similar], similitudo [similarity]. Ὁμοούσιος presupposes both unity and difference. “It is in vain that some reject the word ὁμοούσιος because of the Sabellians and in this they reveal their inexperience, because ὁμοούσιος can be (something) not in relation to itself, but in relation to one to another. Therefore we rightly call the Son ὁμοούσιον [consubstantial] with the Father, since this word denotes both the difference of Persons (et personarum distinctio) and the unity of nature (naturae unitas)” 1369. Ambrose does not provide further analysis of the concept. The concept similis [similar], similitudo [similarity] also denotes substantial unity. Similis [similar] means similarity per omnia [in everything], not secundum speciem [in appearance], but secundum veritatem [in truth]; not secundum partem [in part], but secundum plenitudinem divinitatis et perfectionem similis sit Filius Patri [in the fullness of Divinity and perfection, the Son is like the Father]. This is similitudo secundum naturam [similarity by nature], in contrast to similitudo secundum imitationem [similarity by imitation], - similitudo [similarity], even extending to unitatem naturae atque substantiae [unity of nature and substance] 1370. The very concept of similitudo [similarity] was used in the West, as we have seen, in the same sense earlier, so that if Didymus and St. Vasily very often operates with a similar concept of ὅμοιος, then they could not tell Ambrose anything new; but still the motivation, the explanation of the possibility of a substantial similitudinis [similarity] of the Father to the Son reminds us of the motivation of Didymus and Basil. The latter, in explaining this, used the same analogies with which he illustrated the eternity of Birth. It is impossible, he says, for a radiance (ἀπαύγασμα) to be incommunicable by nature (τοῦ ἀκοινωνήτου κατὰ τὴν φύσιν) 1371; Christ is called radiance (ἀπαύγασμα) and the image of the Hypostasis (χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως), so that we recognize from this the consubstantial (τὸ ὁμοούσιον) 1372 . This motivation is found even more often in Didim. And the image of the Hypostasis (καὶ χαρακτὴρ ὑποστάσεως) means identity (τὸ ταὐτὸν) and indistinguishability (ἀπαράλλακτον) of nature (τῆς φύσεως) 1373; and, as the image of the Hypostasis, the Son is an image in everything (πρὸς ἅπαντα χαρακτήρ) 1374. Similarly, Ambrose proves the similitudinem [similarity] of the Hypostases with the concepts splendor [brilliance], character [imprint], speculum [mirror], imago [image] 1375. “The Son of God is called imago et splendor, et character, because these (names) reveal in Him the incomprehensible and unsearchable Divinity of the Father’s greatness and expressam similitudinem [an expression of His likeness]” 1376. One nature (una natura) and radiance and light 1377. Actually, by this Ambrose has already adequately established the co-substantiality of the Divine Hypostases, and this would be quite sufficient if his concepts of natura [nature] and substantia [substance, essence] coincided. But with the distinction that Ambrose makes between these concepts, the unity of substance does not yet guarantee the unity of naturae [nature]. He himself could have noticed, or the Arians could have pointed out to him, that different species [species] of a single substance can diverge so much in their individual properties that they do not fit the concept of una natura [one nature]. From here Ambrose had the task of proving that that, quod unius est substantiae, separari non potest [that which belongs to a single substance cannot be divided] 1378. This probably also explains the fact that the concept of natura [nature], which was generally little used in Tertullian’s Trinitarian scheme, occupies a central place in the teaching of Ambrose: after all, Tertullian against Praxeus had enough to show that what comes from substance is in a certain sense aliud [other], and moreover, against the reproach of polytheism, to prove that this aliud [other] still cannot to be separable from substance, which was easy to verify from the very concept of substance. This was not enough for Ambrose: in order to protect himself from the Arians, he needed to show not only that what came from the substance is aliud [other] constituting unity with it, but also that this aliud [other] and the substance that produced it are completely identical in their essential properties and, therefore, have unam naturam [one nature]. In this his task partly coincided with the task of the Cappadocians. Therefore, he used the arguments that he found from the latter. The unity of the nature of the Hypostases in Gregory the Theologian was, among other things, proved by reference to the example of Adam and his descendants, who originated in different ways, but have the same essence; therefore, things that happened differently can be of the same essence ( ἐνδέχεσϑαι) 1379 . From him this analogy passed on to Didymus: Adam and Eve, unborn and without a father, were, however, by nature (τῇ φύσει) equal to us who were born from them 1380; Seth was not ἑτεροούσιος [another entity] in relation to Adam 1381. Probably, through Didymus, this analogy passed to Ambrose. “Adam, although he was formed from the dirt of the earth, gave birth to sons suae consortes naturae [participating in his nature]... Consequently, in the sons and the father the principles are different, but humanae conditionis una natura [one nature of the human condition]... If the son (among people) is similar to the father in that, due to the weakness of the humanae conditionis [human condition], he cannot have complete similarity (similitudinis plenitudinem), then how can the True Son be unlike God the Father? 1382 Ambrose points to the analogy of the flesh of Christ. “What can be so related in nature (unius naturae) as our body to the reality of the flesh of Christ? Both arose from different reasons, from different principles: the flesh of the Lord was born by the influx of the Holy Spirit onto the Virgin and did not expect the usual intercourse between a man and a woman; our body, unless the male and female seeds capable of producing children cover the natural receptacles, cannot be formed in the mother’s entrails. And yet, although the cause of birth in both cases was different, the flesh in Christ is una natura est [one nature] with all people” 1383. There is also a reference to the unity of husband and wife and to the unity of believers. “If all who believed, as it is written, had one soul and one heart; if everyone who cleaves to the Lord is unus spiritus [one spirit], as the Apostle said; if husband and wife in the flesh are one; if all men, so far as nature is concerned (ad naturam pertinet), have one substance; if Scripture says about the human that the many are one, while there can be no comparison of the Divine with the human; then much more are the Father and the Son One in Divinity, with whom there is no difference either substantiae [substance] or voluntatis [will]” 1384. Finally, the analogy of Paul and Apollos serves the same purpose. “How do (the Arians) try to deny that the Father and the Son are one, when Paul and Apollos are one both by nature (natura) and by faith? But the latter (unlike God) cannot be one in everything (per omnia), because the human cannot be compared with the Divine” 1385. “Although two people (can be called) unius naturae [of the same nature] by right of birth, they differ in time, and thoughts, and deeds, and place; and therefore, to designate two people, the name unus homo [one person] cannot be used, since unitas [unity] does not take place there, where diversitas [difference] exists. God is called One, and this signifies the glory and fullness of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit" 1386. “Between people or in people there is unitas [unity] of only one thing: either love or desire, or flesh, or piety and faith; generalis [universal] but unitas [unity] and that which secundum divinitatis gloriam [according to the glory of the Divine] embraces everything in itself, belongs only to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit" 1387. Having thus affirmed the unity of the nature and essence of the Hypostases, Ambrose attributes the same predicates to all of them, of course, except for those that characterize the image of origin and existence of each of them. Here he also has points of contact with the Cappadocians and Didymus. All three Persons have una voluntas [one will] 1388, since the unity of substance determines between them idem velle, nolle, posse [what They want, do not want and can do the same thing] 1389; in Didymus we are talking about μία ϑέλησις [single will, desire] 1390. Then the Hypostasis unites una virtus [single power] (Ambrose) 1391, μία δύναμις (Didim) 1392, ἡ δύναμις ἴση (St. Basil) 1393; una operatio [one action] (Ambrose) 1394, una operatio (Didim) 1395, ἴση ἐνέργεια (St. Basil) 1396; una gloria [one glory] (Ambrose) 1397, μία δόξα (Didim) 1398, οὖτε ἡ δόξα διαμερίζεται, ὁμόδοξος, συνδοξαζόμενος (St. Basil) 1399; una dominatio [one dominion, dominance] (relatively rare Ambrose) 1400, μία δεσποτεία (Didim) 1401; unum regnum, unum imperium [one kingdom, one power] (Ambrose) 1402, μία βασίλεια (Didim) 1403, οὔτε τὸ κράτος σχίζεται (St. Vasily) 1404 ; Deus Pater adoratur in Christo, coadorarur in Deo Spiritus, Deus adoratur in Spiritu [God the Father receives worship in Christ, the Spirit receives worship in God, God receives worship in the Spirit] (Ambrose) 1405 1, Didymus also has one προσκύνησις [worship] applies to all Hypostases 1406. Between Ambrose, Didymus and St. Vasily, thus, there is a lot in common here. Still, apparently, Ambrose and Didymus more strongly defend the unity of the predicates of the Hypostases, while St. Vasily only points out the equality of these predicates and all hypostases. But there are two points where Ambrose and the Cappadocians go in different directions. This is, firstly, the question of the relationship of the hypostases with each other. In this regard, the Cappadocians did not completely succeed in freeing themselves from traces of subordinationism. Their doctrine of the Father as a Cause and an imprecise principle in relation to other Persons placed the latter in a certain subordinate relationship to the former. Therefore, the following words of St. sound subordinate. Basil: “The Divine will, rushing as if from some Source of the First Cause (οἷον πηγῆς τινος τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας ἀφορμηϑέν), through The image-Word turns into action" 1407. This is somewhat reminiscent of the previous ante-Nicene concept of the Son as the Executor of the Father's will. In a similar way, the Cappadocians explain all those passages of Holy Scripture that speak of the subordination of the Son to the Father. “I have no father” (John 14:28), - this, according to the explanation of St. Basil, means that the Father is sick (μείζων) of the Son as his ἀρχή and αἴτιος, in relation to Him 1408. The Savior's testimony about Himself: “The Son can do nothing of Himself, unless he sees the Father doing: for whatever He does, the Son also does likewise” (John 5:19) for St. Gregory has the meaning that the Father destined, and the Son carries out what was destined, although not slavishly (οὐ δουλικῶς) 1409. The words of the Apostle: “One God the Father, from (ἐξ) of whom are all things, and we are for Him, and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom (διά) are all things” (1 Cor. 8:6) 1410, as well as the expression: “All things are from (ἐξ) Him, by (διά) and to (ἐν) Him” (Rom. 11:36 ) is explained by St. Basil in the sense that by means of ἐξ [from] the Highest reason is designated (τῆς ἀνωτάτω αἰτίας) 1411, and that in general the difference in prepositions applied to the Hypostases serves as an indicator of the difference, the unmergedness (ἀσύγχυτον) of the concept of the Father and Son 1412; but at the same time, the idea of ​​a difference in nature is still excluded, because each of the listed three prepositions in different places of Scripture is indifferently applied to each of the three Hypostases 1413. In other cases, regarding the places in question, St. Vasily recognizes a certain difference in the creative activity of individual hypostases, if in the Father he sees the original cause (τὴν προκαταρκτικήν αἰτίαν) of existence, in the Son the creative one (δημιουργικήν) and in perfect spirit (τελειωτικήν) 1414. Subordinationian thoughts are also found, but only as an exception, in St. Ambrose. However, they are not only rare, but also stand completely outside of any connection with the general nature of his ideas about the relationships of the Divine Hypostases. Such subordinating thoughts must include, first of all, the remainder of the Origenistic idea of ​​God’s communication with the world through the Son in the Holy Spirit and man’s ascent to God from the Spirit through the Son. “From the One Spirit, through the One Son, our knowledge ascends to the One Father; and from the One Father, through the One Son, in the One Holy Spirit, goodness (bonitas) and sanctification (sanctificatio) and the royal right of eternal power (et imperiale jus aeternae potestatis) are transmitted" 1415. Then this also includes the sometimes expressed view of the Old Testament theophany as manifestations of the Word itself, for the sake of His impending incarnation, while the Father remained invisible 1416, as well as the ideas that we have already encountered once about the impassibility of the Divinity (the Holy Spirit itself) and the suffering of the Son, who took upon Himself human flesh 1417. That's almost all that Ambrose sounds subordinate. As for the first idea, it is either the fruit of direct acquaintance with Origen or passed on to Ambrose from St. Basil, in whom it is still used all the time: “The path of knowledge of God (ὁδὸς τῆς ϑεογνωσίας) extends from the One Spirit, through the One Son to the One Father, while goodness, holiness and royal dignity from the Father through the Only Begotten extends to the Holy Spirit” 1418, is the literal expression of Ambrose. Two other ideas must be attributed to ancient Western, now completely outdated traditions, from which Ambrose, as we see, was not always free: in relation to the Son, Tertullian interpreted the Old Testament Epiphanies, especially strongly emphasizing the invisibility of the Father in contrast to the visibility of the Son 1419 and attributing, in a certain sense, passion to the Son in contrast to the absolutely impassive Father 1420; Novatian also considered it necessary to preserve the Divine Unity to attribute to the Son the property of becoming visible, since otherwise the Son would be equal with the invisible Father (cum invisibili collatus par expressus) and there would be two invisible 1421. Usually, Ambrose knows how to be free from subordinationism. He does not find expressions to adequately designate the absolute equality of the Hypostases. Here he reminds us not of St. Vasily, but rather Didim. They, in general, equally explain those passages of Holy Scripture that gave the Cappadocians reason to consider the Father, as the Cause, to be greater in comparison with other Hypostases. Regarding John 5:19, Ambrose notes: “If the Son, through the common mystery of his nature with the Father, can see and create, and do per plenitudinem divinitatis [according to the fullness of the Divinity [in Him]] what he will, that which remains, unless we believe that per unitatem inseparabilem potestatis [according to the indivisible unity of power] the Son creates only what he sees doing Father; because per inseparabilem caritatem [by undivided love] the Son does not create anything of Himself, for He does not desire anything that is displeasing to the Father; and this is not a revelation of weakness, but of unitatis [unity]” 1422. Consequently, what for the Cappadocians served as proof of the dominance of the Father, in the eyes of Ambrose confirms the unity of power and Divinity. Didymus also gives the same commentary on the passage in question: “The Son, who cannot be separated from the Father, cannot create anything of Himself; Likewise, the Holy Spirit will never be separated from the Son propter voluntatis naturaeque consortium [because of His participation in will and nature]" 1423. Ambrose sees the same meaning in other similar places, for example, in the words of the Savior: “Nevertheless, not as I will, but as You will” (Matthew 26:39): “What the Father does, the Son also does likewise. And he does likewise and does likewise; but still wants the Father to be asked regarding what He Himself intended to do; this should not be seen as evidence of weakness, but unitatem potestatis [unity of power]” 1424. Then, due to the fact that all Hypostases, in the opinion of St. Ambrose, are equal, he applies all those passages of Scripture that directly relate only to one Hypostasis to the entire Trinity: “In the Holy Trinity,” he says, “there is an inseparabilis unitas [inseparable unity] and therefore, where in Scripture either only the Father or Christ, or the Spirit is designated, ibi omnis plenitudo Trinitatis est [the whole fullness of the Trinity is present there]” 1425. We find exactly the same thing in Didymus, according to whose expression “Scripture, due to the identity of Divinity (διά τὸ ταὐτὸν τῆς ϑεότητος) sometimes names (only) one of the Divine Hypostases, and sometimes three” 1426. For both Ambrose and Didymus, everywhere and in everything the Hypostases act inseparably and in exactly the same way. They are inseparable, first of all, in creation. “It is impossible,” says Ambrose in his explanation of 1 Cor. 8:6, “from the difference in the syllables used by the Apostle to conclude about the difference of divinae potestatis [Divine power]; It is certain that through Him are all things, and from Him are all things; and from Whom are all things, through Him are all things; and in Whom are all things, through Him and from Him we must all think. For all creation exists both from Will and through Action and in the Power of the Trinity" 1427. This already sounds somewhat different from the teaching of St. Basil about the mode of participation of the Hypostases in creation, and recalls the main idea of ​​Didymus: each of the Divine Hypostases has the power to create everything perfect; but to show the undivided nature of Their being, creation is filled with the communion of the Holy Trinity 1428. All Hypostases act together and inseparably in the work of redemption and salvation of humanity. According to Ambrose, just as the Father created the sacrament of the Incarnation of the Lord, so the Holy Spirit created, just as it is known about Christ that He Himself created His body 1429; similarly, Didymus conceives of the participation of all three Hypostases in the act of Incarnation 1430. In Ambrose, the Father resurrects the Son, and the Son Himself resurrects, because in the Father and the Son there is una virtus [one power], communis operatio [common action]; una atque eadem substantia [one and the same substance, essence] 1431; and Didymus draws attention to the fact that due to the identity of Divinity and unity of actions ἐνέργειαν) Scripture presents the Resurrection of Christ sometimes as the work of the Father, sometimes as the work of Christ Himself, and sometimes as the work of the Holy Spirit 1432. Ambrose represents communion with Christ together with communion with the entire Trinity: whoever received the Son also received the Father and the Holy Spirit, since una potestas, una gratia, una operatio Trinitatis est [the Trinity has one power, one grace, one action] 1433; Didymus does exactly the same thing: whoever communicates with the Holy Spirit also communicates with the Father and the Son; and whoever receives the grace of the Father has it from the Son, given through the Holy Spirit, because eamdem oregationem esse Patris et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti [the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit have the same action] 1434. Just as for Ambrose, who ascribes the same names to all Hypostases, both the Son and the Holy Spirit are called Paraclete, since unum nomen est Trinitatis et una inseparabilisque praesentia [one name of the Trinity and one and indivisible Her presence] 1435, so in Didymus the Holy Spirit and the Son ἐπίκοινόν ἐστι τοῦ Παρακλήτου τὸ ὄνομα [(acquired) the name Paraclete common to both] 1436. The same tendency is evident in Ambrose if he says that the Father transfers the kingdom to the Son, and the Son to the Father 1437, that as the Father glorifies the Son, so the Son glorifies the Father 1438; The Father betrays the Son and the Son betrays Himself, and likewise the Holy Spirit betrays Him 1439; The Father is light, as are the Son and the Holy Spirit 1440; Father and Son and Holy Spirit bear one name vita [life] 1441; just as the Father is the Source of life (fons vitae), so this title is often applied to the Son and the Holy Spirit 1442. Another question that separates Ambrose and the Cappadocians is the question of the number of the Hypostases of the Holy Trinity. The Cappadocians, again based on their concept of the Father as the beginning of the Trinity, allowed a certain order in the number of Hypostases: The Cause was called the First (πρότερον τὸ αἴτιον), and what came from this cause was considered the Second (δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ), however, not by distance separating them from each other, but only mentally imagining τὸ αἴτιον [Cause] before τοῦ αἰτιάτου [that which is from the Cause] 1443. Didymus, on the contrary, depending on his thought about the absolute equality of the Hypostases, decisively rejects any definite order in their number: “The Holy Books sometimes mention the Father first, then the Son or the Holy Spirit, and sometimes the Son is named First because of the inseparability of nature (διά τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀμέριστον)" 1444. It is easy to guess that in his teaching on the unity of the Divine substance, Ambrose had to take the side of the latter opinion. He denies order in numbers, perhaps even more decisively than Didymus, not at all allowing the application of numerical categories to the Trinity. On the one hand, God is one, but one not numerically (non e numero) 1445, and on the other, the Trinity is non sub numeri lege devincta [bound by the law of number] 1446. In the Trinity, therefore, there cannot be a Second in order: “One God, one name, one Divinity, one glory. Therefore, there is no second, because the Trinity is the principium [beginning] of everything and the Trinitatis primatus [primacy of the Trinity] above all. So, one and not a second, One who has no second" 1447. “There is One God the Father and One Son of God. One and one, because they are not two Gods. One Son, one with the Father... and One Holy Spirit, since unitas Trinitatis est [there is a unity of the Trinity], not divided either by order (non ordine) or by time" 1448. Divina natura [Divine nature] does not perceive the number 1449. “Unitas potestatis [unity of power] excludes numerical quantity, because unitas [unity] is not number (numerus), but itself is the beginning of everything” 1450. And with his teaching about the equality of the Hypostases and the denial of Their numerical order, Ambrose breaks ties with Tertullian’s teaching about different gradus’ax within the Divine Monarchy. “The uncreated and incomprehensible Trinity, which is unius est aeternitatis and gloriae, perceives neither time nor degree (gradum) of the subsequent (posterioris) or the previous (prioris)” 1451. “There one cannot look for degrees of dignity (gradus dignitatis), where the fullness of Divinity exists (plenitudo est divinitatis)” 1452. “Unity (unitas) does not know order (ordinem), and equality does not know degree (gradum)” 1453. Let us now summarize. The teaching of St. Ambrose on the Trinity, in general, is revealed in the basic spirit of Tertullian's Western Trinitarian scheme; Ambrose, however, corrects it with the teaching about the timeless Birth of the Son, a more complete teaching about the Holy Spirit and the equality of the Hypostases. In this case, he depends only to the smallest extent on the Cappadocians, and leans more towards Didymus. The historical merit of St. Ambrose is that he was the first to adapt Tertullian’s scheme to the creed of the first Ecumenical Council. Trinitarian scheme of Hilary, which St. Ambrose found it already ready, characterized by slightly different features and developing on different soil. The relationship between them is defined in approximately the same way as the relationship between Tertullian and Novatian. Orlov’s dissertation, which we have repeatedly cited, quite rightly notes two separate stages in the development of Hilary’s doctrine of the Trinity: its presentation in the commentary on the Gospel of Matthew differs significantly from its edition in the treatise “De Trinitate” [“On the Trinity”] 1454. In the first period of his literary activity, preceding the exile, Hilary expounded the teachings of Novatian almost without any significant changes. He proceeded from the position that the Son was born from the substance of the Father, and at the same time, like Novatian, he distinguished only two moments in the existence of the Word: ex Patris substantia atque intra Patris substantiam [from the substance of the Father and within the substance of the Father] 1455. Then, following the example of Novatian, he attached to the Word the name Filius [Son] even at the first moment of His existence in the substance of the Father, and precisely because of the consideration that received meaning from Novatian: in order for jus [right] and nomen Patris [the name of the Father] to be possible, the Son always existed, since if the Son did not always exist, the Father did not always exist 1456. According to Novatian, further, the birth of the Son was motivated by him exclusively by the will of the Father: nasci autem eum voluntas ejus fuit [it was the will of the Father that the Son should be born]; the moment of birth is also not determined 1457. Finally, the unity of the Son with the Father, again like Novatian, was conceived more morally than substantially, like Tertullian, and was determined not by the unity and inseparability of the Father’s substance, but by the community of Divinity: “Catholic truth proclaims the unitatem Patris et Filii [unity of the Father and the Son] and communem eorum theotetam [their common Divinity], which the Latins call deitatem" 1458. It is possible to point out only one point in which Novatian and Hilary differed from each other: Hilary did not have that sharp, pronounced subordinationism in the relationship of the Son to the Father, which was very strong in Novatian. At least, Hilary explained the Savior’s prayer for the passage of the cup of suffering and for the fulfillment of the will of the Father not in the sense of the subordination of the Son to the Father, but attributed it to the human nature of the Incarnate 1459. In this form, this little original trinitarian scheme has almost nothing in common with the scheme of Ambrose that we have outlined, and therefore there is no need to talk not only about its historical significance in general, but, in particular, about its significance in the formation of Ambrose’s views. In the second period, after exile, under the influence of familiarity with Eastern theology and the needs of the time, Hilary corrected it in approximately the same spirit as Ambrose corrected Tertullian’s scheme. But each of them, apparently, followed his own special path. This already shows their attitude to Trinitarian terminology. In Ambrose, as we have seen, the concepts of substantia [substance, essence], proprietas substantiae [property of substance] and natura [nature] are strictly distinguished, and the starting point of all his reasoning is the first. In Hilary, we not only find the concept of essentia [essence] 1460, alien to Ambrose and ancient Western writers, but at the basis of the entire scheme he puts the concept of natura [nature], as genus [kind, dignity]: he speaks of genus naturae [kind of nature] 1461, about the unity of the Son with the Father in genere naturae [in the genus (dignity) of nature] 1462. As for the concept of substantia [substance, essence], it does not always have the same meaning for Hilary. Sometimes substantia [substance] from the designation of a single and indivisible concrete thing turns into a generic concept of general properties or qualities of many individuals: Hilary himself designates the concepts essentia et natura, et genus, et substantia [essence, nature, genus (dignity), substance] as concepts that are completely equivalent 1463. From this point of view, it is interesting to note the negative attitude already noted by Beck 1464 towards those ancient Tertullian Trinitarian analogies, which were subsequently revived by Ambrose. Hilary rejects them not only because they are not free from the category of spatiality and materiality, but precisely because the objects he designates are numerically indivisible: “They are rather held (together) by an inseparable extension (ab se inseparabili protensione) than to exist by themselves (quam sibi sunt): just as heat exists in fire, and branches in a tree, and a stream in a source. And rather all of them together only constitute one thing, than (each of them) is res ex re substituta [a thing resulting from a thing], because a tree is not other than a branch, and fire is not other than heat, and a source cannot be anything other than a stream” 1465. Sometimes, although substantia [substance, essence] in the spirit of Western tradition differs from natura [nature], nevertheless, expressions are used regarding it that would seem paradoxical not only to Tertullian, but which Ambrose could not agree with; namely, he speaks of the tres substantias [three substances] of the Trinity 1466, obviously bringing the concept of substantia [substance] closer to the ancient Western idea of ​​persona [Person] and only in this connection preserving for the former the former meaning of the concrete form of existence of naturae [nature]. Hilary also encounters another meaning of the word substantia [substance], defined by its relation to the concept proprietas [property]. The concept of proprietas in Ambrose is thought of as a sign within the concept of substantia, and in Hilary proprietas is inextricably linked with natura [nature]: ex proprietate naturae [from the property of nature] 1467 The Son and the Father are not heterogeneous (non aliud sunt), since They are per naturae proprietatem in sese sunt [through the property of nature they abide in themselves] 1468; and the Son and the Father unus et solus [one and only] are due to proprietate in unoquoque et innascibilitatis et originis [properties in each of them of ungeneracy and beginning] 1469. Consequently, just as in Ambrose proprietas [property] is the most essential thing in substance, as indivisible, so in Hilary the concept of proprietas reveals the essential content of the concept natura [nature], as genus [kind, dignity]. Next. “When it is said: There is no God (John 1:1), it means a thing of substance (hie autem res significata substantiae est); because esse [being (here)] is not an accidens nomen [accidental name], but an abiding truth (subsistens veritas), and an abiding cause (et manens causa) and a natural, natural property of the genus (et naturalis generis proprietas)” 1470. Thus, one must distinguish between accidens nomen [accidental name] and veritas [truth] or proprietas [property]; esse [being], or substantia [substance], belongs to the second kind of properties of the naturae [nature] of God: proprietas [property], as the essential content of the Divine naturae [nature], and substantia [substance], as one of the attributes of the latter, partly, therefore, coincide with each other and are placed in a subordinate relationship to naturae [nature]. It is on this basis that the concepts natura [nature] and substantia [substance] are sometimes used one instead of the other: the Father, as the One who gives birth to the Son, is called generans natura [generative nature]; The Son, as having received from the Father all the essential properties of His naturae [nature], therefore also substantiam [substance], is called genita substantia [born substance] 1471 - an expression again unknown to Ambrose, for whom both generans [begetting] and genitum [born] only together form unam substantiam [one substance]. The divine natura [nature], as genus [genus], then exists in indivisible individuals and in each of them receives its own special names, in addition to the name common to all nature: the Father has the name naturae suae [His nature] in the name of the Father that belongs to Him, but only the Father, because He Himself does not borrow His origin from anywhere 1472. From the Father by birth (per nativitatem, ex nativitate) the Son comes. “The Church confesses the Father, Eternal and free from the beginning; He also confesses the beginning of the Son from the Eternal; not Himself without a beginning, but from the Beginningless (ab ininitiabili); not through Himself, but from Him who always exists without dependence on anyone, Born from the Eternal, that is, Who took birth (nativitatem) from the Father’s Eternity” 1473. Again we see differences from Ambrose: if in Ambrose generatio [Birth] is a proprietas substantiae [property of substance], conceived inextricably with this latter, as its essential moment, then in Hilary nativitas [Christmas] does not characterize naturam divinam [the Divine nature] an sich [in itself] and therefore is not called proprietas [properties], but natura divina [Divine nature], existing in Patre [in the Father]; if in the first the divina substantia [Divine substance] itself determines the existence of the Father and the Son together, then in the second the Birth of the Son follows not from the Divine nature itself, but from the properties of the Father; the thinking of Hilary is thus much more reminiscent of the Cappadocians than the language of Ambrose. Finally, it cannot be ignored that while Ambrose designates the act of Divine Birth with the term generatio, Hilary primarily uses the name nativitas. There is a difference between our writers in the expressions they apply to the Father and the Son. As in Ambrose, in Hilary we often find the term ingenitus [Unborn] 1474 for the Father, as well as the expression generans [Giving birth] 1475, but along with this the old Western term innatus [Unborn] 1476, little known to Ambrose, is also used; for the Son, Ambrose’s usual word genitus [Born] 1477 is used relatively rarely, as well as the ancient natus [Born] 1478, but he especially readily uses the word unigenitus [Only Begotten], which Ambrose uses very little 1479. On the question of the relationship of the Son to the Father, Hilary, using the concepts of imago [image], virtus [power], etc., known to Ambrose, often uses the concept of forma Dei [image (form) of God] 1480, which is not found in Ambrose when presenting the Trinitarian problem, although he very often applies it to the Person of the Incarnate; in the Trinitarian scheme he replaces it with the term character [imprint]. Ambrose very often expresses that the Father and the Son are one substance, while Hilary in the period under review almost exclusively talks about the unity of Their nature, about its indifference in both: The Son is inseparable from the Father per naturae indifferentiam [due to the indifference of [Their] nature] 1481; “I and the Father are one” (John 10:30) is a confession of naturae [nature], because both One and the other in this respect are non differat [do not differ] from each other 1482. In the Trinity one must confess a unity inseparabilis naturae [indivisible nature], not merged, but indivisible (non confusam, sed indiscretam) 1483. At the same time, the unity of nature in the Trinity is conceived as the unity of the race. “The name which designates every thing also designates a thing of the same kind; and there are no longer two things, but a thing of the same kind. For the Son of God is God; this is indicated by the name. Not two gods are counted together by one name, because unius atque indifferentis [one and without difference] nature, one name is God" 1484. The unity recognized here is far from being the Ambrosian unity of a substance existing in three species. This generic kinship of the nature of the hypostases is then argued almost exclusively from the concept of nativitas [Christmas], while in Ambrose this kind of motivation takes a secondary place. “The Son of God is the true God, not of an alien and different nature from the Father, but of one and the same Divinity, existing per veritatem nativitatis [according to the truth of the Nativity]” 1485. “The name of God belongs to the Son ex nativitate [at Christmas]” 1486. “The perfect God (the Son) has defined (substituent) perfecta nativitas [perfect Christmas], and perfecta nativitas [perfect Christmas] can so define because in God, Born of God, bodily fullness (plenitudo) dwells” 1487. The analogies he uses are very characteristic of Hilary’s teaching about the generic kinship of the Hypostases of the Father and the Son. The first analogy, which he also gives to explain the image of the Birth of the Son, is the analogy of the kindling of light from light. In this act there is neither division nor separation (divisio ac separatio); There is also no cutting off (desectio) from the original mass of fire; but despite all this, the latter remains in the fire kindled from him; and this one (in turn) is in that from which it is not cut off, but comes out with the unity of natural substance (naturalis substantiae), that is, all its essential properties. They are not separable either by division (divisione) or by the genus of nature (genere naturae) 1488. The analogy is indeed wonderful, if we keep in mind the identical nature of the Hypostases, but it is far from sufficient to prove the numerical unity of their substance. Ambrose does not know such an analogy. Along with this, Hilary offers other analogies: the unity of the Father and the Son is conceived by the analogy of the unity of believers who had one heart and soul (Acts 4:32) and who had the unity of faith, the Lord, baptism and hope 1489; It is obvious again that this unity is not strictly numerical, but unity in the sense of the sameness or identity of qualities belonging to individuals. The analogy of the unity of the human nature of Christ with the nature of man 1490 has the same meaning. In Ambrose we have already encountered the last two analogies, but we must not lose sight of the fact that behind the unity of nature in the sense of the identity of qualities lies the substantial unity of hypostases, justified in a completely different way and by other analogies. The presence of these analogies in Ambrose is explained, perhaps, simply by the fact that in his time they were generally popular. Hilary himself, obviously, felt that the unity of nature does not yet determine the unity of the Divinity, therefore, probably, we still find traces of the subordinate monarchy in him. The Son, dependent on the Father for his origin, depends on Him in general and in his entire being. If the Son cannot create anything about Himself (John 5:19), then this means not only that their creative activity, due to the identity of nature, is identical, but also that in the will of the Father the Son contemplates, as it were, an example (exemplum) for his own creative activity 1491; and this is already the thought of the identity of the will, as a result of the conditioning of the will of the Son by the will of the Father... “What the Son does, He does ministerially, for He does not create from Himself, but what He sees, proceeding in His service from a model given not in action, but in the will of the Father, for the work of the Father consists in will” 1492; This is already a teaching about the Son as an ancient Western minister (minister) of the Father, the executor of His plans. Thus, the Father and the Son, being equal in their essential qualities, are not equal in their mutual relations: if the will of the Son depends on the will of the Father, then the will of the Father is completely independent of the will of the Son. Ambrose insists on absolute equality and mutual conditionality of the creative activity of the Hypostases. But what especially distinguishes Hilary from Ambrose is his teaching about the third hypostasis of the Holy Trinity - the Holy Spirit. Not only does Hilary reveal the teaching about Him incompletely, but he constantly confuses the concept of Spiritus [Spirit] with Filius-Verbum [Son-Word]. This mixture takes place in many of Hilary’s works. In his commentary on the Gospel of Matthew he says: “The bridegroom and the bride are God in the flesh, our Lord; for as Spiritus carni [Spirit of the flesh], so Spiritui caro sponsa est [(and) to the Spirit the flesh is the bride]" 1493; consequently, the subject of the incarnation was not only Filius [Son], but also Spiritus [Spirit], which here, however, are not thought of as separate Hypostases, as we have already seen in Ambrose. The same commentary on the prayer for the cup says: “Some believe that from the weakness (perceived) of the flesh, sadness has stuck to the Spiritui [to the Spirit]; as if the perception of the flesh had, by the lot of its infirmity, damaged this Power of the imperishable substance, and eternity had received the nature of corruption” 1494: the perception of the flesh is attributed to Spiritui [Spirit], but again there is no hint that Spiritus [Spirit] and Filius [Son] form two different subjects. We see the same thing very often in the essay “De Trinitate” [“On the Trinity”]. In places here we come across a dynamically colored idea of ​​the Spirit as a common Power between the Son and the Father. “The Holy Spirit, Who is both the Spirit of Christ and the Spirit of God, is declared to be a thing of the same nature (with Them); the thing Spiritus [Spirit] is characteristic of the naturae [nature] of the Son, but the same thing is also characteristic of the naturae [nature] of the Father" 1495; in comparison with ancient ideas, here the Spiritus [Spirit] is thought to belong not only to the Son, but also to the Father, as in Ambrose, but only in the latter the hypostasis of the Spiritus [Spirit] is shaded much more strongly... “The Holy Spirit, descending from above, sanctified the insides of the Virgin and, breathing in them, mixed (immiscuit) Himself with the nature of human flesh, and that which was alien to Him, with its own power and authority perceived" 1496; in these words the incarnation is attributed to the Spiritui [Spirit], and there is not even any mention of the Son at all. This confusion becomes barely noticeable in works of later origin - in commentaries on the psalms. Created nature embraces the heavenly forces, the visible world and man. Angels are creatures, unlike God, who are not self-existent, but have as their Creator God, Who, by the moment of His command, created such great beauty of the world, and gave the opportunity to non-existent things or causes to perceive substance 1497. They once received their beginning; however, the moment of their emergence in Ambrose’s view remains uncertain and even completely incomprehensible to the human mind: no matter how far our thought turns back in time, it already finds angels existing 1498; they were created specifically and before the visible world, since when the latter was created they already existed 1499. Regarding the image of their origin, it is known that, since they do not participate in the Divine nature, they are not outflows of the Divine essence, do not have cum Patre et Filio aequale consortium [with the Father and the Son an equal share] 1500 and, obviously, like the visible world, were created from nothing. In his teaching on the nature of angels, Ambrose completely abandons the ground of Stoicism on which Tertullian revealed his angelology. Since, according to Tertullian, if everything that exists is corporeal, then the angels, according to him, have suum corpus et suam formam [their body and their form], although their body and form are of a special kind, because, invisible to people, they are visible only to God 1501. Ambrose, having abandoned the idea of ​​the materiality of the spirit in any sense, attributes an incorporeal nature to the angels: this nature exspers manet injuriae corporalis [does not know bodily injustice] 1502. Having no corporeality, angels do not have any human properties associated with materiality: they are free from affects, in them non sunt affectuum varietates [no variety of affects] 1503; they have nulla cura mensarum, nullus conviviorum usus, nullae repositae epulae, nullus vini potus aut sicerae, nulla distentio corporis, nulla ventris offensio [there is no care for the tables, no habit of feasting, no stored food, no drink of wine or strong drink, no bodily bloating, no upset stomach] 1504. Angels have no fellowship with wives; their life is not burdened by the anxiety inherent in the world, is not overwhelmed by sorrows, is not disturbed by vanity 1505. Angels have the same rational nature as man (rationabilia esse et coelestia Dei opera) 1506; but if they, as incorporeal beings, in this respect generally have an advantage over man, then in some other respects their rational nature seems even lower than human: while Scripture testifies regarding man that he is created in the image of God (ad imaginem), it does not attribute anything like this to incorporeal forces; therefore, we have something in our nature that perhaps the angels do not have (quod fortasse angeli non habeant) 1507. But, as a creature, the rational nature of angels is characterized by many limitations of human nature. Thus, it is subject to spatial restrictions. Angels do not simultaneously fill the entire universe with their presence, like God, but are tied to one specific place, moving from one place to another 1508. Their limitation in their conduct is closely connected with this. Thus, the eternal Birth of the Son of God from God the Father, constituting a mystery that exceeds human understanding, is also incomprehensible to the angels 1509; if they know about this, it is only by revelation to them from God Himself 1510; They also did not know the Resurrection of the Lord 1511, they even doubted it, as well as the possibility of the Risen One ascending in the flesh to heaven 1512. Further, angels cannot be compared with God in their power: according to the expression of St. Ambrose, they are cum auctore non possunt operationis habere consortium [cannot have participation in creation along with the Author] 1513. They, like people, are not even immortal by their very nature (naturaliter), but their immortality is based on the will of the Creator 1514. Like all creatures, the heavenly powers do not possess the perfection that belongs to them at first, but are subject to the law of gradual improvement: their knowledge gradually increases (processus habent scientiae), they generally have the ability to succeed (capacitatem profectus); have differences in strength and wisdom; because God alone is sine processu [without progress], eternally abiding in all perfection 1515. The reason for all the listed limitations of the angelic nature is that this nature, by virtue of its createdness, is changeable, in contrast to the absolutely unchangeable nature of God; Only to the extent and strength of its relationship to the Divine does it acquire the property of immutability. On this issue in the second half of the 4th century. Three different views have already emerged, of which two are extreme, and the third is conciliatory, standing in the middle between them. The first of the extreme views was expressed by Origen, who, based on the idea that substantial good exists only in God, argued that the angels were created imperfect, having received from God only freedom, as a condition for acquiring their own perfection; many of the angels, indeed, used their freedom through imitation of God to establish themselves in goodness and, as a reward from God for their merits, received various ranks and dignities 1516. The peculiarities of this view are that the perfection of angels is presented here as a matter exclusively of their own initiative, then their perfection and immutability are, in the end, recognized as relative, since, without losing their freedom even at the highest degrees of their perfection, angels always retain the opportunity to betray the Creator, fall and at the same time lose perfection 1517. We find the opposite view to this among the Cappadocians, in fact among St. Vasily, who attaches almost no importance to the initiative of angels in explaining their immutability. Angels are holy, unlike the Holy Spirit, not by nature, but their holiness stems from the communion of the Divine (ἐκ μετουσίας ὑπάρχει τὸ ἀγιάζεσϑαι) 1518. Nevertheless, this holiness was not given to them as a reward for virtue, but was invested during creation into the very composition of their nature, so that they began their existence not as infants in the moral sense, but already as good and unyielding to evil 1519. According to this view, angels have never been imperfect, have never changed, and cannot change. The middle place between these two ideas was taken by Didymus, who in this case combined the Origenistic idea of ​​freedom, as the most important factor of angelic perfection, with the general church teaching about the absoluteness of Divine grace. Angels are holy, but not by their own nature (non ex propria substantia), but by participation (participatione) of the Holy Trinity 1520 - this is one side of Didymus’ theory, which reveals the source of angelic perfection and holiness in the Holy Trinity; many angels and other higher powers remain in bliss and holiness, but since some of them have turned into something that has a similar nature to them, it is clear that in the original state they remain not because of the immutability of their own essence, but because of more diligent service (servitium) in the Lord 1521 - this is another circle of thoughts of Didymus, which determines the perfection of angels by their voluntary servitium [slavery] to God. Of these three theories, Ambrose's own ideas fluctuate between Origen and Didymus, not at all consistent with the views of St. Vasily. He, like Origen and Didymus, but only more strongly than Didymus emphasizes the moral indifference of the angelic nature in itself: in itself this nature is even subject to vice (vitio obnoxia); like everything created, it can perceive into itself accidentia, the accidental, that is, that which does not relate to its content; and among these accidents we find the punishment of judgment (poena judicii), corruption (corruptela) and prosperity (profectus) 1522 1. Just like Origen, and perhaps more than Didymus, Ambrose points out the need for the angels to act independently in the acquisition of holiness and perfection. They are protected from the damage of nature by the disciplina they pass through 1523. A special zeal, zeal (zelum) for virtue burns in them; without this zeal (sine zelo), the angels themselves are nothing (nihil) and would immediately lose the advantage of their essence (substantiae suae praerogativam), if they did not support it with the fire of zeal 1524. But unlike Origen and in agreement with Didymus, Ambrose determines the holiness of angels not only by their self-activity, but also by grace. Without the grace of the Holy Spirit, the angels could not even call the Lord Jesus 1525. The Divine Word dwells in them, which protects them from affects 1526. The gift of the Holy Spirit (Spiritus Sancti munus) 1527 also acts in them, pouring out on them more abundantly than on people: we are saturated with only a small sip of His grace, while it is poured into the heavenly powers with a full stream of seven spiritual gifts 1528. This sanctification of the Spirit (spiritalem sanctitatem) has earned the angels their zeal for good 1529, and thus they are in a state of perfection by virtue of the work of the Holy Spirit in them 1530. From the content side, the life and perfection of angels is characterized by Ambrose as a blessed life (vita beata) in general, as a state of peace (status tranquillitatis) 1531, similar to what all people will enjoy after the resurrection from the dead 1532. But in Ambrose there is a very noticeable tendency to think of this life not as a model of perfection in general, but as a way of ascetic and virgin life in particular. The jejunii labor [feat of fasting] 1533 is attributed to the angels. Their dignity is due mainly to their purity: castitas [purity] creates angels; whoever preserves it is an angel, and whoever loses it becomes a devil 1534. The life and morals of virgins resemble the life and morals (vita, mores) of angels 1535. “In the holy virgins we on earth contemplate the life of angels (vitam angelorum), which we once lost in paradise” 1536. The number of all angels is infinitely large, much more than what the limited human mind can imagine. Like the earth, says St. Ambrose, compared with the sky, is an infinitesimal point, just as compared with the fullness of the angelic world, the number of all nations is only a small drop. He designates this number indefinitely: multae sunt, millium, et decern millium et innumerabilium millium [many, thousands, tens of thousands and uncountable thousands] 1537. The scale for determining the number of angels is the comparative dignity of the spiritual and sensory world noted by Philo. For Philo, the intelligible world is as much greater than the sensory world as the intelligible is above the sensory 1538. In Ambrose, the number of heavenly creatures also seems to be as superior to the number of earthly creatures as the sky is larger and higher than the earth 1539. But not all angels are the same in their dignity and ranks. The question of whether a transition from one degree or rank to another is possible - higher or lower, as Origen assumed, or whether these degrees and ranks are constant and inalienable, remains open for Ambrose. As for the number of degrees, although Ambrose nowhere says that there are nine of them, neither more nor less, nevertheless, in different places of his works, sometimes separately, and sometimes together, he names all nine ranks known to us: angels (Angeli), archangels (Archangeli), powers (Virtutes), powers (Potestates), principles (Principatus), thrones (Throni), dominions (Dominationes), Cherubim and Seraphim 1540. These ranks are usually listed in a different order, but by accident or intentionally, Ambrose mostly puts Angeli [angels] and Archangels [archangels] in first place 1541, although sometimes he also names them among the latter 1542. Of the individual angels, he names Raphael, the angel of Tobiah (Tov.12:15), Gabriel and Uriel 1543. Angels stand in a subordinate position in relation to God and, in their activity, are ministering instruments for His providential purposes for the world and man. Because of this, they are called slaves (servi), servants (ministri) 1544; they serve the Lord with indefesso obsequio, in unceasing obedience 1545, they serve the Divine command (divino famulentur imperio) 1546. As servants of God, the heavenly powers reveal to people not their own will, but the will of their Master: their words are the commandments of God (mandata Dei) 1547. Dependent on God in general, angels depend on Him at every given moment of their service: they can leave a person only by command of the Lord 1548. The ministry of angels in the world is varied. Ambrose speaks of their activities aimed generally at the existence of the entire visible world. They carry out diversa ministeria [various ministries] in general in the world 1549. Everything is full of them: the air, certain countries of the earth, the sea, etc. 1550 This feature of the angelology of St. Ambrose reminds us somewhat of Philo, who, identifying angels with the Stoic logoi 1551, saw in them world causes and in this sense recognized that the individual elements of the world are divided between different angels 1552; In Ambrose, the identification of angels with logoi is not entirely clear. Likewise, the angelology of Ambrose has something in common with the angelology of Origen, since the latter recognized special angels for each individual people and each individual country, for each area of ​​nature and individual objects 1553; Ambrose has no idea that these cosmic angels should each be attached to their own area. In addition to nature, the sphere of activity of angels is the Church: in addition to bishops, God appointed angels to protect His flock 1554. The archangel Gabriel is sent to build the Church, countless angels and many heavenly armies praise God when the time of its creation approaches 1555. Origen, on the basis of the Apocalypse, speaks in particular about the angels of individual private Churches of 1556. Apparently, St. agrees with him on this. Ambrose, if he mentions ecclesias [Churches] led by angels (quibus angeli praesunt) 1557. Also, certain aspects of the spiritual life of mankind are under the protection of angels, who bring the grace-filled gifts of the Holy Spirit, such as, for example, the gift of healing, healing of the spirit and mind. An example of this type of service is reported in the Gospel, in the story of an angel who annually descended from heaven and disturbed the water in the font to heal the first person immersed in it (John 5:4) 1558. And this small feature was already put forward by Origen, who distinguished a special angel of healing, wisdom, etc. 1559 Finally, Ambrose knows about the ministry of angels in sacrifice, in particular in the Eucharistic sacrifice. “God entrusted the angels with a special mission - to serve invisibly during the offering of the New Testament sacrifice” 1560. In at least one place in his commentary on the Gospel of Luke, Ambrose directly says that when the priest makes a sacrifice and spiritually slaughters Christ, an angel of God is invisibly present and assists him in his service 1561. Just as angels serve special branches of human life, so they also serve individuals. They are sent to protect people (ad protectionem hominum) 1562, for their protection (ad praesidium) 1563. This protection is used primarily by the righteous 1564, then by those who fear the Lord, whom the angels help, delivering them from all kinds of temptations 1565, but then the patrocinia [protection] of the angels is also received by the weak and infirm 1566. Even sinners are not left without their protection, since the angels consider the salvation of a dying person to be an acquisition for themselves 1567. This help to sinners, of course, can be very diverse. But in Ambrose’s ideas related here, one feature dominates, which undoubtedly originates from Philo. Consistently pursuing the concept of the absolute goodness of God, Philo repeatedly expresses the idea that people receive benefits directly from God, while God entrusts the punishment of sinners to his forces, which are sometimes identified with angels 1568. Likewise, in Ambrose, in relation to sinners, angels are sometimes depicted as servants of punishment and ruin (poenarum et excidiorum ministri) 1569. Some categories of people enjoy special protection from heavenly powers; in accordance with castitas [purity], as the most important condition for the perfection of angels, these are most often virgins in Ambrose. The latter enjoy the speciale praesidium [special intercession] of the angels 1570: the angels are called guards (custodes), who raise the pallium of the pure soul (castae animae pallium tollunt) 1571. As for the guardian angels sent to every person, we do not find a clearly expressed teaching about them in Ambrose. We only learn that near (in circuitu) a person there is an angel who prevents him from harming a person 1572, that angels stand not far from a person who are intended to help (ad adjumentum) 1573. But how this should be understood, whether every person has such a protector or only a few, whether this protector stays with him constantly or is sent only for a while, remains completely unclear. Cosmology of St. Ambrose in the history of church literature does not represent anything new and original; it was formed mainly under the influence of two factors: the “Sex Day” of St. Basil the Great and the works of Philo. Philosophically, it is platonic in color, although elements from other classical systems are occasionally found. At St. Basil the Great borrowed primarily the doctrine of the origin of matter. Plato's cosmological dualism, of course, is rejected by both. In almost identical terms, they criticize Plato’s doctrine of the eternity and originality of matter, which the Supreme Artist, as a ready-made material independent of Him, used to embody his ideas about the world. The motivation for this denial is the same for both: eternal, beginningless matter is the same infinite being as God Himself, and therefore is incompatible with His absoluteness, His boundless greatness and omnipotence 1574. However, here St. Ambrose somewhat complements St. Vasily, citing considerations not found in the latter’s “Six Days”. He asks: where could this unstructured matter exist before the world began? and answers: if it existed in some place, then it means that the beginninglessness of matter also presupposes the beginninglessness of place, space, and instead of two we get three infinite ones. It is even more incongruous with the truth to imagine that this matter hangs in the air or rushes through the air: air is one of the elements of the world, and yet in unsettled, unordered matter, as the Platonists imagine it, individual elements could not exist separately and separately; therefore, before the existence of the world there could not have been air as a separate element. After this, only one more assumption remains, namely, that matter existed in God. However, God, as a Being alien to all materiality, could in no case be the eternal receptacle of world matter (materiae mundialis), especially since He Himself in the Person of Christ testifies not only about Himself, but also about His faithful disciples, that they are not of this world and have no part in it (John 17:14) 1575. Then at St. Basil Ambrose also borrows criticism from another classical concept of matter. Some pagan philosophers considered matter to be a shadow (adumbrationem) of Divine power. Although they recognized God as the cause of the world, they understood this not in the sense that the world arose according to the decision of the will of God, but in the sense in which the body is the cause of its shadow: the shadow is connected with the body and the shine with the light more by the communication of nature (naturali magis societate) than by free will. But our writers object to this idea from their own point of view: the incorporeal God cannot have a bodily shadow, and the incorporeal light does not have a sensual radiance 1576. The conclusion from all this is obvious: matter is the product of the free decision of the Divine will. The reason for the world lies in the never-ending Divine creativity. This idea, quite common among church writers, is of filonov origin, who was the first to notice it to explain the emergence of created being. We have already seen that God, in Philo’s view, is an active, ever-acting principle, eternally creating and never ceasing His creative activity: just as fire tends to burn, so God tends to create 1577. The same idea is found in Ambrose and other church writers, with the only difference from Philo being that they more strongly put forward the concept of freedom in constant Divine creativity. God created the world because He always creates as and where He wants; He, by his own will, knitted and connected the individual parts in the university; everything remains as much as His will allows, and also, by the decision of this will, disappears without a trace 1578. What happened at the moment of the emergence of matter, the same reasons acted during the formation of the world from this matter: if in the matter of peacemaking God is the only active cause, then the lot of matter falls to an exclusively passive role, limited to the perception of external actions; the entire process of peacemaking did not stem from the properties of matter, but, on the contrary, matter itself, as a simple lifeless material, was adapted to the dispositions of the Divine will. Due to this view of the significance of matter in the matter of the universe in Ambrose and St. Vasily, she is depicted in the spirit of Plato’s, qualityless μὴ ὄν [non-being]. Before the utterance of the creative word of God, matter did not at all have the qualities with which it is characterized now; what now seems unthinkable and unnatural to us was then in the order of things. Only Divine Omnipotence gave her her current qualities. Likewise, natural laws are not determined by the properties of matter itself, but in their essence represent the will of God addressed to matter. “The first voice of God became a law of nature, which is preserved for all centuries, gives instructions for future generations, determines the method of birth and fertilization” 1579. So, for example, before the utterance of the Divine verb: “Let the waters be gathered together, even those under the heavens are one” (Gen. 1:9), water did not at all have the properties of fluidity and gravity; being above, under the sky, it did not fall down; scattered across the earth, it remained motionless in different places and did not flow into one reservoir; only by virtue of the Divine verb did it flow for the first time, gathering into the seas 1580. In the same way, if, being in the seas and rivers, it does not overflow its banks and does not flood the earth, then this is again determined not by natural laws in our sense of the word, but by a direct prohibition of water to go beyond its intended limits, and water still obeys this prohibition 1581. Then, since matter is a qualityless and completely passive principle, the creation of the world is depicted in Ambrose and St. Vasily is not a more or less lengthy, gradually unfolding process, but a single and instant creative act. According to Ambrose, this act was accomplished brevi exiguoque momento [in a short and short moment], which infinitely exceeds our measure of time, so that in it the intention of the will did not precede the deed and the deed did not precede the will; everything is as St. says. Vasily, it happened τῇ ῥοπῇ τοῦ ϑελήματος μόνῃ, that is, in just one moment of will 1582. Such an understanding of the world-making for both is required by the very concept of God, Who has no boundary between will and action, and for Whom to want means to create; any other idea is fabulous and offensive to Divine Omnipotence 1583. But if indeed everything in the world is constrained and held in a certain state by the omnipotent will of God, then Ambrose is quite consistent, following the example of St. Vasily recognizes the constancy of the laws operating in nature and the essential immutability of the main types of creation. The earth produces seeds, each according to its own genus; none of them degenerates and transforms into the other. If what is sown sometimes bears bad fruit, then this degeneration must be attributed not to a change, perversion of the genus (translationis generis), but to an illness (aegritudinem) of the seed, depending on various external phenomena unfavorable for the preservation of the genus, such as, for example, the influence of cold, rain or the heat of the sun. However, even at the same time, in its further generations, the seed strives to return to its original form. The same must be said about animals. By the divine word, which acted in the establishment of the world, “from the earth all the clans established by God suddenly arose (animantium genera) and in the future, by the power of the prescribed law, they must leave behind an inheritance according to their kind and in their likeness (secundum genus sibi similitudinemque)... Once prescribed, it has forever grown into nature and therefore the earth does not cease to carry out its service with obedience, so that the former species of animals are reborn by the restorative succession of the clan in new generations" 1584. There are two sides to the world: physical, inanimate, and animate nature, consisting of the world of animals and plants. As for the first, in the works of Ambrose we encounter the basic principles of classical physics. Just as classical physics, equally shared by Heraclitus, the Stoics, Plato, and Aristotle, recognized four basic elements of physical nature 1585, so Ambrose knows four such elements, which he includes earth, air, water and fire. Each of these elements is characterized by its own special qualities: air has a moist quality, water has a cold quality, fire has a hot quality, and earth has a dry quality. But just as, according to classical physics, these elements do not actually occur in their pure form, but usually exist in all sorts of mixtures and combinations with each other, so in Ambrose, too, they, together with their distinctive qualities, represent a product of the abstraction of our mind (quod ratione colligimus). If we consider them in their actual sensory form (sensibiliter et corporaliter), we notice that they are complex and connected with each other, so that earth is dry and cold, water is cold and moist, air is hot and moist, and fire is hot and dry. These are, so to speak, the connecting qualities (jugales qualitates) of individual elements, thanks to which alone their connection with each other is made possible. Namely, since in reality the earth is distinguished by both the quality of dryness and cold, it can enter into connection with water through the medium of their common quality - cold, and through the medium of water with air, which is characterized by humidity. Air, in turn, is in the middle between water and fire, connecting with water through moisture, and with fire through heat. Fire is associated with air by the quality of warmth, and by the quality of dryness it is associated with earth. This explains their agreement and cohesion into one whole 1586. But we must not lose sight of the fact that these various qualities of the same element, which make possible the cohesion of different elements with each other, are not equally important in determining the nature of the same element. The qualities of elements are divided into primary and secondary (primus and secundus), into primary and accidental (principalis and accidens). Qualities of the first kind determine the nature of the element, constituting its essential content (proprietas); and each element has only one such quality; qualities of the second kind are imparted to the elements only for the purposes of world formation. Therefore, qualities of the first kind are said to belong to the elements ex natura [by nature], while qualities of the second kind are given to them ex causa [because of (something), for (some) purpose] 1587. Above physical nature are animate beings in their various forms. Their relative worth is determined by the order of their creation: lower forms of life were created before higher ones. The lowest of these creatures, plants, although alive, still lack a breathing soul (spirantem animam non habebant). The fish that appear in the waters are a step higher: they already reveal the strength and dignity of the living soul (viventis animae vigorem dignitatemque), although this life for them is still very simple and low; it lies in one's own self-preservation and in the desire to avoid death 1588. Animals that have a body (corpus) and a soul (anima), which consists of the force that animates the body (vitalis vigor) 1589, are characterized approximately equally with them. Their spiritual life is also simple (simplex), they have no reason (rationem), but they have many affects 1590. But, without reason, animals are still distinguished by the infallibility of their instincts and the expediency of their actions: they resist attacks against them well if they have strength, thanks to their speed they avoid enemies, and by cunning they protect themselves from dangers; they know well the healing power of herbs, in which sometimes man himself makes mistakes 1591. Ambrose explains the possibility of the formation of such unmistakable instincts in creatures devoid of reason in the same way as the Stoics. Just as the Stoics deduced world expediency from the Logos operating in the world and from a whole chain of logoi subordinate to it, which personified the causes operating in the world, so Ambrose, in explaining the instincts of animals, refers to the action in the world of the Divine Word, or Wisdom. This “Divine Wisdom permeates everything and fills everything, and Its action is more abundantly revealed in the feelings of irrationabilium sensibus than in the reasonings of rational people (rationabilium); for the evidence of nature (naturae testimonium) is much stronger than the argument of science” 1592. The created world, as having embodied the Divine will, in all its relations must be wisely arranged and an image of perfection. In the words of St. Basil Ambrose praises the goodness of God, which created the world useful, the Divine Wisdom, which recognized it as the best, and the Divine Omnipotence, which made it the most majestic. In conclusion of the section on cosmology, we will consider the question of Ambrose’s attitude to the Origenistic theory of many worlds, simultaneously and sequentially created by God. In “The Sixth Day” he reveals indecision and hesitation on this matter, which is probably explained by the influence of St. Basil, who in many respects was close to Origen. Without directly asserting the existence of many worlds, he, however, together with St. Basil speaks of the many heavens created by God and considers it insulting to the immeasurable Omnipotence of God to doubt that these many heavens really exist; he also, following the example of St. Vasily does not want to dispute those writers who believed in the existence of many worlds along with the existence of many heavens. But where St. Ambrose was free from the influence of St. Vasily, as, for example, in one of his letters to Sabin, he most categorically speaks out against the theory of many worlds 1593 1. Anthropology and psychology The long chain of earthly creatures is crowned by man. He is God's great creation (magnum opus) 1594, His most precious creation (pretiosissimum opus Dei) 1595. He was the last to appear on earth. St. Ambrose gives two reasons for this. On the one hand, the world, according to the thought of the Creator, is an arena for human exploits and competitions, and the organizer of this competition is God Himself. But whoever organizes a competition first prepares everything necessary for it, and only after that calls on the wrestler, so that there is no delay in rewarding the latter if he turns out to be the winner. Man’s reward is the fruits of the earth and the stars of the sky: the former for use in this life, and the latter for the hope of eternal life 1596. Probably, this idea was borrowed by Ambrose from Philo, who, among numerous considerations in explaining the creation of man, the latter also uses the image of a competition, but only explains his idea somewhat differently: how those organizing a feast do not first call for dinner, how everything necessary for the feast will be prepared, and the organizers of gymnastic and stage competitions (ἀγινας τιϑέντες) gather spectators only having prepared a multitude of wrestlers, shows and plays for the theater and the lists, so the Manager of the Universe (ὁ τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμών), like some organizer of a competition and feast, intending to invite a person to a feast and show, prepared everything in advance so that, upon entering the world, a person would immediately find in it both a feast and a most sacred theater (ϑέατρον ἱερώτατον) 1597 . This Philonian image was only modified by Ambrose to accommodate the Western idea of ​​earthly life as a certamen [competition] for the acquisition of merit and the receipt of rewards. Another reason for the creation of man last in Ambrose is the high dignity of man. Already in one of the predecessors, Ambrose Lactantius, we encounter a casually expressed idea of ​​a person as a small world, a microcosm: consisting of opposite elements, a person makes up the likeness of the world (ipsius mundi similitudinem) 1598. This idea is now widely used by Ambrose and, incidentally, for this purpose. Man was created last in the ranks of other creations, as the sum of all creation (totius summa operis), as the cause of the world (causa mundi), for the sake of which everything was created; having all the regions of the world available to him, he lives among the animals, swims with the fish, flies higher than the birds, rotates with the angels, inhabits the earth and serves the sky, plows the seas, feeds on the air, worships the sun (cultor soli), is an explorer of the depths, a fisherman in the waves, a bird-catcher in the air, an heir in heaven, a joint heir of Christ 1599. This is also probably a free transfer of the words of Philo, who also looks at man as a kind of reduction of the whole world: akin in his mind to the Divine Logos, he is close to the cosmos in the structure of his body; consisting of all the elements of the world, it at the same time combines the properties of all living beings: living on earth, it is an amphibious animal, while plunging and swimming, it resembles a creature living in the waters; if a body raised from the ground is suspended above, then it can rightly be called flying in the air; as well as celestial ones, through the most important of the senses, sight, approaching the sun, moon and other fixed and wandering stars 1600. On the question of the composition of human nature in the West, a stoic dichotomy has long been established, recognizing in man only two main principles: mental and physical. We encounter this dichotomism in absolutely all Western writers. For Tertullian, such principles are corpus [body] and anima [soul] 1601, sometimes called caro [flesh] and spiritus [spirit] 1602. “We have a corpus [body] e terra [from the earth],” says Cyprian, “and a spiritum [spirit] we possess e coelo [from heaven]” 1603. Man consists ex anima et corpore [of soul and body], we read in Lactantius 1604. As for the spirit itself, which, as the highest principle of the mind, the Eastern trichotomists distinguished from the soul in the proper sense, although in the West they recognized it, they considered it not an independent principle, but an essential and inseparable force of the soul. “By animus [spirit], or mens [mind], which the Greeks call νοῦς, we understand nothing else,” says Tertullian, “as an innate and ingrained property of the soul (suggestum animae ingenitum et insitum)... The spirit (animus) has grown together with the soul (anima) and is distinct (from the soul), not as an independent substance, but as (special) administration of substance (ut substantiae officium)" 1605. St. always remains the same dichotomist in the field of anthropology. Ambrose. “What is man,” he asks, “soul (anima) or body (caro), or a combination of both (utriusque copula)?” 1606 And he answers: “Man is a being of two substances (gemmae substantiae): one is common to him along with animals, the other constitutes a special advantage (specialis praerogativa) of him alone” 1607. “He consists of two natures (ex duabus naturis), that is, of soul and body (anima subsistat et corpore)” 1608. If, in addition, St. Ambrose sometimes talks about the spirit, then, like Tertullian, not in the sense of an independent principle, but in the sense of a special quality of a single and indivisible soul (non duas animas, sed diversos qualitates unius animae) 1609. The doctrine of the image of the origin of these two substances in the West was also formed long ago in the spirit of Philo, probably through the mediation of apologists, and was even expressed in terms of Philo’s anthropology. In Philo, here a whole series of heterogeneous contemplations intersect with each other. He distinguishes first of all between τοῦ τε νῦν πλασϑέντος ἀνϑρώπου (i.e. the biblical account of the creation of man fashioned from earth) and τοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα γεγονότος πρότερον (i.e., the creation of man “in the image” even before the beginning of the creation of the visible world); πλασϑείς is our sensible man (αἰσϑητός), consisting of soul and body, and man κατὰ τὴν εικόνα [in the image] is some idea (ἰδέα τις) or genus (γένος), intelligible, incorporeal (νοητός, ἀσώματος), in whose image ἄνϑρωπος πλασϑείς [fashioned man] was created 1610. A man κατὰ εικόνα [in the image] is also called a heavenly man (οὐράνιος ἄνϑρωπος), and πλασϑείς [fashioned] - an earthly man (γήϊνος); οὐράνιος [heavenly] is completely unrelated (ἀμέτοχος) to the corruptible and earthly essence, and γήϊνος [earthly] is created from the substance (ὕλης) of clay (χοῦν). Even the mind of the latter (νοῦς οὗτος γεώδης) would have been perishable by nature if a special higher principle had not been united with it, since God breathed into it the power of true life (δύναμιν ἀληϑινῆς ζωῆς) 1611. While the earthly man is called πλασϑείς [fashioned], the heavenly is sometimes called simply created - ποιηϑείς 1612. So, this means that for Philo man κατὰ εικόνα, οὐράνιος [in the image, heavenly] and ποιηϑείς [created] exists completely separately from ἄνϑρωπος πλασϑείς [man sculpted] and γήϊνος [earthly]. This latter consists of the earthly essence and the Divine spirit (ἐκ γεώδους οὐσίας καὶ πνεύματος ϑείου) or from the soul arising ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ἡγεμόνος τῶν ἁπάντων, ἀπὸ τῆς μακαρίας καὶ εὐδαίμονος φύσεως ἐκείνης [from the Father and Ruler of all, from that [i.e. e. Divine] blessed and happy nature] 1613 ; the body is created from earth (ἐκ γῆς), and the soul is ethereal in nature (αἰϑέρος), representing a Divine particle (ἀπὸσπασμα ϑεῖον) 1614, therefore, there is an outflow of the Divine essence 1615. All of these Philonian ideas were, to one degree or another, used by Western writers for the purposes of church anthropology, with the only difference from Philo being that what the latter says about two different people began to be applied to two different aspects of human nature, and Philon’s idea of ​​a special heavenly man, as a prototype for empirical man, was completely abandoned. Caro [flesh] in Adam is formed from mud (e limo), and the soul came from the Divine breath (ex afflatu Dei), while afflatus [breath] very close to Philo is represented by the evaporation of the Divine Spirit (vapor spiritus) 1616. The soul of man, therefore, is something akin to God 1617. Regarding its origin, the expressions ex Spiritu Dei [from the Spirit of God], ex substantia Ejus [from His substance], ex Dei flatu [from the breath of God] are significant, in contrast to the teaching of Hermogenes about its origin ex materia [from matter], ex materiae suggestu [from the accumulation of matter] 1618. Nevertheless, for all this, the soul is not a part of the Divine Being and is not in everything similar to the Divine Essence: it is much lower than God, it is born (natam earn agnoscimus), it is a breath (ut flatum), but not a spirit (non ut spiritum); although she is immortal (immortalem), which is characteristic of Divinity, she is a passive being (passibilem), a sign characteristic of everything born (ut hoc sit nativitatis) 1619. If in Scripture it is sometimes called spirit (spiritus), “then by spiritus [spirit] we should understand not the natural property of the soul (naturale animae), but something that comes to it from the outside” 1620, namely, the Spirit of God given to the soul at creation (Sancti Spiritus vis... conferitur animae) 1621. The most significant difference between Philo and Tertullian thus boils down to the fact that the latter rejects the idea of ​​the soul as a particle of the Divine Essence. The human soul is endowed with the same properties by Novatian: the body has an earthly origin (terrena primordia), and the soul is an inhaled substance of heavenly and Divine breath (halitus) 1622. For Cyprian, the body is produced from the earth, and the soul from heaven, and man himself is called heaven and earth: terra et coelum sumus 1623. In Lactantius we find the term figuravit, fictus, similar to the term πλασϑείς: hominem figuravit ex limo terrae, unde homo nuncupatus est, quod sit factus ex humo [(God) created (fashioned) man from the dust of the earth, which is why he is called man, because he was created from the earth] 1624; the soul arose from the act of Divine breath: having created the body, God breathed into it the soul from the living source of His Spirit (de vitali fonte spiritus sui) 1625; the concepts of terra et caelum [earth and sky] are applied to the body and soul, because the soul by which we live is velut e coelo, oritur a Deo [as from heaven, comes from God], and the body is e terra [from the earth], since we consider it formed from dirt (e limo diximus esse formatum) 1626; the body is terrenum [earthly], and the soul is coelestis [heavenly]; but unlike Tertullian, immortalitas [immortality] in the understanding of Lactantius is not a consequence of nature (non sequela naturae), but a reward for virtue (merces praemiumque virtutis est); a person is born mortal (mortalem), becoming immortal only when he begins ex Deo vivere [to live from God] 1627. All these ideas about the body and soul of man are found in the works of Ambrose; they are expressed here even much more strongly, since, in addition to tradition, Ambrose was also under the direct influence of Philo. He distinguishes the twofold birth of man (geminam hominis generationem): one secundum imaginem Dei [in the image of God], the other secundum figmentum (πλασϑείς) de luto terrae, by formation from earthly dirt, but these two births do not refer to the creation of two different people, as in Philo, but to the creation of soul and body 1628. In man, the other is figuratum [formed] (πλασϑείς) and the other factum [created] (ποιηϑείς) or paratum; in man there is dust, earth, matter (pulvis, terra, materia), in relation to which there was plasmatio [formation], and along with this something incorporeum, admirabile, immateriale [incorporeal, amazing, immaterial] 1629. In it, therefore, there are two substances: one substance of the created (facti), the other of the formed (figurati); the first is de Spiritu Dei [from the Spirit of God], and the second is from the mud (de limo) 1630. The soul originates from the act of Divine breath (ex inspiratione divina), God breathed (insufflaverat) it into man 1631. Moreover, just as in Philo the words of Genesis 1:26: “Let us make man in our image” refer to the creation of the heavenly man κατὰ εἰκόνα [in the image] 1632, so in Ambrose they are applied to the creation of the soul secundum imaginem [in the image], but not because it was the prototype for man, but because it is the representative of the whole man 1633. God, therefore, gave man something akin to Himself (de cognatione sua) 1634, and therefore the soul is called a heavenly substance (anima coelestis esse videatur substantiae) 1635. But it is still not identified with the Divine essence. The Divine spirit (divinus spiritus) only belongs to her, as the highest Divine principle in her, different from her, 1636. It is to this beginning that the soul owes its immortality, which is a gift of grace, and by no means its natural property. Man himself is defined as animal vivum, mortale, rationabile [living animal, mortal, rational] 1637, because everything created cannot be immortal by nature (naturaliter) 1638; it received the property of being an immortal substance (immortalis substantia) 1639 by grace (per gratiam) 1640. By analogy with Philonov’s idea of ​​the heavenly and earthly, created and educated man, in church literature another idea of ​​the inner and outer man developed, not only in the sense of the moral characteristics of human life, but also in the psychological sense of the spiritual and physical principles in man. This idea is already very often used by Tertullian. The external sense organs form the exterioris hominis ministeria [services of the external man], who is in the service of the interiori homini [inner man] 1641; the soul enclosed in the body is homo interior [inner man], and the body is exterior [external], dupliciter unus [one [man] in two ways] 1642. In Ambrose this idea also found wide application. Ad imaginem Dei [in the image of God] was created interior homo [inner man], and not exterior [external], one that is perceived by the senses, but not by the eyes 1643; in one person there are duo homines [two people]: interior homo noster [our inner man], which is created (factus) ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei [in the image and likeness of God], and exterior [external], formed (figuratus) from the earth 1644. Each of the constituent parts of human nature in Ambrose is then examined in detail. The detailed description of corporeal nature appears to have been borrowed from Philo. This nature, formed from earth, contains in its composition all the basic elements of the physical world: cold, heat, moisture and dryness, of course, together with the material substrates of the latter: air, fire, water and earth: Although the body consists of the same elements as the bodies of other animals, it nevertheless surpasses them in the beauty of its form and straight, upward-facing appearance 1645. In this regard, the idea of ​​microcosm is developed in relation to one body itself: humani corporis fabrica [the structure of the human body] is a similarity to the mundi [the world, the universe]. Indeed, just as in nature the sky rises above the air, earth and seas, which represent, as it were, individual members of the world, so in the body the head rises above the other members, there is a kind of sky between the elements or a tower in a row of city walls. Everything in the body and even in a person’s life depends on the head. The eyes are especially important in this regard. What could courage do if it did not use the guidance of the eyes in battle? What benefit could escape bring if the eye did not cease to see (at any distance)? Without illumination of the eyes, the body would be a gloomy prison. As the sun and moon are in the sky, so are the eyes in a person 1646. The head is also the seat of the brain. The brain serves as the beginning of the nerves and all the senses (omnium sensuum) of voluntary movement (voluntariae commotionis). The beginning of the arteries and the heat inherent in the body, which revitalizes a person, is the heart. The organ of individual senses (sensuum singulorum) are nerves that emerge from the brain in the form of strings and, spreading through parts of the body, adapt to individual functions. Nerves deliver to the brain everything that the eye sees, or the ear hears, or smells. The mass of the brain is softer than the mass of other members, because the brain perceives all feelings, and the soft substance can more easily adapt to these various influences, while the harder substance of the organs and nerves is more capable of activity 1647. Another main part of the human being - the soul, by its nature, is the complete opposite of the body: what is in accordance with the nature of the body (secundum corporis naturam) is contrary to the nature of the soul, and, conversely, what is in accordance with the nature of the soul is contrary to the nature of the body; the nature of the body is visible, but the soul is invisible 1648. Here St. Ambrose already diverges from Tertullian’s Stoic definition of the nature of the soul as, in a certain sense, a material essence. In the latter, the soul, despite all its differences from the gross body, is still corporeal, spread like liquid matter throughout all members of the body; like a body, it has its own form and its members 1649. Ambrose eliminates every element of materiality in the idea of ​​the soul. “The soul,” he objects to representatives of classical philosophy, “is not blood (by its nature), because blood has bodily qualities, nor is it a harmony of nerves, since this kind of harmony is also bodily; it also cannot be air, for the inhaled air (flatilis spiritus) is something else and the soul is something else; finally, the soul is not the Aristotelian entelechy of the body, so to speak, the body, considered from an idealistic point of view, the ideal side common to it and the body of the substrate, but a living essence: Adam was created into a living soul, because the soul animates and controls the insensible and inanimate body" 1650. Ambrose takes away from the soul not only corporeality, but also those predicates that, while not being corporeal in themselves, are nevertheless associated with material things: he also rejects the idea of ​​the soul as a self-moving being that moves by itself, not receiving its movement from anyone else 1651. Human souls are the best in comparison with all the listed phenomena of creation (potiores creaturae) and belong to some superior nature (cujusdam praestantissimae naturae): they cannot be touched and perceived by bodily vision and thereby show similarity (similitudinem) with the Incorporeal and Invisible Nature and rise with their substance above the body and sensory qualities 1652. Just as the soul differs from the body in its nature, so it differs from the body in the way it arises in each individual person. Here we do not see in Ambrose the theory of traditionism that existed before him in the West, at least in Tertullian, who recognized the same distribution of both body and soul. Just as he considers Adam, on the bodily side, to be the source of human nature (fons naturae), so he calls his soul the mother of all human souls in general (matrix omnium) 1653; in human seed both substances are found in a mixed form (confusae substantiae in uno) 1654. Even the soul of Eve came from the soul of Adam by separating a particle from it, so that ut carnis, ita et animae ex Adam tradux fuisset in foemina [in the wife of Adam there was a particle of both flesh and soul] 1655. The works of Ambrose, while showing no trace of such a theory, undoubtedly suggest the opposite theory of creationism, or the creation of souls; but the only question that remains is which form of creationism he prefers. There is no doubt that Ambrose does not sympathize with the Origenistic theory of the pre-existence of souls, which were all simultaneously created by God before the beginning of the world, but then some of them fell and were sent to earth in human bodies to be cleansed of their guilt 1656. Hinting at this theory, he says that the body is not given to man for the humility of the soul, but that, on the contrary, sin, which comes from the flesh, is the reason for our humility 1657. But he quite clearly expresses creationism in the form in which we find it, by the way, in Philo. In the latter we find the theory that the πνεῦμα ϑεῖον [Divine spirit], which originated from the Divine nature, is sent to settle on earth for the benefit of the human race in order to impart the qualities of immortality (ἀϑανατίζεται) to man, who is mortal in his visible part 1658. In Ambrose, accordingly, we read: after separation from the body, the soul will return to that higher place, “from where it was poured into our insides (nostris infusa visceribus) and sighs here with compassion for this body until it fulfills the gift of management entrusted to it (donee commisi gubernaculi munus impleret), namely, with reasonable guidance (rationabili ductu) to control and suppress the unreasonable movements of the present flesh (carnis hujus irrationabiles motus)" 1659. From these words it follows, 1) that before union with bodies, human souls already existed; 2) that they are sent into bodies only temporarily; 3) that the purpose of this embassy is not the purification of the souls themselves, as with Origen, since before their appearance on earth these souls had not yet had sin, but the transformation of the properties of material nature that are contrary to the spirit. Nevertheless, this temporary embassy of human souls into bodies is, in a certain sense, a school for the souls themselves. In this regard, Ambrose applies to human souls the thought expressed by Origen in relation to other creatures. In Origen, not only souls are sent into bodies as punishment for their fall, but also higher powers (in the form of the sun, moon and stars, since, according to Origen, the heavenly bodies are also the animated bodies of heavenly powers) 1660, which “not of their own free will accepted the intended service to vanity, but because the One who conquered them wanted it; God promised to deliver them from serving corruption and vanity” when they completed their great mission of redeeming the sons of God; It is only in the hope of this promise that this creature now groans as it goes through its ministry 1661. Almost literally these words of Origen are applied by Ambrose to human souls, modifying them with a somewhat specifically Western thought about reward: creation is subject to vanity not of its own free will (non ex voluntate sua), but by the will of God (ex divino arbitrio), which was decided (dispositum est) to unite souls with bodies for the sake of their hope (propter spem earum); so that they (souls), since they hope for good, show themselves worthy of heavenly reward (dignas se praestent coelesti remuneratione) 1662. So, souls created in heaven are sent into bodies to spiritualize matter and at the same time to acquire merit for life in heaven. How exactly souls are created, whether all at once, as in Origen, or gradually, as bodily organisms are formed, Ambrose does not solve this question and does not even raise it; but since heavenly life is already thought of as a reward for the feat of earthly life, one can think that the second of the two indicated possibilities is closer to the thoughts of Ambrose than the first Origenistic idea. In his teaching about the powers and abilities of the soul, Ambrose differs from Tertullian and his school. Tertullian, despite his somewhat crude idea of ​​the soul, very resolutely defended its absolute indivisibility and the absence of any parts in it. “Since the soul is immortal,” he says, “it is neither destructible nor divisible, for to divide means to destroy, and to destroy means to die” 1663. “Sometimes,” he continues, “the soul is divided into parts, sometimes into two by Plato, sometimes into three by Zeno... But these are actually not so much parts of the soul as powers, functions and deeds (vires et efficaciae, et operae), just like those that Aristotle discussed. For they do not form members of the soul substance, but abilities, properties (ingenia), such as motor (motorium), active (actorium), mental (cogitatorium)” 1664. True, Tertullian also knows Plato’s division of the soul into rational and irrational souls, but he gives this division not a psychological, but an exclusively moral interpretation. The natural quality of the soul (naturale) should be recognized only as rationality (rationale), which is innate to the soul from the very beginning, having been given to it by the Reasonable Creator (a rationali videlicet auctore). The unreasonable (irrationale) arose later and came from the suggestion of the serpent (ex serpentis instinctu); Every sin is unreasonable (irrationabile autem omne delictum) 1665. Consequently, the activity of the soul that is normal in a moral sense is called rational, while abnormal, sinful activity is called unreasonable. On the contrary, the psychology of St. Ambrose is more complex and developed. On this issue, at different times and in different works, he puts forward two different theories: in the work “De officiis ministrorum” [“On the duties of the clergy”], compiled under the influence of the work of the same name by Cicero, he adheres to the Stoic-Ciceronian psychological theory; in other works, especially those written under the influence of Philo, he already follows Platonic psychology. According to the theory of the first kind, Ambrose, together with Cicero, distinguishes two movements (gemini motus) in the soul: the movement of thoughts (cogitationum) and passion (appetitus); they do not mix, but are separate and distinct (non confusi, sed discreti et dispares). Appetitus is also called ὁρμή, and cogitationes – ratio. The first side is the side of desires and drives that form the motives for action, and the second “is a purely intellectual purpose” 1666, the definition and choice of motives for action. Cogitationes - ratio is the primary force of the soul and, in a normal mental life consistent with the laws of nature, dominates over appetitus, excluding and suppressing the extreme manifestations of the latter 1667. As for the theory of the second kind, here Ambrose also knows several different divisions, probably also depending on Philo, who also uses various divisions. Sometimes he recognizes the soul as consisting of two parts (διμερής, bipartita) - rational (rationabile) and unreasonable (irrationabile), in accordance with Philo's division into λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον 1668. Sometimes this two-part division is replaced by a division into three parts: rational, appetitive and impetuous, denoted by the Latin terms rationabilis, concupiscibilis and impetibilis, as well as by the Greek λογιστικόν, ἐπιϑυμητικόν and ϑυμικόν 1669, as with Philo, μέρος λογιστικόν, ϑυμικόν and ἐπιϑυμητικόν 1670 are distinguished. Occasionally one encounters a four-part division of the soul into λογιστικόν, ϑυμικόν, ἐπιϑυμητικόν and διορατικόν [insightful], and this division is adapted to the symbols of the four animals: man, lion, calf and eagle 1671. Sometimes the Platonic division of the soul is replaced by a division reminiscent of the Aristotelian division of it also into three parts: rational (rationabile animae), nourishment that revitalizes the body (nutrimentum quoddam vitale) and delightful (delectabile) 1672. However, the division of the soul into rational and irrational still remains dominant in Ambrose: all the various listed lower mental functions are considered parts of the irrational soul. Man is divided into two parts (i.e. body and soul), and these two parts (duo) are in turn divided into three (in tres); three parts are conveniently explained from those two (ex illis duobus); duo in tres et tres in duo dividuntur [two are divided by three and three by two] 1673. From these words it is also clear that the unreasonable soul with its functions has the body as its substrate; It goes without saying that all remarks about the spirituality of the soul refer to its rational part, or to the soul in the proper sense. The irrational side of the soul has as its goal, from the point of view of Aristotelian psychology, to animate the body and maintain life in it. Although it is different in nature from matter, nevertheless, its place of residence in the human body is blood, with which it mixes; in particular, since according to the physiology of that time it was assumed that blood veins contain more blood than vital spirit, and arteries are just the opposite, the latter were actually considered receptacula spiritus, the receptacle of the vital spirit 1674. But along with this function, the activity of the irrational part of the soul includes the entire sphere of feelings, including here, in modern psychological terminology, sensations, since they are in direct service to the body: this is where all the functions of the sensory organs, all feelings of pleasure and delight, the need to sleep, eat, talk, walk and others belong. The rational side of the soul is the most important and highest dignity side of the human being and has priority over all others. It constitutes the distinctive attribute of man alone on earth: homo rationabilis videtur inter omnia terrena animantia [man appears to be the (only) rational being among all earthly creatures] 1676. It is called mens, which forms the dominant part and strength of the soul (animae principale est et virtus animae est) 1677; the name νοῦς, animae vigor 1678 is also attached to it. There is a close connection between the two described sides of a person. The soul and the body have a colligatio, a connection 1679, and the body with the unreasonable soul and the mind communicate with each other quadam lege conjugii, according to some law of cohesion, copulantur necessitudine [combined as necessary] 1680; as a result, neither the body acts without the soul, nor the soul is free from the influences of the body 1681. But the nature of this connection is not always determined in the same way. Here, as in the question of the powers and parts of the soul, two currents intersect in Ambrose: the Stoic and the Platonic. The idea of ​​the first kind, according to which body and soul are represented as equally equal parts of the human being, was the usual idea of ​​\u200b\u200bmost of the previous Western writers. According to Tertullian’s terminology, the soul has grown together with the body and is formed with it according to the same form (concreta et configurata corpori anima) 1682. There is such a close union between them, “that it is probably difficult to say whether the flesh serves as the bearer of the spirit or the soul as the bearer of the flesh, whether the soul obeys the flesh or the flesh obeys the soul” 1683. This relationship between soul and body is illustrated by the images of the house and its inhabitant: the house (domus) of the soul is the body, and the inhabitant of the body is the soul 1684. Ambrose expresses a similar view on the relationship between soul and body only occasionally. In him we find the image of a house in relation to a person 1685, although this image could also be borrowed from Philo, in whom the human body is also represented as the image of a house or church of the rational soul (οἶκος γὰρ τις ἢ νεὼς ἱερὸς ἐτεκταίνετο ψυχῆς λογικῆς) 1686 . This also includes the idea that before sin, body and soul lived in complete harmony with each other, submitting to the law of God and moving away from the law of sin; disagreement between them arose only due to the Fall of 1687. Much more often, Ambrose places the body in a subordinate, servile relationship to the soul. Actually, a person is formed by the soul, and the body is only his thing, an accessory. We are different (nos), says Ambrose about the soul, ours are different (nostrum), he means the body 1688. The body serves (servit), and the soul rules (regit) 1689. The body is the lower part (inferior) of a person, and the soul is the highest (superior); the soul imparts life to the body, animates the body, governs it and sanctifies it 1690. In this connection of thoughts, a bright stream of Platonism is breaking through more and more, establishing a view of the body as a hostile principle in relation to the soul, as a natural obstacle to the revelation of spiritual life. As a matter of fact, this Platonic tendency was not completely new in the West for Ambrose: even at the beginning of the 4th century. it is quite evident in Lactantius, in whom we already encounter a view of the body as a prison for the soul, with its sensuality preventing it from knowing the Divine: “The soul, although breathed by God, but, since it is imprisoned in the dark dwelling of earthly flesh, it has no knowledge of what concerns the Divine” 1691. Now in Ambrose, thanks to his acquaintance with Eastern literature, this current begins to break through more strongly. In the spirit of Plato, there is already a view of the body as a source of passions and pleasures that are contrary to the spirit: caro [flesh] is the cause of corruption of the soul, representing, as it were, a country and place of pleasure, from which, as from a source, rivers of lust and evil passions burst out 1692. The comparison of the body with the clothing that the soul puts on itself has the same coloring: caro amictus est animae, quae se induit quodam corporis vestimento [the flesh is a garment for the soul, which puts on some bodily clothing] 1693. For the body, Platonic images of prison and fetters are used. In real life the soul is imprisoned in a carcere corporeo [bodily prison] 1694; Perhaps this image was borrowed through Philo, who also uses it in 1695. In this life, the soul is bound by vincula quaedam corporis hujus, vincula tentationum [certain fetters of this body, the fetters of temptations], which ad injuriam captivitatis astringunt [hold (us) captive] 1696; Philo also talks about the shackles of the flesh, in which in real life νοῦς is imprisoned, having a heavenly origin 1697. This prison and shackles burden the soul, forcibly tying it to the earth: “The soul, seeing itself imprisoned in a bodily hut (gurgustio) ... sighs, being burdened by connection with this body (gravata corporis hujus conjunctione), for the corruptible body gravat animam [burdens the soul], and the earthly abode tilts the mind towards many thoughts" 1698. The influence of the body on the soul is so strong that the soul must wage the most fierce struggle with it. Here Ambrose uses Plato’s comparison of the body and its desires with horses that need to be bridled: when our soul is united (jungitur) with the body, then it, like a chariot drawn by angry horses, needs a coachman for its control 1699. She has, as it were, four horses, four affects: anger, desire, pleasure, fear (ira, cupiditas, voluptas, timor). When she tries to control these angry horses, she will never recognize herself: the corruptible body burdens the soul and, as it were, forcibly abducts it with the onslaught (currus) of irrational animals, while the chariot itself continues to rush forward with the force of the falling body, until these passions are pacified by the power of the Word (virtute Verbi) 1700. This relationship between soul and body is illustrated by another example, also borrowed from Plato, of a musical instrument and the harmony it produces. “Just as a musician sympathizes with the melodies of a flute or cithara, or an organ with his voice, body movement and mood, so that with sad sounds he becomes sad, with joyful sounds he becomes joyful, with exciting sounds he becomes excited, with soft sounds he becomes soft and meek, so in the same way the soul enclosed in this body deals, as it were, with a stringed musical instrument” 1701. Just as the strings produce certain sounds under the blows of the fingers, so the soul strikes the passions of this body, to which the consonance of its morals and virtues responds 1702. God honored the primordial man with a high distinction compared to everything that exists: this high distinction lies in the image of God and the God-likeness of his nature. At the same time, the concepts of image (imago) and by image (ad imaginem) are distinguished. The image of God in the strict sense of the word cannot be a person, but only the Son of God; man was already created in this image (ad imaginem Dei) 1703. This idea, which is also found in other writers, mainly the Alexandrians (Clement), originates from Philo, who was the first to point out the need for such a distinction: for him it is the Logos that is the archetype of other creatures (ἑτέρων ἀρχέτυπον); God is the example of the image (παράδειγμα τῆς εἰκόνος), and ἡ εἰκών [image] becomes παράδειγμα [model] for others; the image was created κατὰ τὸν ϑεόν [according to God], and man was created κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα [according to the image], which received the power of παραδείγματος [model] 1704. But since the relationship between the Father and the Son in St. Ambrose seems to be significantly different than that of Philo and the Alexandrians, then creation in the image of the Son has only a conditional meaning: due to the equality of nature and action, the Father creates man in the image of the Word (ad imaginem Verbi), and the Son, in turn, creates him in the image of the Father (ad imaginem Dei Patris) 1705; man, therefore, is created in the image of the Trinity. Another concept, completely equivalent to the concept of the image, in Ambrose is the concept of seal (signaculum) 1706, again, probably depending on Philo, who applies to the heavenly man the concept ἡ σφραγίς [seal] 1707. In relation to the possession of the image of God in church literature, men and women are sometimes placed in a different position. From Western writers in Lactantius we encounter the idea that while God formed a spouse ad similitudinem suam [in His likeness], He created a woman in the image of man (ad ipsius hominis effigiem) 1708. In Philo we encounter another idea: woman represents a part of man, since God took one of the many powers (δυνάμεων) belonging to the mind or man, namely sensory power (τὴν αἰσϑητικήν), and from this power formed woman 1709. Ambrose also defends this last thought, saying that man was created ad imaginem Dei [in the image of God], and woman received the power of her husband (virtutem sui accipiens viri) 1710. What exactly is the substratum of the image of God in man, his body or soul, or both together, on this issue in church literature opinions have been expressed that are varied to the point of opposites. In the West, Tertullian mainly referred the image of God to the body of man, created in the image of the flesh that the Son of God had to perceive in the sacrament of the incarnation: man created from earthly dirt imaginem induens Christi futuri in came [is clothed with the image of Christ who is about to come in the flesh] 1711. This is imago [image] in contrast to similitudo [likeness], which referred to the infused soul, living, like God (de suo afflatu ad similitudinem suae vivacitatis animavit) 1712. It is unclear, but apparently in the sense of Tertullian, the following words of Lactantius sound: according to the form of his image (ad imaginis suae formam), more perfect than which nothing can be, God formed man from the dirt of the earth 1713. Ambrose, under the influence of the spiritualism of Eastern writers, broke all ties with this idea. In his “Six Days” he cites a rather extensive excerpt from the works of Origen and shows that the external human form cannot be considered the image of God, since in this case we would have to recognize God as corporeal and humanoid in appearance: On the essence of the image of God, he sometimes expresses the same view as Origen: just as Origen in the passage under consideration posits the image of God in the inner man, in the immateriality and immortality of his soul, so Ambrose refers it to the rational side of the soul, saying that God created man in His image for incorruptibility 1714. Sometimes he relates the image of God to the freedom of the human spirit: imago Dei anima nostra quae libera est [the image of God is our soul, which is free] 1715. Along with this, we find extensive extracts from Philo, in which the image is identified with the mind in man; The human mind resembles God in the infinity of its aspirations: just as God fills the universe and dominates it, penetrating the sky, the earth, the sea, and the air, so the νοῦς [mind] of man is invisible itself, but sees everything; he experiences the depths of the sea, extends beyond the latitudes of the earth, rises into the air, enjoys the brilliance of the stars, rises above the planets: In this sense, many other passages in the works of St. Ambrose: ratio [reason] is given to man ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei [in the image and likeness of God] 1716; ad imaginem Dei factus, factus est rationis sirah [created in the image of God, created to contain reason] 1717; in man ad similitudinem aeterni Dei [in the likeness of the eternal God] there exists a νοῦς invisibilis [invisible mind], clothed with the human form 1718. Despite, however, the fact that from the point of view of content, the concept of image in Ambrose is defined in the same way as among the Alexandrians, this concept for him has some features in comparison with its understanding among the latter and in general among Eastern church writers. The first of these features concerns the relationship between the concepts imago [image] and similitudo [similarity]. The Jewish forerunner of the Christian Alexandrians did not yet know how to clearly distinguish between these concepts; constantly dealing with the concept of εἰκών, he uses the word ὁμοίωσις [similarity], as Heinisch puts it, solely for the purpose of more clearly highlighting the concept of εἰκών, that is, the spiritual relationship of man with God 1719. “Since not every image,” Philo argues, “is similar to its archetype and model... therefore, to the expression “in the image” (κατὰ εἰκόνα) the word “in the likeness” (τὸ καϑ’ όμοίωσιν) is added to denote an exact imprint (ἀκριβοῦς ἐκμαγείου)" 1720. Among Eastern Christian writers, these concepts were distinguished very early, especially among the Alexandrians, for whom ὁμοίωσις [likeness], as the ultimate goal of all religious and moral aspirations of man, acquired especially important meaning: while with the concept of εἰκών [image] they began to designate the natural disposition of the human spirit, with which a person already enters life, They considered ὁμοίωσις [similarity] not a gift of nature, but the result of the self-activity of the human spirit in connection with grace. Already according to Clement of Alexandria, τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα [that which is in the image] a person receives through birth (κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν εἰληφέναι), and τὸ καϑ’ ὁμοίωσιν [that which is in likeness] subsequently acquires (ὕστερον) through improvement (κατὰ τὴν τελείωσιν) 1721. Same with many other writers. In the West, where these concepts did not have much importance in the construction of dogmatic and moral systems, they were for a long time in the state of confusion that we noted in Philo. Already Tertullian, where he does not refer the imago [image] to the human body, does not see any difference between imago [image] and similitudo [likeness]: oportebat igitur imaginem et similitudinem Dei, liberi arbitrii et suae potestatis institui, in qua hoc ipsum, imago et similitudo Dei deputaretur [it is proper that (one who is) the image and likeness God was created with free will and power, so that this itself [i.e. e. free will and power] was revered as the image and likeness of God] 1722. Lactantius constantly uses imago [image] instead of similitudo [likeness] and vice versa 1723. It is this poorly developed concept of image and likeness and the constant mixing of them one with the other that we constantly encounter in the works of St. Ambrose, and it does not matter what meaning in one case or another he puts into this concept: God created man in incorruptionem [incorruption], creating him ad imaginem sui [in His image], but at the same time it is said that the nature of the soul is very precious, created by God ad similitudinem Dei [in the likeness of God] 1724. Man was created ad similitudinem Dei [in the likeness of God], that is, ad imaginem Dei [in the image of God] 1725. Sometimes the meaning of similitudo [likeness] is defined completely in the sense of Philo: man has in his substance something de imagine et similitudine Dei [from the image and likeness of God], because he is similar to the Divine image (divinae similis imaginis) 1726; By this, the likeness of God is clearly identified in the final basis with the image of God: the likeness consists in the fact that the image of man is similar to the image of God. The second feature is that, although from the material side the image of God is seen by Ambrose, together with Eastern writers, in the rationality of nature, nevertheless, according to Ambrose, this is not rationality as a natural property of human nature. In the absence of a strict distinction between the concepts of imago [image] and similitudo [likeness], in the West, in cases where the imago [image] does not refer to the body, we notice a tendency to interpret these concepts in a moral sense, to consider them not as properties of nature itself, but as a moral mood or disposition of the spirit, conditioned by freedom and the grace that abides on a person. Having defined imago [image] and similitudo [likeness] as liberum arbitrium [free will] and potestas [power, strength], Tertullian directly explains that this freedom and power lies in dominion not only over others, but also over oneself, in constant service to good and in distance from evil, in doing the truth 1727. With such a view, the image of God, of course, could not remain ineradicable and constant in man. This moral current in the concepts of imago [image] and similitudo [likeness] makes its way through Ambrose, and even in those cases where he materially identifies it with reason. Man expresses the divine image in himself by the brilliance of good deeds (bonorum factorum) and the zeal of virtue (aemulatione virtutis) 1728. People live ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei [in the image and likeness of God] 1729. The presence of an image in a person is determined by his righteousness, so that only a righteous person can be said to be ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei vivit [lives in the image and likeness of God] 1730. Faith also determines the existence of the image: blessed is the man who lives ad similitudinem Dei per fidem [in the likeness of God in faith] 1731. He who has no attachment to the world approaches ad imaginem Dei similitudinemque [to the image and likeness of God] 1732. Vir perfectus [the perfect man] is the imago Dei [the image of God]; and to be similis [like] God means to have truth (justitiam), wisdom (sapientiam), to be perfect in virtue; God is without sin, and therefore only he who avoids sin ad imaginem est Dei [is in the image of God] 1733. If God created man ad imaginem et similitudinem sui [in His image and likeness], then this means that He created him rational (rationabilem), righteous (justum), chaste (pudicum); he exists ad imaginem [in the image], if he is righteous, an image of truth (imago justitiae), pure, so that the image of the Immaculate (immaculati) shines in him 1734. Sometimes similitudo [likeness] is defined negatively, as removal from evil, and imago [image] - positively, as the fullness of virtue: fuga malorum similitudo Dei est, et virtutibus imago Dei acquiritur [flight from [the creation of] evil is the likeness of God, and the image of God is acquired by virtues] 1735. If the imago [image] is determined by the moral disposition of a person and the Spirit of God living in him, then it disappears along with the loss of both: if we act well, the ista imago coelestis [this heavenly image] remains in us, and if someone acts badly, then this imago [image] is destroyed (deletur) in him, the place of which is occupied by the imago terreni [earthly image] 1736. All of the listed perfections and virtues of human nature were fully revealed in the primordial couple. On the external, physical side, God gifted her with a healthy body, good composition of the limbs, giving them the most beautiful appearance 1737. Philo had no shortage of bright colors, which gave Ambrose the opportunity to depict the life of primordial man in the spirit of an idyll, to paint before us a picture of the golden age on earth. As the purpose of creation, the whole world was intended for him to inhabit; cosmopolitan in this sense in position, a fresh, healthy creation of God, constantly rejoicing and incessant in conversation, beautiful in appearance - this is the image of Adam during the period of heavenly bliss of 1738. From the inner, spiritual side, the primordial couple was also in many ways superior to modern humanity. But in revealing this side, a significant difference between Ambrose and Philo immediately catches the eye, a difference that is generally characteristic of Western writers. Philo devotes little space to the supernatural factor in describing the spiritual and moral state of the first man: this state is derived from the natural disposition of his powers and abilities. By his nature, he could not be perfect, because only a heavenly man has virtue by nature, without the mediation of teaching (αὐτομαϑῶς), while an earthly man could not possess it ἀνευ διδασκαλίας [without teaching]; in moral terms, the latter was, therefore, something in between, was neither bad nor good (μέσος, μήτε φαῦλος, μήτε σπουδαῖος) 1739. He was still a baby (ὁ νήπιος) 1740. In this sense, Adam’s nakedness is also explained: if he was naked, this means that he had not yet taken part in either virtue or vice (μήτε ἀρετῆς, μήτε κακίας μετέχων) 1741; if he was not ashamed, then this also indicates his moral indifference 1742. He had yet to acquire virtue: to guide him in this, he was given the Divine Law (νόμος ϑεῖος), which is defined in the spirit of Stoicism as ὁ τῆς (φύσεως ὀρϑὸς λόγος [correct natural reason] 1743 In St. Ambrose, on the contrary, the first man not only had innate purity, but also a positive moral perfection (opertus erat Adam virtutum velamine priusquam praevaricatur), he had clothing, which he later lost in the fall (indumentum quod habebat, amiserat) 1744. Ambrose assimilates not only perfectio vitae, the perfection of life, but also consummatio virtutis, that is, the fullness of virtue, since the word consummatio 1745, as we will see in the section on eschatology, means for him the final limit. As a separate specific feature of this perfection of Adam and Eve, Ambrose notes their strict virginity: Christian virgins should be the same as Adam and Eve were. paradise, since only after his expulsion from paradise it is said about Adam that he knew his wife Eve and she conceived 1746. Adapted to this, primitive nakedness in Ambrose has a completely different meaning than in Philo. People “were naked, but not without the cover of virtues (non sine virtutum integimentis)”; were naked because of the simplicity of morals (propter morum simplicitatem) and also because nature did not know the garment of lies (amictum fraudis) 1747. As a result of this, already in paradise Adam enjoyed bliss that was supposed to be eternal (aeterna delectatione frueretur) 1748. This primitive perfection was determined both by the efforts of man himself and by the direct assistance of God Himself. As for man, with the royal power of his mind (regale mentis imperium) he dominated his feelings and mental movements 1749; his mind rushed to God (mens ejus adhaerebat Deo) 1750. God gave him his grace (non mediocrem gratiam), so that the man coelesti gratia refulgebat [shone with heavenly grace] 1751. This grace, on the one hand, consisted in God instructing the mind (mentem) with Divine precepts and the disciplines of wisdom, by which man could know what he should beware of and what he should choose; the adjustment of reason to these prescriptions consisted of mens recta (ὀρϑὸς λόγος) [correct natural reason] 1752, - this is how Ambrose defines this concept together with the author of IV Maccabees and other Hellenized Jewish writers. But, on the other hand, God directly helped man in acquiring virtue: The Power of God breathed into him success and increase in virtues (apprehendit ergo eum virtus Dei inspirans processus et incrementa virtutis) 1753. The world and man, as we have seen, were created by God perfect and beautiful. Evil and all kinds of imperfections arose in him only later. Of all the types of evil that exist in the world, Ambrose dwells mainly on the philosophical analysis of moral evil. When studying this issue, he, first of all, unconditionally rejects the dualistic point of view, especially detailed in the history of Christianity by the Gnostics, which, to explain world evil, assumed the existence of a special original evil principle: representatives of this point of view Marcion, Valentine and the Manichaeans in his eyes are the distributors of infection and deadly ulcers in people 1754. But at the same time, his religious feeling did not allow him to produce evil from the Creator of all that exists. Trying to reconcile in his “Six Days” the existence of evil with the concept of God, His Omnipotence and Omniperfection, Ambrose took the point of view of St. Basil the Great; everything that he states here about the essence of evil is a simple transcription of the corresponding passages of the latter’s “Six Days”. So, the truth that God cannot be the Creator of evil, and St. Ambrose, and St. Basil the Great equally proves by the consideration that in general nothing can give birth to its opposite and that what is created always has some similarity (similitudo) with its Creator. Hence, just as life does not give birth to death, and light is not capable of giving birth to darkness, so the Divine nature cannot give birth to evil, as its opposite. If in a person opposite mental states sometimes replace each other, as if giving rise to one another, then reference to this phenomenon does not prove anything: it takes place only in the change of affects, but has no relation to the dependence of the beings themselves, because non sicut mutabilitates affectuum, ita etiam generationum progressiones sunt [the change of affects is not similar to how the emergence of beings occurs] 1755. If everything that exists is created by God, and God cannot be the Author of evil, then we can only assume that evil itself has the character not of a substance (substantialis), but of a simple accident (accidens): beings created by God, as created ones, are capable of various changes and states; some of these changeable states are evil. St. Basil expresses the same thought when he says that κακόν ἐστιν οὐχι οὐσία ζῶσα, i.e. that evil is not a living essence 1756. Ambrose also uses this expression when he says that evil has no advantage of the creature and the authority of a natural substance (substantiae naturalis) 1757, that it is not a living substance (viva substantia) 1758. Further, if evil is not substantial and does not coincide with any of the creations, then it is clear that by its nature it signifies not so much something existing, a positive and active force, as it expresses some kind of lack, incompleteness of being, a negative force. Ambrose has no shortage of expressions that indicate that evil is not something positive, equivalent to its opposite - good, but emptiness, non-existence, the absence of good. This is why the absence of evil is already a positive good. “What,” says St. Ambrose, - is not evil, it already represents good, because what is vicious is at the same time evil, and what is devoid of vice is already good” 1759. Obviously, with these words, evil is denied all creative power, which distinguishes it from good by a certain content, and not by absolute emptiness. Hence, for example, innocence (innocentia) is attributed to someone in whom there is no disposition to harm anyone (non est nocendi voluntas), although it is not assumed that he has a conscious desire not to harm anyone, but to do good to everyone 1760. With such an idea of ​​the nature of evil, the very imperfections of nature and human weaknesses cannot be recognized as evil. For example, phenomena in human life such as poverty, uncertainty, illness and death cannot be called evil simply because no one recognizes the opposite of them as true good, while evil is the opposite of good. They cannot be recognized as evil also because they do not depend on us, they represent something inevitable, they arise partly from nature (ex natura, ἐκ φύσεως), and partly are sent to us by God for our benefit (ex commoditate, συμφερόντως) 1761. The second feature of evil is, therefore, that it has only a subjective psychological basis. In the words of Ambrose, evil is produced by levitate morum, the ease of morals; nothing can be considered evil that does not incite the mind (mentem) to crime and does not impose fetters on the conscience (conscientiam ligant); as such, it is only corruption (depravatio) of the mind (mentis) and spirit (animi), deviation from the path of virtue; for the mind this deviation is expressed in the direction of its thoughts (cogitationes), and for the spirit in general in the passions overwhelming it (animi cupiditates). This same thought is expressed by St. Basil the Great, when he speaks of evil as διάϑεσις, as the opposite disposition of the soul to virtue, as a falling away (ἀπόπτωσιν) from good towards frivolity 1762. With all this, if we think theoretically, fundamentally and irrespectively, then we must admit that the evil mood of the spirit is not fatally determined by the natural properties of human nature, does not arise out of necessity and does not form a “fatalistically determining order of nature for all human actions” 1763; it is the result of a free decision of the human will; man himself turns out to be the author of his own guilt. “It is not from outside that danger threatens us,” says St. Ambrose, - but from ourselves”; We must beware of only that which arises from our will (ex nostra voluntate). In complete agreement with the thoughts of St. Basil the Great, he continues that we can freely not do (possumus non facere) evil if we only wish (si nolimus) this; all our actions belong, in the end, to ourselves, are not imposed on us by others, and constitute our property (propria nostra sunt). Ambrose only considers our freedom of action a fact that is self-evident, undoubted and does not require special proof, while St. Basil the Great also tries to give a justification for the recognition of human freedom: if our actions did not depend on ourselves, then all the punishments imposed on us would be unfair 1764. On this fundamental basis, Ambrose came to the conclusion that the sensual side of human nature, in which all the passions and lusts that defile one’s mind are nested, without the assistance and consent of our own will cannot have a decisive role in the commission of evil deeds. The flesh, strictly speaking, is morally indifferent and can equally serve both good and evil. “Our members” can equally turn out to be “instruments of both truth and injustice.” The passion for profit can sometimes lead a person to the most serious type of theft - the theft of the property of widows and orphans; but a person can resist this passion and not only not steal someone else’s property, but even protect the innocently offended, help the poor 1765. The flesh gives rise, for example, to lust: looking at a woman leads a person to sin; however, if the intention of the spirit (animi intentio) is not added to this, then the lust of the flesh disappears 1766. Consequently, the flesh can even be called immaculate and, at most, it can only be a servant of the spirit (ministra) in its vices 1767. Of course, such a condescending assessment of the meaning of the flesh in moral activity contradicts its anthropo-psychological meaning, according to which it is the shackles of the spirit; but in explaining this it must be borne in mind that, firstly, a theoretically free person can practically be a slave of the flesh; and, secondly, according to the vision of the holy fathers and teachers of the Church, a person in his activity encounters the temptations of the devil and his activity takes one turn or another, depending on how persistently he wants to fight these temptations. Just as evil does not come from God, so demons were not created by God as evil, but they themselves became so. The nature of the devil in itself is not bad (non improba) 1768; in this respect, he is superior even to man, whose nature is lower than his nature (diabolus superioris naturae, homo inferioris naturae) 1769. Created together with the angels, the devil was initially among the angels, but then, unknown when, he fell and lost his highest state in 1770. Ambrose defines the cause and essence of his fall differently in different places: he often says that the devil fell because of his pride, 1771, but sometimes he considers the cause of his fall to be his intemperance (intemperantia), similar to how he sees the primary dignity of angels in their moral purity; just as virgins, because of their purity, ascend from the earth (de saeculo) to heaven, so the glorious angels propter intemperantiam suam [because of their intemperance] fell from heaven to earth 1772. And after the fall, in contrast to the angels, evil spirits show greater attachment to sensual pleasures; these include the words of Scripture that the angels loved the daughters of men; captivated by earthly pleasures, they are kept in slavery to them; although they remained spiritual (nequitia spiritualis) after the fall, nevertheless, their nature is now saturated (imbuta) with the poison of this flesh (venenis quibusdam carnis hujus) and infected with human crimes 1773. Through their fall they were subjected to Divine condemnation. This condemnation is eternal, and not temporary, as in Origen. It does not consist in death, but in permanent punishment (non mors, sed poena diuturna) 1774. To the fallen angels ignis servatur aeternus [eternal fire is preserved]. They are deprived of the right to God's condescension and remission of sins (non illae ad commune jus indulgentiae Dei, remissionemque pertinent peccatorum) 1775. Even the redemptive activity of Christ the Savior and the New Testament grace did not bring them any benefit: regarding them even now the Divine decision has not changed (non circa ilium soluta est sententia), as it has changed regarding man; the grace of Christ (Christi gratia), which loosed man, bound (astrinxit) the demons; the curse (manet maledictio) pronounced on the serpent for deceiving a person continues to remain on them in 1776. There are many both angels and demons, and both represent an organized kingdom. Ambrose distinguishes between Satan and his angels 1777. He speaks of spirituales nequitiae [spiritual evil] 1778, of adversariae potestates [adverse forces] 1779; Satan is princeps [prince], and the rest of the demons are ministri ejus [his servants] 1780. Just as in the angelic world there is a distinction between individual functions, so in the kingdom of evil spirits, as Niederhuber showed in detail, “the functions of demons are strictly defined, certain demons have a certain range of activities” 1781. Some of them wage an open struggle with us 1782, others act cunningly, leading us into temptation and taking the form of bright angels 1783, and others, finally, act on us indirectly by arousing passions in our body 1784. Demons of this last category, in turn, are distinguished by a strict delimitation of their functions: between them there are separate spirits of fornication (fornicationis), greed (avaritiae), pride (superbiae), etc. 1785 In the general system of the universe, St. Ambrose assigns to demons the same position between people and angels that they occupy in Origen. Just as for the latter “their habitat is the air, just as the earth is inhabited by demonic souls, as the earth is by human souls, and the sky by angels” 1786, so Ambrose considers the airy sphere to be their habitat: there is a special sky, which is something between heaven in the proper sense and earth, also called an airy place (aerius locus), in which spirituales nequitiae live 1787. The sphere of activity of demons is the earth and in particular the human race. Ambrose shared the belief common to ancient Christian writers, apologists, Tertullian and the Alexandrians that the pagan world was its own kingdom of demons. The devil “gathered for himself nations that he did not create, for God created man ad imaginem et similitudinem suam [in His image and likeness], and the devil brought him to himself with lies. He gathered for himself nationum populos [pagan peoples], creating wealth for himself" 1788. The pagans were his weapons (agsha diaboli gentes), through which he spread atheism in the world 1789. But those faithful to the Lord and Christians are also the subject of his attacks. He shouted (clamavit) for the first time in Eve, then in Cain, Pharaoh, Dathan, Abiron, Korah; shouted at the Jews when they, upon receiving the law by Moses, demanded that gods be made for them; shouted when the Jews demanded a king for themselves in order to retreat from the Lord God, their King; cried in every vain and wicked man. The devil for all mankind is a destroyer (perdix) and an adversary (contrarius) 1790. He is the common enemy (communis inimicus) 1791, sows the bait of sins everywhere 1792, binds people with his fetters (vincula diaboli) 1793. This evil of the devil towards the human race has several reasons. On the one hand, it is as if, even after condemnation, pride speaks in him, which draws him to strengthen the power over the world that has not yet been completely taken away from him (coelestis substantiae potentia suffragatur) 1794; but since everything in the world is subordinate to man, all his greed is directed mainly at the latter with the intention of taking over the whole world in his person 1795. On the other hand, the main motive for his enmity towards people is, apparently, envy of them, which prompts him to make a person an accomplice in his own sin (suae offensae) 1796; he wants to have as participants in his punishment (in supplicio participes) those whom he has managed to make accomplices of his error (in errore consortes), and is looking for comrades in guilt (socios quaerit ad culpam) in order to bring them to punishment (ad poenam) 1797. However, the devil’s enmity towards man would never have achieved its results if God Himself, for His providential purposes, had not given him certain power over the world: this is confirmed by the story of the righteous Job in 1798. Thus, the devil, with all his pride, is subordinate to God and is not omnipotent in his deceit. The Fall of the Forefathers Evil in the human race dates back to the historical fact of the fall of our ancestors. In this fall, two factors acted together: the first people’s own freedom and the temptation of the devil. If Adam wanted to remain faithful to the Lord forever, then the devil could not entice him to fall; Only when Adam himself decided to heed the advice of the devil, the latter, in the figurative expression of St. Ambrose, “took him by the hand and extended it to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, so that he could take the forbidden” 1799, and under the influence of this temptation Adam actually tasted the forbidden fruit. This eating of the forbidden tree was sinful for two reasons. First of all, Adam’s guilt was that he ate what was forbidden, thus breaking the direct commandment of God and showing disobedience; he was removed from paradise by disobedience in itself, since he fell away a mandato Dei [from the command of God] 1800, could not inhaerere mandatis coelestibus [cleave to the heavenly commands] 1801. Then Ambrose gives this fact a Plato-Philonian coloring, condemns it as an indicator that the lower, sensual side of man has triumphed over the higher, rational, flesh has defeated the spirit. From this point of view, following the example of Philo, in addition to the literal one, he also gives an allegorical explanation to the biblical story of the Fall. The tempter, who took the form of a serpent, was an image of external pleasures and feelings. As such, he addresses his proposal not directly to Adam, but to his wife, who is considered the personification of the lower principle in man, feelings (αἴσϑησις); and since Adam himself was a representative of reason (νοῦς), he, following the example of the wife who had sinned before, and taking the forbidden fruit from her hands, followed in the essence of the matter the voice of feeling 1802. Thus, the woman bears the main blame for the emergence of evil in humanity. Ambrose, again following the example of Philo, especially draws attention to the fact that Adam did not sin while he was alone; but as soon as his wife was attached to him, he immediately retreated from God, and all untruths began 1803. From here the grave consequences that the fall had both for people themselves and for all of nature become clear. The first of these consequences was the loss of that original grace that resided in the first man and, by the way, determined his primitive moral perfection. Western writers generally pay much attention to this consequence. Cyprian, for example, sees the consequence of the fall in the fact that Adam did not retain acceptam divinitus gratiam [grace received from above] 1804. In Ambrose, Adam, in the act of the Fall, fell away a fructu gratiae [from the benefit of grace] 1805, abandoned gratiam Christi [the grace of Christ] 1806. Now nakedness was revealed, which man had not previously noticed, and the human mind (mens humana) began to cover itself with numerous counterfeit clothes (multis simulationum involucris); having lost their immaculate and uncorrupted nature, they began to look for man-made clothes of this world in order to cover with them the nakedness of their mind (nuda suae mentis): covering with pleasures the pleasures and illusory pleasures of this world, like leaves with leaves, they wrapped them in the mystery of procreation (genitale secretum) 1807. Then in the West it was recognized that, along with the loss of primitive grace, man also lost the most important advantage of his nature - the image and likeness of God. Both were returned to him only in the sacrament of redemption, when man, as Tertullian put it, again received the ilium Dei spiritum [that spirit of God], which he once received from a breath, but then amiserat per delictum [lost as a result of sin]; both imago [image] and similitudo [likeness] are conceived inseparably from the abiding of grace in man 1808. Also in Ambrose, secundum imaginem [in image] Adam was ante peccatum [before sin], but when he fell, he put aside the image of the heavenly (imaginem coelestis) and put on the image of the earthly (terrestris effigiem) 1809. And in his person, every person has lost the magnum illud munus [that great gift] by which the ad imaginem Dei [in the image of God] was created, and as a result is now subject to all the greater punishment. “For God does not punish (punit) similitudinem suam [His likeness], but the one who was created ad similitudinem Dei [in the likeness of God], because he could not preserve what he received. It means that only that which has ceased to exist ad similitudinem Dei [in the likeness of God] is punished... If in you (even after the Fall) an imago [image] and a similitudo [likeness] were found, then you would not be worthy of punishment, but of reward: that imago [image] with which you were created ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei [in the image and likeness of God] is not condemned with you, but is crowned (non condemnatur, sed coronatur). You are condemned because you have changed, becoming from a man a serpens [serpent], a mulus [a mule], an equus [a horse], a vulpecula [a fox]. This is what Scripture calls us, because, having removed from ourselves the adornments of the coelestis imaginis [heavenly image], we also lost the name of man along with them, not being able to retain the gratiam hominis [grace of man]" 1810. These advantages lost in the fall are restored only by Christ in redemption. “For this imago [Image] came to what existed before ad imaginem [in the image] and for this imago seeks what was created ad similitudinem sui [in His own likeness], in order to imprint and a second time fasten (ut iterum signet, ut iterum confirmat) it, because you have lost what you received: by the gift of the Divine breath (inspirationis) you once had gratiam [grace], which you took away from you tua culpa [your fault]" 1811. Along with imaginem et similitudinem [image and likeness], immortality, inseparably associated with them, was also lost in the fall; sensual people were subjected to death, since everything sensual is perishable and mortal by its very nature 1812. Finally, since the world of sensual pleasures was revealed to people by the devil, who himself is a representative of sensual pleasure, people fell into dependence on him, and the devil now acquired formal right over them. In the book “De Tobia” [“On Tobias”] St. Ambrose represents the devil in relation to the forefathers as a creditor who took a receipt from them (handwriting, chirographum) and kept it with himself as a sign of his power over the debtors 1813. As for the condemnation of nature, although it cannot sin (peccandi sensum non habent), it was nevertheless subjected to punishment along with man due to its especially close relationship with him. Thus, God has given man royal power over nature, but just as in war the death of a leader entails the death and disorder of the entire army, so it would be unfair if nature did not share the severity of the punishment of its leader 1814. This was necessary especially because man is also organically closely connected with all of nature, forming one whole with it: man is the head, and the rest of nature is the totality of all the other members of the same body; and just as an organism dies when its head is cut off, so the whole of nature was upset when its head was defeated in 1815. The justice of her condemnation becomes even more certain if we remember that nature does not have its own purpose and was created only for man, for his benefit and pleasure 1816. After the fall, she should have been upset and impoverished, since from that moment on it was determined for man to eat bread by the sweat of his brow 1817. Finally, the former perfection of nature was a reflection of the perfection of man himself; Now she had to reflect the change in the internal state of a person. This thought of St. Ambrose illustrates borrowed from St. Basil the Great is an example of roses, which previously grew without thorns and did not deceive people with their beautiful appearance, and then became covered with thorns, becoming, as it were, a mirror of human life, where what is pleasant is often poisoned by the extreme stress of worries, a kind of thorns. Perhaps the most important consequence of the fall of the ancestors was, according to Ambrose, the spread of sin throughout the entire human race. This question was of great interest to Ambrose and therefore was revealed to him especially fully; and if our teacher contributed anything original to the general treasury of the disclosure and explanation of dogmatic ideas, then this must first of all be said regarding his teaching about the universality of sin. However, in the very recognition of the fact of the sinfulness of mankind one cannot yet see the merits of St. Ambrose, since this recognition has always existed in Christian theological literature. The consciousness of sinfulness appears quite strongly already in the works of Philo. No one, he says, can be sinless throughout his entire life, without stumbling, 1818; from the very beginning of birth, our soul uses the affects, sorrows, sorrows, passions, lusts and pleasures that enter us through the senses; this already happens when the soul is not yet able to distinguish good from evil 1819. The basis for this lies in the very structure of human nature, in its material composition: the human race is so structured that it has a constant tendency towards sin 1820; a mortal being, by necessity, possesses a certain defilement 1821; ἐξ ἑαυτῆς εἴωϑε γεννᾶν ψυχή, that is, the soul has the habit of giving birth to evil from itself 1822. This consciousness of the sinfulness of humanity in Philo is usually associated with Plato’s view of the union of the soul with the body as the source of defilement of the first 1823: the mind descended from heaven (νοῦς) is bound by the needs of the flesh (σώματος), which determines its sympathy for evil 1824. It is not impossible, of course, that this strong conviction in Philo about the depravity of man had a certain influence on St. Ambrose. However, from this factor alone it is not possible to deduce the teaching of Ambrose, given the significant difference between them. First of all, Philo speaks only about evil, abnormality, and not about sin in the proper sense, personal or universal, while in the works of St. Ambrose, we meet not with evil in general, but with sin as such. Then Philo reveals his idea of ​​abnormality in human nature, completely independent of any connection with the historical fact of the fall of the ancestors, which determines the universality of sin, and in Ambrose this connection and the idea of ​​​​the moral unity of humanity occupy a central place. Finally, no matter how convinced Philo is of the inevitability of evil for man, he, however, failed to preserve the absolute universality of this evil: if he speaks of the gift of God, rare in humanity, to pass one’s entire life from beginning to end without voluntary or involuntary untruths (ἀδικημάτων), then this shows that there are still people who, although not by themselves, but by the gift of God, live their lives sinlessly 1825; for Ambrose, as for all church writers in general, the sinfulness of humanity had its religious meaning only under the condition of its absolute universality, embracing all people except the incarnate Son of God. In church literature proper, the question of sinfulness in humanity was equally diligently addressed by both Western writers and representatives of the Christian Alexandrian school, well known to Ambrose, but both in the main point of view and in detail, both did not always follow the same paths. The Christian Alexandrians stated mainly the very fact of sinfulness, the moral depravity of humanity and spoke not so much about one sin in the proper sense, which weighs indifferently on all humanity, but rather about the tendency to sin. The connection of this inclination to sin with the fall of Adam, although not denied, but, on the contrary, according to the sacred writers, was recognized as undeniable, but was little taken into account in a detailed analysis of the concept of sinfulness. For example, Clement of Alexandria, although he directly calls sin a common inheritance, since the ability to sin is innate and common to all people (πᾶσιν ἔμφυτον καὶ κοινόν) 1826, but he sees the essence of this hereditary sinfulness only in the fact that, following the example of Adam, man became a child, ceased to resist his wishes and, as a result, shackled himself with sins 1827; human sin is nothing more than συνήϑεια, that is, a habit that turns him away from the truth (τῆς ἀληϑείας ἀποτρέπει) 1828. Although Clement distinguishes evil deeds from the root of depravity (τὰς ῥίζας τῆς κακίας) 1829, nevertheless, from his words it is not at all clear that this root is anything greater and more real than the mere possibility or ability to commit evil deeds. The teaching on this same issue of the great successor of Clement Origen is already higher and, apart from his opinion about the pre-worldly fall of spirits sent in the form of human souls for their purification to earth, is more closely consistent with the church’s belief in Adam as the culprit and founder of human sin. Origen already talks about the organic connection between Adam and his offspring, as a result of which sin in man originates from Adam: Adam seems to be like a πτέρνα, that is, the fifth of all humanity, and the devil, having stung this heel in paradise, stung, in essence, all of humanity 1830. In Adam, therefore, all men died in 1831. With all this, this connection of humanity as a whole with the crime of the ancestor actually turns out to be only theoretical in Origen, as a prerequisite for clarifying the essence of the atoning death of Christ; when revealing the nature of human sinfulness, it does not have much significance for him. Not only is there no thought about humanity’s participation in the first sin and about bearing responsibility for it, but even in the state of the fall, man is recognized as having an almost intact formal ability to choose, the ability to strive at his own discretion for both good and evil 1832 - an extreme largely explained by his passion for anti-Gnostic polemics. At most, the corruption of a person is reflected in the strengthening of the inclinations of the flesh, and since the flesh desires what is contrary to the spirit, and the spirit strives in the opposite direction, then in man there is a cruel enmity between the spirit on the one hand and flesh and blood on the other 1833. But even in this enmity, the main factor turns out to be not so much the hereditary corruption caused by the fall of Adam - at least Origen himself does not try to put these two phenomena into a causal connection - but the same human freedom. Only one fact of temptation by demons, who have gained power over man since his fall and act on him by exciting the flesh, without, however, violating his freedom 1834, serves as the only indicator of the abnormal state of affairs. The question of the universality of sin in humanity found more fruitful ground in the West, where Tertullian and Cyprian especially contributed to its clarification. Tertullian, much more strongly than Origen, holds out the idea of ​​the causal dependence of sinfulness in humanity on the sin of Adam. In substantiating this idea, he was greatly helped by his traditionalist point of view on the question of the origin of the soul: if all souls by birth come from the soul of Adam, then it is clear that the change in Adam’s organization caused by sin passed on to his offspring 1835. Souls were contained in Adam, as in a kind of source of nature (ut in fonte naturae) 1836; hence the malum animae [evil of the soul], transmitted by inheritance, has a meaning equivalent to nature (naturale quodammodo) and arises from the depravity of origin (ex originis vitio). In the same sense, Tertullian speaks of the perversity of nature, which for man has become second nature (naturae corruptio alia natura est) 1837, about vitium naturae [vice of nature] 1838; tradux animae [transfer of soul] was also tradux rescati [transfer of sin] 1839; together with the latter we are talking about traducem damnationis [transfer of condemnation] 1840, as well as death, which is transmitted inextricably with the race itself (mors cum ipso genere transducta) 1841. However, even in Tertullian we do not yet encounter all those distinctive features that are characteristic of Western writers of later times. The idea of the transfer of sin and responsibility for it, for example, in the form of condemnation, as can be seen from the listed expressions, is undoubtedly not alien to Tertullian, but still, in reality, the Stoic ideas about the universality of matter and the materiality in a certain sense of the soul, which he internalized, encouraged him to understand this sinfulness not morally and religiously, but physically, in the sense of uncleanness attached to the soul, in the sense of a disorder of the bodily nature 1842 . Vitium originis in the essence of the matter means, in the words of Lofs, “lack of origin” 1843: a person is born through marriage, and any marriage relationship, even the most legal, according to Tertullian’s extremely rigoristic view, is stuprum, fornication 1844; therefore it is nulla ferme nativitas munda [no birth is pure] 1845. How little Tertullian thought about his own sin clearly follows from his view of infants, still free from personal sins, as a virgin age (innocens aetas), in the name of which he rebelled against the church practice of infant baptism in 1846. Another feature characteristic of Tertullian is his lack of a clearly expressed consciousness of the absolute, inevitable power of sin that enslaved the whole person. Despite all the perversity of his nature, man still remains kind, retains freedom and the ability to do good; congenital filth in this regard affects him very little. Goodness is innate to man (ingenita), and sin is an outwardly random phenomenon (accidens) 1847. “The soul is inherent (insit) with good (bonum), it is preferential, related and in the proper sense natural (principale). For what is from God is not so much uprooted (extinguitur) as covered with shadow (obumbratur). It can be obscured because it is not God, but it cannot be destroyed because it comes from God. Consequently, just as light, meeting any obstacle, does not disappear, but it also does not appear if the density of the obstacle is too great; so the good (bonum) in the soul, being crushed by evil (a malo), depending on the quality of the latter, is either completely emptied (in totum vacat), becoming hidden, or, if freedom turns out to be, it shines as much as possible... In the worst of people (of people there is always) something good appears, and in the best something bad is revealed” 1848. The Western writers following Tertullian to Ambrose, essentially adhering to his point of view, in some respects deepened and supplemented it. Cyprian also strongly insists on Adam's perversion of the nature of all subsequent humanity: Dominus adveniens sanasset ilia, quae Adam portaverat vulnera, et venena serpentis antiqua curasset [coming, the Lord healed the wounds that Adam had suffered, and cured the ancient snake venom] 1849. Like Tertullian, these ulcers and poison, passed from Adam to all humanity, for Cyprian mean the weakness of the flesh: as a result of the first crime, the strength (firmitas) of the body disappeared along with immortality (cum immortalitate) and after death, infirmity (infirmitas) appeared 1850; Adam's inheritance is fragilitatis humanae infirmitas, the weakness of human fragility, imbecillitas, decrepitude 1851. And finally, St. The idea of ​​imputing the sin of the forefathers to the offspring was not yet entirely clear to Cyprian; his conviction that in baptism non propria, sed aliena peccata [not one’s own, but other people’s sins] 1852 is clearly demonstrated. However, unlike Tertullian, original defilement is revealed, in his opinion, in a person with greater force. He not only defends the practice of baptizing infants, who, although they do not yet have personal sins, however, like every secundum Adam carnaliter natus [born carnal according to Adam], through the first (carnal) birth (prima nativitate) acquire the infection of ancient death (contagium mortis antiquae) 1853, but also constantly mourns the impossibility for a person to get rid of his own internal struggle: between the flesh and the spirit (in us) there is a struggle (colluctatio), so that we are forced to do what we do not want, because our spirit seeks the heavenly and Divine, and the body desires the earthly and belonging to the century 1854. Lactantius did not add anything new to this, unless he took a step back, since he, as an exception not entirely understood among Western writers, attaches too little importance to the organic connection of humanity with its ancestor 1855. Nevertheless, his sympathies for Platonism, together with the influence of the Western tradition on him, gave him the opportunity to state in quite strong terms the abnormality of human life: the body attracts the spirit united with it and leads it from immortality to death; in itself it is fragile and subject to sin (fragilis et subjecta peccato) 1856; imbecillitas carnis [weakness of the flesh] subject to sins and wounds 1857. But the power of these expressions is significantly weakened by the thought that Lactantius does not abandon that the main cause of all human sins is one’s own will: the incarnate Son of God by His deeds showed people that sinning is not a matter of necessity (non necessitatis), but of intention and will (propositi ac voluntatis) 1858. At the same time, the fatal power of sin reigning in the world is greatly questioned. In Hilary, the immediate predecessor of St. Ambrose, the old traditions are again revealed with all their strength. He speaks of evil (malitia), inherent in people due to the characteristics of our common origin - per conditionem communis nobis originis 1859. This evil sticks to a person by the will of a changed nature - per naturae demutabilis voluntatem 1860. If Hilary speaks here not only of infirmitas, imbecillitas carnis [weakness of the flesh], but also of voluntas [will], then this shows that he has already gone further than Tertullian; but this new thought does not yet receive dominant significance in him. In all his judgments on the issue that interests us, some kind of indecision is noticeable; with great caution and uncertainty he speaks of the universality of sin, from which no ordinary mortal can be free: nescio quem possit excipere 1861. The works of Ambrose in the history of the scientific disclosure of the doctrine of original sin mark a new era. What seems new to him is that he began to pursue the point of view of his predecessors much more persistently and systematically; what was first expressed in passing, he elevates to the level of the dominant idea. “Ambrose,” in the words of Harnack, “made the conviction in the deep perversion of human nature by sin the starting point of his thinking” 1862. The idea of ​​Adam’s connection with all his offspring and the universal sinfulness arising from this connection is expressed more powerfully than before. Between Adam and all humanity there is a certain kind of solidarity, unity; Adam was the representative of all humanity: fuit Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes [there was Adam, and in him we were all] 1863. Ambrose does not discuss the nature of this connection in more detail, but since he generally rejects the basis of Tertullian traditionism, representation and solidarity are not so much real as moral and ideal. Because of this, if Adam fell, he did not fall individually, but brought with him all of humanity: periit Adam et in illo omnes perierunt [Adam fell, and everyone in him fell] 1864, since per unum in omnes pertransivit peccatum [through one sin passed into all] 1865. In contrast to Tertullian, the spread of this fall to absolutely all of humanity is affirmed, and in this case St. Ambrose expresses himself much more strongly than Cyprian. Corruption is the inevitable lot of humanity: all people sin because the ability not to sin is inaccessible to their nature (ultra naturam est) 1866; no one can boast of the purity of his heart 1867, no one is free from death, because death reigned in the world from Adam to Moses and beyond 1868. Not only adults who have managed to defile themselves with their own sins are unclean before God, but not even one of the young children is clean before God 1869. The righteous 1870 and even the greatest of all earthly righteous Virgin Mary are not excluded from the general law of sinful depravity: in the essay “De institutione virginis” [“On the education of the virgin”], dedicated specifically to the praise of the Mother of God, there is not a word about Her non-involvement in sin, while about Christ alone it is clearly noted: unicus solus sine peccato [Only one without sin] 1871 . Further, as with Tertullian and Cyprian and in general with all previous Western writers, the general depravity of humanity, according to the teachings of St. Ambrose, manifests itself not only in external actions, in individual sinful acts, but also lies in the internal depravity of nature, “which no virtue can destroy” 1872. But St. Ambrose introduces partly new terms to denote this concept in the West, speaking, for example, about hereditary fetters (haereditarium vinculum) 1873, about the hereditary matter of untruth (haereditarium iniquitatis glutinum), which acts with such coercive force that a person cannot resist it and free himself from it 1874. Adam left us obnoxiam haereditatem successionis humanae [a punishable inheritance of human succession] 1875; consequently, the very fact of the successive origin of man from one another determines his corruption, inherent, so to speak, in humanity itself, in the very existence of man, as precisely a man: peccasse conditionis est, quia nemo immunis lapsus est [to sin is an accessory to the state (of human nature), because no one fell, being not involved in it] 1876; this corruption is noxiae conditionis haereditas [inheritance of a guilty condition (of a person)] 1877 and, as such, represents a permanent, unchangeable condition of a person, is statio diuturna 1878. As for now the question of how exactly St. imagined. Ambrose this universal sinfulness, whether he identified it, like his predecessors, with infirmitas, imbecillitas corporis [the weakness of the flesh] or put a new ethical meaning into it, here, apparently, St. Ambrose failed to achieve clarity. On the one hand, he undoubtedly continues to stand on his previous point of view: man sins per fragilitatem [due to (his) fragility, weakness] 1879; God spares the righteous as a sinner conditionis fragilitate [due to the fragility, weakness of (his) condition] 1880; infirmitas conditionis est, non specialis improbitas [this is the weakness of the condition, and not any special damage] 1881; caro [flesh] is venenum ante peccatum [poison before sin], that is, obviously, the personal sin of each person, because it precisely serves as a bait for sins (illecebra peccatorum) 1882. On the other hand, at the same time, Ambrose puts forward a new ethical point here, meaning by hereditary corruption moral untruth. In this regard, he first of all distinguishes in a very specific way the concepts of iniquitas [untruth, unrighteousness] and peccatum [sin]. Iniquitas in the development of a person’s sinful life is what precedes, peccatum is what follows; the first is the root, and the second is the fruit of the root; and therefore iniquitas gravior tamquam materia peccatorum, peccatum levius [untruth is heavier as the matter of sin, but sin is lighter]. This is for the reason that iniquitas refers ad mentis improbitatem, to the impiety of the mind, and peccatum - ad prolapsionem corporis, to the fall of the body 1883. In other words, iniquitas is habitudo mentis injustae, that is, a state of an unjust mind, and therefore it is interpreted as an operatrix culpae atque delicti [producer of guilt and sin], while peccatum is iniquitas only because in it there is ipso iniquitas est [itself is untruth], that it is opus est iniquitatis [is a work of untruth] 1884. Of decisive importance here is the bishop’s direct remark that in this kind of iniquitate [untruth] we already begin 1885, freeing ourselves from it only through the baptismal font - per lavacrum 1886. Confirming with these words the desecration of man by untruth (iniquitas) already in the very act of conception, St. Ambrose leaves Tertullian and Cyprian far behind him. However, Ambrose's weakness is that he only outlines this new point of view, accepts it with great restrictions and rarely pursues it consistently. He still hesitates to say whether the mother gives birth to us in her sins (in delictis suis), or whether there are already some sins of the one being born (jam sint aliqua delicta nascentis). It is unknown in whose sins we are born. What is certain is that the fetus is not free from untruth (iniquitatis), since its parents themselves are not free from fall; and thus we are concipimur in peccato parentum et in delictis eorum nascimur [conceived in the sin of our parents and born in their sins] 1887. Here Ambrose is apparently more inclined to admit that, although sinfulness is inherent in all people, it is the sinfulness of a person’s closest parents and thus is only ultimately determined by the sinfulness of Adam, and is not the sinfulness, the guilt of Adam, transferred to all humanity. “Ambrose only felt the nature of sin, as (namely) guilt, but did not find it” 1888; he does not yet know about the imputation of Adam’s sin to the entire human race. True, in one place he apparently distinguishes between iniquitas nostra [our untruth], as the personal untruth of each person, and the inherent iniquitas calcanei nostri in quo Adam dente serpentis est vulneratus [the untruth of our heel, in which Adam was wounded by the teeth of the serpent] and which is praevaricatio Adae [Adam's hypocrisy] 1889; but a little lower it is explained that this iniquitas calcalnei [untruth of the heel] is more ease in committing a sin (magis lubricum delinquendi) than any guilt in one’s own sin (quam reatum aliquem nostri delicti); Therefore, in us, the crimes of our own, and not someone else’s, untruth are punished (nostra in nobis, non alienae iniquitatis flagitia puniuntur) 1890 and, therefore, all responsibility for iniquitas calcanei is eliminated. But what is the weak side of the teaching of St. Ambrose about original sin also constitutes its distinctive dignity. In the already cited study by Deutsch, it is noted that, according to Ambrose, not only does the filth passed on from Adam continue to exist in humanity, but that “evil increases from generation to generation” 1891. This idea, consistently arising from the thought of the conception and birth of a person in the sins of his parents, mother, was still alien to previous writers. Spreading gradually, evil eventually destroys every trace of innocence in humanity; With the extreme development of evil, Christ appeared on earth to transform human nature. Under the influence of evil, nature decreases (minuitur): “Through the spirit and crimes contaminated with filth, its strength is weakened (hebetatur), “malice” (malitia) has increased, innocence (innocentia) has been destroyed, there is absolutely not a single person capable of doing good” 1892. How indecisive is St. Ambrose on the question of the nature of hereditary sinfulness, so he hesitates when depicting the influence that this sin has on human life and activity. Under the influence of the Alexandrians, he sometimes in this respect not only lags behind Tertullian and Cyprian, but is ready to admit even the complete integrity of the will of sinful humanity. This already confirms the remark that in children who are unclean only due to the weakness of the body, actually nulla est culpa [there is no guilt], they exist sine ullo crimine praevaricationis et culpa [without any hypocrisy and guilt] 1893. Diligentia et studium peccandi [love and jealousy of sin] begins, in fact, only from adolescence, because a child sins solely out of his weakness, and a young man begins to sin out of wickedness; he studiose [deliberately] wants to commit sins and is famous for his crimes 1894. In general, in order for sin to arise as a sin, the active and conscious participation of the spirit in action is necessary, improbitas 1895, dishonesty, as the personal mood of the individual, is necessary. This last is the work of the person himself, who sins not per naturam [by nature], but per voluntatem [by will] 1896. In general, the entire legal capacity of a damaged person in religious and moral life in fact remains almost in no way lower than the legal capacity of an undamaged person: the former, if he wishes, can fully understand the requirements of the law and is able to act well; only by his own reluctance does he turn away vigorem mentis suae [the power of his mind] from the knowledge of everything Divine 1897. Although our body serves as a seat of passions and all kinds of unreasonable movements, it still does not act on the soul in a fatal way: if the intention of the spirit (intentio animi) is not mixed in, then the attraction of the body disappears by itself (vanescit) 1898 1; the spirit (animus) serves as the creator of guilt (animus noster culpae est auctor), and the flesh itself is innocent (innocens), although it often turns out to be a minister (ministra) of sin 1899. “No one is forced ad culpam [to guilt] by force unless he inclines to it of his own free will (voluntate propria... Christ chooses for himself a voluntary warrior, just as the devil acquires for himself only a voluntary slave; he does not bind anyone with the yoke of slavery unless someone first sells himself to him at the price of sins. Why do we place the blame on the flesh as weak (infirmam)?” 1900 Not only does the body not force the spirit, but, on the contrary, the spirit can dominate the flesh. “The affairs of the internal man (interioris hominis) pass on to the external man (ad exteriorem hominem), just as, for example, the purity (castimonia) of the internal man is imparted to the chastity of the body (ad castitatem corporis). He who does not know adultery (adulterium) of the heart also does not know adultery of the body, although one cannot conclude from this that he who has not committed adultery with the body has not also committed adultery with the heart” 1901. “In the same person sometimes darkness is born, and sometimes light arises. You yourself are darkness or light. This is the darkness of untruth (iniquitatis), the darkness of sins (peccatorum), and the light is the light of innocence (innocentiae). You yourself are the author of both your pity (resentment, injuriae) and grace (gratiae): Divine action does not sin in anything. Light exists in yourself, since your childhood is immaculate (innocens infantia tua). The mind is pure (pura mens) before the temptations of adolescence and the errors of youth. But you yourself have made into darkness that which is light. The same eye, that is, a person’s feeling, can be dark in a sinner and bright in an immaculate person” 1902. In these words, the presence of complete moral freedom in humanity descended from Adam is expressed so strongly that such an extreme defender of freedom as Origen would have signed them without any hesitation. If the moral disposition does not disappear in a sinful person, and the will remains free, then the fact that under these conditions a person actually constantly sins should be explained not by internal prayers, but by external influences. Quite in the spirit of Origen and some other Eastern writers, St. Ambrose in this regard attributes exceptional importance to the devil and his servants. If there were no temptations of the devil, then the flesh could never dominate the spirit: anima numquam a corpore vinceretur, nisi prius a diabolo tentaretur. “Because,” asks St. Ambrose, “how can the soul, which creates the body, animates it and controls it, be a prisoner of carnal lures, if it is not first itself bound by the shackles of some higher power?” 1903 Further, in exactly the same way, in the spirit of Origen, Ambrose describes the image of the devil’s influence on man, namely: not directly, but through the medium of the body. Origen, admitting that all our natural needs have a basis for themselves in our body and are not imposed on us contrary to the laws of nature by an external force, recognized, however, that as soon as we, in satisfying bodily needs, “allow ourselves more than necessary, and do not resist the first movements of immoderation, the enemy force, taking advantage of this first error, encourages and excites (us) by all means, trying to spread sins more widely” 1904. Ambrose also sometimes comes across the idea that the devil directly acts on the passions of the body, and the body already captivates the spirit. “The pleasantness of honors, the height of power, the sweetness of food, the beautiful appearance of a harlot - all this is the rope of the devil and, as it were, some alluring breath of spiritual malice, which, through the lure of the flesh, which quickly softens with the ease of a woman, also overthrows the spirit from the heights: for the spirit does not see a woman before her bodily eye desires. Moreover, what you do not see, you will not love, but where the flesh desires, there the fortitude of the spirit sympathizing with it weakens and the mind (mens) is inclined by the community of love... and so, under the influence of the temptations of the devil and the convictions of the flesh, death creeps up imperceptibly along with crime” 1905. The only difference is that whereas in Origen, as can be seen from the above words, the initiative of temptation still belongs to man, according to St. Ambrose, the devil approaches man with his temptations, apparently without any reason on the latter’s part; We will once again encounter a similar difference in the views of East and West on the question of grace; it cannot be denied that this slight difference makes the dominance of demons more fatal for Ambrose than for Origen. Not only hereditary sin, but also each person’s own iniquitas [untruth] does not destroy his freedom: iniquitas [untruth] does not take root in the soul, but sticks to it in a purely external way, mechanically. No matter how corrupted our will may be, we can always, however, maintain control over our mood. “As long as we do something dishonest (improbum), the path of untruth (via iniquitatis) remains in us and does not leave us, and therefore we must act carefully to separate it from ourselves” 1906. But in parallel with these ideas about the sin of St. Ambrose, like Cyprian, but in much stronger terms, also points to the coercive power of sin for a person. This can be explained, of course, in different ways: perhaps here we have before us only one of the contradictions, of which Ambrose generally has many, but it is also possible that Ambrose wanted to say that although hereditary sin did not completely destroy human freedom, that although a person descended from Adam theoretically can do good, in reality, by the decision of his own will, he does not fight the temptations of the flesh and is completely mired in sins; in this case, we already have here an intermediate link between Cyprian and Augustine, to the extent that responsibility for the actual inability to do good is already placed on a person, although this responsibility is not transferred from Adam, but stems from personal will; It was easy to come to such an idea, having before our eyes the works of the Alexandrians, who derived sinfulness from personal freedom. In any case, as a fact of the greatest historical importance, it should be noted that the actual helplessness of man in the fight against temptation is established by St. Ambrose is very bright and durable. In each of us there live two people: one is internal (interior), the other is external (exterior); the inner one thinks about what is characteristic of the mind (quae mentis sunt), and the outer one is occupied with bodily life (quae sunt corporis) 1907. The life of the outer man is sometimes designated as the wisdom of the flesh (sapientia carnis), which is in hostile relations with God (inimica est Deo) 1908, the law of the flesh (lex carnis), and the life of the inner man is the law of the mind (lex mentis); There is a constant struggle between them, since the law of the flesh counteracts the law of the mind in us and, as captives, draws us to sin (captivos nos trahit), so that we do what we do not want 1909. “Our heart and our thoughts are not in our power, which, arising suddenly, confuse the mind and spirit and attract in a different direction than you would imagine, incline towards earthly things, plant everything worldly, inspire pleasures, offer bait; even at the very time when we are preparing to rise upward in our minds, we are often thrown down to the earthly by the force of empty thoughts planted (in us). Who is so blessed that he can always rise upward in his heart? Who is able to do this without Divine help? 1910 According to this series of thoughts, it is no longer we ourselves who strengthen temptations with careless movements of our own will, as in Origen, but temptations go against our will, which they paralyze. This fatal dependence of the spirit on the body, which is revealed in reality, gives Ambrose the basis to speak completely in the spirit of the blessed one. Augustine: we are involuntarily (inviti), although with resistance (reluctantes), drawn to sin (ad culpam ducimus) and, being defeated by baits, we often commit involuntary sins (non voluntaria delicta) 1911. What is the invincible power of St. Ambrose was inclined to attribute hereditary sin, this is even more clearly shown by his discussions of the need for atonement and the significance of the Old Testament law in this regard. The Need for Redemption and the Old Testament Law Everyone knows the most profound sayings about the Old Testament law of St. Apostle Paul, who considers it from the point of view of the deep feeling of sinfulness living in man, ineradicable by nothing, and in the inability of the law to fight this feeling, he sees proof of its inability to justify man: “By the works of the law no flesh is justified before God, for by the law is the knowledge of sin” (Rom. 3:20). The law itself is holy, and the commandment of the law is also holy, righteous and good; he is spiritual, but the man is carnal and sold to sin; a person still has a desire for good, he agrees that the law is good and wants to fulfill it; but here it turns out that by the power of the sin living in him, he cannot do the good that he wants, but does the evil that he does not want (Rom. 7:12-23). Sin existed before the law, but before man did not know sin, which was discovered precisely by the law; when the commandment came, sin came to life and man died (Rom. 7:5–10). Nevertheless, the great apostle recognizes the law as having a very great importance in the general history of the salvation of mankind. By the law, first of all, sin is known (Rom. 3:20); then, when the powerlessness of the law to justify man was revealed (Rom. 8:3) and, as a result of the law, sin increased in the world, the saving grace of God was also revealed, so that the apostle could say: “When sin increased, grace began to abound all the more” (Rom. 5:20). In the history of church literature, the question of the meaning of the Old Testament law in the history of salvation was discussed repeatedly, but before St. Ambrose, it seems that none of the writers rose to the point of view of St. Apostle Paul. We have in mind Irenaeus of Lyons and Clement of Alexandria, both of whom, especially the second, do not try to connect the question of the meaning of the law with the question of the sense of sinfulness in man. Irenaeus still partially approaches the thoughts of the Epistle to the Romans: the law of Moses, testifying to sin and exposing it, although it eliminated his kingdom, at the same time made the situation of man even more difficult, instilling in him the consciousness that he, as a sinner, is guilty of death; then, the law only revealed sin (manifestavit tantummodo peccatum), but did not destroy it (interemit), since sin ruled not over the spirit, but over the whole person 1912. But here there is still no talk about the psychological feeling of sinfulness, nor about the powerlessness of the law to eradicate this feeling, nor about its strengthening in the era of the law; the law could not deliver a person only from death; finally, Irenaeus means exclusively the objective dominion of sin in the world and over man. Recognizing the law as capable of eliminating the kingdom of sin, and not death, Irenaeus points out its positive benefits for man: this law, by forcibly attracting the soul of man to obedience to the commandments, taught him to serve God and obey Him freely 1913; then, with his sensual character, he was the best way to instruct and teach Jews prone to sensuality 1914. For Clement of Alexandria, as for all Alexandrians in general, the Old Testament law, as a means of Divine pedagogy, contains hidden truths that lead to Christ 1915. Ambrose for the first time in church literature began to consider the Old Testament law in the light of the teachings of St. The Apostle Paul and in this respect differs not only from the Eastern writers, but also from the Western writers who preceded him, none of whom revealed anything similar. The written law was not absolutely necessary: ​​if a person had remained faithful to the natural law that was given to him from the very beginning, and had not sinned, then there would have been no need for a written law 1916; but when, through the disobedience (per inobedientiam) of man, the natural law was violated, then the need for a written law arose, so that man, who (in the fall) had lost everything, would retain at least a part; if through the fall he has lost what he received through birth (nascendo), then at least through study (discendo) he should know the ego and retain 1917. As a noteworthy detail, it is worth noting the desire of St. Ambrose to give the written law a universal meaning, not only for Jews, but also for pagans, for all humanity. The Law subjugated everyone (omnes subditos fecit), because it was not given only to the Jews, but also called the Gentiles (gentes), insofar as proselytes from the Gentiles joined the Jewish people 1918. Then St. Ambrose explores in detail the meaning of this law, both from the negative and from the positive side. On the negative side, Ambrose is completely in the spirit of St. The Apostle Paul states the complete powerlessness of the law in the justification of man, deriving this powerlessness from the disorder of human nature caused by sin. The law could not destroy sin. “He announced (denuntiavit) sin, but could not restrain the evil qualities inherent within man. I came to know (in this way) a sin that I did not know before, I learned (in particular) that lust is a sin (concupiscentiam esse peccatum), but as a result of this knowledge the severity of sin only intensified, since sin, which previously seemed dead due to my ignorance, now came to life in me; I myself died from this wound of sin, because the knowledge of guilt (cognitio culpae), which seemed useful to me, (in fact) caused me harm (in such a way) so that I learned what I could not avoid” 1919. It should be noted, however, that such an effect of the law on a person did not depend on the law, the commandments of which were good in themselves, but on the person: the same thing can have a different effect on us, depending on how we use it. The infidel finds himself killed even through grace (ex gratia), although the grace (gratia) of the commandment does not suffer at all from this. Indeed, just as the knowledge that a certain drink is poisoned can serve as a means of preserving health, so the Divine commandment (of the law) could lead to eternal life; but, just as for someone who badly uses harmful drink, knowledge about it turns into evil and danger, so for those who poorly explain the law or cannot avoid discovered and forbidden sins, the form of the commandment has become the culprit of death. Just as an antidote (antidotum) is good, although it may turn out to be bad for the unreasonable and intemperate, so is a commandment that is death for someone: good by the nature of a saving prescription, deadly - through intemperance of the flesh 1920. However, a person’s inability to take advantage of the saving provisions of the law for his own good depends not so much on his personal freedom as on the deep disorder of his entire nature. The law itself is spiritual and I see its pleasantness (gratiam), I praise the beauty, I glorify the form, I am amazed at the prescription; but since I myself am carnal (carnalis) and given over to sin, I am involuntarily drawn to sin (trahor invitus ad culpam); guilt dominates me like a slave. I hate crime (crimen) and do: the mind (mens) hates, and the flesh (caro) lusts; I, consisting of both, sympathize with the law with my mind, but with my flesh I do what I do not want. This means that the commandment with which I sympathize is good in itself, and the mind that chooses what is good is good - good for judgment (ad judicandum) and often weak (infirma) for opposition (ad resistendum), because it is opposed by the desire (appetentia) of the flesh and is drawn captive to the baits of error (captivam earn trahit ad erroris illecebras) 1921. For all this, the law was not given to man in vain, since in the hands of Divine Providence it served as a means for preparing mankind for the actual Redemption by the Death of Christ; This is its positive meaning. Here St. Ambrose reproduces some of the above thoughts of Irenaeus, although, in general, his assessment of the law was still new in church literature. This benefit lies, first of all, in the fact that thanks to the law, man learned and at the same time lost the opportunity to justify his sins by citing his ignorance. Although before the law everyone sinned, they could seek justification by citing their ignorance, now everyone’s lips are sealed. The man began to confess what he did not know before, recognized his sins and did not hide his own untruth 1922. Now no one can say: I did not know about sin, because there was no instruction about what I had to beware of 1923. Then, just as with Irenaeus the law was a means of leading people to obedience to God, so to a much greater extent the same meaning is given to the law by St. Ambrose. The law was given to bring the whole world under God (totum mundum faceret Deo subditum) 1924. Since the cause of the fall of the first people was pride (superbia), which arose from the advantages of a virgin state, the law had to lead man again to submission to God 1925. This was achieved by the fact that thanks to the law, the universal guilt of mankind was revealed (universorum culpa operata est), insofar as the law was intended for all mankind, and the consciousness of guilt caused obedience to God; Thus, superbia [pride] brought upon man culpam [guilt], and culpa [guilt], on the contrary, gave birth to obedience (obedientiam generavit); the written law (lex scripta) was given for the purpose of resolving sin by sin (peccatum peccato solveret) 1926; culpa [guilt] increased per legem [thanks to the law], but the culprit culpae [guilt] - superbia [pride] was also resolved; superbia [pride] found culpam [guilt], and culpa [guilt] created grace (gratiam) 1927. Then, the subordination of the human race by the power of the law to God was achieved by awakening the consciousness of one’s own weakness, the conviction of the inability of the law to justify man, and the hope that grew on this soil solely in the grace of God. Et illud mihi prodest, quod non justificamur ex operibus legis [and it is to my benefit that we are not justified by the works of the law]; the law showed man that he cannot be glorified by his deeds, cannot be proud of them, and can only become glorified in Christ 1928. By the law man was humbled (humilitaus), and by this humility (humiliando) the shackles of the former error were destroyed. In this regard, St. Ambrose expresses thoughts that could rightfully be attributed to the blessed one. Augustine; the act of the Fall and hereditary corruption of the family here receives a deep teleological and providential meaning. Fructuosior culpa quam innocentia [guilt is more fruitful than innocence]: innocentia [innocence] made me arrogant (arrogantem), and culpa [guilt] returned me to subordinates (subjectum reddidit). Through the law sin increased (per legem superabundavit peccatum); but since the consciousness of one’s own weakness, caused by the law, placed all man’s hopes on the grace of God, Ambrose speaks in the words of the Apostle: when sin increased, grace began to abound (ubi superabundavit peccatum, superabundavit et gratia); the law thus turned out to be useful in the sense that it acquired grace (acquisivit gratiam) 1930. So, postquam totus mundus subditus factus est [after the world had become subject], the sins of the totius mundi [of the whole world] were destroyed 1931. This was accomplished by the power of Divine grace, revealed to us in the Person of the Son of God, who took upon Himself the image of man. The face of Christ the Savior as the redeemer of humanity from sin Man, as we have seen, could not destroy the sin living in him on his own; he could not expect help for himself in this regard and in general from his neighbors, because every person is infected with the same sinfulness, redemption from which was necessary 1932. Likewise, the angels could not do this: they themselves are in a state of perfection by the power of the Holy Spirit, and some of them even fell; even if entire legions of them bring benefit to people, then not to all, but only to individuals: the seraphim sent by God to the prophet Isaiah could cleanse the lips of only the prophet Isaiah with a burning coal from sinful impurity. In view of this, people needed a Leader whom they could all follow, and such a Leader could only be the One Who Himself is above all 1933. This is how St. motivates. Ambrose, the necessity of the Incarnation of God from the power of sin living in man; in this connection, this argument seems new to him. But sometimes he also considers the Incarnation from other points of view, previously known both in the East and in the West. This is precisely where the idea of ​​the Incarnation as the Revelation of God belongs, and precisely in the color with which it appears in Origen. For the latter, due to the inaccessibility of the Divinity to a human being, the Incarnation of the Son, as the Image of God, is the first way of contemplation of God available to us, constituting a preparation for the future contemplation of the being of God face to face: qui in magnitudine deitatis suae positam gloriam mirae lucis non poteramus aspicere, per hoc quod nobis splendor efficitur, intuendae lucis divinae viam per splendoris capiamus aspectum [...(so that) we, who have not had the opportunity to see the glory of the wonderful light inherent in the greatness of His Divinity, may gain access to the contemplation of the Divine light at the sight of His radiance, thanks to the fact that He becomes this radiance for us] 1934. Similarly, Ambrose sees in the Incarnation the possibly highest level of the Revelation of God for man, with the only difference from Origen that for the latter the Son reveals the Father to us, and according to Ambrose, the Son, although He is the Image of God, is in Himself inaccessible to our contemplation, becoming accessible only in the sensory form of man: “Since we could not see the Image of God, through the Incarnation the presence (praesentia) of the Word was revealed to us, so that the Divinity (divinitas), which is above us, may become accessible to us" 1935. The appearance of Christ in the form of man was an act of the incarnation of the Divine. The idea of ​​Christ as precisely the God-man was very dear to the ancient Western writers themselves. However, Western theology before Ambrose did not create a technical term corresponding to the actual state of affairs, similar, for example, to the one with which in the East, since the heresy of Apollinaris, the concept of ἐνανϑρώπησις [incarnation] has become more and more widespread; We also do not find such a term in St. Ambrose. Although he teaches not only about the incarnation, but also about becoming human, he is content with the former incomplete and imprecise term incarnatio [incarnation], speaking of the sacramentum incarnationis [the mystery of the incarnation] 1936. His closest predecessor, Hilary, knew another synonymous expression - corporatio: in hominem corporatus [incarnate in man] 1937, corporatus Deus [incarnate God] 1938; but in the works of St. We do not meet this term for Ambrose. Another term - economy, οἰκονομία, dispensatio, dispositio - was not previously applied in the West specifically to the incarnation, having a broader meaning of the Revelation of the Divine in the world in general; insofar as the pre-mundane birth of the Son from the Father was motivated by the necessity of creation and the Revelation of God in created being, the term “economy” was applied very often to the pre-mundane birth of the Son according to the Divinity and to the Trinity 1939. Beginning from the 4th century, when the concept of economy in the fight against Arianism was supplanted from the idea of ​​trinity, it begins to acquire the meaning of a term to designate the salvation of mankind and the incarnation associated with it, as not arising from the being of the Divine nature, but based on an act of Divine disposition or decision of the Divine will. In this meaning of a more or less established term, the concept of οἰκονομία [household building] is found among the Cappadocians - among St. Basil the Great: οἰκονομία ἀνάκλησίς ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκπτώσεως [the economy of God and our Savior is a proclamation from the state of the fall], etc. 1940 ; at St. Gregory the Theologian λόγος οἰκονομίας, or speech about the properties of the incarnate Christ, differs from λόγος φύσεως, or about the Divine nature in itself 1941. Perhaps, through their mediation, the concept of οἰκονομία [household building] and all synonymous Latin expressions received the same narrowly technical meaning from St. Ambrose, who speaks of caro dispensationis in Christo [the flesh in Christ according to the dispensation] 1942; subjectio [submission] of Christ according to the flesh to God the Father is more a matter of dispensationis temporariae | temporary house-building] than permanent slavery 1943. However, here it is necessary to keep in mind that the concept of dispensatio in this sense was already established in the West in the works of Hilary: dispensationis novitas [newness of the economy] violated the unity in the word of the Son with the Father 1944; The Son of God ex dispensatione homo esset [was a man according to the economy] 1945. The incarnate Christ was both God and man. The presence of the Divine in man is obvious already from the very concept of the incarnation and from the church’s faith in the Revelation of God in Christ; it was not so much proven as simply stated. This is what St. does in this regard. Ambrose. In Christ the Most High God descended to earth 1946; appears in the form of a man Filius Dei a Deo Patre electus [Son of God, chosen by God the Father] 1947. It is said about Him that He sits at the right hand of God the Father and, therefore, in His Divine dignity is equal to God the Father; at the same time, He sits at the right hand of the Father, not ex praecepto [by prescription] and not ex gratia [by grace], but as dilectissimus Filius Dei [the most beloved Son of God]; therefore, in His person we should not revere an ordinary righteous man, but give Him honor as the most beloved Son of God 1948. Sometimes the Divinity of Christ the Savior is proven by Ambrose by indicating the signs and wonders He performed: it shone in all His actions. Creation itself, animate and inanimate, confesses in Him the Son of God: when He, for example, was in the desert, among the animals, angels served Him 1949. When He hung on the cross, all nature testified to His Divinity: the sun disappeared, the day drew to an end, darkness spread, the earth trembled; Only the one hanging on the Cross did not tremble. Further, His Divine power is revealed from the fact that He forgives sins, brings the thief into paradise 1950. The other nature of the incarnate Son of God is the subject of more detailed research by St. Ambrose. The Son of God, Who propter divinitatem suam [due to His Divinity] created everything, subsequently for the salvation of people et carnis susceptionem et mortis assumpserit passionem [and took on the flesh and suffered death [itself]] 1951. Here our bishop first of all tries to prove in more or less detail the necessity of accepting human nature. “What good would it do me,” he asks, “if God showed only His Divinity intact? Or why else should He take on flesh, if not in order to be able to endure temptations from the conditions of nature and my weakness? He had to endure temptations, had to have compassion on me, so that I would learn how, being tempted, I could overcome” 1952. Further, the same motive required that the incarnation be real and not illusory. Christ the Savior assumed veram carnem [true flesh], naturalem substantiam carnis hujus [the natural substance of this flesh], and did not come in similitudine carnis [in the likeness of flesh] 1953. He suscepit carnis istius veritatem [perceived the truth of this flesh] 1954. Born of the Virgin Mary corporis esset vera natura [was the true nature of the body] 1955. As truly human flesh, the flesh of Christ had all human needs: He who took on the body had to take on everything proper to the body (quae corporis sunt), so that he could hunger, thirst, be troubled, grieve 1956. This was necessary for the validity of redemption: man cannot exist without human affect (sine affectu hominis), since caro sine affectu [flesh without affect] cannot be involved in reward and guilt (culpae); therefore, Christ had to perceive and heal where the culpa [guilt] was concentrated, in order to prevent the emergence of error (originis erroris) and, so to speak, close the door to the intruding sin 1957. Then, in Christ there was not only the actual flesh of man, but also a soul, so that Christ assumed the fullness of human nature. On the need to perceive the soul of St. Ambrose especially insists, and motivates this, as always, by the need for redemption and salvation of the soul; but he does not at all apply for this purpose Origen’s thoughts that only the perception of the human soul, as a mediator between the flesh and the Divine, made the very fact of the Incarnation possible 1958. Together with the flesh, says St. Ambrose, Christ also perceived affectum meum [my affect], that is, in general, the internal makeup of a person 1959. If He assumed carnem hominis [human flesh], then it would be consistent that He assumed the perfection and fullness of the incarnation (perfectionem incarnationis plenitudinemque); in Christ there is nothing imperfect (imperfectum); He took on carnem [flesh] to resurrect; He also accepted animam [soul], but animam perfectam, rationabilem, humanam [perfect, rational, human soul] 1960. He took on the animam [soul] in order to bless it with the sacrament of His incarnation (ut incarnationis suae benediceret Sacramento) 1961. Proving the necessity of accepting the human soul, St. Ambrose has in mind the doctrine of Apollinaris, against whom his words are directed: “It was not the Word of God itself that replaced in His flesh the rational soul and the faculty of reason, but the Word was a perfect man, only without the defilement of sin, having received a rational soul and the faculty of reason, and precisely the human soul and the same substantiae [substance] that our souls have, as well as flesh similem [similar] to ours, that is, the same substantiae [substance], as well as caro est nostra [our flesh]" 1962. Caro ergo ipsius et anima ejusdem cujus anima nostra caroque substantiae est [Consequently, His flesh and soul are of the same substance as our soul and flesh] 1963. It couldn't have been any other way. “What would be the point of perceiving carnem sine anima [flesh without soul], when caro [flesh] is insensible (insensibilis), and irrationabilis anima [unreasonable soul] is not subject to sin and unworthy of reward? No, Christ pro nobis [for us] accepted that which was most easily exposed to danger in us. What else would it profit me if (Christ) had not redeemed me completely? 1964 He who came for the redemption and healing of the whole (totum) of man had to also perceive totum [everything] that erat humanae perfectionis [belonged to human perfection] 1965. Having perceived the human soul, Christ the Savior perceived all its passions, that is, normal mental experiences and movements, in contrast to cupiditas, passion in the proper sense, moral deficiency 1966. Christ, in his humanity, differed from real man only in that he was not involved in sin - this is the last postulate regarding human nature in Christ from the idea of ​​redemption in the understanding of St. Ambrose. If Christ Himself were subject to sin, He could not then redeem other people from the sins: “He is free from all sins and does not pay the price (pretium) of the redemption of his own soul, the price of whose Blood was sufficient to atone for all the sins of the whole world; rightly, therefore, He frees others, He Who owed nothing for Himself” 1967. That is why, although Christ carnem habet nostram [has our flesh], but carnis hujus vitia non habet [has no vices of this flesh] 1968. He had no nulla contagia, no infection of sin 1969, was immunis a culpa et integer a delicto, atque immaculatus a vitio [free from guilt, untouched by sin and untainted by vice] 1970. In this sense, the apostle says that “God sent His Son into the world in the likeness of the flesh of sin” (Rom. 8:3), pointing out not to the illusory nature of the incarnation, but to the sinlessness of man perceived by God, to the fact that Christ took on actual flesh in itself, but as completely sinless, only similar to our sinful flesh 1971. The sinlessness of Christ the Savior must first of all be understood in the sense of freedom from personal sins: He Himself did not commit sin and, moving among people, moved as if among angels 1972. In Him first the discord between the inner and outer man ceased and harmony reigned; both united in His Person into one person and agreed with each other in the unity of their desires; the flesh did what the spirit did 1973. Christ took upon Himself our sins non usu, that is, not by participating in them, but qualitate, that is, probably by assimilating to Himself the qualities of our sinful flesh; and non crimine, i.e. not by committing a crime, but solely suae misericordiae Sacramento, or by virtue of His mercy, which is ultimately incomprehensible to man; and thus peccatum pro nobis factus est, qui peccatum ipse non fecit [He who Himself did not create sin became sin for us] 1974. On the other hand, there is no doubt that Christ was free from hereditary sinfulness, because He nec in iniquitatibus conceptus et natus est in delictis [was not conceived in iniquity and born in sin] 1975. At the same time, the consideration with which St. Ambrose motivates this sinlessness; if in Tertullian hereditary sinfulness is derived from the origin of man from sexual intercourse, then in Ambrose the sinlessness of the Savior is explained by the independence of His Birth from such an act; this is a purely Western point of view. Christ is sinless, because He is non ex sanguinibus, neque ex voluntate carnis, neque ex voluntate viri, sed de Spiritu Sancto natus ex Virgine est [neither of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but was born of the Holy Spirit from the Virgin] 1976. Born de Spiritu et Virgine ab omni concretione generationis humanae mundus [from the Spirit and the Virgin, pure from all materiality of human conception] and ortum illius nulla corporeae generationis concretio usitata fuscavit [His birth was not denigrated by any ordinary materiality of bodily conception] 1977. “Of all those born of a woman, only the Lord Jesus is holy, Who terrenae contagia corruptelae immaculati partus novitate non senserit [at (His) virgin birth did not feel (on Himself) the influence of earthly corruption]” 1978. Since both Divine and human nature exist together in one Person of the God-Man, there must be a certain connection and interaction between them; This is the most important question of the whole problem: the Christological problem arises only with this question and consists in its resolution. The West, as in many other respects, differed significantly from the East here. The significance of Ambrose in the history of Christology in the West should not be underestimated, and it consisted in supplementing the one-sided point of view of Western writers with elements extraneous to it. Ancient pre-Nicene Western Christology is sometimes quite rightly compared with the Christology of the Antiochian school of 1979, which in its extreme straightforward conclusions led the Church to Nestorianism; although both developed on different philosophical foundations and under the influence of different factors, nevertheless, the same trends are sometimes visible in both. This kinship is revealed primarily in the fact that in the West, probably, depending on the view of the Redemptive Activity of Christ, as mainly the feat of man, human nature, more than in Alexandria and some other Eastern writers, they put forward the significance of human nature in the incarnate Son of God; there they tried to preserve in Him not only the fullness and immutability of the Divinity, but to the same, if not greater extent, they protected the integrity and immutability of humanity in Him along with the Divinity and expressed this in the corresponding specifically Western formulas. Thus, Tertullian already speaks of the utramque [both] in Christ substantiam in sua proprietate [substances in their own property], i.e. in its most essential qualities, distantem [various] 1980; states that salva est utriusque proprietas substantiae [the property of both substances is preserved] 1981. The same tendency is visible in St. Ambrose, when he especially insists that in Christ utrumque verum est [both are true] 1982; He non secundum naturam mutatus est carnis, sed immutabilis etiam in ipsa mutabili conditionis humanae qualitate permansit [not changed according to the nature of the flesh, but remained unchanged in the most changeable quality of the human condition] 1983. On the one hand, non est Verbi natura in carnis conversa naturam [the nature of the Word has not changed into the nature of the flesh] 1984, one cannot say that naturam Verbi in corporis naturam esse mutatam [the nature of the Word has changed into the nature of the body] 1985, and on the other, aliud est quod assumpsit [one thing is that which has received], a aliud quod assumptum [other - perceived], and non eadem carnis potuit esse, divinitatisque natura [the nature of the flesh and the nature of the Divine could not be the same] 1986. As another characteristic feature of Western pre-Nicene Christology, it should be noted that in the West, which attached almost primary importance to the intactness of human nature in Christ, long before the emergence of the heresy of Apollinaris and regardless of any dependence on it, they were already talking about homo [man] in Christ, while in the East for the most part they meant only σάρξ, the flesh, although there, undoubtedly, the reality of incarnation The words, despite this purely terminological defect, were not at all questioned. For Tertullian, Christ is Deus et homo, ex carne homo, ex spiritu Deus [God and man, according to the flesh man, according to the spirit God] 1987; utriusque substantiae census hominem et Deum exhibuit [the state of both substances revealed [to us] God and man] 1988. Novatian sees in Christ hominem et Deum [man and God] 1989, as for Lactantius He fuit et Deus et homo [was both God and man] 1990. Ambrose here follows in the footsteps of his predecessors: Deum Christum et hominem esse credamus [let us believe that Christ is God and man] 1991. Quod natum est ex carne, caro est: et qui natus est de homine, homo dicitur [What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of man is called man] 1992. Christ was homo secundum carnem, sed ultra hominem secundum operationem [man no flesh, but more than man in works] 1993. But along with these rather numerous formulas in Ambrose, we often find others where homo [man] is replaced simply by caro [flesh] or corpus [body]. Alia natura carnis, alia divinitatis gloria [One is the nature of the flesh, the other is the glory of the Divine] 1994. In Christ we must recognize differentiam divinitatis et carnis [difference of Divinity and flesh] 1995, or geminam substantiam [double substance] - divinitatis et carnis [Divinity and flesh] 1996, since He is consors divinitatis et corporis [partner of Divinity and body] 1997. Lofs is inclined to attribute these last formulas in Ambrose to the influence of Eastern writers on him, saying that “Western writers of subsequent times (i.e. after Tertullian and Novatian), under the influence of the East, spoke more about the caro [flesh] or corpus [body] of Christ than about homo [man] in Him" ​​1998. It seems to us that in this case, Ambrose only continues to follow his Western predecessors; Perhaps, in the end, all this kind of expression penetrated to the West from the East, but since we meet them in Tertullian, then in the works of St. Ambrose, they do not represent anything new for the West. Tertullian repeatedly speaks of the caro [flesh] of Christ 1999, of the veritatem carnis [truth of the flesh] 2000, recognizes carnem hominis [human flesh] in Him 2001. Novatian especially loves this kind of formula. Christ the Savior for him is nostri consors corporis [partner of our body], who appeared on earth in substantia corporis [in the substance of the body] 2002; He fragilitatem carnis assumit [accepts the fragility of the flesh] 2003 and consisted ex Verbi et carnis conjunctione [of the union of Word and flesh] 2004. Sometimes in the past in the West the formula Deus [God] and homo [man] or Deus [God] and caro [flesh] was replaced by another: spiritus [spirit] and homo [man] or spiritus [spirit] and caro [flesh]. Tertullian distinguishes proprietas conditionum, spiritus et carnis [property of [both] states, spirit and flesh] 2005. Novatian apparently avoids it, but in Lactantius it appears again: Jesus Christ was both Dei Filius per spiritum, et hominis per carnem [Son of God in spirit and [Son] of man in the flesh] 2006. This feature becomes quite understandable if we recall here the unstable views of the named writers on the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit. At St. Ambrose, we tried in vain to find anything similar, while to his closest predecessor, Hilary of Pictavia, the expressions spiritus [spirit] and caro [flesh] are not completely alien, at least in his earlier creations: after the resurrection, Christ consociatam Spiritus et substantiae suae aeternitati materiem ad coelum assumpti corporis retulisse [ascended to heaven, the matter of the perceived body, united with the eternity of His spirit and substance] 2007. Here we must only point out this feature as very important for assessing the historical significance of St. Ambrose. In addition to the listed designations of the Divine and human natures in Christ, St. Ambrose also uses many others, and, although this type of designation is very common among Eastern writers, on whom St. depends. Ambrose, however, from the verbal side they do not represent something typical and characteristic of the East, since they have long been adopted by Western writers. Yes, St. Ambrose distinguishes in Christ the filium Dei [son of God] and the filium hominis [son of man], or virginis [(son of) the Virgin] 2008. These designations were already known to Tertullian: at the Annunciation, the archangel called Christ ex ea parte, qua spiritus erat, Dei Filium [Son of God in the sense that He was a spirit], reserving for the flesh the name filius hominis [son of man] 2009; likewise, according to the expression of Novatian, the Word became flesh, ut per carnis assumptionem Filius hominis illuc posset ascendere, unde Dei Filius Verbum descenderat [so that through the perception of flesh the son of man could ascend to where the Son of God the Word descended] 2010. More often than not, St. Ambrose applies to Christ the designations forma Dei [form, image of God] and forma hominis [form, image of man] or even more often, instead of the latter, following the example of Phil. 2:7, the more derogatory forma servi [form, image of a slave], and the concept of forma [form] of some nature has for him the meaning of completeness, reality, intactness in any respect of the latter. “Quid est in Dei forma,” he asks, “nisi in divinitatis plenitudine?” [What can there be in the image of God, except what is in the fullness of the Divinity?]" 2011 If Jesus Christ took upon Himself the formam servi [the form of a servant], then this means that He took upon Himself plenitudinem perfectionis humanae, plenitudinem obedientiae [the fullness of human perfection, the fullness of obedience] 2012. “Quid est in Dei forma, nisi in plenitudine divinitatis, in ilia perfectionis divinae expressione? [What can there be in the image of God, except what is in the fullness of the Godhead, in that expression of Divine perfection?]" But, being forma Dei [the image of God], Christ accepit [took] and plenitudinem naturae et perfectionis humanae [the fullness of human nature and perfection], so that, as Deo [with God] in Him nihil deerat [was not lacking], so also perfection hominis [man], and He was perfectus in utraque forma [perfect in both forms] 2013. The Son of God is equal to the Father secundum divinitatem in Dei forma [according to Divinity in the image of God], that is, in omni plenitudine divinitatis [in all the fullness of Divinity], which dwelt in Him, and in the person of man formam servi accepit [took the form of a slave] 2014. Both of these terms, and precisely in the same meaning of the completeness and immutability of nature, are also known to Tertullian and Novatian. Tertullian speaks of the forma Dei [the image of God]: God neque desinit esse, neque aliud potest esse [and does not cease to be and cannot be (something) different]; sermo [the Word] in Christ was Deus [God] and therefore remains forever, perseverando scilicet in sua forma [preserving His form] 2015. Novatian speaks of both the forma Dei [the image of God] and the forma servi [the form of a slave]: Christ according to the Divinity was ad formam Dei Patris [in the image of God the Father] and formam servi susciperet [took on the form of a slave], becoming man 2016. Ambrose differs here from Tertullian and Novatian only in that he uses these terms much more often than they do; this, perhaps, should really be attributed to the influence of the East, where these terms were in comparatively greater use, since the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthe humiliation of God in the flesh was more occupied by eastern writers. If, further, Ambrose applies to Christ the names aequalis in Dei forma [equal [to God] in the image of God], simply servus in corpore [slave in the body], and servitus carnis, dominatus autem divinitatis est [slavery is characteristic of the flesh, dominion is the Divinity] 2017, then it is clear that in spirit he is not saying absolutely anything new in comparison with Tertullian and Novatian. Only one thing seems new here in Ambrose: just as in his doctrine of the trinity, together with the term substantia [substance, essence], the concept of natura [nature] also acquires meaning, and in Christology we are talking not only about substance, but also about natures, a concept that his predecessors had not yet used for this purpose. Christ is consors utriusque naturae [partner of both natures] 2018, in Him the unity of the biformis geminaeque naturae [two-form and dual nature] is revealed 2019. As in the doctrine of the Trinity, so here natura [nature] has the meaning of the common generic property of the nature of man and Christ: the nature of Christ was communis nobiscum [common with us] 2020; unius naturae caro nostra cum Domini corporis veritate [our flesh is of one nature with the truth of the body of the Lord] and carnis in Christo cum hominibus una natura est [one nature of the flesh in Christ with (all) men] 2021 . It is indisputable that the absolute fullness and integrity of humanity in Christ is expressed somewhat weaker by this term than by the expression substantia [substance] in its Tertullian meaning; but since natura [nature] is used by St. Ambrose together with substantia [substance], then for now we should here note only an innovation of an exclusively terminological nature, but not a new point of view on the Christological problem in the West. In connection with concerns about preserving the integrity of human nature in Christ, there is another feature of Western Christology: here, much more strongly than in the East, they spoke of Christ as precisely the Mediator, standing in the composition of his nature in the middle between God and man and connecting them with each other. Christ, we read from Novatian, came to people, ut mediator Dei et hominum esse deberet [since he had to become a mediator between God and people] 2022. He appeared on earth, says Lactantius, inter Deum atque hominem medius constitutus [standing in the middle between God and man] 2023. At St. Ambrose also often applies to Christ the designation mediator Dei et hominum [Mediator between God and men] 2024. A further feature of Western Christology is its view of the image of the union of two different natures in the Person of Christ the Savior. While protecting in every possible way the integrity and integrity of humanity in Christ, the West places the latter in only external contact with the Divine; each of the perceived natures acts in one Person completely independently and independently of the other. This idea found its philosophical justification in the Stoic teaching about various ways of connecting different bodies and substances with each other; in particular, the prototype for the Western Christological formula was that type of connection known to the Stoics under the name κρᾶσις or μῖξις, in which the connected bodies retain unchanged all their essential properties and, in case of need, can always be separated from each other again 2025. From this point of view, Tertullian could assert as a general proposition that in Christ substantiae ambae in statu suo quaeque agebant [both substances each acted according to their own state] 2026; the difference between the Divine and human wills in Christ is undoubtedly assumed here, although not directly expressed. St. Ambrose expresses himself in a similar way: there cannot be una operatio [one action] there, ubi diversa substantia est [where there is a difference of substance] 2027; and since una voluntas [one will] is conceivable only there, ubi una operatio [where there is one action], then in Christ alia voluntas hominis, alia Dei [one will is human, and the other is God’s] 2028. There is no talk here of the deification of the human will of Christ, whereas in the East such deification was usually assumed. It is shared not only by the Cappadocians, for whom (for example, St. Gregory the Theologian) the human will in Christ is completely deified (ϑεωϑὲν ὅλον) 2029, but also Origen; the latter, although he insists, like Western writers, that in Christ aliud deitatis natura, alia humana natura [another matter is the nature of the Divine, another matter is human nature], but still, unlike them, he recognizes a certain coincidence of the Divine and human will in Christ, since His human will carried out everything pro motu ac voluntate [in accordance with the movement and will] of His Deities, just as the shadow is inseparable from the body and reproduces all its movements and actions 2030. With the consistent implementation of the considered basic position, the manifestations of the Divine and human natures were distinguished in the West to such an extent strictly that some actions of Christ were considered a manifestation of exclusively His humanity, and others - exclusively of the Divinity; at the same time, as a general rule, they tried to avoid mixing names and transferring predicates from one nature to another. According to Tertullian, man in Christ should be attributed tantum, quantum [that which] should be denied from Deo [God] 2031. Signs and wonders are attributed to the Divine, and the passions and needs of the flesh are attributed to humanity: spiritus res suas gerit in illo [the Spirit produces in Him the works characteristic of Him (the Spirit), i.e. virtutes et opera, et signa [miracles, signs and revelations], and caro passiones suas functa sit [the flesh has produced its passions], hungering before the devil, thirsting before Samaritan woman, mourning Lazarus, being sorrowful to the point of death 2032; in virtutibus [in (great) deeds, miracles] we see Deum [God], in pusillitatibus [in small, weak deeds] – hominem [man] 2033. According to Novatian, passiones [grow together] reveal in Christ humanam fragilitatem [human fragility, weakness], and opera [deeds] – divinam potestatem [Divine power]; homo [man] is known ex infirmitatibus [by weaknesses], Deus [God] is known ex operibus [by works]; mediocritates [ordinary affairs] testify to humanity, and majestas [greatness] testify to the Divinity 2034. For Lactantius also virtus ex operibus apparuit, fragilitas hominis ex passione [the power (of God) was manifested in works, and human weakness in suffering] 2035. Such a sharp delineation of natures, existing in parallel with one another, and their unity is exhausted almost exclusively by mechanical contact, attracts the reader’s attention in the works of Ambrose. “Observe in Christ,” he says, “nunc gloriam Dei, nunc hominis passiones [now the glory of God, now the passions of men]; as God, He spoke, quae sunt divina, quia Verbum est [divine, because He is the Word], as man, quae sunt humana, quia in mea substantia loquebatur [human, because He spoke, [being] in my substance]" 2036. “When He touched the leper, homo videbatur [a man was visible], but was ultra hominem [more than a man] when He healed him; when he mourned the dead Lazarus, quasi homo flebat [He mourned as a man], but was supra hominem [more than a man] when he ordered the dead man to come out with his feet bound; homo videbatur [the man was visible] when he hung on the cross; but he revealed himself supra hominem [greater than man], when, having opened the graves, he raised the dead" 2037. “During the earthly life of the Savior, people in Him hominem viderunt, sed operibus supra hominem crediderunt [saw a man, but, looking at his deeds, believed that he was greater than a man]. Indeed, was He not homo [man] when He mourned Lazarus, and revealed Himself supra hominem [more than man] when He raised him, or was He not homo [man] when He was scourged, and supra hominem [more than man] when He took upon Himself the sins of the whole world? 2038 From their point of view, this was only consistent, since Western writers recognized exclusively His human nature as the subject of the redemptive Suffering, Death and Resurrection of the Savior, while the Divinity did not take any part in this; even moreover, at the moment of the Suffering of the Cross and the Death of the Savior, it completely separated from man for a while, leaving the latter to himself - new proof that in the West only mechanical contact of substances was recognized. According to Tertullian, caro mortua est [the flesh died] 2039, we consider Christ ex humana substantia mortuum [dead in human substance] 2040, while Spiritus Dei pati non potest [The Spirit of God cannot suffer] 2041; if Spiritus [Spirit] continued to remain in came [in the flesh], then caro omnino mori non potest [the flesh could not die at all] 2042. For Novatian, impassibilis sit divinitas, passibilis vero sit humana fragilitas [The Divinity is impassive, but human weakness is passionate]; not that in Christ mortuum esse quod Deus est [died that which was God], but that in illo mortuum esse quod homo sit [died in Him that was man] 2043. St. In this regard, Ambrose not only does not break with the Western tradition, but even expresses himself as if stronger than his predecessors. He attributes exclusively to the humanity of Christ His subjection to God the Father, as well as all the infirmities of His flesh: anima subdita, non divinitas, anima subjecta, non Dei virtus [the soul is subject, not the Divinity, the soul is subject, and not the power of God]; for the virtus Dei [the power of God] is not subject to potestati [power], but enjoys unitate et consortio potestatis [unity and communion with [this] power]; ilia subjecta est, quae humanae conditionis fragilitate plerumque mutatur [that which is subject, which for the most part changes due to the weakness of the human condition], but not that mutari non potest [cannot change] 2044. “As homo [man], Christ dubitat [doubts] and turbatur [is indignant]; not turbatur [indignant] His virtus [strength] and divinitas [Divinity], but turbatur anima [indignant soul]; turbatur secundum humanae fragilitatis assumptionem [indignant at the perception of human fragility (infirmity)]; since He took on the animam [soul], He also took on the animae passiones [passions of the soul]; God, quod erat Deus [that there was God], could not turbari aut mori [to be indignant or die]" 2045. Divinitas commutari [Divinity cannot change] through the needs and sufferings of the flesh 2046. In the same way, in Christ only the body suffered and died, not the Divinity: on the Cross was Dominus Jesus [Lord Jesus], and supra hominem [over man] shone the majestas regis [the majesty of the king] 2047. Not plenitudo divinitatis [the fullness of the Godhead], which, according to the testimony of Holy Scripture, dwelt in Christ (Col. 2:9), but caro passa est [the flesh suffered] 2048; because divinitas [the Divinity] could not be subject to morti [death], but humana susceptio [human perception] 2049. Caro igitur passa est [thus the flesh suffered], divinitas [Divinity] but mortis libera [free from death]; passioni [suffering] is only subject to corpus humanae naturae [the body of human nature], and divinitas [Divinity] can mori [die], when anima non possit [the soul cannot] 2050. In that mortuus [died] Christ that suscepit ex virgine [received from the Virgin], but not in that habebat ex Patre [had from the Father]; in that mortuus, in quo crucifixus est Christus [Christ died in which he was crucified] 2051. Thus, it can be said that Christ the Savior et moriebatur secundum nostrae susceptionem naturae [and died according to the perception of our nature] and not moriebatur secundum aeternae substantiam vitae [died according to the substance of eternal life]; and patiebatur secundum corporis susceptionem [suffered according to the perception of the body], in order to instill faith in the truth of the perceived body, and not patiebatur secundum Verbi impassibilem divinitatem [suffered according to the impassive Divinity of the Word] 2052. He was immortalis in morte, impassibilis in passione [immortal in death, impassive in suffering]; for, as God, He was non cepit mortis aerumna [captured by death], but as a man, He was inferna viderunt [saw hell] 2053. The anima [soul] on the Cross was troubled, but not sapientia [Wisdom], since immutabilis manebat sapientia [wisdom remained unchanged] 2054. Secundum naturam suam et caro passa est [by its nature the flesh suffered] and by this suffering corporis Verbi natura non mutata est [the nature of the body of the Word was not changed] 2055. On the Cross non est immolata divinitas Verbi [the Divinity of the Word was not sacrificed] 2056. As for the divinitatis [Divinity], not only does it not take any part, due to its impassivity and immutability, in the Suffering and Death of man, but on the cross it is even completely separated from the latter; which is why the Death of the Crucified One itself became possible: clamavit homo divinitatis separatione moriturus [cryed out a man dying and separated from the Divine] 2057. It goes without saying that the Resurrection from the dead was also a moment in the life of the exclusively human nature of Christ: etsi Christus resurrexit, utique in eo, quod assumpserat, resurrexit [although Christ was risen, risen, of course, in what He perceived], since in the fullness of His Divinity there could be neither decrease nor addition 2058. “What falls, also rises; what does not fall, does not rise; resurrected, therefore, secundum carnem, quae mortua resurrexit [according to the flesh, which rose from the dead]; but was not resurrected secundum Verbum [according to the Word], which was not allowed into the earth, but apud Deum semper manebat [always remained with God]” 2059. This presentation is carried out by Ambrose in an unusually consistent manner, which deserves special attention in view of the fact that in other respects he is often very inconsistent: he, despite his close acquaintance with Eastern writers in matters of Christology, as we will see below, apparently never dares to use formulas in which the Divine is recognized as the Subject of Suffering and Death. Meanwhile, acquaintance with the East did not remain without a trace in this regard in the works of Hilary, who, although he does not completely break with Western traditions, goes much further than St. Ambrose, when he uses such expressions as passus est Deus [God suffered] 2060, Dei Filius cruci figitur [The Son of God is nailed to the Cross], Christus Dei Filius moritur [Christ the Son of God dies] 2061 and many others. etc. The analogies and images that were used in the West for Christological purposes also fully correspond to the ideas about the Face of Christ the Savior. This is, first of all, the comparison of the flesh with clothing, and the incarnation with dressing. In Tertullian, Christ is called indutus [clothed, clothed], and the concept of indutus is in contrast to transfiguratio, transformation, to indicate that the Divinity did not change from taking on flesh, as well as vice versa 2062. Novatian also speaks of Sermonem Dei indutum carnis substantiam [the Word of God clothed in the substance of flesh], considering His flesh indumentum [garment], and, precisely by analyzing this concept, he tries to establish the integrity and separateness of the two natures in Christ: qui induitur, pariter et exuatur necesse est [he who is clothed must also be put off]; induitur autem et exuitur homo [puts on man and takes off man], which is sometimes called tunica [tunic], sometimes stola [table], sometimes amictum [cloak] 2063. True, they used this concept for Christological purposes in the East, but there they connected with it a completely different meaning, namely, they expressed a view of the flesh as an outer shell that hid, enveloped the Divinity: the Divinity that shone in Christ through the veil (διὰ πρόβλημα) of the flesh, for St. Gregory the Theologian is the Light shining in the darkness 2064. St. Ambrose uses this image in the sense that was associated with it in the West. In Jesus Christ non est Verbi natura in carnis conversa naturam [the nature of the Word was not converted into the nature of the flesh], when He is flesh induit, et induit, quod ante non habuit [clothed and clothed that which previously He did not have] 2065 . True, he also knows the eastern meaning of the image in question: the Deity remained unchanged, etsi circumdaretur amictu carnis [although it was clothed in flesh] 2066; but now he hastens to note that the glory of the Divine did not suffer at all from the perception of the flesh: do not, he says, mix splendori gloriae [the shine of glory] with the darkness of naturae nostrae [our nature] and do not attribute to the light the nebula humanae carnis [of human flesh] 2067. He has the same meaning in another analogy - the idea of ​​the caro [flesh] of Christ as a church: ternplum, qui semper plenus Spiritu Sancto legitur [church that is always filled with the Holy Spirit] 2068. The terminology that was used in the West to denote the image of the union of two natures in Christ must also be recognized as characteristic: in this case, what was most meant was the separateness and distinguishability of natures; if they talked about a connection, they immediately warned that the connection has nothing to do with complete merging or mixing. Tertullian calls hominem [man] in Christ Deo mixtum [mixed with God] 2069 and considers the Son of God miscens in semetipso hominem et Deum [mixing man and God in Himself] 2070, but explains that with this mixing we still videmus duplicem statum [see a double state], not merged (non confusum), but only only connected (sed conjunctum in una persona, Deum et hominem Jesum) 2071. Novatian takes the same point of view; however, he prefers to Tertullian’s terms others that are equivalent to them in meaning, but taken not from the sphere of the connection of bodies, but from the field of moral and social relations; some of them were known to Irenaeus. Thus, he says that utrumque in Christo confoederatum est, et utrumque conjuctum est, et utrumque connexum est [in Christ there was a union, union, combination of both natures] 2072; this connexio [combination] is more closely defined as divinitatis et humanitatis concordia [the agreement of Divinity and humanity], as a result of the fact that Christ in se Deum et hominem sociasse [united God and man in Himself] 2073; therefore Christus intelligatur esse permixtus et esse sociatus [Christ should be represented as mixed and united] 2074; Christus Jesus Dominus ex utroque contextus atque concretus [The Lord Jesus Christ is united and composed of both natures], but in such a way that between the Filium Dei [Son of God] and the filium hominis [Son of Man] there is a distinctio [difference] 2075. And St. Ambrose speaks of distinctio divinitatis et carnis [difference between the Divine and the flesh] 2076; it seems to him that the correct view is non ut confunderet humana atque divina, sed ut distingueret [... not in order to merge the Divine and human natures, but to distinguish them] 2077. In this connection, the thoughts of nature in Christ are connected even more superficially in Ambrose than in his predecessors, since he is talking exclusively about distinctio [difference], but not about conjunctio [connection] and mixtio [mixture]. It is curious that Ambrose does not know the terms of Novatian and Irenaeus (sociatus), while Hilary treats them with attention, speaking of consociatam [connected] with the Spiritus materiem [Spirit of matter] of the Incarnate 2078. Finally, there is no need to expand on the fact that with such views on the image of the union of two natures, the unity of the face of the Incarnate remains rather illusory and doubtful. Therefore, Western writers very rarely talk about una persona [one Person] in Christ; but, in any case, if sometimes, as, for example, in Tertullian 2079, the unity of the Person is recognized, then it still turns out to be very poorly philosophically justified and does not logically follow from all of the above. From this point of view, it turns out that it is probably not accidental and very characteristic that St. Ambrose seems to avoid speaking directly about una persona [one Person] in Christ 2080. True, he often uses, for example, such expressions as ex persona Christi [from the Person of Christ] 2081, ex persona Salvatoris [from the Person of the Savior] 2082, but the name Jesus Christus [Jesus Christ] itself is actually very unstable and is often used to designate any one nature of the Savior, mainly human 2083. In the same way, the rarely encountered expression operis dinstinctione, non varietate personae [according to the difference in deeds, and not according to the variety of persons] 2084, although it eliminates the difference of persons in Christ, it does not necessarily imply the union of the Divinity and humanity into one hypostasis of the God-man. The application of the word persona [Person] to the one human nature of Christ, the usual use of the expressions ex persona hominis, in persona hominis [on behalf of man, in the person of man] 2085 clearly shows how little the Milanese bishop cared about the hypostatic union of natures into one Person of the God-Man. This is the Christology of Ambrose, to the extent that it was formed solely under the influence of local Western factors. If Ambrose had limited himself to only this, then his Christology could have absolutely no significance in the history of Western dogmatics. But his acquaintance with the writers of the East gave him the opportunity to introduce new points of view, previously unknown in the West, into the doctrine of the Face of Christ the Savior, as Hilary had done somewhat earlier. In most of the Christological ideas of the East, the opposite trend lay: there they cared much more about the union of two natures into the unity of the Person of the Incarnate. Under the influence of these ideas, St. Ambrose is now developing in his works a new series of Christological thoughts, completely opposite to the above and often coming into clear contradiction with it. The most important thing that came to Ambrose from Eastern Christology was the idea of ​​the unity of the Savior. True, St. Ambrose does not call this unity the unity of the Person; nor does he make any attempt to substantiate it philosophically; nevertheless, he quite often uses a number of formulas that strongly suggest such unity. He, for example, speaks of Christ as unum in utroque, non alterum [one in both, not one of two], about unitatem naturae [unity of nature] 2086; utrinque unus, non alter ex Pare, et alter ex Virgine [mutually one, not one from the Father, but the other from the Virgin] 2087; non enim alter ex Patre et alter ex Maria [not one from the Father and the other from Mary] 2088; unus loquitur Dei Filius [The Son of God is called one] 2089; non alter [not one of the two] Christ, but unus [one]: as Dei Filius [Son of God], before the age, born ex Patre [from the Father], and as homo [man], born in time through the perception of the flesh 2090; utrumque unus [both are one] and unus in utroque, hoc est, vel divinitate vel corpore [one in both, that is, both the Divinity and the body]; for one is not from the Father, another from the Virgin, but idem aliter [one and the same in one way] from the Father, aliter [different] from the Virgin 2091. Such formulas already remind us, for example, of Didymus: unus est Jesus Filius Dei [one Jesus the Son of God] and out of a sense of piety one should accept non quod alter et alter sit, sed quod de uno atque eodem [not that [He is] one and another, but that [He is] from one and the same] 2092; or οὐκ ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος [not one and the other] 2093 ; or, finally, ἐξ ἀμφοῖν [from both] 2094. Similar formulas were also proposed by the Cappadocians: in St. Gregory the Theologian we are talking about a person who συνανεκράϑη ϑεῷ, καὶ γέγονεν εἰς [united with God and became one [with Him]] 2095; εἰς Θεὸς ἀμφοτέρωϑε [one God of two] 2096; οὐκ ἄλλος δὲ καὶ ἄλλος μὴ γένοιτο [let it not be that (He is) one and the other] 2097. On the idea of ​​unity in Christ before St. Ambrose was also insisted by Hilary; but it still seems to us that his formulas are different from the formulas of St. Ambrose, although in meaning they are the same with them: non enim alius Filius Dei, quam qui filius hominis [for there is no other Son of God than the son of man] 2098; utrumque unus exsistens [both being one] 2099; The formula alter et alter [one and the other] apparently does not appear in him. To denote unity in Christ, St. Ambrose, in addition, also uses the concepts ipse [He, Himself, That] and idem [The Same]: ipse [That], who was in the beginning, iste after was born of the Virgin, in order to become life for mortals 2100; from the womb of the Virgin idem et servus exivit et dominus [came the same slave and master]; and idem [the same], who before the age was from the Father, iste subsequently took flesh from the Virgin 2101; idem altissimus, idem homo [He is the highest, he is also a man] 2102; Christ was not on earth in servi forma [in the form of a slave], but idem [He] existed and in gloria Dei Patris [in the glory of God the Father], was vermis in cruce [a worm on the cross], but idem [He] forgave the sins of His persecutors 2103. Duo [two] seems to be designated, but unus [one] is expressed: for idem [He] as potens [the Mighty One] was born ex potente [from the Mighty One], and as redemtor [the Redeemer] came forth ex virgine [from the Virgin], in utriusque idem naturae diversitate dividuae [The same in the difference of both separate natures] 2104. The unity here is already thought to be so close that predicates of the opposite nature are attributed to one and the same subject: idem [He] both suffered and did not suffer, was buried and was not buried, resurrected and did not resurrect 2105. This is also a formula akin to the formula of Didymus: Christ incarnate remained the same, ὃ ἦν, εἷς καὶ αὐτός [what he was, the same] 2106. But still, even before Ambrose, it was already known in the West to Hilary: qui filius hominis est, idem et Filius Dei est [Who is the son of man, the same is also the Son of God] 2107. In these cases, Ambrose also uses new terminology to denote the way of connecting natures, in which the center of gravity is placed in their inseparability from one another: Christ inseparabilis numero [numerically indivisible] 2108; neque enim divisus est Christus, sed unus [for Christ is not divided, but one] 2109; Deus semper esset aeternus, incarnationis sacramenta suscepit, non divisus, sed unus [God was always eternal, He accepted the mystery of the incarnation, being not separate, but one] 2110. From this point of view, something like a communio idiomatum [community of properties] of natures is recognized, although very rarely and cautiously: He who suffered inseparably must be called both Lord of glory and Son of man (ut indiscrete et Dominus majestatis dicatur esse qui passus est, et Filius hominis) 2111. In these words: inseparabilis, non divisus [inseparable, undivided] and indiscrete [inseparably] we undoubtedly have a parallel to the eastern ἀδιαιρέτως [inseparably] regarding the union of natures, a concept to which ancient Western writers could not yet create an equivalent. But it was already known to Hilary: naturam carnis nostrae jam inseparabilem sibi homo natus assumpsit [He, born as a man, took upon Himself the inseparable nature of our flesh] 2112; non alius ac divisus a se esset, qui et pateretur et viveret [He who suffered and lived was not different and separated from Himself] 2113. The usual way of uniting the Divine and the human into one Hypostasis in the East was that His Divinity was recognized as the actual subject, the person in Christ, while humanity served only for the purposes of the Logos operating in it. This feature was also reflected in Ambrose’s Christology, although to a very weak extent. Christ, he says, is the Son of the Living God, born differently from the Father and differently from the Virgin Mary 2114. In this case, caro [flesh] already loses its independence, being a simple accessory of the Word: non caro erat Verbum, sed caro erat Verbi [the Word was not flesh, but the Word had flesh] 2115. God commanded in Christ, and man acted: servus ad operandum, dominus ad imperandum [slave (came from the womb of the Virgin) to act, master to command] 2116. Further important features of the Christology of some Eastern writers are explained from its philosophical Platonic background. In Platonism, matter itself was thought of as completely formless and qualityless, capable of taking on the most opposite qualities; From this position, some writers of the East drew the conclusion in the field of Christology that the flesh of the Savior, inseparably united with the Divinity, took on some of the latter’s properties and, to one degree or another, became deified, losing some of the qualities that characterize the simple, undeified flesh of man. On the other hand, the same Platonism, which considered only ideal being to be true being, in contrast to the illusory nature of the empirical world, was characterized by a view of appearance, materiality, as an obstacle to the discovery of true being; in Christology, sometimes on this basis the idea of ​​​​the humiliation of the Incarnate Deity, of the weakening of His splendor and greatness, was defended. Both left their traces in the works of Ambrose. So, if, as we have seen, human nature in Christ was subordinated to the Divine and served the purposes of His actual manifestation, then Ambrose, in a new series of thoughts, unlike the previous Western one, had reason to allow a change in human nature itself in Christ. Reuther, of course, goes to the extreme when he understands formam servi [the image of a slave] not in the sense of the objective incarnation of Christ, but in the sense of a deceptive appearance, an optical illusion. “Believers,” he says, “as sensual people and precisely to the extent of their own sensuality, see (in Christ) a formam servi [the image of a slave]”; in reality, only the forma Dei [image of God] exists. It is partly based on Ambrose’s use of the verb videbatur [discovered, seen] (in specie hominis videbatur [discovered in the form of a person]) 2117, which, by the way, can also have the meaning of external appearance, being 2118. This extreme spiritualization of human nature in Christ is inconsistent both with Ambrose’s above-mentioned understanding of formam servi [the image of a slave] or hominis [man] in the sense of the fullness of human nature, and with his insistent statement that not in phantasmate venisse Jesum [ghostly Jesus came], not in phantasmate passus est, nec in phantasmate super mare ambulavit [suffered ghostly and did not walk ghostly on the sea] 2119. Nevertheless, he is not wanting in such expressions as show that humanity in Christ shared in some divine attributes and in some respects differed essentially from our human nature. This already noticeably affects his idea of ​​the Birth of the God-Man: not only did the conception of Christ the Savior occur supernaturally from the Virgin, but the very development of the human body in the womb of Mary proceeded just as supernaturally, regardless of any dependence on the laws of human nature; here comes a somewhat docetic idea of ​​the Virgin Mary as a channel through which the Son of God passed without receiving essentially anything from her. This St. Ambrose reminds us, for example, of Didymus, for whom the virtus Altissimi [the power of the Most High] is the creatrix [creator] of the body of the Savior, who in the womb of the Virgin Mary Christi corpus fabricavit [created the body of Christ] 2120. And for St. Ambrose, the Virgin Mary gave birth to the Son, etsi eum sine aliqua sui operatione formaverit [although she formed Him without any action on her part], so that inoperata est et caro Christi [the flesh of Christ is also unmade]. The active principle in these cases is not the Virgin Mary, but the Divinity or divinae gratia dispositionis [the grace of the Divine institution], which, what was characteristic of the carnis [flesh], assumpsit ex virgine [received from the Virgin] and thus in her membra formavit [formed the members] of the new Adam 2121. In other places, therefore, St. Ambrose says that opus Spiritus virginis partus est, opus Spiritus fructus est ventris [Birth of a Virgin was the work of the Spirit, the Fruit of [Her] womb was the work of the Spirit], that ex operatione et potestate Ejus virgo concepit [from His influence and power the virgin conceived]; The Holy Spirit is directly called the creator of the flesh of Christ, auctor’oM Dominicae incarnationis [The Author of the Lord’s Incarnation] 2122. Similar remarks are valid regarding the sinlessness of the Savior. The meaning of the human nature of the Savior in this case is pushed back, since sinlessness is not thought of as the result of the spontaneous activity of the human will, as human righteousness is, but exclusively as the fruit of the presence of the Word in man. To illustrate this idea, Origen points to the comparison of Christ with a vessel containing the substance of incense, which, while this substance is in it, is not capable of receiving another smell; so Christ was sinless, so to speak, by virtue of natural necessity 2123. Although St. Ambrose does not encounter such an analogy, but the idea expressed in it is undoubtedly not alien to him. The Divinum [Divine] in Christ is that His caro peccatum non fecit [the flesh created no sin], and in Him nec suscepti corporis creatura rescavit [the creation of the received body did not sin] 2124. Freedom from hereditary sin is already the work of the Word and the result of the supernatural formation and development of the body: the Son of God antequam nasceretur ex Virgine, jamdudum erat, et erat semper, et operabatur etiam in utero Mariae constitutus [before he was born of the Virgin, already was and always was, and also acted, formed in the womb of Mary] and was ita sanctus [so holy] that sanctified prophetas suas [His prophets] 2125. Finally, the presence of the Divine in Christ is reflected in a very tangible way on the properties of His physicality. In the pre-Nicene period, this problem of Christology became the subject of careful research by the same Origen, who actually for the human soul in Christ uses the analogy of red-hot iron, which has absorbed all the properties of fire; so the soul received the property of the Divine - “immutability due to continuous and fiery unity with the Word of God” 2126. But through the medium of the soul these qualities are transmitted to the body, which gradually turns into the ethereal and Divine 2127, so that in the end humanity is completely dissolved in the Divine: εἰ καὶ ἦν ἄνϑρωπος, ἀλλὰ νῦν οὐδαμις ἐστιν ἄνϑρωπος [if there was a man, then now he is not a man] 2128. The characteristic features in Origen’s idea of ​​the deification of the flesh of Christ are two features: the gradualness of deification, empirically passing, more and more intensifying, throughout the entire earthly life of the Savior, reaching its highest point at the moment of the Resurrection from the dead and the Ascension into heaven 2129; but, on the other hand, this gradualness depended not on the properties of the flesh, but on the ability and moral disposition of people: Christ appeared to different people in varying degrees of corporeality, having discovered the true nature of his body on the Mount of Transfiguration 2130. At St. Ambrose does not think that the corporeality of Christ is determined by the subjective mood of believers, but the tendency to deify the flesh is obvious to him: caro Christi velut murali divinitatis claritudine circumsepta, coelestis habuerit perfectionem gratiae [the flesh of Christ, surrounded as if by a (some) wall of the radiance of the Divine, had the perfection of heavenly grace] 2131; in ipsa naturae humanae affectione majestatem licet spectare divinam [divine greatness should be seen in the very experience of human nature] 2132. Now all needs and passions are attributed not so much to human nature itself, but are considered as means of the Divine for His saving purposes: utrumque verum est, et plenum utrumque rationis; quod et ille qui est inferior, non timet: et ille qui superior est, gerit timentis affectum: ille enim quasi homo vim mortis ignorat, iste quasi Deus in corpore constitutus fragilitatem carnis exponit [...both [statements] are true and full of meaning: the one who is lower is not afraid, and the one who is higher experiences a feeling of fear; for the first, being a man, does not know the power of death, the second, being God in the body, shows the weakness of the flesh]; all these infirmities are accepted by the Divine, ut eorum qui sacramentum Incarnationis abjurant, excluderetur impietas [to prevent the wickedness of those who deny the sacrament of the Incarnation] 2133. But it is especially interesting to note here that St. Ambrose seems to be no stranger to the Origenistic idea of ​​the final dissolution of humanity in Christ in His Divine nature. On earth Christ was a man; but nunc enim secundum carnem jam non novimus Christum [now in the flesh we no longer know Christ] 2134. “All that,” says St. Ambrose, what is told in the Gospel, should be attributed to the times of the Gospel, when the Lord Jesus inter homines humana specie conversabatur [lived among people in human form]; now secundum hominem jam non novimus Christum [by man we no longer know Christ (cf. 2 Cor. 5:16)]. He was thus visus et cognitus [visible and known] to the ancients, and now transierunt vetera, et omnia nova facta sunt [the ancient has passed, and everything is new]” 2135. In these views on the character of human nature, our bishop also reminds us of Hilary, but only in the most general terms: Hilary in the deification of the humanity of Christ goes much further than St. Ambrose. Hilary reproduces Origen's views on this matter almost entirely. When explaining the manifestations of human weakness, he encounters an Origenistic thought about accommodation to human sensuality - a thought that we do not find in St. Ambrose: Christ mourns, although positus [placed] outside the necessity of fear and sorrow, but his se tamen quae suscepit accommodans [conforms Himself to what he has perceived] 2136. And in inextricable connection with this, the docetic element in Hilary’s Christology appears much stronger than in Ambrose. In its properties, the flesh of Christ was significantly different from ours. “The flesh of Christ would have the doloris nostri naturam [the nature of our sorrow], if our flesh had in its nature the ability to walk on water, not to get tired of walking, to penetrate the impenetrable and to pass through the doors of a closed house. But if only Dominici corporis sola ista natura sit [the Lord's body has such a nature] that with its strength, with its soul it rushes along the waves, stands motionless on a liquid surface and penetrates structures, then why do we judge the conceptam ex Spiritu carnem [conceived of the Spirit of the flesh] by naturam humani corporis [the nature of the human body]? Christ suffered, but still naturam non habens ad dolendum [not having a nature that could suffer] 2137. The true nature of this body for Hilary, as well as for Origen, is revealed at the moment of the Transfiguration: naturae enim propriae ac suae corpus illud est, quod in coelestem gloriam conformatur in monte [for that body which was transformed on the mountain into heavenly glory had its own nature] 2138. The individual moments of his glorification of the flesh are again the same as those of Origen: this is, firstly, the Resurrection of the Savior from the dead, when the flesh of Christ was glorified and received the property of incorruptibility: natura carnis post resurrectionem glorificata... et in immortalitatem corruptione carnis absorpta [the nature of the flesh was glorified after the resurrection... the corruption of the flesh was abolished]... when Christ was adopted and according to humanity 2139 - a thought not revealed by Ambrose; secondly, the Ascension into heaven, when rediret in naturae paternae etiam secundum hominem unitatem Verbum caro factum [The Word made flesh and according to [His] humanity returns to the unity of the Father's nature] 2140. But, if, on the one hand, human nature, under the influence of the Word, acquires new qualities, then, on the other, in Ambrose’s view, it receives the meaning of matter or form in which God appeared to the world 2141, is a “transient bearer of Divine life,” an organ of the Divine 2142, thanks to which only the Divinity is made accessible to man. This basic idea, usually found in St. Ambrose, in connection with the idea of ​​​​derogation of the word, varies in several ways. Considered in itself, without regard to man, the incarnation in the spirit of some Eastern writers is for him exinanitio [exhaustion, humiliation], minoratio [diminution] of the Divine: the Son of God, Deus perfectus et plenus, minoratus est [perfect and complete God, was diminished], that is, he became lesser in comparison with the previous form of his existence in natura hominis [in human nature], in that quae corporalia sunt [what is corporeal] 2143 . The prototype for him in this case was undoubtedly Origen, since the need for humiliation is motivated by him purely Origenistically, by the inability of weak humanity, which cannot withstand the revelation of the fullness of the Divinity in His pure, real nature 2144. In the very understanding of the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bhumiliation, exinanitio, Ambrose also undoubtedly reveals something Origenistic. Origen considered the incarnation in the sense of constitutio in forma Dei [establishment, formation in the form of God] in contrast to existence before the incarnation as imago Dei [image of God], and forma Dei [form of God] through the addition to it of formae servi [form of a slave] is already thought of directly as a descent ab hujusmodi magnitudine [from the same greatness] and is even made possible by comparatio gloriae [comparing the glory] that the Son of God had with God the Father with the state when He lifted the cross 2145. That in Ambrose the forma Dei [form of God], unlike Origen, has a completely different meaning, not at all akin to the concept of exinanitio [exhaustion, humiliation], it only remains to be noted here without any further reasoning. Then, according to Western tradition, St. Ambrose, much stronger than Origen, insists on the immutability of the Divinity even in a state of humiliation. “Christ, whose greatness has no end, has not lost in the flesh the magnitudinis suae nomen [the name of His greatness]” 2146. In the incarnation He “did not lay aside what He was, but preserved (reservavit) and did not cease to exist in forma Dei [in the form of God], but continued (perseveravit); and since the Dei gloria [the glory of God] did not change (non immutata) through the taking on of flesh, but remained unchanged, He achieved a triumph and did not lose power (potentiam non amisit)” 2147. Thus, dignitas naturalis majestatis [the dignity of natural greatness] is not abandoned 2148; The Son of God, although one can consider exinanitum [humiliated], but in no case imminutum [less than He was] 2149; since He became incarnate non ut mutaret quod erat [not in order to change the past], but in order to sanctify us in the flesh 2150. However, on the other hand, the names minor [lesser], minoratus [diminished] are attached to the incarnate Son of God: we know Christ per susceptionem corporis minoratum [diminished through the perception of the body] 2151; aequalis in forma Dei, minor in susceptione carnis et hominis passione [He is “equal” in the form of God, “lesser” in the perception of the flesh and passions inherent in man] 2152. Born of the Virgin, the Son mutavit formam [changed form]; the Origenistic term descent, descensio 2153, is also applied to the incarnation. No matter how full the Divinity may be in Christ, nevertheless, as a result of these expressions, according to Reuther’s fair remark, “the contradiction between the normal, adequate form of the existence of God and His empirical appearance remains irremovable” 2154. The most classic passage expounding the views of St. Ambrose on the essence of humiliation, is still a passage from the essay “De interpellatione Job et David” [“On the complaint of Job and David”], where the idea of ​​humiliation is revealed in connection with Dan. 2:35: divinitas Christi mons magnus est, incarnatio Ejus mons exiguus est [The divinity of Christ is a great mountain, His Incarnation is a small mountain]; the transformation of a great mountain into a small one is thus thought of only as the taking on of the flesh, and not as a change in the Divinity, as far as it is recognized that utrumque Christus, et magnus mons et minor [both are Christ, the great mountain and the small]; when exiguus videbatur [seemed small (mountain)], Christ was still magnus erat [was large] 2155. Here, as elsewhere, St. Ambrose, therefore, remains more faithful to Western traditions, while Hilary, in defining the essence of exinanitio [humiliation], is more inclined towards Eastern writers. Like St. Ambrose, however, he speaks very definitely about the immutability of the Divinity in the mystery of the incarnation: the elevation of humanity was not connected with the cum divinitatis decessione [descent of the Divinity], and the virtus [power] in Christ did not receive reproach per consortium infirmitatis [through participation with weakness] 2156; through the taking on of flesh, the Son of God did not become inops suorum [devoid of His (own properties)], because, as the Only Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth, on earth et in suis perfectus sit, et verus in nobis [He was perfect in His own and true in ours] 2157. The Incarnate Word has not become impoverished in its Divine power - se ex suaque virtute non deficiens 2158 - an expression, by the way, not used by Ambrose. He who became incarnate did not amiserat, quod erat [lost what he was], but only coeperat esse, quod non erat [began to be what he was not]; non de suo destiterat, sed quod nostrum est acceperat [He did not renounce what was his, but accepted what was ours] 2159. But, on the other hand, Hilary expresses himself so strongly about humiliation that all of the above must be understood not in the sense of preserving the former splendor of the Divine, but only in the sense of His actual presence in man; in this case he uses expressions that we would in vain try to look for in Ambrose: the Son of God exinanivit se ex Dei forma [exhausted Himself from the image of God], that is, ex eo, quod aequalis Deo erat [from the fact that he was equal to God] 2160; in the act of His incarnation, the forma Dei [image of God] from that quod erat [that was], was exhausted (evacuata) ad id, quod non erat [into that which was not] 2161; especially striking is the expression about Dei se humiliante substantia [the substance of God humiliating itself] in taking on the flesh 2162. Hilary also appears in the application to Christ of the above-mentioned prophetic images of a mountain and a stone, which he probably borrowed from Origen, but with an explanation somewhat different from that given by St. Ambrose: the moments when Christ was a mountain and a stone are not the same; during his earthly life, Christ propter infirmitatem carnis ex monte in lapidem exinanitus [due to the weakness of the flesh, from a mountain he became a stone]; He became a mountain again only after the Resurrection - propter gloriam passionis ex lapide rursus effectus in montem [because of the glory of Suffering, from stone he again became a mountain] 2163. Occasionally, the Incarnation is viewed from the point of view of the concealment of the Divine in human form. Perhaps in this case we are dealing with an echo of a similar idea of Irenaeus, who speaks of the cessation of the activity of the Word in the Person of Christ the Savior: The Word rested (ἡσυχάζοντος μὲν τοῦ Λόγου) in Christ, so that humanity in Him would thereby have the opportunity to endure temptations 2164 . In Ambrose, the idea of ​​hiding the Divine is motivated in exactly the same way. In this case he uses the expression celare [to hide]: suscepit enim quod non erat, ut celaret quod erat [for he perceived what was not in order to hide what was]. The need to celare [conceal] for the Divine is not based on human weakness, but is postulated by the very idea of ​​redemption. Celare is revealed by Ambrose in connection with the Western understanding of redemption as a human achievement; The Deity had to hide itself in order to enable man in it to be tempted: celavit quod erat, ut tentaretur in eo, et redimeretur quod non erat [hid what was in order to be tempted in it, and in order to atone for what was not]; ut ad id quod erat, per id quod non erat, nos vocaret [to call us to what He was, through what He was not] 2165. Hilary, although he shares this idea, uses a completely different concept latere [to hide, to be hidden] to designate it. Remaining in forma Dei [in the form of God], the Son received formam servi [the form of a servant], not changing (non demutatus), but humiliating Himself et intra se latens [hiding within Himself] and exhausting (vacuefactus) His power. Even more important is that the need latere [to hide] for him is motivated in a completely different way than for Ambrose, precisely due to the weakness of humanae naturae [human nature], unable to bear the splendor of the Divine: The Divinity moderated itself usque ad formam habitus humani [even to the form of the human appearance], so that infirmitas assumptae humilitatis [the weakness of perceived humiliation] could bear the potentem immensamque naturam [powerful and strong nature]; in this case, the virtus incircumscripta [indescribable force] moderated itself to the extent that it was necessary for it to obey usque ad patientiam connexi sibi corporis [up to the transfer of the body attached to it] 2166. Finally, it is necessary to note one more feature in Ambrose’s views on the Person of the Incarnate Word. This feature has undoubtedly already grown entirely on the basis of Origenism. His general Platonic idea that truth can be accessible to a sensory being only in a sensory shell, which Origen primarily used for exegetical purposes, he applied, among other things, to Christology. From this point of view, the incarnation loses its absolute value for Origen, acquiring the meaning of only a temporary form in which the Divine Logos became accessible to human cognition: the main thing in Christ is His Divinity, and humanity is something secondary and indifferent 2167; for the imperfect, who cannot enter into direct communion with the Divine, human nature in Christ has significance; the perfect sage is more occupied with the question of the action of the Word in Christ than with His humanity 2168. Likewise, for Ambrose, the incarnation takes on the meaning of a temporary form of the Revelation of the Divine to people, which, in the end, with the spiritual and moral progress of humanity, will become completely unnecessary: factus est igitur exinanitus umbra nobis, quos sol iniquitatis exusserat [thus, the Humiliated One became a shadow for us, whom the sun of unrighteousness scorched], a umbra [shadow] His fuit caro [was flesh]. We saw in umbra Eum [Him in the shadows] when fides prima procederet [the first faith appeared]; fides pima [first faith] probably refers to the times of the Gospel history. Then follows the second stage - the times of the Church, when we no longer see Christ, but still adhuc Eum per sui corporis, quae est Ecclesia, umbram videmus [we see Him in the shadow of His Body, which is the Church], and not facie ad faciem [face to face], because the oculi corporis [bodily eyes] cannot bear the divinitatis fulgorem [the radiance of the Divine] 2169. The ultimate goal for Origen is the individual union of the perfect soul with the Logos, in relation to which the historical appearance of Christ in the flesh is the model and the beginning 2170. From the same point of view, St. evaluates the Incarnation of God. Ambrose: veni, Domine Jesu [come, Lord Jesus], he says, but no longer in umbra [in the shadow], but in sole justitiae [in the sun of righteousness]; if umbra [shadow] was useful, if covering a person with umbra [shadow] of suffering, if corporis umbra [shadow of the body] healed, then how much more useful could claritas aperta virtutis [open manifestation of power] be? 2171 As far as is known, Hilary makes no attempt to approach the mystery of the Incarnation from this point of view. The work of salvation and redemption of mankind The teaching of St. Ambrose about the Work of renewal of humanity completed by the Savior develops in close connection with his Christology, constituting, as it were, a continuation and conclusion from it, and, like the latter, bears traces of two soteriological directions: on the one hand, it contains the ideas of the East and mainly Origen, and on the other, Ambrose followed in it his old home mentors - Tertullian and Cyprian. In both cases, he gives not one, but several separate contemplations; Moreover, none of them is dominant among him. Bringing the Divine nature in Christ to the forefront to the significance of the only Subject acting in Christ, the theology of some Eastern writers, also in soteriology, attached primary importance to what was primarily the Work of this Divine nature and served as its most vivid manifestation. One of the forms of soteriological teaching that grew on this soil was the understanding of the Cause of Christ primarily in the sense of revelation to people of Divine truth, in the sense of enlightenment from above of humanity living in the darkness of ignorance and idolatry. This sometimes one-sided intellectual form of teaching, quite common among ancient Christian apologists, also found favorable soil among the first writers of Alexandria, an important educational center that especially valued the interests of science and enlightenment. In the minds of both, Christ the Savior is, first of all, the heavenly Teacher of humanity. Thus, Clement of Alexandria understands the work of saving humanity in the sense of enlightening with the light of the Gospel all those who wanted to believe in Jesus Christ, so that the Descent into Hell itself had the purpose of proclaiming the Gospel to those imprisoned there 2172. If in connection with this liberation from the power of the devil was thought of, then it, in turn, consisted of the same enlightenment of the mind, since the devil was presented mainly as the culprit of darkness and ignorance, and the state under his power was the same state of error 2173. If, finally, a religious and moral renewal of life was allowed, then it was also associated with enlightenment and rested on the ancient assumption that identified knowledge with virtue 2174. In Origen, who usually defended a different point of view, there are also traces of this intellectualism; St. is not free from them either. Ambrose. And although it generally cannot be proven that Ambrose owes this understanding exclusively to Origen, in some cases, as far as, for example, can be judged on the basis of comments on the psalms, the connection with Origen is obvious. They both speak in almost the same terms about the fire brought by the Lord to earth - about the fire that burned in the bones of the prophet Jeremiah, in the hearts of Cleopas and Luke, to whom the Lord appeared after His Resurrection. This is the fire of the Divine Scriptures, not only enlightening the souls of people, but also burning away guilt and reducing sins; the sage who burns with it heals the grave wounds of his soul, is aroused by jealousy of virtue, is inflamed by his heart, and rushes against dangerous vicious growths. But along with this, in Ambrose we also find a deeper understanding of the Cause of Christ - in the sense of changing the entire objective world order. Moreover, in accordance with the fact that the sin of the first man made him dependent on the devil, on the one hand, and, as the fruit of disobedience, created enmity between him and God, on the other, Ambrose distinguishes two separate sides in the single Cause of Christ. Based on the church teaching that man, having decided in the act of falling to follow the will of the devil, voluntarily made himself dependent on him and thus gave the devil some right to dominate himself, the idea was formed that Christ the Savior, by His Passion on the Cross and Death, gave Himself as a pledge to the devil and thereby prompted him to liberate humanity; from this point of view, the Blood and Soul of Christ were considered as ransom payment for slaves, as an exchange for people 2175. This idea was partly used by Irenaeus. He already speaks of redemption as the liberation of humanity from the power of the devil; Moreover, he is characterized by the insistence with which he pursues the idea that this liberation was accomplished not by force, but in compliance with the demands of truth (δικαίως ἐνικήϑη ὁ ἐχϑρός [The enemy is defeated justly]) 2176. Origen goes much further and inappropriately connected with the idea of ​​the redemptive payment the famous theory of pious deception, or pia fraus: Christ defeated the devil by misleading him. The idea of ​​truth put forward by Irenaeus with this theory, of course, was not completely denied, but was usually combined with it. We cannot claim that this idea of ​​salvation as redemption from the devil first became known to the Western Church through the works of St. Ambrose. On the contrary, in its general outlines it is already found in some of the works of Pseudo-Cyprian. Thus, the author of the book “De duplici martyrio” [“On the Double Martyrdom”] says of Christ that with His Blood He destroyed the chirographum [manuscript] that existed contra nos [against us], and with this Satanae in nos jus vindicabat [deprived Satan of his right to us] 2177; in this connection the Blood of Christ is called the price (pretium) with which we are redemit Dei Filius [the Son of God redeemed us] 2178. Merit of St. Ambrose lies only in the fact that he began to present this idea in its eastern version. Often, namely in his commentary on the Gospel of Luke, he sets it out in complete agreement with Origen, without any critical attitude towards the latter. “The human race,” he says, “has been in constant captivity obnoxiae haereditatis [of its inheritance] due to the enormous debt that the debtor extended to his descendants de fenerata successione [through inheritance of the debt]. But the Lord came, brought His Death for the death of all, shed His Blood for the blood of all” 2179. “He shed His Blood ut non in fenore essemus alieno [so that we would not be in someone else’s debt]” 2180. From this point of view, the entire earthly life of the Savior is considered under the form of pia fraus [pious deception] in relation to the devil; all her private circumstances were aimed at hiding the true nature of the Incarnate One from the devil. This is how the supernatural birth of the Savior from the Virgin Mary is interpreted. Then, the hunger of the Savior in the desert, followed by the temptations of the devil, was also aimed at seducing and attracting the devil. Ambrose in this case goes so far that he himself recognizes the famine in the desert as pia fraus [pious deception] 2181 and this casts the shadow of docetism on the Face of Christ the Savior. Like Origen, he draws attention to the fact that Christ the Savior, despite all the tricks of the devil, hiding His true dignity, never once called Himself the Son of God 2182. For the same reason, Christ forbade both the apostles and all those healed from proclaiming His Name publicly 2183. Developing his thoughts further, Origen came to the theory that Christ the Savior, during His Passion on the Cross and Death, brought His Soul to the devil (πονηρῷ) as the price of Redemption for all - λύτρον ἀντὶ πάντων, λύτρον ἀντι πολλῷν; the devil, knowing nothing about the Divinity of Christ, accepted her in the hope of keeping her with him; but in fact he could not hold Christ the Savior in his power as the God-man; therefore, the Descent of Christ after Death into hell only led to the fact that He, along with Himself, brought out from there and freed all humanity from death 2184. At St. Ambrose Redemption in this sense is usually designated by the term redemptio; the Origenistic concept of λύτρον [ransom] corresponds to pretium redemptionis [price of redemption] 2185, pretium sanguinis Christi [price of the Blood of Christ], with which people were purchased (empti) 2186; pretium nostrae liberationis [the price of our liberation], which had to be paid to the one to whom we were sold for our sins 2187. This price was paid to the devil when Christ, like the prophet Jonah, spent three days and three nights in corde terrae [in the heart of the earth], in corporis passione [in the suffering of the body], and descended into the underworld; by this He offered animam suam [His soul] redemptionem pro nobis [as an atonement for us] 2188. On the other hand, since the relationship between the devil and man in the spirit of Western writers is conceived by Ambrose in the form of the relationship of a creditor to a debtor who has issued an obligatory receipt to his creditor, the Origenistic idea of ​​atonement in Ambrose is usually closely associated with the idea of ​​​​the destruction of this receipt and the termination of debt obligations; this act is no longer associated with the descent into hell, but with the Savior’s Death on the Cross: Christ nailed the chirographum decreti [(this) promissory note] to the Cross 2189. As a result of this, our enemy and adversary (adversarius et inimicus), in whose power we were, was defeated, the captivity itself was captured (captivam duxerit cartivitatem), bound a perpetuis vinculis [permanent shackles] of the underworld were released 2190. Another common understanding of atonement in the East was the idea of ​​the propitiation of God by the Death of the Savior on the Cross. Origen drew attention to the parallel between the Sacrifice of Christ on the Cross and the Old Testament sacrifice for sins. The Old Testament law prescribed that for the sins of the people a special sacrifice should be made from a calf, the blood of which the high priest sprinkled in the sanctuary and with this sprinkling, repropitiabat, propitiated God for those who had sinned; and the propitiated God forgave those who had sinned their sins. But the same significance that this sacrifice had for the Jewish people, the sacrifice of Christ the Savior had for all humanity. Christ the Savior, in whom the fullness of the Divinity dwelt bodily, was both the propitatorium, the propitiation, acting as the High Priest according to His Divinity, and the sacrifice offered for the people, according to the body, humanity. He is the Lamb of God who took away the sins of the whole world. As the Sacrifice of the Son of God, which had infinite value in the eyes of God, it could truly serve as propitiatio, propitiation, of God, and therefore had as its consequence the remission of sins 2191. We also find traces of a similar idea in St. Ambrose. This circumstance, however, should not be entirely explained by the influence of Origen on him. The fact is that some Western writers (namely Pseudo-Cyprian) before him were already familiar in general terms with this understanding. Namely, Christ was sometimes previously designated in the West as Agnus innocens [Immaculate Lamb], Who totum se contempserit pro Ecclesia [gave Himself entirely for the Church] 2192; His Blood brought peace (pacem) and reconciliation (reconciliationem) to people 2193; His Death was already placed in parallel with the Old Testament sacrifices, insofar as the latter represented umbrae et typi futurorum [shadows and images of the future] 2194. But, probably, acquaintance with Origen gave Ambrose the opportunity, as in the previous case, to deepen and spread this idea. For him, too, the Old Testament sacrifice for sin is a shadow and image of the New Testament Sacrifice of Christ: ante agnus offerebatur, offerebatur et vitulus, nunc Christus offertur [formerly a lamb was sacrificed, a bull was also sacrificed, now Christ is sacrificed] 2195. Accordingly, Ambrose calls Christ princeps sacerdotum [Head of priests, High Priest], offering His Blood for us 2196; princeps omnium sacerdotum [Head of all priests] 2197, magnus sacerdos [Great Priest] 2198. On the other hand, in his view, Christ the Savior is Dei Agnus [Lamb of God] 2199, taurus [(sacrificial) bull], victima [sacrifice] 2200, vitulus [calf] 2201, hostia [sacrificial animal, victim], oblatio [offering], sacrificium [sacrifice] 2202. Christ sacrificavit [made a sacrifice] to the Lord. Sacrificium salutare [Saving sacrifice] for us and dignas conversionis nostrae hostias Deo obtulit [He offered sacrifices worthy of our conversion to God] 2203. In this act of sacrifice, which was actually performed on the Cross, does the Divinity also participate? and humanity in Christ: the Godhead as High Priest, humanity as sacrifice. Offertur [is sacrificed] as homo [man], as able to perceive passionem [suffering]; et offert se ipse [and sacrifices Himself], as sacerdos [High Priest], in order to forgive us our sins 2204. Sometimes Christ appears not only as a Sacrifice, but also as a High Priest in His human nature. The High Priest must sacrifice someone and, according to the law, per sanguinem [with the blood] enter into the Holy of Holies; and since God rejected the blood of bulls and goats (repudiaverat), it was now necessary for the High Priest, per suum sanguinem [with His blood], to enter the Holy of Holies, penetrating into the highest heaven (coeli summa penetrantem); that there may be an everlasting offering (aeterna oblatio) for our sins. Idem [He is], therefore, sacerdos [High Priest], idem et hostia [He is also the victim] and with all this et sacerdotium [and priesthood] and sacrificium [sacrifice] is a matter (officium) of humanae conditionis [of the human condition]; for the agnus [Lamb] was led to the slaughter, and the High Priest exists according to the order of Melchizedek 2205. “Hostiam [sacrifice]... God the Word (Verbum Deus) brought in Himself and slain in His own body” 2206. Christ is agnus [Lamb] and hostia [sacrifice], but agnus [Lamb] is not irrationabilis naturae [of an unreasonable nature], like the sacrifices of the Old Testament, but divinae potentiae [Divine power] 2207. But also the caro [flesh] at the moment of the Passion of the Cross represented a pro delicto mundi totius sacrificium [sacrifice for the sin of the whole world] 2208 which pro nostris flagitiis [for our evil deeds] was offered immolandum [sacrifice] 2209 . That in se obtulit Christus [Christ sacrificed in Himself] that He put on 2210. “Secundum naturam se obtulit nostram [He offered Himself according to our nature] in order to act ultra nostram naturam [above and beyond our nature]” 2211. Ambrose, like Origen, associates with the concept of this sacrifice the idea of ​​propitiation (propitiatio) for the sins of all people, which is explained by the fact that Christ, as absolutely sinless, should not have pro se propitiationem [propitiation for Himself] of sins 2212; this propitiation is sometimes also designated as reconciliation - reconciliatio of peace with God 2213; it was associated with the remission of all sins (remissio omnium peccatorum) 2214. But at the same time St. Ambrose not only preserved, but in a certain sense further carried out what was offered to him by the local Western tradition, which, like the Church of the East, knew not one, but several ideas about the redemptive Work of Christ. Thus, not only the first writers of the West, but partly also writers of the East quite often expressed the idea that Christ, who appeared on earth in the form of a man, in His activity gave us an example of a truly godly life, showing that the will of God can well be carried out by a human being. Western writers only seemed to pursue it more persistently. This idea found its, so to speak, most classical expression in Lactantius, according to whom God sent Christ to earth as a living law (quasi vivam legem) 2215, Teacher of truth (doctorem justitae misit e coelo) 2216; from this point of view, Lactantius motivates the very necessity of the incarnation: “If Christ were only God,” he says, “then He could not show man exempla virtutis [examples of virtue]; just as, being only a man, he could not force people ad justitiam [to righteousness], if superhuman authority and power had not been revealed in him” 2217. Among other Western writers, we most often encounter similar thoughts in St. Cyprian: “Christ, having come into the world, exhorted us not verbis [words] only, but also factis [deeds], having suffered after all the insults and reproaches and being crucified on the cross (crucifixus), in order suo exemplo [by His example] to teach us to suffer and die, so that, since He suffered for us, a person could not have any excuse for himself for not wanting to suffer” 2218. There is no need to say much that the significance of human nature in Christ is greatly emphasized by this. Occasionally similar thoughts are revealed in St. Ambrose. “The Lord Jesus, desiring (volens) to restore to us the ability to become stronger against the temptations of the devil, fasted, intending to enter into conflict with him, so that we would learn that we could not otherwise defeat the lures of evil” 2219. “By Divine Council He took on this flesh to show (ut ostenderet) that the law of the flesh can be subject to the law of the mind”; Moreover, what is meant here is not the moral degeneration of human nature, which will be discussed below, but exclusively the teaching of man through example, which postulates the need for incarnation: he took on carnem [flesh] so that quasi homo [as a man] would be overcome by the One who was supposed to teach people 2220. Then, Christ not only showed man an example of a good life, but at the same time, by His Life, proved to him that man is capable of establishing a normal relationship with God and changing the attitude of an angry Divinity towards himself. In this case, the entire earthly life of the Savior was interpreted in the West by analogy with the repentant deeds of an ordinary person. Man sinned by breaking the commandment of God; from the point of view of justice, as it seemed to the Western Christian consciousness, he, first of all, had to make amends for his offense before God, bringing Him some form of satisfaction; then, in this case, it was conceivable that he would not only give God satisfaction commensurate with his misdeeds, but also greater than would be necessary according to the requirements of justice; and in this case, this excess of satisfaction should have entitled him to special favor from God. Man accomplished all this for himself in the Person of Christ the Savior 2221. At the same time, as a feature, it should be noted here that among Western writers before Ambrose, for the most part, only the first half of the concept under consideration appears, and satisfaction is thought of mainly as covering sins and establishing the previous relationship with God. Although this idea turns out to be completely akin to the spirit of Tertullian, the expression satis facere Deo (to bring satisfaction to God] was first applied to Christ and acquired the meaning of a technical term in the teaching about the redemptive work of Christ only from St. Cyprian 2222. The Sorrows and Suffering of the Lord were significant as a means of satisfaction for us 2223. This idea in the West is usually closely intertwined with the idea of Sacrifice in precisely this sense: for Tertullian Christ is pro delictis oblatus [offered for sins] 2224; receives the name summus sacerdos Patris [High Priest of the Father] 2225. Likewise, in the eyes of Cyprian, “Christ our Lord is ipse est summus sacerdos Dei Patris [Himself the high priest of God the Father] and the first obtulit [offered] Himself sacrificium [as a sacrifice] Father" 2226. The fruit of this satisfying sacrifice to God was, first of all, the destruction of God's wrath against man: Christ iratum Deum homini reconciliat [reconciled the angry God with man] 2227; This was associated with the return of humanity to the state in which Adam was before the Fall: man receives statum eum [that state] which Adam transgressus amiserat [lost through disobedience] 2228. In Hilary of Pictavius, this idea is revealed even more often than in his predecessors, although, in general, he still apparently does not dare to go beyond the boundaries they set. His peculiarity lies only in the fact that he, more than other writers, puts forward the idea that the Death of the Savior had a satisfying meaning, as brought completely voluntarily in order to satisfy the law: death was accepted by Christ voluntarie [voluntarily], in order to give satisfaction (satisfactura) by suffering punishment 2229. To this death the names hostia [sacrifice], sacrificium [sacrifice] are also attached: Christ obtulit [offered] Himself to the death of the maledictorum [damned], to destroy the curse of the law, voluntarie [voluntarily] offering Himself hostiam [as a sacrifice] to God the Father 2230. But in this regard, atonement is still thought of almost exclusively as the remission of sins: here peccata animae [sins of the soul] are forgiven and out of mercy (ex venia) there is leniency for the first crime (indulgentia primae transgressionis) 2231. A further step in revealing this idea was already taken by St. Ambrose, whom we must recognize in this case as the most typical of all Western writers. He surpasses all of them in that he reveals in much more detail the doctrine of the satisfaction Christ brought to God for the sins of all mankind. Man owes his redemption to the insults, injuriis, suffered by the Lord 2232. This was necessary in view of the fact that a Divine verdict weighs on the sinned person - sententia - a term that in the language of Roman law, from where it was apparently borrowed, meant a judicial sentence pronounced on the basis of a thorough study of the incriminating material, which was distinguished by the property of irrefutability and, as it almost never allowed appeal, could not be canceled 2233. By virtue of this sentence, the person obviously had to be punished for his sins. And so Christ the Savior, in order to fulfill in His Person the sentence for all humanity (ut impleretur sententia), took upon Himself death in order to satisfy (satisfieret) judicato, that is, obviously, the Divine sentence; He took upon Himself flesh in order to destroy the curse of sinful flesh (maledictum carnis peccatricis), and He Himself became pro nobis maledictum [cursed for us], so that blessing (benedictio) would swallow up maledictum [curse], purity (integritas - restoration to former rights) 2234 - sin, indulgence (indulgentia) - sentence (sententiam). The force of the sentence weighing on man was obviously destroyed by this act: if man was restored to his former rights, then nothing was done contra sententiam Dei [against the sentence of God], since divinae conditio impleta sententiae [fulfillment of the condition of the Divine sentence] 2235 had previously occurred. This restoration of rights is characterized by St. Ambrose, in general, had the same features as his predecessors. Thus, it is accompanied, first of all, by the cessation of God’s wrath against man: from the sons of wrath (irae filii), which people became after the fall, they have now again turned into sons of peace and love (filii pads et caritatis) 2236; then the venia [mercy] shown to people through the tears of the Lord is mentioned, that is, the mercy of God revealed in the forgiveness of sins 2237. It should be noted that the idea, important for Hilary, that the satisfying meaning of the suffering and Death of the Savior depended on the fact that they were suffered voluntarily, is not applied at all by Ambrose. Then, St. Ambrose differs here from his predecessors not only in the greater completeness of the disclosure of the idea common to all of them, but also in the greater consistency in its development; and this sequence gave him the opportunity to come to conclusions that we have not yet encountered in previous Western writers. The fact is that, according to St. Ambrose, Christ brought not only satisfaction, covering the past sins of mankind and restoring the latter in its previous relationship with God, but, having accomplished much more than was necessary for satisfaction, he also gained man a special favor from God. “Just as through greed (appetentiam) for the forbidden fruit a person lost gratiam [grace], so through fasting (in Christ) it was necessary to restore its power” 2238, says St. Ambrose is in full agreement with his Western predecessors. But in other cases something new is added to it. The entire earthly life of the Savior is presented in the form of a certamina passionum, that is, a series of competitions in passions, a term usually used by Western writers to designate a person’s efforts to gain merit before God. Christ accomplished a long series of works - opera. Thus, in Him, Herod was defeated by the Child (parvulus), since he triumphed in the passions of children (in passione infantium). He hungered, thirsted, suffered blows for us, endured unworthy reproaches for us, ascended to the cross, became dead for us. And with these operibus [deeds], as well as gloria et honore [glory and honor], he crowned (coronavit) the time of His Coming 2239. In Christ, then, caro omnis humani generis [the flesh of the entire human race] was honorata [glorified] 2240. St. Already had this thought about glorifying, rewarding humanity in connection with the certamen [competition] of Christ. Ambrose new. But that's not all. “How much more injuria [unrighteousness],” says our bishop, “is applied to Christ, so much more excellently (uberior) should gratia [grace] be bestowed” 2241. With Christ abundavit una coelestis corona virtutis [the crown of heavenly glory was in abundance] 2242. From here the redemptive Work of Christ receives new illumination: Ambrose is talking not only about returning man to his former grace, but also about giving him abundant grace, which he did not have even before his fall. In the work of Christ there is a difference between the restoration of that quod amissum est [what was lost] and the granting of that quod augendum est [that should have been increased] 2243; Christ came not only to restore (reformaret) naturae gratiam [the grace of nature], but also to increase (augeret), so that where sin abounded, there grace also abounded 2244. Even further. Now the very fall and sinfulness of mankind acquire the deepest teleological meaning and justification, because if man had not fallen, he would never have had that abundant grace that was given to him by Christ. Here Ambrose expresses thoughts that had never even occurred to his predecessors. Beatatiores [More blessed], he says, facit gratia, quam nostra innocentia [makes [us] grace than our innocence] 2245; fructuosior culpa, quam innocentia [guilt is more fruitful than innocence] 2246; amplius nobis profuit culpa, quam nocuit [guilt has brought us more benefit than harm] 2247. We have now quietly come to a new series of thoughts that Ambrose expresses about the redemptive Work of Christ. In them he does not mean a change in external relations, as in previous cases, but an internal religious and moral degeneration of human nature itself. Irenaeus of Lyons served as a teacher for Western writers in solving the question we posed. But not all of them adopted the latter’s views to the same extent, so in this case it is impossible to state complete unanimity between them. In our opinion, the Western writer of the pre-Nicene era who most fell under the influence of Irenaeus of Lyons was Novatian. His views on the renewal of humanity in Christ remain essentially the same as those we find in Irenaeus; they are only less developed in him than in the latter. The Word of God, uniting with man, elevated the nature of the latter and imparted to it some new properties. In Irenaeus, through union with the Word, human nature receives the properties of incorruption (incorruptio) and immortality (immortalitas) 2248; and in Novatian the Word takes on flesh, so that through the perception of flesh the Son of man could ascend to where the Word of God, the Son of God, descended; humanity accepts in him claritatem illam [this glory], which according to Divinity he had before the creation of the world 2249. Then, Irenaeus points to the adoption of humanity in Christ, through whom we adoptionem percipiamus [receive adoption] 2250; and Novatian also attaches very great importance to the fact that Christ made the Son of God one who was not him naturaliter, by nature, who could not be the Son ex natura propria [by his own nature] 2251. Subsequently, of all the Western writers, it was apparently Hilary who followed this path, who not only adopted Novatian’s ideas, but expanded and deepened them through direct acquaintance with Irenaeus and Athanasius the Great. For him, redemption is essentially the deification of man and his initiation into immortality. The Word became flesh, so that the flesh, united with the Word, proficeret in Deum Verbum 2252, would be perfected in the qualities of the Word. This is manifested, first of all, in the fact that in his flesh the universi generis humani corpus [the body of the entire human race] 2253 was sanctified; associated with this was the gift of the spirit, the fruit of which was the incorruption of the flesh: corruptio carnis [corruption of the flesh] is destroyed as a result of transformation in Dei virtutem et spiritus incorruptionem [into God's power and incorruption of the spirit] 2254. In Christ, after the destruction of corruption, God, so to speak, transfused, transformed (transfundit) man into the nature of his own immortality (in immortalitatis suae naturam) 2255. Among the further properties of the flesh renewed by Christ, Irenaeus mentions the destruction, weakening of its infirmities, which no longer manifest themselves in it with the same force as in a sinful person 2256; This property is known to Hilary, for whom the image of the destruction of the infirmities of the flesh is a bleeding woman, who, through touching Christ, received from Him the Spirit of healing 2257. Irenaeus mentions the gift of prophecy and miracles of a renewed person 2258; and according to Hilary, first of all, the potestas virtutis dominicae [the power of the Lord’s power] is transferred to the apostles, and then to all the renewed ones in general, manifesting itself, for example, in the case of their healing the sick, raising the dead, cleansing lepers, expelling demons 2259. Irenaeus captures the totality of all these changes under the general concept of the image of God, lost by man in the fall, and in Christ not only restored, but also perfected, fully realized 2260; for Hilary also through Christ in humanity consummatur imago Dei [the image of God is perfected] 2261; “those who in Adam were formed in imaginem et similitudinem Dei [in the image and likeness of God], now receive perfectam Christi imaginem et similitudinem [Christ's perfect image and likeness], having no difference virtutibus [in virtues] with their Lord; and those who were previously earthly are now becoming heavenly”; the sermon about the approach of the kingdom of heaven (Matthew 10:7) points to the realization of imaginem et similitudinem Dei [the image and likeness of God], which are now perceived in consortium veritatis [into the communion of truth] 2262. Apart from Novatian and, mainly, Hilary, we no longer find this idea of ​​​​the renewal of humanity in Christ either in Tertullian, or Cyprian, or Ambrose, and even less so in Lactantius; these writers form a special, more moderate movement in the West, which, apart from some details, resembles Irenaeus only in the very basic thought about the reality of the renewal of man in Christ. Representatives of this movement pay attention not to how the Word united with it in Christ should have influenced humanity, but to what man himself in Christ did for his own renewal; if there the renewed human nature already loses some of its human properties, then here the renewed man is still thought of as essentially human, although this also refers to some changes in man described by Irenaeus. The process of such updating is designated there by different terms. St. Cyprian knows the expression reparare [to restore] for this case. “The Father,” he says, “sent the Son so that He could reparare [restore] us, and the Son wanted to be sent and become the Son of Man in order to make us sons of God. He humbled Himself to set upright the people who had formerly lay down; was wounded to heal our wounds; served to bring those in slavery to freedom; died for the purpose of granting immortality to mortals” 2263. The changes in man apparently do not extend further. Tertullian uses for this purpose the expression reformare [to transform], which is similar in meaning. Christ was born so that by His Birth nativitatem nostram reformaret [to transform our birth], and also by His Death, having risen from the dead, He would destroy our death 2264. In other cases, Tertullian replaces the word reformare with the expression restituere, restitutio [restore, restoration], meaning by it primarily the restoration of a person in a state of immortality both in soul and body 2265. Thus, in all the listed cases, reparare, reformare, restituere actually mean the destruction of abnormalities in man caused by sin, the restoration of filial relations with God, the return of immortality lost in the act of the fall. Of all these designations, St. Ambrose most often uses reformare to define the essence of the salvation of people accomplished by Christ. In general, it does not go beyond the framework outlined by his predecessors, although still, depending on the fact that the action of sin is defined more deeply for him, it acquires a deeper physical and psychological meaning for him, and becomes a transformation in the strict and precise sense of the word. The sacrifice of Christ, on the one hand, cleansed and destroyed the sins of the world (omnes homines per passionem Christi esse purgandos), even burned them 2266, washed away the infection of ancient sin (peccati veteris) 2267. But, on the other hand, Christ nailed to the cross not only the delicta factorum, but also the cupiditates animorum 2268, that is, he not only removed responsibility for previous sins, but, having crucified the passions that lead us to sin, gave us the ability to new life. He destroyed in His body our bodily passions (passiones) 2269, extinguished the fire of lust and moderated their intensity (diversorum passionum incendia temperavit) 2270, destroyed all the vanity of the world (omnes mundi hujus vanitates) 2271. An immaculate and pure life (vita innoxia et Integra) 2272 has now become available to him, it has become possible to live in a renewed body (in corpore redivivo) 2273. However, at the same time, about the deification of the redeemed man, which we noted in Hilary, and about the perfection of the image of God in St. Ambrose has no say in this regard at all. Thus, at St. Ambrose, we can note about six separate views on the essence of the redemptive work of Christ. Now the question naturally arises as to how we should look at this parallelism and heterogeneity of concepts about salvation: do we have here a change of views that has occurred under the influence of various influences, or something completely different? This question can be answered with complete confidence in the negative, since in the interpretations of the psalms, which appeared at approximately the same time, we encounter the coexistence of both the theory of propitiationis [propitiation] and the theory of satisfactionis [satisfaction, satisfaction], as well as we discover traces of the other ideas we have characterized. This clearly shows what they all meant for St. Ambrose is of equal value. Even more than that: Ambrose seems to confuse them and, apparently, is not aware, does not try to highlight the difference between them. As the Sacrifice of the God-Man, the Sacrifice of Christ the Savior has an all-sufficient significance and extends to all humanity, to all times. After Christ, each person no longer has to make sacrifices for propitiationem suam [his own propitiation]; propitiatio [propitiation] and redemptio [redemption] of individual people (singulorum) are no longer required. This unconditional significance of the Sacrifice of Christ is explained, firstly, from its infinite greatness and value, and, secondly, from the unimportance and inconsistency in comparison with It of any other purely human sacrifice. Pretium [price] of the Blood of Christ in itself is sufficient to atone for the sins of the whole world. On the contrary, there is not a single person on earth whose blood would be sufficient for redemptionem sui [his redemption] after the priceless Blood of Christ the Savior has already been shed for everyone: no human blood can compare with the Blood of Christ. Thus, a person can only enjoy the fruits of the Sacrifice of Christ 2274. At St. Ambrose also has another very important basis that makes it possible for the actual and actual assimilation of the fruits of this Sacrifice to all people: this is the teaching of Christ as the Second Adam, as the Second and New Representative of all humanity. Actually, this theory is not new and original for him, both in its basic idea and in the main thing and in the method of its proof. Expressed in the Holy Scriptures, in the letters of the Apostle Paul (Rom. 5:14–19; 1 Cor. 15:21–22), the idea of ​​the mystical spiritual connection of Christ with all humanity is known to many ancient writers of both the East and the West, but usually it does not reach the level of a detailed and substantiated theory. Tertullian already speaks of novissimus Adam et primus [The Last Adam and the First]; he also points out a specific similarity between them in that just as the first Adam was celibate before his expulsion from paradise, so the Last Adam remained celibate forever (innuptus in totum); therefore, the last Adam is also a more perfect Adam (perfectior Adam) compared to the first 2275. However, in Tertullian there is no noticeable attempt to use this idea in detail to clarify the method of transferring the fruits of the Redemptive Sacrifice of Christ to all humanity. Of the Eastern writers we encounter this idea in a still undisclosed form, for example, in Origen; in one borrowed from him also St. Ambrose, in the place of interpretation on Psalm 48, he, speaking about Adam as the heel of all humanity, speaks in parallel about the heel of Christ: by this heel he understands all the weak and unfaithful, indicating thereby, obviously, the connection of Christ with all His followers; then, the apostles, although not yet all of humanity, are directly called by him the body of Christ - σῶμα Κυρίου 2276. A detailed disclosure of this idea was given to us by Irenaeus of Lyons and Athanasius of Alexandria; Moreover, both of them told him each of their special imprints. Irenaeus gave him the special term recapitulatio, the headship of all mankind in Christ 2277; then, the unity of Christ with humanity seems to him not generic, not generic, but completely special and exceptional: Christ the Savior in the circumstances of His earthly life reproduced, repeated to the smallest detail the life of Adam, so to speak, really became Adam and through this became in the same relationship to humanity in which the first Adam stood to him 2278. On the contrary, St. Athanasius the Great, in the spirit of Platonism, thinks of the similarity we are considering as generic, generic: “The Lord, by offering what is similar in all likes,” destroyed death, “by means of a similar body, being with all” 2279. Two great Western writers of the 4th century. we also find a detailed disclosure of this theory: it is curious that while Hilary leans more towards St. Athanasius, St. Ambrose is much closer to Irenaeus. Hilary talks about Adam primus [the first Adam] and Adam secundus [the Second Adam]; but they are placed in parallel to each other not from the specific circumstances of their lives, but only from the point of view of their most general qualities: Adam the first was formed from the earth, and Adam the Second, at the moment of taking on flesh, also descends from heaven into the depths of this earth 2280. The generic relationship between Christ and humanity appears even more clearly: “Christ took upon Himself the body universi generis humani [of the entire human race], so that just as all were created in Him through the fact that He willed to be bodily, so Himself also passed back into all through that which was invisible in Him” 2281. Christ took upon Himself naturam totius humani generis [the nature of the entire human race] 2282. Hilary tries to make this relationship between Christ and humanity clear through the same analogy that St. Afanasy. The latter, as is known, represented Christ as a vine, and believers as rods, consubstantial with Him in their bodily nature and through this consubstantiality receiving from Him resurrection and salvation 2283; for Hilary, too, Christ is the true Vine (vera vitis), and humanity is its branch (propago): “Those who, through faith in the Incarnate God, are worthy to abide in natura [in the nature] of the corporis [body] assumed by God, are purified to the extent of the eternal fruits brought by Him, since it is necessary that the propago [branch], being intra vitem [in the Vine], holds naturam verae vitis [nature true Vine]" 2284 . St. imagines the matter completely differently. Ambrose. In him we find all the main thoughts of Irenaeus, with the exception of the word recapitulatio [heading], which he apparently does not use. Christ for him is the Representative of all humanity. Just as all humanity once existed in Adam, so now it was represented by Christ, and Christ Himself personam repraesentat Adae [represents the face of Adam] 2285. Like Irenaeus, he understands this representation in the sense that Christ reproduced and represented in Himself the life of the first Adam and all humanity. Irenaeus in this sense sees in Christ the reproduction of a long series of people (longam hominum expositionem) and salvation in abbreviation (in compendio) 2286; and Ambrose applies to him expressions similar in meaning to the sum of all and part of individuals (et summa universitatis, et portio singulorum est) 2287. In most cases, both Ambrose and Irenaeus point to the same particular parallels between Christ and Adam. Thus, Irenaeus draws attention to the fact that the first man was created from virgin, uncultivated soil (ἐκ γῆς ἀνεργάστου), and Christ was born of the Virgin (ἐκ παρϑένου) 2288; and for Ambrose it matters that ex terra virgine Adam, Christus ex virgine [Adam from the virgin land, Christ from the Virgin] 2289. According to Irenaeus, just as at the beginning of creation, man was revived and created as an animal rationabile [rational being] through the mediation of a Deo aspiratio vitae [breath of life from God], so at the end the Word of the Father and the Spirit of God, uniting with man, made Him alive and perfect, having received the perfect Father, fully realizing in him imaginem et similitudinem Dei [the image and likeness of God] 2290; Ambrose, who did not share the idea of ​​the realization in the most perfect form of image and likeness only through the Incarnation, modifies Irenaeus’ parallel by indicating that the first Adam was created ad imaginem Dei [in the image of God], and in the Second the imago [image] itself was revealed; the first was therefore preferred to all irrational animals, and the second to all living 2291. In addition to these cases of more or less complete coincidence between the first Adam and the Second, our writers indicate a whole series of apparently identical circumstances of life, where one and the other act, however, in completely opposite ways. For Irenaeus, it is important that through the tree of paradise we became debtors to God and per lignum [through the tree] received remission of sin 2292; and Ambrose sees the coincidence in the fact that mors [death] came to us per arbrorem [through the tree], and vita [life] - per crucem [through the cross] 2293. Irenaeus indicates that the first man was defeated in the temptation of the devil, thereby bringing death upon himself, and Christ, on the contrary, won, giving us the opportunity to return to life 2294, and for Ambrose it is important that in deserto [in the desert] there was Adam and in deserto Christus [in the desert Christ] 2295, but only victus est Adam [Adam was defeated], while Christ vicit [won] 2296. According to Irenaeus, Adam was expelled from paradise, while the Incarnate Word brought man into communion with God 2297; and for Ambrose, Adam the first is expelled from paradise into the desert, and Adam Second from the desert returns to paradise 2298. For Irenaeus, it is especially important that Christ corrected the first man’s disobedience regarding the tree by obedience on the tree 2299, that Christ covered our disobedience with His obedience 2300. St. Ambrose attaches no less importance to this. “Since guilt crept in through disobedience, when the Divine commandments were violated, obedientiam [obedience] had to be restored (reformare) first of all, in order to destroy the breeding ground of error” 2301. “Through the inheritance of obedientiae [obedience] poured into us, the cause of eternal salvation was to be created for us, for whom previously, through inobedientiae haereditatem primus ille Adam [the inheritance of disobedience, that first Adam] became the cause of death” 2302. Therefore, “and the Lord came quasi obediens [in obedience] to break the rope inobedientiae et praevaricationis humanae [disobedience and hypocrisy of man]; so that just as sin entered per inobedientiam [through disobedience], so exactly per obedientiam [through obedience] it was destroyed” 2303. By virtue of all of the above, Christ, according to Irenaeus, became the beginning of the living, just as Adam was the beginning of those dying 2304; and for Ambrose the primitiae mortis [the firstfruits of death] are in Adam [in Adam], while the primitiae resurrectionis in Christo [the firstfruits of the resurrection are in Christ] 2305. Hence St. Ambrose speaks of the haeres [heir] of Adam and the haeres [heir] of Christ: “Formerly we were heirs of sin, but now we have all become heirs of Christ. The first inheritance was the inheritance of crimes, and the second is the virtutis haereditas [heritage of virtue]; this connected us, and this allowed us; the first condemned us, burdened with debt, to the enemy, and the second won us to Christ, redeemed by the honor of the Lord's Passion. The evil inheritance of Eve devoured the whole man, the glorious haereditas [heritage] of Christ liberated the totum hominem [the whole man]" 2306. Man becomes a real participant in this heritage in the Church founded by Christ on earth. The teaching of St. Ambrose on the Church should attract special attention of the researcher in view of its features, which acquired very great importance in the history of Western dogma of subsequent times. In some cases, it is true, he clings quite tightly to the old Western tradition; and below, as far as possible, we will have to note all these points of contact. But he already thinks of the Church not only as an external strictly organized institution, once forever established by God and then must exist unchanged, but to a much greater extent as an internal phenomenon, gradually revealing itself and realizing itself in the world throughout the entire time of its existence; Of the various factors under the influence of which this idea was formed, we will have to attribute almost primary importance to the influence of the Alexandrians. Then the concept of the Church is first revealed by our author in the opposition of two concepts - civitas Dei [city of God] and civitas terrena [city of the earth]. Here we must admit that the historical roots of these latter concepts are not entirely clear. For us, first of all, it is certain that the concept of civitas in the sense in which it is used here has nothing in common with the concept of civitas of ancient Roman law: there civitas, like jus civile [civil law], has a rather narrow national meaning 2307 1, and the Romans themselves (cives Romani) are full citizens in this state, in contrast to all other nationalities conquered by the empire who were not considered cives [citizens], and called peregrini and latini 2308; here, among church writers, on the contrary, the concept of civitas acquires a very broad world meaning, uniting in itself all the various individual states and nationalities, and the citizenship of its members does not depend in the least on their relationship to the Roman civitas and jus civile. We know of two more sources from which we could try to explain the origin of the concepts we are considering. The first of them is Stoicism, which, with its cosmopolitan tendencies, already greatly expands the concept of civitas, πόλις and recognizes only its sage as a true citizen. From them, the concept of πόλις interpreted in this way passes to Philo, in whose eyes the innocent primordial man was a real cosmopolitan, and the whole world served as his home and state (οἶκος and πόλις) 2309; sometimes πόλις is identified with virtue, of which only the wise can be citizens, while all evil are expelled from it 2310. Under the influence of Judaism, the Stoic concept of πόλις in the same Philo is already undergoing a rather significant modification: for him, the Jews themselves are the true citizens, to the extent that, thanks to the precepts of the Mosaic Law, they could become true sages and free from errors and passions 2311. Of the Christian writers, the concept of πόλις is very often used by Clement of Alexandria, and in approximately the same sense as the Stoics and Philo, but with the peculiarity that he associates true citizenship with life in heaven: “From earthly pedagogy, a person passes to the state of citizenship in heaven, receiving there the Father, about whom he learned on earth” 2312. But so that what is found in St. Ambrose and other Western writers, the concept of civitas was borrowed from this source, it is very doubtful in view of the fact that they identify it with the concept of the Church and, as we will see below, almost constantly develops in connection with the concept of “Zion and Jerusalem”, which, of course, could not yet be the case with the writers we have considered. Another source that we can still bring to consideration in this case is the purely Jewish and Christian tradition of the first centuries. In the same Clement, the Stoic concept is already combined with another: the true city, he says with direct reference to the Stoics, is only heaven, since all earthly cities cannot be called true cities 2313, but he immediately identifies this heavenly city with Jerusalem, of course, also heavenly and the Church of the Logos (ἡ Ἐκκλησία ὑπὸ Λόγου) 2314 . The historical genesis of these concepts can be presented in this form. The object of the most ardent desires of every devout Jew was the holy city, earthly Jerusalem, around which the entire religious life of the Jewish people was concentrated. Particularly keen interest in it is aroused in Jewish chiliastic literature of the last centuries before the Coming of the Savior: the difficult political situation of St. city ​​forced the faithful Jews to place all their hopes on the Messiah promised by God, who would appear in the world in the form of a conquering king, restore the holy city to its former splendor and glory, destroy and conquer its current enemies and oppressors, and even grant it dominion over the entire world and humanity. Thus, even on Jewish soil, the idea of ​​the global significance of the holy city of Jerusalem, Zion, developed. Sometimes these ideas in Jewish apocalyptic literature are combined with others: in the place of the former earthly Jerusalem, in accordance with the splendor and significance of the restored Kingdom of Israel, the Messiah will lay the new heavenly Jerusalem brought down from heaven by Him 2315. For the Christian consciousness, such a city was the Church remaining on earth after Christ, to which all the predicates that were previously attached to the kingdom of the Messiah were transferred. This identification of the holy city of Jerusalem with the Church was all the more natural and understandable because it has for itself the authority of Holy Scripture. Thus, the Epistle to the Hebrews represents the acceptance of Christianity under the image of approaching Mount Zion and the city of God: You are approaching Mount Zion and the city of the Living God, the heavenly Jerusalem and the host of angels, the triumph and the Church of the firstborn, etc. (Heb. 12:22–23). Then these images passed on to ancient church writers, as we already observed in Clement, and, in particular, they found a sympathetic attitude in Christian chiliastic literature. According to the idea, for example, of Irenaeus, to reign together with Christ in the land of the saints, after the renewal of heaven and earth, the new Heavenly Jerusalem will descend to earth (novam superiorem Jerusalem ait Domini discipulus Joannes descendere); the name of the city of 2316 is also applied to this future kingdom. Apparently, the concept of civitas that interests us has its historical roots in this idea, although, of course, it is not possible to completely identify them. All the most important elements that make up the contemplation of St. Ambrose about the Church as the city of God existed in the church consciousness long before him, and in particular among some ancient Western writers. Taking advantage of them, in some cases he slightly modified them, and, in addition, in contrast to the concept of an ecclesiastical or heavenly city, he again created the idea of ​​a civitas terrena [earthly city]. This application of civitas to the whole world, which is little consistent with the concepts of Roman law, is sufficiently explained from the political situation of that era. The importance that barbarians acquired in the empire in this era was supposed to turn previous ideas about the state upside down; the legal barriers of earlier times gradually collapsed and all nationalities had to dissolve into a single state. Then the Roman political organization, quite shaken, had to face the ever-increasing power of a new organization, the Church, which had the power to embrace all nationalities and for which the previous division of the subject into citizens and non-citizens had no meaning; The Church could distinguish only those who had already managed to enter it, and those who still continued to remain outside its borders as a force alien and sometimes hostile to it; all other differences could no longer have any meaning for her. She considered the totality of all members of the first kind to be her own citizens, while everyone actually or only in spirit alien to her was interpreted by her as members of a special earthly state. After these general remarks, let us turn to the details. St. Ambrose distinguishes from the Church, as the state of God, the earthly state, civitas terrena. By this concept he does not mean any specific political organization, nor paganism in general; the concept in question has an exclusively moral meaning in his eyes and serves to designate the world in general, the sin reigning in it, living its own natural life as a person. The Christian must leave de hac terrena civitate [this earthly city], because his civitas [city] is superior Hierusalem [higher Jerusalem]. That is why Christ came out de civitate [from the city] and suffered outside the city gates, so that we, having left de hoc mundo [from this world], could live supra mundum [above the world]. In the same way, the Jewish tabernacle stood outside the camp, and the bodies of animals sacrificed for the sins of the people were also burned outside the camp, after their blood was offered up on the altar; because no one, living in the vices of this world, is saved, and his blood is not accepted by God, unless he first frees himself from the uncleanness of the body (de corporis inquinamento) 2317. Sometimes this world, due to the power of sin operating in it, is called the kingdom of sin (regnum peccati) 2318, a place of evil, a workshop of wickedness (locus malitiae, officina improbitatis) 2319. Insofar as the main culprit of sin in the world is the devil, the sinful world stands in the closest relationship to him; Moreover, just as the entire body of believers forms the one Body of Christ, so the devil, together with the members of this world faithful to him, form one organism 2320: each individual sinner is a portio diaboli [part of the devil] 2321, then there are membra diaboli [members of the devil] 2322, and all together they form the corpus draconis [the body of the serpent] 2323. As for the Church, as the opposite of this city, Western writers, probably as an echo of chiliasm, have long shown a tendency to apply to it the concept of civitas and often with the addition of the word Hierusalem [Jerusalem]. The author of the book "De montibus Sina et Sion" ["On Mounts Sinai and Zion"] speaks of Hierusalem de coelo descendentem [Jerusalem descending from heaven] as hanc civitatem sanctam et novam [this holy and new city], meaning in this case the spiritual Church (spiritalis Ecclesia) 2324. The author of the work “De Pascha computus” [“On the calculation of Easter”] also knows civitatem, id est Ecclesiam [city, that is, the Church] 2325. What is characteristic of both is that although civitas is identified with the earthly Church, it is only from its invisible, spiritual side; then, they simply talk about civitas [city]. Ambrose began to attribute even greater significance to these ideas than had been done before. By identifying the Church with the city, he already speaks of civitas Dei [city of God] 2326. First of all and mainly he means here the heavenly Church and speaks of Hierusalem in coelo [Jerusalem in heaven] 2327, civitas in coelo [city in heaven] 2328, filia Sion civitas ilia Hierusalem, quae in coelo est [daughters of Zion that city Jerusalem, which is in heaven] 2329, coelestis civitas [heavenly city] 2330. The distinctive feature of this heavenly city, in contrast to the earthly Church, lies in its absolute perfection and moral purity: civitas Hierusalem, quae in coelo [the city of Jerusalem, which is in heaven], is perfecta [perfect] and immaculata [pure]; nothing unclean (immundum) 2331 can enter it. Its members are, first of all, all the heavenly powers 2332. It also includes people after their death, although not all to the same extent. Thus, some of them, the most perfect, begin to enjoy all its benefits immediately after death; this is stated by St. Ambrose, for example, regarding Acholy of Thessaloniki, who immediately after his death became superiorum incola [inhabitant of the highest], the owner of the civitatis aeternae illius Hierusalem, quae in coelo est [that eternal city of Jerusalem which is in heaven]. In a purely chiliastic spirit, the bishop describes the position of Acholy at this moment: the latter is already contemplating the immense size (mensuram immensam) of the city, pure gold, precious stones, continuous light without the sun; although he had already known about this before, while still living on earth, nevertheless, only now everything appeared before him facie ad faciem [face to face] 2333. Others, after death, only partially begin to participate in the heavenly city; this participation will become finally perfect for them only when everyone is resurrected in incorruption, honor and glory and is worthy to see Dei faciem [the face of God] 2334. The character of this heavenly city and the benefits associated with belonging to it are depicted by our bishop in different ways. Civitas in coelo [city of heaven] is characterized by the fullness of grace: the grace of the Holy Spirit, with which we are now saturated only in small sips (brevi haustu), there flows more abundantly (redundantius) and seethes (fervens) with a full stream of seven spiritual forces (virtutum spiritalium) 2335. Apparently connected with this is a chiliastic feature - the idea of ​​the heavenly Jerusalem as a state of peace (pads) and tranquility (tranquillitatis) 2336. Finally, in the concept of the heavenly city we encounter a feature that reminds us of Origen. The latter very often reveals the idea of ​​the future life as a time of complete revelation of all religious secrets; then the saints will fully comprehend the eternal truths and Divine institutions in their true essence without any external form or image; in contrast to the knowledge given in the law and the Gospel, this future revelation of all mysteries constitutes “the so-called eternal Gospel and Testament, always new and never decaying” 2337. St. also expects the same from life in the heavenly city. Ambrose. “There is a civitas ilia Hierusalem in coelo [that city Jerusalem in heaven], in which abound interpreters of the Divine law (divinae legis interpretes) and experts in instruction (disciplinae periti); through them the Verbum Dei [Word of God] is found” 2338. “Now we walk in imagine [in image], we see in imagine [in image]; Then we will begin to see facie ad faciem [face to face], when there will be complete perfectio [perfection], because every perfectio [perfection] consists in truth (in veritate)” 2339. Relatively less often, St. Ambrose speaks of civitas Dei [city of God] in relation to the earthly Church. He knows in this sense about civitas Hierusalem, quae nunc videtur in terris [the city of Jerusalem, which now exists on earth] 2340. There is no doubt that in this case he, like his predecessors, has in mind the invisible spiritual side of the earthly Church. This is evident from the fact that, in his opinion, one can become a resident on earth (incola) of the illius civitatis supernae [of that highest city] solely by one’s morals (moribus), raising one’s thoughts to heaven 2341. Then, the word Hierusalem [Jerusalem] in a mystical sense is used by him to actually designate a peaceful soul (animam pacificam) 2342. However, at St. Ambrose there is not yet a hint that on earth one could become a member of this mystical Jerusalem, apart from the visible earthly Church and independently of it. The only thing that is essentially new in Ambrose compared to the ancient Western writers is the idea that the civitas Dei [city of God], both in its heavenly part and in its earthly half, although invisible in nature, does not arise immediately, but is realized only more gradually. Although the Church in its idea is eternal, as far as et Ecclesia erat, et sancti erant praedestinati ante saecula [and the Church and the saints were predestined before the age] 2343, but initially it was hidden, so that then at a time predetermined by God it would appear outwardly: in praedestinatione Dei [in the predestination of God] the Church existed semper [always], so that when it follows It was divine decree to break through (prorumpere), but by the will of God it was preserved until a certain time (certo reservatam tempori) 2344. The beginning of its actual discovery on earth dates back to the time of the first people’s stay in paradise 2345. Then the circle of its members begins to expand, but in such a way that the gratia [grace] of the Church, from the very beginning of the world, flourished only in the saints (in sanctis) and only recently has it spread among the people (se diffudit in populos) 2346. The entire Old Testament history is essentially the history of the gradual creation of the Church on earth. It is for this purpose that patriarchs, prophets, and the Archangel Gabriel are sent, but it was actually only Christ who founded it in the sacrament of his Incarnation 2347. From the images to designate the Church of St. Ambrose uses the image of the biblical Deborah, who defeated the Canaanite military leader Sisera (Judges 4:11–15); in this case, she mystice [mystically] revealed to us the emergence of the Church, which had to rise from the pagans, to which belongs the triumph over the spiritual Sisera, that is, over the opposing authorities (de adversariis potestatibus) 2348. Another image of the Church is for him our ancestor Eve, mater omnium viventium [mother of all living], just as the Church is the mother of the living 2349. Sometimes he calls her a virgin (virgo) for her purity and innocence 2350, married (nupta) due to her close relationship with Christ, a widow (vidua) 2351, probably because she no longer has a Groom for herself on earth 2352. Finally, in Ambrose we also find something quite common among church writers and, by the way, among St. Cyprian 2353 calling the Church the house of God: The Church is the house of God, the stones of which are all believers, and the walls are individual communities of believers 2354. The most typical teaching about the Church in the West was, of course, the teaching of St. Cyprian. In the depiction of more particular predicates of the Church of St. Ambrose only occasionally agrees with him, and in most cases he goes the completely opposite route; but these points of contact do not concern the most characteristic ideas of the Carthaginian father, so that about his influence on St. There is no need for Ambrose to speak. Among these points of contact we must first of all include the concept of the catholicity of the Church. The term catholicus [catholic], Ecclesia catholica [Catholic Church], used by Cyprian, is also found in Ambrose; Cyprian associates with this term the concept of the unity and indivisibility of the Church 2355, and Ambrose designates with it a single church assembly from representatives of different countries and nationalities 2356. The connection of believers with Christ that forms the Church embraces, in his view, all rational creation, because all rational creation spiritually lives by the grace of Christ, and by the power of the Holy Spirit sent by Him to complete His Work. Christ is everything and in everything. Hence the Church is called heaven, the kingdom of heaven, because it has in its depths saints who are compared to angels and archangels, and the angels themselves. It is also called the world, because the earthly members also belong to it. As consisting of earthly members, the Church fills the entire earth, the entire orbis terrarum [(entire) universe], contains within itself the assembly of peoples (congregationem gentium), not distinguishing between Jew and Greek, nor between barbarian and Scythian, nor between slave and free 2357. On the other hand, the Church of Christ is also limitless in terms of the time of its existence: existing from eternity in Divine predestination, it has to exist at all times and is a permanent and eternal kingdom 2358. At St. Cyprian very persistently holds out the idea of ​​the absolute necessity of the Church, as an external organization, for the salvation of every person: there can be no salvation (salus) anywhere except in the Church 2359; whoever is outside the Church does not even deserve the name of Christian 2360; the greatest religious feats, for example, martyrdom, since they were committed outside the Church, cannot have any significance 2361. The idea that a person can reach heaven exclusively through the earthly Church is also very important for St. Ambrose. “One must beware,” he says, “that anyone, having once been received by Christ through baptism, is not separated from His Body, that is, cast out from the Church (ne excutiatur ab Ecclesia), for this is tantamount to perpetual death (mortis perpetuae)” 2362. “Whoever separates himself from the holy altar (a sacris altaribus) finds himself gone into a foreign land, like the prodigal son; because it means being separated from Jerusalem, which exists in heaven, or, so to speak, from the full and close abode of the saints (civico quodam et domestico sanctorum domicilio)” 2363. Therefore, the meetings of heretics and schismatics, as separated a regno Dei [from the kingdom of God] and ab Ecclesia [from the Church], are meetings not of God, but of the unclean spirit 2364. From time immemorial, its holiness was recognized as an integral predicate of the Church. But it had the meaning that the Church is holy only in its idea and because its goal is to lead people to holiness; but therefore it is precisely she who must tolerate sinful members in her midst. In this sense, Pope Callixtus compares the Church with Noah's Ark, in which clean animals were found together with unclean ones 2365. What St. Cyprian was completely in agreement with this; this is clearly evidenced by his attitude towards Novatian’s schism. His concept of the Church as an institution established for the salvation of people also convinces of the same; We also find Callixtus’ comparison of the Church with Noah’s Ark 2366. And according to Ambrose, both saints and sinners equally belong to the earthly Church, whom it must lead to salvation. A member of the Church either should not know sin at all, or, if he sins, he should stop sinning 2367. It consists of omnibus [all], forming the flock of Christ (Christi grex): some of its members graze with fodder, while others are fed with milk; they must beware of wolves hiding in sheep's clothing, taking on the guise of abstinence, but in fact capable of arousing only the abomination of intemperance 2368. In it there is not only the success of the strong, but also the fall of the weak (infirmorum lapsus) 2369. In two books about repentance, St. Ambrose especially vehemently rebelled against Novatian and his supporters, who understood the Church in the sense of a society exclusively of saints and did not allow leniency for human weaknesses. He prayerfully asks Christ to turn to everyone (ad universos), to gather the good and the bad, the lame, the blind and the deaf, in order to fill his house with all of them 2370. The Church must tolerate sinful members in its bosom; this is required by the concept of it as a Body. The Church is the organism or Body of Christ; but just as a body consists of members of different importance and activity and for all that remains one body, so that each of its members uses the help of others, and if one suffers, all the others suffer, so in the church body each member, no matter how small and insignificant it may be, is necessary for the entire church body; everyone must sympathize and serve each other, and if it is hard for the body to lose one member, then how much harder for the Church to lose one person! If through the removal of one member the whole body is upset, then in the same way through neglect of each individual person the integrity of the church assembly (sanctae Ecclesiae congregatio) 2371 is also upset. With all this, in some of the most difficult cases the Church needs to cut off sinful members; This cutting should only be done with great care. It is not accomplished by itself in the very fact of the Fall, but through the mediation of the ministers of the Church: like a good doctor (bonus medicus), the shepherd of the Church must remove from the whole body of the Church every serious ulcer so that the infection does not spread wider 2372. But this excommunication from the community of believers is for St. Ambrose is significant not as a complete removal and oblivion of sinful members, but as a means of protecting believers from danger to the whole society (totam massam) and, on the other hand, as an incentive for the sinner to reform (ut spiritum ejus salvum faceret); it is produced ad expurgandum, for the purpose of purification, since what is to be purified is not recognized as completely useless, but not ad projiciendum, not for complete removal, when nothing useful is recognized in what is thrown away. Excommunication, or sequestratio [separation], has the meaning that it makes it possible to subsequently return the sinner to the sacraments and thus constantly keep intact the entire church body 2373. That is why one who has been excommunicated should be accepted back into church communion only with extreme caution and in any case after he has discovered the real fruits of correction. The Church, of course, must show mercy (misereri decet), but she must also observe the form of justice (forma justitiae); being careful that someone removed from participation in communion, after a short and slight repentance or even stronger contrition, does not easily wrest from the priest communion, which should be sought only after a more or less long time. Is it possible that if a priest shows leniency to an unworthy person, does he not thereby attract many to the infection of the fall? Gentleness in showing mercy serves as an incentive to sin 2374. That's almost all that is in the teaching of St. Ambrose about the Church can still remind us somewhat of Cyprian. In the future, we see a significant difference between them in the fact that whereas for St. Cyprian The Church has a main significance as an external institution established by God for the salvation of mankind, in the teaching of St. For Ambrose, this side hardly appears at all, and by the Church he means a more internal organism, the mystical connection of believers with Christ. We should not be at all surprised by this, since this feature has never remained completely alien to Western theology, and in the previous pre-Cyprian time it was even dominant. Tertullian himself distinguishes the Church as numerus episcoporum [the number of bishops], and the Church as Ecclesia Spiritus [Church of the Spirit], that is, as a manifestation of the Spirit that exists per spiritualem hominem [through the spiritual man] 2375; in the same way, the Church is conceived by him as the spiritual body of the Holy Trinity 2376. And at St. Cyprian is also almost constantly associated with the concept of the Church as an external institution, the idea of ​​it as the internal unity of believers with Christ, as the indivisible mystical Body of Christ: he constantly speaks of unitas corporis [unity of the body] 2377, of consentientis populi corpus unum [one body of a unanimous people], of corporis unitatem concordiae [unity of the body in agreement] 2378. Pseudo-Cyprian speaks of Ecclesiam sanctam [the holy Church], as of the mysticum Christi corpus [mystical Body of Christ], without communion with which there is non est salus [there is no salvation] 2379; Christ Himself is caput Ecclesiae [Head of the Church], as Imprecise Principle and Efficient Cause corporis ac membrorum ipsius [of its body and members] 2380. It is this ancient Western feature in the idea of ​​the Church that St. receives. Ambrose's exceptional development to the detriment of the concept of an outwardly visible Church. This circumstance can hardly be explained by random literary influences alone, since, as we have already had occasion to talk about this more than once, St. Ambrose very systematically bypasses the external church organization; rather, it suited his personal tastes. Then, in addition to the fact that he spent his life before occupying the episcopal see under the influence of completely extraneous traditions, he could also be influenced by the circumstances of the time: in the Arian era, when the external organization of the Church did not prevent the emergence of the most heated debates on the most important issues of the Christian faith, it was natural to see the guarantee of truth and the most significant sign of the Church in its internal solidarity and cohesion: Ambrose himself observed the strength of this cohesion in his flock during his repeated clashes with heretics and civil authorities. Be that as it may, the Church, first of all, for Ambrose, is the Body of Christ. The image of this Church was already given in paradise in our first parents and in the fact of the creation of the first woman from the rib of her husband. The union (copula) of Adam and Eve was a great sacrament (sacramentum magnum) into Christ and the Church; for it is known that just as Eve was bone of the bones of her husband and flesh of his flesh, so we are members (membra) of the corporis Christi [the body of Christ], bone of bones and flesh of His flesh 2381. The totum corpus Ecclesiae [the entire body of the Church] embraces all believers in general, not only those existing on earth, but also those who have ever existed on it. Here St. Ambrose distinguishes first of all between the higher members (membra superiora), the saints who have already achieved their rest in heaven, and the members who are still just toiling on earth (membris unius corporis laborantibus); There is still a spiritual connection between the two, to the extent that the former sigh and sympathize with the latter 2382. The earthly members, in turn, have different meanings and dignity. Very picturesque and detailed St. Ambrose characterizes their position in the whole church organism: “We all constitute the unum corpus Christi [one body of Christ], the Head of which is God, and we serve as its other members: among the latter there are eyes (oculi), such as the prophets; there are teeth (dentes), like the apostles, who poured the blood of the Gospel preaching into our insides... the hands (manus) of this body are those who are engaged in doing good deeds (bonorum operum); there is also a womb (venter), which is formed by believers who give the poor strength to exist; some are legs (pedes), and even lower than them are members that have the meaning of heels (calcaneum)” 2383. Sometimes, in accordance with the fact that Eve was created from the rib of Adam, the life of the Church (vita Ecclesiae) is represented under the image of the rib of Christ (costa Christi), which came out of Christ without diminishing His Body, for this costa is not bodily (non corporalis), but spiritual (spiritalis), but the spirit cannot be divided 2384. Ordinary members of the Church are also simply called her entrails (nos ergo viscera Ecclesiae sumus), as her members are flesh of her flesh and bone of her bones 2385. As a body, the Church must be a closely knit unity. One of the most important foundations of this unity in the West since the time of St. Cyprian considered the unity and indivisibility of the church episcopate. “There is only one bishop,” says St. Cyprian - and each of the bishops participates integrally in it; the Church is also one, which, with the increase in fertility, expanding, is split into many” 2386. “The Church is founded on bishops (super episcopos) and every action of the Church is controlled through the same rulers” 2387. “The Ecclesia [Church] is the plebs [people], united to the bishop (sacerdoti adunata), and the flock attached to its shepherd” 2388. At St. Ambrose, we not only do not encounter this argument, but in his idea of ​​the Church as a Body, the hierarchical feature is almost completely absent. It is not the hierarchy, but precisely the sancta plebs [holy people] that comes first for him. “Where the Ecclesia [Church] is,” he says, “there is the populus gravis [numbered people]” 2389. It is not so much that the people are made dependent on the hierarchy, but just the opposite. St. Ambrose calls his flock, considered as a whole, even his parent, who gave birth to him by election to the priesthood, and only arrogates to himself the right to call each of the members of the flock individually his son 2390. Due to such outstanding significance in the Church of the people, every repentant needs his protection; he receives forgiveness of sins because the whole people prays for him, just as, seeing the tears of many of the people, the Lord raised the son of the widow of Nain 2391. Another basis for church unity in the West, by the way, according to the same Cyprian, is the unity of God, Christ, faith 2392; importance was also attached here to the love and unity of believers among themselves: dilectionis et caritatis foedera [union of love and mercy] 2393 is obligatory for members of the Church. This kind of argumentation by St. Ambrose attaches extremely great importance. Despite all the diversity of its members and its spread throughout the universe, the Church is one in its essence. It is one because it is headed by the same God and Jesus Christ. Just as by unity of essence the Father, Son and Holy Spirit belong to unitas potestatis [unity of power], so Their kingdom is one 2394 and inseparable in itself 2395. The unity and indivisibility of the Church is primarily determined, therefore, by the unity and indivisibility of the Holy Trinity operating in it 2396. Then, if we begin to consider the Church from the side of the believers who compose it, then its unity turns out to be conditioned by the unity of the threads connecting them and, in particular, by the unity of faith. Faith is the foundation of the Church 2397 ; the teaching of faith is the leaven by which the life of the Church is maintained 2398. Only those who preserve the teachings of the faith in correctness and integrity belong to the Church. On the contrary, heretics and Jews, who do not have Christ among them, remain outside the Church and cannot be in communion with believers 2399. Any Church or any society that rejects the true faith and does not recognize the foundations of the apostolic preaching is cut off from the common church body 2400. The second connecting thread is love (caritas); St. Ambrose describes it much more vividly and puts forward it more strongly than Cyprian, and understands it primarily in the sense of unity with Christ, and not unanimity between people, as in Cyprian. The concept of caritas [love] for him usually appears in connection with the idea of ​​the mystical unity of the believing soul with the Logos. Here the matter was probably not without the influence of Origen. As is known, the relationship of the bride and groom depicted in the Book of Song of Songs, bound together by strong bonds of the most intimate love, was first interpreted by Origen in the sense of the individual mysterious communication of the Logos, who appeared in Christ, with the soul in the likeness of His relationship to the Church. According to a more private meaning of this interpretation, the marriage relationship between Christ and the human soul is expressed in the fact that, having loved the soul, Christ draws it to heaven, to Himself, arousing mutual love in it 2401; as the beloved of the Divine Bridegroom, the soul is constantly in His palace, remaining in the most inextricable unity with Him, acquiring inner beauty, moral perfection, and being cleansed from all vice 2402. To what extent exactly does St. Ambrose used the works of Origen for his own purposes, it is difficult to judge, since the fragments of two Origen commentaries on the Book of Songs that have survived to this day, in all likelihood, represent only part of what actually came from the pen of Origen 2403. However, in their present form, these fragments make it possible to answer positively that Ambrose drew his idea of ​​caritas [love] as the essence and basis of church unity precisely from them. This is confirmed not only by the identity in the main explanation of the Book of Song of Songs, which formed the basis of Ambrose’s work “De Isaac vel anima” [“On Isaac and the Soul”], but also by the agreement between them in some minor details; so, for example, like Origen, the expression of the bride: “your caresses are better than wine” (Song. 1:1) of St. Ambrose understands in the sense of indicating Divine Wisdom and the heavenly sacraments 2404. Only this eastern thought, associated with the Book of Song of Songs, seemed to receive more mysticism and subjectivism from Ambrose: “It acquired from him,” as Harnack put it, “a special coloring, as a result of the depth of the heart of a great man and his ability to give a warm expression of his personal love for Christ” 2405. And it is precisely in this sense of individual communion in love with Christ that St. Ambrose applies to the Church the previously mentioned image of husband and wife and marital relations between them 2406. “The Ecclesia [Church], which loves Christ, is wounded by love (vulnerata est caritate); and Christ arouses and resurrects this love (caritatem) in her until she hears His voice and feels His presence, because He not only comes to those who seek Christ, but comes with joy” 2407. “The Ecclesia [Church] is the Body of Christ, which is held together by the bonds of caritatis [love]; The crime of the Jews against Christ actually lies in the fact that they destroyed every connection of caritatis [love]” 2408. As in justifying the unity of the church body of St. Ambrose differs very noticeably from Cyprian, as he does not agree with him in his views on the conditions for the destruction of this unity. In addition to the violation of the other listed conditions of unity, Cyprian here attributes the main significance to the break with the bishop, disobedience to the bishop. The bishop exists in the Church and the Church in the bishop, and whoever is not with the bishop is not in the Church 2409; he cannot be with Christ who acts against the bishops 2410; heresies and schisms arise precisely from the unwillingness to obey the bishops 2411. St. Ambrose, on the contrary, instead of this hierarchical sign everywhere points to the perversion of faith and moral impurity of the members of the Church. “De civitate Dei [from the city of God] the worker of iniquity (iniquitatis) is driven out. Civitas Dei Ecclesia est [the city of God is the Church], a Ecclesia corpus est Christi [the Church is the Body of Christ]. Therefore, anyone who desecrates the rights of the heavenly civitatis [city] and defiles the holiness of the immaculate body (immaculati corporis) with the impurity of his vices sins against heaven (in coelum). Christ precisely loved the Church for her holiness and immaculateness (sancta, immaculata, sine ruga) 2413. Therefore, zeal and thoroughness in life 2414 are required of every candidate for the Church. The gates of the Church, invincible from hell, are considered to be inner purity and truthfulness 2415; persistence in sins (pertinacia delictorum), the dominance of sin (dominatum peccati) in a person pulls him out of the Church and pushes him into the gates of hell 2416. The only thing that we can still discover in the teaching about the Church in Ambrose, a writer of the Western Church, is to some extent his attitude towards the personality of St. Apostle Peter. True, he does not draw any conclusions from this regarding the Roman bishop, recognized as the successor of the Apostle Peter; he does not talk about any prerogatives of the Roman bishop and the Roman Church over other bishops and local Churches. Likewise, regarding the personality of the Apostle Peter himself, Ambrose, unlike Callixtus, does not interpret Matthew 16:18 et seq. in the Roman Catholic sense. 2417; by the rock on which the Church is built, he means not so much the Apostle Peter, but generally every believer, his faith, actions, mood (mens) 2418. He also, apparently, does not know, or he does not attach any importance to the view of the Apostle Peter Cyprian as an image of church unity: “In order to show the unity (of the Church), the Lord was pleased to begin this unity from the very beginning” 2419. However, at St. Ambrose, we encounter many expressions that seem to suggest a special position of the Apostle Peter among the other apostles and in the Church. The Apostle Peter, says Ambrose, had all the faith (omnem fidem), for which he received the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, in order to open the entrance to others, but who these others are, whether only the apostles or all believers in general, he does not say; a few lines above, he mentions that the Lord demanded considerable faith from all the apostles (neque mediocrem fidem Dominus exigit ab apostolis) 2420. Then St. Ambrose sometimes expresses that the Apostle Peter is preferred to everyone (omnibus antefertur) 2421, that, as the more perfect, Christ entrusted him with ruling the more perfect (perfectiores) 2422, that where Peter is, there is the Church, since Peter opened heaven and closed the underworld 2423; in the Apostle Peter was the support of the Church (esset Ecclesiae firmamentum) 2424. But, undoubtedly, in all the listed cases there is still no talk of any special position and rights of the Apostle Peter in the Church. This is how St. Ambrose, when he speaks only about one Apostle Peter, without touching on his relationship to the other apostles. If he has to talk about the Apostle Peter together with the other apostles, then he calls all of them, without exalting one above the others, equally the pillars (calumnae) on which the holy Church is founded 2425; Likewise, speaking about other famous apostles, for example, about the Apostle Paul, without touching on the personality of the Apostle Peter, he mentions the abundance of his ministry and grace (ejus exuberat portio), his superiority (praecellit Paulus) 2426. True, the Apostle Peter bound himself with the threefold spirit of Divine love 2427, but this still did not create any special rights for him. The Lord promised invincibility through the gates of hell not to the Apostle Peter himself personally, but to his confession of faith 2428; but the apostle expressed this confession of faith not only on his own behalf, but also on behalf of the rest of the apostles 2429; and therefore the primacy of the Apostle Peter was a primacy in the confession of faith, but not a primacy of degree and even honor (primatum confessionis, non honoris, non ordinis) 2430. The teaching of Ambrose about the Church, set out in such terms, should be considered characteristic in general for Western writers of the 4th century; except St. Ambrose, we meet him in almost the same form in Hilary. Instead of a hierarchical concept of the Church, the latter also has a concept of it as a body, and to express it, Hilary uses the same concepts that we find in Ambrose. Christians “before the establishment of the world were chosen in Christi corpore [in the Body of Christ], and the Ecclesia [Church] is corpus Christi [the Body of Christ] ... and civitas [city] built on a mountain,” that is, built on the Body of Christ, symbolized in Scripture under the name of a mountain 2431; this city (civitas) embraces not only people, but also angels, since close communication is established between both. However, to illustrate the relationship of St. Ambrose to Hilary, it is necessary to note those features that in this case noticeably separate them. Firstly, Hilary relates the biblical expressions about the City and Jerusalem for the most part to the flesh of Christ and only mediocrely applies them to the Church, as based on this flesh. Zion is the corpus Christi [Body of Christ], in which we are transformed from enemies into reconciled ones, and from lost ones become newly won 2433 . Verbum Dei [the Word of God] became caro [flesh], and this caro [flesh] is et Sion et Jerusalem [and Zion and Jerusalem], civitas novae pads [city of the new world] and our guard (speculatorium nostrum) 2434. At St. Ambrose, we noted the application of the concept Hierusalem [Jerusalem] to the believing soul, to the Church, but we did not see its application to the Body of Christ at all. Secondly, while in Ambrose people are thought of as the Body of Christ by virtue of caritatis [love] connecting them with Christ, Hilary, apparently, reveals the idea of ​​the Church as a Body, in close connection with the doctrine set forth in its place about the generic likeness in the flesh between Christ and all humanity; humanity, which forms the Church, precisely constitutes the Body of Christ because it takes one or another part in the human nature of Christ and joins the Divine properties of this latter. Hence Hilary uses not only such expressions as ilia Dominici corporis Ecclesia [that Church of the Lord's Body], but also explains that Jerusalem, built on a mountain, in the sense that it means the Church founded on the flesh of Christ, that in Christ, through the acceptance of our body and flesh, we ourselves can be contemplated 2435. The mountain on which the city is founded is nothing other than the corpus [body] which Christ received ex nobis [from us], and transformed (transfiguravit) the body humilitatis nostrae [of our humiliation] into a body conformable to the gloriae suae [His glory]; for post habitationem Ecclesiae [after the ecclesiastical monastery] our body rises to Him, in Him it rests on high (in Domini sublimitate), in Him, finally, we communicate with the choirs of angels, as much as we constitute Dei civitas [city of God] 2436. In this case, Hilary apparently does not attach much importance to the concept of civitas. Finally, thirdly, in view of the fact that civitas Hierusalem [the city of Jerusalem] is first of all the flesh of Christ and can serve as a designation for the Church only to the extent that the Ecclesia [Church] participates in this flesh, in Hilary the noticeable distinction between the earthly Church and the heavenly Jerusalem, which we noted in Ambrose, is destroyed; he does not expect a person to go to heaven, but the latter belongs to him already here on earth, to the extent that he managed to join the properties of the flesh of Christ. “Everyone reborn (renatus) in Christ represents the Dei templum [church of God], and especially the one in whom death no longer reigns, but life (vita) reigns; such a one, offering himself as a living, reasonable and pleasing sacrifice to God, is able to become the king of sin, whom he previously served; then from this living church, that is, from this holy abode of their own body (ab hac sancta corporis sui habitatione), those who have become kings, that is, those who have ceased to serve sin, can offer themselves as a gift to God (offerent se ipsos Deo munus) in the assembly of numerous angels in that heavenly Jerusalem” 2437. The force through which the communion of humanity with God, expressed in the concepts of the Church and the Body of Christ, is realized is the grace of God. The concept of grace and the conditions for assimilation of the fruits of the atoning sacrifice of Christ the Savior In its views on the essence of grace and the conditions for bestowing it on a person, Western theology, already from ancient times, has taken its own position, somewhat reminiscent of the Stoics of the later formation, with the latter’s characteristic feeling of the radical inadequacy of man’s natural powers in matters of religious life; only the Divine could, in their opinion, bring a person out of a disastrous state. Seneca, one of the later Stoics, in explaining human morality, assumed the indwelling of the holy spirit in man (sacer inter nos spiritus sedet), although, of course, he did not mean here the Divine Hypostasis, the Spirit of God, but simple cosmic power 2438. Even later Stoics, like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, already looked at the good in man as a gift from God, completely opposite to the natural disposition of man 2439. Divine help is already conceived here as a conditio, a sine qua non [obligatory condition] of human good. This same conviction about the complete religious failure of nature and man in their natural state and the idea of ​​grace as the only and exclusive source of religious good in man also distinguishes Western writers. From the latter, of course, it should have received other purely ecclesiastical foundations: this, firstly, the idea of ​​the state of primordial man, according to which all the advantages of the latter were derived not so much from his natural powers and abilities, but from the special supra-natural principle resting on him; and, secondly, the conviction of the power of sin operating in man, which, of course, should have created the need for grace for man even more than during the period of his heavenly life. This idea is revealed by Western writers in the strict differentiation and opposition of the concepts of natura [nature] and gratia [grace]; the first, in their language, denotes the natural principle in man, and the second the supernatural principle operating in him; It is only the connection of the second with the first that imparts religious value to the latter. We already meet this in Tertullian, who contrasts the word natura with the expression vis divinae gratiae [the power of Divine grace]; the latter is stronger, more powerful (potentior) than nature, subordinating to itself liberam arbitrii potestatem [freedom of will], which belongs to us by nature, capable of changes and transformations 2440. If we now note a similar opposition of concepts also in St. Ambrose, this shows that in the doctrine of grace the tendencies of his Western predecessors were dear to him. “We have,” he says, “the silver of naturae [nature], we have et gratiae [and grace]; natura [nature] is the work of the Creator (opus creatoris), and gratia [grace] is the gift of the Redeemer (munus est redemptoris).” This supranatural principle operates hidden in the natural beginning, not being accessible, unlike the latter, to external observation: although we do not see the gifts of Christ (dona Christi), yet Christ gives (donat), and acts secretly (operatur occulte) and bestows on all (et donat omnibus). Then, among the characteristic features of this supra-natural principle is that, although it is communicated to all, it is nevertheless preserved and not lost by only a few (servare paucorum est et non amittere); but it is communicated to everyone not in the same way, but in varying degrees (non omnibus tamen donat omnia) 2441. Usually this basic position is maintained by Western writers more or less consistently, if absolutely everything in which a person’s religious life is manifested is declared to be a work of grace living in a person. This is most classically expressed in St. Cyprian, who attributes everything good that we are capable of doing to God (Dei est... omne quod possumus) 2442; in particular, our religious confession (confessio) 2443 is attributed to the action of grace. But that Tertullian stands on the same point of view is clearly confirmed by his remark, for example, that without God we are not able to acquire knowledge of Him 2444, that only grace reveals to us the meaning of Scripture (Scripturae revelantur), transforms our mind (intellectus heformatur) 2445; grace is necessary for a deeper knowledge of the truth 2446; only she can teach us correct prayer 2447. St. Ambrose also reveals a tendency to derive the entire religious life of a person from the action of grace: only it reveals to us the Divine mysteries (solus Christus aurem aperuit humanam ad cognoscenda mysteria) 2448; everything that we can think of as holy is the gift of God, the inspiration of God and grace (hoc Dei munus, Dei inspiratio, Dei gratia) 2449; without the assistance of grace, the commandments of God (mandata Dei) 2450 remain inaccessible to us; our prayer to St. Ambrose, like Tertullian, considers it a work of grace 2451; finally, the love (caritas) necessary for every Christian also turns out to be a gift of the Holy Spirit (fructus Spiritus Sancti) 2452. With this meaning of grace, Western writers presented the process of a person’s subjective assimilation of the salvation objectively accomplished by Christ the Savior, as well as the relationship of a person’s self-activity to the principle of grace operating in him and saving him in this form. While Eastern writers, starting from completely different premises, argued that the initiative and subjectivity in the assimilation of salvation belongs to the person himself, his good will and desires, and grace is given to him only later, on the basis of his personal desire and in the form of assistance to him in his activities, Western writers, due to the above considerations, naturally had to go in the completely opposite direction: God belongs not only to the assistance of a person’s personal efforts, but the very beginning of his conversion; and if anything is required from the person himself, then it is only to follow the Divine call 2453. Tertullian attributes to the action of Divine grace the fact that a bad tree acquires the ability to bear good fruit, that stones turn into the sons of Abraham, acquiring his faith, and the brood of vipers create the fruits of repentance 2454. To the extent that religious and moral rebirth and turning to God are found in faith, the latter is also quite consistently attributed not only to man, but also to God: this faith, according to Tertullian, is achieved only by those to whom it is given 2455. But to grace belongs not only the arousal of faith, but also the success in it, the final affirmation of the will in good: grace constantly acts and succeeds until the very end (operante scilicet et proficiente usque in finem gratia Dei) 2456. For Tertullian, this need for the constant action of saving grace in a person, by the way, is motivated by the incessant temptation of the devil: if the devil always acts and daily strives towards unrighteousness, then how is it possible that the work of God either ceases or ceases to prosper (opus Dei aut cessaverit aut proficere destiterit) 2457 . However, it still remains very characteristic of ancient Western writers that they do not yet talk about the irresistibility of the action of grace; both at the beginning of conversion and in further moral activity, grace acts together with freedom, which it in no case violates. Tertullian obviously assumes this when he considers repentance a necessary condition for receiving grace, an act in which “a person prepares a pure habitation of the heart for the Holy Spirit who comes to him” 2458; repentance thus turns out to be the price by which grace is purchased, and grace is the reward for repentance; through repentance a person deserves (meretur) the grace of justification 2459. Also, according to St. Cyprian, the measure of grace is strictly consistent with the measure of our own faith: “We draw as much from the abundance of grace as we have faith capable of receiving it” 2460; fear is the guardian of integrity and the Lord abides in us only for our worthy obedience 2461. Insofar as the regeneration of evil will is determined by the action of grace, the progress of moral perfection is at the same time an increase in grace; grace is communicated to a person gradually, becoming more and more intensified in its extent. Of all the ancient Western writers, this point comes out especially clearly in St. Cyprian; Moreover, since human self-activity in this case is not yet denied, the growth of grace and the elevation of the moral state proceed together and inseparably, mutually conditioning each other. On the one hand, a person must not only preserve the grace received, but also increase it by increasing his faith 2462; and on the other hand, the will increases to the extent that spiritual grace increases 2463. St. Ambrose very often characterizes the process of saving a person by grace with the same features. Grace is absolutely necessary for man because of his sinfulness: since the whole human nature (omnis humana conditio) is subject to weakness (obnoxia fragilitati) and it is not in our power to correct our path by our own will (ex voluntate), therefore we are commanded that we trust in God, and He Himself will do it (spera in Domino, et ipse faciet) 2464. This grace is equally necessary at all stages of conversion, both at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end of it: no one is able to create without God (aedificare sine Domino), preserve (custodire sine Domino) and begin without the Lord (incipere sine Domino) 2465; no one can become perfect (perfectus) without the grace of God (sine favore Dei) 2466. The beginning of a person’s conversion is his faith, and this faith, as with Tertullian and Cyprian, turns out to be not the fruit of his own initiative, but a gift of grace (fides Dei donum est) 2467. But, as with the above-mentioned writers, this grace revealed already in faith not only does not exclude, but also presupposes the self-activity of man. The latter most often manifests itself negatively, in the reluctance to follow the Divine call and lead a life pleasing to God, which is followed by the cessation of grace: The Divine is manifested in the fact that blessings are sent to us, and ours in the fact that they change 2468; although it is characteristic of Divine mercy (divinae misericordiae) to desire that for no one there should be death and that all should be redeemed, yet he who separates himself from the Lord (qui se elongat a Domino) is banished; he who separates himself from the Lord is himself separated by him (qui se a Domino separat, ipse a Domino separatur) 2469; Christ leaves the careless (deserit negligentes) 2470; but He not only does not leave, but, on the contrary, visits even more often the one who himself seeks Him and begs Him in the proper way 2471. Further, self-activity in relation to grace should also be revealed in a positive way, to the extent that it is required of a person that he himself prepares himself to accept grace. In this regard, St. Ambrose puts forward the same idea about repentance as a necessary condition for receiving grace, which we noted above in Tertullian: where punishment is prescribed (poena praescribitur), there must also be repentance for sins (poenitentia peccatorum); where remission is given (remissio), grace is revealed (gratia est); repentance precedes (praecedit poenitentia), and grace follows (sequitur gratia). But, continues St. Ambrose further develops his Western point of view, and grace and human self-activity mutually condition each other, revealing themselves inseparably: and poenitentia [repentance] does not exist sine gratia [without grace], and gratia [grace] is impossible sine poenitentia [without repentance]; for poenitentia [repentance] must first condemn sin (prius damnare peccatum), so that gratia [grace] can destroy it (possit abolere); That is why John baptized in poenitentiam [into repentance], and Christ - ad gratiam [into grace] 2472. Through John - poenitentia [repentance], through Christ - gratia [grace]; the latter bestows quasi Dominus [as Lord], and the former proclaims quasi servus [as a slave]. Therefore, the Ecclesia [Church] preserves both the first and the second (utrumque custodit), so that it acquires grace (ut et consequatur gratiam) and does not reject repentance (et non abjiciat poenitentiam); for gratia [grace] is the gift of the Generator (munus largientis est), and poenitentia [repentance] is a saving remedy for the erring (delinquentis remedium) 2473. The grace thus revealed in faith at subsequent stages of human activity, as with Cyprian, multiplies more and more; Moreover, this increase equally depends on both grace and the will of the person himself: grace is communicated according to the receptivity of our nature 2474; God's mercy is more abundantly revealed where faith is more devoted 2475; God tests and weighs the merits of people and according to the measure (pro mensura) of the latter gives gratiam [grace] 2476. But the increase of grace, in turn, is thought of as a work of grace, to the extent that a person is advised to ask for an increase in his faith 2477. Among those subjective conditions that turn out to be necessary on the part of a person to receive and increase grace, St. Ambrose calls faith (fides) and virtue (virtus) or works of mercy (misericordia); both the first and the second are apparently recognized as self-sufficient: just as the sun and the moon do not need any extraneous evidence, but have evidence of themselves, of their greatness in their own splendor and light, so faith is intestata testis, so to speak, a witness that does not need external confirmation, and carries its own value in itself; similarly, deeds (opera) do not need publicity, but shout about themselves, announce themselves 2478. Being important and necessary in themselves, faith and works of charity are so closely related to each other that they also turn out to be necessary for each other. Perhaps faith even has some advantage over virtue: it most recommends us before God 2479; without it, good deeds cannot be lasting 2480; on the contrary, in combination with faith they themselves acquire greater value 2481 and become more perfect 2482; this is because only faith can serve as a reliable basis for works (fundamentum bonum, stabile fundamentum) 2483. However, there must also be an inverse relationship: faith alone without works is not enough, since perfection requires not only faith, but also good deeds 2484. Thus, faith is the first condition of our salvation, and works of mercy are the second, but also necessary 2485. What exactly is the faith that St. speaks about in its essence? Ambrose? His Western predecessors, when they talk about faith in similar cases, usually understand it in the sense of faith in Divine Revelation and the teaching of the Church. The faith necessary for the correction (correctio) of a person, in the eyes of, for example, Tertullian, is nothing more than the regula fidei [rule of faith], confessing the One Almighty God, the Creator of the world, and His Son Jesus Christ, incarnate, suffered, rose from the dead, ascended into heaven and will come again to judge the living and the dead 2486. There is no doubt that in the vast majority of cases, St. Ambrose means faith exclusively in this sense. True faith, according to St. Ambrose, is the same as simple trust (credo), the same thing that precedes reason (rationem praeveniat fides), does not seek evidence and conviction, but accepts the words of God out of simple trust in their truthfulness: for, says St. Ambrose, it is unworthy that we, who trust human reports about others, should begin to distrust the sayings of God about Himself. If it is said that Abraham believed God and was justified for this, then this means that he did not look for evidence, but voluntarily believed what was promised by God to him and his future offspring 2487. In other words, religious faith is usually in St. Ambrose is the same as religiosa confessio 2488, confession of faith, cognitio divinitatis, knowledge of God 2489, agreement with the eloquiis Domini [word of God] 2490, that is, the outwardly formulated teaching of the Holy Scriptures and the Church, unconditional recognition of its truth and preservation intact; if anyone damages this teaching, he thereby loses true religious faith and cannot be whole and saved 2491. According to Reuther's fair remark, the highest and essential questions of religious faith in this case are nothing more than questions of dogma 2492. But while faith was understood exclusively in an external way, then its connection with good deeds had to be exclusively external. Just as the precarious anchorage (infida statio) of a ship in a port threatens it with danger, just as the sandy foundation of a building quickly falls, not being able to withstand all the weight placed on it, so, obviously, good deeds cannot have any meaning if they are in disagreement with the demands and truths that religious faith offers us; the latter tells us what we should do, shows us which deeds are of value and which are not; it is a kind of regulation of affairs. Hence, it is not so much the person who did not do something out of ignorance who is subject to condemnation as the one who, knowing what he needed to do, did not do it 2493. The position, of course, is correct, but somewhat one-sided and showing that the center of gravity here lies not in the mood itself, the desire of the actor, but in one or another specific form of his activity. In this case, works of love do not develop with inner necessity from faith as their psychological basis, but only under the influence and control of faith they take a certain form; between them, as Förster puts it, only mechanical coexistence remains and the organic, necessary connection and kinship are lost 2494. Until now, we have not yet opened at St. Ambrose is nothing new and significantly different from the views on grace of the first Western writers. But still, sometimes he develops thoughts that are not quite common in the West, which suggest a completely different relationship between freedom and grace; here even more space is given to human initiative than before. It is completely in vain, in our opinion, that Werther, the author of the history of the dogma of grace, tries to defend the unconditional unity of Ambrose’s contemplation on the relationship of grace to freedom, explaining all this from the point of view of the above basic Western principles 2495; Many of Ambrose's expressions undoubtedly remind us of Eastern writers. We have already had reason to note that in the East the initiative of conversion was attributed to the free decision of the will, and grace was introduced only as a facilitating force, assisting a person’s own efforts. For example, consider the views on this issue of Origen and St. Basil the Great, two eastern writers, very well known to St. Ambrose. According to Origen, the grace of God is communicated to a person only when he himself feels the need for it. Just as in cases of temptation of the devil we ourselves, by our own intemperance, give him a reason for this, so, obviously, in good deeds we ourselves, by our mood, attract grace to ourselves, which already raises us “to all perfection” 2496. Origen, in explaining his thought, refers to the example of a student who, in order for the teacher to correct his shortcomings, must first agree to this and come to the teacher; so God gives a heart of flesh instead of a stone one to people “not against their desire, but under the condition that they present themselves to the Physician of the afflicted”; for the same purpose, Origen refers to the example of the gospel sick, whom Christ healed at their request 2497. The relationship of grace and freedom in the process of salvation in Origen is sometimes defined in the sense that a person tries, and God removes obstacles to his efforts 2498; this grace is thus given to a person in the form of a reward; the person himself deserves it 2499. St. Basil the Great derives the necessity of grace mainly from the concept of freedom, as an abstract balance that can be upset in the direction of good only with the help of God 2500. But the communication of this grace still presupposes the presence of certain conditions on the part of the person himself. St. Basil illustrates this relationship with the analogy of the relationship of the eye to sunlight: just as sunlight does not illuminate everyone, but only those who have eyes and are awake, so true light (τὸ ἀληϑινὸν φῶς) does not give its shine to everyone, but only to those who live worthy of it (τοῖς ἀξίως αὐτοῦ πολιτευομένοις) 2501 . It follows from this that the Holy Spirit is communicated only to those worthy of Him and “is not accepted by them in the same measure, but shares actions according to the measure of faith” 2502. When compared with this, some passages from the works of St. Ambrose show that sometimes he could speak about grace not in the language of a Western writer, but in the language of an Eastern theologian. Already in one of his earliest works, “De Cain et Abel” [“About Cain and Abel”], he explains that a person fights the corrupting influence of the world with his own, and not other people’s, forces and receives a reward for this 2503. But this idea was especially strongly reflected in the commentaries on the twelve psalms, written under the influence of Origen and Basil the Great. St. Ambrose, speaking here about the repentance of the prophet David, uses the Origenistic analogy of a doctor, to whom, in order to receive healing, the sufferer himself must first turn. The Prophet David, wanting to be healed (curari), seeks a Physician in every way, opens his wounds to Him, crying out: “Heal me, but not in Your wrath, because my infirmities (infirmitates meae) will not withstand heavy healing (medicinam duram).” The medicine of Christ (medicina Christi) is correction (correptio est) 2504. The example of the prophet David, moreover, generally shows that before being corrected (corripi), one must ask, confess, reveal one’s sins; To prevent the ulcer from spreading further in the body, the patient must go to the doctor himself (aeger offere se debet), if the latter is not with us (si differt medicus) 2505. Christ corrects only those who come to Him with faith in Him (venit crediturus in Christum) 2506; and in general, only those who themselves display a mood full of reverence and reverence for Him can call God their own (qui ipsi exhibent plenum reverentiae et pietatis affectum) 2507. Moreover, the rest of Ambrose's works are also not free, to one degree or another, from traces of the same way of thinking. “Is not the Lord,” he asks, “for all good (non ergo omnibus bonus est Deus)?” And he answers: “Of course, for everyone, inasmuch as He is the Savior of all people, and especially of believers... but since - once again our writer repeats the doctor’s analogy - not everyone requires healing (non omnes medicinam expetunt) and many avoid it (refugiunt), so that the healing of the ulcer does not worsen, then God heals only those who want it and does not force those who do not want it (volentes curat, non astringit invitos); therefore, only those who seek healing (medicinam expetunt) receive healing (sanitatem), and those who reject the Doctor and do not seek His good cannot feel what they do not experience (quam non experiuntur, sentire non possunt)” 2508. “Christ comes (to us often) and from afar (per prospectum) stretches out His hand (to us); but not always (non semper), not to everyone (nec ad omnes), but only to the soul that is able to say: “I have thrown off my tunic” (Song. 5:3)” 2509. And in general, many passages associated with the Book of Song of Songs should be included here, since the individual unity of the Logos with the soul is possible only under the condition of the moral purity of the latter. Probably, the occasionally used St. should be attributed to this same influence. Ambrose, the term cooperatur, promotes, regarding grace, which presupposes a relationship between freedom and grace precisely in the spirit of the Eastern Fathers: “Everywhere the power of the Lord promotes the efforts of man” 2510. In addition to the two above, we find in the teaching about grace in St. Ambrose still has a new third series of thoughts, which, since it is not found in the previous history of church dogma in either Western or Eastern writers, should be attributed personally to Ambrose himself. Here our bishop puts forward a broad and philosophical concept. Although the need for human freedom and initiative for one’s own salvation is not disputed in this case either; but all salvation, both of an individual person and of all humanity as a whole, appears to be an outpouring of God’s undeserved grace by man. Here, for the first time in the history of church literature, St. Ambrose gives something in the form of a brief philosophy of the history of mankind pre-ordained by God: all humanity follows its natural path, no people are forced from above and are not forced to do good; but the grace of the Lord combines these individual moments in such a way that each subsequent one is chosen for the good of its predecessor, and each of the previous peoples is converted in the appearance on the historical stage because it is influenced by the example of the subsequent one; but, of course, the grace of the Lord initiates the process, brings forward the moments. This third series of thoughts is rooted in the essence of the matter in Western ideas about the relationship between grace and freedom, but in detail it contains much that is different from them. Both the salvation of each individual person and the salvation of all humanity is accomplished by virtue of Divine predestination (praedestinatio). Although St. Ambrose put forward this concept, but since he still recognizes the need for human self-determination for salvation and denies the invincibility of the action of grace, it does not yet acquire for him the meaning that the clergyman told him a little later. Augustine. The very act of predestination to salvation, undoubtedly, is already exclusively an act of Divine grace, serving as a source of unshakable Christian hope in the achievability of salvation: there is nothing that we could be afraid to deny for ourselves and in which we could not trust the constancy of Divine bounties, of which such a long and continuous abundance has already been revealed that God first predestined, then called and, whom he called, he justified, and whom he justified, he glorified 2511. But this is praedestinatio [predestination] for St. Ambrose is still based on the act of Divine foreknowledge of man’s relationship to the grace that saves him: “Not before (God) predestined (praedestinavit) what he foresaw (praesciret), but whose merits he foresaw (quorum merita praescivit), he also predestined rewards (eorum praemia praedestinavit)” 2512. How the reconciliation of these two disparate concepts is possible is shown by the view of St. Ambrose on faith and his assessment of a person’s good deeds. Although a person does good deeds, these deeds alone do not have a justifying meaning for him. This is explained by the deep damage of his nature by sin: bodily weakness (carnalis infirmitas) makes a person incapable of doing good deeds on his own, which is why he does not and cannot have good deeds in the proper sense; man himself cannot therefore do anything worthy of heavenly reward 2513. Only faith now takes the place of good deeds: we are justified not by works, but by faith, because bodily weakness is an obstacle to deeds, and the brilliance of faith overshadows the lies of deeds and deserves mercy for sins 2514; fides est quae liberat per sanguinem Christi [faith is that which sets free through the blood of Christ] 2515. Secondly, the very concept of “faith” is used here not only in the sense of externally formulated faith; it is considered not only the sum of dogmatic truths, but also a deep rebirth and inner mood of the soul through living personal communication with Christ, confidence in God and His mercy 2516. This faith is astuosa devotio [active piety], religiosa mentis intentio Dei verbo [religious striving of the mind for the word of God] 2517. “What good is it to me,” asks St. Ambrose, “to know, for example, about the day of the Last Judgment and to be aware of the multitude of my own sins, if Christ does not live in me and speak in me?” 2518 Faith in this sense coincides with the need for Divine condescension to human weaknesses, with hope for Divine mercy 2519, there is a consciousness that without Divine help human untruth cannot become impoverished (deficere) 2520. Therefore no one can be arrogant and boast of his own merits and power, but everyone must hope to find mercy through the Lord Jesus, for what other hope is possible for sinners? 2521 It goes without saying that faith in this sense is not the work of the person himself, but a gift of grace, illumination from above: every Christian, when asked the question of why he became a Christian, can only answer in this way: visum est mihi [it was judged [so] to me (see. Luke 1:3 )] 2522 ; the will of a person is prepared by God and the very fact that someone turns out to be able to believe in God is not the work of the person himself, but Dei gratia [the grace of God] 2523. But if even under this condition, previously in the West they still considered it possible to talk about a person’s deserving of grace, as St. sometimes admitted. Ambrose, now he reveals the idea of ​​grace as a pure gift of God, to which man himself cannot make any claims: the justification of a person is something given to him (donatum) 2524; he is “justified by the Lord not by works, but by faith; for just as the outcome of our fate is not in our power, but depends on chance, so the grace of the Lord is not given in the form of a reward for merit, but solely according to the will of God” 2525. This is something hitherto unheard of in the West; according to Harnack, we have here “Augustinism before Augustine,” and in some cases “even more than Augustinism” 2526. An excellent illustration of this series of thoughts of St. Ambrose is served by his reasoning about the rejection of Israel and the calling of the pagans into the Church. In the fate of nations we do not have the action of blind chance, but the discovery of a special Divine secret (mysterium oportebat impleri) 2527. God originally rejected the Gentiles and chose the Jews; this preference, however, was not given according to the merits of the Jews, but solely according to the will of God: if anyone was redeemed (redemptus est) from the Jewish people, it was not because he had a great opinion of himself (quia multam habuit aestimationem sui), but redeemed freely (redemptus est gratis), because salvation by grace (gratia) is not salvation by the merit of works (merito operum) and justification of virtues (nec justificationis virtutum), but is produced by the generosity of the Giver (sed liberalitate donantis), the election of the Redeemer (electione redimentis) 2528. Nevertheless, the Israelites were then rejected, but no longer solely by the will of God, but through their own fault, precisely because they did not understand the mystery of their election and were incorrectly exalted in their deeds; Israel did not inherit what he was called to because he wished to justify himself before God (quia se justificare cupiebat), because he was proud of his works (quia operum suorum jactantiam requirebat), because he did not discover faith (quia fidem non detulit) and did not know grace (nec gratiam recognovit); and therefore (in place of Israel) there followed an election (electio consecuta est), which heard the Caller (vocantem audivit), accepted the One who came (advenientem susciperit) 2529 - proof that the election of the pagans was in accordance with their own readiness and that, therefore, in this connection of the thoughts of St. Ambrose, in addition to grace, also attaches importance to the second human agent 2530. However, in the rejection of Israel and the election of the pagans, the grace of God was also revealed: in the dispute between two peoples, which of them could be called superior, God, who called the pagans, imprisoned the other and thus, by His mercy, so that the whole world would become subordinate to God, the people (Jewish) retreated back in the ranks of heirs and were betrayed to the lie of a grave crime for not recognizing God's foreknowledge of secrets 2531. Grace was revealed here in that the rejection of the Jews was not final, but was supposed to serve as a correctional school for them: for those who themselves did not want to be healed, the Lord retained the grace of returning back (reservat Do minus regressionis gratiam), so that the Israelites, rejected out of the blindness of their own hearts (per cordis proprii caecitatem), return again through the fullness of the Church (per plenitudinem Ecclesiae revertantur) 2532 . The election of the Gentiles was thus salvation for the Jews (electio gentium salus Judaeis); first there was a movement, an agitation (commotio) among the pagans; but through this excitement (ex hac commotione) the Jews also underwent the grace of no small change (non mediocris mutationis gratiam), the remnants of which will be saved 2533. God in the last times (ultimis temporibus) accepted the people of the Jews, but not according to their merits (non secundum illius merita), but according to the election of his grace (sed secundum electionem suae gratiae) and laid his hand on their eyes to destroy blindness (ut caecitatem aufert). He postponed his salvation for a while (distulit sanitatem) so that the people would believe last (ut postremus crederet), who previously did not consider it necessary to believe and lost the advantage of the highest election (praerogativam superioris electionis amitteret) 2534. Thus, the grace of God gradually leads the entire human race to salvation, using the rejection of the Jews and the election of the Gentiles in accordance with their own moral disposition as the means to achieve this final goal. First the Gentiles were rejected for Israel; then Israel was blinded for the calling of the Gentiles; and the remnant of blinded Israel were saved by the election of grace, after the fullness of the Gentiles had come in; as a result, the guilt of Israel benefited the Gentiles, and the faith of the Gentiles freed the people of Israel 2535. As far as is known, none of the church writers rose to such a concept of grace until St. Ambrose. True, we find something analogous to this in Hilary, in whom the concept of justification by grace is sometimes contrasted with justification by works. But it seems that he understands by grace mainly the work of the redemption of mankind accomplished by Christ, in contrast to the ineffective justification of the Old Testament law. “Were there,” he asks, “those people for whom the Incarnation of Christ would not have been necessary? But,” he answers further, “no one is justified by the law.” Christ showed the futility of boasting about the righteousness of the law (ostendit ergo inanem justitiae se jactantiam); for since sacrifices were powerless in the matter of salvation (sacrificiis inifirmibus ad salutem), mercy was necessary for all those under the law (misericordia erat universis in lege positis necessaria); whereas, if truth from the law were possible, then mercy through grace would not be necessary (nam si justitia fuisset ex lege, venia per gratiam necessaria non fuisset)” 2536. As far as is known, Hilary's point of view is not taken further than this. In the same way, the rejection of Israel along with the calling of the Gentiles is not considered by him from the point of view of the Revelation of grace, but is simply derived from the personal disposition of these peoples. The first election (primum electionem) was to live (vivere oportuisset); nevertheless, in the person of the bleeding woman, salvation is first granted (anterior salus) to publicans and sinners. While salvation was intended for one, it was thus granted to another (ita alter salus, dum aliis defertur, est reddita). The pagans won it with their faith in Christ, which the Jews did not discover; so that what was prepared for Israel (quod Israeli parabatur), the people of the Gentiles (plebs gentium occupavit) took away 2537. But if St. Ambrose had no predecessors here among church writers, but there is still no doubt that in this case, as in the question of original sin, he was strongly influenced by the Epistles of St. Apostle Paul. The Apostle Paul, of all the sacred New Testament writers, was the most beloved writer of St. Ambrose; this is sufficiently proven by the extraordinary number of quotations from his epistles, many of which are given by Ambrose in defense of his doctrine of justification 2538. About satisfactions and merits Western writers associate another feature with the teaching about grace and the relationship of human freedom to it, to the clarification of which, in view of its enormous importance in the system of Western theology, we devote a special chapter to. As is known, in the East the concept of grace was constantly revealed in opposition to the concept of merit. The Eastern Church constantly held the conviction that moral perfection is achieved by a person’s own strength only in union with grace, and rejected any merit on the part of man in the acquisition of this perfection and the heavenly reward associated with it: everything that a person managed to achieve here is not his exclusive work, but also the work of the grace that assisted him. In the West, as we have seen, on the contrary, the concept of grace was discussed not in opposition to the concept of merit, but in contrast to the concept of nature, to the extent that any religious value was denied behind everything natural. Such a formulation of the question, of course, could not exclude the concept of merit where natural forces act in union with grace. And the sympathy of Western writers for legal ideas, which we have repeatedly noted, directed their attention precisely in this direction. They often think of the relationship between God and man in legal terms: each party has its own rights and obligations that must certainly be fulfilled, as required by the truth. These relationships have two main forms, depending on man’s relationship to the will of God, which he can either violate or fulfill. In the first case we get a form that is called satisfaction, or satisfaction, and in the second we have what Western writers usually regarded as man’s pure merit before God. As for satisfactions, their legality and necessity arose for Western Christians from the nature of the relationship that was established between God and man after the latter’s redemption in general and the sacrament of baptism, as the moment of actual assimilation of the fruits of this redemption, in particular. This relationship is sometimes characterized by St. Cyprian as the relationship of the Lawgiver to those who receive the law. God gave the healed man a law (legem dedit sano) and ordered him not to sin again in the future, so that nothing worse would happen to the sinner compared to what had happened before 2539; this law is called a new law (lex nova) in contrast to the previous one (lex prior), given through Moses and now abolished 2540. Lactantius also sees in Christianity a new law (novam legem), given by God through Christ to his new followers (novis cultoribus) 2541. In some cases, the relations of the legislation of St. Cyprian substitutes a contractual relationship between God and man: a Christian is bound by the force of a contract (te foederis pactione constrictum), the fair condition (justa conditio) of which is either the granting of salvation to a person or the fear of punishment (in case of violation of the contract) 2542. St. Ambrose, who, like his predecessors, reveals the doctrine of satisfactions, justifies their necessity in a similar way. If he, apparently, does not speak about the relations of the legislator, then he knows contractual relations, using another term - contractus, non mediocris contractus. Here, obviously, we mean a “pledge contract”, which in the language of Roman law was called pignus, when something is pledged to someone, and the legislator is given the right of action against the pledgee in the event of failure by the latter to fulfill the terms of the contract 2543. Thus, Christ offered His Life and accepted Death for all; He now demands from man the return of His property (suum est, quod a te Christus reposcit), and man is obliged to fulfill His legal demand 2544. In this regard, St. Ambrose reveals the idea of ​​man as a debtor in relation to God: in return for our former debt to the devil, since the time of redemption we have become debtors to Christ; we, therefore, only changed the creditor, but did not escape him (mutavimus creditorem, non evasimus); our debt is attributed to him along with interest (manet enim debitum, fenus intercidit) 2545; man is a debtor [debtor] in the sight of God 2546. The correct relationship of man to God is therefore interpreted as the payment of a debt (solve, quod debitur); a Christian must detect the mood of a good debtor (boni affectum debtoris), not resort to subterfuge (ut versuram non facias), but pay the interest of his own faith according to the qualification of the contract (censu contracti) 2547. If the debtor wishes to eliminate the debt, then he must return the money and not before considering himself free from paying interest (nec prius evacuatur fenoris nomen) until he has paid in everything to the last penny (ad summum) 2548. “So, return,” says St. Ambrose's application to his listeners is that he owes (quod debes): blessed are those to whom God is a debtor. Oh, that we could contribute what we have received (utinam quod accepimus, possimus exsolvere)!” 2549 The sins committed by a person after baptism represent, so to speak, a violation of the obligations of the contract, destroy the merciful relationship of the Creditor and arouse His wrath. Western writers characterize this change in attitudes differently and, as is their wont, sometimes too specifically. According to Tertullian, God in this case is offended (Deus offensus) 2550; St. Cyprian speaks of the wrath of God (ira Dei) 2551, of an insulted God (Deus offensus) 2552, of anger and of insult simply (ira et offensa) 2553; Hilary also speaks of ira Dei [the wrath of God], iratus Deus [angry God] 2554, but next to this he mentions the vengeance (ultio) of God's wrath 2555, the vengeance due for crimes (ultio criminis debita est) 2556. To denote the totality of all this kind of change, Western writers also knew a special term - indignatio, obviously from indignus, unworthy. Tertullian understands it, apparently, in the sense of God’s indignation at man, recognizing him as unworthy of His mercy, and this recognition entails punishment for the offender: in peccatorem [for the sinner] confession with all its necessary accessories pro Dei indignatione fungatur [committed for God’s indignation] 2557. St. understands it the same way. Cyprian: God responds to man's crimes with a full stream of indignation (pleno indignationis impetu) 2558; sometimes he connects it with the concept of offensa [outrage] and speaks of indignantis offensa [outrage, anger of the indignant (God)] 2559. Hilary also speaks of the indignation of God in a state of indignation (in indignatione conturbat), and the characteristic signs of this state are the imposition of punishment corresponding to the offense (ob meritum impietatis poena decreta est), and the arousal of fear and horror in the guilty (metus et terror affertur) 2560. This term, among others, is known to our bishop. He associates it with the idea of ​​punishment: God does not abandon his fatherly feelings (velut patrio quodam affectu haeret) towards a person, even in indignatione [in indignation], when he betrays the erring person to punishment (ad poenam tradat errantem) 2561. Sometimes the concept of indignatio is combined with the thought of the fear evoked in a person by punishment, as an educational means: Dominus Jesus [Lord Jesus] is therefore indignetur [indignant] at us sinners, in order to convert us (terrore convertat) with the fear of indignationis suae [His indignation] 2562. He is indignatur [indignant] so that we humble ourselves (humiliemur), and we must humble ourselves (humiliamur) in order to become worthy of regret rather than punishment (ut digni simus magis miseratione, quam poena) 2563. But unlike Hilary, St. Ambrose excludes from the concept under consideration any trace of vengeance on the part of God to man for his sins, recognized by Hilary; indignatio is not an act of revenge (non ultionis exsecutio), but rather an act of permission from sin (magis absolutions est operatio) 2564. Thus, under the indignatio of St. Ambrose understands the manifestation of God's love, expressed in punishing a person, not with the goal of taking revenge on him for his sins, but solely with the goal of correcting him. Of the other terms related here, he uses only those that were used by Tertullian and Cyprian: these are ira [anger] 2565 and offensa [indignation, disfavor] 2566. Divine mercy, however, does not leave man in his fall after atonement and baptism. It again gives him healing means to destroy his sins and restore the relationship to God that originally existed before the sin. A number of technical terms have served to designate this activity of mercy in the West; all of them, apparently, were borrowed from the field of Roman jurisprudence. To the extent that mercy is found in providing a person with the means necessary to atone for his sins, it is called, for example, in Cyprian, pietas divina [Divine love] 2567: pietas divina, condescending to our weaknesses, pointing us to works of truth and mercy, opened in them some way for preserving salvation (viam quamdam tuendae salutis aperiret) 2568. Another designation for it is the concept of dementia [mercy], divina dementia [Divine mercy]: “how great is the dementia [mercy] manifested in caring for the complete preservation of an already redeemed person!” 2569 Hilary also uses the expression divina institute [Divine institutions] to designate the saving means presented to man by grace. As far as this grace is considered from the point of view of the remission of a person’s sins, it also goes by several names: it is called either indulgentia [condescension, indulgence], sometimes venia [mercy, forgiveness], sometimes misericordia [mercy]. The first of these concepts, indulgentia, is very often presented in contrast to merit, which gives a person the right to some claim in relation to God, and denotes a gift sent by God to man: “No one,” says Tertullian, “promeretur [deserves [favour, mercy]], using indulgentia [indulgence], but solely through obedience to the voluntati [will] of God” 2571, i.e. that is, through the commission of a special category of deeds that give a person the right to special merit before God. In the same way, Cyprian, speaking of indulgentia, very often depicts it as a gift of God: Christians know divinae indulgentiae munus salubre [the saving gift of Divine condescension] 2572; Dei rursus indulgentia largitur [God’s condescension again appears [to us]] 2573. Venia [mercy] in Tertullian (almost never found in Cyprian) is opposed to the concept of poena [punishment] and, therefore, denotes the liberation of a person from punishment: God, who determined poenam [punishment] by judgment (per judicium), also promised veniam [mercy] through repentance (per poenitentiam) 2574. In Lactantius, misericordia Dei [God's mercy] seems to be identified with peccatis venia [forgiveness of sins] 2575. As for our author now, he characterizes the manifestation of God’s love for a sinned person more subjectively, from the point of view of the remission of a person’s sins, than objectively, from the point of view of the foundation of the institution of grace-filled means. The concept of dementia apparently does not appear at all in him, and the term pietas is applied to God only occasionally: Christ waits for our tears (exspectat lacrimas nostras) in order to pour out His love (ut profundat pietatem suam) 2576; here this concept, unlike Cyprian, is acquired by the very act of remission of our sins. To designate this latter, he, moreover, very often uses the expressions indulgentia and venia. Indulgentia, like its predecessors, is usually opposed to the concept of reward: in earthly life, indulgentia pro corona [indulgence as a reward] 2577 is available to man; that this indulgentia is a gift of God, which a person can only desire, but which he has no right to demand, this is indicated by the speech about indulgentia, as only an object of hope for the penitent: those who have washed the poenas with heavy suffering [i.e. e. suffered punishment] for the crimes committed, sperant indulgentiam [hope for leniency] 2578; no one can properly perform poenitentiam [repentance] who does not speraverit indulgentiam [hopes for indulgence] 2579. The concept of venia [mercy, forgiveness], on the contrary, is very often used with the verb promereri [to deserve]: the repentant veniam promerebitur [will deserve forgiveness] 2580; those who indulge in penitential deeds volunt veniam promereri [want to earn forgiveness] 2581; he who endures suffering for the name of Christ cannot remain sine venia [without forgiveness] 2582; he who humbles himself by repentance preserves himself veniae [for forgiveness] 2583; all who turn to God are promised (pollicetur) venia [forgiveness] 2584; the society of those who have been cleansed of sins is called veniae societas emerendae [society deserving forgiveness] 2585. In order to make amends for one’s sins before God and to acquire indulgentiam [indulgence] and veniam [forgiveness] consisting in the act of forgiveness of sins, man himself, on his part, must bring God a certain satisfaction. The technical term for the latter is satisfactio. Satisfaciamus Deo Domino nostro [let us bring satisfaction to the Lord our God], says Tertullian 2586. This concept had a strictly defined meaning in the West: this name there designated the sum of certain actions, which were considered as the only sufficient means to satisfy God. It was precisely the satisfying meaning that all human actions associated with the latter’s suffering had; and, as an expression of man’s suffering, humility, and self-condemnation, they were able to reconcile him with God 2587. The substrate of these satisfying actions was considered primarily to be the human body: among them Tertullian, for example, names fasting (jejunia), sighing (ingemiscere), crying (lacrymari); but some of these actions also have the soul as their substrate: the spirit should be subjected to sorrows (animum moeroribus dejicere), in order to change the one who sinned 2588 through a sad exercise (tristi tractatione); this also includes prayer 2589 and confession of sins (satisfactio confessione disponitur) 2590. St. Cyprian, among the satisfactory actions, mentions prayers, petitions and fasting: orationibus et praecibus et jejuniis [by prayers, petitions and fasting] one can satisfacere [bring satisfaction] to God pro delictis [for sins] 2591; then he lists works of charity [peccata (sins) are atoned for by eleemosynis (alms)], works of mercy (misericordiae), and they are given preference over those listed before: orationes [prayers] and jejunia [fasts] are useful only in conjunction with eleemosynis [alms] 2592. The totality of all this type of action in Tertullian is called disciplinae 2593; St. Cyprian also speaks of medicina satisfactionis [medicine, the healing property of satisfaction], or de satisfactione medicina 2594. Comparing now with this the creations of St. Ambrose, we notice the same thing in them. He talks about satisfactio [satisfaction], about satisfaciendum [the need for satisfaction] 2595. The essence of satisfaction also lies for him in the enduring of suffering by a person for God: whoever wants to cleanse the vices of human weakness (humanae infirmitatis), must endure his very weakness (ipsam infirmitatem), so to speak, put it on his shoulders, and not throw it off 2596. Let us exhaust ourselves (curvemus) to the end, says St. Ambrose regarding the term satisfactio [satisfaction], bringing to Christ not only faith, but also the permanence of our sufferings (passionum nostrarum perseverantiam), and we will rejoice in our sufferings, as Christ rejoiced in passionibus suis [in His sufferings] 2597. As for those private actions that are capable of delivering satisfaction, Ambrose knows a lot of them (plura subsidia): oratio, lacrymae, jejunia [prayer, tears, fasting] - this is debitoris boni census est [the estate of a good debtor] 2598. Sometimes weeping and tears are mentioned: fletibus et lacrymis [with weeping and tears] delicta [sins] are washed away 2599; sometimes - tears, grief, severe punishments: lacrymis [tears], aerumnis [sorrows], gravi supplicio [severe punishment] are resolved delicta [sins] 2600; finally, sometimes, along with fasting, almsgiving (eleemosyna) 2601 is mentioned, with good deeds (bona opera) in general - confession of sins (confessio) 2602. The entire set of these cases in Ambrose is also called disciplinae virtutum 2603. Continuing to consider the institution of satisfying actions further, we notice that not only the type of action itself matters, but also those secondary conditions with which they are associated and in the presence of which only they receive their satisfying power. Such a condition among ancient Western writers is, for example, a strict quantitative correspondence between satisfaction and sin: the more severe the sin, the greater the quantitative satisfaction had to be and vice versa. “How much we have sinned (quam magna deliquimus),” says St. Cyprian, - one must mourn so much (granditer): a deep wound must be healed diligently and for a long time; repentance cannot be less than the crime (poenitentia crimine minor non sit)" 2604. This quantitative point of view on the reality of satisfactions is also strictly adhered to by St. Ambrose: the more wine (major culpa), the more prayers she requires 2605; for lighter sins (pro levioribus delictis), only private prayer (satis Deus precatur) is sufficient, while venia [mercy] for more serious sins (graviorum) is acquired only by the prayers of the righteous 2606; a great crime (grande scelus) is associated with a stronger satisfaction (grande habet necessariam satisfactionem), since one must grieve more strongly (satis dolendum) where the sin is greater (peccatum est fortius) 2607. Another condition necessary for the validity of satisfaction for Cyprian is its accomplishment in Ecclesia catholica [in the Catholic Church] and a member of Ecdesiae catholicae [Catholic Church] 2608. The Church is the only institution where satisfaction is possible, also for Ambrose: in Ecclesia [in the Church] a sinner should not be ashamed to implore the Lord (Deo supplices); and in general, the most serious sins can be washed away only by the prayers of the entire Church, as the totality of all believers 2609. Finally, a necessary condition for satisfaction in ancient times in the West was considered to be its fulfillment during earthly life; with the death of a person, the opportunity to perform satisfactorial actions is taken away from him: delictum [sin], according to Cyprian, can be washed away, while the sinner in saeculo est [is in (this) world], while his confession (confessio) can be allowed (admitti) and satisfactio [satisfaction] through the priests (per sacerdotes) can be made pleasant apud Dominum [with the Lord] 2610. St. Ambrose completely agrees with him here, believing that only as long as a person lives on earth can he correct his mistakes before God 2611: the day of death (dies mortis) is approaching, and there is no longer any means of conversion left for a person (jam nullum conversionis remedium est) 2612; Therefore, God extended Cain’s life so that he would have the opportunity to atone for his sin by repentance 2613. The power of satisfactions achieved, subject to all necessary conditions, is manifested, firstly, in a change in the attitude of the angry Deity towards man, and, secondly, in the moral renewal and rebirth of the latter. As for God, then, according to St. Ambrose, satisfaction ends the wrath of God against man: ira Dei discedit [the wrath of God passes away] 2614; and Tertullian speaks of turning away the wrath of God in this case: prayer omnem iram Dei avertit [turns away all wrath of God] 2615. Then, at St. Ambrose, we encounter the term acceptor, receiver, indicating that God accepts, agrees to accept as satisfaction the good deeds performed by a person 2616; This corresponds to the acceptabilis found in Tertullian, acceptable, worthy of acceptance: we must offer to God orationem propriam et acceptabilem [prayer that is appropriate and acceptable], that is, the kind that He Himself sought (requisivit) 2617; and St. Cyprian also knows for this purpose a special expression in its original formulation, unknown to Ambrose, in acceptum referre, that is, to record, to assign to the parish the receipt of 2618. Finally, God’s relationship to satisfactions is expressed in the fact that the latter are pleasing to him: St. Ambrose knows such expressions as delectatur Dominus tali precatione [the Lord delights in such prayer] 2619, Domino placere [to please the Lord] 2620; St. Cyprian also often speaks of Deus satisfactione placandus [God, Who should be propitiated with satisfaction] 2621, Deo placere, placeat [to please, please God] 2622. In addition, St. Ambrose speaks about God changing his decision regarding a sinful person (ut mutare videatur suam Deus sententiam), about oblivion, ignorance by God of the insult inflicted on Him (homo es, et vis rogari, ut ignoscas; et putas Deum tibi non roganti ignoscere) 2623; similarly, Tertullian represents God as forgetting, at the moment of satisfaction, the guilt of man, not knowing it (non ignoscit) 2624; like St. Cyprian speaks of dementer ignoscere [condescending ignorance] regarding God, propitiated by the exploits of the sinner 2625. When describing the influence of satisfactions on the person himself, St. Ambrose also assimilates much of what the Western church tradition had already created before him. He, for example, imagines satisfaction actions as a means of compensation for previous sins, thanks to which the latter are resolved and the punishment for them is canceled: compensatione caritatis actuumque reliquorum, vel satisfactione quacumque, peccati poena dissolvitur [as a result of compensation for love and other deeds, or some kind of satisfaction, the punishment for sin is canceled] 2626; We already meet this in Tertullian, who speaks of the need for redemption from sins by compensatione [compensation] for good deeds 2627. Then, for St. Ambrose satisfactions are a means of washing away sins: penitents propria delicta laverunt [wash away their own sins] 2628; by fasting eluerimus peccata nostra [we wash away our sins] 2629; in Cyprian there is an expression equivalent in this meaning about the cleansing, purgatio, of sins: for a person it means eleemosynis et justa operatione [with alms and righteous deeds] to cleanse one’s sins purgari [to cleanse] 2630, misericordiae mentis peccata purgari [to cleanse sins by works of mercy] 2631. Ambrose also uses the verb libero [to liberate] for this purpose in the sense of freeing a person by the power of satisfaction from sins: eleemosyna a peccato liberat [alms frees from sin] 2632; this is also a very favorite expression for St. Cyprian, for whom the works of alms can animas a morte liberari [deliver the soul from death] 2633; eleemosynis a prima morte animae liberantur [alms delivers the soul from the first death] 2634. Sometimes Ambrose connects with the concept of satisfaction the idea of ​​redemption (redemptio) of a person from sins and holds the idea that individual satisfactorial actions are the price (pretium) of this redemption: pretio [at the price of] mercy (miseratione) one can redeem (redimas) peccata [sins] 2635; redimi te [redee yourself], he says to the rich man, operibus tuis [with your deeds], redime te pecunia [redeem yourself with your wealth] 2636; these ideas were equally characteristic of both Tertullian and Cyprian: how can one, says Tertullian, without paying the price (pretium), stretch out his hands to the reward (ad mercedem), for, according to the institution of God, venia [mercy] can only be won by pretio [price]; This compensation of repentance should acquire impunity 2637; for St. Cyprian, man peccata sua eleemosynis redimisset [atones for his sins with alms], eleemosynis [with alms] one can vitam de periculis redimi [free life from dangers] 2638. Tertullian sometimes speaks of satisfying actions as a kind of entrustment of the sinner to God, as a recommendation of sincerity of repentance (commendatio): patientia [patience] of the body precationes commendat [entrusts prayers] 2639; St. Ambrose also knows this concept: with various types of virtues one should commendare se [commit oneself] to God 2640; commendatione meritorum [recommendation, guarantee of merit] to exempt from punishment (solutione poenarum) 2641. But much stronger and more often in Ambrose is the idea of ​​covering sins with satisfactions: with good deeds one can tegere rescatum [cover sin] 2642; and since a strictly quantitative relationship must be maintained between sin and satisfaction, care must be taken, ne plura peccata sint, quam opera virtutum [so that there are no more sins than good deeds] 2643; the penitent must not only diluere lacrymis peccatum suum [to wash away his sin with tears], but also factis operire et tegere delicta [(with good) deeds to cover his sins], so that sin is not imputed to him (non ei imputetur peccatum) 2644; Let us therefore, says the bishop, cover (tegamus) our sins with deeds (factis) and cleanse with tears (mundemus fletibus) 2645; bonis operibus et confessionibus tegamus [we will cover our errors with good deeds and confession] 2646; with abundance (abundantia) bonorum operum tegantur [good deeds cover] sins 2647: caritas [love] covers (operit) multitude of sins 2648. At the same time, satisfactions are for Ambrose, as for other writers, a means of liberation from eternal punishments to which a person would otherwise be subject for his sins: God awaits our sighs (gemitus), but temporary (temporales), in order to free us from eternal ones (ut remittat perpetuos) 2649. The remission of sins that a person acquires for himself through satisfactions does not have the character of merit. At least St. Ambrose very strongly insists that this imputation of satisfying actions is solely a matter of Divine love. The fruits of satisfaction do not have the character of a reward that a person would have the right to demand from God. Those who are in slavery to sins, he says, should be more respectful (reverentiores), and not usurpers (non usurpatores esse debere) 2650. “One must both perform repentance (agendam poenitentiam) and believe in the retribution of mercy (tribuendam veniam credere); it is not so, however, that we hope to receive veniam by virtue of faith (ex fide), but not as what is due to us (non tamquam ex debito); one thing is to deserve (mereri) and another thing is to consider oneself worthy (praesumere). Faith asks for itself as if by virtue of a contract (tamquam ex syngrapho), and praesumptio [high-mindedness] is more characteristic of the arrogant than the one who asks” 2651. And in general, the Western tradition quite sharply distinguished satisfying actions from actions to which the meaning of merit in the proper sense was attributed. For example, for Cyprian, remission of sins, as an act of satisfaction, is only a reward, quasi praemium, but not just a praemium [reward] 2652. A completely different category of deeds are represented by actions that in the language of Western writers are called merit (meritum, merita). Actually, meritum does not mean exclusively a good deed for them: it generally denotes human actions that require remuneration in one form or another. From this point of view, merita is called equally both bad and good deeds. Like Tertullian and Cyprian 2653, this is how St. defines the concept of meritum. Ambrose: for the meritorum [merits] of a person, he says, after death there remain (manere) either rewards or punishments (aut praemia aut supplicia) 2654. But the concept of meritum [merit] in its positive sense, as a means of acquiring reward, acquires very great importance among them. The satisfactorial institution in the West is contrasted with the meritorious institution, which, like the first, is of a contractual and legal nature. If there, through the fear of punishment, God motivates us to bring satisfaction, here, with the promise of reward, He attracts us to good deeds. In this regard, the need for good deeds is motivated solely by the promise of reward for them. God rewards, says St. Ambrose, calls us to virtue 2655. In his opinion, without this hope of reward, moral life is even unthinkable: the absence of hope (desperare) is the cause of negligence, while hope is an incentive to work (incentivum laboris) 2656. From this point of view, the concept meritum [merit] includes any good deed in general. The meaning of good deeds is that they, if only they outweigh evil deeds, are capable of exempting from punishment for the latter and even making a person, if the preponderance is significant, worthy of a heavenly reward instead of punishment. “God rewards everyone,” says St. Ambrose, – secundum opera [on affairs], and the quality of affairs (qualitatem operum) is taken into account; so He either assigns a praemia [reward] for the merits of individual actions (merita singulorum), in case the latter are in the majority and they are of the best quality (complurium et meliorum); or, on the contrary, we are burdened with both the number and the bitterness of merit (et numero gravemur, et acerbitate meritorum)” 2657. “Every person has good merits (bona merita), and also has vices and sins (vitia atque peccata); both are weighed as if on scales (in trutina): if sins outweigh bonis factis [good deeds], then people go to judgment (praecedunt ad judicium), for peccata [sins] are immersed, as it were, in the depths (in profundum), immersed precisely either by their heaviness and bitterness, or by their multitude” 2658. “On the scales (in statera) human deeds (facta) are weighed, and if good deeds outweigh evil, rewards will follow (remuneratio praemiorum), but if sins exceed virtues, then the culprit is bound by an even more deplorable punishment (tristior reum poena constringat)” 2659. But in addition to such a broad understanding of merit, under which every good deed is subsumed, among Western writers we also encounter the teaching of a strictly defined category of deeds that are primarily capable of making a person deserved before God. Those actions that are worthy before God are mainly those actions that are not obligatory for every Christian, but are only recommended by God as desirable and are performed by believers solely of their own free will for the purpose of greater pleasing to God. Tertullian distinguishes between praeceptum [instruction] and consilium [advice], and by praeceptum [instruction] he means actions of the first kind, and by consilium [advice] - the second 2660; sometimes he distinguishes praeceptum [prescription], as a generally binding commandment of the law, and voluntas [will], as the expression of the optional will of God, obedience (obsequium) of which gives merit 2661. St. Cyprian knows those commandments with which God commands (jubet) and those with which He only exhorts (hortatur); in the first, He imposes the yoke of necessity (jugum necessitatis), and in the second, He reserves for man the free decision of His will (maneat voluntatis arbitrium liberum) 2662. Following the example of this, St. Ambrose distinguishes in Scripture and in the teaching of the Church two kinds of prescriptions: generally binding and optional. He sometimes designates the first by the word praeceptum, and by the second he means a vow voluntarily given to God (votum); the latter is not the subject of a Divine command (non jubetur), but is indicated in the form of desire (desideratur) and is therefore more a matter of voluntary election than slavery (electionisque magis est, quam servitude) 2663. In other cases, Ambrose uses Tertullian's division into praeceptum [prescription] and consilium [advice], as well as lex [law] and gratia [grace]: praeceptum [prescription] is prescribed for those under authority (in subditos fertur), and consilium [advice] is given to friends (amicis); where there is praeceptum [injunction], there is lex [law], and where there is consilium [advice], there is gratia [grace]; praeceptum [prescription] is imposed (imponitur), and consilium [advice] is only offered (praeponitur) 2664. Therefore, praeceptum [prescription] is forma praeceptiva [obligatory form, form of law], and consilium [advice] is forma voluntaria [voluntary form]. This difference is adapted to the Gospel story about the rich young man (Matthew 19:16-22): “Will you not understand the difference (distantia) praecepti [prescription] and consilii [counsel] if you remember the one who in the Gospel is first praescribitur [prescribed] not to commit murder, not to commit adultery and not to give false witness? For praeceptum [prescription] exists where punishment for sin is due (poena peccati). But when the young man declared that he had fulfilled the praecepta legis [prescriptions of the law], he was given consilium [advice] to sell all his property and follow the Lord; this is not suggested to him as a prescription (non praecepto imperantur), but is offered in the form of advice (pro consilio deferuntur); so that there is a twofold forma mandati [form of command]: one praeceptiva [obligatory], and the other voluntaria [voluntary]” 2665. Those who have fulfilled the first form of the commandment do not yet have any special merit before God and can only say: for we are unworthy servants, everything that we ought to create has been created (Luke 17:10); whereas the one who fulfills the consilium [advice] expects his reward as due to him (quasi reposita exspectat praemia) 2666. Sometimes the concepts praeceptum [prescription] and consilium [advice] are used by Ambrose together with some other side concepts and are associated with the instructions of St. Apostle Paul regarding celibacy, etc. (1 Cor. 7:6). "When St. The Apostle Paul speaks about virginity, then he gives not a praeceptum [instruction], but consilium [advice]; for what is above the law (supra legem est) is not praescribitur [prescribed], but rather admonished by the given advice (magis dato suadetur consilio); and here it does not insist on authority (nec auctoritas praesumitur), but grace is shown (demonstratur gratia)” 2667. In consilio [advice] there is benefit (utilitas), and in praecepto [prescription] there is coercion (rope, laqueus); consilium [advice] calls on those who voluntarily agree (voluntaries), and praeceptum [instruction] binds against their will (invitos) 2668. The fulfillment of voluntarily chosen consilia [counsels] was seen in the West as especially pleasing to God and important to man. To designate this type of matter, Western church literature has developed a lot of characteristic images and comparisons. St. Cyprian compares these affairs with a spectacle pleasing to God (spectaculum): if the pagans, he says, value it when proconsuls and emperors are present at their spectacles, for which no expense is spared, then how much more important and glorious is it to have Deum [God] and Christum spectatorem [Christ as spectator]! Coelorum virtutes [heavenly powers], Angeli omnes [all angels] 2669 also gather for this spectacle; moreover, it gives pleasure to God (nostri spectaculo perfruatur) 2670. St. occasionally uses this comparison. Ambrose, who speaks of acts of virtue as a theatrum [theater], a spectacle, qui spectaretur ab angelis [which is observed by angels] 2671. Then, Cyprian also knows the image of battle (certamen), which he usually uses together with the previous one (spectaculum) 2672; God spectet nos certantes [looks at us struggling] 2673. This is also the most beloved and used image of St. Ambrose. He means here the struggle with all temptations that are deliberately sent by God to test the strength of man: Whoever wishes to give a praemium [reward] must first spectare certamen [observe the competition], because no one is crowned (coronatur) sine certamine [without a competition] 2674; certamina [contests] make the winner worthy of the crown 2675. With the image of the certamen [contest] of St. Cyprian usually associates the idea of ​​struggle, competition, lists: those who perform deeds worthy of reward are in hoc operis agone currentes [runners in this competition] and, if they turn out to be winners (vincentes), receive a coronam [crown] 2676; they strive in agone justitiae [in the field of righteousness] 2677, which is agon sublimis et magnus et gloriosus [high, great and glorious field] with the reward of coronae coelestis [heavenly crown] 2678. And St. Ambrose likes to combine this idea with the previous one. “How unworthy,” he exclaims, “to assert that, although certaminis gratia [favor for competitions] has power with people, it does not have it with God! For often in this worldly certamine athletarum [competition of athletes] the people are in the habit of crowning (coronare) the vanquished (victos) together with the winners, if the certamina [competitions] of the former are considered worthy of approval; especially those about whom it is known that they were deprived of victory due to misfortune or deception. How can Christ allow the athletas suos [His athletes], who have fallen under heavy punishments, to be left without mercy” (we are talking about the return of the fallen into the Church) 2679. “What athlete, not hoping to receive a coronam [crown], enters the stadium (in the stadium), or what winner (victor), demanding it, will sin!” 2680 Finally, Cyprian ascribes to meritorious actions the meaning of a sacrifice pleasing to God: he specifically speaks of martyrs as sacrificium Deo et pretiosum et gloriosum et plurimum [valuable, glorious and very great sacrifice to God], because martyrs, as hostiae Deo [sacrifices to God], offer themselves sanctas atque immaculatas victimas [(as) a holy and immaculate sacrifice] 2681; but then in general bona facta [good deeds] are considered by him as sacrificia Dei [sacrifices of God] 2682. This identification of works with the character of merit and sacrifice is also found in St. Ambrose: whoever trained for a long time (se exercuit) and fought for Christ (Christo militavit), pro Christo se obtulit [offered himself for Christ] 2683. Western tradition has long known a whole class of actions with the character of merit in the narrow sense of the word. St. Cyprian indicates three types of such activity: martyrs (martyres), virgins (virgines) and righteous people in general (justi) 2684; the last name refers to those who perform opera justitiae [deeds of truth] 2685, opera justa [righteous deeds], that is, in general, in order to acquire merit before God, they perform deeds pleasing to Him, for example, alms 2686. Not all of these deeds are equal in their dignity in his eyes: the first place is occupied by the martyrs, and the second by the virgins: primus martyrum fructus est [the first fruit of the martyrs], and secundus [the second] by the virgins, for whom merces secunda [the second reward] awaits 2687. In Cyprian, martyrdom is generally surrounded by the most majestic aura: it contains the last degree of perfection of life (consummatio vitae in martyrio) 2688. The last place in the listed order is thus occupied by opera justitiae [deeds of truth]. A necessary condition for the significance of all the listed cases is their connection with the Ecclesia catholica [Catholic Church]: outside the Church, even martyrdom cannot have any significance 2689. St. Ambrose holds much the same views. “The grace of the Church is a favorable time for the acquisition of merit (Ecclesiae gratia meritorum vindemia est)” 2690. Then, just as there are many merits, so there are also many deeds that acquire these merits (non una forma meritorum, ideo non una forma factorum) 2691; in this world multa certamina [many competitions] 2692 are possible. As for now these matters, Ambrose does not mention them together anywhere; nevertheless, there is no doubt that he attaches especially great importance to some of his good deeds. This must be said, for example, about virgins, about virgin life, because virgins are given a better place (meliorem locum), and they have more glorious rewards compared to others (in coelo praemia ceteris praestantiora) 2693. Along with this, we also find a high appreciation of martyrdom: there is not una [one], but duplex gratia [double grace], as among people there are not only believers, but also those who suffer for the Lord Jesus; of course, he who qui credit [who believes] has suam gratiam [his grace], but he whose faith is crowned with suffering (passionibus coronetur) has another (alteram); St. the apostle Peter, before he suffered, was not sine gratia [without grace], but when he suffered, he acquired another; and many others, although they do not have the gratiam [grace] of suffering for Christ (ut pro Jesu paterentur), but have the gratiam [grace] of faith (ut in Jesu crederent) 2694. However, St. Ambrose in this case differs from previous Western writers in that, no matter how much he exalts the virgin life and martyrdom, he still does not place above all the feats of martyrdom, like Cyprian, but for the first time in the West points to the service of priests and the life of monks as associated with the highest degree of merit. “Who will argue that in the sphere of more zealous piety of Christians (in attentiore christianorum devotione) the haec duo [these two] turn out to be the most remarkable: clericorum officia et monachorum instituta [duties of clergy and monastic rules]. Both of them are real fighters and athletes who establish the life of angels on earth and fight against nequitiis spiritalibus [spiritual evil]” 2695. From other affairs of St. Ambrose mentions meritum jejunii [merit of fasting] 2696. The merits acquired by such deeds, according to Western writers, have absolute significance for God: a person has the right to demand a reward for them, and God cannot deny him this reward. Meritorious actions in their concrete explanation represent, so to speak, money loaned to God, and God appears to be man's debtor. Patientia [patience], according to Tertullian, has God as its debtorem [debtor] 2697. In the words of St. Cyprian, man lends to God by giving alms to the poor (Deus eleemosynis pauperum foeneratur) 2698. And God, indeed, distributes rewards in accordance with the merits of each; according to Cyprian, He never lacks a reward for our merits (nusquam Dominus mentis nostris ad praemium deerit) 2699. This act of Divine reward for merit in the same Cyprian is designated by the special term dignatio, consisting in God’s recognition of a person’s right to a reward and the dignity corresponding to this right 2700: God served Him filios facere dignatus est [deigned to make His sons] 2701; in particular the martyrs divina dignatio honoravit [i.e. e. the martyrs were honored with Divine reward, honored] 2702. At St. Ambrose we encounter almost the same images and basic concepts: God is a debitor [debtor] for the one who acts in accordance with His will 2703; insofar as God must grant man salvation for his merits, He is called debtor salutis [debtor of salvation] 2704; and on the day of judgment the righteous will indeed receive salutem a Domino [salvation from the Lord], whom he had on earth suae debitorem misericordiae [debtor of mercy] 2705 . At the same time, St. Ambrose also knows another image, similar in meaning: by performing deeds pleasing to God, we turn out to be mercenaries (mercenarii) of the Lord and expect from Him a reward for our own labor (mercedem laboris nostri) 2706. Under such conditions, a person is ascribed a certain claim before God for a reward: he can postulare, demand this reward, just like the prophet David postulet remunerationem a Domino Deo [demands reward from the Lord God] for his labors; then he can usurpare, steal this reward, and this right is the prerogative of faith and truth (praerogativa est fidei atque justitiae) 2707. God, for his part, does not hesitate to award the worthy the appropriate reward: He is the Dispenser of the reward (dispensator mercedis), the Author of the gift (auctor muneris) 2708. Like Cyprian, this act of Divine rewarding truth is present in St. Ambrose the name dignatio, although he uses the latter very rarely; it, apparently, also has the meaning of rendering honor in accordance with merit: divina dignatio [Divine favor] will lead virgins to the rest of the Great Saturday (ad illam magni requiem sabbati) and dignetur, i.e. recognizes them as worthy to place them on the mountain of his heritage (in monte haereditatis suae) 2709. The Western tradition that preceded Ambrose, affirming a strictly quantitative relationship between reward and merit, very clearly distinguished between earthly rewards and heavenly rewards. The reward for merit, according to Cyprian, is given to the righteous already on earth: they are already given here various benefits that they ask from God; he points, for example, to the resurrection of Tabitha as a reward for her virtue 2710; alms delivers life from dangers and frees the soul from death 2711. But the full reward is still realized in heaven. Of the various heavenly rewards of St. Cyprian calls the purple crown of martyrs (purpuream pro passione) and the white crown as a reward for good deeds (coronam candidam pro operibus) 2712. Martyrs have the highest degree of reward: unlike others, they receive it immediately after their death (statim) 2713; inter omnia [among all] the title of blood (sanguinis titulus) turns out to be more beautiful (pulchrior) and the crown most beautiful (integrior corona) 2714; to them belongs magna laus [great praise], nobilis corona [noble crown], majora praemia [great reward] 2715. Then St. Cyprian speaks in general about many abodes (habitacula multa) 2716, about many and better dwellings (habitacula plurima et meliora) 2717; in particular, among various awards, he mentions palma [palm branch, glory], as a reward in general for deeds 2718, palma certaminis [palm branch (glory, victory) in the competition] of martyrs 2719, vita aeterpa [eternal life] 2720, gloria [glory] regarding martyrs 2721, paradisus [paradise] 2722 . As for now St. Ambrose, then in this case he represents that feature in comparison with Cyprian that he completely denies the existence of earthly rewards, attributing the latter exclusively to the other world. He systematically presents the idea of ​​earthly life as a time of exploits, and of heaven as a place of reward. The earth is a place of exercise for man, and heaven is a crown (terra ergo exercitium est hominis, coelum corona) 2723; crying is the fate of the present (praesentium), and the reward (merces) belongs to the future 2724. “Here we compete (luctamur), and elsewhere (alibi) we will be awarded... While we are in this life, the certamen [competition] does not stop, and the corona [crown] awaits us ahead; for no one can gain approval except he who remains steadfast to the very end; so that only afterwards (postea) can he who has legitime certaverit [properly competed] be coronari [crowned]” 2725. St. Ambrose points to the example of St. the Apostle Paul, who, being a vessel of election, did not first, however, demand a reward for himself (non ante sibi coronam vindicavit) until he completed his entire feat (certamen omne consummaret) 2726. This reward awaiting the righteous in heaven is commensurate with the degree of his merit: different virtues (diversis virtutibus) are assigned different rewards (merces diversa proposita est); preference is given to a higher feat (quae meliora praeferantur) 2727. Of the various types of heavenly reward, St. Ambrose calls vitam perpetuam [eternal life], as a reward for good deeds 2728; then he mentions twelve springs and seventy palm trees (duodecim fontes et septuaginta arbores palmarum) waiting in the sky for virgins 2729; we have already seen that he repeatedly calls coronam [crown]; this should also include the idea of ​​paradise (paradisus) and the kingdom of heaven (regnum), and the latter means a higher degree of reward compared to the first 2730; in heaven everyone has a propriam mansionem [proper dwelling] 2731. For what merits the highest degree of award is given remains not entirely clear. Some evidence suggests that he gives preference to bishops and ministers of the Church in general; We have also already seen above that, according to his idea, the Thessalonian Bishop Acholy immediately after his death (solutis vinculis corporis) takes a place among the angels and receives vitae aeternae praemia [reward of eternal life] 2732. Then, our bishop gives noticeable preference to everyone who has provided any important services to the Church. He especially readily attributes this to pious Christian emperors: he speaks of the beatitude of the emperors Gratian and Valentinian II immediately after their death 2733; in the same way, according to him, Theodosius, immediately after his death, is gloriatur [glorified] 2734 and becomes an inhabitant of the supernae illius civitatis [of that highest city] 2735. Until now we have had in mind only those cases in which satisfactions are brought and merits are acquired by the very person who himself desires to receive remission of sins or to receive a reward. But, in addition to this, so to speak, direct method of justification, the Western tradition also knows an indirect one, which consists in imputing the merits of others to those in need. The basis for this idea was those possible cases when a righteous person acquired such an amount of merit that they were not only enough to receive the highest degree of reward, but even some surplus remained from them, which directly could no longer be awarded due to the lack of an appropriate reward. This surplus could be rewarded, so to speak, indirectly, by imputing it to others who needed it, both for deliverance from sins and for receiving a reward 2736. Western Christian antiquity attributed especially important importance in this case to the martyrs, who were considered the main intercessors for sinners: if they did not die (confessors), they could intercede already on earth and, on the basis of their intercessions, the Church accepted back into its fold those who had fallen away 2737; but they intercede even more after they go to heaven and will intercede on the day of Judgment 2738. However, their petitions have no coercive force in relation to God and are satisfied only by the consent of His own will (in dantis arbitrio est); God may fulfill a request, but may not fulfill it 2739. This idea of ​​imputing the merits of others is shared by St. Ambrose; He considers the intercessions of the saints to be the basis for such imputation. By imputing the merits of others, a sinner can get rid of punishment for sins, and this can be done both on earth and in heaven after the death of the sinner. The right to intercede for sinners in the land of St. Ambrose sometimes attributes it to certain individual saints, just as the prophet Moses interceded for the people entrusted to him 2740. But more often he speaks of the prayer of the entire Church, as a mass of believers, whose merits and sufferings in their entirety may be sufficient to cover the sins of others. “The whole Church (tota Ecclesia) must take upon itself the burden (onus) of the sinner and sympathize with him through weeping, prayer and sorrow; and, so to speak, to ferment the whole of oneself with its leaven (fermento ejus se totam conspergat), so that in this way, through everyone (per universos), what is superfluous in anyone who performs repentance (ea quae superflua sunt in aliquo poenitentiam agente) is purified, so to speak, by a dense admixture of universal mercy or compassion (virilis misericordiae aut compassionis velut collativa quadam admixtione purgentur)" 2741. To receive forgiveness of sins, a sinner needs patrocinium sanctae plebis [patronage of the holy people] 2742. In the afterlife, each new deceased is met by angels and souls of saints and interceded for him before God 2743. By imputing the merits of others through this intercession, it is possible, as has been said, to receive a reward and even the highest degree of it, if the deceased lacked something for this: in his “Consolatio de obitu Valentiniani” [“Consolatory Word on the Death of Valentinian (Emperor)”], St. Ambrose contemplates the Emperor Gratian, interceding out of brotherly love (pietate fraterna quasi advocatus assistat) for his brother Valentinian II, who died unbaptized 2744; after this, he is presented with the image of Valentinian, enjoying complete bliss according to the merits of Gratian, who introduced him into all the secrets of heaven and by virtue of baptism 2745. Church sacraments and methods of communication among church members The visible intermediaries in communicating the gifts of grace to believers are the hierarchical ministers of the Church - priests and bishops. They receive a special assignment from God for this (Dominus ordinavit) 2746. They are intended to be the spiritual leaders of the people, to communicate to them the word of God 2747, to preserve the flock of believers from the attacks of heretics 2748, to intercede for them before God and to serve as intermediaries through whom God enters into communication with his people 2749. In the latter case, hierarchical persons, according to St. Ambrose, are purely passive conductors of grace poured out on man; in the proper sense, the performers of the sacraments are not they, but through them God, and the work of God cannot be attributed to human help (humanae opis); sacraments are gifts of God 2750 ; although God gave everything to his disciples, but where the grace of the Divine gift (divinae muneris gratia) operates, it is not revealed to human power (nulla in his hominis potestas est) 2751. Views of St. Ambrose on the relationship between the Divine and human factors in the hierarchical ministry do not have much significance in the history of Western dogmatics. On this issue, by his time, two different trends had already more or less emerged in the West: the old one, which had already been finally established, and the other, which, although it had been expressed a long time ago, had not yet received full disclosure and recognition. According to the first view, the grace of the priesthood is directly dependent on the personal moral worth of the hierarchical minister; sinful members of the hierarchy lose their hierarchical rights and dignity. It was defended by St. Cyprian: for him, the spiritual actions of a sinner bishop concerning religious subjects are invalid 2752; Therefore, the people themselves are obliged to separate themselves from the sinner-primate (a peccatore praeposito) and not to take part in the sacrifices of the sacrilegious priest (nec se ad sacrilegi sacerdotis sacrificia miscere) 2753. Another trend was outlined by the Roman bishop Callixtus, who, according to the testimony of Hippolytus, demanded the irremovability of the bishop even in the event of the latter’s mortal sins 2754. But it later found its main defender and theorist in the person of Blzh. Augustine, who, as we will have the opportunity to consider this in more detail, revealed the doctrine of the nature of the priesthood indelible by any personal sins. St. Ambrose continues to side with Cyprian: “Sacerdos [priest] asks more (impetrat) when virtue is stronger (cum virtus praevalet)” 2755. This determines the need for priests to take special care of their personal morality; only under this condition can they retain their gift forever. “I love,” says St. Ambrose, - you, elders or deacons, who, if you succeed in anything, never experience a lack of your gift for a long time (nequaquam se patiuntur a suo diutius abesse munere)... Let us therefore always follow Jesus without ceasing. And if we always follow, then we never become impoverished (numquam deficimus) in our gift; for He gives strength (vires) to those who follow Him. As a result, the closer you are to virtue (propior virtuti fueris), the stronger you will be (eo fortior eris)” 2756. The expression diutius [for a long time], used here by the saint (a suo diutius abesse munere), apparently gives reason to assume that, although sins deprive priests of the gift of hierarchical grace, this deprivation is only temporary, more or less lasting; Probably, the correction of a sinful clergyman eo ipso [thereby] returns to him the grace removed by sins. The same probably matters regarding the conditions of validity of the church sacraments performed by priests. The word “sacrament” (sacramentum, mysterium) is still preserved by St. Ambrose has the same broad meaning that it had in the West before. In addition to the sacraments in the proper sense of the word, he readily applies the concept of sacramentum, as we have seen, to the act of the Incarnation; he often also talks about heavenly sacraments, heavenly mysteries that will be revealed to us in the future life. In general, the section on the sacraments in his works is revealed more or less weakly; they give us material for characterizing his views only regarding the sacraments of baptism, repentance and communion. Baptismatis sacramentum [sacrament of baptism] 2757. Ambrose considers both its essence, together with its external form, and its internal effect on man. Two agents take part in the sacrament of baptism - water and the Holy Spirit. The need for baptism by water and the Spirit is motivated differently. In some cases, St. Ambrose resembles Tertullian here. The latter motivates the need for the presence of water and Spirit in baptism by the duality of the composition of human nature: body and spirit; both caro [flesh] and spiritus [spirit] act together in the commission of sin (inter se communicant reatum), with the only difference that the spirit in this case commands, and the body carries out its commands; now in baptism the Spirit of God must cleanse a person’s spirit from sin, and water must cleanse his flesh 2758. In Ambrose we find the same motive: since a person consists of soul and body, the visible is cleansed by the visible, and the invisible by the invisible, the body by water, and the soul by the Holy Spirit, the need to cleanse both body and soul together is explained by the fact that sins equally belong to both the soul and the body, and that, therefore, cleansing from sins (purificatio communis) 2759 must also be common to them. But next to this at St. Ambrose we also encounter another argument - from the mysterious meaning of the sacrament of baptism. This argument reminds us of the Cappadocians and most of all of St. Basil the Great. According to St. Vasily, in baptism we must first die to the old carnal, sinful life, and then rise to a new one - holy and spiritual. Therefore, the Lord laid down for us the covenant of baptism, which is the image of death and life (ϑανάτου τύπος καὶ ζωῆς περισχουσαν); the image of death is water, and the guarantee of life is received from the Spirit. Water has the image of death, taking the baptized body as if into a coffin when immersed (ὥσπερ ἐν ταφῆ τὸ σῶμα παραδεχόμενον), and the Spirit gives us life-giving power (ζωοποιὸν δύναμιν), renewing our soul from sinful deadness into original life. So it is with St. Ambrose in illo aquarum elemento [in this watery element] we are sepelimur [buried], and renovati per Spiritum resurgemus [renewed by the Spirit we are resurrected]; the gifts of water and the Spirit are different: aqua [water] is the image of death (imago mortis), and in the Spirit we possess the guarantee of life (in Spiritu pignus est vitae); per aquam [through water] the corpus peccati [the body of sin] dies, since it encloses the body as if in a coffin (quae quasi quoquam tumulo corpus includit); and per virtutem Spiritus [by the power of the Spirit] we are renewed a morte peccati [from the death of sin], we become reborn in God (renati in Deo) 2760; water is thus a witness of burial (testis est sepulturae), and the Spirit is a witness of life (testis est vitae) 2761. With this St. Vasily also connects another argument - from the comparison of baptism with the death of Christ. For the perfection of life, he says, it is necessary to imitate Christ in everything, i.e. not only the examples of virtue He showed in His life, but also His death; we also imitate the burial of Christ through baptism because the bodies of those baptized in water are, as it were, buried 2762. St. Ambrose also sees in baptism an image of burial and death with Christ from the elements of this world (consepulti in baptismo et mortui cum Christo ab dementis hujus mundi) 2763. Therefore, he speaks of our receiving in baptism the likeness of Christ (similitudinem Christi), since in baptism we are buried in the likeness of His death (cujus mortis similitudini consepulti) and receive the image of His life (imaginem vitae) 2764. Although, due to the above considerations, water is an essential element when performing baptism, nevertheless, it does not have sacramental, sanctifying power here on its own, but receives it from the Spirit; by itself, it retains all its natural properties. In this regard, we must again note Ambrose’s direct dependence on St. Vasily, as the following comparison shows. However, the same views were held in the West even before Ambrose, so his teaching could not seem new there. Tertullian, for example, explains the sanctifying power of water from the presence of the Holy Spirit in it (de Sancto sanctificata natura aquarum, et ipsa sanctificare concepit); he recalls that already at the very beginning of peacemaking, the Spirit of God hovered above the water, imparting life-giving power to it 2765. In addition to immersion in water, a necessary moment when performing baptism is the pronouncement of the well-known baptismal formula. Just as energetic as St. Basil the Great in his polemic against the Arians, St. Ambrose requires that such a formula include a confession of faith in the Holy Trinity, and that baptism be performed in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. This formula should serve as the most reliable criterion in judging the validity or invalidity of baptism: baptism performed without it, and, moreover, by persons who damage the Orthodox teaching of the Holy Trinity, for example, Arians, cannot have the meaning of a valid sacrament 2766. The internal actions of baptismal grace are determined by St. Ambrose is very different. Here he mostly just repeats what we find in other Western writers. What they all had in common was the belief that through baptism a person is actually restored to his original state, in which he was before the fall. This restoration is expressed, first of all, in a change in the properties of human nature damaged by sin. The filth of original sin is destroyed: those who are baptized, according to Cyprian, by the power of the grace of the saving font, take off the old man and, renewed by the Holy Spirit at the second birth (iterata nativitate), are cleansed from the impurity of the ancient infection (a sordibus contagionis antiquae) 2767. Along with hereditary sin, of course, personal sins (remissio peccatorum) 2768 are also forgiven. St. Ambrose also connects with baptism the destruction of original defilement, using for this the images of stripping and endowment. Everyone who is baptized takes off (exuat) that in which he was born (quod natus est), and puts on (induat) that in which he was reborn (quod renatus) 2769; the body, which previously, serving as a bait for sin, was poison (venenum), now becomes an antidote (antidotum) 2770. In this sense, the bishop explains the fact of the Savior’s washing his feet to his disciples: “St. the apostle Peter was clean (mundus), but still had to wash his feet (plantarn); for he inherited the sin of the first man (primi hominis de successione peccatum), when the serpent overthrew him (supplantavit) and led him into error. Therefore, his feet are washed in order to destroy hereditary sins (haereditaria peccata)" 2771. But along with hereditary sins, baptism also washes away all our personal sins; it means remissio peccatorum omnium [remission of all sins] 2772. The baptized person thus becomes a new creature (nova creatura) 2773. Along with the rebirth of man's sinful nature, Western writers associated with the concept of baptism the return of Divine grace to him; but, insofar as their existence in the image and likeness of God was conditioned by the presence of grace, baptism was also considered by them as the return to man of the likeness of God, as the full realization in him of the image of God: man is now restored (restituitur), according to Tertullian, ad similitudinem [in the likeness] of God, whereas before he was only ad imaginem Dei [in the image of God], for the imago [image] is contemplated in the image (in effigie), a similitudo [similarity] – in eternity (in aeternitate); he again receives that Spirit of God (illud Dei spiritum), which he lost during the fall 2774. Since the original immortality of man had its cause in the Spirit of God that was upon him, the return in the baptism of the Spirit is at the same time the return of lost immortality. Tertullian speaks of consecutio [attainment] in baptism aeternitatis [eternity] 2775; Novatian sees in baptism the return of the flesh not only ad statum innocentiae [to the state of innocence], but, after the removal of guilt, also to immortalitatem [immortality] 2776. By a strange coincidence, Ambrose does not seem to time the return of man's likeness to God to the sacrament of baptism, although in general Tertullian's idea in spirit is in complete harmony with his own views; he also connects with baptism the return of grace: the baptized becomes an heir not of the natural order, but of grace (fiat non familiae haeres, sed gratia) 2777. Because of this, baptism is called by St. Ambrose by heavenly birth, right of divine birth (jus divinae generationis) 2778. Receiving immortality also refers to the actions of baptismal grace: the baptized person can find for himself a permanent abode of eternal life (perpetuum domicilium habitationis aeternae) 2779. Baptism, of course, performed in the correct way, according to the teachings of St. Ambrose, cannot be repeated: whomever the Ecclesia [Church] washes, there is no need to wash it a second time (iterum lavare) 2780. The dogmatic basis for this is with him, as with St. Basil, serves the uniqueness and uniqueness of the death of Christ, which is depicted by baptism: As for now, the time of performing the sacrament of baptism, then, according to the generally accepted church practice of that time, it took place already at a more or less conscious age of a person, very often in adulthood, and sometimes even before death. The practice of infant baptism undoubtedly also existed in Christian antiquity, although some, albeit very few, church writers, especially Tertullian, found baptism unnecessary for infants in view of their purity and moral purity 2781. St. Ambrose equally defends both the practice of adult baptism and the practice of infant baptism (omnis aetas Sacramento idonea); This is supported by his conviction that sinful defilement is inherent in every age, so that no one can be clean from it (sicut ab infantia peccatum, ita ab infantia circumcisio, omnis aetas peccato obnoxia) 2782. In addition to the usual form of baptism with water and the Spirit, Christian antiquity, both in the East and in the West, also knew baptism with blood, which was considered equivalent in its effect to baptism with water; This view was especially widespread during the era of persecution, when many Christians, not having time to be baptized, became martyrs. St. Ambrose respects this ancient belief and considers martyrdom to be equivalent to baptism: aliud baptisma... baptismum passionis [another baptism... a baptism of suffering] 2783. He was especially encouraged to do this by the violent death at the hands of the usurper of his still unbaptized favorite Valentinian II, whom, in view of his services to the Church, he looked upon as a Christian martyr. It is on the occasion of his death and wanting to console the sisters of the deceased, who were obviously worried about the final fate behind the grave of their unbaptized brother, that the Milanese bishop proves the identity of martyrdom and baptism: if those preparing for holy baptism accept the crown of martyrdom before they have time to proceed to the sacrament itself, then their baptism with their own blood acquires for them the power of baptism with water and the Spirit 2784. In other places he explains that martyrdom has such great power that, like baptism, it destroys previous guilt (culpam superiorem) and frees a person from everything deserved by sins (meritum delictorum) 2785. However, as a consolation to the relatives of the tall deceased St. Ambrose also cites a consideration of another kind, quite curious from the point of view of his views on the reality of the sacraments: it turns out that the intention and solicitation of the sacrament (voluntas et petio) is capable of having a meaning equivalent to the grace of a truly received sacrament, if the latter is prevented by circumstances independent of the will, as happened with Valentinian II 2786. Here, as in baptism, the external form of the sacrament and the nature of the grace imparted by it also differ. Ambrose's form of performing the sacrament remains the same. In this case, first of all, it should be noted that while in the East public repentance, which was practiced there along with secret repentance in the first centuries, starting from the 4th century, began to gradually fall out of use 2787, St. Ambrose still distinguishes two more types of repentance: public (publice agitur) and private; the latter is reserved for light sins (delictorum leviorum), and the former is intended for more severe sins (graviorum) 2788. Sometimes Ambrose uses the concepts of crimen and delictum, as they were distinguished by ancient Roman law, to distinguish between the spheres of public and private repentance and to distinguish between light and serious sins. The latter knew two groups of offenses: crimina publica and delicta privata; the former meant crimes against society and the state, which, being more serious, were accompanied by public punishment; the latter meant violations of the personal or property interests of private individuals; as they concerned only individuals, they were prosecuted only at the request of the victims themselves 2789. Likewise, Ambrose distinguishes among the penitents, firstly, as more serious sinners, those who wash away the gravibus aerumnis poenas commissorum criminum [with severe suffering, crimes committed, i.e., bear heavy punishments for them], and, secondly, those who fletibus et lacrymis [with tears and tears] cleanse the propria delicta [their own sins] 2790. Unfortunately, St. Ambrose does not give us a complete list of light and serious sins; but what we generally know about cases of public repentance generally coincides with the concepts of Roman law about crimina and delicta: Tertullian classifies murder, idolatry, blasphemy, fornication, etc. among graviora peccata [grave sins]. In both cases, all those actions that in the language of Western writers were called satisfactions served as a form of repentance. But the bishop speaks in detail about public repentance, while the details of private repentance were probably left to the personal discretion of the penitents. Public repentance is defined as internal mourning for committed sins, combined with known external deeds. First of all, it requires sincere repentance, the inner disposition and self-condemnation of the sinner, consciousness of one’s own sinfulness. The model for the repentant in this regard is the prophet David, who never forgot or denied his own sins, but, constantly having them before his eyes, he himself proclaimed to everyone about his iniquities 2792. But the sincerity of the inner disposition and repentance must be evidenced by constant prayers to God, sorrows and tears, torture of the body, fasting 2793, as well as works of mercy 2794. Repentance must have its external expression, finally, in complete removal from participation in church sacraments: until a person is freed from the sins that weigh on him, while his flesh is at war with his mind, he cannot bear the fruits of grace, patience and peace; In this case, it is better for him not to start the sacraments at all, than to start them unworthily and thus, during the time of repentance, commit serious sins, which in turn require repentance 2795. In addition to feats of repentance, as proof of the sincerity of repentance, another necessary moment of repentance is priestly or episcopal absolution from sins. We pay special attention to this circumstance in view of the fact that it is mainly only here that we note in St. Ambrose the strongest traces of the hierarchical concept of the Church. He justifies, first of all, the need for such permission: without it, the sinner cannot hope for forgiveness in heaven; where sins are committed, they must be forgiven; sins bound on earth remain bound in heaven, and sins resolved on earth are resolved in heaven 2796. The right of such permission belongs to the Church founded by Christ on earth. This necessarily follows from another right of the same Church, namely from its right to bind sins: the Lord equally granted to the Church jus et solvendi et ligandi [the right to solve and bind]; those who deny her jus solvendi [the right to decide] cannot retain jus ligandi [the right to knit], just as someone who does not have jus ligandi [the right to knit] cannot have jus solvendi [the right to decide]. The Church has both the first and the second (utrumque), in contrast to heresy, which has neither one nor the other 2797. But the representatives of the Church in its rights to bind and decide are priests and bishops. Christ first gave the power to knit and decide to St. to the Apostle Peter and other apostles, and from them this power passed to the shepherds of the Church 2798; the latter receive the Holy Spirit, which makes them priests for the forgiveness of sins of people 2799. This right is granted exclusively to them alone (jus hoc solis permissum sacerdotibus est) 2800. From here we extract a very important criterion for judging the validity or invalidity of the sacrament of repentance; If for baptism such a criterion is the integrity of the faith in the Holy Trinity, then for repentance it turns out to be the legitimacy of the sanctioning hierarchy: Ecclesia [the Church] can bind and decide, because it has true priests (veros sacerdotes), and heresy, which does not have priests of God (sacerdotes Dei), does not have this right either 2801. However, even in the act of priestly permission, “the church act is not at all identical with Divine forgiveness” 2802. According to his general idea of ​​the importance of the personality of the priest when performing the sacraments, St. Ambrose attaches meaning to the priestly act of absolution from sins not so much as sacramental in the literal meaning of the word, but as outwardly symbolic. In reality, only God alone can forgive sins, and if He gave this power (dimittendi potestatem) to His priests, then this only means that He Himself forgives sins through the priests 2803; the priestly act is only a certification that the act of divine forgiveness has taken place. In its internal meaning, repentance is so close to the sacrament of baptism that it constitutes one sacrament with it (unum in utroque mysterium est); it gives remissio peccatorum [absolution of sins] committed after baptism 2804. At the same time, St. Ambrose defends the practice of a very lenient attitude towards serious sinners. The Christian West of that time had a dual attitude towards sinners. The older practice was also more strict. Among the classical writers of the West, this practice found a defender in the person of the Montanist-minded Tertullian, who divided sins into forgiven and unforgivable (remissibilia and irremissibilia) 2805; although the Church demanded repentance for the last kind of sins, nevertheless, she did not dare to resolve them with her own power, encouraging only the repentant to hope for the truth and mercy of the Divine sentence 2806. During the time of St. Ambrose, the same views were held by the followers of Novatian, who have not yet disappeared in the West, against whom his books “De poenitentia” [“On Repentance”] were directed. St. Cyprian, on the contrary, stands before us as a defender of the opposite way of thinking: demanding from the ministers of the Church extreme caution in the matter of the re-acceptance into the Church of grave sinners, who had to be thoroughly tested first in terms of the circumstances of their fall and sincerity of repentance, he still allows for the possibility of cleansing from almost all sins (peccata omnia passione purgasse) 2807; the exception is sins against the Holy Spirit 2808. St. Ambrose not only adheres to the direction of Cyprian, but in most cases recognizes the possibility of forgiveness of all sins without any exception: let the believer not be afraid of perishing either in the event of any condition or due to any fall (ex quocumque statu, ex quocumque lapsu) 2809. “Some argue,” says our bishop, “that mercy can be shown only in respect of lighter sins (relaxare veniam levioribus), while more serious crimes (gravioribus criminibus) are excluded from this ... but God does not make (such) distinction (distinctionem), who promised his mercy (misericordiam suam) to everyone and entrusted to his priests the power of showing mercy without any exception (sine ulla exceptione)” 2810. Even Judas the traitor could have earned forgiveness from God for his crime, if only he had repented before Christ, and not before the Jews 2811. The basis for such hope in the infinity of God’s all-forgiveness is faith in the omnipotence of God: God can forgive such sins that seem unforgivable to man, because what is impossible for man is possible for God 2812. The uniqueness of repentance, provided it is done correctly, is based on the relationship between the grace-filled gifts of the sacrament of repentance and baptism; however, this uniqueness applies only to public repentance, while private repentance can be performed even daily (quotidiani) 2813. Christi corporis et sanguinis sacramentum [sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ] 2814. Our bishop’s dogmatic teaching about this sacrament is revealed too weakly and fragmentarily, but what we find in him in this case speaks mostly of his solidarity with other Western writers. We find in him, first of all, a view of the sacrament of the Eucharist as a repetition of the Sacrifice of Christ the Savior on the Cross, performed for the purpose of remembering it. This view of the meaning of the Eucharistic offerings was first revealed in detail in the West in the works of St. Cyprian, for whom the whole sacrament is sacramentum sacrificii Dominici [the sacrament of the Lord's sacrifice] 2815; in all our sacrifices (in sacrificiis omnibus) we create the memory of His Passion (passionis ejus mentionem facimus), for we must do no other than what He Himself did 2816. Likewise, according to the teaching of Ambrose, when we offeramus pro populo sacrificium [offer a sacrifice for the people], we follow the principem sacerdotum [(in this) after the High Priest], who came to us and offered pro nobis [for us] His Blood; this imitation should replace for us the Sacrifice of Christ, which is no longer offered on earth by Christ: although Christ is no longer offered (etsi nunc Christus non videtur offerre), but still He is ipse offertur [He is offered] on earth when Christi corpus offertur [the Body of Christ is offered] 2817; in this sense of constant repetition in the Eucharistic Sacrifice of the Sacrifice of Christ it is said that on the church altar Christus hostia est [Christ is the sacrifice] 2818. This, of course, presupposes the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist 2819. In this case, the Eucharistic bread and wine, of course, take on the meaning of the Body and Blood of Christ. Ambrose describes the way in which bread and wine receive the properties of Body and Blood with features that very closely remind us of Tertullian. The latter is sometimes considered a representative of the “symbolic” view of the Eucharist, 2820 but the word “symbol,” if we use it, has a special meaning here, different from ours; it does not mean a thing that is not actually in front of us, but which is replaced, represented by another thing similar to it in some respect, as happens in our symbols; on the contrary, in patristic literature the concept of “symbol” means any sensually comprehended thing, in which, as in the outer shell, there is another, invisible, but, nevertheless, truly existing thing 2821. This is precisely the point of view taken by Tertullian, and many other fathers and teachers of the Church, attributing to bread and wine the properties of the Body and Blood of Christ. He uses mainly two terms here: 1) repraesentatio, representation, presence behind someone or something: with bread Christ ipsum corpus suum repraesentat [represents His Body] 2822; 2) figuga, figure, appearance, appearance: The Savior gave corporis sui figuram [the figure of His Body] to bread 2823. In accordance with the above, these two terms have the meaning that under the figure of bread and wine in the Eucharist the Body and Blood of the Savior are invisibly present: His corpus [Body] is considered, thought (censetur) by us to be present in the bread (in pane) 2824. This was meant, in contrast to the main theses of Gnosticism, to prove the possibility of combining the sensory shell and the spiritual principle into an inextricable whole 2825. St. Ambrose, to denote the transformation of bread and wine into Body and Blood, first introduced in the West the terms conversio [transformation], mutare [change], transfiguratio [transformation] 2826, transfiguration, change from one type to another (offeras transfigurandum corpus altaribus) 2827; but his further reasoning gives reason to think that what he means here is essentially the same as Tertullian. The bishop’s remark is worthy of attention that at the moment of communion we perceive the Lord not in the bread itself, but only with our mind (mentis hospitio) 2828. The essay “De mysteriis” [“On the Sacraments”] sheds clear light on this. As far as mutare [change] 2829 is concerned with the Eucharistic offerings at the moment of the sacrament, bread and wine take on new properties that they did not have before: before the Eucharistic blessing, alia species nominatur [one species is named], and after the blessing, the corpus [Body] is designated (significatur); before the blessing aliud dicitur [one thing is said], and after sanguis [Blood] it is called (nuncupatur) 2830. But still, apparently, the former properties of bread and wine are preserved, so that together with them we receive a spiritual body and spiritual blood: in illo Sacramento [in this sacrament] Christus [Christ] is present, because here the corpus Christi [Body of Christ] is offered; however, this Body is not carnal food, but spiritual (non ergo corporalis esca, sed spiritualalis), and the Eucharistic Body of Christ is a spiritual body (corpus enim Dei corpus est spirituale), corpus [Body] of the Divine Spirit (divini Spiritus), because Spiritus Christus [Spirit is Christ] 2831. The external act by which bread and wine receive the meaning of blood and flesh is the Eucharistic blessing and sanctification (benedictio, consecratio): that which formed (formavit) natura [nature] sanctified (consecravit) benedictio [blessing], since the power of benedictionis [blessing] is greater than the power of naturae [nature], benedictione [by blessing] even ipsa natura [nature itself] changes (mutatur) 2832. Moreover, in the act of Eucharistic blessing, human blessing (humana benedictio) and Divine sanctification (consecratio divina) are very clearly distinguished as two separate moments. If human blessing had such great power (tantum valuit) that it was capable of changing nature (ut naturam converteret), then even stronger is Divine sanctification, in which verba ipsa Domini Salvatoris [the very words of the Lord Savior] operate; it is by the word of the latter (sermone Christi) that the sacrament is finally accomplished (conficitur); a word that has created something existing out of nothing can change everything into what it was not before, since it is not easier (non minus) to give things a new nature than to change an already existing one (novas rebus dare, quam mutare naturas) 2833. Of the various fruits of the Eucharistic sacrifice, which are already listed in ancient patrolological monuments, St. Ambrose knows only one, which, moreover, is not the exclusive effect of the Eucharist: both baptism and repentance, and the Eucharist, he assimilates peccatorum remissio [remission of sins] 2834. In him we do not find that realistic understanding of the fruits of this sacrament, which gained strength from his older contemporary Ilarius. For the latter, the Eucharist is mainly a means of uniting believers in the flesh with Christ. Insofar as all believing humanity is conceived as a single body with Christ, the Eucharist is considered one of the most important means of including and consolidating believers in the composition of this body: in the Eucharistic food we prepare for communion with God (ad Dei consortium praeparamur); and through the communion of the holy flesh we are again placed in the whole of the holy body (per communionem sancti corporis in communione deinceps sancti corporis collocandi) 2835. Relationships between Church Members Another type of church relations consists of various forms of relations between members of the Church and are either relations between the earthly and heavenly Church and vice versa, or relations between earthly members of the Church. Of the first kind of relationships, the most important is the relationship with the Blessed Virgin Mary. In the teaching about the Blessed Virgin Mary, the historical significance of our writer is unusually great. In Harnack's "History of Dogmas" he, together with Bl. Jerome is called the “patron” of the Mother of God 2836, which, however, sounds somewhat strange. His significance in this case is revealed by comparison with other writers who before him became famous for their teaching about the Mother of God. Such writers were especially Irenaeus and Tertullian. Irenaeus revealed his teaching about the dignity of the Mother of God in close connection with his teaching about the new headship (recapitulatio) of humanity by Christ: developing the idea of ​​Christ as the New Adam, he also taught about the Virgin Mary as the new mother of the new humanity; saying that Christ made up for the shortcomings of the first Adam, he also argued about the Blessed Virgin that she corrected the ancient error of Eve. Between Eve and the Virgin Mary there is the same inverse relationship that was established between Christ and Adam. Just as Eve was deceived by the word of an angel (per angeli sermonem) in order to depart from God, transgressing His word, so the Virgin Mary received the gospel per angelicum sermonem [by the word of an angel] in order to bear God, obeying His word; just as she disobeyed God, so this one was obedient to Him, so that the Virgin Mary became the intercessor (fieret advocata) of the virgin Eve; and just as through the Virgin the human race was bound by the bonds of death, so through the Virgin it is saved, because the Virgin’s disobedience is balanced by the Virgin’s obedience 2837. The Virgin Mary was thus of great importance in the cause of the salvation of mankind (causa facta est salutis) 2838. But since Irenaeus deduces the high importance of the Virgin Mary for humanity solely from the contrast of her personal qualities and life circumstances with the qualities and circumstances of Eve’s life, then her “active” participation in the salvation of mankind is still expressed rather weakly. The teaching about the Blessed Virgin Mary of Tertullian in some points reveals a close dependence on the teaching of Irenaeus. For him, the Virgin Mary is also the new Eve and for the same reasons as Irenaeus: Eve was a virgin who was seduced by a deadly word (verbum aedificatorium mortis); therefore it was necessary for the life-creating Word of God (Dei Verbum extructorium vitae) to enter into the Virgin, so that salvation could occur through the same sex (per eumdem sexum) through which destruction entered; Eve believed the serpent, and Mary believed Gabriel, so that what the former sinned by faith against the devil (credendo deliquit) was destroyed by faith (credendo delevit); the first gave birth to the devil, a fratricide, and the second conceived the One who saved Israel, her brother in the flesh 2839. Further, Tertullian's view of natural sexual birth as the source of sin prompts him to especially defend the virginity of the Mother of God not only before the Birth, but also at the very moment of conception and birth: only a virgo [virgin] could be our regeneration (regeneratio nostra) 2840; although she really gave birth to a Son, it was not through the assistance of her husband, so that she remained a Virgin in relation to a person and was not a Virgin in relation to the one whom she gave birth to 2841. At the same time, the personal sinlessness of the Mother of God is affirmed: virgo [virgin] was spiritually sanctified by Christ from all defilement (spiritaliter ab omnibus inquinamentis sanctificata per Christum) 2842. St. Ambrose shares the idea of ​​the Virgin Mary as the Second Eve, although this idea is illustrated by new examples: the first Eve expelled a man from paradise, and the Second Eve took him to heaven 2843. Like Tertullian, he defends the personal sinlessness of the Mother of God: by the power of grace she remained untouched by sin (per gratiam ab omni intergra labe peccati) 2844. But he goes beyond what we found in Tertullian and discusses the issue we are considering in much more detail. First of all, he emphasizes the idea of ​​the Ever-Virginity of the Mother of God. She was a virgin before the Birth of Christ the Savior and in the very act of Birth, because she conceived and gave birth to the Son “without any admixture of male seed” (sine ulla virilis seminis admixtione) 2845; intergritas [innocence] 2846 belongs to her. Then, Mary remained a virgin after the Birth of her Son and generally forever. She is the Virgin who has not violated her virginity (incorrupta virgo) 2847. In this sense, St. Ambrose already applies to her Ezekiel's prophecy about the holy gates of the future church, through which only the Lord God of Israel will pass and which will remain closed to everyone else (Ezek. 44:2). In his interpretation, the gate symbolized Mary, through whom only Christ the Savior entered the world; having passed through them, Christ did not open them, so that Mary remained a virgin (virgo), keeping the seal of her chastity inviolable (inviolata integritatis signacula) 2848; the gates remained closed forever and were not opened by anyone else 2849. Likewise, in relation to this thought, the expression of the Evangelist is explained that Joseph did not know Mary until he gave birth to his Firstborn Son (Matthew 1:25). With these words St. The Evangelist does not say at all, as some argued already at that time, that after the Birth of the Savior Mary, according to the laws of natural birth, already had sons 2850, since “donee” only indicates that something did not happen before a certain moment in time, but does not at all imply that this something should have certainly happened after the onset of this moment; in a similar sense, for example, in the psalmist, God the Father says to the Son: Sit at My right hand, until I will make your enemies your footstool (Ps. 109:1), although it does not follow from this that the Son of God ceased to sit at the right hand of God the Father after triumphing over his enemies; on the contrary, as true God, He dwells eternally with the Father 2851. The brothers of Christ spoken of in the Gospel were not actually the sons of Mary. They could be the sons of Joseph and could even be called brothers by Christ in the sense of belonging to the same clan and even people (gentis et generis, populi quoque consortium); in this sense the name of the brothers of Christ can be applied to many 2852. For the sake of such high dignity of the Mother of God, St. Ambrose calls it a palace (aula), consecrated for the dwelling of God, a sanctuary of unsullied purity (immaculatae castitatis sacrarium), a church of God (Dei templum) 2853; in these qualities she serves as an eternal model for all Christian virgins: the vita [life] of Mary is for us, as it were, virginity embodied in a concrete image (tamquam in imagine descripta virginitas), and in her, as in a mirror, shines the image of purity and the form of virtue (species castitatis and forma virtutis) 2854. Then, Ambrose not only highly values ​​the dignity of the Mother of God, but even attributes to her a certain degree of active participation in the salvation of people 2855: to her he applies the promise given to Eve to erase the head of the serpent (Gen. 3:15), since she already owns part of the victory over the devil 2856; about her, therefore, it is said that she freed Eve 2857 and generally accomplished the salvation of the world (operata est mundi salutem) 2858. Finally, St. Ambrose already directly calls on believers ad cultum to venerate St. Mary and any doubt about Her Ever-Virginity, any manifestation of disrespect towards Her is viewed as impiety, sacrilege (sacrilegium), which cannot be left without condemnation (indamnatum) 2859. However, the veneration of Mary should not turn into deification of her, into divine worship of her: She was only the church of God, but not the God of the church; divine worship must be rendered to one God only, the trinity in Persons 2860. The veneration of the Mother of God is followed by the veneration of saints and angels. The holy martyrs also enjoyed special veneration, as in the first centuries; at the same time, not only their sacred memory was revered, but also their remains (reliquiae). In one letter to Sister Marcellina, St. Ambrose describes his discovery of the relics of the Milanese martyrs Gervasius and Protasius, marveling, like a miracle, at the fact that these remains were incorruptible: the bones preserved intact, the presence of blood among them told him that the martyrs were men exalted by God 2861. Their bodies are called trophies of an exalted spirit; the incorruptibility of their bodies is considered to be the work of God; The incorruptible relics are compared with the heavens mentioned by the psalmist, preaching about the glory of God 2862. They provide the Church with protection 2863, assistance and therefore are called patrons 2864. They take part in the life of the Church and, while in heaven, have compassion for those living on earth, awaiting with them the final liberation of creation from the sighs caused by sin 2865. The disposition of the heavenly saints towards their earthly brothers is expressed in the various benefits of the former to the latter, so that the saints in heaven remain our neighbors; this closeness of the saints to people should encourage the latter to virtue and works of mercy, since only under such a condition do the saints maintain their closeness to us 2866. The memory of all such saints and martyrs, glorified by God and known for their patronage of the Church, is solemnly celebrated by the Church; this celebration consisted of dedicating to the memory of the remembered special solemn word on his virtues as an example for the faithful to follow and in the celebration of the Eucharistic Sacrifice 2867. Ambrose associates the veneration of saints with the veneration of their sacred remains and sacred objects in general. One of the first places in this regard is occupied by the veneration of the Holy Cross as an instrument of the Death of Christ and an instrument of the salvation of mankind: it is called the sign of salvation 2868, the palm of eternal life 2869, the sword with which the head of the devil is truncated 2870. The power of the Cross of Christ is generally so great that even the fact that this Cross was hidden for a long time and unknown to people, in the eyes of Ambrose, is the work of the devil himself, who, in the absence of the Cross, tried to conquer humanity again 2871. The Cross of Christ, found by Queen Helena on Mount Golgotha, has miraculous power; the crown made by Helen for Constantine from nails found at the Cross of Christ and then passed on to other emperors, became in history the beginning of faith, piety and put an end to the persecution of the Church, giving it protection 2872. However, veneration should not relate to the substance of the Cross itself, which would be a pagan error and impiety, but to the Crucified One on the Cross 2873. The veneration of images of the righteous and saints has the same meaning. It has a psychological basis for itself. It is generally human nature to strive to see a righteous person and his image; this natural desire is also characteristic of the Church, just as the gospel wife who typified it hurried to the Pharisee’s house to see and hear the Lord present there and to anoint His feet with oil. But at the same time, one should look not so much at his appearance, but at the inner content that is hidden behind this appearance, at the mood and virtue of the righteous man. After all, those who venerate the image of the emperor do not venerate the image itself, but its prototype, just as those who carelessly treat an imperial statue insult the emperor himself 2874. Relations between earthly members of the Church are characterized by constant prayers for each other, mutual support, bonds of love and goodwill, joy in the holiness of some and mourning for the sins of others, and deeds of Christian charity 2875. A special type of these relations are relations with deceased members. Ambrose recommends prayers for them (orationes) and the offering of the Eucharistic Gifts (oblationes) in their memory; both are necessary for the soul of the deceased, entrust it, recommend it to God (Domino commendandum arbitror) 2876. About himself, Ambrose testifies that he did not leave a single day without his prayers for the deceased emperors Gratian and Valentinian II, making sacrifices for them, and expresses the hope that if his prayers are valid, the emperors will receive bliss beyond the grave 2877. But the prayers and sacrifices that were always performed for the dead were considered especially necessary on certain days associated with the day of their death; such days were considered the seventh day after death, since the number seven served as a symbol of future peace 2878, the fortieth day following the example of Patriarch Joseph 2879, the thirtieth day after death following the example of the Jews who mourned the death of Moses for thirty days 2880; the last two days are thus recommended by Ambrose not for their significance for the deceased, but simply out of respect for the authority of Revelation 2881. Prayers and offerings for the dead were of two kinds: private (privatum) and public (publicum), in which the whole Church participated; Moreover, private commemorations, according to Ambrose, in themselves do not bring much benefit and must certainly be combined with church-wide prayers, in which all the power actually lies 2882. Eschatology: the last times of the world, the appearance of the Antichrist, the second coming of the Savior All of the above means were established by God for the purpose of saving humanity in eternity. But before entering into the possession of salvation, man, according to the immutable will of God, must undergo physical death and destruction. This inevitable phenomenon in the human race is the subject of special attention of St. Ambrose. In its essence, physical death is separation (segregatio) 2883, separation of soul and body (animae corporisque secessio) 2884, departure from this life (vitae hujus excessus) 2885; the bodily side of human nature is then decomposed into its four basic elements 2886; the spiritual nature, even after separation from the body, continues to exist unharmed 2887. As separation from matter associated with the indestructibility of the spiritual principle, death in the human race not only does not represent evil, but, on the contrary, is a positive benefit for man. In support of this view, St. Ambrose brings up many different considerations. Thus, in him we encounter a view of earthly life, full of worries and sorrows, characteristic of classical pre-Christian antiquity, as an evil from which bodily death, which therefore represents a good, saves us. Some consider the dead, he says, to be deprived of the pleasures of life. But what kind of pleasantness (jucunditas) is possible among those sorrows and sorrows of our life that arise either from the weakness (ex infirmitate) of the body itself or stem from an unfavorable combination of external circumstances? What benefits, therefore, may those who escape from the power of these failures be deprived of? 2888 Death therefore cannot be an evil for us, since it represents a refuge from all sorrows and evils (aerumnarum omnium, malorumque perfugium), a reliable state of carelessness (fida statio securitatis) and a haven of peace (portus quietis) 2889. Despite, however, this pessimistic point of view, St. Ambrose denies a person the right to commit suicide 2890; an exception seems to be made only for virgins, who are allowed to sacrifice their lives rather than lose their virginity 2891. Along with this point of view, we also encounter considerations that gained great importance in Christian times. This includes, first of all, the view of heaven as the homeland and place of permanent residence of the immortal human spirit: on this earth we appear only temporarily, as wanderers and strangers 2892. Then, sometimes a view is expressed on earthly life as a temporary punishment for a person; physical death, as the cessation of punishment, can therefore only be a good thing: mors [death] is an acquisition (lucrum), and vita [life] is a punishment (poena) 2893; this thought is reminiscent of Origen's view of earthly life as a place and time of punishment and cleansing of the soul from sins 2894; but in Origen this idea is in connection with his doctrine of pre-worldly existence and the fall of souls 2895, which is not the case with Ambrose. Further, already in the section on the anthropology of St. Ambrose, we had the opportunity to see that he, like many other church writers, especially Eastern ones, has a Platonic view of the body as a kind of prison for the soul and fetters that prevent it from contemplating the immaterial truth; Therefore, death, freeing the soul from this prison, gives it the opportunity to more conveniently comprehend the truth. Having freed itself from the shackles of its own senses, the soul, with a free gaze (libero obtutu), begins to contemplate what it had not seen before while in the body 2896. In this case, death reminds the Milanese bishop of a dream: during sleep, the souls, when the body is at rest, rise to the heavenly (ad altiora) and communicate to the body visions (visiones) of absent things (absentium) or even heavenly (coelestium) 2897; posthumous knowledge is even higher than the knowledge we receive in dreams: in dreams we still remain in the power of bodily fetters (vinculis adhuc corporeis inhaerentes), while after the separation of the soul from the body, there can be no obstacles of bodily darkness for pure and ethereal feeling 2898. Finally, death has its justification in that it takes possession of a person only temporarily; human nature must one day be resurrected in its former form 2899. The secondary union of the soul with the body will occur at the end of the world on the day of general resurrection. But the latter, according to the general belief of the Church, will not come immediately, but will be the completion of a rather long eschatological process. It must be preceded by changes in nature and human life, the appearance of the Antichrist along with some other circumstances associated with it, and the Second and Glorious Coming of Christ. Many church writers of earlier times, especially those who showed, to one degree or another, a tendency towards hesychasm, when speaking about the last times of the world, had in mind mainly external changes in it. Following the example of the Chiliasts, many of them were of the opinion that the world would exist for 6000 years, according to the number of days of creation, and after this period its death would occur: in the West, this opinion was held by Irenaeus 2900, Hippolytus 2901, in all likelihood, Cyprian 2902 and Lactantius 2903. Great political changes in the lives of peoples were considered signs of the end of the world. The general opinion was that the Roman Empire, which dominated the world, would be destroyed and give way to another kingdom. At the same time, the main danger for the Roman Empire was usually expected from the east, which was quite consistent with the position of Rome in the 2nd and 3rd centuries, which was forced to protect mainly its eastern borders. Based on the vision of the prophet Daniel of four beasts, which served as images of four successive world powers, and the last most terrible beast had 10 horns (Dan. 7: 1–7), Irenaeus 2904 and Hippolytus 2905 talk about the division of the Roman Empire into 10 small kingdoms that would constantly be at enmity with each other. Lactantius also knows about this fragmentation of the world empire into ten kingdoms 2906 with the transfer of hegemony over the universe to the eastern rulers: the Roman Empire will be destroyed, the West will be subject to slavery, and the East will receive the power to command 2907. At St. Ambrose we still find minor traces of this ancient idea; he still continues to connect the end of the world with the fall of the Roman Empire. Sometimes the unfavorable political circumstances in which the empire was then instilled in him the idea that the fall of the empire and the end of the world were imminent; here he reminds us of the ancient Christians, who lived in the thought of the nearness of the Second Coming and the final reward: he considers himself and his contemporaries living at the end of the world (in occasu mundi); he is convinced that the end of the world will find them still alive (mundi finis invenit); in this he is strengthened by civil strife among the Goths and the latter’s attack on the borders of the empire; Likewise, war-induced famine (fames), pestilence (lues) on livestock and people, in which he sees the quaedam aegritudines mundi [certain diseases of the world] 2908 predicted by the Savior, lead him to the same thought. The attacks of the barbarians mean for him excidium totius orbis terrarum [the death of the entire universe] and mundi finis [the end of the world] 2909. But Ambrose, given the changed political situation, no longer expects, as before, a decisive blow for the empire from the East; it is clear to him that it was the Goths that God appointed to put an end to the empire: it is in the person of the Goths that he sees Gog and Magog predicted by the prophet Ezekiel (Ezek. 38:14–16) 2910. At the same time, in his eschatology we notice a strong spiritualistic current: he refers primarily to religious and moral changes in the world, as a sign of its demise. Like the writers of the Alexandrian school, he sees the world from the religious and moral side as a process that only gradually reaches the full development of the embryos lying in it; This state of world perfection has a special name for him - consummatio. In the history of the world, both good and evil equally develop and reach their highest manifestation; St. Ambrose therefore speaks of consummatio mundi [the consummation of the world] both in relation to good and in relation to evil. There are many consummationes: there is a consummatio in the resurrection for salvation; consummatum deed (opus) is called any generally completed, perfect deed (perfectum opus); malice (malitia) can also be called consummata in the sense of complete malice, which has everything necessary for the art of harm (cui nihil desit ad studium et artem nocendi); it is possible to consummatio of man and many other consummationes for every thing until it reaches a state of perfection (donee ad perfectum veniat); in its essence, the consummatio of any phenomenon represents its end or goal (finis); consummatio saeculi [completion of (this) age] is finis saeculi [end of (this) age] 2911. The Second Coming of Christ will coincide with the consummatio of the world in goodness: the days of the Second Coming are called the days of righteousness (dies justitiae), when Christ will be revealed in the full splendor of his greatness (pleno majestatis suae lumine revelabitur) 2912. External signs of the growth of good in the world are the spread of the Gospel throughout the world before the appearance of the Savior 2913, as well as, like Origen, the conversion of the Jews to Christ, Whom they did not accept in the days of His First Coming 2914. But, on the other hand, these days will also be days of wickedness (dies perfidiae), when iniquitas [untruth] 2915 will reign in the world; this state of the world is sometimes called its impoverishment (Domini secundus adventus in defectione mundi) 2916; external proof of this will be the appearance of the Antichrist. Ambrose has no talk of this happening after 6,000 years of the world’s existence. In his teaching about the face of the Antichrist, two different currents emerge, just as in many other church writers, here we notice two currents. Most often, the name of the Antichrist is associated with the idea of ​​one strictly defined person, who will appear only at the end of the world, who, in his mood and way of action, is hostile to God; at the same time, he is often represented under the image of an earthly conquering king. In this case, they were again based on the above-mentioned vision of the prophet Daniel, according to whose image, on the head of the fourth beast with 10 horns, another small eleventh horn grew, uprooting three of the previous horns (Dan.7:8); since, according to the interpretation of some church commentators, the image of the fourth beast with 10 horns meant the Roman Empire, which was divided into 10 small states, the new eleventh horn was considered the image of the new eleventh conquering king, the Antichrist, who with his strength will replace the destroyed Rome; he will be distinguished by extreme arrogance and cruelty. For Irenaeus, the Antichrist is rex impius, et injustus, et sine lege [king wicked, unrighteous and lawless] 2917, who out of 10 kings existing in his time will kill three, and subjugate the remaining seven and will himself be the eighth to reign among them 2918; in it all the wickedness and deceit that have ever existed in the world will be restored (ἀνακεφαλαίωσις), collected in one place, so that it will be easier to destroy them at once 2919. St. Hippolytus of Rome, under the Antichrist, imagines a king who will ultimately eradicate three horns, i.e. Egypt, Libya and Ethiopia, and subjugate the remaining seven horns 2920; he will restore the kingdom of Judah 2921, gather the Jewish people from the dispersion 2922, establish himself in Jerusalem 2923. In all his activities, the Antichrist will relentlessly pursue one goal: proud of the consciousness of his own power, extending to the whole world 2924, he will demand from people divine worship of himself 2925; he will persecute the saints as his enemies and adversaries 2926. In order to more easily achieve his goal - to replace Christ with himself for the people, he will try to become like Christ in everything 2927. In this regard, Hippolytus draws a very interesting parallel between Christ and the Antichrist, namely: Christ is called a lion and the Antichrist also; Christ is the King, and the Antichrist will be the king of the earth; like Christ, he will appear circumcised in the world; just as Christ appeared in the form (ἐν σχήματι) of a man, so ἐν σχήματι [in the form of] a man the Antichrist will come 2928; just as Christ came from the tribe of Judah, so the Antichrist will come from the tribe of Dan, being, according to the prophecy of the patriarch Jacob (Gen. 49:17), a serpent sitting on the path and biting the “heel of the horse,” that is, a seducer who had already seduced Eve 2929. As for the relationship of the Antichrist to the devil, the church tradition did not allow their identification: although the Antichrist acts at the suggestion of the devil, nevertheless, he is a person different from the latter; Irenaeus calls him only the one who took upon himself all the power of the devil (omnem suscipiens diaboli virtutem) 2930, St. Hippolytus sees in him the son of the devil (υὑὸς τοῦ διαβόλου) 2931. St. Ambrose also very often speaks of the Antichrist as a specific person. This will be a man of unrighteousness (homo iniquitatis), who has to come after the workings of Satan (secundum opera satanae) with all power and signs and lying wonders, and teaching of all unrighteousness (omnis eductione iniquitatis) 2932. Of the writers we listed above, Ambrose partly reminds us of St. Hippolyta: he calls the Antichrist Dan, as having to appear ex tribu Dan [from the tribe of Dan]; Jacob's prophecy applies to him - Gen. 49:17; he is the serpent who bit Adam and his descendants; called a cruel judge (judex saevus) and a ferocious tyrant (tyrannus immanis) 2933. Like Hippolytus, St. Ambrose puts the Antichrist in close relations with the Jewish people and the Jewish cult: he will sit in the Jerusalem temple and appropriate the seat of Divine power (divinae solium potestatis) 2934. But Ambrose also has some peculiarities in comparison with Hippolytus and other writers: if in him we do not find the Hippolytus parallel between Christ and the Antichrist at all, then this only means that his teaching about the Antichrist was less developed than the teaching of Hippolytus; but if he is reluctant to apply the name of those [king] to the Antichrist, then this must be attributed to the originality of his point of view. Ambrose makes no mention of the kingdom of the Antichrist being a real earthly kingdom that would replace the now existing states; He also does not speak about the eradication of the three horns and the subjugation of all the others. Like the concept of the state of God in St. Ambrose receives the meaning of a universal state, going far beyond the framework of the Roman concept of empire, and the state of the Antichrist, characterized not by political, but by religious and moral features, extends, in his opinion, to all states, without representing a special political organization. His stay in Jerusalem and the Jerusalem temple has an allegorical rather than a literal meaning: he will sit in the church, but in the inner church (in templo interiore) of the Jews, who will continue to deny Christ; it is he who, like the Jews, will wage a struggle against the real Christ, trying to prove on the basis of Scripture that only he himself is the real Christ (ex Scripturis disputans esse se Christum) 2935; this will be a man of sin (homo peccati) and a son of perdition (filius reditionis), who will ascend above everything that is called God (quod dicitur Deus), or that is revered by people, so that he sits, as it were, in the church of God, pretending to be God 2936. At the same time, the appearance of the Antichrist will serve as an obstacle in general to the moral activity of man: he will tempt those who walk the path of truth, wanting to refute the truth 2937. With this moralization of the personality of the Antichrist, the latter appears to be St. Ambrose is not the king of mankind, but mainly his judge; In him, the judicial activity of the Antichrist, as noted by Niederhuber, is greatly advanced 2938. This feature can be explained very simply: it was inspired by St. Ambrose, philosophical etymology of the name “Dan” in the sense of κρίσις, court 2939; similarly, Antichrist for him is judicium [court], since the name “Dan” judicium significatur [denotes court] 2940. Combining then this etymology of the name with the idea of ​​the Antichrist as a hostile person, Ambrose makes it clear that he means here a court not in the sense of a trial before a judicial tribunal, but simply a court in the sense of the final determination of the dignity and fate of his followers: just as Christ the Savior has his faithful people, which are called sancta plebs [holy people], so do the followers of the Antichrist, no matter what nation they belong to in their own way. moral mood, form one populus [people] of the Antichrist, populus impietatis [people of wickedness]; the Antichrist will judge this one who will be subject to eternal punishment populum suum [his people], in the sense that the unbeliever has already been condemned, and the believer will not be subject to judgment (qui enim non credit, jam judicatus est; qui autem credit, non judicabitur); whoever constitutes the populum [people] of the Antichrist will eo ipso [thereby] already be condemned, of course, not by the Antichrist, but by virtue of the immutable moral world order or by God 2941. From this point of view, the coming of the Antichrist has the significance of an external criterion for judging the dignity of people and preparing for the final decision of their fate at the Last Judgment during the Second Coming: every follower of the Antichrist eo ipso [thereby] must be recognized as worthy of condemnation, and those who remain faithful to the Lord - worthy of reward. The question of the relationship of the Antichrist to the devil, as with church writers in general, is resolved by Ambrose in the sense of their distinction: the Antichrist is only a disciple of the devil (discipulus diaboli) 2942; the devil appears to be his culprit (auctor antichristi) 2943; if occasionally the name “Antichrist” is applied to the devil, then it is always made clear that he differs from the Antichrist in the proper sense: alius antichristus, auctor hujus, diabolus scilicet [(there is) another Antichrist, the culprit of that, the devil] 2944. Along with this, Ambrose, as we said, sometimes spiritualizes the personality of the Antichrist, understanding him not as an individual person, but as a well-known religious and moral current and disposition in humanity. This view, together with the above, is also occasionally found among former Western writers; St. Cyprian sometimes calls all heretics and schismatics antichrists 2945. In this case, Ambrose was probably also influenced by the Alexandrians, led by Origen, with their tendency to look for some kind of internal meaning for every historical fact. Origen understands the Old Testament and New Testament prophecies about the Antichrist in two ways: literally, according to the letter of the text (ipsum textum) and spiritually (spiritaliter); the latter understanding, as always, is given preference over the first. According to this, the Antichrist for Origen is generally a spirit fighting against God, reigning in the world and at war with the Spirit of Christ; in particular, the name of Antichrist denotes every false teacher, every false teaching (verbum falsum), perversion of the meaning of Holy Scripture, heretical errors that have always existed in the Church and will especially increase in the last days of the world 2946. Probably, following his example, St. Ambrose looks at the Antichrist in two ways: juxta historiam [from the point of view of history] and juxta interpretationem spiritalem [from the point of view of spiritual interpretation] 2947. He distinguishes three Antichrists. The first of these is the Antichrist in the proper sense. The second Antichrist is the devil himself. The enslavement of man to the power of the Antichrist is his enslavement to the servants of the devil. Just as the actual Antichrist will sit in the Temple of Jerusalem, so the seat of the second Antichrist is mea Hierusalem [my Jerusalem], mea anima [my soul], like anima Dei [soul of God], anima pacifica [peaceful soul], which he tries to surround with his legions (obsidere nititur suae legionis exercitu); While this Antichrist reigns, truth is in exile, and unrighteousness reigns (justitia exulat, iniquitas regnat), faith becomes rare (rara), so that the Lord, as if doubting its existence (quasi addubitans), “was able to see from heaven upon the sons of men, if he had understanding or sought God” (Ps. 13:2), not because God could doubt, but because faith can be so rare among people that, according to human understanding, its existence can be doubted (secundum opinionem hominum videretur esse dubitandum); but when the spiritual presence of Christ (Christi praesentia spiritualis illuxerit) illuminates the worker, then iniquus [unrighteous] disappears and justitia [righteousness, truth] begins to reign, which abolishes the dominion of the devil from the minds of all believers (omnium fidelium mentibus evacuat principatum) 2948. The third Antichrist (tertius antichristus) is represented by heretics - Arius, Sabellius and in general everyone who deceives us with a perverse interpretation of faith (qui prava nos interpretatione seducunt) 2949. The days of the dominion of the anti-Christian spirit will be shortened by God in order to prevent the general falling away of mankind from Christ. It is the Second and Glorious Coming of Christ that will put an end to his dominion: just as the primus adventus Domini [the first coming of the Lord] took place for the atonement of sins, so the secundus adventus [the second coming] is necessary to restrain crimes (propter geprimenda delicta), so that many do not fall into the error of wickedness (ne plures perfidiae errore labantur) 2950 . In the discussion of the Second Coming of the Savior into the world, we again come across similarities between Ambrose and Origen: and here, as in the question of the face of the Antichrist, both of them, in addition to the literal understanding, also offer a spiritual explanation. For Origen, the Second Coming of Christ is not only an external fact that will take place at the end of history, but also an internal phenomenon, as a certain moment in the religious and moral development of man. From this point of view, all the small details of the future event are explained. Thus, according to the Savior’s prediction, the Son of Man will come again into the world on the clouds of heaven with power and great glory (Matthew 24:30). Here, Origen argues, we must understand not ordinary clouds, but spiritual ones, that is, the apostles, prophets and saints in general, “who revealed Christ to the world, in their own words showed the light of truth and declared His Coming with their divine mind, surpassing human nature” 2951. St. Ambrose here completely agrees with Origen, understanding by the clouds of the Second Coming the clouds that cover the brilliance of heavenly mystery (coelestis obtexunt mysterii claritatem), moistened with the dew of heavenly grace (rore gratiae spiritualalis humescant); these are: Moses, Joshua and in general viri sancti [holy men], who, like clouds, soar above (volant); these are, further: Isaiah, Ezekiel, “who through the seraphim and cherubim showed me the holiness of the Divine Trinity (qui mihi per Cherubim et Seraphim sanctitatem divinae Trinitatis ostendunt); Christ came on these clouds" 2952. As for the nature of the Second Coming of Christ, for Origen it is the highest degree of communion with God available to man on earth; recognizing the presence of God throughout the world, a person at the same time receives the opportunity to unite more closely with Christ; this connection takes on the character of individual communication in the strictest sense of the word: Christ, in the words of Origen, comes “into the soul of every believer” 2953. Likewise for St. Ambrose The Second Coming of the Savior is the moment of the closest communication with man (in singulis); although Christ is generally and always present in his faithful slaves, but now this presence is revealed more fully (pleniore infusione), now He is revealed with a greater fullness of Divinity (plenitudine divinitatis), giving augmentum gratiae [increase of grace] 2954; mihi [for me], exclaims the bishop, Christ must venire [come], mihi [for me] adventus ejus [His Coming] must take place 2955. A further point in the development of the eschatological process is the resurrection of the dead. Eschatology (continued): the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead St. Ambrose is one of the very few ancient Christian writers who devoted special works to the issue of the resurrection of the dead, and whose significance in revealing this dogma is more or less great; this gives us the right to expound his teaching in connection with the theory of the dogma in question, in order to determine its own place in history. After fragmentary remarks made about the truth of the resurrection of the dead by Clement of Rome, Polycarp of Smyrna, St. Justin Philosopher, his student Tatian and Theophilus of Antioch, who touched upon the dogma in question only in passing 2956, the first Christian writer to reveal in detail the truth of the resurrection from the scientific and philosophical side was Athenagoras, an apologist writer of the second half of the 2nd century, who outlined his thoughts in a special work entitled “Περὶ ἀναστάσεως τῶν νεκρῶν" ["On the resurrection of the dead"] 2957. He reveals his thoughts exclusively in polemics with the pagans, who considered the resurrection of the flesh destroyed by death impossible and unnecessary. To refute them, he, by his own admission, puts forward two types of evidence, some of which are borrowed from the concept and meaning of the creation of man, while others are postulated by the idea of ​​​​Divine Providence about us 2958. The essence of the evidence of the first type can be expressed in a brief statement: God, who created the first man out of nothing, can, by collecting the scattered parts everywhere, resurrect him again to life - which follows 1) as from the properties of the Creator Himself, 2) and from the qualities of creations. God has all the necessary properties to resurrect the body; if the latter, after death, as the pagans pointed out, dissipates, then this cannot serve as an obstacle for him. This is guaranteed, first of all, by His unlimited knowledge: He who, at the creation of the human body, knew the nature of the elements that formed it and those parts of them from which He intended to take something suitable for the composition (σύστασιν) of the body, He, of course, even at the resurrection will not turn out to be ignorant (ἀγνοηϑήσεται) as to where each particle of what He collected for formation went a total of 2959. Then, the power of the Creator convinces of the same thing: He who created previously non-existent bodies of people can undoubtedly resurrect what was scattered, no matter how the latter happened 2960. Of the evidence arising from the idea of ​​​​Divine providence about man, Athenagoras points out only two. The first of these is the idea of ​​a future court, which can be a just court only when the whole person will be subject to it for their deeds 2961. Body and soul act together in this life, together they must be subject to responsibility for their actions: just as some virtues, for example, abstinence and moderation (ἐγκράτεια καὶ σωφροσύνη), are possible only as a result of the union of the soul with the body, and vice versa, many vices stem only from the body; It would therefore be a matter of the greatest injustice to punish or reward only one soul 2962. Another proof of the same kind is the proof from the goal (ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους) of human existence: this goal, embracing a whole person consisting of soul and body, can only consist in the contemplation of Existence (τῇ τε ϑεωρίᾳ τοῦ ὄντος) and in constant delight in His commandments 2963. In his treatise “On the Resurrection,” Athenagoras limits himself almost exclusively to evidence of the possibility of a future resurrection of the flesh. As for the question of the very fact of the resurrection and the properties of the resurrected bodies, Athenagoras pays very little attention to it, obviously without any special motives for this, since he had to defend the truth of the resurrection only against unbelieving pagans. From his words on this subject we learn very little, namely: about the identity of resurrected bodies with real ones, although the possibility of such an identity turns out to be very little justified 2964; with this identity, the difference will be that the resurrected body will receive the properties of incorruptibility and freedom from all passions (ἀφϑαρτὸν καὶ ἀπαϑὲς σῶμα - Athenagoras’ usual expression for designating the resurrected body) 2965. The next writer of great importance in the history of the scientific interpretation of the dogma of the resurrection of the dead is Irenaeus of Lyon. He reveals his teaching, undoubtedly, without any dependence on Athenagoras. What they have in common is only one thought about Divine omnipotence as a sufficient basis for the resurrection; but this thought is also in St. Irenaeus is revealed in a completely different connection, with other examples and details. God, Irenaeus argues, can resurrect the person whom He created by taking dust from the earth: after all, it is much more difficult to bring a person into existence from non-existent bones, nerves, veins and other components than to restore again what was once created, but then turned into earth with death; and just as then the flesh took upon itself the artistry of God, so at the resurrection it will be able to receive and accommodate the power of God 2966. Then, to give this argument even more convincing power, Irenaeus cites a long series of examples of the manifestation of Divine omnipotence completely unknown to Athenagoras, which can therefore serve as a guarantee of the future resurrection of our flesh. Thus, already on earth bodies can live for as many years as God pleases; the longevity of our ancestors sometimes went far beyond seven hundred, eight hundred and nine hundred years; and Enoch and Elijah were even completely taken to heaven alive, having not seen death 2967. Some examples show that God can save a person’s life under the most unfavorable conditions for him: the prophet Jonah, at the command of God, was thrown safe by a whale from the depths of the sea; Hananiah, Azariah and Mishael survived unharmed in the fiery furnace 2968. To this main argument Irenaeus adds many others. Moreover, since he no longer had to deal with pagans, but with Christian Gnostics, he prefers argumentation from the evidence of Revelation and religious concepts to philosophical argumentation, the only one from Athenagoras. From biblical material, Irenaeus cites a lot of evidence from the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, and also points out many examples of the resurrection from the dead as proof of its possibility. From the Old Testament, he cites the prophecy of the prophet Isaiah about the revival of the dead and the resurrection of dead bodies (Is. 26:19), and also points to the vision of the prophet Ezekiel of a field strewn with human bones, clothed in flesh by the power of the Spirit of God and raised to life (Ezek. 37: 1–14) 2969. From the New Testament places we find in him a reference to the words of the Apostle Paul about God, who raised Christ from the dead and has the power to give life to our mortal bodies through His Spirit who lives in us (Rom. 8:11) 2970; and on the expression of the same apostle about the future uprising in the incorruption of the flesh sown in corruption (1 Cor. 15:42) 2971. In addition, he focuses his attention on the words of the apostle about flesh and blood, which cannot inherit the Kingdom of God (1 Cor. 15:50), due to the fact that the Gnostics, in their denial of the resurrection of the dead, relied mainly on these words; drawing on Romans 8:8-9, he interprets them in connection with his entire religious contemplation in that sense, rare in church literature, that flesh and blood themselves, united with the soul, really cannot become participants in the inheritance, but they can still be resurrected by receiving the Spirit of God 2972. From biblical examples of resurrection, Irenaeus points to the Resurrection of the Savior Himself 2973, to the resurrection of the daughter of Jairus, the son of the Nain widow and four-day-old Lazarus 2974. Irenaeus develops another series of thoughts in support of the resurrection on the basis of his general contemplation on the essence of salvation and redemption. Christ, having united with human nature, in His own Person imparted to it the properties of incorruptibility and bestowed the Holy Spirit 2975. We are temples of the Holy Spirit, who can resurrect us 2976. This idea is illustrated by Irenaeus, who was first mentioned by St. the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. 15:36-37) and before Irenaeus, revealed by Clement as a Roman image of a seed that must first decompose in the earth in order to sprout from itself: spiritual bodies that have a soul die, and rising through the Spirit, they become spiritual (spiritualia) 2977. Finally, for Irenaeus, partaking of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Holy Eucharist serves as an external guarantee of receiving incorruption and communion with the Spirit of God: God will resurrect our bodies nourished by them in due time 2978. The teaching about the properties of resurrected bodies by St. Irenaeus is revealed in more detail in comparison with Athenagoras and in a more reasonable manner. The resurrected bodies will be identical in essence to the real ones. This is justified in two ways: firstly, by the very concept of resurrection, which presupposes the restoration of what died 2979; secondly, the idea of ​​righteous retribution, which, however, our writer actually applies to the first resurrection of the righteous to reign on earth: it is fair, he says, that in the same creation in which the righteous labored or suffered tribulations, they should receive the fruits of their sufferings 2980. The resurrected bodies will remain identical to the present ones, despite the fact that they will acquire some qualities that are now missing to them, among which Irenaeus mainly mentions immortality and incorruptibility (ἀϑάνατος καὶ ἄφϑαρτος γίνεται) 2981; after all, a grafted wild olive does not lose the essence of the tree, but changes the quality of the fruit and receives a different name 2982. Almost at the same time as Irenaeus developed these thoughts, Tertullian wrote his famous treatise “De resurrectione carnis” [“The Resurrection of the Flesh”], exploring in it the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead “in more detail than all the Ante-Nicene fathers” 2983. His treatise reveals the author's familiarity with the ideas of Athenagoras and Irenaeus; but to what he borrowed from the latter he added even more of his own, which makes his significance in the history of the revelation of dogma especially important. In the series of numerous proofs he cites, we, like Irenaeus, distinguish between considerations of theological reason and references to the evidence of Revelation. Tertullian himself, in one place in his treatise, gives the following brief enumeration of all the evidence of the first kind: the dignity of the flesh in itself, the power of God, its examples, the motives for judgment and its necessity 2984. The postulation of the resurrection by the high dignity of the flesh is first encountered by us only in Tertullian and, of course, should be given credit to him 2985. The second of the listed proofs, the reference to the omnipotence of God, on the contrary, reminds us together of Athenagoras and Irenaeus 2986. But the following examples, which illustrate the possibility of resurrection, which we have not encountered either in Irenaeus or Athenagoras, in some cases again belong to Tertullian himself, and in others they remind us of the doctrine of the resurrection of St. Clement of Rome and Theophilus of Antioch. Like Clement, Tertullian sees the image of resurrection in the change of day and night that we constantly observe: the day dies, giving way to night, and then comes to life again with all its splendor; like Clement, he points to the seeds being sown, which can only grow unless they first decay; Finally, Clement Tertullian reminds us with the example of the mythical Arabian phoenix bird, which, having reached a ripe old age, turns into a new little phoenix and thus “always remains, although it ceases to live, remains similar to itself, although it is no longer the same bird.” Tertullian recalls Theophilus of Antioch in those cases when, in addition to the above, he points to the phases of the moon, which constantly renews its circle, weakened by the monthly revolution, to the successive change of four seasons, when some phenomena and works appear to disappear, and disappear to appear again 2987. The last of Tertullian's considered considerations - the motivating reasons for the trial and its necessity - is already fully shared by him together with Athenagoras: the resurrection of the flesh is required by the idea of ​​​​the justice of the future judgment, to which a person must be subject not only to the soul, but also to the body 2988. The number of references given by Tertullian to the testimony of Revelation about the resurrection of the dead is unusually large compared with Irenaeus; Moreover, it is important that in the former we find only a few of the evidence and examples that we noted in the latter. Their common evidence, undoubtedly, should include a reference to the vision of the prophet Ezekiel (Ezekiel 37: 1–14) 2989, then to the example of the prophet Jonah, thrown out by a whale intact in his mental and physical essence 2990, to the example of Christ the Savior, Who was resurrected in our flesh, becoming the guarantee of our resurrection 2991, and to examples of the miraculous resurrection dead by Christ, although Tertullian does not list these cases separately, as Irenaeus 2992. Also, like Irenaeus, he gives a detailed analysis of the words of the apostle: flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor. 15:50); but understands by them the old man, i.e. the affairs of a man given over to the desires of flesh and blood 2993 ; to this he adds, in part, considerations unknown to Irenaeus: the apostle, judging by the letter, actually blocks flesh and blood not from resurrection, but only from the Kingdom of God; and they will rise again for judgment; then, although flesh and blood themselves, our author here uses the considerations of Irenaeus, cannot inherit the kingdom, but are able to achieve it with the help of the Spirit 2994. To this Tertullian adds many other testimonies from the Old and mainly from the New Testament 2995. Tertullian’s historical significance is even greater in revealing the question of the properties of resurrected bodies, and in this case he also stands above not only Athenagoras, but also Irenaeus. True, his identity of bodies is proved, among other things, by the latter’s argumentation: it follows from the concept of resurrection as the restoration of what was destroyed 2996. It is then verified by the example of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, Risen in the same flesh in which 2997 died. But to these Irenaean thoughts, Tertullian adds his own proof from the sowing of a seed, identical in essence to the plant growing from it: what is sown, that grows 2998. Further, although the difference in the particular properties of bodies identical in general essence has always been assumed by church writers as undoubted, but, as far as is known, the possibility of such a combination of different things in the identical was first made the subject of careful study only by Tertullian. The change itself is designated by the term demutatio 2999. A similar possibility is clarified for him by the same example of a seed, which, having decayed, is restored in the plant in a slightly changed form, with a gain of 3000. For the first time in the history of church dogma, Tertullian, based on the words of St. Apostle Paul (1 Cor. 15:38–41), states the difference in the degree of change in the resurrected flesh for different persons 3001. Finally, Tertullian depicts the changed properties of bodies in such detail as no one before him: among them he calls incorruption and immortality borrowed from Irenaeus 3002, using for them such figurative expressions as putting on immortality 3003, vesting in a robe, the robe of incorruptibility (per indumentum illud incorruptibilitatis) 3004, robe in the robe of immortality 3005; to this he also adds the future glorification of the flesh following the example of the flesh of Christ glorified in the resurrection 3006. The resurrected bodies will also be free from all organic defects, damage and diseases such as blindness, lameness and general external ugliness: damage to the body is something accidental for it (res accidens), while non-damage is its own property (integritas propria est); the damage occurred subsequently; therefore, whatever flesh we received from God at creation, we will receive the same from Him a second time at the resurrection; along with the shortcomings, the passions of the flesh, which now overcome it 3007, will also disappear. To prove the possibility of this, Tertullian uses the biblical examples given by Irenaeus on another occasion of the prophet Jonah, Enoch and Elijah, whose flesh even before the resurrection reveals some qualities usually unknown to it: the prophet Jonah three days later was thrown ashore completely unharmed; Enoch and Elijah, taken alive into heaven, were freed from all deformity of the flesh, from all reproach and everything accidental 3008. In general, Tertullian designates the future state of the flesh as an angelic species (habitus angelicus) 3009, an angelic state (status angelicus) 3010: like the angels, the resurrected will not know sexual desires, marriage 3011, and will not be subject to the needs of the flesh at all 3012; The organs of the body, although they will continue to exist, but, no longer satisfying earthly needs, will receive a new, higher purpose 3013. This is how the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead was formed in the first half of the 3rd century. The next stage in his philosophical processing was created by Origen, who transferred the whole question to another, hitherto completely unknown, ground: all of the listed types of teaching about the resurrection of the dead did not take into account the data of the science of that time, sometimes coming into direct contradiction with it; Origen was the first to subject them to rather sharp criticism from the point of view of this science and, in contrast to them, although with partial assistance from them, created his own special type of teaching, consistent with the data of science, but not consistent with church tradition, religious needs and aspirations of believers 3014. According to the testimony of the blessed Jerome, Origen had an equally negative attitude towards both the teachings of the Gnostic heretics and the current ideas about the resurrection of the dead among ordinary members of the Church 3015. Against the Gnostics, who, as is known, denied the resurrection of the flesh, Origen defends the necessity of the resurrection. In this case, he does not yet create anything new and original and uses the consideration that was applied to this goal by Athenagoras and after him Tertullian; it is he who proceeds from the concept of the truth of future retribution 3016. As for ordinary members of the Church, Origen rebels against their, in his opinion, too crude ideas about the resurrection of the body in its present form, with all the members and functions of the latter 3017. He is primarily concerned with analyzing these ideas. For this purpose, he analyzes the biblical foundations on which the traditional view was based, and mainly the vision of the prophet Ezekiel (Ezekiel 37:1-14) and comes to the conclusion that the prophet Ezekiel is not actually talking about the resurrection of the flesh, but only bones, skin and veins 3018. Further, for his part, he tries, by reference to the testimony of Revelation, to prove the unfoundedness of the current belief in the resurrection of present flesh and blood. He points to the words of St. Apostle Paul about the impossibility of flesh and blood to inherit the Kingdom of God (1 Cor. 15:50), which, therefore, he understands in accordance with the Gnostics 3019. The results obtained by Origen by criticizing current ideas are then used by him as the basis for his positive doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh. The material substrate (τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον) never remains identical (οὐδέποτε ἔχει ταὐτόν) 3020; only the appearance characterizing the body remains identical (τὸ εἶδος τὸ χαρακτηρίζον τὸ σῶμα ταὐτὸν εἶναι) 3021, which remains unchanged from infancy to old age 3022. Under this condition, of course, there can be no talk of the material identity of bodies having to be resurrected, but only of individual identity 3023. The present material body, after the resurrection, must turn into a spiritual one, in which not earthly qualities will be preserved, but the form that characterizes its appearance; what was once expressed in the flesh will be expressed in the spiritual body 3024. Origen explains this by means of a concept reminiscent of the Stoic doctrine of λόγος σπερματικός [spermatic logos] about the inherent in the human body, as in all existing things, a seed or embryo 3025: all seeds are innate by the Creator with a known principle that forms them - ratio, which contains future matter; falling into the ground and collapsing, the seed, by virtue of its inherent ratio, attracts the matter surrounding it and so gradually turns into a stem, leaves and ears; so the human body has its own ratio, in which, after the body is destroyed, some old principles remain for restoration (manent quaedam surgendi antiqua principia) and, like the core or nursery of the dead, warm up in the bowels of the earth, but on the day of the Second Coming of Christ, with the voice of the archangel and the last trumpet, the earth will shake, the seeds will begin to move (movebuntur semina) and instantly grow dead 3026. This insita ratio [invested force, principle] in Origen’s view is strictly different from the soul, which is evident from the fact that after the destruction of the body it continues to exist in the earth, serving as the basis for its future resurrection. This principle preserves a corporeal substance (corporalem substantiam) actually distinct from the external body, which it again restores 3027; “But this corporeal substance,” Atzberger comments on the passage under consideration, “is not actually matter, which after death returns to primary matter, but only certain features or forms of matter, through which individual bodies, although they are formed from the same substance, differ from each other” 3028. Although ratio determines the identity of the resurrected ones (eosdem ipsos futuros esse homines dicimus), it does not determine the identity of the same state (non in eodem statu) 3029 insofar as the resurrected bodies change into spiritual ones. The possibility of such a change in qualities is proven by some facts from the history of salvation and side considerations: Origen sees such an example in the Transfiguration on Mount Tabor, when the flesh of Christ the Savior, Moses and Elijah changed, but their personal identity was not destroyed by this 3030; then in the qualities of the flesh of Christ after His Resurrection from the dead, when He took on flesh of an ethereal and spiritual nature (naturam aeri corporis et spiritualis), as a result of which He appeared at the closed doors and disappeared instantly from sight when breaking bread 3031; the science of that time, according to Origen, also favored his theory insofar as it recognized the convertibility of matter from one form to another: wood turns into fire, fire into smoke, smoke into air, etc. 3032 Origen finally sought positive support for his teaching in the Holy Scriptures. He points to 1 Corinthians 15:44: “The natural body is sown, the spiritual body is raised,” i.e. That is, in his opinion, the physical body is sown, but the spiritual is raised 3033, on 1 Cor. 15:53, etc. 3034 Origen turns out to be no less original in his doctrine of the qualities of future bodies. The latter will differ from the present ones in their composition: these are thin, ethereal bodies (σώματα αἰϑέρια), ray-shaped (αὐγοειδὲς φῶς) 3035, so that they will not be accessible to touch or weighing 3036. They are credited with freedom from all infirmities 3037, beauty (decor), radiance (splendor) and brilliance (fulgor) 3038. Different in composition, future bodies will also differ in their external form - a feature that we have not yet encountered in any writer: they will apparently have a spherical form (σφαιροειδῶν... αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων), as the most perfect of all possible forms 3039 . Like Tertullian, Origen allows for a distinction between the bodies of the resurrected in accordance with their personal merits; but if for Tertullian this difference does not go beyond the degree of glory, then for Origen it is expressed in qualitative features, and here again his Platonic view of matter appears before us: the saints who lived holy and pure on earth will receive bright and glorified bodies at the resurrection (lucida et gloriosa), and the wicked, on the contrary, having loved the darkness of error and the darkness of ignorance in this life, will be clothed in bodies are dark and black (obscuris et atris post resurrectionem corporibus induantur) 3040. It would not be expected that Origen’s stated theory would meet with an approving attitude from the Church in view of its obvious contradiction with the established church tradition and the spiritualistic tendency that permeates it. Sooner or later she had to be rejected; the honor of its critical analysis belongs to Methodius of Olympus, a writer of the second half of the 3rd century. and the beginning of the 4th century, who wrote against Origen a special work, “On the Resurrection,” which has survived to us only in fragments. In this work we must distinguish two sides: an extensive polemic directed against Origen, and a relatively brief presentation of Methodius’s own positive views on the resurrection; the thoughts expressed both there and here represent a phenomenon in the history of the revelation of dogma worthy of attention. Refuting Origen, Methodius first examines the arguments that Origen put forward against the generally accepted idea of ​​the resurrection 3041. Then he moves on to Origen's teaching about the spiritual body of the resurrection. Origen, recognizing the material difference of bodies, insisted on the identity of the species, but in reality, along with the denial of material identity, the identity of the species also disappears: if a spiritual body is resurrected instead of the present one, then neither the form nor the elements will remain unchanged, another similar body will arise, and not the dead one 3042. Here Methodius stops at 1 Corinthians 15:50. The Apostle, he argues in the same way as Tertullian, means here not the flesh itself, but sinful morals, which he himself speaks of in 1 Cor. 6:9–10 3043; its originality, compared with previous experiments in explaining this passage, lies in the fact that it sees the basis for its interpretation in the words of the apostle immediately following the expression in question: “And corruption does not inherit incorruption” (1 Cor. 15:50); corruption, he says, is not corruption, but making corruptible (φϑορὰ δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ φϑειρόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ φϑεῖρον), just as by death it is not understood a dying body, but that which makes the latter mortal 3044. Here, in a series of polemical thoughts, Methodius also cites many positive, in most cases his own, considerations in favor of the resurrection of the dead in their present bodies. Thus, he defends the idea that everything created by God must necessarily be immortal, as the work of the Immortal. Everything can only give birth to what is related to itself 3045. This is not contradicted by the fact of the existence of death in the human race. Methodius, like Irenaeus and Theophilus of Antioch 3046, sees in it a means of salvation for man in the hands of Divine Providence. From the free will of man, which God gave him at creation, came evil, which would have been immortal if man himself had continued to be immortal; but as a result of this, - this is how Methodius allegorically explains the biblical story about God preparing clothes for man (Gen. 3:21), - God prepared a dress made of leather κατεσκεύασεν), as if clothing a person with mortality, so that along with the destruction of the body, all the evil born in it would die 3047. Another important proof for Methodius of the resurrection of the flesh is the belief in the unlimited omnipotence of God - an old argument, but which appears in Methodius in a new light. Our bodies will be resurrected, because nothing can oppose that command that created things out of nothing and adorned everything with its wisdom 3048. Methodius finds many proofs of the resurrection of the flesh in Revelation and sacred history, and most of them we meet with him for the first time. The image of the resurrection for him is the forty-year wandering of the people in the desert, when, through the action of Divine omnipotence, not only their bodies remained healthy and did not experience suffering, but also their clothes and shoes did not age (Deut. 29:5) 3049. He interprets the story of the prophet Jonah allegorically in relation to his goal: the whale is never stopping time, the ship is our miserable life; what a ship is in relation to the country to which it is heading, real life is in relation to immortality; storm - temptations, temptations; Jonah being thrown into the sea corresponds to death; the belly of the whale is the earth; finally, being thrown out by a whale after three days serves as an image of our resurrection, after we have been in the earth for three periods - the beginning, middle and end 3050. From the evidence of the Old Testament, Methodius refers, among other things, to Daniel 12:2 about the future awakening of those sleeping in the dust of the earth, to Ps.67:7 (in an allegorical explanation); from the New Testament - on 2 Cor. 4: 10-14 about the revelation of the life of Jesus in us and about the resurrection of us by God through Christ 3051. These are all the most important attempts to resolve the issue of the resurrection of the dead, which were determined in the history of church dogma by the time of St. Ambrose. To the question in what relation to the listed writers Ambrose stands in his teaching on the resurrection of the dead, we must now answer: in the same exact way as each of them stands in relation to his earlier predecessors. He does not fully exhaust the argumentation of any of these writers so that one can speak of his direct dependence on any of them; but at the same time his teaching resembles each of them in at least one respect; most of all he reminds us of Athenagoras, Irenaeus and Tertullian. This still does not give reason to say that in this particular case he had their creations at hand. The superficiality in the similarities between them, rather, leads to the assumption that thanks to the works of all the listed writers, a general type of interpretation of the dogma of the resurrection had already been formed, a type that had already become current and popular, with which everyone was probably familiar, even who did not have the opportunity to study the works of Athenagoras, Irenaeus and others. But St. Ambrose, like each of the writers we have named, is not limited to only slavishly reproducing what church practice and literature could tell him; what is similar to others appears in him in a different light and application; much has been added and expanded, and some things, although not particularly important or significant, have been stated completely again. St. himself Ambrose, in his work "De fide resurrectionis" ["On the hope of the resurrection"] declares that he intends to prove the truth of the future resurrection in three ways: ratione, that is, by arguments of reason, universitatis exemplo, or examples from the life of the universe, and, finally, testimonio rei gestae, quia plurimi resurrexerunt [by evidence of the event, because many have been resurrected] 3052 . He did not collect much evidence of the first type. The first of these is the proof from the concept of the truth of Divine retribution, first put forward by Athenagoras and then widely used by Tertullian. Since our entire earthly life takes place in the community of body and soul (in corporis animaeque consortio), and the resurrection is associated with a reward for good deeds or punishment for wickedness, then the body must also be resurrected, whose deeds will be weighed; for it is impossible that only one soul without a body should be called to judgment, when it must give an account of its cohabitation with the body 3053. Since body and soul act together (communis est actus), and the body does what the soul thinks, then both of them must be brought to justice and both must be punished or preserved for glory; for it seems unjust that while the law of the flesh (lex carnis) contradicts the law of the spirit (animi legem), and the mind (mens) often does what it hates - namely, when the indwelling sin of the flesh (peccatum carnis) is committed - the spirit alone should be offended, punished for another's guilt (alienae reus culpae), while the flesh, the author of disasters (autor aerumnae), enjoys peace; so that only one would be subjected to torment, who was not the only one to err, or one would gain glory, when not one alone would fight gloriously 3054. Faith in the unlimited omnipotence of God, following the example of Athenagoras and Tertullian, serves for St. Ambrose is another reliable guarantee of the resurrection of the flesh. God created everything out of nothing (ex nihilo); why are we surprised that, by the power of His omnipotence, what already existed can be reborn (renasci posse) again, when, through His action, that which did not exist (natum esse quod non fuit) was born? 3055 But St. Ambrose illustrates the effect of omnipotence in the world with new examples, still unknown to us. The nature of things always obeys the dictates of heaven: at the touch of a rod, a rock in the desert produces water for a thirsty people; the rod turns into a serpent, testifying that by the will of God the sensual can be born from the insensible; The Jordan turns back, the sea divides, allowing one people to cross safely among the walls of water, and covering another with its waves; in the New Testament, with the words of Christ, the waves are tamed, the winds are stilled 3056. In connection with the concept of the omnipotence of God, St. Ambrose discusses the question of how, for example, drowned people or the dead whose bodies were eaten by animals can be resurrected. Let us assume, he reasons, that the bodies of all the dead men listed will not be resurrected; nevertheless, even in this case, one could doubt not the resurrection itself, but only about part of it: if the bodies of those eaten do not rise, then the rest will still rise. But in reality there cannot be such a partial doubt: after all, everything that comes from the earth, therefore, the bodies of the unfortunate, returns to the earth and is resolved into it; the sea, for example, usually washes the bodies of drowned people in waves onto the nearest shores. In any case, it will not be difficult for God to unite what is scattered, since the world obeys Him, the dumb elements obey, nature serves: as if the revival of lifeless dirt during creation was not more miraculous than its unification? 3057 From the origenistic evidence in St. We meet only one thing about Ambrose, and that is not at all dependent on him: Origen deals with science, and Ambrose deals with pagan myths; this is a reference to the ability of the elements of nature to transform into each other. St. Ambrose points this out to the pagans who, allowing for the possibility of transformations, denied belief in the resurrection; they believed the myth about some hydra, from the sown teeth of which armed warriors allegedly grew, they admitted that a person could be born from a snake, and flesh could come from teeth, but it was much more worthy of belief that what was sown will rise in its nature, that the harvest is no different from sowing, that the soft is not revived by the hard and the hard by the soft, that poison is not turned into blood, but the flesh is restored (reparari) by flesh, bone from bone, blood from blood, wet from wet; the pagans cannot deny restoration if they admit the transformation 3058. There is something in this part of Ambrose’s reasoning that reminds us of Methodius, but again in the most general terms; we mean the Ireneo-Methodian understanding of physical death as a temporary means of salvation for a person: in the words of St. Ambrose, death was not originally in nature, but it turned into nature (et mors quidem in natiira non fuit, sed conversa in naturam est); God did not establish it from the beginning, but gave it as a means of salvation (pro remedio dedit), but it is actually directed not against nature itself as such, but against the evil living in nature (non naturae mors ista est, sed malitiae); death destroys evil, while nature remains in existence 3059. Among the second type of evidence given by Ambrose as an exemplum universitatis [an example from the life of the universe], we encounter the same analogies that were already known to Clement, Theophilus of Antioch and Tertullian; only that with the latter it has the meaning of a simple analogy, an example, with Ambrose it acquires the significance of the paramount importance of proof. The resurrection of the dead is evidenced by the life of the world, the state of all things (rerum status omnium), the series of births (generationum series), the change of generations (successionum vices), the setting and rising of the luminaries, the sunset of day and night, in order to appear again every day. Especially St. Ambrose loves to point out the fertilizing and revitalizing power of nature, as a result of which the resurrection from the dead even acquires the meaning of a natural fact. The earth usually returns everything it receives. Seeds decomposed in the ground become green again under the influence of earth vapor and pressure; What matters here is the influence of the warmth of her inherent vital spirit (calore vitali spiritus); How is it possible to be surprised that the earth will one day restore the people it has received, if it revives, straightens, clothes, strengthens and protects the received seeds? 3060 Is it permissible for the earth, which so far usually revived everything, to become degenerate (degenerate) only in people? Rather, on the contrary, restoration is more in accordance with nature than contrary to it (secundum naturam magis, quam contra naturam est) 3061. After all, the human body, says St. Ambrose, based on 1 Cor. 15:44, represents a seed. He gives various explanations for this. The human organism is a seed in the most literal, physical sense, because it is distinguished by all the properties of a real seed: the seed has its juices, its moisture, and the body has its juices in the blood; in addition, it itself is not dry, but wet, since it is created from mud (e limo) 3062. Sometimes he uses to designate the body as a seed, an expression that reminds us of Origen about the substance of resurrection remaining in the earth (substantia resurgendi), although he still does not speak of insita ratio [imposed force, principle], λόγος σπερματικός [spermatic logos] 3063 . To this the pagans probably objected that if the human body were a real seed, then we would already be witnesses of the resurrection, since plants grow from sown seeds quickly, before our very eyes. “Not every time,” Ambrose answers them, “is adapted for the awakening of seeds: at one time wheat is sown, at another it is born, at one time the vines are planted, at another they grow, luxurious leaves appear in abundance, berries are formed; at one time the olive trees are planted, and at another they bow down under the weight of their abundant fruit. Before each plant has its own special time, the fruit remains in a bound, hidden state, and the time of birth does not depend on the power of the one being born. The same applies to our bodies. Just as on olive trees the fruits ripen at the end of the year, so the completion of the world process (consummatio mundi) turns out to be an age adapted for our resurrection” 3064. Among the analogies of resurrection from the life of nature should be included, finally, a reference to the legendary phoenix bird, which we have already encountered in Clement and Tertullian. The phoenix bird living in the Arabian country has the ability to come to life again; her life span extends to five hundred years; when she feels the approach of death, she makes herself a cell (thecam) from various fragrant substances and, entering it, dies; but from the moisture of her body a worm emerges, which gradually turns into the image of the same bird. This bird, by its example, tells us about the possibility of our resurrection, with the only difference that it resurrects in the five hundredth year (isti avi quingentesimus resurrectionis annus est), while the thousandth year (nobis millesimus) is intended for our resurrection, or, since the entire period of the life of the world represents a single millennium in the spiritual sense, the end of the world (consummatio mundi) 3065. From evidence of the latter type - historical examples of the resurrection of St. Ambrose, of course, attributes the most important significance to the Resurrection of Christ. Christ the Savior was resurrected according to His humanity, because He died according to His humanity; therefore, in the fact of His Resurrection we have indisputable proof of the possibility of the resurrection of human flesh. But Christ, in addition, was the firstfruits of all humanity, representing in His Person all humanity; by virtue of this organic connection with all people, He became the Firstborn from the dead, the Firstfruits of those who died 3066, so that in Him the whole world, heaven and earth 3067 was resurrected. Therefore, whoever doubts the future resurrection of the dead doubts the very fact of Christ’s Resurrection, considers the Passion and Death of Christ to be futile, and falls into grave wickedness 3068. From further facts of the resurrection of St. Ambrose lists everything that was already known to Irenaeus, namely: the resurrection of the four-day-old Lazarus, the son of the widow of Nain, the daughter of the arch-synagogue - in the person of which, in a spiritual sense, the resurrection of humanity had already already taken place, since with these miracles Christ aroused the faith of people, revived the mind, which was dead 3069. But he also supplements Irenaeus with some new examples: not only did the Lord Himself resurrect the dead, but also the prophet Elijah raised the dead by touching the body (1 Kings 17:17-23), or St. the apostle Peter in the name of Christ raised Tabitha (Acts 9:40) 3070. Regardless of this, St. Ambrose, like all writers before him, proves the truth of the resurrection of the dead by the positive testimony of Holy Scripture. He, like Methodius, points to Daniel 12:2, drawing attention to the fact that the prophet here calls the dead sleeping, making it clear that death will not last forever 3071. Oh St. Irenaeus reminds us of Is. 26:19, where the prophet on behalf of God preaches to the Jewish people the future awakening of those lying in the tombs and speaks of the dew that revives the dead 3072; This also includes, found, however, in Tertullian and other writers, an indication of Ezek.37:1–14 3073. From the Old Testament evidence, Ambrose seems to have a new indication of the well-known confession of the righteous Job, who, patiently enduring the disasters that befell him, hoped for the future resurrection by the power of God of his flesh and for a reward for the evil of the present life in the future life (Job 19:25) 3074. The number of references to the New Testament is relatively smaller: in the work “De fide resurrectionis” [“On the hope of the resurrection”] we find only 1 Thess. 4:14–17 about the resurrection and Second Coming of Christ 3075, especially often various testimonies from 1 Cor. 15 3076; John 6:39 about the resurrection on the last day 3077 . The identity of resurrected bodies with present ones stands for St. Ambrose beyond all doubt: resurgit enim natura eadem [for the same nature is resurrected] 3078. This identity is conceived not only as individual, as in Origen, but also material, as in Irenaeus, Tertullian and others. It is proven by analyzing the concept of resurrection: resurrection consists in the rising of what has fallen and the revival of what has died 3079. The same is required by the comparison of the human body with a seed: what is sown is renewed in the identity of its genus and species (in eadem genera, in easdem species reformantur); from the grain the grain grows, the apple is restored to the apple 3080; in general, all new trees reproduce their previous shape and image 3081. Finally, in a completely original way, St. Ambrose seeks evidence of such an identity in the words of Christ the Savior during the resurrection of Lazarus: Christ the Savior, who had the power to resurrect without words (tacitus), during the resurrection of Lazarus calls him by name, so that it would not seem that instead of one another was resurrected 3082. Describing the particular properties of resurrected bodies, St. Ambrose names, first of all, Ireneo-Tertullian immortality and incorruption (flos resurrectionis immortalitas est, flos resurrectionis incorruptio est) 3083. Then they are attributed to the permanence of existence, indestructibility: per resurrectionem perpetuaretur natura [through the resurrection nature becomes permanent] 3084; as well as freedom from all restrictions and sorrows 3085, glorification 3086. But at the same time, the influence of specifically Origenistic ideas is noticeable on Ambrose’s teaching about the properties of resurrected bodies: the comparison of resurrected bodies with the glory on the Mount of Transfiguration 3087 must be attributed to this influence; they are credited with permeability, the ability to pass through closed doors; in this sense they are called spiritual bodies, in contrast to dead soul bodies 3088. Undoubtedly, Ambrose's usual idea that the bodies of the righteous will differ in their qualities from the bodies of sinners is also of Origenistic origin; the bodies of the righteous are compared to stars and appear to be light and shiny 3089, although the possibility of understanding this kind of comparison in a spiritual sense is not excluded. Sometimes only the basic idea of ​​Origen is retained, but it is revealed somewhat differently: apparently, not all bodies change during the resurrection, but only the bodies of the righteous (omnes quidem resurgemus, sed non omnes immutabimur); while the bodies of the righteous, remaining valid, will receive a new property - incorruption (immutabuntur enim justi in incorruptionem, manente corporis veritate), sinners, apparently, will not be rewarded with any change in their flesh and will retain its current properties intact 3090. According to the teachings of St. Ambrose, the bodies of all the dead will be resurrected, because Divine mercy extends to all people; but the time of resurrection will be different for different people depending on the difference in the degree of their merits (omnes quidem resurgent, sed unusquisque, ut ait apostolus, in suo ordine; communis est divinae fructus clementiae, sed distinctus ordo meritorum) 3091. According to this order of merit, all those distinguished by the maturity of piety, such as the Old Testament patriarchs and apostles, will be resurrected first. Behind them will be resurrected those of the pagans who left the service of the pagan gods and went over to the Church of Christ. The first are given priority, since faith began to shine from them, the second follow directly behind them, because they strengthened and spread faith to the West, to the very extreme limits of the world. Then follows the third and fourth classes of those who will be resurrected, namely all those of whom the Church 3092 was composed. In this list of those who will be resurrected, attention is drawn to the fact that it speaks, firstly, only about those who are worthy to inherit the Divine name and, secondly, about some kind of prerogative (praerogativam) in the resurrection itself 3093. The question now is, if, as we saw above, all people must be resurrected, then why does this list say nothing about the resurrection of sinners and those who do not belong to the Church? If the righteous have only a prerogative, and not an exclusive advantage, then when will those who are deprived of this prerogative be resurrected? This question will become clear to us if we remember that St. Ambrose still encounters the chiliastic theory of two resurrections – the first and the second. Regarding Ps. 1:5 he notes that the wicked will rise, but not to judgment; They have already been condemned by their unbelief in Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and will be resurrected in order to suffer the punishment intended for them for their unbelief 3094. He further explains that both according to the teachings of the Savior Himself and according to the testimony of St. Apostle John in the Apocalypse (Rev. 20:5) there must be two resurrections: some will receive a reward in the first resurrection, and others, although they will also be resurrected in the first resurrection, will be considered unworthy of the reward and will be left until the second resurrection; in the period of time between the first and second resurrection they will have to undergo punishments; those who turned out to be unworthy and at the second resurrection continue to be punished further 3095. Thus, together with Kellner, we must distinguish three groups of those who will be resurrected: firstly, those who are not subject to judgment at all and are already awarded glory at the first resurrection; secondly, those who suffer punishment only until the second resurrection, and then receive the crown of glory; finally, thirdly, great sinners who, even at the second resurrection, do not find mercy for themselves 3096. The theory of two resurrections and the division of those who will be resurrected into three categories is one of the most difficult places in the eschatology of St. Ambrose finds different assessments and explanations in the scientific literature. Here it is possible to see either direct chiliasm or only traces of Origen’s related doctrine of two judgments, although Origen himself, with his extreme spiritualism, was not among the defenders of chiliasm with all its essential details. Many researchers tend to favor the first of these assumptions. Förster disputes the possibility of reducing the entire theory of two resurrections to the influence of Origen due to the significant differences between this theory and the teachings of the famous Alexandrian: Origen speaks only of two judgments - προτέρα [first] and δευτέρα κρίσις [second judgment], while St. Ambrose recognizes two resurrections; then, Ambrose, unlike Origen, attaches great importance to the very period of time between the first and second resurrection. This gives Förster a reason to attribute St. Ambrose to the supporters of chiliasm 3097. Kellner, agreeing with him in this assumption, reinforces it with those side considerations that if St. Ambrose really was an opponent of chiliasm, then in this place or in any other he would have directly expressed this; then, darling. Augustine, by his own admission, adhered to chiliasm in his early years; from here it is natural to conclude that his teacher, St. Ambrose, under whose influence Augustine was in his early years, was also a chiliast 3098. Undoubtedly, the theory of two resurrections somewhat reminds us of chiliasm; but it also seems that its similarity with chiliasm is not complete and does not extend beyond its visible appearance. It does not contain the most essential feature of chiliasm, no, as Kellner himself admits, 3099 not a hint of a thousand-year period of time between the first and second resurrection, not to mention other details. And it is strange to suppose that a supporter of chiliasm would express his doctrine so casually and vaguely that his expressions require special comments. But much more important is the fact that the similarity of the doctrine of St. Ambrose with the doctrine of Origen, the opponent of chiliasm, is much more complete than Förster is inclined to admit. First of all, the place of commentary on Psalm 1, in which St. Ambrose speaks of two resurrections, already in its external literary side, according to Förster himself, 3100, reminiscent of the corresponding passage from Origen’s commentary on the same first psalm. To do this, it is enough to cite their original text. When comparing these two texts, it seems that Origen's text served as a source for Ambrose: Ambrose tries to prove that the words of the psalmist should be understood not in the sense that the wicked will not rise at all, but that, having risen with everyone, they will be condemned; Obviously, he means those simpletons in the faith of whom Origen speaks and who completely denied the resurrection of the wicked. But even with the reworking that Ambrose subjected to Origen’s text, he did not introduce anything significantly new into it. Origen says that ἐγερϑήσονται οἱ ἀσεβεῖς οὐκ ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ κρίσει, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ [the wicked will be resurrected not at the first judgment, but at the second] 3101; therefore, he, like Ambrose, recognizes not only two judgments over the resurrected, but also two acts of resurrection. Eschatology (end): the final judgment, the final destinies of the world and man The final decision of man's fate after the resurrection will be preceded, according to the teachings of St. Ambrose, purification by fire. The idea of ​​a temporary, different from eternal Gehenna, fiery purification even before St. Ambrose was shared by some Western writers. Tertullian already speaks of the sin-cleansing power of fire and, therefore, has in mind a special test by fire, different from eternal fire, as a means of punishment 3102. St. Cyprian gives a more definite idea about it: some people, in his opinion, immediately after death receive bliss, while others, who did not have time to atone for their sins during life, must undergo further purifying suffering before receiving the reward 3103; this purification continues, therefore, temporarily and has no universal significance. Lactantius, on the contrary, recognizes purification by fire as necessary for all people, both righteous and sinful; but it will only affect different people differently: gross sinners will be burned by this fire, those whose good deeds will outweigh their evil ones will only be slightly scorched, and those who are perfect in virtue will not feel its power at all. In addition, Lactantius does not refer the moment of fiery purification to the time immediately following the death of a person, as St. Cyprian, and by the time of the last trial, which seems to him also to be the only trial of man 3104. The teaching of St. Ambrose comes closest to the teachings of Lactantius, although there are dividing points between them. Like Lactantius, St. Ambrose refers to the time of trial by fire as the end of the world: post consummationem saeculi [after the completion of (the end of) (this) age], when the Lord sends his angels to separate the good from the evil, the future baptism will take place (futurum baptisma) 3105. Like Lactantius, Ambrose recognizes the universality of the trial by fire: if anyone turns out to be a saint, even to the same extent as St. Apostle Peter or John, then he will still have to be baptized in this fire (baptizatur hoc igni) 3106. The purpose of such a test is the preliminary cleansing of sins in order to obtain bliss: “Through the fiery furnace (per caminum ignis) unrighteousness (iniquitas) is burned, so that the righteous (justi) may shine in the Kingdom of God, as the Sun itself shines in the kingdom of His Father” 3107; fire “will burn in us the lead of unrighteousness (plumbum iniquitatis), the iron of sin (ferrum peccati) and make us pure gold (aurum sincerum)... whoever passes through the fire (per ignem) will enter into peace, from the material and worldly will move to the incorruptible and eternal” 3108. This fire, in accordance with its meaning, is called the final fire (ignis consumens) 3109 1. But while Lactantius recognizes only one type of fire, pointing only to its different effects on different people, St. Ambrose strictly distinguishes cleansing fire, as a very special type of fire, from fire as punishment for serious sinners: “Another fire (alius ignis), he says, is the one with which sins are burned not voluntary, but accidental (peccata non voluntaria, sed fortuita), and which the Lord prepared for His servants in order to cleanse them from the growths that adhered to the dead; and that other fire (alius ille ignis) which the Lord prepared for the devil and his angels (Matthew 25:41)” 3110. As presented, the representation of St. Ambrose about the purifying fire has, of course, very little in common with the Roman Catholic teaching on purgatory, as set out by Bl. Augustine and Gregory the Great, and even more so among the theologians of the era of scholasticism. This has already been noted in comparative detail by Deutsch, who gives the following assessment of the views of the Milanese bishop: “From the later doctrine of purgatorium [purgatory], as it was first created by Augustine, then by Gregory the Great, the view of St. Ambrose is different in that this purifying fire appears only at the end of things for everyone at the same time and, moreover, only as a quick process; What is common to both views is only the idea that even after death, the purification of a person is still necessary before he becomes able to enter the Kingdom of Heaven” 3111. To this it should be added that, although Ambrose applies such expressions to the purifying fire as purgare, purificare [to cleanse] 3112, he does not yet know the Catholic term purgatorium [purgatory] 3113; then, in all his discussions about this fire there is not a hint that it was adapted to any specific place. The cleansing trial will be followed by the Last Judgment. In describing its properties, Ambrose appears before us as a genuine representative of the West. Western writers connect with it mainly the idea of ​​​​final retribution to man; it seems to be a formidable revelation of God's wrath against the unworthy, bringing everyone into fear and trembling 3114. So is St. Ambrose calls the last judgment a court of vengeance (ultionis judicium) 3115, a terrible judgment (terribile judicium) 3116, future wrath (futura ira) 3117, an evil and difficult day (dies mala, aspera) 3118. Only sometimes is importance attached to Divine mercy: “The judgment (justum judicium) of the Son of God is righteous, for it is carried out secundum voluntatem Dei [according to the will of God], and not secundum hominis affectum [according to human will]; but God is also full of mercy (plenus misericordiarum est), and His misericordia [mercy] is connected with judicio [judgment], just as judicium [court] is with misericordia [mercy]: without judgment He does not show mercy, just as without mercy He does not judge” 3119. This final judgment will be a judgment in the proper sense only for certain categories of people, while the fate of all others seems to have been decided in advance. Those who believed correctly (bene crediderunt) and accompanied their faith also with good works will arise, not to be judged, but to take part in the council of the righteous (ipsi non judicari, sed surgere in consilio justorum); sinners who cannot rise up among the righteous will rise up for judgment (surgent in judicio); We thus already have two orders (duos ordines); the third category is formed by the wicked (tertius superest impiorum), who, due to their unbelief, have already been condemned (qui quoniam non crediderunt, jam judicati sunt) and therefore will rise not for judgment, but for punishment (non surgent in judicio, sed ad poena), which will serve as a court for them (et ideo judicium eorum poena est) 3120. Beginning with the depiction of the final fate of the righteous and sinners, the eschatology of St. Ambrose now takes on an almost entirely Origenistic imprint, only sometimes slightly softened in the spirit of the established Church Tradition. The place of hellish torment has different names for him: hell (Ἅιδης) 3121, abyss (abyssus) 3122, but most often it appears under the name of the underworld (infernus, inferna) 3123. The essence of the torment endured in it is defined in the same way as in Origen, despite the fact that in general the Western Church, represented by the majority of its writers, stood on the side of the literal understanding of Gehenna fire and hellish torment 3124. In Origen's view, the fire of hellish torment is an internal fire that every person lights for himself: realizing the full severity and multitude of his own sins, the soul will be tormented by this consciousness, not being able to free himself from the remorse of conscience generated by it. Inextricably linked with remorse is a feeling of discord with oneself, an awareness of the contradiction between one’s aspirations and one’s actual position; the severity of this kind of punishment should be intensified by the relentlessly haunting consciousness of the soul that no one else, but she herself, through her actions in earthly life, created a sad fate for herself. Exactly the same with St. Ambrose, the hellish gnashing of teeth, the unquenchable fire and the undying worm are not represented as external phenomena, but as internal states of the soul. He who adds sins to sins, who does not care about cleansing from them, exposes his neck to the weight of old and new sins, is burned by his own fire, eaten by his own worm: regret (moestitia) for committed sins generates the fire of torment; consciousness of sins, like a worm, eats away the inner recesses of conscience (viscera conscientiae); gnashing of teeth lies in a person’s deep sense of dissatisfaction with himself, in frustration at late repentance. The similarity in this case between Origen and Ambrose will become even more obvious to us if we remember that, firstly, both of them compare the effect of the fire of Gehenna with the effect of fever on a person and that, secondly, both are based on Is. 50:11, which speaks of fire and flame kindled by man himself 3125. In an allegorical sense, like Origen, St. Ambrose also speaks of the gospel prison and darkness. By darkness and prison, Origen means the absence of true knowledge of God, the religious and moral ignorance of sinners. According to St. Ambrose, darkness, both now and in the future, will cover all those who live in disregard of the Divine commandments, in ignorance of them, who live without Jesus Christ, since Christ and His commandments form the true inner light of every believing soul 3126. Entirely in the Origenistic spirit, he describes the eternal torment of the devil in the sense of the latter’s internal torment: the devil is always in a state of punishment, since, being constantly bound by the chains of his own wickedness, he himself will forever (in perpetuum) be under the judgment of his conscience 3127. Above Gehenna, but below the heavenly abodes, there is still a special intermediate place, which has different names among different writers and has different meanings. The fact is that, according to the ideas of ancient Western writers, only martyrs receive their reward immediately after death; St. Ambrose joins them with more priests and emperors favored by the Church. For the temporary stay until the final judgment of all others who have reason to hope for a reward, Abraham’s bosom serves. Usually Western writers place this womb in the underworld, considering it as a special branch of the latter 3128. But St. Ambrose in this case is inclined, rather, to the idea of ​​Origen’s womb, rather than fully sharing the views of his Western predecessors. In Origen, Abraham's womb is different from the underworld and is identified with paradise 3129; the latter, occupying a middle place between hell and heaven, serves as the residence of the souls of the righteous 3130. And St. Ambrose already understands by the bosom of Abraham a state of bliss, although, apparently, so far only partial. It is characterized by a state of peace in which every element of suffering is eliminated: “Poor Lazarus bore a heavy yoke from his youth and rested only in Abraham’s bosom” 3131. In this sense, we can speak not only about the bosom of Abraham, but also about the bosom of all patriarchs in general (gremium Jacob, Abrahae sinus): “The bosom of the patriarchs is a certain place of eternal peace (sinus enim patriarcharum recessum quidam est quietis aeternae)” 3132. Sometimes it is characterized as participation in eternal life: “Lazarus, reclining in the bosom of Abraham (in Abrahae sinu), shared eternal life (vitam carpebat aeternam)” 3133. Still, there is reason to think that this term does not characterize the state of all righteous people in general, but only the less perfect ones, who need outside help and other people’s merits to acquire bliss; to accept into the bosom in this case means to help someone with one’s merits: “Let us follow the morals of Abraham, so that he may accept us into his bosom (in gremium suum) and, like Lazarus, the heir of his humility, warm us with his own virtues (propriis virtutibus) in his embrace” 3134. Perhaps in connection with this is the teaching of St. Ambrose about two kingdoms in heaven: the first Kingdom of Heaven is intended for the saints at the moment of their separation from the body (primum regnum coelorum sanctis propositum est in absolutione corporis), and the second will come after the resurrection, in communion with Christ (secundum regnum coelorum est post resurrectionem esse cum Christo) 3135; this first, so to speak, preliminary reign in heaven may be the womb of Abraham, although there is no material to prove this. Concerning eternal rewards, it has generally been taught in the West that there are many different kinds of these rewards, according to different degrees of merit: because of the variety of merits (pro varietate meritorum), God has many mansions (multae mansiones) 3136 . But the firmly established and noted above view of earthly life as an exclusive field for acquiring merit could not, of course, favor the idea that a righteous person in the Kingdom of Heaven could move from one monastery to another, more perfect one. As for St. Ambrose, then he agrees with them in recognizing only the first half of this idea. “Although there is one Kingdom, there are different merits in it (diversa tamen merita sunt in regno coelorum)” 3137. Usually the number of these monasteries is not precisely determined, however, in the work “De bono mortis” [“On the Good of Death”], the fourth apocryphal book of Ezra inspired him with the idea of ​​​​seven classes of bliss of the righteous, which he describes in great detail 3138. But St. Ambrose thinks that the fate of the righteous in the Kingdom of Heaven does not remain unchanged forever in the form in which it was determined at the last judgment. Apparently, the process of moral improvement continues in heaven: the grace of the Heavenly Kingdom can always be further multiplied (caritas augeatur) 3139. In the Kingdom of Heaven there are a number of degrees of reward, and its members gradually ascend from the lowest level to the highest: the Emperor Gratian had already ascended higher up these stages (pio officio ad ulteriora processerat) when Valentinian the Younger had just begun to ascend (ascendere) 3140. Ambrose represents this many abodes under the image of seven heavens, and the transition from one heaven to another occurs with strict gradualism: from the first heaven you can only move to the second, from the second to the third, etc. in order until the seventh; only Jesus Christ, by His humanity, was removed from this law of gradualism and immediately ascended through all heaven to the Throne of God 3141. This circle of thoughts partly reminds us of the eschatology of Origen, for whom “earth” is also “not the only place for the development and activity of the soul,” and “all the different worlds and heavens are thought of as stages of the development and formation of the soul” 3142. Associated with this difference in degrees of perfection is the difference in degrees of reward; in this sense, Origen 3143 also speaks of seven heavens. But this similarity between our writers should not be exaggerated: St. Ambrose assigns to man for future perfection not the entire world in general, like Origen, but exclusively the sphere of heavenly abodes. The life of saints in the heavenly abodes of St. Ambrose characterizes him with features that eliminate any reproach of sensuality. It consists in the close communion and agreement of the saints with each other (sanctorum sibi vita non dissonet) 3144 and in the close communion of people with the angels (angelorum atque hominum futura consortia) 3145. From the content side, this life is characterized by a state of complete peace, freedom from all worries and worries: the saints rest from all pleasures of the flesh, from all disturbance of the spirit (animi perturbatione), enjoying peace of mind and meekness of soul 3146. At the same time, life in the Kingdom of Heaven is conceived as a state of perfect knowledge and revelation, previously inaccessible to man without sensory images of mysteries: “Now we contemplate through a mirror (per speculum), and then face to face; now we serve according to the flesh (secundum carnem), and then in the spirit (spiritu) we will contemplate the Divine mysteries (divina mysteria); and the image of the true law will be imprinted in our morals (in nostris moribus exprimatur), since we will live in the image of God (in Dei ambulamus imagine)” 3147. St. Ambrose contemplates Gratian meeting his brother Valentinian in the heavenly abodes and explaining to him the mysteries of the Old Testament and the Gospel (Testamenti veteris, et Evangelii sacramenta); he initiates him into the inner secrets (penetralia arcana) of the mother Church and into all the mysterious mysteries (in omnia secreta mysterii), offering him a drink of spiritual grace 3148. But from these expressions it is clear that Ambrose here means exclusively knowledge of a religious nature, which has as its subject the true content of Revelation and the spiritual meaning of the teachings and institutions of the Church. This feature of his eschatology differs from the related eschatology of Origen, who also expected the revelation of secrets in eternity 3149, but considered the object of this future knowledge not the truths of religion, but everything that exists in general 3150. Before completely putting an end to the eschatology of St. Ambrose, we must ask ourselves and resolve the question: does he consider the eternal difference between the fate of the righteous and sinners after judgment? In the West, as we have seen, any possibility of improving one's lot after death was denied; Ambrose sometimes agrees with this, as has already been shown. Here, in confirmation of this, we cite several more new passages: without the remission of sins on earth one cannot receive vitam aeternam [eternal life] 3151; suffering (flagella) after death does not bring any benefit 3152. However, close acquaintance with the works of Origen in some cases directs his thought in a completely opposite direction: although the Origenistic concept of “apokatastasis” is not found in him, there is no shortage of ideas that remind us of apokatastasis. “Those guilty of sins (peccatorum reos) after death are released by prison (career emittit),” with this argument he wants to touch the hard-hearted rich people towards their debtors 3153. But it is even more important that in the commentary on Psalm 36 there is a passage borrowed, judging by the sequence of speech and expressions, from Origen and interpreting that sin and wickedness, which did not exist from the beginning, will also not exist forever: together with the earth, which currently serves as the habitat of sin, the last sinner will disappear, but since the substance of sinners will still be preserved, here we have an Origenistic thought about future, after the second resurrection, conversion to Christ and correction of all sinners. God, therefore, does not reject sinners forever (non in aeternum projicit) 3154, the time will eventually come when the last enemy - death - will be destroyed, when evil will be completely impoverished and only eternal blessings will exist 3155. This is the end of things, - this is how Ambrose argues for his apocatastasis, - and the perfect end can only be one that concerns not one and not some, but all (ille verus est finis, qui non unius erit finis, sed omnium) 3156. However, it is very doubtful that St. Ambrose was inclined to recognize a universal apokatastasis, like Origen: an analysis of his teaching about evil spirits showed us that he did not recognize the possibility of their turning to God at any time. The teaching of Saint Ambrose on morality 3157 Starting to present the ethics of St. Ambrose, we must immediately note his outstanding historical significance in this area. In this regard, he can only be compared with Clement of Alexandria, and then only with a reservation: if Clement is considered the first scientific ethicist in the history of Christian church literature 3158, then St. Ambrose was not only the first ethicist in the West, but his work “De officiis ministrorum” [“On the duties of the clergy”], specifically devoted to issues of morality, represents, if not the first scientific and philosophical system of church morality, then, in any case, the first more or less complete code or collection of philosophical solutions to issues of Christian ethics. Of course, church literature in the West treated moral issues even before Ambrose: the works of Tertullian and Lactantius can serve as good sources for familiarization with this ancient period of Western treatment of issues of church morality. Nevertheless, we can begin the history of scientific ethics in the West with Ambrose, since Tertullian, as far as we know, turns Christian morality into a simple collection of rules that externally regulate life to the smallest detail, 3159 and not only does not deal with questions about the principles of morality, but does not even feel the need to give the ethical problem a scientific form and philosophical justification. The ethics of Lactantius, although it differs favorably from Tertullian in its more or less fundamental character, is still revealed outside the data of classical science and even in opposition to them. Only Ambrose used this science for the scientific treatment of church ethics. But, as the first experience of scientific ethics, the ethics of St. Ambrose has very significant shortcomings: it lacks, first of all, the character of an integral system; discussing various moral issues, St. Ambrose makes no attempt to derive them from a single principle and foundation; as a result, according to Boehringer’s fair remark, his teaching on morality is the sum of individual Christian teachings on morality, and is not a single Christian teaching on morality in the strict sense of the word 3160. Then, drawing thoughts from a wide variety of sources, from the teaching of the Church and Revelation, on the one hand, and from the classical systems of morality, on the other, St. Ambrose could not overcome the dualism in ethics that naturally formed in this way; in him we find, in the complete absence of an organic connection and with only “external combination” 3161, the parallel coexistence of two essentially heterogeneous currents of thought - Christian-ecclesiastical and classical. Of the factors, under the undoubted influence of which the doctrine of morality of St. Ambrose, should point to the work of Cicero “De officiis” [“On Duties”] and to the ethics of Philo, which is a synthesis of elements of Stoicism and Platonism, sometimes modified, but always combined with the teaching of the Old Testament Revelation. As for Clement of Alexandria, it is indisputable that in some cases the representations of St. Ambrose discovers a lot in common with him; but still, given the existence of a very large difference between them, the question of the dependence of the ethics of Ambrose on the ethics of Clement, even if it is risky to resolve irrevocably in a negative sense, still has to be left under very, very great doubt. In some places we will try to illustrate this with individual examples. In some cases, finally, we find in Ambrose the ideas of St. Vasily. Sources of moral law; concept of conscience From Western writers to St. Ambrose's teaching on the origin and source of morality we find, for example, in Lactantius: consistently pursuing the point of view of the sharp contrast between the natural, natural and given by God, usual among Western writers, he apparently denies the possibility of a natural origin of the moral law, deriving the latter exclusively from the revealed commandments of God. “Although the pagans,” he says, “thought that they should do good according to the dictates of nature (poscente natura), neither they themselves nor their philosophers could do it, because the ability to be virtuous is given only by heavenly science (doctrina coelestis), as the only wisdom (sola sapientia)” 3162. Ambrose in some places reveals more attention to the natural goodness in man. If we look at his interpretations of the psalms, we will see that in them he repeatedly mentions some kind of moral law in man. “The pagans,” he says, “when they do what the law prescribes (judging by the general meaning of the speech, external, written), they are a law unto themselves, realizing what they must follow and what they must beware of” 3163. Since they have the prescriptions of morality solely by virtue of the testimony of nature, without knowing the existence of the revealed law of God, then we can say about them that they follow the law naturaliter [naturally], fulfill the prescriptions of the naturalis legis [natural law], written in our hearts and forming the interioris hominis ventrem [the womb of the inner man] 3164. This natural law finds its effect not only among pagans, deprived of a frank written law, but does not lose its meaning for Christians either; rather, on the contrary, he speaks the more powerfully in the latter, the further they stand from sin; the written law was given to man precisely because sin gradually began to drown out the testimony of the naturalis legis [natural law]; if there were no sin, then there would also be no need for a written law. “In the heart of the righteous (justi) there is a lex Dei [the law of God], certainly not scripta [written], but naturalis [natural], for the lex [law] is not made for the righteous, but for the unjust (injusto).” If the pagans are able to be guided by a moral feeling when doing good, then all the more, of course, is a faithful and righteous husband (fidelis et justus), living ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei [in the image and likeness of God], able to determine what is decent (decora) and honest (honesta) and use some, having the character of a law, guidance of natural wisdom (uti legitimo quodam naturalis sapientiae gubernaculo) 3165. Understanding the further judgments of St. Ambrose about the nature of the natural moral law, we notice that he characterizes it with Stoic features, in some places slightly modifying them, like other Christian writers, in accordance with new concepts. For the Stoics, the moral law in man was primarily the voice of the individual human mind, and morality was an activity consistent with the requirements of this reason 3166; like this, St. Ambrose recognizes the legislative significance of the activity of our mind, which explains the universality of the natural law of morality in the human race: opinio nostra sibi legem facit [(our) opinion creates its own law] 3167. The Stoics, further, taught that not every activity of the mind in general has the meaning of a law, but only correct activity, correct reason or the so-called ὀρϑὸς λόγος 3168, or reason acting in accordance with the course and law of the world as a whole, with the general world mind, cognizing the laws of this latter 3169. St. Ambrose also makes mens, as the individual and subjective human mind, dependent on the objective mind - ratio. Moral activity for him is rationis rectae consideratio [reflection of the right mind] 3170; rectae rationis tractatione [by correct reflection] passions can be destroyed 3171; through recta ratione [right thinking] the mind (mens) is able to adhere to the instructions of wisdom 3172; Only life secundum tractationem rationis [according to reason] 3173 can be normal. This idea of ​​recta ratio [right reason] as the source of moral consciousness is of such importance to St. Ambrose, that he makes even the external written law dependent on him. The latter acquires the authority of the law only under the condition of agreement with it, acting under the influence of ratio reason, so that in the end, in Ambrose, the Stoic formula remains valid: reason (mens), directed towards rationi, precedes the virtues 3174. External law is useful only in exhortation and weak in persuasion; a person does good or strives for evil not due to external compulsion, but solely of his own free will (voluntate arbitra); what the law prescribes is confirmed only by the ratio inherent in reason 3175. But at St. Ambrose, like other church writers, ὀρϑὸς λόγος [correct reason], of course, could not mean the agreement of the individual mind with the world mind, because they did not have a pantheistic lining underlying such a concept. The moralists, led by Philo, who stood on the basis of Revelation, made a significant amendment to the classical concept of objective reason that the criterion for judging the correct functioning of the individual mind is considered to be its agreement with the Logos, acting in the world, but, nevertheless, different from the latter. Clement of Alexandria presupposes precisely this concept of the Logos when he asserts that the purpose of our life is assimilation (ἐξομοίωσις) [(i.e., assimilation) to correct reason, logos] 3176; St. Ambrose also knows a similar identification when he speaks of the Logos as a law, in contrast to the written law: if the commandment of the Lord (mandatum Dei) already has the meaning of a law (lex) for us, then even more so the living and active Word of God (multo magis vivum et operatorium Verbum Dei lex est) 3177 is the law for us. Somewhat more difficult is the question of how exactly Ambrose defines the relationship of this law to conscience (conscientia), which, like the Stoics, occupies a prominent place among his moral concepts, and what meaning he connects with it. Ewald, who defends Ambrose’s slavish dependence on Stoicism in his book, does not find in him the concept of conscience in its true sense of spiritual force, commanding to do good and avoid evil, in the sense of moral duty, imperative; as a result, it cannot be considered as a source of moral consciousness. The one-sided Socratic-intellectualistic direction of Stoicism requires, in his opinion, a distinction between the concepts of “internal law” and “conscience”, because the internal law, although in its final instance it turned out to be the law of the all-governing world Logos, nevertheless, for the subject it received the meaning of law due to the recognition of authority on the part of the subject himself 3178; Thus, the decisive importance among the Stoics, and after them also among Ambrose, belongs to the convictions of reason, and conscience arises only subsequently, after the commission of an action, as a subsequent, judging, punishing conscience, but not preliminary and commanding 3179. Indeed, as for Stoicism, at least in its Ciceronian version, conscience does not matter to it as a source of moral consciousness: “For us,” Cicero instructs his son, “the conviction we receive from success in philosophy should be sufficient” 3180; There is no talk of conscience here at all. Justice also requires noting that Ambrose, apparently, often does not mean the imperative power of conscience and usually speaks of it only in the sense of the result of one or another course of action: after an offense, the vision of the inner conscience opens (conscientiae interioris aperitur visus) 3181; interior conscientia [inner conscience] shares the merits of the immaculate and the corrupt and is the source and incorruptible dispenser of rewards and punishments 3182; conscience is a domestic court (judicium domesticum), to which each of us gives an account of our actions; It makes itself felt especially strongly when it appears as a poena [punishment], as a vulnus [wound], an internal painful wound 3183. Thus, we do not find any significant difference from the Stoics either here or anywhere else. But we cannot ignore the fact that although the concept of moral duty is not associated with the concept of conscience, conscientia [conscience] very often appears in St. Ambrose as a very important motive that precedes any action: the wise man avoids evil not only because the conviction of his own mind distracts him from it, but also because he is ashamed of the voice of his own conscience (pudenda conscientia est), because he is subject to his own judgment before the judgment of others 3184. That a writer like Ambrose, along with the natural law, had to recognize the written law, this should be noted here only for completeness. Supernatural factor of moral activity For church writers, in contrast to the Stoics, especially their most ancient formation, reason was only one, but not the only factor in moral activity. Along with it stands the Divine factor, which has not only legislative significance, but also direct participation in the very process of moral activity. By introducing this last factor into his teaching, St. Ambrose significantly elevated his morality compared to Stoic morality. If in Stoicism, where the Divine was thought of under the form of the world, the law of reason was nothing more than the natural law of nature, and the moral world in the essence of the matter did not in any way rise above the natural world, nature, then in St. Ambrose, morality has taken into itself something independent of the laws of nature and not only does not obey the latter, but even dominates it in order to achieve its highest goals. The introduction of the concept of a supernatural Actor into the circle of moral concepts required the recognition of the Personality and transcendence of the Divine, who is, however, in a never-ending relationship with the world. It was also required by the awareness of the weakness of the natural powers of man as a created being, and in particular by the conviction of the corruption of his nature by sin. This was already done on a fairly extensive scale by Philo, who was followed to a greater or lesser extent by Christian ethics. It would, of course, be a mistake against historical truth to place a high importance on the supernatural Actor in the morality of St. Ambrose can only be deduced from the influence of Philo, although it cannot be disputed that in the depiction of this figure Ambrose sometimes reminds us of Philo. As a biblical example to illustrate the need for Divine help in human moral activity, Philo often cites Rebekah: if the writer of everyday life says that Eleazar met Rebekah at the well when she came for water (Gen. 24:15–16), then this minor circumstance for the Jewish exegete serves as an image of a mind thirsting for prudence (φρονήσεως) descending to the source of Divine wisdom (σοφίας Θεοῦ), from which alone it can be filled; St. uses it in the same way and in the same sense. Ambrose: Rebekah serves as the image of the Church descending to the source of wisdom (ad sapientiae fontem), or of every soul striving for perfection, in order to draw from there the instructions of pure wisdom (sapientiae purae) 3185. Probably, depending on Plato's teaching on Divine Eros, Philo considers ἔρως, the desire and love for virtue, the driving force of moral activity: the soul that is shepherded by God receives ἔρως, under the influence of which, despising everything base, it begins to cultivate ἐπιστήμην [knowledge] 3186. He often talks about a special eros of knowledge (ὁ ἐπιστήμης ἔρως), which encourages constant wakefulness of the mind and protects against spiritual sleep 3187; but sometimes heavenly eros (ἔρως οὐράνιος) seems to be the source of all virtue in general (ἐξ οὗ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν φύεσϑαι συμβέβηκεν) 3188. St. Ambrose also attributes to the Logos the arousal in the soul of a special love (amor), which is also defined in two ways: both the love of knowledge of heavenly mysteries in particular, and the love that generates virtue in general. When amor Verbi coelestis [the love of the heavenly Word] flows into our soul, and the sanctified mind (mens sancta) communicates with the rational world, marvelous mysteries (mysteria) 3189 are revealed to it; with moral improvement, this love increases (augetur amor) and leads to the sight of God, as well as to virtue 3190. In connection with the idea of ​​this, St. Ambrose speaks of the seeds he left in the soul, from which (ex seminibus) the contemplation of the fullness of the Divinity develops 3191. Communication between God and man at the highest levels is designated by Philo by the name of virgin charisma, gift (τὴν παρϑένον χάριτα); here we mean the stage of the closest communication with God, when there is nothing in between between God and the soul (μὴ εἶναι Θεοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς μέσον) 3192. Something similar is found in Ambrose, although he does not speak about virgin charisma, but about the virgin Logos (παρϑενικὸς λόγος), which he identifies with the face of Christ the Savior. The soul enjoys joy and gladness when it has παρϑενικὸν λόγον [virgin Logos], because for it Christ suffered and was crucified, Who is παρϑενικὸς λόγος [virgin Logos] 3193. The possession of this Logos also obviously takes place at the highest levels, because it is characterized by joy, and the deprivation of the Logos is accompanied by sadness and repentance: the soul in which, due to its intemperance, the word of God, or παρϑενικὸς λόγος, has died, falls into pity 3194. St. owes a lot. Ambrose in this case and Origen. This mainly needs to be said regarding his work “De Isaac vel anima” [“On Isaac and the Soul”], although in view of the loss of the corresponding commentary by Origen, it is not possible to say where the borrowed ends and our own begins. It is possible to systematically present the idea of ​​moral activity revealed here in this form. Verbum Dei [the word of God] is received by every soul, but only the pure soul (immaculata) 3195 retains it. This Word acts in man under the condition of the self-activity of his spirit: in accordance with our merits (nostris meritis) Verbum Dei [the Word of God] either lives or dies in us; for if our efforts and deeds are good, the Verbum Dei [Word of God] lives and works in us; but if our thoughts and deeds are dark, then the sun of truth (sol justitiae) 3196 sets for us. As is already known, the relationship of the Logos with the soul, according to Origen, is described by Ambrose under the image of the beloved and beloved of the Book of Song of Songs. Here it is necessary to note two main features of such unity. On the one hand, the unity of the Logos with the soul should be understood not in the sense of simple assistance from the Word, but in the sense of the internal mysterious unity of the soul with Him, in the sense of joint action in goodness, first the Word of God, as it were, knocks on the door of the soul, wanting to enter it; As soon as the soul responds to the call of God, opens the doors to Him, it already perceives the Word within itself and, having received It, learns from It 3197. From this moment on, the Word becomes the Bridegroom, and the soul becomes His beloved bride; she herself begins to burn with the desire to constantly be with the Word, strives uncontrollably towards Him, so to speak, feels His voice within herself, perceives “the fragrance of His Divinity with her inner feeling (intimo sensu)”; Feeling within herself the grace-filled breath of the presence of the Word, she, like the biblical beloved, says: “This is the One I am looking for, the One I desire” 3198. These relations between the soul and the Word are also explained by the analogy of the close relations between the soul and the body: just as the union of the soul with the body is enlivened by a special vital spirit (spiritu vitali), so the soul is enlivened by the Divine Word, which from the moment of union with it forms a vital substance (vitalis substantia) for it, nourishing, supporting it and increasing goodness in it 3199. But, on the other hand, the unity of the soul with the Divine Word is not their complete mystical fusion, in which the individuality of the soul is lost, immersing itself in the Word and disappearing in It. This must be noted both in relation to the beginning and in relation to the last and highest stage of their mutual unity. First, the Word addresses the soul “as if through a well,” that is, incompletely and imperfectly, throwing into the soul only seeds that it perceives in its mental womb, in order to then develop them into virtue. After prolonged improvement, she comes closer to the Word, feeling the fullness of His Divinity; but even now her relationship to the Word is compared with the relationship to the Lord in the womb of Mary, who had not yet left the womb of John the Baptist, who, feeling the close presence of the Lord, rejoiced in the womb of the righteous Elizabeth 3200. In the process of establishing an intimate relationship between the soul and the Word of St. Ambrose distinguishes three distinct stages. The first stage is defined only as institutio animae, as the instruction of the soul; its essence lies in the fact that the soul, by revelation of the Lord to it, is seized by a special affect (affectum), a passion for getting closer to God. At this stage, she sees, as it were, only shadows, does not yet sense the nearness of the Word, for her the day of the Gospel does not yet shine in all its splendor. The relationship between the soul and the Word thus remains more or less external. The second stage is the stage of secundum profectum, that is, the stage of prosperity, greater perfection, and consists in the fact that instead of the previous shadows, the soul begins to smell the stench of fragrances, obviously, it is attracted to good exclusively by the power of good and disinterested love for it. Finally, the third stage is the stage of secundum perfectionem, that is, a state of perfection, when the soul already rotates with the Word Himself and serves Him, rests with Him and brings not only the pleasant color of virtue, but also its fruits 3201. The concept of virtue and its signs And the gradual development of man’s natural powers and strict gradualism in the implementation of relationships with God and His Word should naturally also instill the idea of ​​strict gradualism in the accomplishment of virtue, as the real content of moral life. Indeed, the entire totality of Christian virtues appears to St. Ambrose by a long, gradually developing process, in which each subsequent stage can be reached only through the previous one. Getting to know the works of St. Vasily gave him a comparison of moral activity with the long staircase seen by Patriarch Jacob, consisting of many steps, along which we can only climb little by little, starting with the most insignificant and gradually moving on to what is more difficult for our nature. The first step of this ladder stands very close to the earth, being the most compatible with earthly affections, the second is very similar to the first, and each of the following has very much in common with its previous one; in such gradualism, a virtuous life cannot be a task beyond a person’s strength. Specific signs that characterize St. Ambrose's gradually developing virtue, again resurrects before us the classical sages; Moreover, some of them were characteristic of all classical antiquity, while others were the property of Stoic philosophy itself. The category of signs of the first kind includes the dominance of a one-sided intellectual moment in the concept of virtue. This understanding found its classical expression in Socrates, who defended the identity of virtue and knowledge. After him, almost all ancient philosophical schools, without distinction of directions, agreed among themselves in the general recognition that just as the root of evil lies in ignorance, so the source of good must be sought in knowledge; it is enough to know to be virtuous. Our author takes the same point of view. “Virtue,” he says, “can be a subject of teaching (docibilis enim virtus), and it is acquired through study and study (studio et discendo), while it disappears due to negligence” 3202. “Science is capable of making us respect justice, for justitia [justice, righteousness] can be acquired through teaching (discendo), and therefore let us strive diligently towards the science of the Gospel” 3203. This feature in the teaching of St. Ambrose on the nature of virtue should be noted especially because it did not have roots in the church tradition of the West, as far as the latter was reflected, at least, in the teaching of Lactantius: virtue is thought of here as a fact of moral life, although associated with knowledge, but still different from it and requiring for its implementation in some other conditions besides knowledge. Knowledge is not yet a virtue. “Virtue,” says Lactantius, “does not consist in the knowledge of good and evil (bonum ac malum scire), but consists in doing good and avoiding evil (bonum facere, malum non facere); and although knowledge (scientia) is connected with virtue, insofar as the first precedes the second, and the second follows the first, knowledge (cognitio) in itself does not bring benefit if it is not accompanied by activity” 3204. The classical understanding of virtue as knowledge was further developed and expanded by the Stoics. The deepest instinct of every living being is the instinct of self-preservation; the latter can only be achieved through a life consistent with the laws of our nature; virtue, therefore, consists in activity consistent with nature 3205. On this basis, Cicero's idea of ​​nature as the leader of human life is revealed: in our activities we naturam debemus ducem sequi [must follow nature] 3206; if we sequemur ducem naturam [follow nature], we will never make mistakes 3207; this conformity with nature prescribes, on the one hand, not to do anything contrary to the nature of the whole (ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus), and on the other, without violating the whole, to follow the inclination of one’s own nature (propriam naturam sequamur), not to sin against the rule of our nature (nostrae naturae regula) 3208. St. Ambrose attributes to virtue this Stoic-Ciceronian trait under the name secundum naturam ["by nature"] almost exclusively in the work "De officiis ministrorum" ["On the duties of the clergy"]: let us imitate nature (naturam imitemur), says his motto, because the image of nature (ejus effigies) serves as a form of discipline and honesty 3209. He usually understands this term in the same sense as the Stoic Cicero: to live secundum naturam [by nature] in his language means nothing more than that it is the duty of every person to determine first of all his own abilities (ingenium) and then to order his life in accordance with his abilities 3210. The classical spirit was generally characterized by the identification of the morally good and the aesthetically beautiful, according to which only the truly beautiful was recognized as good, and only the truly good could be truly beautiful. On this basis, the Stoics developed the doctrine of virtue, consistent with reason and expressed in imitation of nature, as beauty (τὸ καλόν). Cicero denotes this trait by two meaningful terms - honestum and decorum, i.e. honest and decent. Ambrose does the same in De officiis [On Duties]. It should be noted that for both one and the other, honestum and decorum are more likely only two different points of view on the same subject 3211 than two significantly different characteristics: everything that is honest at the same time is also decent, just as everything that is decent at the same time is also honest, so that the difference between them exists not so much in reality as in the concept, as a result of logical abstraction; it can only be understood rather than explained. However, both of them consider each of these concepts separately. As far as can be concluded from individual expressions of Cicero, the term honestum denotes everything normal, healthy, in accordance with nature, or, better said, normal, in accordance with the laws of nature, attitude towards various things and phenomena: the ability to observe in everything the measure and order inherent only to man, the ability to appreciate beauty and maintain constancy serve as examples of the manifestation of honestatis in a person 3212; loyalty to concluded agreements, manifestation of generosity and fortitude are also included under this concept 3213. Ambrose has essentially the same thing in mind, for whom the word honestas, honestum serves as a symbol of everything healthy, normal; it can mean both the state of the body, namely, its strength and health (honestas velut bona valetudo est, et quaedam salubritas corporis), and the integrity of our deeds and actions (velut salubritas igitur totius operis actusque nostri honestas est) 3214; honestatis, he explains his thought, is characteristic, for example, of performing acts of charity or observing fasting in secret (in abscondito), seeking rewards only from God, and not from people 3215. The opposite of honest property is considered by Cicero to be dishonest, turpia, turpitudo, meaning by it everything that deviates from the norm 3216, like all kinds of ignorance, delusions, temptations and generally unjust actions (injusta) 3217. Ambrose also contrasts the concept of honestum with turpitudo, which cannot be in agreement with the first, because they are separated from each other by the law of nature 3218. Honestas has meaning for him because, as for the Stoics, it is consistent with the laws of nature (honestum secundum naturam), but this last circumstance is explained in the spirit of the church, namely: God created everything very good (omnia enim fecit Deus bona valde), and turpitudo is the opposite of this (contraria est) 3219. But this minor feature does not significantly change anything in the general series of concepts, because, in the end, and under this condition, honestas is the same property of nature as among the Stoics. Decorum means something slightly different: if honestas is normality, naturalness, something that should be in general, then the concept of decorum refers exclusively to the aesthetic moment of being and activity. From here the inseparable connection of the latter with the former is already self-explanatory. Decus for Cicero has the meaning of beauty, harmony in the structure of the nature of the human body, and beauty as a property of virtue. Just as the beauty (pulchritudo) of the body is capable of delivering pleasure through the harmony in the arrangement of its parts and their activities, so decorum, shining in life with orderliness, steadfastness and restraint in words and deeds, evokes the approval of others 3220. But just as the pleasantness and beauty of the body (venustas et pulchritudo corporis) cannot be separated from health (a valetudine), so decorum is completely mixed (confusum) with virtue and can be separated from it only in the mind and thoughts 3221. We can find these same thoughts in almost identical expressions in the treatise of St. Ambrose. And for him decus is, as it were, venustas [pleasantness] and pulchritudo [beauty] 3222. The relationship between honestum and decorum is exactly the same as between the health of the body and its beauty: decorum is superior to honestum, just as pulchritudo [beauty] is superior to salubritatem ac valetudinem [(merely) healthy state]. With all this, they cannot be separated from one another: the beauty of the body is impossible without its strength and health, since without valetudo [health] pulchritudo [beauty] together with venustas [pleasantness] would not be possible; similarly, honestas contains (in se continet) decorum in the sense that it originates from her and cannot exist without her; it is cum honestate confusum [merged, closely connected with it] and differs only in thought (opinione); honestas represents the root (radix), and decorum is like a flower growing from this root 3223. St. Ambrose completely agrees with Cicero, not only in the very understanding of decorum, but also in dividing it into separate types. Both of them distinguish two types in it: decorum general (generale) and particular (speciale); in the first sense, it denotes the entire totality of the deeds that characterize a person, which, taken together, excite the impression of beauty; in the second, it is applied only to one specific act, which in itself, without any relation to other matters, can serve as an object of aesthetic pleasure 3224. The introduction of both terms considered into the doctrine of morality and, at the same time, understanding them in the same sense as Cicero was supposed to inform the morality of St. Ambrose has a special coloring. Both of these concepts have too broad and indefinite content: they denote the normal and the aesthetically beautiful, no matter what they are revealed in, but actions of this kind can and do fit into this category, the moral nature of which, from the point of view of other principles, is not only disputed, but even completely denied. It should be noted, however, that along with such a general and classical formula in St. Ambrose there is another, narrower, but also more ecclesiastical: decet [befits, appropriate] can only be applied to what relates not to present, but to future benefits 3225. This is an attempt to more closely unite the concepts of philosophy with the teachings of the Church. But on the other hand, this is already a completely special formula, which for him only exists in parallel with the first, but is in no way connected with it, does not modify it, does not explain or supplement it. In view of the importance that virtue should have for the preservation and development of human life, it is also thought of as the only useful good. This somewhat confusing admixture of utilitarianism serves as the third characteristic feature of the Stoic concept of virtue. Together with the Stoic Cicero, Ambrose also shares it: for both of them, everything honest and decent is at the same time useful 3226. True, both of them recognize the opposite position as necessary in this case: only that which is at the same time honest and decent can be considered useful. Therefore, it is not virtue that is determined by the property of utility, but the utility of an action depends on its character as a virtue. Nevertheless, no matter how we turn the formula around, we will never be able to get rid of the obsessive thought: utility, no matter how sublime it may be and no matter what it is based on, always remains useful. For us, the position stands firmly: a person should strive for honesty and decentness, not only because they are good in themselves, but also because they are useful. All that remains is to prove with examples that our writers hold the same point of view. Both of them distinguish two main types of usefulness. One of them includes everything that benefits others, that increases the well-being of others. This, by the way, motivates the need for a benevolent attitude towards others, the need for a sympathetic attitude towards their sorrows and material needs; This same motive determines the requirement that our charity should have in mind not the rich, but the poor. In the work “De officiis ministrorum” [“On the duties of clergy”] St. Ambrose very often completely loses sight of the high importance of the feeling of Christian love for others and argues more like a lawyer, as a practical figure, than as a representative of the Church, standing on the basis of the covenants of the Savior. From this point of view, although the internal quality of good deeds is not denied, their external quantitative side is mainly assessed: the larger the number or the more people in need someone has provided benefits, the more morally valuable his act is 3228. But with even greater force, the utilitarian character of virtue turns out to be in the second type of useful, useful for the individual; The concept of virtue even includes that which benefits the creator of virtue himself. St. Ambrose, for example, calls everything useful in the sense of virtue that makes us loved in the eyes of the people, and recognizes as useless everything that makes us unloved by people; Virtue, like charity, is valuable because it, so to speak, flows into the people's soul and wins us the sympathy of the whole society 3229. This is a completely Ciceronian way of thinking, since Cicero also recognizes the benefit of charity, that by its very appearance it attracts “the souls of all” and recommends us well in the eyes of people 3230. In his discussion about the nature and types of useful things, St. Ambrose sometimes speaks in a language unsuitable for a church preacher. In him, as in Cicero, the spirit of a natural Roman speaks a strong language, brought up in an atmosphere of external splendor, honors and military success, proud of his origin and in his attachment to earthly goods going so far that even a person’s personal ambition, his desire for glory, is recognized as a completely moral motive for activity; for him, as for Cicero, in some cases “the morally good is simply commendable, and glory seems to be the highest of motives” 3231. In Cicero we find a rather detailed discussion about the benefits and beauty of human glory, about the ways in which it can most easily be acquired; A prominent place is given to military glory 3232. As does St. Ambrose means the same thing, and by glory, as a reasonable motive for activity, he means ordinary human glory, this is clearly evident from the fact that he values ​​military glory very highly, speaking about it with praise; he even tries to prove that in this respect the saints are no lower than the Roman generals, since they also became famous for their skill in military affairs: it is rightly used by Joshua, who miraculously stopped the sun and won the victory over the Gibeonites, Gideon, who defeated the Midianites, the Maccabees and many others. etc. 3233 He considers it necessary to limit only excessive greed for fame, mainly for unworthy glory 3234. From this we can see that the similarities between St. Ambrose and Cicero here are much more complete and significant than even Ewald recognizes it, who, comparing their teaching on glory, comes to the conclusion that, while agreeing with each other in recognizing the legitimacy of the desire for glory, they diverge in different directions as soon as the question arises of where glory should lie: the first seeks glory in the Christian, and the second in the ancient Roman 3235. And, indeed, in the doctrine of usefulness and glory, as well as in the doctrine of honest and decent, in Ambrose we notice two heterogeneous currents - Ciceronian and ecclesiastical. Along with the useful, as practically beneficial, he also knows the useful in the sense of salvation, which consists in serving Christ who redeemed us 3236, and in deeds of piety 3237; to worldly glory, expressed in military valor, he contrasts, as a higher form, religious glory, the glory of Christian martyrdom and generally suffering for the faith 3238, the glory of serving the Church and labors for its benefit 3239. But the Christian-ecclesiastical element in the teaching of St. Ambrose about the useful and about glory, just as in the two previous cases, constitutes only a separate view, and not the whole: it only complements the Ciceronian point of view, but is not organically connected with it. In other works of St. Ambrose points out another sign of virtue, also of Stoic origin, but weakly prominent in Cicero. Precisely, insofar as virtue is thought of as an activity consistent with reason, the Stoics note in it a moment of harmony, a moment of harmonious mood of the spirit. This harmony was thought of in two main forms: as a harmonious mood of the subjective spirit and as a harmonious relationship of parts to the world whole. We notice this feature in Ambrose, and, moreover, in both of these forms; and at the same time we discover the kinship of his ethics with the ethics of the Alexandrians, in whom the trait in question is also found. About virtue as a harmonious disposition of spirit conditioned by reason λόγου), says, for example, Clement of Alexandria 3240. In the same sense, probably, Ambrose speaks of virtue as a consonance, and of vice as a dissonance with the normal and general mood of the spirit: quod bonum et faciendum, consonans et adhaerens, quod vero turpe, hoc dissonans 3241. He warns against bad deeds so as not to destroy the harmoniam [harmony], which consists in the consonance of bonorum operum [good deeds] 3242. The second form of classical harmony in the moral sense on church-Christian soil was subjected to such a significant revision that instead of agreement with the world as a whole, they spoke about the harmonious relations of humanity redeemed by Christ, considered as a single whole; and this integrity of humanity, in turn, was affirmed on its relationship to the world Logos, the hypostatic Son of God. In this sense, agreement with the whole is found in the same Clement of Alexandria. He calls everyone to virtue in order to form a unity corresponding to the unity of essence (κατὰ τὴν τῆς μοναδικῆς οὐσίας ἕνωσιν); if the moral discord between people is thought of as polyphony and dispersion (ἐκ πολυφωνίας καὶ διασπορᾶς), then the unity between them represents Divine harmony (ἁρμονίαν ϑεϊκήν) or a single harmonious symphony (μία γίνεται συμφωνία), performed under the guidance of the Divine Word 3243. The same view on the nature of moral activity is held by St. Ambrose, although one can speak of his agreement with Clement only in relation to the general and basic idea. People must be unanimous in doing good, must strive for unity among themselves, live secundum unitatem [according to unity]; they all represent something consistent and harmonious, because they were all created by God one in nature and recreated by Jesus Christ into one body and one spirit 3244. He also knows about the rational harmony of the Word (harmoniam rationabilem Verbi), ἁρμονία τοῦ Λόγου: it consists in the spiritual unity of humanity with Christ and in its spiritual solidarity with Him, constantly increasing according to the action of the Word Himself. Thanks to this harmoniae Verbi [harmony of the Word] there occurs a complex and internally connected increase in the spiritual body (augmentum corporis), an increase that extends to the entire composition of the ministry (per omnem juncturam ministrationis) and proportionate to the value of each individual part (in mensuram unius cujusque partis); in this way a single church of God is created in all (unum templum Dei in omnibus) 3245. This connection of the body with the Logos, thanks to the activity of the latter, becomes, in the end, indestructible: through the harmony of virtues and ministries (per harmoniam quamdam virtutum ac ministrorum), a single body from all the spirits of rational nature is so attached to its Head Christ, the connection of the entire structure becomes so close that it cannot be destroyed even by the influence of individual members belonging to it 3246. Thus, according to the teaching of St. Ambrose, virtue is an activity drawn from learning, in accordance with the laws of nature, healthy, beautiful and useful and at the same time in harmony with both a person’s own mind and with the universal mind - the Word of God. Following the example of the two main schools of classical ethics, Stoicism and Platonism, which equally recognized four basic virtues, many moralists of Christian times conceived of virtue under four main forms. St. Ambrose also knows these four virtues, which he considers the cardinal virtues, as virtutes cardinales 3247, virtutes principales 3248. The immediate sources for him in this case were the same Cicero and Philo. In the essay “De officiis ministrorum” [“On the duties of the clergy”] he lists them in the same order as Cicero: prudence (prudentia), justice (justitia), courage (fortitudo) and moderation (temperantia) 3249. Sometimes he copies, almost verbatim, long excerpts from Philo’s works with a random listing of virtues in a slightly different order: prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo and justitia 3250. Occasionally, the four listed virtues, with direct reference to the sages of Greece (prudentes Graeciae esse memoraverunt), are adapted to the four most important human abilities: thinking, desiring, appetitive and insightful (λογιστικόν, ϑυμητικόν, ἐπιϑυμητικόν, διορατικόν), with the first corresponding to prudentia [prudence], the second to fortitudo [courage], the third to temperantia [moderation] and the fourth to justitia [justice] 3251. The relationship between the four virtues in St. Ambrose is defined in the spirit of the Stoics, in the sense of their closest unity: they represent separate species (species) of generic virtue (genus) 3252. Being connected in idea, virtues are inseparable in their practical manifestation: where one of them exists, all the others exist 3253; they are mutually connected (connexae) and interlocked with each other (concatenataeque), so that whoever has one has all 3254. However, it cannot be said that Ambrose consistently pursued this point of view; he “only had a presentiment of this truth,” but did not internally relate to it 3255. In fact, the ideal of moral perfection in the depiction of St. Ambrose is far from being the ideal of the uniform development of all four virtues; it always bears the stamp of one-sidedness, since out of a number of all virtues, only one usually stands out; Patriarch Jacob, for example, is considered mainly as an example of patience in the midst of sorrows and disasters 3256, Patriarch Joseph is presented as an ideal of moral purity and chastity 3257. Considered objectively and in idea, the unity of all virtues is based on the unity of a common source for all of them. Such a beginning for all virtues (princeps omnium virtutum) for Cicero is sapientia [wisdom], known among the Greeks under the name of wisdom, σοφία; it differs from the first of the four virtues - prudentia [prudence] and, following the example of the Stoics, is defined as knowledge of things divine and human (rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia) 3258. At St. Ambrose on this issue we encounter several separate opinions. Sometimes, just like the Stoics in general, he sees the source of all virtues in wisdom (sapientia), however, with the difference from Cicero that he understands by it not something completely different from prudentia [prudence] and higher in comparison with it, but identifies the latter with the first: prudence (prudentia) can be called the source of the other three virtues, because the latter psychologically depend on it 3259. On this basis, St. Ambrose often replaces the concept of prudentia [prudence] with the word sapientia [wisdom] and lists the main virtues as follows: sapientia [wisdom], justitia [justice], fortitudo [courage] and temperantia [moderation] 3260. In this way he achieves at least the advantage of clarity, since in Cicero the boundaries between sapientia [wisdom] and prudentia [prudence] turn out to be very unclear and confusing. In this series, sapientia [wisdom] is thought of by St. Ambrose still in the stoic sense. But, besides this understanding, Christian ethics knew something else. In Clement of Alexandria, the inexact beginning of virtues is already thought of as Logos, precisely as σοφία 3261. St. Ambrose also sometimes speaks of sapientia [wisdom] in this sense: Sapientia Dei [Wisdom of God], the source of spiritual grace (fons gratiae spiritualis), serves as the source of other virtues (fons virtutum est ceterarum) 3262; from the one Word of God (unico Dei Verbo) flow four sources prudentiae, et fortitudinis, temperantiae quoque et justitiae [prudence, courage, moderation, and also justice] 3263, but, affirming the unity of all virtues in God and the emergence of all of them from the Word, as a single source, Ambrose overlooked a very important psychological factor of moral activity. His ethics suffers from the significant shortcoming that it devotes very little place in moral activity to the Christian feeling of love. Let's move on to a review of individual virtues. Prudentia [prudence]. In many cases, Ambrose's understanding of this virtue has much in common with Cicero's understanding. Like Cicero, he sees the psychological basis of prudentiae [prudence] in the natural desire of the human mind to acquire knowledge; this boundless striving of the mind serves as the highest decoration of human nature and has its most significant difference from the nature of animals 3264. At the basis of both, therefore, lies the Socratic-Platonic view of the nature and most important functions of the human soul, as a primarily rational, intellectual being 3265. As for the content of prudentiae [prudence], both define it as cognitio veri, knowledge of the true in general 3266. But, while agreeing with each other in formal terms, Ambrose and Cicero do not agree in the definition of that truth, which is the object of prudentiae [prudence]: Ambrose’s Christian-ecclesiastical consciousness spoke stronger here than in many other cases. Cicero understands this truth in general in the sense of philosophical and scientific truth; for him, a sage is also a philosopher and scientist, exploring the truth partly for the sake of truth itself, for the sake of satisfying his own curiosity, and partly for the sake of its practical use. He is engaged in defining for his sage the rules necessary for a fruitful study of the truth, which include, for example, the requirement not to accept anything unknown as known, to study diligently and without haste, to study only sciences necessary for life, to study only objects accessible to human understanding. He considers not only law, which has enormous vital and practical significance, but also dialectics, astrology, geometry, etc. among the sciences suitable for the study of a sage. Ambrose, on the contrary, sees nothing decent in activities to satisfy the simple curiosity of the mind; he even considers it indecent (indecorum), leaving the study of the reasons for our salvation, to turn to the study of human errors and engage in such sciences as astrology, geometry, the study of the air spaces, sky and sea 3268. In his opinion, Cicero himself deserves to be reproached for the fact that, contrary to his basic rule of not taking the unknown for the known, he recommends studying such subjects that are inaccessible to us 3269. He contrasts scientific and philosophical truth, as the object of Ciceronian prudentiae [prudence], with religious truth, as the only subject worthy of our knowledge. The sage, having left the wisdom of this world, “seeks God with his inner heart” (intimo Deum quaesivit affecto) 3270. Only one who knows God, such as Abraham, deserves the name of a sage. At the same time, knowledge itself is understood not in the sense of scientific research, but in the form of assimilation by faith and preservation of the teachings of Revelation and the Church intact. Hence, only one who belongs to the Church and professes the Church faith can be wise. “For how,” asks Ambrose, “can an Arian be called a sage who prefers to consider the Creator imperfect and created rather than true and perfect God? How can Marcion and Eunomius be called wise, who would rather have an evil God than a good one?” 3271 Further, the Ambrosian sage strives for religious wisdom not so much for purely theoretical reasons, but for the purposes of moral self-improvement; better to say, the knowledge of God and His Son is for the sage not only a simple rational confidence in His existence, but also in a moral life in accordance with the will of God. Already the main motive of the knowledge of God by St. Ambrose sees in the fear of God: “The beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord,” he says in the words of the Old Testament sage (Ps. 110:10) 3272. Therefore, when thinking about God, the sage never forgets that everything that exists, as well as man himself with his life and death, is in the power of God, that God rules the whole world, and that we must repay Him for this with our deeds. An honest and decent life is possible only for one who believes in God as the Judge and Giver of people, who knows that nothing can be hidden from God, that everything obscene offends Him and, on the contrary, everything honest earns His favor 3273. Prudentiae [prudence] tends to mourn the transitory and seek the eternal, to look with sorrow at the worldly (lugere saecularia) and to look for the God of the world (Deum pads) 3274; it itself provides inner peace (pacem habet) 3275. Justitia [justice] determines our relationships with other beings. In “De officiis ministrorum” [“On the duties of the clergy”], Ambrose, under the influence of Cicero, understands it mainly in the narrow sense of fair relations towards other people; for both, the name justitia denotes virtue, which is ad societatem generis humani et ad communitatem refertur, i.e. refers to the commonwealth and to the intercourse of the human race 3276 . Then, both one and the other divide the virtue of justice into two parts: justice in the proper sense and charity (beneficentia), of which each has its own divisions 3277. They consider both separately. As for justitia [justice] itself, there is a huge difference in the definition of its particular types between our writers. Cicero, standing on the point of view of a purely legal understanding of justice in the sense of rewarding each according to his deserts, distinguishes two gifts (munus) of justice, of which the first consists in the prohibition of causing harm to anyone, except in cases of injury to us (ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessitus injuria), and the second encourages the use of common property as common, and private property as one’s own (ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis) 3278. The first of these types is the subject of attacks by St. Ambrose. “What philosophers,” he says, “call the first gift of justice, is completely excluded with us, and their position: ut nemini quis noceat, nisi lacessitus injuria is abolished by the authority of the Gospel; for, according to the teaching of Scripture, the spirit of the Son of Man (spiritus Filii hominis) must abide in us, who came into the world to bring grace (gratiam), but not to cause offense (non inferre injuriam)” 3279. Thus, St. Ambrose excludes hostility and vindictiveness even towards enemies, and this is his high superiority over the Roman sage. Although Ambrose recognizes the second of the gifts of justice indicated by Cicero, he does so with amendments: while agreeing that the general should be common, he, again for Christian reasons, does not agree to admit that the private must be looked at as one’s own property. This, he objects, is not entirely in accordance with nature (ne hoc quidem secundum naturam). Nature produces everything for everyone, and God sends food to all creatures 3280; this should encourage us to sacrifice our own for the benefit of others 3281. Here too we must give preference to the Christian bishop over the Roman orator-jurist. For both Cicero and Ambrose, the basis on which justitia [justice] is affirmed is faith (fides), but each of them associates his own meaning with this concept. For the first, this fides [faith] is ordinary human trust in others, based on the assumption of constancy and truth of promises and contracts (dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas) 3283. For the second, fides [faith], as fundamentum justitiae [the foundation of justice], is religious faith in Christ, the embodiment of truth; the form or model of this justice (forma justitiae) is the Church founded on Christ. According to the commandment of the Savior and according to the example of the Church, which prays, acts and endures in commune [commonly], the believer is also recommended to care for the good of others, so to speak, to be guided by the common law (jus commune) and interests: whoever denies himself, from his own benefit, becomes a true righteous (justus) and worthy of Christ 3284. Together with Cicero, St. Ambrose explores some specific forms of justice discovery. In some cases, Cicero influenced him here not entirely favorably in the sense that he pays too much attention to those forms of justice that are not directly related to the ecclesiastical writer. The general position of both here is this: it is necessary to be fair to everyone, to observe justice always and everywhere, both in times of war and in times of peace. During war, you need to be fair even towards the enemy. According to the requirement of this justice, war must be waged honestly and openly, without allowing any deception; it is necessary first, together with the enemy, to establish the place of the battle and determine its time in order to prevent military operations outside the boundaries of this place and time 3285. But although justice is recognized as necessary in relation to all enemies, nevertheless, it is allowed to be consistent with their personal way of activity: in relation to cruel and treacherous enemies, greater vengeance and greater punishment are permitted than in relation to others 3286. Outside of hostilities, Cicero recommends the observance of measures in vengeance and punishment (ulciscendi et puniendi modus) 3287, and Ambrose defends an even more humane attitude, prohibiting all vindictiveness in general 3288. As a relationship contrary to justice, St. Ambrose, in agreement with Cicero, calls a greedy, selfish way of activity (avaritia), as well as a lack of impartiality (cupiditas) 3289. Regarding another of the subordinate types of justitiae [justice] - beneficentiae [beneficence], Dreseke 3290 states the superiority of Ambrose over Cicero in that Cicero speaks of beneficentia [beneficence] and the associated generosity (liberalitas) 3291, while St. Ambrose also includes here a benevolent attitude (benevolentia) towards neighbors, thus distinguishing two special parts in the virtue beneficentia - benevolentia [benevolent attitude] and liberalitas [generosity] 3292. But in reality, the difference between them, apparently, is not so great, since Cicero also knows how to distinguish between beneficentia [beneficence] gentleness towards others (benignitas) and liberalitas [generosity] 3293. When describing the particular properties of the virtue in question, our writers largely reveal complete solidarity with each other. They, equally, in matters of charity, first of all recommend taking into account the degree of closeness of different persons to us: first of all, our parents and relatives deserve charity. St. Ambrose, in addition to our loved ones in the flesh, also means domesticos fidei [those close to us by faith], because if everyone generally deserves our mercy, then even more so should those close to us by faith 3294. Then, in providing charitable works, one should take into account the inner dignity of those in need and the actual degree of their need: only those who need it for good purposes deserve our help; It is impossible, for example, to help those who are thinking of using our help against the fatherland and society; Those who seek it through deception and other dishonest means cannot use our help either. Ambrose's general formula for this case is: ubi causa manifestatur, persona congnoscitur, tempus urget, largius se debet profundere misericordia [when the matter is obvious, the person is known [and] circumstances prompt, mercy should be given more generously] 3295. Ambrose also borrows from Cicero the motives that can guide charity. One of these motives is even of an egoistic-utilitarian nature: charity is recommended as a very useful deed for the benefactor himself. Through our own acts of charity, we can provide support for ourselves if we ourselves ever fall into need. In addition, charity can win us the sympathy of the people (dilectio multitudinis): the people love those who do good to them 3296. The second motive, not being egoistic, is of a specifically stoic nature. For Cicero, such a motive is the unity of the origin and nature of people, who are united by a natural connection (naturali quadam societate) 3297. So in Ambrose, refusing help is contrary to the laws of nature (contra naturae legem sit non juvare) 3298. This motif is also found in works written independently of Cicero. We see it in "De Noe" ["On Noah"]: the same natura [nature] serves as the mother of all people, and therefore we are all brothers, born of the same nature, and bound by the same right of kinship (eodem jure devicti) 3299; and also in “De Abraham” [“About Abraham”]: all people are products of the same naturae [nature]; by right of kinship we are related to each other as brothers (jure quodam germanitatis velut fratres connectimur), and therefore, as half-brothers, we must love each other with mutual love (tamquam uterini nos diligere debemus amore mutuo) 3300. St. Ambrose differs from Cicero in that the motif of the unity of nature is often linked into one whole with the idea of ​​humanity as a single organism, and of the Church as the body of Christ: mutual relations between people should be arranged on the model of the mutual relations of members in the body, which help each other in their service to the whole, and in a series of which no one is unnecessary for the others 3301. With all this, one cannot fail to recognize the validity of many of the advantages of the doctrine of beneficentia [beneficence] of St. noted by Dreseke. Ambrose in comparison with Cicero 3302, to what extent Ambrose in some places corrects Cicero from the point of view of the Christian ideal. He, more than Cicero, takes into account the purity of the intentions of the benefactor: the best way of charity is charity in secret, because liberalitas [generosity] cannot be perfecta [perfect] if it is done more for reasons of arrogance than charity (si jactantiae causa magis, quam misericordiae largiaris); from the mood (affectus) a good deed gets its name; God always asks about the intentions of the benefactor 3303. Then, although St. Ambrose points out in detail those categories of persons who deserve our charity more than others, but considers it necessary to clarify that this does not exclude the obligation to lavish one’s benefits on absolutely everyone (nos autem omnibus quidem debemus misericordiam) 3304. We find a slightly different idea of ​​the virtue of justitia [justice] in other works of St. Ambrose. Here, first of all, attention is drawn to the high importance that he attributes to justice among the other three virtues. In this case, we may be able to bring into consideration the Western tradition as an explanation. In view of the strength that in the process of salvation the deeds of piety were given to in the process of salvation, there was generally a tendency there to significantly advance the virtue of justice compared to the others. This, probably, in addition to third-party philosophical influences, should explain that in Lactantius justitia is the mother of all virtues (virtutum omnium mater est) 3305, the source of virtues (fons virtutis), the pinnacle of virtue (summa virtutis) 3306. Describes with almost identical features the meaning of justitiae [justice] and St. Ambrose, in whose eyes she is also the mother of virtues (non enim pars est justitia, sed quasi mater est omnium) 3307, the fertile parent of the remaining virtues (parens ceterarum est fecunda virtutum) in the sense that in whom she is found, all the others exist with her 3308; justitia [justice] embraces (complectitur) all virtues and recommends (commendat) them 3309. Then, if church writers talk about justice, then it does not mean a person’s relationship with others in general, but exclusively relationships of a religious nature; and therefore not exclusively relations to other people, as in Cicero, but also relations to God. To the extent that our relations with our neighbors depend on our relations with God, justitia [justice] itself is defined by Lactantius as pious and religious reverence for God (Dei unici pia ac religiosa cultura) 3310. In those cases where relations to God are distinguished from relations to people, the latter are designated by the name justitia, δικαιοσύνη, and the former are united in the concept of piety (pietas, εὐσέβεια), and an inextricable connection is imagined between them. Philo already distinguishes between relationships with God in piety (πρὸς Θεὸν δι’ εὐσεβείας καὶ ὁσιότητος) and relationships with people in humanity and justice (πρὸς ἀνϑρώπους διὰ φιλανϑρωπίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης) 3311 . In Clement of Alexandria, εὐσέβεια [piety] and δικαιοσύνη [justice] have completely Christian content: with the name δικαιοσύνη [justice] he associates the idea of serving God in εὐσεβεία [piety] and deeds (πρᾶξιν), in order to become like God to the best of our ability (ἐξομοιούμενοι τῷ Κυρίῳ κατὰ το δυνατὸν ἡμῖν) 3312. In those cases where St. Ambrose understands justitia [justice] as relations of a religious nature; he also distinguishes between pietas [piety] and justitia proper [justice]. By pietas [piety] he generally understands the attitude towards everything that is worthy of being the object of our worship; the first place in this case is occupied, of course, by the relationship with God: pietas enim prima in Deum, secunda in parentes [piety, firstly, in relation to God, secondly, in relation to parents] 3313. In this sense, in “De officiis” [“On Duties”] he complements Cicero, if in the section on justice he speaks of justitiae pietas prima in Deum, secunda in patriam, tertia in parents, item in omnes [the piety of justice, [which], firstly, to God, secondly, to the fatherland, thirdly, to parents, and, finally, to all] 3314. It is to this pietas [piety] that St. Ambrose speaks of the advantages of justitiae [justice]: pietas [piety] is, so to speak, the mistress of all goods (omnium principatus bonorum) and the nursery of the remaining virtues (seminarium virtutum est ceterarum) 3315. As for justitia [justice] itself, it is understood by Ambrose as a Christian activity, alien to selfish calculations, exclusively for the benefit of all our neighbors without exception: justitia [justice] is born more for others than for oneself (aliis est potius nata quam sibi), pursues the common benefit (commune commodum), and not its own, and considers the good of others (alienum bonum) to be its own; its good is sufficient for all (omnibus proficit), is directed to many (ad plures proficiscitur) and passes to all (ad omnes pervenit) 3316. In this sense, justitia [justice] is completely identified with St. Ambrose with the works of Christian charity, is nothing more than mercy (misericordia) 3317, and misericordia is the fullness of virtues (plenitudo virtutum est) 3318. The pinnacle of justice (summa justitiae) is the complete voluntary renunciation of one’s wealth in favor of the poor, according to the Savior’s instructions to the rich young man 3319. Fortitudo [courage] as depicted in De officiis ministrorum [On the Duties of the Clergy], like the previous two, is largely Ciceronian in nature. St. Ambrose, like Cicero, distinguishes two particular types of this virtue: courage in military matters (res bellicas) and courage in domestic matters (domesticas), to which Cicero corresponds to courage in civil affairs. For Cicero, both types of courage have the same value, while for St. Ambrose res domesticae [household things] already have an advantage over res bellicae [military things] 3320. Considered in its essence, the virtue fortitudinis [courage] in both cases characterizes, on the one hand, relationships with other people, and on the other, relationships with oneself. In the first case, fortitudo [courage] is closely associated with justitia [justice] and is the courage, determination and ability to carry out the demands of justice in relation to other people; in this sense, such a close connection is established between fortitudo [courage] and justitia [justice] that where there is no justice, courage cannot have the meaning of virtue 3321. In relation to oneself, courage appears as greatness, fortitude, as the highest degree of self-control. In this sense, only that person can be called courageous who has conquered himself, freed himself from anger and other passions, is not embarrassed by all kinds of adversity, the variability of circumstances and the lures of the world, and always remains calm and composure 3322. But here a new current, alien to Cicero, breaks through in Ambrose. While Cicero, like the Stoics, demands self-control as the only reasonable way of life in the face of the necessity of everything that happens, which we are often unable to change in our favor, and thus value it as a means of combating pessimism and maintaining a cheerful and good mood, St. Ambrose attempts to base the virtue of courage on a religious foundation. He thinks of it as a virtuous way of life in general, and the motives for it are the fear of punishment after death and the hope of receiving salvation beyond the grave. Ambrose does not hide from himself the fact that it is extremely difficult for a person to achieve victory over himself. But, he continues further, this will become more accessible to us if we pay attention to the “fear of Divine judgment”, to those more severe punishments compared to everything that befalls us on earth, which await us beyond the grave 3323. A new, unknown to the Roman sage, sphere of manifestation of true courage is also indicated: the ideal in this case is for Ambrose the Christian martyrs and ascetics who, with their faith, stopped the mouths of lions, extinguished the power of fire, dulled the edge of the sword, and prevailed over the temptations of the flesh 3324. The virtue of courage is of the same essential character in other creations. On the one hand, Stoic features still emerge here: fortitudinis [courage] tends to overcome anger (iram vincere), restrain indignation (indignationemque cohibere), thereby fortitudo [courage] strengthens the spirit and body and does not give them the opportunity to be outraged by emotions in the form of fear or grief 3325; it further denotes a meek disposition of spirit (mansuetudo) 3326. On the other hand, Christian martyrdom is revealed primarily in enduring persecution and persecution for the faith, in the ability to prefer the Divine to what is considered valuable in the language of people; the final and highest moment of courage is suffering for faith (consummationem esse fortitudinis passionem) 3327. This is an ancient church idea of ​​​​courage, which developed already in the era of persecution of Christianity: Clement of Alexandria already saw a positive manifestation of courage in Christian martyrdom 3328. The last of the virtues - temperantia [moderation] is characterized by St. Ambrose is in complete agreement with Cicero. It is identified with the virtue of moderation (modestia). In its internal content, modestia reminds us of courage. Just as Cicero, from the negative side, defines it as removal from all kinds of disturbances of the soul (ut perturbationes fugiamus) 3329, so Ambrose believes it in the calmness of the spirit and its freedom from affects (tranquillitas animi) 3330. In accordance with the production of the word modestia [moderation] from the concept of modus [measure], the positive content of virtue in Cicero is defined as ordinis conservatio, that is, the preservation of measure and order in actions and speeches (quae agentur aut dicentur) 3331; and at St. Ambrose modestia is the preservation of order in life in general (ordo quidam vitae nobis tenendus est) 3332 and the preservation of measure in individual things (in rebus singulis modum servare) 3333. For Cicero, modestia [moderation] in terms of its external manifestations is defined as adaptation to the place of action (accomodatis locis) 3334, conformity with time (scientia idoneorum ad agendum temporum) 3335, conformity with age, since one is convenient in relation to young people and the other in relation to old people 3336. Accordingly, Ambrose prescribes in every action to observe what is characteristic of the face, what is time or age, or what is appropriate to our abilities; for often what is decent for one is indecent for another; one is convenient for a young man and the other for an old man; one course of action is appropriate in danger, and another in favorable circumstances 3337. How sinful is it for St. Ambrose is the result of an abnormal relationship between sensuality and reason, temperantia [moderation] often has for him an exclusively negative meaning, as removal from sin: temperantia keeps (abstinet) from sin, neglects the lures of the world 3338; it tames passions (resecat cupiditates) 3339 and, as a result, serves as the cause of purity of heart and spirit (cordis et animi munditia) 3340. Insofar as both body and soul are equally involved in the activity, the virtue of moderation or abstinence has two types (species gemina): one kind destroys confusion (titubationem) of the flesh, and the other warms the mind with the pleasantness of virtue (virtutis gratia) and turns away from it all weakness 3341. The ultimate goal of moral activity: vita beata [blessed life] and summum bonum [highest good] Based on everything that has gone before, we can expect to meet in this section of St. Ambrose several heterogeneous series of thoughts, usually poorly connected with each other. Cicero, of course, had to instill in him a Stoic point of view on the question of the purpose of moral activity. And how the Stoics and Cicero along with them should have thought about this issue is not difficult to guess. The identification of the principle of moral activity with the activity of reason, raised to the level of a law of nature, on the one hand, the pantheistic idea of ​​objective reason as a universe, on the other, with logical necessity, required the recognition, so to speak, of the strict immanence of moral goals: the purpose of moral activity lies in the activity itself, and not outside it and not above it; it itself gives internal reward as well as punishment. I must be moral because my mind demands it of me. But for what? In a Stoic view, this question is, strictly speaking, even inappropriate, because every law of nature acts only for the sake of acting; he can't even help but act. Hence the final moral formula, as we find it in Cicero, reads: summum bonum [the highest good] is nothing other than convenienter naturae vivere [to live according to nature] or, what is the same, cum virtute semper congruere [to always agree with virtue] 3342; This means that the highest good that a person strives to achieve through a virtuous life lies in virtue itself. At St. Ambrose, this point of view appears quite strongly, mainly in two of his works: “De officiis ministrorum” [“On the duties of the clergy”] and “De Jacob et vita beata” [“On Jacob and the blessed life”], precisely in those cases where he analyzes the concepts of vita beata [blessed life] and summum bonum [the highest good]; and the former is completely identified with the latter. Vita beata [blessed life] is immanently inherent in a virtuous life: it is created by the tranquility of conscience (tranquillitas conscientiae) and the carelessness of innocence (securitas innocentiae). All other benefits in a person’s life are nothing compared to this; just as the rising sun hides the moon and other luminaries, so the brilliance of honesty (honestatis), combined with unperverted beauty (incorrupto decore), covers with shadow all other goods that people usually recognize as such 3343. A virtuous life deserves the name of a blessed life, because it is recognized as such not by the judgments of strangers, but is perceived, so to speak, by one’s own feelings at home, as if by one’s own judge 3344. Vita beata [blessed life] is, therefore, the same as vita perfecta [perfect life]. “There is also vita beata [blessed life] in people, but, of course, only in those in whom there is also vita perfecta [perfect life]. And the name perfecta vita [perfect life] is not borne by this sensual (sensibilis), but by that rational life secundum tractationem rationis et mentis vivacitatem [in agreement with the thinking of the mind and the vital force of the mind]” 3345. St. Ambrose takes up arms against those who considered bliss inaccessible to man in this life, full of sorrows and various disasters; bliss is available to us on earth, since the beatum [blissful state] consists in being victorem passionis [conqueror of suffering] and not frangi temporalis motu doloris [lamented by temporary sorrows]; it is not determined by the presence of pleasure and external goods, but lies in the altitudine sapientiae [height of wisdom], in the virtutis sublimitate [sublimity of virtue] 3346. A life characterized by such features, perfect in its moral dignity and blessed in its result, has the meaning of the highest good, the final goal of our aspirations: “The only and highest good is virtue (solum et summum bonum esse virtutem), which alone abounds in the fruits of vitae beatae [blessed life]; and not through the external benefits of the body, but through virtue alone, is vita beata [the blessed life] achieved” 3347. So, the highest good does not lie outside a person, but in himself, in his personal, internal mood and disposition conditioned by virtue. This is explained by the fact that virtue in itself is capable of delivering moral satisfaction to a person, and this satisfaction is for the sage the true reward for his mode of activity. A wise man does good for the sake of good itself. Possessing virtue as the highest good, he does not need any external reward; even external adversities and failures are not able to darken his joyful mood, due to the presence of virtue. Moreover, this point of view is held by St. Ambrose not only when, under the influence of Cicero, he talks about virtue, losing sight of the Christian point of view, but even when he means Christian virtue. “Whoever follows Jesus,” says St. Ambrose, “he has his own reward in himself (habet in se remunerationem suam) and in his own mood he has reward and pleasantness (in suo affectu praemium et gratiam)” 3348. If classical philosophy was characterized by the conviction that one or another type of human activity determines inner bliss or misfortune, then all the expressions related to this did not have only a figurative, figurative meaning. Classical philosophy, in almost all its directions, is characterized by a hedonistic view of virtue as something pleasant in itself, as an object of pleasure and enjoyment in the most literal sense of the word. We find this same trait in many moralists of Christian times 3349. But we probably will not exaggerate if we say that not a single ancient church writer shows the hedonistic element in the idea of ​​virtue in such a concrete and tangible form as in St. Ambrose. From this side, he characterizes virtue with a wide variety of predicates. He associates the concept of virtue with the concept of pleasure and therefore he speaks of virtutis voluptas [the pleasure of virtue] 3350; indulging in religious knowledge uberem capit voluptatem [gets very great pleasure] 3351. Virtue has, in particular, the property of sweetness (suavitas and dulcedo), so it is appropriate to talk about bonae conscientiae suavitas [the sweetness of a good conscience] 3352, about plena suavitatis virtus [virtue full of sweetness] 3353; the righteous steals innocentiae suavitatem [the sweetness of innocence] and for him dulcior fructus [sweeter fruit] and cibus suavior [more pleasant food] 3354 are not yet conceivable. This sweetness is capable of delivering pleasure (delectare, mulcere), while not all sweets have this property: bonum delectat [good delights], although it is sometimes rough (asperum), and indecorum, even being suave [pleasant], non mulcet [does not please]; nothing delectat [delights] better than consiliorum honestas and operum pulchritudo [beauty and virtue of thoughts and deeds] 3355. Delectatio [pleasure] can also be provided by various individual matters of a religious and moral nature, such as fasting and knowledge of religious subjects: jejunare delectaret et Christum [fasting [in the desert] delighted Christ] 3356; delectabatur [delighted] the prophet David in the knowledge of 3357. Finally, virtue is described as a pleasant state in general: the wise man is quidam jucunditatis particeps [a certain sharer of pleasure] 3358. In another series of thoughts, the ultimate goal of the moral activity of man is St. Ambrose already sees in receiving a heavenly reward and in getting rid of otherworldly punishments. The question that constantly confuses many is why the righteous often suffer on earth, while sinners undeservedly prosper, St. Ambrose decides in the sense that the final goal of the righteous is not earth, but heaven, and that we should expect a reward for our virtue not in this life, but in the next: futuram, non praesentem; in coelo, non in terra mercedem promisit esse reddendam [He promised to give a reward in the future, not in the present, in heaven, not on earth] 3359. Here a person is only a fighter, an athlete practicing in acts of virtue 3360. From this point of view, the highest good for man should, of course, be vita aeterna [eternal life]. As for now the relationship of this vita aeterna [eternal life] to vita beata [blessed life], or vita perfecta [perfect life] in the Stoic sense, it turns out to be in St. Ambrose is not entirely stable. On the one hand, in contradiction with the above, the concept of beata [blessed] is already applied to vita aeterna [eternal life]: “In the nature of the honest is vita beata [blessed life], which Scripture calls vitam aeternam [eternal life]” 3361. In this case, she is placed not in a stoic dependence on her own reason and conscience, but exclusively in dependence on the judgment of God: whoever seeks reward from God has vitam aeternam [eternal life], therefore Scriptura [Scripture] more expressively designated vitam aeternam [eternal life] that which can be called beata [blessed]; and the judgment about it is not left to the opinions of people, but is entrusted to the Divine court 3362. But in general St. Ambrose quite successfully reconciles the concepts of vita beata [blessed life] and aeterna [eternal] in the sense that vita beata [blessed life] in the Stoic sense is thought of as a shadow, an image of vitae aeternae [eternal life] in a frank sense, a transitional stage and a necessary condition for acquiring the latter. “Through vitam beatam [blessed life] vita aeterna [eternal life] is sought, for vita beata [blessed life] is the fruit of the present, and vita aeterna [eternal life] is the hope of the future” 3363. The benefit (bonum) that the sage has in this life serves for him as a causa futurorum bonorum [the cause of future benefits] 3364. But his teaching about the highest good of St. Ambrose adds several more religious and philosophical features, which, undoubtedly, should turn our gaze towards Alexandrian ethics. Philo already identified the Platonic idea of ​​the highest good with the frank teaching about God as the Supreme Being and Creator of the world. God appears to him as good (τὸ ἀγαϑόν), as the ultimate source of all good in the world and the completeness of all perfections 3365. But for Philo, depending on his teaching about the Logos, the name of the highest good is applied only to Being, which becomes accessible only to those standing at the highest levels of moral perfection, while only His angel Logos 3366 is weak, unable to endure the highest radiance. For Clement of Alexandria, the possession of the Logos already appears to us as the highest good; but since the actual possession of this good is conceivable only upon achieving moral heights, the desire for likeness to God or for the gradual realization to the possible extent of the moral ideal that is given to us in the concept of God and in the Revelation about Him 3367 also acquires the significance of the highest good. This godlikeness consists in the conformity of life with the Logos 3368. In full agreement with this idea, St. Ambrose sometimes sees the only and highest good only in God, from Whom all other and secondary goods come: quod bonum [what is good], he says, divinum et quod divinum bonum [that is divine, and what is divine is good] 3369. The True Good is possessed only by the one who seeks God and finds Him 3370. God is true good for us, because He penetrates everything, controls everything, because everything that exists depends on Him for its existence, and we ourselves live and move in Him, because, finally, there is nothing else that could surpass Him in any respect 3371. Moreover, the name solum illud et summum bonum [the only and highest good] is applied, first of all, to the Divine Being in general, since we receive everything from Him, but we ourselves cannot deliver anything to Him, because He does not need anything 3372. But by virtue of the special relationship of believers to Christ, their Redeemer, ipse est ergo Dominus Jesus summum bonum [The Lord Jesus Himself is the Supreme Good] 3373 . He is such as the Source of spiritual life proper (fons vitae), as the Giver of vital substance (ex quo vivendi substantia ministratur omnibus); He can therefore be an object of supreme pleasure (major voluptas est) 3374. The goal of our life should therefore be close union with Him through liberation from the desires of the body: the anima nostra [our soul], desiring to approach Deo [God], must always cleave (adhaereat) to that bono [Good] which is the divinum [Divine], which always exists, was in the beginning and was with God, i.e. Dei Verbum [the Word of God] 3375. In connection with the idea of ​​God as the Highest Good, the Alexandrians have two more features, subordinate to the first, but in themselves still very important. The first of them is that, under the influence of the intellectualism of Platonic philosophy, the possession of the Highest Good and union with it is achieved in the form of theoretical knowledge; hence, so to speak, in a derivative sense, the very act of knowing God acquires the meaning of the highest good. For Philo, the highest limit of the path of life is γνῶσις and ἐπιστήμη Θεοῦ [(knowledge of) God], which act in contrast to the pleasures of the flesh, which are destroyed by the desire for knowledge 3376. In Clement of Alexandria, in connection with the ideal of moral perfection, we also constantly encounter speeches about γνῶσις τοῦ Θεοῦ [(by) knowledge of God] 3377; the perfection of life is determined by the property of contemplation (ϑεωρίας) and the closely related abstinence of the flesh (ἐγκρατείας) 3378. Another feature associated with this among the Christian Alexandrians is based on the authority of the New Testament Revelation. The idea of ​​God as the Highest Good requires assimilation and imitation of Him. Hence, for Clement, the highest good is deeds of love and Christian mercy, manifested on the widest scale in the image of Christ the Savior 3379. St. Ambrose exhibits both of these traits. Religious knowledge is considered to be of great importance in the matter of moral perfection. Beatum [blessed] can make a person scientia [knowledge], combined with moral purity (innocentia) 3380. Holy Scripture itself posits vitam aeternam in cognitione divinitatis [eternal life in the knowledge of the Divine] 3381. This knowledge, in view of its significance for us, can justly be called summum bonum [the highest good]: the soul receives its food and clothing, which cleaves illi summo bono [to that Supreme Good], so that through the acquisition of ejus cognitionis [His knowledge] we ourselves can become partakers (consoles) of divinae naturae [Divine nature] 3382. It is impossible, however, in this case in the ethics of St. Ambrose loses sight of one feature that quite noticeably distinguishes it from Alexandrian ethics: while the Alexandrians mean knowledge, although its subject is the content of Revelation, but still diverges in many respects from the teaching of the Church and is accessible not to all members of the latter, but only to the most perfect of them, St. Ambrose understands by this knowledge, apparently, exclusively church faith, the teaching of the Church: faith has vitam aeternam fides [eternal life], since it is fundamentum bonum [good foundation] 3383. The second feature - works of mercy - also appears with a peculiarity in comparison with Clement: the idea of ​​love is completely absent from him and simply bona facta [good deeds] are meant as the goal of human life: vita aeterna [eternal life] lies in fructu bonae operationis [in the fruits of good deeds] 3384; have vitam aeternam et bona facta [eternal life and good works], since vir justus [a righteous man] is approved both by words and deeds 3385. The so-called theory of double morality and a specific image of moral perfection In the ethics of St. Ambrose we encounter one important feature, alien to the moral consciousness of our time: he knows two types of moral life, of which one, lower in dignity, is intended by him for ordinary mortals, and the other, more sublime, is recommended only to people who are outstanding in spiritual terms, perfect. Here we recognize a feature that was deeply etched into the moral consciousness of classical times. The theory of double morality initially arose in the depths of very ancient religious-philosophical and priestly organizations, which, in addition to the teachings they publicly preached, had an even higher mysterious knowledge, into which only selected members of the organization were initiated; the former were called esoterics, and the latter - isoterics. Then this tradition passed on to representatives of specifically philosophical thought, and many philosophical schools and systems of Greece morally, as well as intellectually, divide people into perfect and less perfect. Following the example of the Stoics, Cicero holds the same point of view in his “De officiis” [“On Duties”]. He divides the duties that he intends to discuss in his book into intermediate duties (officium medium), or general duties (officium commune), i.e. intended for all people in general, and perfect duties (officium perfectum), as accessible only to the perfect; the former are also designated by him with the Stoic term καϑῆκον, and the latter are also known under the Stoic name κατόρϑωμα 3386. Cicero sees the criterion for dividing duties into these two classes in the degree of subjective conviction in their reasonableness: that which is recognized as correct, reasonable without any hesitation (rectum quod sit), id officium perfectum esse [is a perfect duty], a medium officium id esse [the average duty is that], regarding which, when asked why it should be done, one can only give a probable reason (probabilis ratio) 3387. In his book, Cicero reveals in detail only officia media [average duties], characteristic of non sapientium [not wise], but communia [common] to the entire human race, and precisely on the basis that the actual perfect sage does not exist, and the idea of ​​him has the value of only an ideal 3388. Following the example of Cicero and St. Ambrose distinguishes between officium aut medium aut perfectum [obligation either average or perfect] 3389, or κατόρϑωμα, perfectum et absolutum officium [perfect and absolute duty], on the one hand, and commune officium [general duty], on the other, and in the latter case the officium [obligation] is meant, which is potest plurimis esse commune [can be common to many] 3390; or also officia prima [first duties] and officia media [medium duties], of which the first are intended for the few (paucis), and the second for the many (pluribus) 3391. Strictly speaking, duties of the second kind are not completely devoid of perfection, so we can only talk about two forms of perfection (duplex forma perfectionis) - incomplete, or average, and complete 3392. Although for Ambrose, as for Cicero, perfection is an ideal state, but, as noted by Ziegler and others, 3393 with the difference from Cicero that it is thought of as actually feasible in a future life: one of the two forms of duties is possible hie [here], and the other ibi [there], one secundum hominis possibilitatem [in accordance with human strength], and the other secundum perfectionem futuri [in accordance with the perfection of the future] 3394. However, this view, even in the same work “De officiis ministrorum” [“On the duties of clergy”] is not strictly maintained, since many of its passages show that St. Ambrose went even further from Cicero and was inclined to admit the possibility of observing officium perfectum [perfect duty] even in earthly life, life in the body. Illustrating the difference between average and perfect duties with specific examples, he says, for example: the accumulation of monetary savings is accessible to many, but jejunare [fasting] and being continentem [abstinent] is characteristic of a few (paucorum); likewise, the absence of greed for what belongs to others (alieni cupidum non esse) is a rare phenomenon (rarum) 3395. The fact is that the revealed teaching of Ambrose about the division of responsibilities is put in connection with the teaching about the Gospel commandments and advice already set out in its place: officia media [average responsibilities] for him constitute the positive instructions of Revelation (mandata Dei), which are intended for all people as generally binding commandments 3396; he sees the basis for the recognition of officia perfecta [perfect duties] in such instructions of Revelation, to the fulfillment of which a person is not forced, as to the fulfillment of commandments, but which are provided exclusively to his free will in order to acquire the highest degree of moral perfection; as an example, he points to the Savior's words to the rich young man 3397. St. has a similar meaning. Ambrose and the terms consilia and praecepta [councils and commandments] 3398. It cannot be said that this division of duties is distinguished by clarity, since the boundary between medium [average] and perfectum [perfect] does not always remain strong and defined: if the concept consilium [advice] has at least a certain meaning when discussing the category of such voluntary actions as maintaining virginity, the vow of widowhood and the like, then, according to Jacobi’s fair remark, ambiguity already appears in his understanding if in De officiis ministrorum III, 10 St. Ambrose ironically contrasts, as officia media [average duties], such actions as the pursuit of monetary benefits, the desire for choice food, dissatisfaction with one’s own wealth, with the duties of perfecta [perfect], meaning by the latter fasts, abstinence, freedom from greed for the goods of others; meanwhile, all of the above actions are obligatory not only for perfect Christians, but also for all Christians in general 3399. Carrying out the New Testament consilia [councils], or officia perfecta [perfect duties], in the language of St. Ambrose bears the Stoic name of a sage (sapiens), a perfect husband (vir perfectus) or simply perfect (perfectus). His image is largely characterized by stoic and platonic, reminiscent of Alexandrians, features. But in this case, there can still be no talk of a simple slavish copy from someone else’s originals: the classical and Alexandrian moral ideal is subject to significant revision under the influence of the Western Christian spirit. The parallel between the sage St. Ambrose, on the one hand, and the perfect Philo and the Gnostic Clement, on the other, is very curious from this point of view. When starting to present these parallels, we, as a guiding principle in this case, will begin with the position that the analysis of the concept of “moral” in general gives us, as a result, on the one hand, the concept of the moral content that must be infused into the form of empirical reality, and of the psychophysiological nature that must be transformed by combining it with moral content. Defining now the attitude of the sage St. Ambrose to the sage and the Gnostic of the Alexandrians, we must note that they are similar to each other as far as moral content is concerned; in other words, what a sage must learn and do to embody in his life the ideal of moral perfection, St. Ambrose defines essentially the same as the Alexandrians. The difference between them is revealed when they begin to describe those changes in the composition of the human natural nature of the sage, which are produced in it by the influence of the moral ideal: while the Alexandrians present this change as so deep and radical that nature seems to completely lose its natural qualities, St. Ambrose preserves much of it intact for his sage. From this point of view, we will systematize small details. As for the similarity, it is revealed, first of all, in the fact that the Western sage wages the same irreconcilable struggle with sensuality and the lower side of his being, like the morally perfect Alexandrians. Like Philo, a concrete example of this way of activity of St. Ambrose sees in the biblical patriarch Jacob, who for a long time was a shepherd of sheep for his father-in-law Laban (Gen. 30:36). Explained in an allegorical sense, this circumstance for both one and the other means that Jacob shepherded the unreasonable movements of his soul, knew how to observe moderation in satisfying the feelings and pleasures of the flesh, conquered his feelings, restrained his anger, reconciled the previously warring law of the flesh with the law of reason 3400. The necessity of such a dominance of reason over the sensuality of St. Ambrose deduces from the highest dignity of the first in comparison with the second: prudentia vel ratio [prudence, or reason] is higher than passion (passionis), and that which judges in a person is superior to that which is subject to the court; and it cannot be that the unreasonable (irrationabile) is above reason (ut ratione sit melius) 3401. In the same sense it should have acted on St. Ambrose and the influence of Cicero. The latter, distinguishing two dominant forces in the human soul: cogitationes [thoughts] and appetitus [desires, aspirations], or ὁρμή, considered it possible to realize what is honest, decent and useful only if reason dominates passions and desires 3402. Knowing this psychological theory, St. Ambrose also holds the belief that only if desires (appetitus) obey reason (rationi) can it most easily be possible to preserve what is due to all duties 3403. Reason must embrace the entire being of a sage, equally dominate both his inner and outer world, so that there must be complete harmony between them. Clement of Alexandria puts forward this trait especially strongly in his Gnostic, “whose deeds are judged by the direction of the will; what matters is not what we did, but what we wanted to do” 3404. Already one intention can have meaning if for some reason it could not be carried out, and merciful, for example, are called not only those who are engaged in acts of mercy, but also those who would like to be merciful, but do not have the necessary material means for this 3405. Philo also defends the need for internal perfection: a perfect life (τέλειος βίος) is possible when our assumptions (ἡ γνώμη) agree with reason (ὁ λόγος), and deeds correspond to intentions (οἷον τὸ βούλευμα τοιάδε ἡ πρᾶξις); the absence of this harmony (τῆς ἁρμονίας ταύτης) already serves as a sign of moral imperfection 3406. St. Ambrose also evaluates the actions of a wise man by the purity of his intentions: in homine perfecto [in a perfect man] there must be gemina virtus [double virtue] - intention (intentio) and action (actio); intentio [intention] is the beginning (principium) of actionis [action], and actio [action] forms its goal (finis) intentionis [intention]. A good intentio [intention] has