Уничижение Христа
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Between the Gospel image of Christ and our concepts stands the apostolic-patristic dogmatic teaching, which obscures the simplicity of the Gospel truth from us. In general, this barrier leans towards the preponderance of the theological side in the work and teaching of Christ over the human-historical side. Dogmatic formulas, in their conventional understanding, make the Gospel truth in its historical purity inaccessible to many. Meanwhile, in the essence of the matter, dogmatic Christology, understood correctly and in sufficient depth, returns our thought to the gospel fact and leads our heart to the living Christ. This is precisely the meaning of the apostolic-patristic thought about the self-abasement of Christ, curled up in church Christology, but not included in dogmatic formulas. We need to begin with dogmatic Christology, but the direct task of the philosophy of Christological dogma is to bring to light this idea of self-abasement inherent in the depths of dogma, which extended to the subordination of Christ to the laws and conditions of human existence.
This task is pursued by our study of the humiliation of Christ, which serves as an introduction to the presentation of Gospel history and teaching.
Explanation of the last to Phil. II, 5 – 11 (Phil. 2:5–11)
The entire earthly life of Christ was a matter of great condescension of divine love (ἡ ἀπό ῤῥ ητος λόγου θεοῦ κατάβασις). This was witnessed by Jesus Christ Himself, who said about Himself: “I came down from heaven” (John 6:38) 1 and about His Father: “God so loved the world that he gave His only begotten Son (so that whoever believes in Him should not perish, but have eternal life" (John 3:16). He came to be served, but to serve and to give His life as a ransom for many” (Matthew 20:28; Mark 10:45). He said about Himself: “I am meek and lowly in heart” (Matthew 11:29).
Revealed in the life of Jesus Christ as a fact, His self-abasement later became the subject of the apostolic teaching. The classic place (locus classicus) in this regard is considered to be the last one. ap. Paul to Phil. 2:5–11.
Let us first determine the connection of these verses with the previous text of the message.
The first two verses of the second chapter after. to Phil. closely adjacent to Phil. 1:27, where the apostle exhorts the Philippians to stand in one spirit, striving with one accord for the faith of the gospel. So, the apostle continues (Phil. 2:1), if there is any consolation (for the apostle himself) in Christ, if there is any consolation of love (which was supposed to unite the apostle with the Philippians), if there is any communion of the spirit, if there is any mercy and compassion (which the apostle begs for himself from the Philippians and in whose name, as well as in the name of consolation in Christ, the consolation of love, communion of the spirit, he turns to them the following exhortation), - then (Phil. 2:2) complete my joy, have the same thoughts, have the same love, be of one mind and of the same mind. “The persistence with which the apostle begs the Philippians to fulfill his request, clothed in the form of some solemn spell, reveals to us the whole depth of his loving heart (and the extremely important importance that he attaches to unanimity and like-mindedness, as the surest guarantee of a truly Christian life).
Being in captivity, awaiting the death penalty every minute, the apostle even uses his suffering and the danger that lies ahead as a means to enhance the persuasiveness of the admonition with which he addresses his beloved children” 2 . Further, the apostle more precisely defines the inner nerve of Christian unanimity, describes the mood that should lie at its basis - he specifically names humility, which in his depiction is the complete opposite of any egoism and serves as the main motive for selfless activity: do nothing out of selfish ambition or vanity, but out of humility, consider one another superior to yourself. Let each one not only take care of himself, but each one also of others (Phil. 2:3–4).
In order for his admonition to pave the way to the heart of the Philippians and to expose humility in the light of a high virtue worthy of full assimilation on the part of Christians, the apostle calls Jesus Christ Himself the bearer of this mood, Whom Christians should imitate: for you must have the same feelings that were in Christ Jesus (Phil. 2:5). Then, in the following verses, the apostle not only in general, as in Phil. 2:5, but in specie (in particular - editor's note of the electronic edition) outlines the main moments of the divine-human life in which the humility of Christ was manifested, which were generated by this mood, which underlies all selfless activity.
And this depiction of the basic feelings of Jesus Christ, although in such a connection apparently has an introductory meaning, is given by the apostle with attention corresponding to the importance of the subject, in expressions that amaze with expressiveness and sophistication, and in such completeness that not only are the moments of Christ’s self-abasement separately indicated, but also the glorification of Him from God the Father that followed self-abasement is described: He, being the image of God, did not consider it robbery to be equal with God (Phil. 2:6); but he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, becoming in the likeness of men; and becoming in appearance as a man (Phil. 2:7), he humbled himself, becoming obedient even to death, even death on the cross (Phil. 2:8). Therefore God has highly exalted Him and given Him the name that is above every name (Phil. 2:9), so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth (Phil. 2:10), and every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father (Phil. 2:11).
These words ap. Paul are remarkable not only because they contain with exceptional completeness the actual teaching about self-abasement and humility of Jesus Christ, but also from all sections of St. The Scriptures relating generally to the teaching about the person of Jesus Christ are distinguished by their content, depth of thought and expressiveness. According to Theodoret, “with these few sayings the divine apostle overthrew all heresy” 3 . Therefore, it is quite natural that from ancient times to the present day the thought of both the fathers and teachers of the church, and heretics, and all free-thinking theologians in general, turned to this classical section of the Epistle to the Philippians. But with all their expressiveness, the words of the apostle leave the possibility of different understandings: the church fathers and heretics, Orthodox theologians and freethinkers found and find in them evidence in favor of their beliefs and opinions. Hence the diversity of ancient and recent interpretations.
Already the author of the work de incarnatione Domini reports that each of the heretics (named by him) (such as Arius, Eunomius, Apollinaris, Marcion, Manes, etc.) explained the words of the Apostle in his own way 4 . This diversity of interpretation continues to this day 5 . Τοῦτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμῖν ὃ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ , ὃ ς ἐν μορφ (Phil. 2:5–6).
The first question that arises when reading the apostolic words and to which various answers are given relates to the subject designated by the apostle by the name of Christ Jesus: Phil. 2 ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰ ησοῦ, Phil. 2ὃς. Who does the apostle mean by this name: the eternal Son of God, Who made Himself of no reputation already when He entered the world (εἰσερχόμενος εἰς τὸν κόσμον: Heb. 10:5), at His incarnation, revealing us an image of divine meekness (ἡ λόγου θεοῦ κατάβασις)? or the man Jesus, Who showed in His earthly life an example of human humility? The name Christ Jesus used by the apostle equally allows for both meanings 6 . Various answers to this question in most cases were and are determined by general views on the face of Jesus Christ. The Eastern fathers and teachers of the church understand by the name Jesus Christ the only begotten eternal Son of God, Who was God and had no less than a Father 7 ; however, Western fathers and teachers attributed the name Jesus Christ to the God-man and the feat of humiliation was timed to coincide with the earthly life of Jesus Christ 8 .
The ancient heretics either attributed the name and humiliation to the man Jesus, in Whom the Logos dwelt, - thus Paul of Samosata and the Ebionite heretics in general - then also attributed the name to the Son of God, but, considering Him unequal to God the Father and another essence, as, for example, Arius and his like-minded people taught, they saw in the words of the Apostle the opposite meaning, “that Jesus Christ, being in the form of God, is not He delighted him to be equal with God, but, being a lesser God, He did not delight him to be equal to the great and greatest God" 9 ; then, finally, they applied the name to the Son of Man in a special sense, namely, considering the human form to be the eternal form of existence of the Son of God, as Apollinaris taught 10. Later Lutherans, following the Latin exegetes, taught about the kenosis of the incarnate Son of God, who, although possessing divine powers even after his incarnation, did not always manifest them in the days of the flesh (gloriam divinam non perpetuo manifestavit atque exseruit).
In later and modern times, some of the theologians generally follow the Greek exegetes, recognize the premium existence of Jesus Christ and attribute humiliation (κένωσις) to the incarnation - these are the so-called kenotics 11; others understand in the passage in question the Epistle to the Philippians the historical Jesus Christ (der im Fleisch Erschienene, der geschichtliche Christus), recognizing Him either as the incarnate Son of God 12, or as a man united with the Son of God in the Nestorian sense, 13 or as a simple man, rejecting in the latter case both the kenosis of the Son of God and His incarnation 14.
There is no doubt that ap. Paul in the last to Phil. 2:5–6 seq. does not understand only the man Jesus, because neither this nor the other apostles knew Jesus Christ only as a man, and not together as the Son of God 15. Likewise, humiliation in the sense of taking on the image of a slave (μορφὴν δούλου λαβ ὼ ν) and becoming like men (ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἄνθρώπων γενόμενος Phil. 2:7) can be asserted in no way about a person 16 7). But, on the other hand, the apostle, speaking, as the fathers and teachers of the church rightly teach, about the Son of God, it was not in vain that he used the name Jesus Christ, in any case indicating the incarnate Son of God (Luke 1:31). It must also be borne in mind that the one named Jesus Christ serves as the subject of actions as indicated in Phil. 2 and befitting a being who has the norm of divine existence, so in Phil. 2:7–8 and possible only for the Incarnate, and even remains the object of the actions of God the Father (Phil. 2:9–10), directed at a person secondarily called by the name of Jesus (Phil. 2:10) and again by the name of Jesus Christ (Phil. 2:11), in any case, understandable only in relation to man or the Incarnate.
Along with the two extremes, even less true is the seemingly average, but in fact combining both extremes unreconciled, the opinion that Jesus Christ existed from eternity in the human form of existence 17 . When Christ Himself speaks of “the Son of man who came down from heaven, who is in heaven” (John 3:13; cf. John 6:38, 51, 58), He does not thereby mean that “He who came from heaven” (John 3:31), “the only begotten Son of God” (John 3:16), is a man, but expresses the idea that He whom “God sent into the world” (John 3:17) and who, being born of a woman (Gal. 4:4), became the Son of man, came down from heaven and is in heaven. That is why the Jews did not understand the words of Jesus Christ, because they thought only about Jesus, whose father and mother they knew (John 6:42), because they did not distinguish the hypostasis of the speaker from the form of His existence at the moment of speech. When Christ said about Himself: “before Abraham was, I am” (John 8:58), then He did not mean His humanity, but that in Himself that was before His incarnation and remained unchanged after the incarnation - He understood Himself as the subject, the bearer of all (i.e.
both divine and human) forms of His existence. And in all the places cited, including Phil. 2:5–6 next, as in many similar ones, by the name of Jesus Christ, or the Son of Man, or a pronominal designation, one must understand what actually constituted the person, more precisely, the hypostasis of Jesus Christ, unchanged when the forms of His existence changed, which was the unchanging single bearer of these forms of existence. The name Jesus Christ in Phil. 2:5–6 seq. cannot, therefore, be determinative of the actions referred to in the following verses; on the contrary, according to the properties of these actions or states, one should determine each time who is meant by the name of Jesus Christ.
First, the apostle speaks of Jesus Christ, Who, being in the image of God (ἐν μορφ ῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων), humbled Himself through taking on a human, slave form (ἑαντὸν ἐκένωσεν μορφὴν δούλου λαβ ὼ ν), obviously meaning the premium Son of God, Who before the incarnation was in the image of God and for whom the incarnation was already humiliation; then the apostle speaks about the incarnate Son of God, about the historical Jesus Christ, Who (after the incarnation, in earthly life, in addition to self-abasement) humbled Himself (ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτὸν) in obedience to death on the cross and for such voluntary self-abasement and humility was exalted by the Heavenly Father (ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσεν) 18.
Presenting Jesus Christ Himself to the Philippians as a model of humility 19, the apostle writes that He is ἐν μορφ ῇ θεοῆ ὑπάρχων, glory. in the image of God (he did not consider it robbery to be equal with God). What is μορφή 20? First of all, it should be noted that in Phil. 2 the word θεοῦ (like δούλου) is used without a member, and for this reason the expression ἐν μορφ ῇ θεοῦ is heterogeneous with Col. 1:15: εἰκ ὼ ν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, the image of the invisible God, where τοῦ θεοῦ definitely points to God the Father (cf. Heb. 1:3: ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ n. θεὸς ) 21 ; on the contrary, ἐν μορφῆ θεοῦ does not indicate the relationship of Jesus Christ to God the Father, but the divinity of the image in which Jesus Christ existed before the incarnation 22. But, on the other hand, the image is not the same as nature: the divinity of the image of existence is not the same as the nature of God, and the image of a slave is not the same as human nature. The divinity of the image is the norm of divine existence, which the Son of God in the Incarnation changed to the norm of slave existence, preserving His divine nature unchanged.
Hilary distinguishes the concepts of image (forma) and nature (natura) and posits kenosis (evacuatio) in the change of the image of God to the image of a servant in a change that did not destroy the divine nature of Jesus Christ. Taking on the image of a slave, argues Hilary, and being in the image of God are not the same thing. Therefore, one who abides in the image of God could take on the image of a slave only through the humiliation of the image of God, through changing it to the image of a slave (per evacuationem suam = per evacuationem formae Dei). But he who humbled himself (qui se exinanivit) and who took the form of a servant are one and the same. The change (humiliation) of the image is not the humiliation of nature: the one who humiliates himself does not cease to exist (evacuatio formae non est abolitio naturaë quia qui se evacuat, non caret sese, et qui accipit, manet) 23. When the Son of God became incarnate, His divine nature was preserved, but the image of God was not preserved, because through the humiliation of the image of God the image of a servant was assumed (erat naturae proprietas: sed Dei forma jam non erat, quia per ejus exinanitionem servi erat forma suscepta) 24 .
The distinction between the concepts of image and nature 25 can be accepted on sufficient grounds. 1) Replacing the word “image” with the word “nature” does not fit another of the two New Testament passages in which the word μορφὴ appears, namely Mark. 16:12, where it is conveyed about the risen Christ that He appeared in a different form. 2) If the apostle wanted to express the idea that Jesus Christ before the incarnation was God or a divine being, which he affirms positively in other places and which was so decisively expressed by the apostle. John in the first verse of his gospel, then he, of course, would have used 26 the same expression as we find in St. John. John (John 1:1): θεὸς ἦ ν ὁ λόγος = θεὸς ὢ ν or ὑπάρχων, as well as the following words τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῶ to express the idea of the equality of the Son with God the Father would be replaced by the words ἴσον τῷ θεῷ or ἰσόθεον. On the contrary, as weakly considered from this point of view the expression ἐν μορφ ῇ θεού ὑπαῷχων not only in comparison with ὁ θεὸς ὡ ν, but also with θεὸς ὢ ν or ὑπάρχων. 3) Expression ἐν μ. θ.
ὑ ., in the course of speech, should be equivalent to the following τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῷ and not completely identical with it only in its smaller volume; in any case it expresses no more than τὸ ε. ἴ. θ. 27; therefore, the meaning of the words μορφὴ θεοῦ must fit both expressions: and ἐν μ. θ. ὑπάρχων, and to οὐχ ὰρπαγμὸν ἡγ. τ. ε. ἴ. θ. 28. But since, according to what follows, Jesus Christ ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν, humiliated, devastated, or defrauded Himself 29 from τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴδα θεῷ, then, if under In order to understand the essence or nature of God, it would follow that the Son of God in the incarnation renounced His divine nature. Therefore, μορφὴ cannot mean the same as οὐσία or φύσις.
However, μορφὴ as the norm of being divine or human, as a form in which essence is cognized, although different from essence, nevertheless presupposes it: μορφὴ θεοῦ presupposes the nature of God and μορφὴ δούλου - human nature.
In later times, learned exegetes also distinguished μορφὴ from οὐσία and φύσις. Οὐσία 30 means pure essence; φύσις is the same essence, but endowed with natural properties; μορφὴ gives both the essence and its natural properties accidental qualities, which flow from the true nature of a thing and give form to οὐσία or φύσις. Therefore μορφὴ presupposes essence or nature, but οὐσία or φύσις can be without μορφὴ: The Son of God in the incarnation changed μορφὴ θεοῦ to μορφὴ δούλου , retaining, however, the divine nature (φύσις θεοῦ). Most of the newest exegetes come to similar results, who usually understand by μορφὴ the characteristic properties of the essence, the form of existence or the image of the appearance of the essence. The best exponent of this understanding can be called Bishop. Theophanes, who conveys μορφὴ with the words norm of being: “for every kind of being there is its own norm of being, by which we immediately define (the being). Everyone knows the human norm, the animal norm. In relation to this, speaking humanly, God has its own norm of existence.
Whoever has this norm of divine existence is God” 31.
So, ἐν μορφ ῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων = possessing the norm of divine existence, Jesus Christ οὐχ ἁ ρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῷ. It was customary for ancient exegetes to combine with this saying of the Apostle discussions about the deity of Jesus Christ, about His equality with God the Father, which was denied by heretics and affirmed by right-thinking theologians 32 . But it should be borne in mind that the equality of the Son of God with the Father is indicated in ev. John (John 5:18) with another expression: ἴσος τῷ θεῷ, whereas in the last. to Phil. (Phil. 2:6) ἴσα (adverb, not adjective) and θεοῦ without a member are used. According to Bishop Theophana, τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἰσα θεῷ means to be on the same line with God 33. Then ε ἶ ναι ἰσα θεῷ is different in meaning from τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσον τῷ θεῶ 34 and very similar to the expression ἐν μορφῆ θεοῦ ὕ παρξις, although not identical with it 35.
According to the structure of the apostle’s speech, τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῷ can either a) designate a consequence of what is expressed through ἐν μ. θ. ὑ ., or b) be equal to ἐν . μ. θ. ὑ. meaning and differ from this expression only in a larger volume, so that ἐν. μ. θ. ὑ. (embraced by the expression τὸ ε . ἴ . θ .) has the force of the main feature or general meaning, otherwise - the essential feature of what is meant by τὸ ε . ἴ. θ. In the latter case, the entire saying of the apostle would be similar, from a formal point of view, to the following phrase: he, being the heir (de jure) of a rich father, did not want to lead a rich (luxurious) life 36. Leading a rich life expresses more than being the heir of a rich father: a rich life presupposes not only the rights of inheritance or possession, but also actual possession, although the main purpose of a rich life, according to this combination of thoughts, is to maintain family honor - so that the rights of inheritance are obvious to others...
It is easy to see that the norm of divine existence constitutes the main feature, or the main sign of existence on one line with God, and the mutual relationship of these expressions should be understood according to this model, which is quite consistent with the expressiveness of the apostolic speech. What does the norm of divine existence embrace and why is it the main sign? There can be only one answer: divine glory and for divine glory. Divine glory is the revelation of the perfections of divine life, heavenly greatness... In the revelation of the perfections of divine life, in divine glory the norm of divine existence is revealed. The truth of this understanding of the apostolic speech follows first of all from the analysis of the word θεὸς and then from the contextual connection. Θεὸς is the concept of superiority and sublimity over the finitude, convention and limitations of earthly existence. All the more so, this meaning of the word must be maintained because it is contrasted with the concept of δοῦλος - the concept of conventionality, subordination, infamy.
In addition, it is necessary to see a very close relationship between that from which Jesus Christ ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν , embraced Himself (namely τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῷ , embracing and ἐν μορφ ῇ θεοῦ ὕ παρξις), and by what God exalted Him to (Phil. 2:9–11), with the difference discussed below. But the exaltation consisted in giving Jesus Christ the name Lord (κύριος); from here we can conclude that Jesus Christ emptied Himself of dominion (κυριότης), from dominion over the world, from an outwardly majestic attitude towards the world.
Possessing the norm of divine existence, Jesus Christ did not consider existence on the same line with God, or divine glory, to be theft (not the admiration of Nepschev). The words οὐχ ἁ ἡγ. very difficult to understand; their interpretations, from ancient times to our own, are extremely diverse. Russian translation 37 refers us to the interpretation of ancient Western exegetes. They, understanding τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῷ in the sense of the equality of the Son of God with the Father, gave the word ἁ ρπαγμὸς the meaning of theft (actus rapiendi), that is, an active meaning, and accepted the entire saying of the apostle in the affirmative sense: Jesus Christ is not considered it robbery to be equal to God, did not think that to be equal to God on His part was robbery, and therefore was equal to God 38 . This understanding of the text among Western writers determined the latest translations of the text 39, and foreign translations influenced Russian ones. Disadvantages of all these translations of Greek.
of the text are that 1) the thought they convey does not agree with the general flow of speech, 2) with such a meaning, the apostle would almost have used the form of the imperfect past instead of the aorist, which is used here (ἡγήσατο); 3) the word itself ἁ ρπαγμὸς indicates some kind of action or direction of thought, and not just a thought or opinion 40.
The ancient heretics interpreted the words of the apostle differently. They understood Τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῷ in the sense of equality with God the Father, but they equated οὐχ ἁ ρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο with οὐχ ἥ ρπασε and everything the saying was given a negative meaning: they said about Jesus Christ that He, “being in the form of God, did not delight to be equal with God, - that, being a lesser God, He did not delight to be equal to the great and greatest God” 41. It cannot be said that οὐχ ἁ ρ. ἡ. does not contain the meaning expressed through οὐχ ἣ ρπασε; the negative result in relation to the deity of Christ, which the heretics came to, does not depend on the understanding of οὐχ ἁ ρ. ἡ. in the sense of οὐχ ἣ ρπασε, but from the combination of such an understanding with the explanation of τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῷ in the sense of τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσον τῷ θεῷ. Transfer οὐχ ἁ ρ. ἡ. through οὐχ ἥ ρπασε was not unknown in ancient times, but it was usually rejected as associated with heretical unthinking.
If, the Orthodox exegetes reasoned, being in the image of God meant that Jesus Christ was truly God, then how could He take away what belonged to Him? Heretics say that Jesus Christ was a lesser God and did not enjoy equality with the great God. But (not to mention the fact that Christian teaching does not know such a division of God into great and small) how could Jesus Christ, being lesser by nature, delight in the great nature? A man cannot steal something in order to be equal in nature to an angel, and a horse cannot steal something in order to be equal in nature to a man... Moreover, what kind of humility is necessary 42?
Understanding οὐχ ἁ ρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο in the sense of οὐχ ἣ ρπασε, it is necessary to understand by τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῷ that which Jesus Christ did not own 43. Therefore, avoiding heretical conclusions with this understanding is possible only if the action is οὐχ ἁ ρπ. ἡγ. relate to the earthly life of Jesus Christ. This is what A.S. does. Khomyakov, who proposed the following translation: “Christ, Who did not conceive (or did not undertake, or did not commit) the theft of being equal with God, that is, Christ, Who, being the image of God, did not deliberately attribute to Himself equality with God, but from God expected His destiny and glory” 44. But we cannot agree with this opinion either. Οὐχἁ ρπ. ἡγ. must fall at the same time (before the incarnation) to which ἐν μ refers. θ. ὑπάρχων. Then, the sayings ἐν μ. θ. ὑ. and τὸ ε ἶ. ἴ. θεῷ are very similar, while the understanding of the saying οὐχ ἁ ρπ. ἡγ. in the sense of οὐχ ἡρπασε assumes that ἐν μ. θ. ὑ. means something completely different than τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῷ 45. Finally, οὐχ ἁ ρ. ἡγ, containing the moment of action, is still not equivalent to οὐχ ἤ ρπασε.
The apostle’s thought is not that Jesus Christ abstained or refused to commit the act of theft, but he speaks of those feelings (Phil. 2:5) with which Jesus Christ reacted to His τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῷ (ἡγήσατο cf. ἡγούμενοι Phil. 2:3) 46. In the word ἡγήσατο the concept of action is combined with the concept that the Apostle denotes by the word φρονεῖν. The real reason why the apostle used not οὐχ ἥ ρπασε, but οὐχ ὰρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο, not excluding the moment of action, goes deeper: Jesus Christ not only did not commit theft, but also did not think about it 47. Meanwhile, the introduction of a new moment, designated through φρονεῖν, to the moment of action makes the difference in the matter that οὐχἥ ρπασε requires as an object that which was not Jesus Christ’s own and to which He had no right; on the contrary, οὐχ ἁ ρπ. ἡ. according to the moment φρονεῖν is possible in relation to what belonged to Him or was characteristic of Him.
The Eastern fathers and teachers of the church understood the word ἁ ρπαγμὸς in the meaning of ἄρπαγμα, praeda, that is, the result of an action, and not the action itself, and the whole expression οὐχ ἁ ρ. ἡγήσατο gave the following meaning: did not look at it as prey, did not consider it as prey. Thus, Theodoret writes in explanation of Phil. 2:6–7: “Jesus Christ, being God and God by nature and having equality with the Father, did not consider this great (οὐ μέγα τοῦτο ὑπέλαίὶε) 48 because it (i.e. such φρονεῖν ) is characteristic of those who have achieved any honor not according to their merit, but, having hidden their dignity, they chose extreme humility and clothed themselves in human form” 49 . Similarly, John Chrysostom writes that “the Son of God was not afraid to become lower than His dignity, because He did not look at His divinity as an object of theft (οὐχ ἀρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὴν θεότητα) 50 and not He was afraid that someone would take away His nature or dignity. Why - and he hid it, not thinking of diminishing in the least through this” 51.
In revealing the concept of humility, by which someone renounces what he owns, like the Son of God from τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῷ, and freedom, with which the rightful owner, in contrast to the predator, which was, for example, Absalom, lays down his dignity, is the main theme of both conversations of John Chrysostom on words ap. Pavel.
Many of the newest exegetes and theologians maintain the understanding of the Eastern Church Fathers. They determined the newest translation of Osterwald 52. The English theologian Brucë well conveys the words of the apostle: “Jesus Christ did not look at His divinity as a predator looks at his prey, that is, as a thing that he should greedily hold on to, not letting it go from his hands for anything” 53 .
However, in the area of such an understanding of the apostle’s words, different shades of thought are possible. Equating ἁ ρπαγμὸς with ἅ ρπαγμα, res rapta, one can take the word as the name of a thing either to be tenaciously held as plunder by a robber, or one of which one proudly boasts (and the thing is to be boastfully displayed, as spoils by a victor) 54. Some, as we see, take the word in the first shade of meaning, others, on the contrary, in the second. So ep. Macarius writes: “The Savior did not look at His equality with God, at His glory and greatness, and did not use them in the same way as people sometimes use their spoils” 55. Also E.I. Lovyagin in the tropar of the three-canticle for Holy Monday “The Ineffable Descent of the Word of God” words: τὸ Θεὸς οὐχ ἀρπαγμὸν ε ἶ ναι ἡγησάμενος (God is not the rapture being nepshchevav) translates: “considering His deity not to be an object of self-interest” 56.
Now we need to solve the question 1) about a certain point in time to which φρόνησις, the feeling of Jesus Christ, expressed through οὐχ ἁ ρ, relates. ἡγ ., and 2) about the result of the supposed possible positive action ἁ ρπαγμὸν ἡγήσασθαι τὸ ε . ἴ. θεῷ. What οὐχἁ. ἡγ. refers to a specific point in time, this is indicated by the aorist, in which there is ἡγήσατο, equal to ἐκένωσεν. This point in time is determined by the contextual connection οὐχ ἁ ρ. ἡγ. with ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν. Jesus Christ did not consider His divine glory to be a matter of self-interest at the time when He humbled Himself, taking on the form of a servant, that is, He passed from the existence of ἐν μορφῆ θεοῦ into the existence of ἐν μορφ ῇ δούλου, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων. In οὐχἁ ρ. ἡγ. you need to see the φρόνησις of Jesus Christ, His self-reflection, which took place during or before His transition from the existence of ἐν μ. θ. into the existence of ἐν μ.
δούλου: then it was He who did not consider His divine glory to be a matter of self-interest, then He decided, instead of having a selfish attitude towards heavenly glory, to humiliate Himself, putting on the image of a servant. In such a depiction of the “feelings” of Jesus Christ, one must see an anthropomorphic representation, to which the apostle resorts for moralizing purposes. In this anthropomorphic representation, one should not attach objective significance to the supposed possibility that Jesus Christ, ἀρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο, would react selfishly to τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῷ, which was in fact a moral impossibility. But in its present negative form, this image fully corresponds to the actual state of affairs and correctly marks the freedom with which the Son of God submitted to the will of the Father regarding His incarnation, which is figuratively presented elsewhere in the words of the Son of God addressed by Him to the Father before the moment of perception of the human way of existence: “Behold, I come to do Your will, O God” (Heb. 10:7).
It is now easy to determine the result of a positive action ἁ. ἡ. τὸ ε. ἴ. θεῷ. When Jesus Christ passed from existence in the image of God to existence in the form of a servant, He did not look at His divine glory as an object of self-interest: it is obvious that He emptied Himself of what was set before Him - what would have happened if, anthropomorphically speaking, He had looked at His divine glory as an object of self-interest. If He had treated His heavenly glory the way a predator treats its prey, then He, when appearing externally in the world, would have chosen an individual form of revelation that would outwardly correspond to His heavenly glory, so that the recognition of His divine dignity on the part of created beings and, in fact, people would be a matter of a simple impression of His greatness; therefore, although external, it would be universal and unconditional. Instead, Jesus Christ emptied Himself, taking on the form of a servant, becoming in the likeness of men, and becoming in appearance like a man.
The apostle conveys the same thought in other places as follows: “Jesus, for the joy that was set before Him, endured the cross, despising the shame, and sat down at the right hand of the throne of God” (Heb. 12:2); and again: “Jesus Christ, being rich, became poor for your sake, so that through His poverty you might become rich” (2 Cor. 8:9).
ἀλλά ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν μορφὴν δούλου λαβών , ἐν ὁμοιώματι (Phil. 2:7)...
Ἀλλὰ here means exactly but, not and, and expresses the opposition between what could have been and what actually was. In the expression ἑαυτὸν ἑκένωσεν, you need to pay attention to the fact that the addition ἑαυτὸν, as a word with stress, precedes the verb ἐκένωσεν, glory. belittled himself. This gives a special shade to the opposition dissected by the union ἀλλά: instead of acquiring through theft what Jesus Christ did not yet possess (and which constitutes the object of the positive action of ἁ ρ . ἡγ . τὸ ε . ἴ . θ ., i.e., instead of the joy set before Him), Jesus Christ directed this theft towards His His own wealth, with what He already owned, defrauded Himself. In addition, the word ἑαυτὸν indicates the freedom of self-abasement of Jesus Christ, 57 Who is thus presented as a self-conscious person. As a self-conscious person, Jesus Christ freely possesses His natural relations (ἐν μορφ ῇ θεοῦ ὕ παρξις, τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῷ).
In the anthropomorphic depiction, the apostle represents the opposite of the divine nature, omnipotent and formidable, before which, as before an all-consuming fire, creation disappears, which can only correspond to an outwardly majestic phenomenon in the world, an outwardly glorious revelation to people, with the freedom of the face of the Son of God, acting out of motives of love for people, condescension to their infirmities: the apostle depicts “the most wonderful meekness of condescension in that that Jesus Christ softened the invincible power of His nature” 58, thereby causing surprise at divine love 59. Ἐκένωσεν – a very strong expression 60; Ep. Theophanes conveys it in words: devastated or defrauded. The Russian translation is expressive: he humiliated (turned into nothing, ad nihilum redigere) Himself, the Slavic translation is less expressive: He diminished Himself, exhausted Himself more, hence the “state of exhaustion” in dogmatists. What made you empty? From τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῷ, divine glory, and from the embraced by this expression μορφὴ θεοῦ, the image of God: in the incarnation, the Son of God replaced the image of God with the image of a slave and the divine glory with the humiliation of a slave.
Μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, taking the image of a slave, defines the self-abasement of Jesus Christ (κένωσις), answering the question: ποῖος κενώσεως τρόπος , and is contrasted with the expression ἐν μ. θ. ὑ. Δοῦλος, slave, indicates not nature, but a relationship - in this case, the relationship in which every created being is to God, Lord and Master of all: Jesus Christ in the Incarnation replaced the norm of being divine, glorious and lordly in relation to all created things with the norm of being created, “working for God”! Such a change is fully consistent with the expression ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν. However, the change affected only the norm of being, but not the essence, which the apostle designated by the name of Jesus Christ, which, with the change of images of being, constituted an unchanging hypostasis that established the connection between the images, which is why Jesus Christ said: “before Abraham was, I am” (John 8:58). This essence remained unchanged when changing images. Born from St.
Mary, according to the Apostle, did not begin His existence from just this moment (birth), 61 but began to exist in a new form of existence, in the form of a servant, having previously been in the image of God. And again, to the question whether Jesus Christ was a slave, the apostle gives a negative answer: He was not a simple slave, servus purus putus, but He was only in the form of a slave. He only changed in the incarnation the attitude of greatness and dominion to the attitude of slavery.
The next two sayings are ἐν ὁμ. ἀν. γ. καὶ σχ. εὑρ. ὡ ς ἀνθρ. more closely define the image of a slave. The norm of slave existence is the norm of created existence, but what exactly does the apostle mean? To this he responds with the first saying. But further the question arises about the relationship of the human nature of Jesus Christ to the nature of other people: was it completely the same or different? To this the apostle answers καὶ σχ. εὑρ. ὡ ς ἄνθρωπος.
The first of the sayings that more closely define the image of a slave is ἐν ομοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος. Ὁμοίωμα - image, copy, snapshot, also appearance, appearance, figure 62 - in the New Testament is always used only in the second meaning and precisely as a concrete expression, and not an abstract one (Rev. 9:7; Rom. 1:23). This word should also be understood in Phil. 2:7. Relatively plural. ἀνθρώπων it should be noted that it expresses the community of human nature in contrast to its individual bearers. Finally, γενόμενος in any case indicates occurrence or appearance 63. So, the whole saying means: (Jesus Christ took upon Himself the form of a servant at the time when He, or: in the fact that He) appeared in human form. The apostle does not want to say that Jesus Christ became like people or that He became like a man, but says that Jesus Christ had the appearance characteristic of a man, was in the form, or appearance, of a human.
The apostle does not speak about the similarity of the human nature of Christ to the nature of other people, with the assumed (similarity and) difference, but defines the appearance of Jesus Christ as completely human - he says about Jesus Christ what can be said about every person. However, the apostle speaks only of the external (human) appearance of Jesus Christ, and not of the human being or nature, and his expression does not mean that Jesus Christ became a man (ἄνθρωπος or σὰρξ ἐγένετο John 1:14). To the question whether Jesus Christ became a man, homo purus putus, the apostle (again) gives a negative answer: Christ was only ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων. The Apostle says exactly the same thing as in another place: ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁ μαρτίας (Rom. 8:3).
Καὶ 64 σχήματι εὑρεθεἰς ὡ ς ἄνθρωπος . Σχῆμα - habitus, way of life, way of life, behavior, embracing (except for appearance in the sense of figure) body movements, speech, actions, also finitude, convention, passion of human nature, since all this is found in the external everyday life 65. Εὑρίσκεσθαι with trace. partic. (Matthew 1:18) or präd. subst. and adj. (Acts 5:39; Rom. 4:9) means to appear, to appear as someone or as someone. In this meaning, εὑρίσκεσθαι is never (in N. 3.) accompanied by the particle ὡ ς (as someone, before the next subst. or adject.) 66. Therefore, the particle ὡ ς found in the text means, as it were, like. The entire saying of the apostle, therefore, makes sense: and in all external life, Jesus Christ appeared as a man, as if a man. Again, the apostle does not say that Jesus Christ was a man, homo purus putus: He was a man, in outward life he was, as it were, a man 67.
Suggested understanding of the words of the apostle ἐν ὁμ. ἀν. γ. καὶ σχ. εὑρ. ὡ ς ἄνθροοπος is confirmed by the authority of the ancient Greek exegetes. Thus, John Chrysostom writes in explanation of these words: “Jesus Christ was not one of many, but as if one of many” 68; in the words of the apostle, according to the author de inc. Domini, “does not refer to nature, but to activity, since the Lord Christ, having our nature, did not accept our sinfulness, but was clean from all sin” 69. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that before the eyes of ancient exegetes the ghost of Docetism never disappeared, which sought justification for itself, in addition to many other places of Scripture, in these words of the Apostle Paul. Therefore, with these words they associated the idea of the difference (with similarity) of the human nature of Christ from the nature of other people. by sinlessness, by supernatural birth 70, etc. But the newest exegete must keep in mind the opposite of docetism and the understanding of κένωσις 'a, which is predominantly, if not exclusively, characteristic of the newest Protestant theology.
According to this latter, the kenosis was that the Son of God in the full sense of the word became, or became, a man, so that, having become human, he even entered, like a baby, into an unconscious state, which was gradually replaced by human consciousness and self-awareness. According to this understanding, kenosis was absolute 71: it maintains to the letter the expression of the evangelist ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο (John 1:14), without coping with the fact that πάλιν γέγραπται. In this case Phil. 2 and acquires a special meaning: it is precisely this place that turns out to be such a different place, where πάλιν γέγραπται, where kenosis is depicted as relative. The essential meaning of the apostle’s teaching is that everything human is only external, manifested (τὸ φαινόμενον) in relation to the divine, that everything human in Christ was only external, visible in relation to that essential thing that he designates by the name of Jesus Christ. According to the teachings of the ap. Paul, Jesus Christ, having become incarnate, was not transformed into a man, did not change his divine nature to human, but appeared in the flesh 72. This, of course, does not mean that Docetism is right.
There is no contradiction between Phil. 2and Rom. 5:15, 19; 1 Cor. 15:21, 47 (cf. 1 Tim. 2:5), where the apostle calls Jesus Christ a man. Like in Rome. 5:15 and others, the apostle does not call Jesus Christ a man in the sense of homo purus putus, which is beyond all doubt, so, on the other hand, does Phil. 2 gives every reason to call Jesus Christ a man, although not in the sense of homo purus putus. The Apostle does not teach here that the humanity of Jesus Christ was illusory, that everything corporeal in Him was only apparent, a theophany (as Docetism teaches); on the contrary, he claims that Jesus Christ was in the norm of being a slave, that His appearance was human and that throughout His entire life He was completely like a man; he speaks in full about what, as another apostle, a self-witness of the earthly life of Christ, puts it, it was from the beginning, what they heard, what they saw with their eyes, what they looked at and what their hands touched (1 John 1:1) - he speaks about the appearance and life of man, completely real, but not at all illusory.
(καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεἰς ὡ ς ἄνθρωπος), ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτὸν (Phil. 2:8).
The self-abasement revealed by the Son of God in the incarnation consisted in the exhaustion of the external greatness inherent in God for the sake of the created-human, conditionally limited norm, which He took upon Himself. But, according to the apostle, the great work of divine condescension accomplished by the Son of God is not limited to His self-abasement (κένωσις); it continues in the humility (ταπείνωσις) of the Incarnate. Jesus Christ not only humbled Himself, taking on the form of a servant, appearing in human form, but, moreover, throughout His entire life, turning out to be like a man, that is, after the Incarnation, in the days of the flesh, He humbled Himself, becoming obedient to the Heavenly Father even to the point of death, even death on the cross. Cyril of Alexandria (in his explanation of Isaiah 53:2–3) clearly distinguishes between these two types of humiliation of Jesus Christ. “The Son of God,” he writes about the incarnation, “could have descended from heaven, crowned with divine glory, shining with an unapproachable light and inaccessible to contemplation due to the excess of glory.
But He humiliated Himself, His appearance was dishonorable, because the human is small, insignificant and completely worthless in comparison with the divine and highest superiority and the most brilliant beauty of the highest nature. But about Him,” continues Cyril, “even more is said: His appearance was diminished before people, just as if they had said: among people you can see some who are distinguished by the brilliance of their virtues, exalted and distinguished by the advantages of wealth or any other advantages existing on earth; but Emmanuel was no different in this way and was in a belittled and humiliated position, so that he seemed lower than all people” 73. “The Incarnation,” writes Bishop. Theophanes 74, is the first stage of self-abasement in the person of God, who deigned to hide the glory of the Divine under the cover of humanity. But staying there could be glorious. And the Lord did not want this. He chose the most invisible kind of life: he was born in a manger, grew up in poverty and toil, lived among hardships, not having anywhere to lay his head. Thus he humbled himself.
This humbled Himself signifies the voluntary choice of such a life - it determines the character of all life. The word, being obedient, embraces the very flow of life, with all its accidents. As God, He ruled over everything and could direct the course of His life Himself; but He renounced His power, and humbly accepted everything that happened, and submitted to it” (Matthew 4:10; 6:10; 12:50; Mark 14:36; John 6:34, etc.). The measure of humility is indicated by the words: (being obedient) even to death, and death on the cross. In addition to the freedom of achievement, the expression being obedient indicates the highest, by the will of the Heavenly Father, predestination for the Incarnate to live a humiliated life; Obviously, the same will determined the measure of humility. If we take into account that the attitude of the Incarnate One to the will of the Father had a peculiarity in comparison with the attitude of the premium Son of God towards it, since in the days of the flesh He was obedient to it as a man; it is easy to understand that the feat of humility during earthly life, representing a continuation of humiliation in the incarnation, nevertheless retains its characteristic feature.
Thus, humility (ταπείνωσις), in contrast to self-abasement (κένωσις), constitutes, according to the teachings of St. Paul, the earthly feat of obedience to the Incarnate will of the Heavenly Father, fulfilled by Him in conditions of human suffering, predetermined by this will. “Although He is the Son,” the apostle writes in another place (Heb. 5:8), “yet he learned obedience through suffering” (cf. Rom. 5:19).
Διὸ καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσεν καὶ ἐχαρίσατο αὐτῶ τὸ ὄνομα ? ῃ ἐπουρανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων καὶ καταχθονίων , καὶ π ᾶ σα ????? θεοῦ πατρός ( Phil. 2:9–11 ).
In Art. 9–11 the apostle describes that glorification, or exaltation (ὑπερύψωσις), which followed the humiliation and humility voluntarily suffered by Jesus Christ. Considered as an external reward, glorification no longer belongs to the realm of humiliation; but, in essence, voluntary humiliation, in obedience to the will of God, is necessarily accompanied by glorification on the part of God and includes exaltation as its essential element. Therefore, the apostle adds to the description of Christ’s self-abasement and humility a description of His glorification, although for his purposes - to portray the humility of Jesus Christ as a model for the behavior of Christians - a description of glorification would be unnecessary if exaltation were an external reward for humiliation. On the contrary, as constituting an essential element of humiliation, as expressing its inner purpose, the glorification with which the humility of Jesus Christ was crowned, and the exhortation to imitate Christ should have given strength and persuasiveness.
Briefly, adding to the description of the humility of Jesus Christ the description of His glorification by the Heavenly Father, the apostle remains faithful to that eternal truth, which Jesus Christ Himself expressed in the words: “Whoever exalts himself will be humbled; and whoever humbles himself will be exalted" (Matthew 23 cf. Luke 24:26: “Is it not necessary for Christ to suffer and enter into His glory?” Heb. 2:9: “We see that for suffering death Jesus was crowned with glory and honor”; Rom. 8:17).
Διὸ καὶ indicates the close connection of glorification with humiliation and humility (cf. Rom. 4:22; Heb. 13:12, etc.). However, this connection puts in first place not the moment of reward, but the moment of the action of the power of God in human humiliation (2 Cor. 12:9). Therefore, following the conjunction διὸ καὶ, there is immediately ὁ θεὸς before the verb ὑπερύψωσεν. Guided in His life and work by humility and renouncing all selfish use of His advantages, in obedience to the will of the Heavenly Father, Jesus Christ gave (as every Christian gives) the opportunity to manifest in His life the power of God, acting precisely in weakness, preparing from His life an instrument of divine activity, a means for achieving divine goals.
This action of the power of God can be viewed from two sides: a) from the side of the personal attitude of the Heavenly Father towards the humble and humble, God’s action is the merciful return to man of that which he voluntarily renounces in the name of God (restitutio ad integrum), and b) from the side of achieving objective goals, this action is revealed as a manifestation of divine glory in human humiliation. However, both of these sides are inextricably linked. The first side of the action of the Heavenly Father is indicated by the apostle with the word ὑπερύψωσε: from a state of humiliation, God the Father raised Jesus Christ to the state that He voluntarily humiliated, in ἐν μορφ ῇ θεοῦ ὕ παρξις, τὸ ε ἶ ναι ἴσα θεῷ (restitutio ad integrum), as Jesus Christ Himself said: “Now glorify Me, O Father, with You, with the glory which I had with You before the world was” (John 17:5), and as the Apostle said: “God has made Him Lord and Christ of this Jesus, whom the Jews crucified (Acts 2:36). But Jesus Christ, according to the last. to Phil. 2:9, was not only exalted, but also exalted, ὑπερ ύψωσε: what degree of glorification is expressed by this?
Was Jesus Christ exalted above what He possessed before the incarnation and which He voluntarily renounced in the incarnation, or does this expression contrast ascension with humiliation in the sense that the Heavenly Father exalted Jesus Christ extremely in comparison with the humiliation to which Jesus Christ voluntarily determined Himself, i.e. expresses the extreme degree of goodness of the Heavenly Father? In any case, it is certain that the apostle, connecting the ascension with the granting of Jesus the name Lord, before whom every knee bows, in heaven, on earth and under the earth, inextricably connects both sides of the action of the power of God in the humiliation of Jesus Christ, as it really is, and in the glorification of Jesus he already contemplates the manifestation of the glory of the Heavenly Father, i.e. he sees the fulfillment of the objective goals of God. The pre-worldly glory of Jesus Christ was His property, which He could selfishly possess, as if in opposition to the Heavenly Father; it was, further, exclusively heavenly glory, before which everything earthly and underworld trembled.
But the glory of Jesus Christ, given to Him by the Heavenly Father for His humiliation, given to Him in this humiliation, is precisely the glory of the Heavenly Father, manifested in humiliation, becoming the property of everything humiliated, not only heavenly, but also earthly and underworld. This is the same premium glory of Christ, but already bestowed upon Him by the Heavenly Father; this is the same divine glory, but already manifested in humiliation. Therefore, the glorification of Jesus Christ by the Heavenly Father was ὑπερ – ύψωσις!
of course ὀνόματος ) τοῦ χαρισαμένου αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα 75: and he gave Him the name that is above every name. Καὶ – explicativum and the whole expression more precisely or specifically defines what the exaltation of Jesus Christ by God the Father consisted of. Ὄ νομα – a name meaning glory. What name exactly? Name Lord, Κύριος; this name is above every name; to this name is fitting the bowing of every knee (Phil. 2:10), and finally, every tongue confesses Jesus Christ as Lord (Phil. 2:11). The Apostle Paul expresses the same thought, which was expressed most clearly by St. Peter in his speech to the Jews: “God has made this Jesus, whom you crucified, both Lord and Christ” (Acts 2:36). Ap himself. Paul connects with this name of Jesus Christ every manifestation of His honor and glory and often denotes by it alone the glorious fruits of His earthly exploit 76 .
The objective purpose of giving Jesus Christ the name Lord is expressed further by the apostle: ἵ να ἐν τῷ ὁνόματι Ἰ ησοῦ κτλ. Ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι - not before the name, but about the name, as in glory. translation, or in the name, i.e. based on what the name means - based on the works of Jesus Christ, etc. What name is meant here? Not the name Jesus, but the name Jesus, or given to Jesus, Lord. The purpose of giving Jesus Christ the name Lord is so that in the name of the Lord given to Jesus, or for the sake of His Lordship, every knee of heaven, earth and hell (of course, rational beings) should bow. Who did you bow to? “As I live, says the Lord, every knee will bow to Me, and every tongue will confess to God” (Isa. 45:23; Rom. 14:11; sn. Eph. 5:20; Col. 3:17). Once again we are reminded that the name Lord was given to Jesus and that for His name every knee will bow to God. This reminder makes it clear that the name Lord, which was given to Jesus Christ for the indicated high purpose, was given specifically to Jesus, i.e. The Son of God in the humiliation of His earthly life.
Who should be understood by the name of heavenly, earthly and underworld (intelligent beings), opinions vary greatly; According to more worthy of attention than others, the heavenly are the beings of the spiritual world (cf. Eph. 1:21; 3:10; Heb. 1:4, 6), the earthly are people (living), the underworld are the dead (Theodoret, Bishop Theophan), demons or sinners (John the Golden, Theophylact). But it seems there is no need to go into finding out who is meant by each of these names; the meaning of the entire set of names is quite obvious, and perhaps the apostle wanted to say nothing more than: all created-intelligent beings. In this case, parallel to the place in question will be Rev. 5:13; Ps. 95:11, 12 77 ). Rather, we need to pay attention to the comparison of the heavenly with the earthly and even the underworld: the admiration for the name of Jesus Christ not only in heaven, but also in the earthly and underworld testifies to the fact, or is the fruit of the fact that His glory was manifested not only before the inhabitants of heaven, but also before the extremely humiliated beings, manifested because Jesus Himself. Christ voluntarily accepted extreme humiliation.
“It was necessary that He, for whom are all things and from whom are all things, bringing many sons to glory, should make the captain of their salvation complete through suffering” (Heb. 2:10), etc.
Καὶ (sc. ἵ να) π ᾶ σα γλῶσσα ἐξομολογήσεται ὅ τι Κύριος (sc. εστὶ) Ἰ ησοῦς Χριστός: and that every tongue, that is, every rational being, should confess, openly and solemnly acknowledge 78 that Jesus Christ is Lord.
Εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ πατρός: to the glory of God the Father. It is difficult to say what these words are related to, whether to both sayings of Phil. 2:10–11 or only to the nearest: that every tongue may confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father. In any case, the general meaning of the phrase is clear: the glory of Jesus Christ is the glory of God the Father 79 . Here, of course, the same idea is expressed as in 1 Cor. 15:24–28: (then there will be) “the end when He (Jesus Christ) gives up the kingdom to God the Father... then the Son Himself will submit to Him who put all things in subjection to Him, so that God may be all in all” (cf. 2 Cor. 4:6).
So, according to the teachings of the Apostle, Christ Jesus, possessing the norm of being divine, did not (during the incarnation) selfishly approach His divine glory, but humiliated Himself, accepting the norm of being a slave, appearing in human form. Then, outwardly revealed as man, in the days of the flesh, He humbled Himself in obedience to God the Father even to the point of death on the cross. Therefore, God the Father exalted Him and gave Him the name Lord, which exceeds every other name, so that in the name of the Lord Jesus all rational creation would bow before God the Father, and so that everyone would acknowledge that Jesus Christ is Lord and His glory is the glory of God the Father.
The Question of Kenosis in Christian Writing in the First Three Centuries
a) The truth of God’s condescension, discovered in the very reality of the earthly life of Jesus Christ and preached to the world by His apostles, became the property of Christian doctrine from the very first days of Christianity. But the assimilation of this truth by Christians and its expression in Christian writing has its own history, determined by many favorable and unfavorable conditions of church life. “The doctrine of the incarnation of God, let’s say in the words of John Chrysostom 80, was very inconvenient. This excessive love of Him and His great condescension was terrible and required many preparations for it to be accepted. For, imagine what it was like to listen and learn that God, ineffable, incorruptible, incomprehensible, invisible, immense, - Whose glory, not fully revealed, even the cherubim could not see, but covered their faces with outstretched wings (Isa. 6:2), - He who surpasses all understanding and surpasses understanding, deigned to become man, to take on flesh created from the earth and dust, and test all that is human.”
Already the first listeners and followers of the apostles experienced the difficulty of fully assimilating the idea of divine condescension due to some special conditions of their religious life. Firstly. Although the preaching of the apostles was addressed to all people without distinction of their rank and condition and was even received mainly by the poor and oppressed classes of society, although its subject was the cross of Christ as much (i.e., no less) as His glorious resurrection (1 Cor. 1:23; 15:17), however, it was accompanied by so many signs and such an abundant communication of the gifts of the Holy Spirit that the first followers of the apostles, in an abundance of grace-filled gifts, they perceived the kingdom of God as a kingdom of glory and power (Acts 8:5–8). Secondly.
Comparing the history of the earthly life of Jesus Christ with the Old Testament prophecies about the suffering and glory of the Messiah, the first Christians found that in the life of Christ only the prophecies about His suffering and humiliation were fulfilled, and they concluded from this that the glory of Christ would soon (was), in fulfillment of the Old Testament prophecies, be revealed in the glorious earthly kingdom. Christians waited so intensely for the second glorious coming of Christ that their first generations hoped not to see death before the appearance of the Savior 81 . Through all this the thoughts of Christians were chiefly directed to the divine glory of Christ, and not to His humiliation. Only over time, when the temptations that befell Christians in the form of severe persecution from the Jews and especially pagans instilled in them the need for consolation by the example of Christ, did they, with love and attention, gradually increasing, turn to the meek and humble image of Christ, comprehending the meaning of His humiliation not as accidental, but as saving for people, as predetermined by the will of the Heavenly Father. Thirdly.
The attitude of the first followers of the apostles to the idea of divine condescension was determined by the historical meaning, or the content of their faith in Christ Jesus. Witnesses of the earthly life of Christ and His resurrection, the apostles themselves went out to preach worldwide at a time when they were just as convinced of the incarnation of God in the person of Jesus Christ (John 1:14), as they were that the man Jesus, whom they called teacher, was or became the Son of God, the Lord (Matthew 16:13–16; Acts 2:36). For us - believers, removed in time from the events of the earthly life of Christ - the Christian faith is, first of all, faith in the Incarnation of God, which took place so many centuries ago: we confess the “Lord Jesus Christ” first of all as “the Son of God, the only begotten, born of the Father before all ages, light from light, true God from true God, begotten, uncreated, consubstantial with the Father, in Him all things was” and only then: “for us, man and for our salvation, who came down from heaven and became incarnate from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary and became human.”
But for the listeners of the apostolic sermon, to believe in Christ meant to recognize that the man Jesus of Galilee, the son of Joseph and Mary, crucified under Pontius Pilate, was not a simple man, but was or became the Son of God, God. God made this Jesus, whom you crucified, Lord and Christ (Acts 2:36): this is the typical content of the apostolic sermon. This meaning of the early Christian faith was determined by the fact that the Jews, for whom the preaching of the crucified Christ was a temptation, and the Hellenes, for whom it was madness, 82 greeted the Christian faith with ridicule, as faith in a common man.
Therefore, Christian writers, even in those cases when they turned their words to believers and confessed Christ the God-Man, when they spoke about His divine glory and about human suffering, still proclaimed not about God, Who condescendingly became man, but about man who was God. So, Clement, bishop. Roman, teaches the Corinthians to think of Christ as nothing other than God, the Judge of the living and the dead 83. Ignatius the God-Bearer, although he found consolation and encouragement for himself in the sufferings of Christ and expressively points to them as the basis of Christian patience 84, however, he confesses Christ in the form of opposition to “Ebion”, precisely forbidding the Lord Jesus Christ to be considered “a simple man, and not the only begotten God, the Wisdom and Word of God” 85; even turning your thoughts to what Jesus Christ was, i.e.
born of the Father, God the Word, the only begotten Son, he moves from here not to the humiliation of the earthly life of Christ, but to the fact that “He remains the same at the end of the ages” 86; even saying that in the incarnation of Christ “God appeared as man,” he directly adds that in Christ “man also acted as God” 87 . Barnabas, expressing faith in Christ in the same contrast between humanity and deity, inspires us to see in Jesus “not the son of man, but the Son of God, who appeared in the flesh (in appearance) and suffered in order to set an example of the resurrection” 88. The Son of God, according to the “Shepherd” in the work of Hermas of the same name, is not placed in a slave position, but has great power and authority 89.
It is easy to understand that Christian writers had just as little motive to speak about the humiliation and suffering of Jesus Christ and even about the incarnation of the Son of God in general, when over time they turned their word to the pagans and Jews, directing it against them in defense of the truth of the Christian faith. The main subject of Christian apologies was the deity of the eternal Son of God as the object of the Christian faith: the need to protect the latter from the attacks of pagans and Jews forced apologists to turn their thoughts not to the humiliation of Christ, but to His divine greatness, and made the subject of Christian writing exclusively the Logos - God the Word, and not the man Jesus, who became the Son of God in the incarnation.
Justin, philosopher and martyr, reveals to the pagans and Jews that Jesus, revered by Christians, was the Word who took on a visible form, that (and after the incarnation) He was in everything - entirely the Word, that as the Word He (and before the incarnation) acted in the entire - pagan and Jewish - world, that all the best in the pre-Christian world was the fruit of this activity, was made by people to the extent of their participation in the Logos, then partially revealed and fully revealed in Christianity, that He appeared to people many times and in many ways before His incarnation, that He is the Son of the true God, takes second place after Him, that after God who gave birth to Him, no one is equal to Him in power, that although He suffered and was in humiliation in fulfillment of prophecies, yet in this humiliation His power was already manifested, and His second coming will be even more glorious 90. Tatian, Theophilus of Antioch, Athenagoras in their works that have survived to us speak about God the Word, about His equality with God the Father, 91 but they do not speak about His incarnation, they do not say a word about His human humiliation.
b) Paganism and Judaism, which were hostile to Christ, not only rejected faith in Him, remaining external to Christianity, but, penetrating into the area of the Christian faith itself, they gave rise to heretical trends in Christian doctrine, in connection with (i.e. in opposition to) which the church definition of faith was developed. Illegitimate, on the basis of pagan and Jewish worldviews, teachings about the person of Jesus Christ, which arose already in the first century, but especially worried the church in the second and third centuries, can be summed up under two categories: firstly, teachings that denied the deity of Christ and are designated by the general name of Ebionism, and, secondly, teachings that rejected the reality of the incarnation and the truth of the human nature of Jesus Christ and are known by the general name of Docetism. The first teachings degenerated from Eastern Jewish ideas about the Divine, as infinitely distant from everything earthly and even throughout the opposite world, from those ideas according to which the suffering and limitations of earthly life are most alien and even disgusting to the Divine.
Man, according to the Eastern worldview, is only a shadow of existence; there really is one Almighty. Therefore, the humiliation of God could not take place at all in the system of the Eastern worldview. The second false teachings degenerated from paganism, more specifically, the type of Greek religion 92; Although it was accustomed by its mythologies to the idea of the appearances of the Divine in various visible and, in particular, human forms, it nevertheless understood these theophanies in the sense of random, only visible, apparent phenomena: by virtue of viewing matter as evil or, at least, as non-being, and on divine perfections as the same properties of human nature, only strengthened in degree and measure, freed from convention and limitation. The pagan God is the same man, but free from his limitations; He may appear in human form, but His actual incarnation would be a denial of His very divinity.
Therefore, Ebionism, denying the possibility of the incarnation of God, saw in Christ not God incarnate, but a man distinguished from others only by his moral purity and respected over others by the predominant dwelling of the Holy Spirit or divine power in him 93 ; on the contrary, Docetism looked at the suffering of Christ as apparent, illusory, as a deceptive shell under which the unlimited and inaccessible to suffering Divinity acted: Christ was a man only ἐν τῷ δοκεῖν 94 .
In the third century, Ebionism and Gnostic Docetism were transformed into monarchianism, which, despite its apparent closeness to Christianity, essentially consisted of the same elements of pre-Christian, pagan and Jewish worldviews; it developed in two forms - in the form of Ebionian monarchianism and in the form of docetic patripassianism. Antitrinitarians of the first direction recognized Jesus Christ as a simple man 95 who surpassed the prophets only in virtue 96 . The most prominent representative of this teaching was Paul of Samosata, who, contrary to church teaching, thought lowly and disrespectfully about Christ, presenting Him as an ordinary man by nature 97, and did not want to admit that the Son of God came down from heaven (τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ οὐ 98, but called the man Jesus the organ of the heavenly Logos, under whose influence he was gradually perfected 99, etc.
While the anti-Trinitarians of this trend continued the work of the Ebionites, anti-Trinitarians of another kind proceeded from the desire δοξάζειν τὸν Χριστὸν, to put Him in the closest relationship to God and to attribute His suffering to the divine nature. They achieved this by identifying the Father and the Son; they asserted ipsum patrem descendisse in virginem, ipsum ex ea natum, ipsum passum, ipsum esse Iesum Christum 100 etc. But to attribute suffering to the divine nature means either calling the divine nature passive, or recognizing suffering as fictitious. The same dilemma was made inevitable by the fact that the antitrinitarians we are talking about called the spirit in Christ the Father, but saw the Son only in the flesh; at the same time, they argued that the flesh suffered, but the spirit - the Father - had compassion. But the compassion of the spirit is either its suffering, which is absurd, or it is not suffering, but in this case it was fictitious 101. In any case, Docetism was inevitable.
The fight against these heretical trends was also not conducive to the revelation in Christian writing of the truth of God's condescension, revealed in the incarnation of the Son of God. Against Ebionism, it was necessary to testify to the deity of Jesus Christ and even to reveal the doctrine of the second person of the Holy Trinity, it was necessary to speak about the manifestation in His human life of the properties of the divine nature, about the glorification of humanity, which was based on the incarnation 102: “those who claim that Christ was just a man,” writes Irenaeus of Lyon, “remove man from the ascent to God and become ungrateful to the Word incarnate for them.” God's For for this purpose the Word of God became man and the Son of God the Son of man, so that man, united with the Son of God and receiving adoption as sons, would become the Son of God. For we could in no way receive incorruptibility and immortality if we were not united with incorruptibility and immortality” 103 and so on.
Against Docetism, it was necessary, pointing to the reality of Christ's humanity as a fact, to explain the truth of the affinity of man with the Divine 104 and to prove that the human image does not contain anything nasty and humiliating for the Divinity 105. True, monarchianism in the form of patripassianism gave place in its system to kenosis, according to which the heretics of this trend taught. The Divine is subject to suffering like the flesh. But obviously, this kenosis of the divine nature is contrary to the true teaching about the free ethical self-abasement of the Son of God 106. Therefore, church writers, in the fight against this trend of heretical unthinking, also strenuously put forward the truth that the divine nature, as dispassionate, was not involved in the suffering and death of Christ, that these were the sufferings of man, and not the Word, that these very sufferings, during which Christ was abandoned by the Father, this abandonment of Christ by the Father, this voice: My God, my God! Why have you left me? – all this showed that God was not involved in human suffering 107.
c) Finally, the pagan and Jewish worldviews, hostile to the idea of true condescension by God, also found their effect on representatives of the church teaching itself. One of the powerful weapons of paganism in its struggle with Christianity in the first centuries was philosophy - this highest fruit of pre-Christian history. Later, Christian writers themselves began to adopt the techniques and even the content of pagan philosophy to combat educated paganism. Another contemporary of Christ, the Jew Philo, in Alexandria, built a syncretic system of philosophy, in which he combined elements of the Old Testament revealed religion and pagan philosophy. (This experience has already shown that the revealed principles in the philosophical system acquire a pantheistic-dualistic character). Over time, Christian writers took the same path of agreement between the revealed principles of the Christian religion and pagan philosophy.
The union of the Christian faith with pagan science and the experiments in the philosophical systematization of Christian doctrine were confined mainly to Alexandria, this center of pagan enlightenment, in which the Christian Church had a school from the very first times. Already Panten was a teacher of both Christian doctrine and secular sciences; Clement was convinced that just as knowledge must be the believer, so faith must be knowledge; Origen gave experience in systematizing Christian doctrine. Clement and Origen were strongly influenced by Platonic-Philonian philosophy. This concession on the part of Christian learned writers had an unfavorable effect on their Christology: the latter is of a Gnostic-Docetic character.
This can be said about Clement, who taught that the body of Jesus Christ did not need food, that His wounds were not accompanied by a feeling of pain, and generally taught about the impassibility of the body of Jesus; this can be said about Origen, who taught that the body of Christ had a different appearance for the eyes of each person, that the baby Jesus possessed the fullness of wisdom, that the human soul of Christ first (before His incarnation) became perfect in order to then unite with the Logos, taught, finally, about the inequality of the Son of God with God the Father 108: the doctrine of the inequality of the Son with the Father, the docetic view of the humanity of Christ under the influence Platonic-Philonian philosophy, in the fight against Gnostic monarchianism, Origen hoped to make clear the union of the Logos with the human body.
d) Such were the conditions unfavorable for the revelation of the truth of God's condescension in Christian writing. Meanwhile, the very life of Christians over time made them very capable of perceiving this truth: long and difficult persecutions gradually cultivated in Christians a deep love for the humiliated image of Christ, whom they depicted in catacomb painting as a good shepherd, and in their chants they sang as the “quiet light” of the Heavenly Father. Persecuted and suffering Christians found support and encouragement in the suffering of Christ; their own suffering strengthened their faith in the suffering and death of Christ, presupposing it as their necessary basis: if Christ did not suffer, then what significance and meaning could the suffering of Christians have?
But these unfavorable conditions made it so that the truth of God’s condescension was expressed in Christian writing hymnologically, in the form of doxology, solemn glorification of God and the meek Christ, and exclusively in moral and preaching presentation in the form of instructions to Christians, and not in any way as a teaching about how in Christ God became man; and in such a hymnological form we find the expression of the idea of divine condescension more or less developed only at a later time; in the very first centuries it is given in Christian writing only sporadically, by chance. We find such sporadic sayings in Ignatius the God-Bearer, who, in the reality of the suffering of Christ and His death, saw the justification of his bonds and his desire for even greater torment, and drew from them strength that strengthened him in his own feat 109. Clement of Rome, in the humility of Jesus Christ, who came not in the splendor of splendor and power, as he could have done as a rod of divine majesty, but in a humble form, showed Christians a model to follow 110. Author of the last
to Diognetus stops in awe of the greatness of the love of the invisible God, Who sent the very artist and creator of everything to people, not in order to bring fear and horror to them, but with goodness and meekness, and draws from here the appropriate moral conclusions 111. The expression of the idea of kenosis in individual sayings, sometimes not logically connected with the whole system of teaching 112, is also found in Irenaeus, Tertullian and Origen 113.
4th century teachings on the self-abasement of Jesus Christ
a) Already before the 4th century, two types had developed in resolving the question of the relationship of the divine to the human in Christ. According to one type, they proceeded from the humanity of Jesus Christ, considering divinity in Him as a predicate - they affirmed the freedom and reality of suffering, but did not give room in Christology for the concept of humiliation. In another way, the unity in Christ of divinity and humanity was put in first place, so that they proceeded from divinity, considering humanity to be a predicate; they insisted on the self-abasement of divinity, but looked docetically at humanity. We encounter the same two types of Christology in the 4th century: the first found its representative in the person of Arius, the second in Apollinaris.
Arius, a student of the Antiochian school, is Paul of Samosata of the 4th century. Regarding the holy places Scriptures, the content of which is the self-abasement of Jesus Christ, to the eternal Son of God, the Arians rejected His deity and inexpressible glory 114. They said that there was once a time when there was no Son of God, that He was born later, without existing before, and that, whenever that was, only He received being in the same way as every man 115; saying that God created everything from the non-existent, they included the Son of God in the ranks of all creations and consistently asserted that His nature is changeable and can perceive both good and evil 116. The Arians asserted with complete seriousness the truth of the human nature of Christ; they understood in the most decisive sense (Luke 2:48, 52) His sufferings, ignorance and, finally, His glorification from God the Father.
But, considering the Logos not consubstantial with God the Father and attributing human infirmities directly to Him, even in the sense that they put Him in the place of the human soul, they saw in the conditionality of earthly life not the free humiliation of the Logos, but the natural path to perfection, to glory. Arius had numerous followers, strict and non-strict. But Photinus should be recognized as his brother in Christology, according to whose teaching the man Jesus, through moral self-improvement, achieved divine dignity and adoption by God (adoptionism).
b) Apollinaris appears before us as an opponent of Arianism and an ardent defender of “consistency”, as driven by two interests: 1) to establish the truth of the unity of theanthropic life 117 so that humiliation and suffering are attributed to God Himself, and not to a being less than God, and to substantiate the sinlessness of Jesus Christ as necessary (non posse peccare), in contrast to the Arian doctrine of variability and ability Logos to the fall (τρεπτος); 2) to substantiate the affinity of the divine and human in contrast to the Arians, who proceeded from the separation of the divine world and the human world, requiring a mediator (Logos). Apollinaris makes the basic axiom that two perfect things (meaning by perfect that which is complete in relation to its nature) cannot unite into one: where God is, there is no man, and where man is, there is no God 118. Therefore, if God were united with man, perfect with perfect, then there would be not one, but two - two sons, one by nature, the other by adoption 119.
In addition, if the humanity of Christ were complete and had a mind, then in Christ there would be a sinful struggle and He would have a need for purification 120. So, Apollinaris concludes, God can become a man without ceasing to be God 121 only in the sense that He takes the place of the mind in man 122. Thus, the Son of God was the direct subject of all human phenomena, actions and states. “The Savior endured hunger, thirst, labor, languor and sorrow... God endured all this... That which is inaccessible to suffering suffers, not because of the necessity of involuntary nature, but because of the consequence of nature” 123. “It was necessary to be moved to suffer, in the likeness of people” 124. “The expressions that signify suffering do not belong to man from the earth, but to God who came down from heaven; what was received into union with Him belonged not to man from the earth, but to God who came down from heaven” 125.
Briefly put in the words of Gregory of Nyssa, “the whole purpose of the work of Apollinaris ὁμοίωσιν ἀνθρώπου) is aimed at proving that the deity of the only begotten Son is mortal, and that it was not humanity that accepted suffering in Him, but the impassive and unchangeable nature was changed to participate in suffering” 126.
The fact that the Logos took the place of the mind in man not only made human suffering His own, but also gave the flesh the significance of His organ. Our appearance served in Christ only as an instrument for God, His shell 127; the divinity of Christ was related to His humanity, as in us the soul is related to the body 128. The humiliation, therefore, consisted in the fact that Christ, being God in spirit and possessing the glory of God, became a man in body and bore the inglorious image of man 129.
In addition to such incompleteness of human nature, which allowed him to be a simple instrument, the outer shell of deity, the possibility of incarnation and the unity of the natures of Christ in Apollinaris are explained by the predisposition of the Son of God to physicality: Jesus Christ was a man who descended from heaven 130. No matter how this point of the teaching of Apollinaris is understood, in any case, he calls the flesh of Jesus Christ uncreated, heavenly, consubstantial with the Divinity, co-essential and co-natural with Him 131, then God is called existing in the flesh before the ages: ἔνσαρκος θεὸς πρὸ αἰώνων 132 , σάρκινος θεὸς 133 . All this expresses Apollinaris's thought about the affinity of the divine and the human 134; he, in the words of Gregory of Nyssa, “made God and man one nature” 135. The union of divinity and humanity that took place under such conditions in Christ was so close that the flesh became one person and one living being with the Lord 136 .
c) The struggle against Arianism and Apollinarism, which filled the entire fourth century, was also unfavorable for the development of the idea of kenosis in patristic writing. True, the question raised by Arianism, in its essence and in its factual side, should in its answer lead to the doctrine of kenosis. Thus, Athanasius against the Arians sometimes reveals the idea of divine condescension 137. But with other interests (namely, the explanation of the mystery of the Holy Trinity), Arianism distracted the Orthodox from a thorough disclosure of the idea of divine condescension; then the conclusions to which the Arians came (the non-divinity of Jesus Christ, His inconsistency with God the Father) drew the attention of the Orthodox to the primary revelation of the glory of Christ, and not his infirmities; Mainly, the reception of Apollinaris, as an extreme expression of the self-abasement of Jesus Christ, diverted the Orthodox from the same path. It goes without saying that the fight against Apollinarism, precisely as the abuse of the idea of kenosis, was also unfavorable for the development of this idea.
In the fight against Arianism, Orthodox writers were first required to reveal the truth of the consubstantiality of His only begotten Son with God the Father, to present the doctrine of the deity of the actual eternal Son of God, of His immutability, omnipotence and other properties of His divine nature. This task so absorbed the attention of the defenders of Orthodox teaching that they also touched upon the Incarnation in connection with this task insofar as the divine properties of the Son of God were preserved in it and “His divinity was not diminished.” Holy places The Scriptures, in which the truth of the self-abasement of the Son of God is revealed, Orthodox writers, of course, did not pass over in silence; but they mainly tried to show, contrary to the Arians, that all derogatory expressions are sacred. The Scriptures refer specifically to humanity, which was accepted by the Son of God, that they do not humiliate His deity, that the humiliation of the incarnation rather served to glorify and even deify humanity, as Gregory the Theologian often expressed. The Word as the image of a servant (Phil.
2:7) condescends to fellow servants and servants, puts on an alien image, representing in Himself all of me and everything that is mine, in order to drain my worst in Himself (ἵ να ἐν ἑαυτοῷ δαπανήσον τὸ χεῖρον), like how fire destroys wax or the sun destroys the earth's vapor, and so that through union with Him I can partake of what is characteristic of Him 138: this is how the right-minded opponents of Arianism looked at the humiliation of the incarnation. From the same angle they viewed and in the same sense explained all the passages cited by the Arians as support for their false teaching. Considering “each of these sayings,” they “explained them in a pious sense”: The Word entered into communion with the flesh and became man, but in Him the common man became God, - He was born human, but of the Virgin, - born human, born divine, - He was wrapped in swaddling clothes, but, having been resurrected, laid aside the graveclothes, - He was baptized as a man, but absolved sins as God - He was tempted like a man, but conquered like God 139, and so on.
The sublime and speculative, deep and abstract words about the theology of Gregory the Theologian are a characteristic example and precious fruit of the struggle of the theologians of the brilliant fourth century with Arianism. Gregory talked about God the Word. We also need to add here consubstantial (ὁμοούσιος), similarity (ὁμοιος), co-existent (ὁμοιούσιος), non-subsisting (ἑτεροούσιος), section, division, resolution and etc., in order to have an idea of the content of the Arian disputes. A subtle analysis of all the Arian intricacies and objections is given in the work of Basil the Great, Refutation of the defensive speech of the evil Eunomius 140. But, analyzing the places of St. The Scriptures in which the humiliation of Jesus Christ is revealed, the author of the fourth book of this polemical work under the ignorance of the Son (Matthew 24:36) means only silence about what He knew - the words of the prayer of Gethsemane (Matthew 27:46) mean not about Christ, but about those who had sinned against Him 141, etc.
d) And Christian writers had to endure such abstract disputes with the Arians at a time when the consciousness of Christians through three centuries of persecution was sufficiently accustomed to the truth of divine condescension, when the moral and practical significance of the self-abasement of Jesus Christ was even very clearly recognized by Christians. “Everyone,” writes Macarius the Great, “everyone who wants to become the Son of God must first humble himself in His likeness, be considered unwise and dishonest, and not turn his face away from spitting” 142 and so on. Moreover, as has been said, the question raised by Arianism related to the self-abasement of Jesus Christ. Therefore, it is easy to understand that the Orthodox writers of the 4th century who fought against Arianism were deeply imbued with the idea of divine self-abasement, but the circumstances of the time were not favorable and prevented them from dwelling on this idea and revealing it consistently.
In one of his words against the Arians, Athanasius explains that the Word became man, and did not descend into man, 143 that He bore the infirmities of the flesh as His own, 144 that it was fitting for the Lord to put on perfect flesh and accept the sufferings inherent in it 145. But immediately after this, his speech turns, at the request of polemics, not to the humiliation of the Son of God, but to the deification of humanity in Him, to the immutability of divinity 146 and so on. A similar attitude to the idea of kenosis is found in the Western fighter against Arianism, Hilary: some scholars 147 see in him the crudest docetism, others 148 find in him a brilliant expression of the idea of kenosis.
f) There is no doubt that Hilary attached significant importance to the idea of kenosis in explaining the mystery of the incarnation. He understood the humiliation of Jesus Christ in the incarnation as a change in the image of God to the image of a servant with the unity of the person of the Son of God incarnate 149. The remarkable position of Hilary’s Christological system is the idea that the humiliation of Jesus Christ was at the same time the glorification of God: for people, perfection and glory are in progress, in moving forward, while divine glory is revealed in external humiliation 150. But along with this, Hilary teaches that the suffering of Jesus Christ was valid only in appearance and in the only sense that any other person in the place of Jesus Christ under similar conditions would have experienced suffering, but Christ, apparently suffering, did not experience the pain of suffering and was inaccessible to them, just as fire is inaccessible to a blow 151. Likewise, according to Hilary, Christ ate and drank not because he felt thirst and hunger, but because He adapted to the human way of life 152.
f) The shortcomings of Apollinaris's Christology, which formed the subject of polemics among the Orthodox, are the following: 1) according to its meaning, either the deity in Christ was subject to suffering, or everything visible in Him was imaginary and not true 153; 2) if Christ did not have a human mind, then He did not have human freedom, and therefore the flesh did not freely participate in virtue and appropriate itself to God 154. However, Apollinaris's teaching about pre-eternal humanity gave the Orthodox a reason to speak in defense of the idea of kenosis 155.
g) The results to which the long-term and persistent struggle of the church came with the heretical trends of Ebionism and Docetism, Arianism and Apollinarianism were expressed in the creed of the councils of Nicaea (325), directed against Arius, and of Constantinople (381), which had in mind the teachings of Apollinaris, in any case, which approved and supplemented the creed of the Council of Nicaea with a more strengthened expression of reality humanity of Jesus Christ. The main provisions of the creed developed at these councils are: 1) the truth of the trinity of persons of the one essence of God and 2) the truth of two natures in Christ.
The doctrine of the Holy Trinity of divine persons, as is obvious in itself, constitutes the cornerstone of Orthodox Christology. Therefore, all the later presentations of the first two ecumenical councils of the doctrine of the face of Christ, for example, the dogmatic epistles of Agathon and Sophronius, begin with the church teaching about the Holy Trinity 156.
Along with the trinity of divine persons, the fathers of the First and Second Ecumenical Councils confirmed the reality of two natures in Christ, divine and human: they confessed Him, on the one hand, as the Son of God, consubstantial with the Father, and on the other, descended from heaven, became incarnate, suffered, and was buried. The reality of the two natures in Christ serves as another fundamental truth in the doctrine of the person of Jesus Christ and, in particular, in the doctrine of kenosis 157.
The teaching of Cyril of Alexandria on the self-abasement of Jesus Christ in connection with the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia
a) Cyril’s Christology developed in the struggle against Nestorianism and cannot be considered without connection with the latter. But Nestorius was a preacher of the teachings of Theodore of Mopsuestia, the most prominent representative of “Nestorianism,” as a well-known theological direction of the Antiochian school.
Theodore of Mopsuestia set the main goal of his Christology to clarify the fullness and free moral development of the human nature of Christ Jesus. In this case, he first of all remained faithful to the historical and grammatical direction of the Antiochian school in the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. Scriptures: He was a brilliant representative of this school. In particular, his Christology was determined by the fight against Apollinarianism; he was an ardent opponent of the Laodicean bishop. Theodore of Mopsuestia, like Apollinaris, proceeded from the Nicene creed - from the truth of the two-natural life of Christ. But his exclusive attention was directed to the fullness of human nature; he even argued that in Christ God did not become incarnate, but united with man. The Son of God was united with the Son of man. In Christ Jesus, according to his teaching, there were originally two persons and two sons, who over time were united into one person and one son: in the one born of St.
Virgin to the man Jesus - why is she in the proper sense (τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματος) the mother of man (ἀνθρωποτόκος) and only in the improper (τῇ ἀναφορ ᾷ) Mother of God (θεοτόκος) 158, - the Son of God, the Logos, acted, dwelling in him by good will 159. This dwelling gradually degenerated into a closer union, by virtue of which two natures and two sons produced one person and one son, precisely by union 160. This combination did not destroy the differences of natures so much that each of them, not only divine, but also human, remains perfect and therefore not impersonal 161. The unity of united natures is similar to that in which a husband and wife abide 162. Therefore, we can say that the Logos took on flesh, but it cannot be said that the Logos became flesh 163. The transition of the habitation given at birth into a closer union of the Logos and Jesus was determined by the moral improvement of Jesus 164. The moral perfection of the man Jesus has very important significance in the Christological system of Theodore of Mopsuestia.
At the same time, he believed that the human nature of Christ was subject to (moral) temptation and variability, 165 that the man Jesus achieved perfection freely, by struggling with temptations, through a completely human moral experience: the human freedom of Jesus Christ was the beginning and end of the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia.
The preacher of the Christological views of the Antiochian school, who drew general church attention to them, was Nestorius, who gave this Christology his name. The struggle was primarily associated with the name “Christ Mother,” as Nestorius called St. Maria.
The content of objections to this Christology on the part of Orthodox writers is easily determined by the striking discrepancy between its church dogma. This Christology 1) undermines the entire work of our redemption, since it names the common man as our savior; 2) it does not give place to the actual incarnation of God, and even more so 3) it contradicts the idea of divine condescension 166. It was primarily from this latter point of view that Cyril Alex viewed and rejected Antiochian Christology. “If,” he writes, “the only begotten Son of God (τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος), as our opponents think, - having received man from the most wonderful David and Abraham, contributed to his formation (in the womb) of St. The Virgin, united him with himself, brought him to death and, having raised him from the dead, raised him to heaven and seated him at the right hand of God, then in vain, as it seems, they taught St. Fathers, we ourselves and all the inspired Scripture teach that He became man, because this, I think, and nothing else, is what the wise John means when he says that the Word became flesh.
In this case, the whole mystery of the economy in the flesh is, of course, completely overthrown, because it is not visible that, according to their teaching. The Son of God, being God by nature and having come from God, allowed Himself to be exhausted, taking the form of a servant, and humbled Himself, but quite the opposite (according to the meaning of their Christology) man is exalted to divine glory and to superiority over all, accepted the image of God and is exalted to sit on the throne with the Father” 167. Elsewhere, precisely in defending the tenth anathematism against Theodoret, whom Cyril suspected of being a Nestorian, he further develops the significance of the idea of kenosis for understanding the mystery of the incarnation, in defense of his Christology and in refuting the Christology of the “Easterns”, which did not correspond to this idea. Bearing in mind those who “say that a person is perceived by God as the Word - through an internal disposition or spiritual affinity,” and counting Theodoret among them, Cyril asks him: “or do you think that St.
Paul deceives those who are sanctified through faith by speaking very clearly about the Only Begotten: He, being rich, became poor for your sakes (2 Cor. 8:9)? No. The herald of truth speaks the perfect truth. But who is rich, and how did he become poor? Let us also ask: if a person is accepted by God, then how does one become poor, one who is adorned with supernatural riches? For he is glorified!.. He who is accepted is not poor. So, it remains to be said that he who is rich like God has become poor like us. So, how did you become poor?.. Where do we see the assumption of height? Is it really that He perceived someone similar to us? And what kind of exhaustion and impoverishment is there in that one who wanted to honor a person like us? The God of all is by no means humbled through goodness. So, how did you become poor? Because, being God and the Son of God the Father, he became man, being born in the flesh from the seed of David, taking on the form of slavery, that is, humanity - He who was in the form of God and the Father, in whom and through whom are all things, who is the Creator of all things. But, having become a man, He is not ashamed of humanity.
For whoever did not disdain to become a man like us, how will he be ashamed of the fact that he could actually become like us for our sake? If we remove human relationships and names from Him, then we will in no way differ from those who strip the flesh from Him. But perhaps someone will say that it is unworthy and humiliating for God the Word to shed tears, to fear death, to avoid the cup, to be a high priest? True, I myself will say that this in itself is incompatible with the divine and superior nature and glory; but in this we contemplate the poverty that He voluntarily suffered for us. If the 168 ignominy of exhaustion seems so low to you, then you should be all the more amazed at the divine love for you. What you call derogatory, He did voluntarily for your sake” 169. We read something similar in Cyril’s letter to the Egyptian monks, in this first monument to his struggle with Nestorius. Here is Cyril, explaining Phil.
2 in the sense of the humiliation of the Son of God, rejects the Nestorian opinion that humiliation consisted only in the dwelling of the Son of God in man, and writes that it consisted in His very incarnation and His assimilation of everything human 170.
b) Cyril of Alexandria was the most prominent defender and exponent of church teaching about the person of Jesus Christ in the church’s struggle against Nestorianism. In the long and heated debates about the relationship between the two natures in Christ, which arose due to Nestorius’s wrong-thinking and which were fruitful in revealing Orthodox teaching, Cyril took not only a tirelessly active, but also a leading part. “Almost the entire dispute about faith,” he himself wrote 171, “has been raised because of us, since we constantly assert that St. The Virgin is the Mother of God." Therefore, the abundant dogmatic works of Cyril as an exponent of church teaching are very important, first of all, for elucidating in general the mystery of the theanthropic life of Christ. But at the same time, the writings of this great Alexandrian bishop occupy an exceptional place in the history of the teachings on the self-abasement of Jesus Christ. Kirill undoubtedly holds the honor of being the first – both in time and in perfection – to consistently disclose the idea of kenosis.
His entire Christological system is based on this idea and is permeated by it. His deeply meaningful and systematically revealed teaching about the relationship of the two natures in Christ is nothing more than the Orthodox teaching about the self-abasement of Jesus Christ.
Historical circumstances were already favorable to such a construction of Christology. We understand the struggle of the church with Nestorianism. What was the point of this fight? The result of the Arian disputes was the most decisive affirmation of both the divine dignity of Jesus Christ, which the heretics belittled, attributing “derogatory sayings” to His deity, and His human nature, to which the Orthodox attributed “derogatory sayings.” The task of further revealing Christology was to reconcile the divine dignity with the reality of the suffering of Christ. Here, as in reality, two extremes were possible: Apollinarism, which attributed suffering to the deity himself, thus making it fictitious, and Nestorianism, which, strenuously exposing the reality of human nature, separated it from the divine, making human suffering completely alien to the deity.
Orthodox writers, the successors of Gregory the Theologian, Basil the Great, Athanasius of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, now had to, according to the demands of the time, talk about the assimilation of real human suffering to God, without falling into the extremes of Apollinarism and Nestorianism 172. In particular, it was inevitable for the representative of Alexandrian theology in the fight against Nestorianism to take this ground, in which the roots of the doctrine of the self-abasement of the Son of God were affirmed. We have already seen how the idea of kenosis found application in Cyril's polemics against Nestorianism.
The exponent of the needs of the time was a man exceptionally capable of solving the task ahead of him. How deeply Cyril was imbued with the consciousness of the amazing divine condescension revealed in the incarnation of the Son of God is clear from the fact that in the language of his works the expressions “condescension”, “exhaustion” are completely replaced by the words “incarnation”, “incarnation”, and that these expressions, as well as similar ones, are used by him not only very often, like no other church writer, but even occur in those cases when he only needs to point out a fact incarnations; he even takes every opportunity to either expressively point out the truth of God’s condescension, or to clarify it in some way. Thus, discussing the symbolic meaning of the mandrakes, which were found by Reuben and divided equally by Leah and Rachel, Cyril notes that the mandrakes “fortunefully point to the mystery of Christ, in some way falling asleep for us and allowing Himself to be exhausted even to death” 173.
Speaking in another place about the fact that Moses, having reached age, went out to his brethren (Ex. 2:11), and applying this coming of Moses to the appearance of the Son of God, he writes: “Do we not agree with the fact that the Word born of God the Father became like us, that is, became a man, in some way came out of Himself, became outside the divine glory, if it is true that Christ, being rich, became poor (2 Cor. 8:9) and made Himself of no reputation (Phil. 2:7)?... What then? Could not the Lord of heaven and earth, as God, who by nature has power over everything, come out of Himself, appearing in the form of a slave? Couldn’t he, even if only for a short time, part with that which most befits Him” 174? Then, seeing in Moses’ vision of the fireproof bush a foreshadowing of the sacrament of Christ, the exegete explains the meaning of the vision as follows: “to the fire of St. Scripture likens the divine nature for the reason that it is omnipotent and can easily overcome everything; He likens man to the trees and grass of the field, who came from the earth. But just as fire is unbearable for thorns, so is deity for humanity.
However, in Christ it became bearable (ἐν Χριστῷ συνέβη καὶ γέγονεν οἰστή), because in Him dwells all the fullness of the deity bodily, as the wise Paul testified (Col. 2:9). And He who dwells in the inaccessible light (1 Tim. 6:16), that is, God, dwelt in the church of the Virgin, descending to the point of wondrous meekness and, as it were, softening the invincible power of His nature, in order to be accessible to us, just as fire became bearable for thorns” 175. Not only in the interpretation of Isa. 53:2–3) 176, but even in a defensive speech to Emperor Theodosius, Cyril turns his thoughts to divine meekness, wanting in the latter case to present a model of action for the emperor: “the divine and immortal nature, which rules over everything, which lives in the unapproachable light.... before which creatures fear and tremble, is a nature so glorious and worthy of extreme surprise, and has condescension equal to the greatness of his superiority and ineffable power" 177.
Briefly, through all of Cyril’s writings, both exegetical and polemical-dogmatic, both early and later, one conviction equally consistently and persistently runs through one conviction: “the whole mystery of the economy consists in the exhaustion and humiliation of the Son of God” 178. This conviction of Cyril has a significant, and not accidental, significance and a central, not a side position in his entire Christological system: it lies at the basis of his Christological views, which, moreover, are imprinted by the character of as much genius 179 as harmony and consistency 180.
c) The most general and most significant thing in Cyril’s understanding of the mystery of the appearance of the Son of God in the flesh is that in the incarnation of the Son of God, he first of all saw nothing other than the great work of God’s condescension. He understood the mystery of incarnation, or God-manhood, in its truest, most literal sense. According to Cyril's faith, God Himself, the Son of God, became man, or flesh. Cyril saw the great and exceptional work of God’s love, revealed in the incarnation of the Son of God, in the fact that God Himself condescended to human baseness and took upon Himself the measure of humanity. He made our insignificance his own. This general meaning of the Christology of the great Alexandrian father is more often expressed in his teaching about the unity of the person of Jesus Christ, about the assimilation by the Son of God of everything human, except for sin, about the fullness of the humanity of Jesus Christ and his infirmities.
The insistence with which Cyril asserted the unity of the person in Jesus Christ and precisely the divine person of the Son of God was determined by his view of the incarnation as a divine condescension. If the incarnation of the Son of God was the work of His condescension to human baseness, then it is understandable only in the sense that the Son of God Himself in His own divine person was the bearer of humanity perceived by Him, so that the latter did not have its own special center except the face of the Son of God, His hypostasis (ἔνωσις καθ ’ ὑπόστασιν). Therefore, the complete opposite of Cyril’s Christology is, in essence, the Christology of the Antiochene school. “We worship not two sons,” writes Cyril, “in Christ Jesus, and we do not confess two Christs; we believe in one Emmanuel, in whom perfect man and God the Word were united... We do not establish a duality of sons (υἱῶν δυάδα), but we say that God is one and the same by nature, since he came from the very essence of God and the Father, and in the last times became man (γενόμενον ἄνθρωπον) and was born from St.
Virgin and serves as the object of our worship, as well as St. angels" 181. That's why St. The Virgin is called the Mother of God 182. The mystery of the incarnation was not the elevation of man to deity, or even the infusion of God alone into man. It cannot be said that the Word, which is from God, dwelt in the one born of St. Virgins, as in an ordinary person, cannot imagine Christ as a God-bearing man (θεοφόρος ἄνθρωπος) 183. The Son of God did not dwell in man, as one in another (ὡ ς ἕ τερος ἐν ἑτέρ ῳ), but He Himself became man. That is why the voice from heaven did not say: in Him is My beloved Son, but this is My beloved Son (Matthew 3:17) 184. The same Word, which inexpressibly came from God the Father, was also born from a woman 185, so that there is one Son and one Lord Jesus Christ both before taking flesh and after the incarnation 186. One and the same exists from eternity and is born in time according to the flesh. He who is holy by divine nature, the same sanctified Himself with us, when He appeared as a man to whom it is proper to be sanctified.
Who, as the Lord, by nature has the highest dignity, the same one appeared in the form of a servant, which was adopted by Him, and therefore called His Father God and was quickened by the Father 187. So, Emmanuel should not be divided into a separate person and God of the Word 188: one and the same God and man 189.
According to the teachings of Cyril of Alexandria, in Christ it was not man who was united with God, but God Himself took upon Himself human nature 190 - He took it in His own person (ἐν ἰδί ῳ προσώπ ῳ) 191 so that it did not have a separate personal existence, but was His own nature 192. He took upon Himself humanity and everything human, except sin 193. This attitude of the incarnate Son of God to human nature is denoted by Cyril by the term οἰκείωσις: “The Word assimilates our nature to Himself when it becomes like us” 194. This assimilation by the Son of God of all manifestations of human life consisted of the self-abasement of the incarnation. The humanity of Jesus Christ with all its properties, in all stages of its development, in all forms of its appearance, was the own humanity of the Son of God 195. By virtue of this saving assimilation, not only everything divine, but also everything human belonged to one and the same Christ, the Son of God: and Cyril did not separately refer derogatory sayings either to two beings or to two persons, but to one Christ, the Son of God.
“If it is necessary to believe that the true God by nature became flesh, that is, a man animated by a rational soul, then what reason does anyone have to be ashamed of such His sayings, which would be fitting for a person? If He refused to speak in a manner befitting a man, who would force Him to become a man like us? And when for our sake He brought Himself down into voluntary humiliation, then for what reason did He refuse to utter words befitting humiliation? So, all the sayings contained in the Gospels must be attributed to a single person, to a single incarnate hypostasis of the Word” 196. In particular, the Son of God adopted for Himself the gradual growth characteristic of man: of course, the divine nature had no need for growth and prosperity, but He, through economic assimilation (κατ ’ οἰκείωσιν οἰκονομικὴν), made His ( ἑαυτοῦ πεποίηται τὰ ἴδια τῆς σαρκὸς ) 197 .
Also, finally, the sufferings by which we were redeemed were the own sufferings of the Son of God: He suffered not with the divine nature, but with his own flesh ( σαρκί) 198, so that God suffered for us with his own flesh 199. Thus, the reality of the incarnation of the Son of God coincided with the reality of His assimilation of everything human: the question of the reality of the incarnation for Cyril comes down to the question of the relationship of Jesus Christ to the human appearance He took upon Himself - and precisely about the relationship of assimilation. This particular part of Christology deserves special attention - it stands in connection with the whole system, and, as we will see, it explains some other particulars. For the Son of God, humanity was not only an external form accepted for the sake of deceptive appearance, but, as acquired by Him, it was true, inconspicuous. Is it possible to call such a significant and obvious economy (incarnation) a ghostly phenomenon?
We do not exist ghostly, but live in bodies that can be touched and seen, and, clothed with this earthly flesh, we are subject to destruction and passions. Therefore, if the Word did not become flesh and did not suffer in temptations, then He cannot help those who are tempted, and His sufferings did not bring us any benefit. Does the shadow suffer (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν τι πάθοι σκιά) 200?
The incarnation of the Son of God was, according to the teachings of Cyril, valid, since He took upon Himself our flesh, our nature. But did the Son of God take on our entire nature? Yes, the Alexandrian bishop answers, “The Word, having become incarnate, took on human nature in all its fullness, or perfection.” Cyril persistently developed the truth of the fullness of Christ's human nature in contrast to the teachings of Apollinaris. He, in his own words, never thought the same with Apollinaris and always taught that the body of Jesus Christ was not alien to the soul and mind 201: with the opinion of Apollinaris, he writes, we have nothing in common 202. In the incarnation, the Son of God took on not only human flesh, but flesh inspired by a rational soul, so that he was truly born of a woman, lived on earth and existed as a man. Just as He was perfect in divinity, so He became perfect in humanity. Christ was formed not from divinity and flesh only, but from two perfect natures, divine and human 203.
But the fullness of human nature also includes its weaknesses. Did the Son of God take upon Himself, along with our nature and its weaknesses? And Kirill answers this question decisively in the affirmative. In addition to polemical interests, Cyril’s persistent teaching about the fullness of the human nature of Christ was prompted by part of his views (common patristic) on the work of our salvation, for the fulfillment of which Christ had to accept the whole man, and mainly by his desire to depict in all its depth the self-abasement of the Son of God. Cyril, in contemplating the mystery of the Incarnation, took a point of view for which human infirmities, as perceived by the Son of God, serve as proof of His extreme loving condescension, for which they do not constitute a difficulty in understanding the mystery of Christ, but a confirmation of the reality of the Incarnation.
That is why Cyril does not forget a single natural property in the human nature of Christ, since each forms a source of special suffering, not a single relationship, since each causes one or another weakness; in particular, Cyril considers the question of the reality of the soul, as an integral part of the human nature of Christ, in connection with the question of infirmities. Along with the flesh, the Son of God, through the economy and humiliation of the incarnation, also acquired the infirmities of the flesh 204; but for the best part of our nature, that is, for the soul, His labors would have brought no benefit if they had been directed only to one body. Therefore, the mystery of the economy was well accomplished through both.
He used His own flesh as an instrument and performed carnal deeds through it - He was not alien to physical infirmities and everything that does not deserve blame ( μὲν ἰδί ᾳ σαρκὶ , πρὸς τὰ σαρκὸς ἔργα τε καὶ ἀ ῤῥ ωσιήματα φυσικὰ καὶ ὄσα μώμου μακράν); and again, through His own human soul, human, although only immaculate, affects were accessible to Him ( καὶ ἀνυπαίτια πάθη – affecfiones). It is said about Him that He thirsted, experienced hardships from a long journey, was subjected to confusion and fear, sadness and grief 205. Having assimilated to Himself everything human, the Son of God, possessing omniscience like God, but not despising measures of humiliation, appeared to the ignorant as well as subject to the need for sleep and fatigue 206. Not only that. Having become a man and descending to humiliation in his external state, He called the Father God, appeared with us subordinate to God, according to the law to which human nature is subject 207, and, finally, submitted to the law of death 208.
To put it briefly, by becoming incarnate, the Son of God experienced our weaknesses 209 .
d) So, the Son of God, having become incarnate, truly became man, λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. But what happened to the deity of the Son of God? Various answers are possible to this question when looking at the incarnation of the Son of God as self-abasement, in the sense of Cyril’s teaching; in other words, this view does not yet exhaust the entire mystery of the incarnation, even to the extent accessible to man. This view may cause a variety of answers to the proposed question. First of all, different answers are possible to the question of whether the incarnation of the Son of God was the humiliation of His very deity, the divine nature, so that He, having become incarnate, ceased to be God, or the humiliation of the incarnation related only to the external manifestation of the deity and did not extend to the deity itself, so that He became a man without ceasing to be God. In the case of the first answer (not to mention now the second), it is possible either to understand the matter in such a way that kenosis extended to the entire divine nature of the Son of God, or in such a way that He became incarnate according to His one hypostasis, that humiliation applied only to the person of the Son of God, and not to nature.
In this last view, two sides are easily distinguishable: first, that the Son of God was incarnate only by hypostasis, that, in other words, the divine nature was not incarnate; second, that the incarnation was the humiliation of hypostasis. When presenting this view, you can pay attention to one side or the other, but when analyzing it, an answer on both sides is inevitable.
Cyril reveals his view of the deity of Jesus Christ not only positively, but also negatively, in the form of an analysis of opinions that he recognized as false. Thus, he rejects the opinion that the incarnation of the Son of God was a humiliation, in the literal sense kenosis, devastation, abolition of His divinity, and above all the form of this opinion in which such kenosis extended to the hypostasis of the Son of God. He writes against those who believe that the Son of God, when he became man and lived on earth, was in His divine dignity co-essential with the Father πατρί), but was no longer co-inherent with Him by hypostasis (καθ ’ ὑπόστασιν δὲ, οὐκ ἔτι), that His divine essence remained in heaven, in the divine sphere, or form of being, co-inherent with the Father, and His filial hypostasis was entirely was humiliated, came out of the womb for what reason αὐτῶν τῶν πατρικῶν κόλπων), lost her presence in heaven (ὁ υἱὸς κεκένωκε τῆς αὐτοῦ παρουσίας τὸν οὐρανόν ).
This opinion, as explained by Cyril, is false in that it presupposes the limitation of the hypostatic existence of the deity, which assumption is soon given ad absurdum. In fact, if His Son, consubstantial with the Father, had become incarnate, was no longer present in heaven, but lived only among earthly beings, then with equal right it could be said that the Father does not dwell on earth hypostatically (ἡ γῆ κενὴ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποστάσεως), but only in heaven, since He did not incarnate. In reality it is not like that. The Father abides in the Son, the Lord fills earth and heaven: together with the Father, Christ, born of Him by nature, fills everything. The Divine hypostasis is not limited, and the Son is consubstantial with the Father. Then, this opinion, while outwardly depicting the mutual relationship of the Father and the Son, outwardly, and therefore falsely, represents the relationship of the hypostasis of the Son to His divine essence. The born man exists separately from his father; but the Son of God, born from the essence of the Father, does not exist outside of Him, but from Him and in Him, therefore, His hypostasis is inseparable from the divine essence 210.
From here two conclusions follow: the first is that the hypostasis of the Son, as divine, cannot be humiliated, abolished or limited in an externally mechanical sense; the second is that the Son of God could not be incarnate only by His hypostasis, but was also incarnate according to His Divine nature.
In another form, the opinion about the humiliation of the deity of the Son of God extends kenosis not only to the hypostasis of the Son, but also to His divine essence, to His deity itself; according to this opinion, the only begotten Word of God, having become incarnate, left heaven according to His nature ( οὐρανούς ). Kirill rejects this opinion too. To speak of such a limitation (to one earthly region) of the divine nature of the Son of God, according to his reasoning, means nothing more than to measure it quantitatively and consider it limited in the same (material) sense in which limitation is applicable to physical bodies. This opinion, further, shares the error of the Arians: calling the Son of God God, but depriving Him of divine dignity, it thereby reduces the Creator to the level of a creature. In reality it is not like that. The kenosis of the incarnation did not extend to the divine nature, it was not a humiliation of the very essence of the Son of God. And at the time when the Son of God was on earth in human form, the heavens were filled with His deity, because He did not cease to be God 211.
In contrast to the first false opinion, Cyril claims that the Son of God was incarnate not only by hypostasis, but also by His divine nature 212. Having become incarnate, the Son of God did not cease to be God, 213 so that the flesh and humanity of Jesus Christ were the flesh and humanity of God. We were baptized into God incarnate 215, God was in a form similar to us and the Lord in the form of a servant 216, the Father’s Word itself suffered in the flesh for our sake 217, etc.
In contrast to the second opinion, Cyril teaches that the divine nature is unchangeable, that the Son of God was therefore incarnate in all His divine nature. During the incarnation of the Son of God, His divine nature did not diminish or change, because the divine nature is stable and unchangeable. God is above all change 218. “God the Word,” writes Cyril in his famous letter to John of Antioch, written in a conciliatory tone, “descended from heaven to earth and, taking the form of a servant, emptied Himself and was called the Son of man, remaining what He was, that is, God (for by His own nature He is unchangeable and unchangeable), and with His own flesh is thought of as one. He is called a man from heaven, because he is perfect in divinity and also perfect in humanity, 219 and is thought of as one person. I even consider those who allow even a shadow of transformation in the divine nature of the Word to be extravagant. For It remains as it has always been, and is not different, and will not ever become different, and is incapable of any change.
Moreover, we confess the Word of God itself to be impassive, although It itself was pleased to attribute to Himself those sufferings that are characteristic of the flesh” 220. Cyril equally rejects the change in the divine nature of the Son of God, both in the sense of mixing it with the human, and in the sense of changing, or transmuting, into the human. The Word became flesh in such a way that He united with Himself, in the unity of persons, a body animated by a rational soul; natures have truly united with each other, so that in the union there is one Christ and the Son 221. So, Jesus Christ was true God, but not incorporeal, he was true man, but not simple, but remained what he was before taking flesh 222.
Such a union in Christ of perfect humanity with a perfect and undiminished deity, so that the flesh of Christ was the own flesh of the all-perfect God in His nature, had the consequence that the humanity of Jesus Christ possessed special properties that distinguished Him from the nature of every simple man. Just as the properties of human nature were adopted by the incarnate Son of God, so, on the other hand, His human nature became a participant in the properties of the divine nature 223 - and this not only in the sense of the metaphorical transfer of the properties of one nature to another by the unity of the person, but also in the sense of the essential union of human nature with the divine. Thus the flesh of the Son of God became life-giving 224. So He placed His human soul above sin, as if decorating it with the strength and immutability of His divine nature 225. And the development of His human nature was completely different from the development of any common man.
Since in His divine nature He had the fullness of all perfection, it was unnecessary for Him to accept anything from the outside: His human nature, developing, received from His own divine nature 226. The development of His human nature was a discovery, a gradual unfolding, a revelation of the properties of the divine nature 227 . “In the slave form that the Son of God took upon Himself, His divine dominion was revealed, in human poverty - God-worthy glory; in Him, the lawful life, in accordance with the measure of humanity, appeared crowned with royal greatness, human humiliation - in extreme advantages. For the only begotten Son of God did not become man in order to remain forever in measures of humiliation (οὐχἵ να τοῖς τῆς κενώσεως ἑναπομείν ῃ μέτροις), but for in order to accept, along with humiliation, everything characteristic of him, but being God by nature, to open himself in humiliation to God, to decorate human nature in Himself, showing it to be a participant in sacred and divine virtues” 228.
In the gradualness of this external revelation, in accordance with the development of human nature θεότητος ἐν αὐτῷ ) 229, consisted of humiliation...
Thus, rejecting false teachings about kenosis, which are based on the idea of the dissolution of the hypostasis of the Son of God from His deity and the changeability of His divine nature, Cyril recognizes, along with the fullness of Christ’s humanity, the fullness of His deity with the unity of the person of the Incarnate and understands kenosis in the sense of gradualness, or limitation, of His external revelation. But even such a view of kenosis, leaving open the question of the nature of the union of natures, does not exclude the possibility of a false understanding of the divine-human life of Christ. It is possible that the two natures, each being complete, were united in the person of Jesus Christ, as if in some kind of container, by which they embraced and were brought into mutual contact, and the intercommunication of the properties (communicatio idiomatum) of both natures is understood in the sense of a sporadic, random intrusion of the properties of one nature into the life of the other, so that this very randomness of the intercommunication of natures (opposed in this case not to the law and system, but to the entire volume) gave rise to mutual limitations of both natures.
In other words, it is possible that kenosis consisted in the mutual limitation of natures, taken by themselves or, at most, in relation to a single person who embraced them - and therefore in an external limitation. It is obvious that such an external intercommunication of the properties of both natures, no matter how far it extends, is fully reconciled with the disunity of two lives in Christ, divinely glorious and humanly humiliated, externally touching in the unity of person. The name Christ embraced two lives that walked side by side, each flowing in its own sphere. The external connection of the unity of the face made it possible to manifest the properties of divine nature in the sphere of human life, which sporadically violated the fullness (limitedness, conventionality) of human nature; but with the exception of these intrusions of divine life into the human realm, in general the divine life did not manifest itself in the external sphere of the human nature of Christ, in this small corner of world existence, and was thereby itself limited to it.
To the extent that the human life of Jesus Christ took place outside the realm of divine life, this latter also took place outside the human life. And according to this view, kenosis fell on the human form of the external revelation of divine life, but in such a way that this form did not have exclusive significance for divine life, that in addition to it, not manifesting itself in it entirely (that is, not manifesting itself entirely in it) and only being limited to it, and even along with it, divine life flowed in all its unlimitedness, that divine life did not enter entirely into the framework of the human, opposing the latter only by its unlimitedness, being parallel to it in nature. –Has Kirill encountered this form of teaching about kenosis? This question must be answered in the affirmative - and answered in a decisive tone 230. Wasn’t this the teaching of Ebionism, Ebionian monarchianism and, finally, Nestorianism, which, together with Ebionism, moved away from legal thinking in the same direction?
Thus, Paul of Samosata, in the seventh of ten questions he addressed to Dionysius of Alexandria, clearly expresses the idea that the man Jesus, and not the Logos of God who dwelt in him, took on the image of a slave, humiliated and humbled himself even to death (Phil. 2:6–8). This man, according to the teachings of Paul of Samosat, worked miracles and accomplished the entire work of our salvation by the power of the Logos, which guided him continuously until his suffering. But essentially the Logos remained external to the man Jesus: His essential unity with man would be a dispendium for Him, a humiliation of His very divine nature. The human appearance in which divine wisdom was revealed was not Wisdom itself; Yes, Wisdom cannot become anything in appearance (ἐν σχήματι εὑρεθῆναι), it is above everything accessible to sight (μείζων τῶν ὁρωμένων ἐστί) 231. Likewise, Nestorius, based on the fact that the Word of God took on flesh in order to reveal His divinity, in order to become in appearance like a man (Phil.
2:7), does not recognize that the Word became one with the flesh (in all respects); in such unity he sees as much an expansion of the flesh into the infinity of the divine nature as a local transformation of the divine nature, the transformation of the Logos into flesh; Armed against both, he attributes humiliation and suffering not to the Logos, but to man, united with Him 232, and insists on a double type of phenomena in the life of Christ, divinely glorious and humanly humiliated, not finding it possible to attribute both those and other phenomena to the one Jesus Christ 233. He gives a place in his teaching to the assimilation of human nature by the Logos, but one that did not make the human nature of Christ the exclusive form of the revelation of the Logos, did not result in a single theanthropic life, was not such a close unity that everything human related to the Logos, so that those who saw the man Jesus, listened and touched Him, saw the Son of God himself (1 John 3:1).
However, Paul of Samosata and Nestorius 234 said more than that; even the connection by the unity of the person disappeared in their systems, being replaced by the connection of two persons (Logos and man), which in the Antiochian school was designated by the terms: συνάφεια, ἔνωσις κατ ' εὐδοκιάν. Cyril dealt with such a coarser type of teaching (Nestorius) - with a type of teaching in which the idea of the disunity of natures in Christ, externally united in the unity of the person, was absorbed by the coarser position of the duality of persons in Christ. To deal with an opponent who does not consider the subject in depth means not to find an opportunity to consider the subject in such a way.
But Cyril, in his polemic with Nestorianism, is not content with analyzing its existing provisions (such as the doctrine of two sons), but delves into the essence of the fundamental principles (such as the disunity of lives in Christ), from which, perhaps, that teaching flowed, or, at least, which were assumed by him; for his part, in contrast to Nestorianism, he reveals not only those aspects of Orthodox Christology in which it is opposite to the doctrine of two sons, namely the doctrine of the unity of the person, but also those aspects in which church Christology excludes the fundamental principles of Nestorianism (about the disunity of lives in Christ, divine and human), namely the doctrine of the one theanthropic life of Jesus Christ.
He, in addition to the strict consistency of his Christological system, acts as if according to the following plan: in the fight against Nestorianism, it is not enough to reveal the truth of the unity of the person of Jesus Christ; this truth allows, along with itself, the idea of the disunity of lives in Christ, and this latter necessarily, with consistent disclosure, leads to Nestorian conclusions; as long as this thought is not undermined, Nestorianism can always be revived; It is therefore necessary, in contrast to Nestorianism, to develop the truth of the unity of the divine-human one-hypostatic life of Christ 235. To denote this truth, Kirill uses the terms: φυσικὴ ἔνωσις, ἕ νωσις κατὰ φύσιν, μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον σεσαρκωμένη - in contrast to Nestorianism, he teaches about natural unity, about the one nature of God the Word incarnate. Acting according to this plan, Cyril writes a letter to Nestorius about excommunication (him from the church), defends the third anathematism against the objection of the East and the fourth - against the objection of Theodoret. Here are Kirill's main thoughts.
In Christ, in the unity of person, or hypostasis (ἔνωσις καθ ’ ὑπόστασιν), two natures were united, divine and human, perfect. How were they connected? This connection can be understood either in the sense that natures mutually limited one another, or in the sense of the true unity of theanthropic life. But natures could limit one another in an outwardly mechanical sense if they could be represented in the form of two parts from which the whole is composed - parts, so to speak, of equal rights, parallel. And it would be possible to represent natures in this form only if they were identical, similar (ὅ μοιος).
But natures, divine and human, are not identical, different (Χριστὸς – ἐκ δύο πραγμάτων ἀνομοίων 236, ἐκ δύο διαφόρων πραγμάτων) 237; therefore they cannot be represented as two parts (ζἄνθρωπος ἀνὰ μέρος ἱδικώς καὶ θεὸς ὁμοι ὡ ς), from which the whole is composed, Christ 238; consequently, the union of natures cannot be understood in the sense of mechanical limitation 239, but must be understood in the sense of the unity of theanthropic life. Cyril's opponents, understanding the connection in the sense of limiting natures, were faced with a dilemma: the connection was either contact (συνάφεια), or dissolution, fusion, transformation (σύγκρασις, φυρμός, σύγχυσις, τροπὴ), just as a physical body with another similar (physical) body can, as two equal parts of one whole, form either a mixture or a chemical compound. And they were so afraid of fusion (Apollinarianism) that they even avoided “unity of face.”
For Kirill there was no such dilemma: imagining natures as unequal, he understood their union in the image of the union of a person’s soul with his own body 240. And the unity of face for Cyril was certainly not a fusion of natures. But it was not enough to oppose the doctrine of the contact of natures. Therefore, Cyril preferably dwells in thought on the unity of the divine-human life and diligently reduces the very unity of the person to this unity. Avoiding the expression contact, or union (συνάφεια), as it cannot sufficiently express unity (ἔνωσις), he says that the Word of God became one with the flesh hypostatically 241, that Christ, united in an inseparable unity from two and, moreover, different natures, is one, and not a subsistence, like man, consisting of soul and body, is not recognized as double, but single 242; without merging natures and without mixing them with one another, he affirms; that from two non-identical natures, divinity and humanity, one Christ was made 243.
Cyril speaks of such a close union of divinity and humanity that after the union of the Word with the flesh, even if someone called Him the only begotten and God from God, His existence must no longer be understood without flesh, or human nature, and, conversely, even if someone called Him a man, it does not exclude the fact that He is God and Lord 244; According to Cyril’s teaching on saving assimilation, everything human and humiliated in the earthly life of Christ must be attributed not to the nature of a slave, but to the Word of God Himself. Finally, delving into the very depths of the matter, into the latest fundamental principles of church teaching about the relationship of natures in Christ, at the point at which Nestorianism takes the first step in the direction from Orthodoxy, in which the difference between legal thinking and Nestorianism is barely perceptible, Cyril reveals this difference. According to church teaching, the visible human nature of Jesus Christ in its development was a gradual revelation of the properties of His divine nature, the same according to the Nestorian.
According to church teaching, kenosis fell on the human form of the external revelation of the Son of God incarnate, the same according to the Nestorian. What was the difference? The difference was that God, according to the Nestorian concept, dwelt in man as one in another; therefore, His revelation in man was not determined by any necessity (that is, by natural development or the law of human nature), but entirely and every time by His will; Moreover, before giving anything to a person, He limited what was given, so that the limitation of what was given depended entirely on His will, the action of which preceded the perception of what was given by man 245. This concept of revelation seemed to Cyril to be applicable only to a prophet or a God-bearing man, and he turned away from it just as much as he was disgusted to imagine Jesus Christ as a simple man.
Here are his significant words addressed to Theodoret: “whoever said that revelation was given to the nature of a slave by God who dwells in it, moreover, a limited revelation, already turns Emmanuel into our prophet, a God-bearing man” 246. On the contrary, according to the teachings of Cyril, human life was not extraneous, alien to the divine nature of the Logos; He did not act in it only by His will, but His divine nature itself was, as it were, embraced by the human, hidden in it and revealed through it depending on the laws of human nature (so that His will was revealed only in submission to these laws) - His divine nature itself was one with the human, living with it one divine-human life. Even this is how Cyril expresses this unity of the divine-human life: it was unity by nature, natural unity, or the unity of natures that made up one, it was the one nature of God the Word incarnate - he teaches about φυσικὴ ἔνωσις 247, ἔνωσις φύσεων 248, ἔνωσις κατὰ φύσιν 249, μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη 250.
f) Cyril’s teaching on kenosis could not stop at the position . In fact, if the Word of God became incarnate in the fullness of His divine nature and the deity was united with humanity by nature, even if a natural unity occurred, resulting in the one nature of God the Word incarnate, then how could there be a real assimilation by the incarnate Word of God of everything human, including the very weaknesses of human nature? Cyril’s initial (logical) view of kenosis, as the assimilation by the Son of God of the infirmities of human nature, then, in view of the clearly realized and revealed truth of the fullness of the deity, who lived bodily in the human nature of Christ and even united with it into a single theanthropic life, becomes more complicated and turns into a system of views that determine the relationship of the natures in Christ, divine and human.
Now the doctrine of kenosis must answer the question: how could human nature, when united with the divine, preserve the reality of its infirmities?
If the Son of God was incarnated in all the fullness of the divine properties of His nature, if even a natural union occurred, then how was human nature not diminished from union with the divine, was not absorbed, hidden by it? how could she resist the supremacy of the divine nature 251 ? In answering this question, Kirill sees the only basis for relative independence, for the naturally free development of the human nature of Christ in the free will of the incarnate Son of God. According to Cyril, the incarnate Son of God freely possessed His united natures: their relationship, the action of the divine nature on human nature, and finally, the natural development of human nature - all this was determined by the free will of the Son of God. The Word, who did not consider it robbery to be equal with God (Phil. 2:6), gave Himself up to voluntary humiliation (καθῆκε ἑαντόν εἰς ἑκούσιον κένωσιν) and according to His will ( ἐθελοντὴς) condescended to resemble us, without ceasing to be God and without despising the measures of humanity 252.
The union is natural, not by habitation, but true, so that the Son of God did not add human nature to the divine, but Himself became man - a union that does not merge natures and does not mix them up, is the free self-abasement of the Son of God; He did not humiliate Himself without will, but voluntarily became a man ( Μονογενὴς γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος): this is how one can summarize Cyril’s richly thought-provoking defense of the third anathematism against Theodoret 253. The Son of God possessed the fullness of the divine nature, but He freely possessed it and therefore could become weak and limited by His human nature: He could restrain the superiority of the divine nature by His will. It was not difficult for the humane God to show Himself in this way tolerable for the conditions of limited human life ( ἑαυτὸν ἀποφῆναε τοῖς τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος μέτροις ). Moses delineated this mystery of the incarnation of the deity in the thorny image of a fireproof bush.
Just as wood, a combustible material, by the will of God was not destroyed by the action of fire, so by the will of the Son of God His divinity became tolerable for His human nature 254. Cyril repeatedly applies this principle of explanation to particular phenomena and forms of human limitation and weakness, such as birth from a wife (Virgin), gradual growth and development, hunger, thirst, ignorance, fear and death itself. “It was not impossible for the omnipotent Word, when He decided to become man for our sake, to form a body for Himself by His own power, rejecting the virgin birth, just as Adam was formed without the mediation of birth. Only because this might give occasion to unbelievers to slander the incarnation as invalid, it was necessary that He should submit to the ordinary laws of human nature" φύσεως νόμων) 255.
Then, according to the bodily universal birth, “for the Word, as for God, born (essentially) from the Father, it was not impossible and inaccessible for the body united with itself and from the very shrouds to be lifted to heights and raised to the measure of perfect age. After all, it would be easy and convenient for Him to impart amazing wisdom to a baby. And only because this would be a miraculous action and inconsistent with the goals of the economy (τοῖς τῆς οἰκονομίας λόγοις ἀνάρμοστον), the mystery was accomplished gradually. For the purposes of economy, the Word allowed the conditions (measures) of human nature to rule over Himself” 256. “Being, like God, omniscient, the Logos, like man, did not refuse to appear to the ignorant, because this befits human nature. Just as He, being life for all and strength, nevertheless took bodily food, without neglecting the measure of humiliation (τὸ τῆς κενώσεως οὐκ ἀτιμάζων μέτρον), - sleep and fatigue are also attributed to Him, so, knowing everything, He was not ashamed to take to Himself the ignorance that is natural to human nature” 257.
“He knows everything according to God, like the wisdom of the Father; but having become under the level of ignorant humanity (τὸ τῆς ἀγνοούσης ἀνθρωπότητος ὑπέδυ μέτρον), economically does what is characteristic of others” 258 . “Being free like God, He took on the form of a slave” 259. The other infirmities and sufferings of Jesus Christ are explained in a similar way. Thus, according to the teachings of Cyril, at the basis of each moment of the humiliation of Christ as a state lies His free self-abasement as an act (action): His self-abasement was primarily relevant (κεκενῶσθαι ἐνεργεία) 260.
But didn’t such relevance make the self-abasement of Jesus Christ illusory? The docetism of the sufferings and infirmities of Christ is eliminated from Cyril’s Christological system by the position that the self-abasement of the Son of God in the form of freely granting human nature the ability to bear His divinity extended to submission to the laws of human nature that possessed Him 261 . According to the teachings of Cyril, (ὅ τε) δι ’ ἡμ ᾶ ς κεκενῶσθαι (λέγεται) μορφὴν δούλου λαβ ὼ ν = 262 . The relationship of natures was determined by freedom, but freedom gave place to the dominance of the laws of human nature. Therefore, the union of natures was not accompanied by a sporadic and arbitrary intervention of divine nature in the area of human nature, but the intercommunication of properties, a gift from God to human nature, was determined by the laws of human development. Christ, writes Cyril, excelled in wisdom, age and grace.
It cannot be said that the man Jesus prospered, in the sense of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius. “The wise evangelist, beginning the story of the Logos who became flesh, shows that the Word, for the purposes of economy, allowed his own flesh to develop according to the laws inherent in the nature of the flesh, for which it is natural to advance in age and wisdom, as well as grace, in accordance with the growth of the body.” Therefore, although He could have instantly imparted perfection to His human nature, He nevertheless “allowed the conditions (measures) of human nature to control Him.” This was done in the form of likening us. It is common for us to succeed gradually in accordance with bodily growth and mental development, and the Logos has assimilated our nature to Himself 263. This explains the gradualness of the revelation of the deity in His human life in accordance with the development of human nature ( θεότητος ἐν αὐτῷ ) 264 . He even submitted to God according to the law to which human nature is subject.
By humiliation He became under the law, although He Himself spoke it and, as God, He Himself is the lawgiver 265. From this point of view, humiliation consisted of submission to the laws of human nature.
f) The Nestorians and, in general, representatives of the Antiochian school, understanding the kenosis of Jesus Christ in the sense of the external limitation of natures, the properties of the divine nature of the Logos, revealed in the human life of Jesus, imagined, even outside of their relation to human life, the way they were revealed (in human life): they imagined the divine life to be the same as we imagine life, or a human being. Divine knowledge was for them the same as human knowledge, differing from the latter only in its unlimitedness. This was precisely the deepest basis for the fact that they imagined natures (in Christ) to be mutually separated in all ways, 266 and the intercommunication of natures, the revelation of the divine in the human, the limitations of this revelation were attributed to the will of the Logos who dwelt in man.
According to them, with direct intercommunication of natures, human humiliation would be a detriment to the divine nature and the revelation of the divine nature in the human would be an expansion of the flesh into the infinity of the divine nature. To attribute to the same (Christ) both (divine) knowledge and (human) ignorance, according to their understanding, meant either representing the Logos as ignorant or man as omniscient. Therefore, they attributed ignorance not to God the Word, but to the image of a slave, who only had as much knowledge as the deity living in him revealed. They also said the same about all the infirmities of Jesus Christ 267. We have already seen that for Cyril to understand the matter in this way meant to represent Christ as a prophet or a God-bearing man. He, on the contrary, did not consider deity and humanity to be equal parts of one whole, but understood them as non-identical, heterogeneous 268. In what exactly is the heterogeneity of deity and human nature expressed?
Cyril’s view can be briefly expressed in the words of the historian Socrates Scholasticus: “Christ was a man on the visible side, and God on the invisible side” (H. E. III, 23). According to the teachings of Cyril, the divine and human natures in Christ constituted not two parts of one whole, but two sides of the single life of the incarnate Son of God: human nature was the external side, or form, of divine life as internal content, it related to the deity, as the visible to the invisible, as appearance to essence, form to content 269. Having become incarnate, the Son of God, as it were, put on the external form of human nature, hid His divine life in it, and covered itself with our flesh 270. Hence His revelation in His human nature was in the proper sense a revelation, an outward manifestation of His inner, invisible, divine life 271 . This includes Cyril’s favorite analogy of a person consisting of spirit and flesh.
Just as the body serves as an organ of the soul, so the Logos used his own flesh, understood not without the soul, as an organ 272, not in the sense that one person serves as the creature of another, or a prophet serves as an organ of divine verbs, or the lyre is an instrument for discovering the corresponding art, 273, but in the way that speech serves as an organ (detection) of thought, a statue as an expression of an idea 274 and under. Just as a person’s flesh relates to his soul, so human nature (the flesh, not understood without soul and mind) relates to the divine: this is the same relation of the external to the internal, the organ to the action, the expression to the idea. The divine and human natures in Christ were not equal parts of one whole: the properties of one and the corresponding properties of the other were not parallel, incompatible, mutually replacing one another, but were, with a correspondence similar to that which is recognized between an idea and a picture, heterogeneous, multi-valued. For example, divine knowledge and human knowledge are not the same thing.
Human knowledge, along with divine knowledge, is not knowledge, but a type of knowledge, and ignorance is a type of ignorance. Hence the following expressions from Cyril: ?? ? ἀγνοίας τὸ σχῆμα, τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι δοκεῖν 275. Therefore, human knowledge was, in its own sense, a discovery, an external manifestation of the knowledge of the divine: ? τοῖς ὁρώσιν ἢ καὶ ἀκούουσιν ἐφαίνετο 276. Not only that; due to the same relationship of human knowledge to divine knowledge, divine knowledge does not embrace human knowledge (as its part), and human knowledge, with all its limitations, even in the form of fortune telling or ignorance (of something), does not exclude divine knowledge.
He who knows divinely may or may not know humanly; human knowledge does not increase the divine, and human ignorance does not reduce the knowledge of the divine; human knowledge is a new kind of comprehension along with the divine: whoever knows humanly can, without violating the limitations of human knowledge, know divinely. One and the same Christ could know something both divinely and humanly; one and the same Christ could know something divinely and not know something humanly 277 . It is not that He knew twice in the same sense, or knew and did not know; but twice He knew in different senses - but knowing also did not know in different senses, just as you can know with your mind and heart, and you can, knowing with your mind, not know with your heart, you can understand and not imagine. What is said about knowledge must apply to other properties 278.
So, relating to each other as the external to the internal, the properties of human nature and the properties of divine nature were not two homogeneous parts of one whole, but were heterogeneous and dissimilar, they were two sides of a single life or being. It is easy to understand what consequence follows from this for the question of the unity of the divine-human life, or being. Divinity and humanity in Christ, precisely because they are heterogeneous, were united into the unity of theanthropic life, into natural unity: it was the one nature of God the Word incarnate. Two human bodies, no matter how different or how similar they may be, even if they have the same head, cannot form one body, but are two bodies; on the contrary, clothing does not increase the number of one body, but a clothed body is one body. Also, the soul in union with the body is not two souls, not two bodies, not two people, but one rational flesh; word and thought, idea and picture – not two, but one. Unity, not composition or mixture, occurs when parts are heterogeneous. “Truly there is one nature of the Word made flesh.
For if there is one Son, by nature and truly originating from God the Father, the Logos, ineffably begotten, and if He, having taken on flesh, not soulless, but animated by a rational soul, became a man, descended from a woman, then He should not be divided as a result of this perception into two persons or a son, but remained one, only no longer incorporeal and not outside the body ( μεμένηκεν εἰς, πλὴν οὐκ ἄσαρκος, οὐδ ’ ἔξω σώματος), but having acquired it by virtue of an inseparable connection. But whoever says this does not at all affirm confusion or merging, or anything like that; such a consequence does not necessarily follow from the preceding premises.
If the only begotten Son of God, incarnate and made man, is called one by us, then by this we do not yet affirm that He underwent confusion, as our opponents think, that the nature of the Word was transformed into the nature of the flesh, or the nature of the flesh into the divine nature; but we say that He, through an ineffable and incomprehensible unity, showed us a single filial nature, only already embodied - we say precisely because divinity and humanity exist and are understood each in the peculiarities of their nature. For, in fact, unity is attributed not only to simple things, uncomplicated in nature, but also to complex ones. So there is one person, consisting of soul and body. Soul and body are heterogeneous and unequal in essence, but in combination they formed one human nature. We talk about such unity, not forgetting that things that are united in composition are characterized by the difference of elements from which the unity was made” 279.
g) This unity is understandable despite the heterogeneity of the parts. But if the heterogeneity of deity and humanity is given in the relation that deity is the essence, and human nature is an appearance; then isn’t such a unity of theanthropic life close to docetism or, at least, to Apollinarism? In answer to this question, we must first of all agree that Cyril’s Christology gives room for such objections (cf. above τὸ δοκεῖν πληροῦσθαι σοφίας ... δοκεῖν ... δοκεῖν) and that logic can draw certain conclusions from its provisions. But the freedom of logic in this case is limited to direct and undoubted data, which, like facts, it itself must follow; and what is undoubtedly given is that Cyril, with firm and unshakable persistence, affirms the reality and sincerity of the communion of the Son of God with our humanity. All this absolutely does not allow us to understand some of his expressions 280 in the sense of recognizing the illusory nature of Christ’s human nature.
Equally, he always and invariably understands the flesh of Christ not without soul and mind: what place is Apollinarism here? The only rational assumption for explaining the provisions of Cyril’s Christology is that, in terms of visibility and appearance, Cyril defines not the opposition of the human nature of Christ to the nature of other people, but the relationship of human nature in general to the divine, and human nature is called flesh (but, of course, not without a soul) in order to more clearly highlight a certain relationship of human nature to the divine as external to internal, by analogy of soul and body. From Cyril’s point of view, obviously, the nature and life of every person can be called visible and manifest in comparison and even in relation to the divine.
The difference between the nature of each person and the human nature of Jesus Christ in this regard is that in each person the deity appears and acts only as the image of God in which man was created, but in Christ Jesus the Son of God himself personally took upon himself human nature. True, this seems to provide a basis for distinguishing the nature of every person from the human nature of Christ in the sense of greater independence of the first, greater, so to speak, reality of the nature of each person (along with the divine) than was the case with the human nature of Christ. But this is only apparent. The fact is that the personal perception of human nature by the Son of God, as if making it a shadow of deity, has its reverse side the assimilation by the Son of God of everything human, including the very weaknesses of human nature. We have already seen how significant this assimilation is in Cyril’s Christological system.
Now let us pay attention to the fact that such a combination of perception with assimilation is, in fact, a combination of the exaltation of human nature with the self-abasement of the Son of God, even from the point of view of human nature under consideration. Through the incarnation of the Son of God, human nature was elevated into the quality of an external instrument of divine activity, but at the same time this was His self-abasement to human visibility. While perception, understood in itself, raises the question of the reality of the human nature of Christ, it also, in connection with assimilation, directs our thought to the reality of the self-abasement of Jesus Christ. Self-abasement consisted in the fact that the Son of God adopted human appearance and made it His own. Every man is by nature a manifestation, or revelation, of divine glory; but in Christ human nature, as an instrument of such revelation, was directly appropriated by the Son of God, and was the exclusive 281 organ of His external revelation 282 .
In Him dwelt the fullness of divinity bodily 283, in Him divinity became tangible, visible 284 and so on. This was the self-abasement of the Son of God, that He made His revelation dependent on the conditions of gradual development and the general limitations of human nature, that He appeared to people in a humiliated form: after the incarnation, the Son of God did not change in His divine nature, but He is no longer incorporeal 285 and does not act outside the body 286, now He had to ἐν νηπί ῳ σοφίαν ἐκφῆναι , ἀποκαλύπτειν ἑαυτὸν κεὶ ὁσημέραι σοφώτερος ? ξην ἰόντος τοῦ σώματος 287, now He, in the words of Tertullian, desires to be known and honored 288 only through and in human nature...
But, again, if kenosis was thus relative and was limited precisely to the external revelation of the Son of God in the human nature He assumed, then, even with the undoubted reality of the latter, was self-abasement valid for the Son of God? Yes, it was. After all, the very limitation and reality of the gradual development of the human nature He perceived was a matter of His will, and this will extended to submission to the laws of human life. Isn’t it clear, as the Holy Scripture actually teaches, that the self-abasement of the Son of God was not illusory, but real (κεκενῶσθαι οὐ δοκήσει, ἀλλὰ ἐνεργεί ᾳ) 289.
This is the Christology of Cyril. It occupies an exceptional place in the history of the teachings of kenosis. The enthusiastic attitude towards the great Alexandrian saint of the fathers of the III Ecumenical Council and the same attitude towards his memory of the fathers of the V Ecumenical Council, the unwavering loyalty to his doctrine even on the part of the fathers of the IV 290 and VI Ecumenical Councils - all this gives the right to call Cyril doctor incarnationis 291! His Christology is rightly recognized as the rule of faith for all times 292. But this Christology is built on the idea of kenosis - it is actually the doctrine of the self-abasement of Jesus Christ. Therefore, in the Christology of Cyril of Alexandria we have the most perfect type of patristic teaching on kenosis.
Christology of Theodoret of Cyrus from the point of view of kenosis
a) In the long and stubborn struggle between Cyril and Nestorius, Theodoret was Cyril’s opponent. Despite this, Theodoret’s Christology in some points is similar to the letter with the Christology of the great Alexandrian saint. The Cyrus shepherd proceeds from the position that the incarnation of the Son of God was the revelation of the divine essence, or divine life, in human appearance. This is how he argues in the dialogues “Eranist” - in a work directed against the Monophysites, whom Theodoret himself could imagine as the direct successors of Cyril. He accepts 293 the position of his interlocutor, the “Eranist,” that in the incarnation the Son of God “appeared on earth and spoke among men” (Bar. 3:38) 294, and in accordance with this explains “the Word became flesh” (John 1:14) in the sense that “God,” in the words of the Apostle Paul (1 Tim. 3:16), “appeared in the flesh.” The divine nature is invisible, but the flesh is visible; through visible flesh the invisible divine nature was revealed, performing miracles through it and demonstrating its power 295.
Thus (God in Christ) with his hand produced the sense of sight and healed a man blind from birth, then he restored hearing to a deaf man and resolved a tied tongue, using the fingers of the hand as a tool and applying spitting as a saving medicine. Likewise, by walking on the waters of the sea, Christ revealed the omnipotence of His deity. Therefore, the apostle appropriately said: “God appeared in the flesh,” that is, through the flesh the invisible divine nature became visible. And before God revealed himself to people, so “the Lord appeared” to Abraham “at the oak grove of Mamre” (Gen. 18:1); This is how Isaiah writes about himself: “I saw the Lord sitting on a throne, high and exalted” (Is. 6:1), also Ex. 30:11 ; Number 12:8. But before the incarnation of the Son of God, the humane Lord proportioned His revelation to the abilities of those looking at Him. God Himself did not say about Himself: ὤ φθην, but ὡ μοιώθην; and ὁμοίωσις is not the same as the nature of the visible 297. Therefore, Old Testament people did not see the nature of God, but some phenomena adapted to their acceptability 298.
Even the angels themselves did not see the divine essence, but some glory accessible to their nature 299. After the Incarnation, the very being of God appeared not in the likeness of glory, but under the true and living cover of flesh, which had the meaning of a veil 300. In response to the objection of the “Eranist,” Theodoret insists 301 on the idea that the flesh is a veil, or veil, of the deity, referring to Heb. 10:19–22; Life 49:11. Having said: “The Word became flesh,” continues the Bishop of Cyrus 302, the evangelist added: “and dwelt among us” (John 1:14), i.e., by the words “became flesh” he means that the Son of God built a tabernacle in us and wore the flesh he received from us, like a church. Then, teaching that He remained unchangeable, the evangelist added: “and we have seen His glory, the glory as of the only begotten from the Father” (John 1:14). And, having put on flesh, He showed affinity with the Father (τὴν πατρῷαν εὐγένειαν), shining with the rays of deity and the brilliance of divine power, revealing through miracles His divine nature hidden under the cover of flesh. The divine apostle wrote something similar to this in the last. to Phil. 2:5–8.
Both speak in agreement: the evangelist - “The Word became flesh and dwelt among us,” the apostle - “taking the form of a servant.” Both of them teach that Jesus Christ, being God and the Son of God and clothed with the glory of the Father, took in the incarnation the form of a servant. Apparently He was that which was to be seen; in fact, He was God clothed in human nature. According to this in the work. de incarnatione Domini 303 Theodoret calls the human nature of Christ visible, revealed (τὸ ὁρώμενον, τὸ φαινόμενον), the divine - hidden (τὸ κρυπτόμενον) under the veil of humanity, dwelling in it as in a church and opening through it (φανερωθεὶς θεὸς ἐν αὐτῷ) 304. “Revealing His deity,” writes Theodoret, pointing to Luke. 2:49, - The Lord Christ shows by this that He is not only what it seems, but also God, hiding in this visible, transcendental and eternally descended from the Father” 305. This revelation of divine nature in human appearance, according to the teachings of the Bishop of Cyrus, was consistent with the measure of human nature and was gradual according to the conditions of human development.
Evangelist Luke writes: “Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and men” (Luke 2:52). The body prospers with age, the soul with wisdom; the deity does not accept either one or the other increase, because the Word of God is perfect. But the evangelist rightly combined the growth of wisdom with the growth of the body, because, as the body grew, the nature of God revealed its wisdom 306. Determined, on the one hand, by the conditions of human development, gradual revelation was determined, on the other hand, by the free will of the Son of God: it was the conformity of revelation with the conventions of human development that was the work of His free will. Bodily needs, of course, were aroused by need, but not because the deity united with the body could not make it need nothing. It would not have been difficult for the incarnate Son of God to make His own body superior to all need (κρείττον ἐνδείας); but He sought out the body to show its nature - He allowed it to hunger, thirst, work out, sleep 307 and so on.
Christ spent forty days and the same number of nights in the desert without food: He could have lived without food for a longer time, but He did not want to exceed the measure of the ancient fasters, so that the tempter would not shy away from the fight with Him and, having learned who was hiding in Him, would not run away from the battle with what he saw in Him. To do this, after the specified period, Jesus reveals in Himself the weakness of human nature and takes over from hunger, giving the enemy an opportunity to attack with His hunger 308. Then the perceived humanity of Jesus Christ feared death and prayed, because the divinity dwelling in Him allowed fear to act, so that through suffering the nature of what was perceived would be revealed. Finally, the Son of God who dwelt in the body allowed him to suffer and die in order to fulfill the mystery of the economy, although He could make His body a conqueror of death (which He did after three days) 310. In the writings of the Bishop of Cyrus, expressions are often found: Christ hides His divinity (Matthew 4:4), reveals His divinity (Luke 2:49) 311 and so on.
According to the teachings of Theodoret, the self-abasement of Jesus Christ consisted in the gradualness and conditionality of the revelation of the deity in human visibility.
b) Understanding the incarnation as a matter of condescension of divine love, as the self-abasement of the Son of God, it is necessary to imagine the relationship of the deity of Jesus Christ to His humanity so close that one can call St. Virgin Mary. The Bishop of Cyrus allowed this name precisely in connection with the truth of the self-abasement of Jesus Christ. In the letter to Nestorius from John of Antioch, who stood at the head of the “eastern” bishops who gathered in Antioch in 430, among whom was Theodoret, we read: “if we do not accept the name Theotokos with the meaning that it contains, then we will deprive ourselves of the salvation provided by the ineffable building of the only begotten Son of God: how soon will this word be rejected, and, consequently, that meaning, what is contained in it, the thought will follow that the One who inexpressibly appeared on earth for our salvation was not God, that God the Word, who exhausted Himself before taking on the image of a servant (Phil. 2:7), did not show us ineffable love for mankind, while the priest.
Scripture most of all affirms God’s love for us (revealed in the incarnation of the Son of God”) 312. But accepted “with the meaning that it contains,” the name Mother of God inevitably raises questions about the freedom of self-abasement of the Son of God and the freedom of the natural development of His human nature. We have seen that in Cyril’s Christological system, the freedom of the Son of God and the freedom of human nature, which He assumed, were harmoniously united in the position that the Son of God freely obeyed the laws of human life, and therefore the interest in establishing both freedoms for Cyril coincided with the interest in the truth of the complete unity of natures in Christ. Theodoret had a different attitude towards these issues. For him, the freedom of self-abasement of the Son of God and the freedom of human nature, which He assumed, did not coincide into one, and therefore the interest in establishing both freedoms did not coincide with the interest of truth in the closest possible union of natures - for him these interests diverged, and moreover, in such a way that the first was predominant for him.
For the sake of establishing the freedom of the Son of God and His human nature, Theodoret significantly weakened the expression of the unity of natures in Christ; in his Christology, the relationship of the deity to humanity as the invisible to the visible, in which the divine nature was revealed, the freedom of conditional or gradual revelation, and even the name Theotokos have a connotation that obviously distinguishes his Christology from the Christology of Cyril. Theodoret even debated with Cyril for a long time: the stimulus for this polemic was Theodorit’s predominant attention to the freedom of self-abasement of the Son of God and the freedom of the natural development of His human nature. As soon as the identical path of the Christological construction reached the point at which questions about this freedom arise, Theodoret differs from Cyril. Against Cyril’s teaching about “natural union,” Theodoret argues that nature is something driven by necessity and devoid of freedom.
For example, we are aroused to the feeling of hunger by nature, not by intention, but by necessity; By nature we feel thirst, we sleep, we breathe air. All this happens not according to our will. Therefore, to recognize in Christ “the natural union of the image of God and the image of a slave” for Theodoret was tantamount to the thought that “God the Word was forced by necessity, and not by love of mankind, to unite with the image of a slave, and the legislator of everything is in the need to follow the laws.” But the self-abasement of the Son of God was free. Speaking about Him “he made Himself of no reputation” (Phil. 2:7), the apostle “presents Him as not being forced” 313. In order to defend this freedom of self-abasement of the Son of God, Theodoret found it necessary to accept unity in relation to the divided, so that “division precedes unity,” and to recognize the peculiarities of the nature of the perceiving God and the perceived human nature 314. Moreover, his defense of the freedom of the natural development of the human nature of Christ led to him.
Defending the reality of human infirmities and sufferings of Jesus Christ, Theodoret found it necessary to attribute them to the “image of a servant,” “perceived,” “visible,” and not to the only Son of God, as Cyril did; otherwise, he considered the inevitable dilemma of either, in the Arian manner, “to assimilate to God the Word what is humbly and decently said about the image of a servant,” or (docetically) to deny the reality of the infirmities and sufferings of Christ. If the Son of God is God, then to whom shall we attribute Matt. 27:46; 26:39; In. 12:27; Mk. 13:32 ? “To whom do we attribute hunger and thirst? to whom is wakefulness and sleep, ignorance and fear? who needed the help of angels? In particular, Theodoret dwells on “ignorance” (Matthew 24:36) and here shows the inevitability of this dilemma. If ignorance is attributed to the one God the Word, then it is necessary to admit that “wisdom reveals ignorance”, that He is in vain “called wisdom, since He is subject to the weakness of ignorance, that He does not have everything that the Father has.”
And if, recognizing the wisdom and knowledge of the Father in the Word of God, we nevertheless attribute ignorance to the one Word of God, then the weakness of ignorance was illusory and, moreover, deliberately deceptive: “if, knowing the day, he said that he does not know, then look to what blasphemy the connection should lead, how the truth, undeservedly called truth, deceives if it contains something contrary to the truth? But ignorance and “great ignorance” were true: Jesus Christ does not even know whether it is possible or impossible for the cup to pass away (Matthew 26:39). The fear of death was true, so the image of a servant perceived by the Son of God was not a dream or fantasy 315. The Bishop of Cyrus often speaks from this point of view about the human weaknesses of Jesus Christ, especially about the dying sufferings, fear, prayer to the Father and death, about gradual development, moral improvement, and the fight against temptations 316.
From the truth of the human infirmities of Jesus Christ, Theodoret comes to the following conclusion: “thus, ignorance does not belong to God the Word, but to the image of a servant who only had knowledge as much as the deity living in him revealed. The same should be said about other similar things” 317 - about suffering, moral development, temptations: briefly to say, “what was said and happened befitting of God should be attributed to God’s Word, what was said and done humbly should be appropriated to the image of a servant” 318.
c) It is difficult to say better about the reality of the human infirmities of Jesus Christ, the conditionality and gradualness of His human development than Theodoret does. Not only to speak differently about this subject, but even to take one tone lower than the confident speech of the Bishop of Cyrus will be a betrayal of the truth. But the conclusions that Theodoret comes to cannot be called logically correct from the point of view of Cyril’s Christology. Let the Alexandrian shepherd speak of a “natural union,” but still the freedom of self-abasement of Jesus Christ has such a firm position in his Christological system that one can even raise the question of the relationship of this system to docetism; let him sometimes seem to make some concession to docetism, but still he speaks of the free subordination of the Son of God to the laws of human life, yet he speaks intensely and in a high tone about the reality of the human infirmities of Jesus Christ - the Christological principles of Cyril gave the widest possible place and firm justification for the human infirmities of Jesus Christ.
Based on the Christological principles of Cyril, repeated in Theodoret (we mean the relationship in Christ of the deity to humanity as the invisible to the visible, in which God was revealed), there are no logical grounds in the name of the freedom of self-abasement of the Son of God and the freedom of the natural development of His humanity to divide the glory of Jesus Christ and His humiliation between the Logos and the image of a servant. To what extent this division is sharp in Theodoret can already be seen from what is in Eran. dial. III, where we are talking about the subject of the suffering of Jesus Christ and this subject is indicated in the humanity of Jesus Christ 319, the author himself raises the question of the salvation of these truly human sufferings, of their relationship to God the Word. True, the answer to this question he gives has an undoubted advantage over “monophysitism”: he puts human suffering in relation to the Logos in the relation of assimilation according to the unity of the person, 320 reminiscent of Cyril in the doctrine of assimilation.
But the basis of this assimilation is a single person, or unity in persons (ἐν πρόσωπον ἀδιαίρετον, – τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, ὅ σα τῆς τῶν προσ ὡ πων τῷ ἑνὶ προσαρμόττομεν) 321, too weak in comparison with Cyril’s teaching on hypostatic unity. It is obvious that Theodoret approaches the Christological principles that he and Cyril have in common with a different principle, which was led by the prevailing interest in the freedom of self-abasement of the Son of God and the freedom of the natural development of human nature. This is another principle: humiliation was voluntarily suffered by the nature of the slave, which comes from the seed of David - it belonged to the image of the servant, and not to God the Word 322, Who adopted, or accepted in the unity of the person, the humiliated nature 323.
Humiliation, according to this principle, consisted in the limitation of revelation (ἀποκάλυψις μεμετρημένη), and the limitation of revelation was a matter of the will of the Logos, preceding revelation (which should be understood about each moment of revelation): what was revealed was limited in advance and in such a limited form (with the possibility of the unlimited and, moreover, without human intervention nature of Jesus) 324 communicated to human nature 325 . This image of revelation leaves the only possibility of the union of natures in the unity of a person or persons, and the natural or hypostatic union is necessarily equated with confusion 326. Here we come to the most basic difference in the Christological systems of Theodoret and Cyril 327 ... It was the difference in the point of view on the subject, in the ways of its investigation, in the direction in which it was approached - these were different directions, why Cyril and Theodoret met at the goal of their aspirations, as enemies, face to face, and not as friends, hand in hand. How can we look at this difference objectively?
It was of such a kind that it lay outside the area embraced by church definitions - it was not a fenced-off area of detailed disclosure of Christian truths. To evaluate constructions in this area, assuming they do not deviate from the letter of the conciliar definition of faith, there is no objective criterion, at least in relation to such equally important and even exceptional theologians as Cyril and Theodoret. Perhaps there is a place here for a free choice between the Christologies of Cyril and Theodoret, as between two equal ways of understanding the mystery of the Incarnation 328... However, if we give objective significance to the idea of self-abasement, which underlies these Christological constructions, then we can see in it the desired criterion.
But from the point of view of this idea, the Christology of Cyril stands above the Christology of Theodoret: it is the first that is a completely consistent, majestic and harmoniously harmonious disclosure of this idea, while in the second, the self-abasement of the Son of God noticeably, with the course of the system, gives way to the external glorification of the image of the slave, perceived by the Logos - the God-bearing man. “The Word became flesh” (John 1:14) - this is Cyril’s Christology; “Jesus of Nazareth, a man testified by God with miracles and wonders and signs, which God did through Him, whom you killed, but God raised Him up” (Acts 2:22–24) - this is Theodoret’s Christology 329...
d) The difference between Cyril and Theodoret on Christological issues, precisely because it related to the direction in the Orthodox solution to the Christological problem, had all the advantages of such a controversial subject, the study of which by the disputing parties should clarify the very essence of the matter, which introduced them in medias res. But, unfortunately, this “dispute, in the words of Prof. V.V. Bolotov, had all the inconveniences of pre-terminological polemics” 330. The lack of development of terminology related to the dispute forced the polemicizing parties to pay primary attention not to the subtle and essential difference for a complete explanation of the issue, which actually existed between them despite the similarity in basic dogmatic truths, although the latter were expressed by theologians of both sides in different terms, but to these terms, and each side suspected a heresy dangerous for the faith in the terminological inaccuracy of the other and thought to strike precisely with its stability in its own terminology such hidden heresy.
Cyril opposed Nestorianism, suspecting Theodoret and all the “Easterns” in it, put forward and Theodoret, convicting Cyril of imaginary Arianism and Apollinarism = Monophysitism, argued δύο φύσεις = δύο ὑποστάσεις = ἓ ν πρόσωπον 331 . Cyril and Theodoret agreed on essential dogmatic (Christological) truths, but Cyril’s φύσις is not the same as Theodorit’s φύσις, the former’s ὑπόστασις is not the same as the second’s ὑπόστασις, and One person's πρόσωπον is not the same as another's πρόσωπσν. Meanwhile, they wanted agreement precisely in the area of this terminology. With mutual concessions, the union between the Easterners and Cyril actually took place. John of Antioch, in his letter to Cyril, written in a conciliatory tone, expressively calls St. The Virgin Mary and confesses one Christ, one Son, one Lord 332. In his reply message, Cyril rewrites the religion of the East, confessing two natures in Christ 333.
Although after this union Cyril again uses the expression μία φύσις 334, and Theodoret again writes against Cyril 335, however δύο φύσεις and ἓ ν πρόσωπον, and φύσις = nature in the modern sense of the word have come into general use. In any case, from this time on, μία φύσις, used not in the sense of Cyril, but in the sense established since the time of the union, turns out to be heretical Monophysitism. The opponent of such Monophysitism, Leo, Pope of Rome, stands entirely on the basis of Antiochian terminology...
Data for the Doctrine of Kenosis in the Dogmatic Epistle of Leo, Pope of Rome
About the teaching of the Monophysites, the definition of the IV Ecumenical Council says that they “introduced fusion and confusion (of the divine and human natures) and madly imagined that (in Christ after the incarnation there was) one nature of flesh and divinity, and strangely asserted that the divine nature of the Only Begotten by fusion is passive” 336.
The main theme of Leo's dogmatic message is the fullness of divinity and humanity in Christ: He was, in the strong expression of the message, wholly in His (deity), wholly in ours (humanity) 337 . The natures, having united, did not lose their characteristics: the Word did not fall from equality in glory with the Father, and the flesh did not lose the nature of our race 338. In Christ, therefore, the properties were combined in which these natures are opposite to one another: the greatness of the deity perceived the humiliation of humanity, power - weakness, eternity - mortality 339. How could such opposing properties, divine and human, be combined in one person? Why did the perception of the image of a servant on the part of the Son of God, that is, that exhaustion by which the invisible became visible, magnified the human and did not diminish the divine 340? According to Leo's answer, the perception of the image of a servant on the part of the Son of God did not diminish God because His exhaustion was an indulgence of His mercy, and not a lack of power (exinanitio illa inclinatio fuit miserationis, non defectio potestatis) 341.
Then Lev points out the affinity of man with God by the very creation of the first by God: He who, being in the form of God, created man, He Himself became man, taking the form of a servant 342.
The author understands the relationship of the divine nature to the human, as the invisible to the visible, like Cyril. Kenosis consisted in hiding the divine glory under the humiliation of the human image. The being of the Son of God did not suffer changes. He was not separated from divine glory, but, having become a man, He did not reveal it, “hiding the immensity of His greatness” 343. But Leo recognizes two series of phenomena in the life of Christ, divinely glorious and humanly humiliating. “Each of the two natures, in conjunction with the other, acts in the way that is proper to it: the Word does what is proper to the Word, and the flesh does what is proper to the flesh. One of them shines with miracles, the other is subject to suffering” 344. Leo represents a long parallel of phenomena of two kinds, of which some served as a revelation of human nature, and others - of the divine nature. “The birth of the flesh is the revelation of human nature; and that the Virgin gives birth is a sign of divine power,” 345, etc. How were these two types of phenomena united?
Leo in a few words, but clearly expresses his view: the natures in Christ were combined into one person 346...
It is easy to see that the message in depth of thought is significantly inferior to the Christological systems of Cyril and Theodoret.
The doctrine of the self-abasement of Jesus Christ in the dogmatic letter of Sophronius of Jerusalem
In the dogmatic message of Leo and in the creed of the IV universe, which agrees with him. Council, the truth of the fullness of two natures in Christ, divine and human, was affirmed: the unity of the two-natural life of Christ constituted the task of the further development of Christology. The Monothelites, recognizing the will as an accessory of the person, solved this problem by pointing to the single will of Christ 347.
The most prominent representatives of the church in the fight against monothelitism were Sophronius of Jerusalem and Agathon, Pope of Rome.
Sophrony 348 looks at the humane incarnation of the Son of God, first of all, as His greatest humiliation and condescension towards us earthly 349. Sophronius defines the incarnation in such a way that He Who has an unlimited being and an incomprehensible nature took upon Himself our form 350 to help those who see 351. This appearance of the Son of God in the limited form of our existence was at the same time His renunciation of His fatherly and own will ( θελήματι) 352. Humiliation completely coincided with the incarnation: there was no incarnation without humiliation, and there was no humiliation without the incarnation. The flesh and soul of the Word Incarnate before the true condescension towards us never existed, but have an existence that coincides with the natural condescension of the Word 353. Further affirming the fullness of divinity and humanity in Christ 354, Sophrony accurately repeats the teaching of Leo about the union in Christ of the opposites of divine nature and human nature, about the special action of each nature 355, etc.
But at the same time, Sophrony puts forward that in Christ “there were two in relation to natures, but in hypostasis and in person there was one” 356, and repeats the teaching of Cyril that one and the same Christ and Son accomplished both divine and human, that with each nature, with the special actions of both, it is the Word 357 that is in communion. One and the same Christ naturally does high and low things, according to the natural and essential quality of each of His two natures 358 . At the same time, the peculiarity of Sophronius’ message is that he related the reconciliation of the opposing properties of the divine and human natures to the freedom of self-abasement of the Son, extending the feat of self-abasement, as the reason for the harmonious action of the natures, throughout the earthly life of Jesus Christ. In particular, Sophronius explains 1) the reality of human infirmities and sufferings of Jesus Christ with the freedom to endure them, 2) the fullness of the divine nature while limited by the laws of bodily life, and 3) the unity of sonship with God, which brought into harmony the actions of natures.
Sophronius, like Leo, sees the actions of human nature, perfect in its fullness and after the incarnation, in the birth from the Virgin, in feeding on milk, in gradual growth, in bodily infirmities, in spatial limitation, in the describability of the species, in sensitivity to pain, in the ability to suffer. But Christ, according to the teachings of Sophronius, endured all this not out of (natural) necessity alone, but also out of freedom: He gave, as He wanted, human nature time (καιρὸν) to do and endure what is characteristic of it. He did not accept this out of compulsion or necessity, although He endured all this naturally and humanly and did it according to human motives. As God, He could not suffer. But He Himself deigned to suffer and act with His own nature of the body. Obviously, Sophronius expresses Cyril’s thought that Christ’s voluntary humiliation extended to His submission to natural law. In Christ there was the highest combination of freedom and natural law. He voluntarily and naturally discovered the humiliated and human.
He Himself was the author of His human suffering; but what was human in Him was because He was a man 359.
The teaching about the fullness of the deity of the incarnate Son of God does not violate the truth of the humanity of Christ in the mouth of the Jerusalem saint: the fullness of human nature was the work of His free exploit. It is easy to understand that this feat consisted of limiting the divine nature by the laws of the body. The divine nature acted as it was peculiar to it, but, according to the meaning of the incarnation, it was revealed outside and revealed according to the laws of the body. The clarification of this truth is the great merit of Sophronius. Under the operation of the deity in Christ, he, like Leo, understands signs and wonders; but he further explains that, although all this was accomplished by God the Word outside the limits of the mind and human nature and therefore served as proof of the divine nature, it was nevertheless accomplished through the flesh. Therefore, God the Word cannot be considered incorporeal and acting outside the body, although He did things that exceed the boundaries of the body 360.
The fullness of humanity, while the deity is limited in its external manifestation according to the laws of the body, is the unity of the divine-human life. Since submission to the laws of human nature was the free feat of Christ, the unity of the divine-human life was a matter of the same personal feat of Christ, His one sonship with God, His personal will. This idea is expressed firmly in Sophronius’ message. The properties of the action itself, he writes, determine what nature it belongs to, but let no one alienate any action from the one sonship. Emmanuel alone accomplishes both high and low. Both belonged to one Son. The so-called general and godly action 361 belongs to the same force.
Explanations of the doctrine of the self-abasement of Jesus Christ in the dogmatic letter of Agathon, Pope of Rome
The main point of Agathon's message, accepted by the sixth ecumenical council with open arms (ὑπτίαις χερσὶν ἀσπασαμένη), is that volition is natural; therefore, the three persons of the Holy Trinity have both one nature and one will, but in Christ everything is twofold: both two natures and two natural actions 362. The message sees an indication of the divine will in Ps. 134 (The Lord does whatever he wants); In. 5 (The Son, like the Father, gives life to whomever He will); Matt. 11 (The Son reveals the Father to whomever he wants); The gospel points to the human will of Christ when it says that He, walking on the sea, had a desire, like a true man, to catch up with His disciples (Matthew 14:25; John 6:19), that, walking with the disciples through Galilee, He did not want anyone to recognize Him, but could not hide (Mark 7:24), also John. 4:34; 7:1. Can we really admit, continues Agathon, referring to these testimonies of the priest? Scripture that He is the Creator and Redeemer of all, for whom to will is as to be able (Ps.
134:6), whose wave the heavenly authorities obey with fear, wanting to hide in an earthly house, had no power - He, Who from eternity in divine majesty rules with the Father over the mysteries of heaven and in whose hands are the ends of the earth? Is it really possible... by one and the same will the Lord can do whatever he wants, in heaven and on earth, and at the same time, with all his desire, cannot hide in an insignificant house, as the Gospel testifies? But if we take into account the dispensation of His humanity, in which He accepted our weakness, then everything that is unworthy of His divine greatness turns out to be related to His humanity... The human will, together with human nature, was accepted and saved by Him 363.
So, when they say that there were two wills in Christ, what is meant by this name is not personal will, but will as the tension of nature, its very life or “movement without any coercion” 364. According to this definition of will, it, generally speaking, can manifest itself before self-consciousness and, in any case, without the participation and influence of consciousness or personal will. Wanting stems from the being to whom the will belongs, that is, from an angel the angelic will, from man the human will, from God the divine 365. But just as human nature is not contrary to the divine, because “the Creator did not create anything contrary to Himself,” then the Son of God “did not receive anything like that (i.e., contrary) in the sacrament of incarnation,” 366, and two natural wills could not be contrary and hostile to each other, as if divided into two persons or hypostases 367. Therefore, the Son of God could not have, having become incarnate, His task of (moral) subordination of His human will to His divine will 368.
But human natural will differs from divine will in its relation to personal will: in man, natural will does not coincide with personal will, but acts on it. And Christ, when he took upon himself human nature, was subject to the influence of human natural will. Human nature gave rise to feelings and desires in Him that were different from the divine: as a man, He could desire something different from what the Father desires. The Son had one will from eternity, co-natural with the Father and the Holy Spirit, and He himself, in accepting humanity, accepted another in time into His own person 369. This human will of His, as His own, could be opposed to the will of the Father, with Whom, according to divinity, He desired one thing; It was His will that He had to subordinate to the will of the Father; this constituted His moral task. Agathon sees the manifestation of this human will of Christ in the prayer of Christ, in which He opposed His will to the will of the Father: “My Father! if possible, let this cup pass from Me; however, not as I want, but as You want” (Matthew 26:39; Mark 14:36; Luke 22:42) 370.
The will that Christ called His own is, in the words of Ambrose 371, our human sorrow; the words of Christ: “not what I want, but what You want” (Mark 14:36) refer to His humanity, through which He was obedient (i.e. to the Father) even to death 372. His unchanging nature could never want anything other than what the Father wants. He subordinates His will to the Father, that is, our human 373.
These explanations of Agathon are very important: his view of the wills in Christ as natural constitutes a necessary assumption of patristic Christology. It resolves the question of the moral relationship of Christ according to humanity to God the Father 374.
John of Damascus on the question of the self-abasement of Jesus Christ
John of Damascus unites in general the dogmatic and, in particular, the Christological views of the fathers and teachers of the church who preceded him. In the language of Cyril, he writes that the Word of God became a hypostasis for the flesh, that in Christ it was not man who was deified, but God became man 375, that the Word inherent in the flesh assimilated to Himself 376, that in Christ the entire essence of divinity was united with all human nature 377 - he even speaks of the one nature of God the Word incarnate 378. John also discusses the revelation of the deity in the humanity of Jesus Christ like Cyril 379. John speaks expressively about the fullness of humanity. “Christ took on all the natural and immaculate passions of man: He took on the whole man and everything that belongs to man, except sin... Natural and immaculate passions are not in our power, which entered human life as a result of the condemnation resulting from crime, such as hunger, thirst, fatigue, labor, tears, decay, evasion of death, fear, death throes, from which sweat, drops of blood occur. etc.” 380.
“Christ took on a nature that lacked knowledge and was slavish” 381. John, like Cyril, makes human infirmities dependent on the free will of Christ, who allowed humanity to endure what is characteristic of him 382. John of Damascus talks about two wills in Christ like Sophronius and Agathon: the two wills in Christ are two natural wills; and since there was one hypostasis, then it is one and the same One who naturally desires and acts according to both natures... It is not the same thing to desire and how to desire: to desire in general is a property of nature, and how to desire is a property of the hypostasis... Christ took upon Himself, along with human nature, the desirable ability of human nature... In Himself and through Himself He subdued that which there was humanity in Him, to God the Father 383...
Note. In the first edition of the book “The Humiliation of Christ,” the patristic teaching on kenosis was followed by an exposition of later and specifically Protestant views on this issue. This review more or less fully expounded Bodemeyer's typical teachings Die Lehre von der Kenosis, Gött. 1860, Thomasia Christi Person und Werk Th. 2, Erlang. 1857, Ebrard Christliche Dogmatik 2 B. Königsb. 1852, Hess Das Dogma von Christi Person und Werk etc. Basel 1887, Dorner Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi nach dem Reformationszeitalter 1856, System der ehr. Glaubenslehre 2 B. 2 H. Berl. 1880 and Franc System d. ehr. Wahrheit 2 H. Erlang. 1880. At the same time, all the latest literature on the issue of kenosis was also indicated with greater or less completeness. All this made sense in the monographic study, but does not make sense in the present edition, since here patristic Christology has the exclusive significance of the return path to the Gospel teaching.
What results does the study of church teaching on the humiliation of Christ lead to?
We are forced to point out that the church teaching on kenosis cannot be brought into one system that embraces all types of church teaching, each of which has its own unique features and represents a more or less closed circle. What they have in common is only what is given in church formulas, and everything that in this teaching goes beyond the general formulas takes on a unique coloring for each church father. One can say moreover: the church teaching about kenosis does not even give any direct, i.e., the only possible conclusions, since all its types are located along two slopes - along the slope of the idea of the incarnate Logos and along the slope of the idea of the exalted man. Therefore, if we want to reach certain conclusions, then we must pose an independent thought and then ask whether it is justified by church teaching; any supposedly direct conclusion seems to us to be a crudely disguised tendency.
As such a thought, we put the gospel, religious-historical image of Christ, as the image of a man with a natural, God-given self-consciousness and with God-given miraculous power: and this image seems to us to have sufficient justification for itself in the church teaching about the self-abasement of Christ. Church formulas, filled with the idea of kenosis, fit completely within the framework of this image. Next. If we dwell more or less decisively on this image, then in more consistent types of church teaching, such as the teaching of Cyril of Alexandria, we will gain the right to transfer the feat of humiliation into the God-son self-consciousness of Christ, to understand the ideology of kenosis as the feelings and inner experience of the historical Christ.
In these results we regard the doctrine of the humiliation of Christ as an introduction to the philosophy of gospel history.
Wed. stt. 51.58; III, 13. These words were included in the text of the Nicene-Constantinople Creed; “with them, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Adv. Apollinarem, cap. IX: Migne, s. gr. t. XLV, col. 1141, - Creativity, part 7 (M. 1865) p. 76), signifies the condescension of the Divine to the humiliation of our nature.”
Ave. Review 1891, Jan. page 93.
Interpret. er. ad Phil. II, 11: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXXII, col. 572, – Creation. part 7 (M. 1861), p. 467; also de inc.Domini, p. IX, X: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXV, col. 1428 sec. and John Chrysostom about hom. VI in ep. ad Phil. l: Migne, s. gr. t. LXII, col. 218 sec. – p. lane (M. 1844) page 100 next
De inc. Domini, p. IX: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXV, 1428.
Cfr. Bruce, The humiliation of Christ, 3 ed. Edinb. 1889, p. 11–12.
Rome. 5:15; 1 Tim. 2 the apostle speaks of the man Jesus Christ (or: Christ Jesus), and 1 Cor. 10:4, 9 he applies the name Christ to the eternal Son of God and 2 Cor. 8 we find words similar to Phil. 2next (Jesus Christ, being rich, became poor for your sake), where humiliation (becoming poor) obviously refers to the incarnation.
John Zlat. hom. VII, 1: Migne, s. gr. t. LXII, col. 228. Also Theodoret Interpret. ep. ad Phil. II, 6: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXXII, 571; cfr. Eran. dial. 1: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXXIII, 72, 73, de inc. Domini, p. X: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXV, 1429 sequ. Cyril of Alexandria defens. IV anath. c. Theodor. Migne, s. gr. t. LXXVI, 417; der. f. ad regin. or. II, p. III: M. LXXVI, 1340; c. Theod. Mops. ibid. 1443; ep. 1 ad monk. (p. XV): Migne, LXVXII, 25.
Ambrose Comment. in ep. ad Phil. II, 5. 6: Migne, s. lat. t. ХVII, 408 – 409.
Ioanna Zlat. hom. VI, 2: Migne, s. gr. t. LXII, 220; hom. 1:col. 228.
Liebner, Christologie oder die christologische Einheit des dogm. Syst. darg. 1 Abth. Go %: ting. 1849. S. 322 folg. Ebrard, Christliche Dogmatik , 2, Königsb. 1852, Ss. 33–34 § 359; Frank, System der ehr. Wahrheit, 2, Erlang. 1880, S. 139 folg. § 34.3; Martensen, Die ehr. Dogmatik, deuts. Ausg. Berlin. 1856, S. 245 § 133 and many more. etc.
Philippi, Glaubenslehre, IV/1, 1861, S. 440 folg.
Dorner, System der ehr. Glaubenslehre, 2/1 1880, Ss. 285.286.441.
From Rome. 5:15; 1 Tim. 2cp. Gal. 1:12, 16 and many more. etc.
Here the words of Cyril of Alexandria Adv have their full meaning. Nest. lib. 5, p. II: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXVI, 221: ἢ οὐχ ἄπασιν ἐναργὲς ὅ τι ταπεινοῦται τὸ ὑψηλὸν, οὐ τὸ οἴκοθέν τε καὶ φυσικῶς ἐν ὑφέσει τε ὑπἀρχον καὶτεταπεινωμένον; κενοῦται δὲ, ο ἶ μαι, τὸ πλῆρες ὑπάρχον, καὶ δεδεημένον οὐδέν. δέχεται καὶ δούλου μορφὴν, τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς ἐλεύθέρον κατὰ φύσιν κτλ. Cfr. Gregory of Nyssa Adv. Apollon. XXI: Migne, s. gr. t. XLV, 1165.
Of the newest scholars, Beyschlag holds this opinion, Die Christologie des Neuen Testaments, Berlin 1866 (Ss. 233 folg.).
Cfr. The Holy Bible, ed. by F. C. Cook, vol. VIII, Lond. 1881, p. 608; H. A. W. Meyer, Kr. – exeg. Handbuch ü. d. Br. Pauli an die Phil. (Kol. und Philem.), 5 Aufl, neu bearb. von Dr. A. H. Franke, Götting. 1886, S. 93.
Μορφὴ means image, or form in which the essence is recognized. Oh sinon. ε ἶ δος, ἰδέα, σχῆμα see N. Cremer, Bibl. – theol. Wörterbuch d. N. T. Gräc. 6 Aufl. Gotha 1889, S. 606. In H. 3. except Phil. 2:6–7 μορφὴ is found only in M. XVI, 12: ἐφανερώθη ἐν ἑτέρ ᾳ μορφ ῇ.
Meanwhile, the Russian translation does not convey the differences between Phil. 2:6–7 and Col. 1:15.
As in Gregory of Nyssa Adv. Apollo, p. XX: Migne, s. gr. t. XLV, 1164: ε ἶ ναι ἐν τῷ πληρώματι τῆς θεοτητος ἴσα θεῶ.
De Trinitate, lib. IX. 14: Migne, s. lat. t. X, col. 292, 293.
De Trinitate, lib. IX. 51: Migne, s. lat. t. X, col. 322.
However, Greek exegetes, for polemical purposes, understand image in the sense of nature. So John Zlat. in epist. ad Phil. hom. VI, 1. 2: Migne, LXII, 219. 220; cfr. hom. VII, 3: col. 232. – p. lane pp. 102. 103; Theodorite interpr. ep. ad Phil. II, 11: Migne. s. gr. t. LXXXII. 572; Eran. dial. I: Migne, s. gr. LXXXIII, 73; epist. CLI: ib. 1424: also de inc. Domini, p. X: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXV, 1428. Polemical interests are indicated by the fact that against the Arians they conclude from the image of a slave = the nature of man to the image of God = the nature of God, and against the Docetes they conclude back from the image of God = the nature of God to the image of a slave = the nature of man, and even alternately use both arguments (interpr. ep. ad Phil. II, 11: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXXII, 572, – p. 476). – Defining the word image in the sense of nature, Greek exegetes express the relationship of the image of God to the image of a servant in the incarnation of the Son of God in a well-known, strictly established formula: “being what he was, the Son of God accepted what he was not” (de inc. Domini, p. VIII: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXV, 1425: μένων ὅ ἦ ν , ἔλαβεν ὃ οὐκ ἦ ν . Cfr. Кирилла Александрийского de inc. Unigeniti : Migne, s. gr. t. LXXV, 1224; de r. f. ad Theod . с. XXVI: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXVI, 1169) и They believe His self-abasement to be in hiding the image of God under the shell of a human image (Theodoret interpr. ep. ad Phil.
II, 6: Migne, LXXХII, 569: τὴν ἀξίαν κατακρύφας , τὴν ἄκραν ταπεινοφροσύνην εἴλετο καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ὐπέδυ μορφὴν. Cfr. Ioanna Zlat. hom. VII, 1: M. LXII, 229). Thus, Western and Eastern exegetes differ only in words and agree in the essence of the matter: the first, accepting the image in the sense of the norm of existence, talk about the humiliation of the image while the nature remains unchanged; the latter also talk about the immutability of the image = the nature of God, hidden under the shell of the human image.
As the Greek exegetes actually say: John Chrysostom. hom. VII, 1: Migne, s. gr. t. LXII, 228;Kirill Alex. adv. Nest. lib. V, c. II: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXVI, 221: ὁ ἐν μορφῆ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ΙΙατρὸς ὑπάρχων ὡ ς θεὸς κτλ.
Cfr. A. W. Bruce, The Humiliation of Christ, 3 ed. Edinb. 1889, p. 18; Ebrard, Chistliche Dogmatik, 2 B.S. 34 § 359; Fr. H. K. Frank, System d. ehr. Wahrheit, 2 H.S. 140 § 34.3; W. Weiffenbach, Zur Auslegung d. Stelle Phil. II, 5–11, Karls, u. L. 1884, S. 22 folg. R. A. Lipsius, An (Gal. Röm.) Phil thinks differently. 2 Aufl. 1892 (Hand. – Comment. zum N. T. von. H. J. Holtzmann u. a. B. 2, Abth. 2, Freib. 1893) S.226; Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 2 Th. Erlang. 1857, S. 152; Hotmann, Schriftbeweis, H. 1, 2 Aufl. Nördl. 1857, pp. 150–151.
Cfr. A. Bruce, The humiliation of Christ, p. 18.
Ep. Feofan, Interpretation of the last. St. an. Paul to Phil. and Sol. M. 1883, 74.
Zanchius, De filii incarnatione, lib. I c. XI; A. Bruce The humil. of Christ, p. 19.
Interpretation of the last St. an. Paul to Phil. and Sol. p. 72. Of the newest theologians, Meyer Ss. can also be mentioned. 95. 96; Thomasius S. 150; Weiffenbach, S. 20; Ebrard, Ss. 34–37; Liebner, S. 327; Lightfoot, Saint Paul's ep. to the Phil. London, 1890, p. 127–133.
John Chrysostom hom. VI, 2: Migne LXII, 220; Theodorite interpr. ep. ad Phil. II, 6: Migne, LXXXII, 569; Kirill Alex. de r. f. ad regin. I. s. VIII: Migne, LXXVI, 1308; cfr. Didima Alex. de Trinitate, I, 26; Lightfoot, p. 135.
Interpretation of the last St. an. Paul to Phil. and Sol. 73.Cfr. Thomasius, 157; Weiffenbach, 23.
Lightfoot, 112; Bruce, 20.
Bruce, 18; Ebrard, 34; Frank. 140, etc.
Wed. 2 Cor. 8:9; Heb. 12:2.
Synod. edition: did not consider it robbery to be equal with God; bib. total ed. 1822: equality with God was not considered theft. About the translation of Lond. ed. 1854 will be seen below.
So Ambrose in epist. ad Phil. Migne, s. lat. t. ХVII, 408: Hic (id est. J. Chr.) non rapinam arbitratus est esse se parem Deo; sciens enim in forma Dei se esse, non furatus est, ut diceret: Ego et Pater unum sumus... jure ergo exaequavit se Deo; Ille enim arbitratur rapinam facere, qui se parem facit ei quo inferior est etc. For translations of Tertullian and Augustine, see Lightfoot's op. cit. r. 134. However, the Vulgate gives the following translation: qui quum esset in forma Dei, non rapinam arbitratus est, ut esset aequalis Deo.
Welcher, ob er wohl in göttlicher Gestalt war, hielt er es nicht für einen Raub, Gotte gleich sein. – Lequel étant en forme de Dieu n’a pas regardé comme une usurpation d’être égal à Dieu. – Thought it not robbery to be equal with God.
See A. S. Khomyakova Complete collection. composition vol. 2, ed. 2, M. 1880, pp. 443–444.
Ioanna Zlat. hom. VI, 2: Migne, s. gr. t. LXII, 220. – p. lane page 104.
Ioanna Zlat. hom. VI, 2: Migne, s. gr. t. LXII, 220 sequ. – p. lane page 104 next
Cfr. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 2, S. 152.
Complete Works, vol. 2, p. 144. Cfr. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, I, 150–151.
Thomasius, translating αὐχὰ. ἡγ. through rapiendum sibi duxit, consistently distinguishes these sayings by meaning. Chr. R. and. W. 2, 152.
Cfr. Cook, The holy Bible, vol. VIII, p. 610, 618.
Cfr. Räbiger: Apostolo licuisset simpliciter scribere οὐχ ἣ ρπασε, non rapuit τὸ ε. ι. θ ., sed ut sententiam etiam graviorem redderet et Christum, de illo ne cogitasse quidem significaret, propterea scripsit οὐχ ἀρ . ήγ. (Thomasius, S. 152, Anm.).
Wed. r. lane Lond. ed. 1854·: He, being the image of God, did not exalt himself in that He was equal to God.
Interpr. er. ad Phi l. Migne, col. 569, – p. p. p. 465. Theodoret stands closest to Origen in Ioh among the previous exegetes and theologians. t. 1, p. XXXVII: Migne, s. gr. t. XIV, 85; in Rom. V, 2: 1022.
However, John Zlat. takes the word ἀρπαγμὸς then in the meaning of ἅ ρπαγμα, prey for which they greedily hold on (“if someone takes something, ὄπερ ἄν ἀρπάση τις, then he does not dare to leave it and holds it constantly”: ἀρπαγμὸς = ἄρπαγμα), then in the active meaning (“so the Son of God laid aside nature or dignity [here still ὰρπαγμὸς = ἄρπαγμα]... because οὐχ ἁ ρ. ἡγ ., i.e. had unstolen power": here ἀρπαγμὸς has an active meaning. Hom. VII, 1: col. passim). In what sense the word is used by him in one case or another is determined each time by contextual connection.
Hom. VII, 1: col. 229, – rub. lane 126. Also Theodore of Mopsuestia, Cyril Al., Theophylact.
I. – Chr... n’a point regardé comme une proie à ravir l’égalité’ avec Dieu. Cfr. Recolin, La personne de I. – C. et la théorie de la kenosis, Paris 1890, p. 32 sec.
The humiliation of Christ, p. 363–364; also Gore, The incarnation of the Son of God, Lond. 1893, p. 157; Ebrard, Christl. Dogm. 2, S. 34.
Cook, 618 (for the former); Meyer, 100 (for second).
Explanation of the last St. an. Paul to Philip. Eagle 1869, p. 63.
See 3rd ed. Liturgical Canons, St. Petersburg. 1875, p. 215. This understanding of the apostolic words is especially developed in Weiffenbach, Zur Ausleq. S. 26, which roughly paraphrases the Apostle’s thought as follows: “Christ Jesus did not intend to abuse His heavenly glory in such a way as to commit theft.” Nazarevsky's Epistle of St. an. Paul to the Philippians - interpretation of page 71 (Serg. Pos. 1893) ἡγήσατο = non arbitratus est, did not look at it as stolen, without further disclosure of the concept.
So Theodoret Repreh. III anath. Migne, s. gr. t. LXXVI, 404, – Acts. II (Kazan 1861) p. 140; cfr. Ep. Macarius, 64; Lightfoot, 112.
Kirill Alexan. Glaph. in Exod. lib. 1, p. 8 de visione Moysis in rubo: Migne, s. gr. t. LXIX, 413; cfr. Theodorit repreh. III anath. Migne, s. gr. t. LXXVI, 401–404 and the Eastern objection to the same anath. ibid. 325.
Kirill Al. defens. anath. X s. Theod. Migne, s. gr. t. LXXVI, 441: ὃ ταν σοι φαίνηται φορτικὸν τὸ ἐκ τῆς κενώσεως δυσκλεές, θαύμασον μειζόνως τὴν εἰς ἡμ ᾶ ς ἀγἀπησιν τοῦ Yἱοῦ .
Κενοῦν – to empty, exhaust, humiliate, vacuum reddere, vacuefacere, exinanire (Grimm, Lex. gr. – lat.in l. N. T. ed. 3, p. 239), leer machen, entleeren, hence Selbstleerung, also Selbstverlieren, – vider (il s’est vide, otherwise il s’est dépouille, otherwise il s’est anéanti), – to make void or empty (the self-void-making, self-emptying). However, the ancient Greek exegetes do not give reason to understand this word literally, but apply it to the incarnation in the sense of hiding the divine glory under the shell of humanity. So (according in this case with the fathers and teachers of the church) Theodore of Mopsuestia (comm. in epist. ad Phil. Migne, s. gr. t. LXVI, 924: τὸ, ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν, ἀντὶ τοῦ , ούκ ἕ δειξεν ἑαυτὸν, μ γὰρ λ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκείνην ἀπέκρυψεν, τοῦτο τοῖς ὁρώσιν ε ἶ ναι νομ ῳ όμενος, ὅ περ ἐφαίνετο ).
Kirill Alex. de r. f. ad Theod. With. XII: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXVI, 1152; adv. Nest. 1. 1, p. 1: 56, 57.
Sinon. εἰκών, from which ὁμοίωμ ἅ differs in that εἰκών can mean original, prototype, ὁμοίωμα - never; εἰκών can express slight similarity, ὁμοίωμα - the greatest possible similarity. It should also be noted that ὁμοίωμα does not mean only (some or simple) similarity with an assumed difference - no, but it means the entire appearance or appearance of something. Cremer, 651, 652.
Ioanna Zlat. hom. VI, 3: Migne, 223.
By connection of the word καὶ σχ. εὑρ. ὡ ς ἄνθρωπος refer to the subsequent ἑταπείνωσεν ἑαυτὸν as a definition of time ταπεινώσις ’a. Therefore, punctuation marks are placed correctly in tex. rec. and incorrectly in the Russian translation: the sign (;) should be placed not before “humbled himself,” but before “and in appearance became like a man.” This last saying already applies to Phil. 2:8. In meaning, it is very similar to the previous one, “having become like men” and, as it were, repeats it. However, on this basis the explanation of these sayings should not be torn apart. Only the meaning here explained, “and having become like a man in appearance,” should be connected (repeated in connection) with what follows.
Cfr. Ep. Feofan, Lightfoot, Weiffenbach and others.
Otherwise, the particle ώς would be superfluous, and, in addition, the combination of εὑρεθεἰς (ὡ ς) ἀνθρωπος with ἐν σχήματι can only have the meaning that Jesus Christ was revealed in external life as a man, because the appearance ἐν σχήματι = external life does not exhaust the human being: only ἐν σχήματι cannot be εὑρίσκεσθαι homo purus putus. Therefore, ἐν σχήματι, as a word with logical stress, comes first.
Hom. VII, 3: 231, – p. lane 133.
De inc. Domini, X: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXV, 1428.
Gregory of Nyssa adv. Apollo. XXI: Migne, s. gr. t. XLV, 1164, 1165.
Gess, Das Dogma von Christi Person und Werk, Basel, 1887, can be named as a defender of absolute kenosis.
1 Tim. 3:16: ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκἰ. Cfr. Kirill Alex. de inc. Unigeniti: Migne, s. gr. LXXV. 1220: Θεὸς ἐπέφανεν ἡμῖν ; de r. f. ad Theod. With. VIII: LXXVI, 1144: ὁ λόγος ἑφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί ; Afanasy Alex. oratio de hum. nat. With. 41: Migne, s. gr. t. XXV, 168–169; John Zlat. hom. VII, 3: Migne, s. gr. t. LXII, 231 λ ,, οὐδὲ οὐσία μετεβλήθη ἀλλ ’ ὡ ς ἄνθρωπος ἑφάνη .
Migne, s. gr. t. LXX, 1172; cfr. de r. f. ad reg. or. II, p. XIX: M. LXXVI, 1357.
Wed. 1 Cor. 15:27 , – Weiffenbach, 48.
See Rome. 5:1, 11, 21; 6:23; 7:25; 8:39; 13:14; 14:8; 16:20; 1 Cor. 1:3; 2:8; 5:4 , 6:11; 2 Cor. 4:10; 8:9; 13:13; Gal. 1:3; 6:14, 18; Phil. 3:20; 4:23 ; 1Sol. 1:1; 5:28. Cfr. Weiffenb. 49, 50.
Cfr. Ioanna Zlat hom. VII, 4: col. 234.
Ἐξομολογεῖν: confiteor, profiteor with trace. Ass. obj. or ὄτι and only with the trace. dat. personae in the sense of celebro, praedico (Rom. 14:11).
John Zlat. hom. VII, 4; col. 234: ἵ να πάντες τοῦτο εἴπωσι : τοῦτο δέδόξα τοῦ Πατρός .
Homil. εἰς το, Πάτερ, εἰ δυνατον ἐστι κτλ. 3: Migne, s. gr. t. LI, col. 48, – Conversations at a time. m. St. Pis. vol. II, p. 140; Acts everyone personal vol. VI, Kazan 1871, pp. 204–205.
This intense expectation on the part of Christians of the second, glorious coming of Christ, which, according to their belief, was to be revealed on the night of Easter, explains the origin of the all-night vigil, the oldest form of Christian worship. See Histoire de Bréviaire romain par. P. Batiffol, Paris 1894, p. 2 sec.
Epist. II ad Corinth, p. 1: Migne, s. gr. t. I, col. 329. ὡ ς περὶ Θεοῦ, ὧ ς περὶ κριτοῦ ζώντων καὶ νεκρών.
Epist. ad Trall. X; epist. ad Smyrn. IV.
Pastor, lib. III, simil. V, p. VI: Migne, s. gr. – lat. t. II, col. 961–962: in servili conditione non ponitur Filius Dei, sed in magna potestate et imperio.
1 Apol. With. V: Migne, s. gr. t. VI, col. 336; With. ХIII: 345–348; XVI: 352–353; LXIV; 425; LXV: 428–429; 2 Apol. VIII: 457; X: 460–461; dial. cum tryplh. Jud: c. CXIII, CXXI, CXXVI, CXXVIII: 736–737. 757. 769–776. For Justin, Christ the Logos, as the power of God and an angel, is necessary, by the nature of a divine being - formidable and inaccessible to man, a mediator between God and man. Dial, cum Tryph. Jud. With. CXXVII, CXXVIII: Migne, s. gr. t. VI, 772–776. Therefore, Justin could compare the Incarnation with the theophanies of pagan mythologies.
Tatiana Oratio ad Graec. With. V: Migne, s. gr t. VI, 813–817; Theophilus of Antioch ad Autol. lib. il, p. XXII: 1083; Athenagoras Legatio pro christ. With. X: 908–909.
That Docetism is primarily a product of the Greek spirit, and not of Eastern worldviews, about this see A. Harnack, Lehrbuch d. Dogmengesch. I (1888, 2 Aufl.), 192.
Theodorite haer. fab. comp. lib. II, 1: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXXIII, 388; Epiphanius adv. haer. III, 14, XVI, ХVIII. In the man Jesus, the Ebionites saw first of all the mercy of God, revealed in his glorification, they saw his free prosperity and improvement (προκοπή); This is an order of thought that is completely contrary to the idea of kenosis.
However, it should be noted that according to all Gnostic systems, matter opposes the Divine as His limitation, so that God’s relationship to the material world is understood, in any case, as a humiliation of the divine nature. Even in those systems in which matter is considered as an external manifestation of the divine spirit, this revelation is presented in the sense of the extreme degree of self-limitation of the divine being (Die Materie ist der sich objectiv und äusserlich gewordene Geist auf dem äussersten Puncte (dieser) Selbstentäusserung. Baur, Die ehr. Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer gesch. 1 Th. The main terms of the Gnostic systems are πλήρωμα - the world of ideas or aeons, the fullness of divine existence, and κένωμα - the sensory world, emptiness, alien to reality. Ibid. 148. The transition from divine existence to the visible world is, according to the very basic concept of Gnostic systems, κένωσις of the divine nature. The presence of divine light in the world of sensory appearance is necessarily accompanied by the suffering of the Divine; particles of divine light scattered in matter, through this suffering, strive to escape from the world. But these sufferings are only visible, apparent...
Theodorit haer. fab. comp. II, IV: M. LXXXIII, 392; Tertullian de praescr. haer. c. 53.
Theodorit haer. fab. comp. II, 8: LXXXIII, 396.
Tertullian adv. Prax. With. 1, XVI; Theodorit haer. fab. comp. II, IX; III, III: M. LXXXIII, 396. 404.
Tertullian adv. Prax. With. XXIX.
See Tertullian adv. Judaeos, Cyprian Kare. Testimonia adv. Judaeos (cfr. Justina dial, cum Tryph., also the epistles of Barnabas and Clement of Rome); similarly and against Ebionian monarchianism, Hippolytus in Op. σμικρός λαβύρινθος (φιλοσοφουμενα) and Novatian in Op. de Trinitate, mainly prove the deity of Jesus Christ, and Novatian uses the method of contrasting everything human in Christ with His divine greatness and dignity: the descent from Abraham of eternal divine existence, etc. More details about this controversy can be found in D. A. Gusev. Heresy of the Anti-Trinitarians of the Third Century. Kazan, 1872, p. 149 next.
Sop. haer. lib. III, XIX, 1: Migne, s. gr. t. VII, 939, – p. lane priest Preobrazhensky, pp. 370–371.
So Irenaeus writes that man is the shelter of God’s activity and His power (p. haer. III, 2: M. VII, 943, - p. n. 375), that man is not a stranger to God, but, as created in the image and likeness of God, is His own property (lib: V, II, 1: 1123–1124, p. n. 579–580), that he is created according to the image of the Word, so that the incarnation of the Word is presupposed by creation itself (lib. V, XVI, 2: 1167. 1168, - p. n. 623), that living man is the glory of God (lib. IV, XX, 7: 1037, - p. n. 478).
For example, Tertullian de carne Christi p. IV (cfr. p. VI). Migne, s. lat. t. II: 758–760; adv. Marc. lib. III, p. X: 334–335.
Not to mention the docetism inevitable for this direction.
Tertullian adv. Prax. With. XXIX. The main content of the polemic against this type of monarchians was the disclosure of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity; so, besides Tertullian, Hippolytus in Op. With. Noet., Origen, Dionysius Alexan. (a student of Origen) in various epistles (excerpts from them, for example, in Athanasius Alex. in his epist. de sententia Dion. Alex,). Dionysius of Rome in adv. Sabellianos (as much against Sabellius as against Dionysius Alex.). More details from D. A. Gusev Heresy of Anti-Trinitarians, p. 218 next.
See courses and monographs, for example. Dorner, Entwicklungsgeschichte d. Lehre von d. Person Christi; V.A. Snegireva Doctrine about the face of Jesus, Christ in the first three centuries of Christianity, V.V. Bolotova Origen's Teaching about St. Trinity.
Epist. ad Troll. X; epist. ad Smyrn. V.
Epist 1 ad Corinth. ХVII.
Epist. ad Diogn. VII, X.
Cfr. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 2 Th. Erlang. 1857. S. 166 (about Origen: keineswegs... conséquent).
See Thomasius, Chr. P. xi. W. 2, Ss. 160–166. 170–172.
Theodorit E. h. III: Migne, s. gr. t. LXXXII, 889 – p. p. (St. Petersburg 1852) p. 18; Mansi S. conciliorum coll. t. II, 644; – Acts vol. 1 (Kazan 1859) p. 42; Epiphany adv. haer. lib. II, t. II. haer. LXIX, 19; Migne, s. gr. t. ХLII, 232.
Id. Migne, s. gr. t. LXXXII, 892, – p. paragraph 20; Mansi II, 645, – Acts. I. 44.
Ibid. Cfr. Socrates h. e. I, 6; Sozomena h. e. I, 15.
Gregory of Nyssa adv. Apollo. XXXIX. XL. L: Migne, s. gr. t. XLV, 1212. 1213. 1244, – pp. 144–146, 147, 177, 178
Adv. Apollo. L: 1244, – page 177.
Id. XXXIX: col. 1212, p. 145.
Athanasius de incar, p. Apollo., lib. I, p. 2: Migne, s. gr. t. XXVI, col. 1096, – Creation. Part 3 (M. 1853) p. 359.
Gregory of Nyssa adv. Apollo. IV. LVI col. 1129, 1260, – pp. 64–65, 193.
Adv. Apollo. LVI col. 1260, – p. 193; Epiphany adv. haer. lib. III, t. II,. c. 2: Migne, s. gr. t. XLII, col. 644, – p.p. page 176.
Adv. Apollo. LVIII col. 1265, – p. 199. The expression ἀκολουθία φύσεως may mean the free submission of the Logos to the laws of the flesh, its weaknesses. Cfr. Theodorit Eran. I ΙΙ: M. LXXXIII, 309.
Adv. Apollo. LVIII: 1268.
Adv. Apollo. XXXIII: col. 1199, – pp. 128–129.
Id. With. V: col. 1132; cfr. With. LII: 1248; XXXI. XXXII: 1192.
Afanasia de incar. With. Apollo. lib. I, p. 2: M. 1096, – p. 359.
Gregory of Nyssa adv. Apollo. ХLIV: col. 1228–1229, – pp. 161, 162.
Adv. Apollo., VI. XII. XIII. XXIV. XXV:col. 1133–1135. 1145, 1148, 1173, 1177, – pp. 69, 70, 80, 81, 107, 110; Epiphany adv. haer. lib. III, t. II, p. 2; col. 644, – page 176.
Epiphany adv. haer. lib. III, t. II, p. 2; col. 644, p. 176; Gregory of Nyssa adv. Apollo, p. ХVII: col. 1156–1157, – pp. 90–91.
Adv. Apollo, p. XXV:col. 1177, p. 110.
Id. With. XIX:col. 1160, – page 94.
It must be remembered that Apollinaris was an expert in Greek classical literature, the main idea of which was πάντα θεία καί ἀνθρώπεινα πάντα.
Adv. Apollo. ХIII: col. 1148, page 82: μίαν ἐποίησε τοῦ θεοῦ τε καὶ τοῖ ἀνθρώπου τὴν φύσιν .
Adv. Apollo. XLIV:col. 1228–1229, pp. 161–164. In an excerpt from the work de fide ex parte belonging to Apollinaris, cited by Leontius De sectis, VIII: Migne, s. gr. LXXXVI, 1, 1256, the expression is found: μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λὸγου σεσαρκωμένη.
Eg. or. With. ar. II, 78; crf. III, 30 (Migne, s. gr. t. XXVI, 387), 31 (389), 32 (389–392).
Gregory the Theologian or. XXX (theol. IV) p. VI: Migne, s. gr. t. XXXVI 109, – Creation. Part 3 (M. 1883) p. 67. Even later, Theodoret does not agree with Cyril “to assimilate to God the Word what is humbly and decently said about the image of a slave” in the interests of polemics with the Arians. Repreh. IV anath. Migne, s. gr. t. LXXVI, 409, – Acts. II, 148. Cfr. Kirill epist. ad Acac. Migne, s. gr. t. LXXVII, 197, – Acts. II, 398–399.
Gregory the Theologian or. XXIX (theol. III) c. XIX. XX: col 100, – pp. 59–60. A common idea among fighters against Arianism is that in the perception of human nature there was nothing indecent for Jesus Christ. So Gregory Nis. or. cat. M. XLV, 69–72; Afanasia or. de h. n. ect. M. XXV, 168.
Adv. Eunom. Migne, s. gr. t. XXIX, – p. lane Creation part 3 (M. 1846).
Adv. Eunom. lib. IV, 3: col. 696. 697, – p. 166. 167. Like Afanasy Alexan. explains the words My God, My God! Why have you left me? (the Lord said this on our behalf) Father! into Your hands I commend My spirit (the Lord in Himself commends all men) and so on. De inc. Dei Verbi et p. ar. With. II, V. VI. Migne, s. gr. t. XXVI, col. 988. 992, – pp. 288, 290. Cp. his words on the Arians, also Gregory of Nyssa's words against Arius and Sabellius. Other fathers and teachers of the church speak differently about the named infirmities of Jesus Christ and precisely in the sense of their reality. In any case, one should, for example, remember the words of Theodoret about the ignorance of Jesus Christ; “If, knowing the day, (Christ) says that he does not know it, then look to what blasphemy (this) should lead, how (deceives) the truth, undeservedly called the truth, if it contains something contrary to the truth.” Repreh. IV anath. Migne, LXXXVI, col. 412, – Acts. II, 149. Cyril compares the reality of I. Christ’s ignorance with the reality of sleep and fatigue: see below.
Liber de patientia et discr. With. XV: Migne, s. gr. t. XXXIV, 877. Similar thoughts are scattered in abundance in the writings of Ephraim the Syrian.
Oratio III p. ar. With. XXX: Migne. s. gr t. XXVI, 387, – p. part 2 (Creation 1850), 423.
Id. With. XXXI: col. 389, – p. p. p. 425.
Id. With. XXXII: 389–392, – page 426.
What is the Christology of John Chrysostom. had the same direction as that of Athanasius, Basil the Great, Gregory the Theologian, this is evidenced by his words against the Anomeans, also against Jews and pagans.
Bruce, The Humiliation of Christ, Edinb. 1889, p. 237 sec.
Thomasius, Christi P. u. W. Th. 2, S. 172 folgg.
De Trinitate lib. IX, 14: Migne, s. lat. t. X. col. 292. 293. – lib. IX, 51: col. 322.
De Trin. lib. IX, 4: col. 283. 284, – lib. IX, 38: 310, – lib. IX, 41: 313–315, – lib. XI, 42: 426–427.
De Trin. lib. X, c. 23: col. 261–262.
De Trin. lib. IX, 24: col. 364: (I. Chr cum potum et cibum accepit, non se necessitati corporis, sed consuetudini tribuit.
Gregory of Nyssa adv. Apollo. XXXIII (cfr. pp. XXIV-XXVIII): col. 1196, p. 129; Epiphany adv. haer. lib. III, t. II, p. IV: col. 645–646, pp. 179–180; also both books of Athanasius against Apollinaris. Wed. definition of the Sirmium Cathedral (A.P. Lebedeva Ecumenical Council. IV and V centuries. M. 1879, 76).
Adv. Apollo. XLI; col. 1217, – pp. 151–152; adv. haer. lib. III, t. II, 27–31: 680–688, pp. 213–221.
Adv. Apollo. XIV:col. 1149, p. 83: εἰ προαιώνιος ἡ σὰρξ, οὐ κεκένωται ἡ θεότης, ὰλλ ᾿ ὅ περ ἦ ν τ ῇ φύοει, τοῦτο ἐφανερώθη νῦν, οὐκ ἐταπεινώθν. Cfr. c. Χ V. ΧΧ . ΧΧΙ; Epiphany adv. haer. lib. ΙΙΙ, t. ΙΙ, ΧΧ V ΙΙ: 680, p. 213.
Sophronius, in his dogmatic epistle, gives a most detailed presentation of church teaching about St. Trinity (Mansi, t. XI, 461–510).
Kenosis can be the subject of either moral preaching and hymnological concepts, or doctrine, systematic teaching. In other words, kenosis can be considered either as a free moral act of divine love, expressing the nature of God’s relationship to the world, or as the way in which the union of the divine and human natures was accomplished in Christ, as a quomodo of the incarnation (cf. Origen de princ. praef. IV; Migne, s. gr t. XI, 117). In the latter sense, the doctrine of kenosis, or the doctrine of kenosis, constitutes a systematic disclosure of the manner in which God became man, in which the divine and human natures were united in Christ. While Christian writers had to defend the very reality of the divine and human natures in Christ, until then they were forced to talk about kenosis only in hymnological form. Even if the writings of church writers of the first centuries were more replete with reasoning about kenosis than is actually the case, still these reasonings would not have the character of a doctrine.
When the truth of the trinity of divine persons and the truth of two natures in Christ was established, then, together with the possibility of the question of the method of unification of natures in Christ, an incentive was given to reveal the doctrine of kenosis as a doctrine... One can even say that in the very definition of faith I and II universal. Councils is a direct and literal expression of the idea of divine condescension, revealed in the incarnation of the Son of God. “The voice of the council says: descended from heaven... Reason, writes Gregory of Nyssa, reveals the highest meaning in these words - here we are not talking about the local condescension of the deity (μὴ τοπικῶς καταβα ί νεν τὸ θεῖον) everywhere existing and containing everything that exists, but it signifies condescension to the humiliation of our nature ( παραδηλῶν συγκατα᾿ βασιν)". Adv. Apoll. X: Migne, XLV, 1141, p. 76. We read the same in Cyril Alex., Theodoret, John of Damascus (de fide orfh. lib. III, 1: M. XCIV, 984), in the Right Confession of the Cath. and an.
38: “The Son of God descended from heaven without changing place - since, like God, He is everywhere and fills everything - but it was so pleasing to His greatness to humble Himself by accepting human nature” (ed. 10, M. 1839, p. 39), in the Message of the Patriarchs of Rights. department Churches about the Orthodox faith: “Son of God, T. n. I. Chr., exhausted Himself, that is, took upon Himself human flesh in His own hypostasis - and became human” (Part 7). – Religion 1st and 2nd universal. Councils made it necessary to explain the mystery of the divine-human life the doctrine of kenosis; from this time on, the “theory of kenosis” constitutes a distinctive feature of Orthodox Christologies; from that time on, the presentation of the church teaching about the person of Jesus Christ every time turns into the doctrine of kenosis, as soon as they wanted to give a more church formula - not only to describe it, but also to explain it. True, we know a Western writer of the late IV and early. V Art. Augustine, whose Christology does not give any place to kenosis: man was perceived as the Son of God, such is the meaning of his Christology. But in judging this Christology one can agree with Dorner Entw. d. L.v.
d. P.Ch. II, 88–89: Augustinus wie auch Ambrosius zeigen keine nennenswerthe Productivität in unserem Dogma...
Fragmenta ex libris de inc. Filii Dei, – ex libro XIV: Migne, s. gr. t. LXVI, 991.
Fragm. ex lib. XIV; col. 989.
Fragm. ex lib. VIII.·981.
Id. The union of natures in Christ is called. by Theodore M. named συνάφεια.
Fragm. ex lib. VII: 976–980.
Fragm. ex libris c. Apollo. Migne, s. gr. t. LXVI, 996–999. Cfr. A. Neander Allg. Geschichte d. ch. K. 2 / 3 Hamb. 1831, S. 929 folgg.
Wed. Ep. John's History of St. Sun. cathedrals, vol. 1, M. 1871, pp. 174–175.
Quod unus sit Christus: Migue. s. gr. t. LXXV, 1280–1281; cfr. de r. f. ad reg. I, p. XII, M. LXXXVI, 1220; With. XIX: 1357–1360; c. Theod. Mops. col. 1439.
Russian translation of Acts. (“important”) does not stand up to either the meaning of the words or the spirit of Cyril’s views.
Migne, LXXVI, 440–441, – Acts. II, 179–182.
Epist. 1 ad mon. aeg. (pp. XIII, XIV): Migne, LXXVII, 24 cfr. adv. Nest. lib. I, p. VI: LXXVI, 44; lib. III, p. IV: 152–153. It was not only Cyril of Alexandria who judged Nestorianism from the subtle point of view of the idea of kenosis, but this point of view, as if involuntarily, by the essence of the matter, was pointed out to every fighter against Nestorianism. So, Proclus stands on it in a conversation he said against Nestorius (Mansi, IV, 577-588, - Acts 1, 311-322). Even John of Antioch, in his letter to Nestorius, connects the name of the Mother of God with the truth of the self-humiliation of Jesus Christ (Mansi, IV, 1065, - Acts I, 434-435).
Epist. XXXIX (XXXIV) ad Ioan. Antioch. M. LXXVII, 117 – Acts. II, 376.
Glaphyr. in Genes, lib. IV, de patr, Iacob c. II: M. LXIX, col. 220.
Glaphyr. in Exod. lib. I, p. 7: Migne, LXIX, 400–401.
Glaphyr. in Exod. lib. I, c. 8 de visione Moysis in rubö M. LXIX, 413; the same in homil. pasch. ХVII, 3: Migne, LXXVII, 781.
Apol. ad Theod. imp. M. LXXVI, 453, – Acts. II, 262.
Glaph. in Exod. lib. I, c. 4: Migne, LXIX. 396.
Histoire de l'Église, par W. Guettee, t. 4, p. 465 sec.
Dorner, Entwicklungsgeschichte d. Lehre v. d. Person Christi, 2 Th. 1853 (v. d. ä. Z), 64.
De r. f. ad Thieod. With. Χ VI ΙΙ: Migne, LXXVI, 1160 (de incarn. Unigenitï Migne, LXXV, 1212); adv Nest. lib.II, p. I: LXXVI, 60; With. XI: 101–104. 105; lib. III, p. I: 121; lib. IV, cap. VI: 204; ad reg. or. II, p. VIII: 1345.
Dialogus cum Nestorio quod sancta Virgo deipara sit et non Christi para: Migne, LXXVI, 249–256; liberadv. nolentes confiteri sanctam Virginem esse deiparam: Migne, LXXVI, 256–292; anath. I and his defense against Theodoret and the Eastern and many others. etc.
Adv. Nest. lib. I, p. II, Migne, LXXVI, 28; lib. IV, p. VI, 200–205; lib. V, 209; ad monach. aeg. (p. XIX), LXXVII, 29; ad Nestor, de excomm. ep. ХVII (XV); LXXVII, 112.121.
De r. f. ad Theod s. XXXVI: Migne, LXXVI, 1185 (de inc. Unigeniti, M. LXXV, 1240).
De r. f. ad Theod. With. VIII: Migne, LXXVI, 1144; With. XXIV: 1168; With. XXXV: 1185 (de inc. Unigen. Migne, LXXV, 1221). Cfr. adv. Nest. lib. 1, p. I: Migne, LXXVI, 21; With. III: 32; With. VI: 44; With. VIII: 49. 52; lib. III: 112–113; With. I: 120–121; With. II: 133; With. III: 136; lib. IV, c. VI: 202–204 κτλ.
De r. f. ad Theod. With. XXVI; Migne, LXXVI, 1172 (de inc. Unig. Migne, LXXV, 1224); With. XXV: 1168–1169; de r. f. ad reg. or. II, p. II: col. 1340; d. an. III c. or. col. 328.
Quod un. s. Ch. Migne, LXXV, 1280, explic. 1 anath. Migne, LXXVI, 297, – Acts. II, 31; defensio III anath. c. or. Migne, LXXVI, 328, – Acts. II, 60; adv. Nest. lib. III, p. IV: 152; lib. V, p. 1, 220; With. VII: 248.
Quod un. s. Chr. Migne, LXXV, 1289. Therefore, which expressions related to the issue Cyril considered legal and which did not allow, see V.V. Bolotova, Chr. Thurs. 1885, 1, p. 65, approx. 1, p. 70, approx. 1.
Anath. II, IV; def. anath., IV p. orient. M. LXXVI, M, – Acts. II, 71; ad Theod. de r. f c. XVI: Migne, LXXVI, 1157; XXXII: 1180.
De r. f. ad Theod. c. XXXIV; col. 1184.
Adv. Nest lib. V, c. II: Migne, LXXVI, 224: τοῦ Ἐμμ ., κ ἂ ν εἴ τις ἄνθρωπον λέγοι , τὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ Πατηος λόγον μορφὴν δούλου λαβόντα νοοῦμεν , καὶ ἐκ τών τῆς κενώσεως μέτρων δηλοῦσθαί φαμεν , εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ Θεὸν μονογενῆ , τὸν αὐτὸν ε ἶ ναι πιστεύοντες ἐνηνθρωπηκάτα τε ἣ δη καὶ σεσαρκωμένον . Just as in man bodily phenomena presuppose the soul and vice versa, so in Christ divinity and humanity were related. Adv. Nest. lib. V, c. VII: 244.
Ep. IV ad Nest. Migne, LXXVII, 48, – Acts. 1, 333; adv. anthr. c. XIV: Migne, LXXVI, 1101–1104.
Quod un. s. Chr. Migne, LXXV, 1332; οἰκειοῦτα τὰ ἡμῶν. ἐπεὶ γέγονε καθ ’ ἡμ ᾶ ς .
Explicit. anath. III: Migne, LXXVI, 301: οὐ γὰρ ἦ ν ἀλλότριον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἑνωθὲν αὐτῷ σώμα, ὃ καὶ ἁ πτὸν ε ἶ ναί φαμεν, καὶ ὁρατόν; de r. f. ad Theod. With. XXVI: Migne, LXXVI, 1169 (de inc. Unig. Migne, LXXV, 1224): ἀλλ᾿ ἴδιον ἀληθώς ; also de r. f. ad reg. or. I, p. III: Migne, LXXVI, 1205; or. II, p.VIII: 1345; With. XX: 1361; adv. Nest. 1, 1; Migne, LXXVI, 20. Similar expressions are found in Cyril quite often. In particular, he speaks of the Son of God’s assimilation of tangibility, visibility (Explic. anath. III: M.LXXVI, 301, - Acts II, 34) and so on; he even talks about the conception of God from the Virgin, about the birth of God (γέννησις), about the similarity of God with us in the economy in everything, about the suffering of God (Θεοῦ τὸ πάθος), about the resurrection of God, about the ascension of God to heaven. Schol. de inc. V. D. Migne, LXXV, 1416, - Acts. II, 196–197; cfr. adv. Nest. lib. I, p. 1: LXXVI, 17; lib. II, IX: 97; XI: 105; lib. V, p. VI: 241; de r. f. ad reg. or. 1, ХIII: 1260.
Ad Nest. de excom. ep. XVII (XV): Migne, LXXVII, 116, – Acts. I, 448 (repeated in def. IV an. c. or. cfr,. expl. an. II). As for Cyril’s attitude at this point to the former church writers, we must remember that the latter, in the fight against Arianism, strongly distinguished between sublime sayings, referring them to the Divine, and derogatory sayings, which referred to the One who exhausted Himself (Gregory of God. theol. III, XIX: col. 97, - p. 59), although they did not forget unity (ἕ νωσις), calling the body of Christ the body of God (Athanasia Al. er. ad Maxim, phil. col. 1088, - p. p. III, 354), as well as relating both actions and infirmities to the one Christ (Ep. IV ad Serap.: 657, - p. 91; Gregory Nis. adv. Apoll. p. XXI: 1165, – p. 98).
Def. anath. IV c, or. Migne, LXXVI, 340–341, – D. II, 74; cfr. Quod unus sit Christus: Migne, LXXV, 1332; de r. f. ad reg. or. II, p. XVI: Migne, LXXVI, 1353.
Quod un. s. Chr. Migne, LXXV, 1337; de r. f. ad reg. or. II, ХLII: LXXVI, 1393; adv. Nest. lib. V, c. 1: 212–213; c. Ι V: 232; With. VII: 244.
Quod un. s. Chr. Migne, LXXV, 1340: πέπονθε δἰ ἡμ ᾶ ς καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν σαρκὶ "ὁ ὤ ν ἐπὶ "The question of suffering is explained in detail in defens anath.
De r. f. ad Theod. itr. s. VIII. IX: Migne, LXXVI, 1144–1145 (de inc. Unig. Migne, LXXV, 1196).
Epist. XXXIII ad Acac. Migne, LXXVII, 160–161; cfr. ep. I ad mon. aeg. (p. ix): Migne, LXXVII, col. 17, – (p. XII) 21 and many more. etc.
Defens. anath. III c. or. Migne, LXXVI, 332, – Acts. II, 64.
De r. f. ad Theod. imp. s. XXIV: Migne, LXXVI, 1168 (de inc. Unig. M. LXXV, 1220).
Qu ο d unis bit Christus: Migne, LXXV, 1328: ὥ σπερ ἰδίαν αὐτοῦ τὴν σάρκα γενέσθαι φαμέν, ο ὕ τω πάλιν αὐτοῦ κατ ’ οἰκείωσιν οἰκονομικὴν , καὶ κατὰ γε τὸν τῆς κενώσεως τρόπον, τὰς τῆς σαρκὸς ἀσθενείας.
De r. f. ad Theod. itr. With. XXI: Migne, LXXVI, 1164 (de inc. Unig. Migne, LXXV, 1213–1215); ad reg. or. II, p. XXXVI, Migne, LXXVI, 1384; Thesaur. XXIV: Migne, LXXV, 369.
Adv. anthrop. XIV: M. LXXVI, 1101; Quod un. s. Ch. M. LXXV, 1332; Thesaur. XXVIII, 428.
Adv. Nest lib. II, p. III: LXXVI, 73; ad Nest.de excomm. LXXVII 112, – Acts. 1, 444–445.
De r. f. ad Theod. With. ХLII, 1197–1200 (de inc. Unig. LXXV, 1216); ad reg. de r. f. I, p. VI: LXXVI, 1208; XIII: 1296 (ἀπέθανε Θεὸς ἐν σαρκί); ad Nest, de excom. LXXVII, 113, – D. 1, 445–446. – The Logos also took upon Himself the conditions of the actual moral development of humanity: this is how He was led by the Spirit into the desert and defeated the devil here. Ad reg. II, p. XXXVI: Migne, LXXVI, 1384.
De r. f. ad reg. ΙΙ, c. ΧΧ XVI Ι: Μ. LXXVI, 1385 (ἀσθενειῶν).
Adv anthrop. ХVIII: Migne, LXXVI, 1108–1112; cfr. ad Nest, de excom. Migne, LXXVII, 109, – Acts. 1,442.
Adv. anthrop. XIX: Migne, LXXVI, 1112. 1113.
De r. f ad Theod. imp. XXXI: Migne, LXXVI, 1180: προσλαβοῦσα ἡ τού λόγου φύσις τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ; cfr. adv. Nest. lib. I, with III: LXXVI, 33; er. 1 ad mon. aeg. (v.): Migne, LXXVII, 16: de r. f. ad Theod. c. XXXII: LXXVI, 1181 (de inc. Unig. M. LXXV, 1233): εἰς Θεὸν πράττεται – ἡ πίστις τὸν φύσει καὶ ἀληθώς ἐν προσώπφ Χριστοῦ; c. XL. 1193; c. Theod. Migne, LXXVI, 1438, - Acts. V, 110; adv. Nest. lib. I, p. I: LXXVI, 20: lib. II, p. X: 97; lib. III, p. II: 126; With. III: 140; lib. V: 208.
De r. f. ad Theod. With. XXXI: LXXVI, 1169 (de inc. Unig. Migne, LXXV. 1209. 1224), also adv. Nest. lib. II. With. III: LXXVI. 77. 79; lib. III, c. III: 141. 145; IV, I: 172: p. II: 177; quod. b. M. s. Deip. With. XIV: 272; explic. I anath: col. 297; IV anath. col. 301; de r. f. ad Theod. XXX: 1177, de r. f. ad reg. I, p. IV: 1205; c. VIII: 1209; from XIII; 1249–1268; or. II, p. XXXIII, 1377.
De r. f. ad Theod. imp. ΧΧΧ VII: Migne, LXXVI, 1188 (de inc. Unig. LXXV, 1240).
Quod unus s. Chr. LXXV, 1261; ad reg. II, p. IX: LXXVI, 1348; With. XV, 1353.
Quod. unus s. Ch. LXXV, 1340.
De r. f. ad Theod. With. X: Migne, LXXVI, 1148 (de inc. Ung. LXXV, 1200): p. XXX: 1177; c. XLI: 1193; def. an. III, c. or. 328; def. an. I c . Theod. col. 396.
Cfr. de r. f. ad Theod. c. XXI: Migne, LXXVI, 1764 (de inc. Unig. LXXV, 1213); de r. f. ad reg. l: 1221; adv. Nest. lib. III, c. II; 128, p. IV; 169.
Ep. XXXIX (XXXIV) ad Ioan. Ant. Migne, LXXVII, 180, – Acts. II, 377. 378.
De r. f. ad Theod. With. Χ, Migne, LXXVI, 1148. 1149; With. XI. 1149; With. XXIV, 1168 (de inc. Unig. LXXV, 1260. 1261. 1292); explic. anath. I. II, col. 297; Quod un. s. Chr. LXXV, 1472; ep. IV ad Nest. LXXVII, 45, – Acts. 1, 330; exlibro c. Syn. Migne, LXXVI, 1427 sequ. adv. Nest. lib. I, p. III, LXXVI, 33; With. VIII; 53.56; lib. IV, p. VII: 205. 208.
De r. f. ad Theod. c. XL, Migne, LXXVI, 1193: ἀνθρώπων, φύσει μὲν ὑπάρχων Θεὸς καὶ οὐ δίχα σαρκάς ἄνθρωπος δὲ ἀληθῶς , καὶ οὐ ? c. XLIV; 1200; de r. f. ad reg. I, c. XIII: 1248, 1257; or. II, p. ХLII: 1393: οῦτε ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός , ο ὔ τε ἄσαρκος λόγος .
Quod un. s. Chr. LXXV, 1280.
Anath. II: LXXVII, 121, – Acts. 1, 455; de r. f. ad reg. 1, p. XIII: LXXVI, 1281–1284, etc.
De r. f. ad Theod. With. XX: LXXVI, 1162 (de inc. Unig. LXXV, 1213); Quod un. s. Chr. LXXV, 1304–1305. 1325.
Quod un. s. Chr. LXXV, 1308. 1320. This view of Cyril on the development of the human nature of Christ, as a revelation of the properties of His own divine nature, stands in connection with his teaching about the Holy Spirit as his own Son - not only as the Logos, born of the Father, but also as incarnate for our sake, so that glorification from the Spirit was not “the use (on the part of Christ) of alien power.” De r. f. ad Theod. With. XXXVI, Migne, LXXVI, 1188–1189; anath. IX, Migne, LXXVII, 121, – Acts. I, 454; defen. IX anath. c. Theod. Migne, LXXVI, 433; adv. anthr. XIV: 1101; Thesaur. XXXIII, XXXIV, Migne, LXXV, 568. 588. At this point, Cyril thinks in the same way as his predecessors, for example, Athanasius Al. Epist. 1 ad Serap. Migne, XXVI, 588. 589; by Con. Eun. lib. V, Migne, XXIX, 732.
Cfr. Dorner, Entw. II, 79, Bruce, The humil. 55.
Quod unus sit Christus: Migne, LXXV, 1320; adv. Nest. lib. V, p. II. LXXVI, 225; With. V, 233. 236; de r. f. ad Theod. With. XXV: 1169; ad regin. II, p. VIII: 1345.
Thesaur. XXVIII: Migne, L ΧΧ V, 428.
So the third anathematism of Cyril is directed against those who condemn the unity that is in Christ, and say that the natures are mutually divided and separated in all ways, both exist separately and separately. Defens. III anath. With. Theod. Migne, LXXVI, 405, – Acts. II, 143.
D.A. Gusev. Antitrinitarian heresy tr. V. pp. 137–145.
Cfr. defens. anath. IV p. Theod. Migne, LXXVI, 417, – Acts. II, 156: “the nature of the slave suffered exhaustion.”
Nestorii anath. I, II, III, IV, X, XII: Mansi, t. IV, 1093, – Acts. I, 461 next.
For Nestorius's attitude towards Paul of Samosata, see Baur, Die chr. Lehre von d. Dreiein. I, 738–739.
Even “whoever said, in the words of Cyril, that revelation was given to the nature of a slave by the God who dwells in it, and, moreover, a limited revelation, already turns Emmanuel into our prophet, a God-bearing man and nothing else,” whoever thinks “that derogatory expressions should be removed from God the Word and assimilated into one nature of a slave, he splits one into two sons.” Defens. IV anath. With. Theod. Migne, LXXVI, 416–417, – Acts. II, 155. 156. That Cyril developed his thesis φυσικὴ ἕ νωσις as a counterbalance to the Nestorian disunity of natures, about this see Migne, LXXVI, 405.
Defens. anath. III p. or. Migne, LXXVI, 332, – Acts. II, 64.
Ad Nest, de excom. Migne, LXXVII, 116, – Acts. 1,447.
Ad Nest, de excom. Migne, LXXVII, 113, – Acts. 1, 442 and many more. etc.
Defens. anath. IV c. Theod. Migne, LXXVI, 413, – Acts. II, 152.
Ad. Nest, de excom. Migne, LXXVII, 116, – Acts. 1, 447; epist. XLVI (ol. XXXIX) ad Succens. II, 4: 245; epist. L (ol. XLIV) ad Valer. col. 260. and many more etc.
Ad Nest, de excomm. col. 112, – Acts. 1, 444 and many more. etc.
Ad Nest, de excomm. col. 116, – Acts. 1,448.
Defens. anath. III c. or. Migne, LXXVI, 332, – Acts. II, 64.
Quod unus s. Chr. Migne, LXXV, 1292; cfr. defens. VIII anath. c. or. Migne, LXXVI, 352, – Acts. II, 85. Cp. above.
Such a teaching about the participation of the divine will in the revelation of the Logos in the human nature perceived by Him does not contradict their view of the mutual limitation of natures, which is explained by the well-known nature of the mutual communication of natures, similar to each other and externally united in the unity of the person (see above), and not by the active principle of this mutual communication.
Defens. anath. IV p. Theod. Migne, LXXVI, 416, – Acts. II, 155.
An. III; expl. anath. III, Migne, LXXVI, 300; defens. anath. III c. or. col. 332; defens. anath. III c. Theod. col. 405; de r. f. ad regin. I, p. ХIII: 1288; ep. Ι ad mon. aeg. Migne, LXXVII, 21; epist. ad. Nest, de excom. col. 112 (anath. III) 121; hom. pasch. Χ VII, 3 col. 748.
Epist. XXXIX (XXXIV) ad Ioan. Ant. Migne, LXXVII, 177.
Adv. Nest. lib. II, p. 1: Migne, LXXVI, 65; de r. f. ad reg. 1, p. VIII: 1209; c. XI, 1217; c. Χ II: 1220; ad Nest, de excom. Migne, LXXVII, 112.
Quod un. s. Chr. Migne, LXXV, 1289; adv. Nest. lib. II: Migne, LXXVI, 60; defens. VIII anath. c. or. col. 349; de r. f. ad reg. I, c. IX: 1212, · epist. XL (XXXV) ad Acac. Melit. Migne, LXXVII, 192. 193, epist. ad Eulog, col. 225; epist. XLV (ol. XXXVIII) ad Succens. I; 232; epist. XLVI (ol. XXXIX) ad Succens. II: 240. 241. 244. The position of Cyril’s Christology ἕ νωσις φυσικὴ, μία φύσις served as the subject of the most fierce attacks of his opponents in the Nestorian disputes, and soon after his death received even greater fame from the connection with him Monophysitism was established. The first open Monophysite, Eutyches, solemnly declared: “I read (the writings) of the blessed one. Cyril (the Holy Fathers and St. Athanasius): they recognized two natures before the union, and after the union and incarnation they no longer recognized two natures, but one.” Mansi, t. VI, 745. This accusation of Cyril as a Monophysitist is persistently supported by later and modern scientists of various directions. And in fact, Cyril taught about μία φύσις, therefore, he is a Monophysite: short and clear!
Even those scientists who, due to their official position or sincere conviction, cannot suspect the purity of doctrine in Cyril’s presentation, try to explain the expressions φυσικὴ ἕ νωσις, μία φύσις as accidental and uncharacteristic of his Christology, and make noticeable efforts to get rid of them. Cyril’s defense is usually reduced to the fact that “the expression is not his own, it was borrowed by him from one of the works of St. Athanasius: de incarnatione Dei Verbi (Migne. t. XXVIII, 28), which, however, is recognized as spurious,” that “Cyril himself allowed this expression because, like many writers of the ancient Church, he confused the concepts of “nature” and “person.” He uses the word φύσις in the sense of ὑπόστασις “. But after all, “this expression was loved in the circles of the Alexandrians” (A.P. Lebedeva Ecumenical collection. IV and V centuries. p. 191, note 33), Cyril himself, to assert the right to use this expression, refers, citing several excerpts, not to any one. composition, but directly addressed to Athanasius (defens. anath. VIII pp. or. Migne, LXXVI, 349; de r. f. ad regin.
I: 1212); s. gr. XCIV, col. It is beyond any doubt that Cyril not only used the expressions we are talking about, but these expressions are highly harmonious with the entire system of his Christology and indeed serve as the most typical feature of his Christological views. But nevertheless, it can be resolutely asserted that Monophysitism was a caricature of Cyril’s Christology. There is a gross similarity here - these are the same expressions, there is a deep, although subtle, difference - in the meaning of the expressions. The followers of Eutyches in the expression μία φύσις understood the last word literally and specifically called the divine nature the one nature of Christ, which, in their opinion, was absorbed by the human and to which, as one, the suffering of Christ was related.
On the contrary, Cyril’s expressions φυσικὴ ἕ νωσις, μία φύσις are equivalent to his other expressions: ὑπόστασις μία (adv. Nest. lib. II, c. VII Ι, Migne, LXXVI, 93; epist. adv. Nest, de excom. Migne, LXXVI Ι, 116), ἕ νωστς καθ ’ ὑπόστασιν (anath. II; adv. Nest. lib. 1, p. 1, Migne, LXXVI, 17. 20; XIII: 53; lib. II, с. II: 69; cap. VI: 84; V Ι II: 89. 92; с. X: 97; с. XII; 108; lib. III, с IV: 157; lib. IV, с.II: 176; de r. f. ad reg. I, с. XIII: 1276; epist. IV ad Nest. Migne, LXXVII, 45 etc.), perhaps sometimes replaced by the expression ἕ ν πρόσωπον (quod un. s. Chr. Migne, LXXV, 1297, 1329, sch. de inc. Dei Verbi, col. 1413–1416, adv. Nest. lib. II, Migne, LXXVI, 60. 64. 68, defens. IV c. col. 413, epist. XXXV ad Acac. LXXVII, epist. XLIV col. ἀληθὴς (adv. Nest. col. 61. 64. 65. 72. 96. 136. 158. 160. 161. 169, explic. III anath. col. 300, defens. IV anath. 328). Cyril’s expressions μία φύσις and the like, according to the only understanding that corresponds to the most basic, essential meaning of his Christology, mean: a single theanthropic life, or a single divine-human being. From his own repeated explanations it follows that with these expressions he wanted to affirm the idea of the true union of natures, divine and human, into the unity of a theanthropic being, or theanthropic life, just as a person, consisting of soul and body, lives one life.
Defending the third anathematism, which affirms the unity of natures, against the objection of Theodoret, Cyril explains that it is directed against those who condemn the unity of natures in Christ, who say that the natures are mutually divided and separated in all ways, both exist separately and separately - he argues against such idle talk that the Word is natural, that is, not by dwelling, but truly joined to the holy flesh. Natural unity, Cyril continues, is true unity (ἕ νωσις φυσικὴ, τουτέστιν ἀληθὴς: Migne, LXXVI, 405. 408 cfr. adv. N. lib. II, I: 65; exp. III an. col. 300), not merging their natures; the union is called natural in accordance with the fact that substances were united, that the Word became man and became incarnate, so as not to give place to an untrue, inhabitable union; this unity is similar to how man is one, although one is by nature a soul, and the other by nature a body; so the unity accomplished in Christ does not contradict the fact that the Word of God by nature is something other than flesh, and other flesh by nature.
Defending this same anathematism against the eastern objection, Cyril again points out that Nestorius divides natures from one another, as if into separate parts, that the anathematism against such a reckless opinion confesses one Christ - the incarnate and incarnate only begotten Word of God, although by its nature the flesh is different from the Word and the Only Begotten is different in relation to its nature. And conversely: although the body is of a different nature than the Word of God the Father, yet to understand the matter in this way does not mean dividing natures after the union: one Christ, and Son, and God, and Lord. Thus, a natural connection means a true connection (Migne, LXXVI, 332), the word natural is the same as what is true. Natural union does not merge natures and does not mix them. In epist. XLV (ol. XXXVIII) ad Succens.
I immediately before the position μία φύσις τοῦ λόγον σεσαρκωμένη Cyril explains the difference between flesh and divinity, and immediately following this position he makes it clear that it expresses the union of natures into the unity of the Son and Christ and means the one incarnate Logos (Migne, LXXVII, 232–233) and again turns to the analogy of man, one of soul and body. (Also de r. f. ad Theod. p. XXVI, Migne, LXXVI, 1169). In epist. XLVI (ol. XXXIX) ad Succens. II Cyril draws your attention to the added word: incarnate (μία φύσις Yἱοῦ) σεσαρκωμένη. This added word invalidates the objection that from Cyril’s position there followed the suffering of the divine nature itself, a characteristic sign of Monophysitism ( ὁ λόγος τῆς μετὰ σαρκὸς οἰκονομίας εἰσφέρεται, εἰκῆ ?? περὶ ἣ ν εἰκότως ἂ ν συμβῆναι τὸ παθεῖν νοοῖτο ἀπαθοῦς ὄντος τοῦ λόγου: Migne, LXXVII, 240).
Refuting further the corollary derived from his teaching about the confusion of natures and, in particular, about the reduction of human nature ( τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φὐσεως ), Cyril explains his expression as equivalent to another: ε ἷ ς ὁ μονογενὴς Yἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ σεσαρκωμένος καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσας, – Yἱὸς, Who precisely as incarnate revealed himself to us in the unity of the divinely-sonary nature incarnate (μίαν ἡμῖν ἕ δειίεν Yἱοῦ φύσιν πλὴν, ὡ ς ἕ φην, σεσαρκωμένην Migne, LXXVII, 241 cfr. XL. ΧΧΧ V) ad Acac. col. 192. 193; de r. f. ad regin. Ι , с. XI Ι I, Migne, LXXVI, 1245: τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἑνὸς Yἱοῦ ; adv. Nest, lib II, p. ΙΙ, col. 69).
Likewise, to the Eastern objection: against the IV anathematism, that from the point of view of Cyril it is difficult to resist Eunomius and Arius, who confuse all the Gospel sayings of Jesus Christ or about Jesus Christ as if they were spoken about one nature, Cyril answered that the unity about which he teaches is precisely the inseparable union (distinguishable in the union of natures), is actually the unity of Christ, His sonship of God ( τῆς ἄκρας ἑνώσεως φυλαττομένης καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς Yἱοῦ, καὶ Χριστοῦ, καὶ Κυρίουὁμολόγουμένου, περὶ τὸν ἕ να καὶ τόν αὐτὸν Yἱὸν ἐκλαβέσθαι χρὴ τὰ λεγόμενα: Migne, LXXVI, 337), that Christ is one, although he consists of two distinguishable and in a union of natures (ὁ ε ἷ ς καὶ μόνος Χριστὸς κ ἂ ν ἐκ δυν νοῆται καὶ διαφόρων πραγματων εἰς ἑνότητα τὴν ἀμέριστον συνενηνεγμένος: cfr. epist. IV ad Nest. ἑξ ἀμφοτέρων Χριστὸς καὶ Yἱὸς οὐχ ὡ ς τῆς τών φυσεων διαφορ ᾶ ς ἀνηρημένης διὰ τὴν ἕ νωσιν ; ad Nest de excom. Migne, LXXVII, 116,· epist. ad Acac. col. 193; hom. pasch. XVII, 3: 784; de r . f. ad Theod. pp. XVI: Migne, LXXVI, 1157: ἀνομοίων πεπρ ᾶ χθαι φύσεων ). In the last to ep.
To Valerian, against those who think according to the dogmas of Nestorius, Cyril explains: what came from the flesh is flesh without any change, and what is from God is God; however, Christ is made up of both, the one Son and Lord. Each person consists of soul and body, of various and foreign objects; however, man is thought of as one, has one hypostasis and one nature, since the body, differing from the soul, is its own body and together with it constitutes the hypostasis of one person - one person, one of his nature, in the undoubted sense that body and soul, differing, constitute one animal, man. So Christ was one. (Migne, LXXVI Ι, 260, cfr. adv. Nest. lib. II: Migne, LXXVI, 60. 61. 85; explic. III anath. col. 300, the same in adv. Nest. lib. And, p. XII: LXXVI, 108, def. VIII anath. and I epist. ad top. aeg. p. XII: LXXVII, 21 cfr. XXIV, where the term ἕ νωσις φυσικὴ denotes the union of soul and body in a person). In the last to Akakios, Cyril confesses one Christ by the unity of two natures, by the inseparable union of different things, he confesses one (after this union) nature of the Son, as one, but incarnate (Migne, LXXVII, 192. 193) and so on.
What has been said is enough to see that the natural unity that Cyril teaches is completely identical with the position brilliantly developed by Cyril that the mystery of the incarnation consisted in the personal perception of the flesh by the Son of God, in His assimilation of everything human (Quod un. s. Chr. Migne, LXXV, 1289: ἕ να Y ἱὸν, καὶ μίαν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ε ἶ ναί φαμεν , κ ἂ ν εἰ ἐν προσλήψει γενέσθαι σαρκὸς ... αὐτοῦ γὰρ γέγονε τὸ άνθρώπινον. Cfr. Nest. self-abasement to the conditions of human life (defens. anath. III p. Theod. LXXVI, 404–409, def. an. IV: 417, epist. I ad top. aeg. (p. XVI), LXXVII, 28, ad Nest, de excom. col. 112), - briefly and again to say, there is the unity of theanthropic life.
Quod unus sit Christus: Migne, LXXV, 1292: ἀλλ ’ εἰ μίαν ε ἶ ναι φύσιν Yἱοῦ φαμεν , κ ἂ ν εἰ νοοῖτο σεσαρκωμένος , π ᾶ σά πως ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι φυρμὸν μολογεῖν καὶ σύγκρασιν , ὑποκλεπτομένης ὡ σπερ τῆς ἀνθρώπου φύσεως ἐν αὐτῷ. ; ibid. col. 1293: human nature οὐ δαπαν ᾶ ται divine, epist. II ad succens. M. LXXVII, 241: φύσεως.
Explicit. IV anath. Migne, LXXVI, 301.
Migne, LXXVI, 404–409, – Acts. II, 142–147; adv. Nest. lib. I, col. 17; ep. I ad mon. aeg. (p. XXIII): Migne, LXXVII, 36.
Quod unus sit Christus: Migne, LXXV, 1293. Cp. higher.
Adv. Nest. lib. 1, p. I: Migne, LXXVI, 21.
Quod unus sit Christus, Migne, LXXV, 1332.
Adv. anthrop. With. XIV, Migne, LXXVI, 1101–1104.
Defens. anath. IV c. Theod. Migne LXXVI, 416, – Acts. II, 154.
Adv. Nest. lib. II, p. VIII: LXXVI, 92; lib. V, pp. II: 221.
Schol. de inc. V. D. Migne LXXV, 1416; adv. Nest. lib. V, p. III, LXXVI, 228; dial. cum Nest. col. 253: ἡμεῖς μὲν φυσικῶς πεινῶμεν καὶ διψῶμεν καὶ καθε ὖ δομεν, οὐ γνώμ ῃ, ἀλλ ’ ἀνάγκ ῃ φύσεως δουλεύοντες . αὐτός δὲ οὐκ ἀνὰγκ ῃ, ἀλλὰ γνωμ ῃ κτλ . de r. f. ad reg. LXXVM, 1205: καταβέβηκεν ἑκ ὼ ν ἐν τοῖς τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος μέτροις κτλ.
Adv. Nest. lib. I, p. 1, Migne, LXXVI, 17: τοὑς τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος οὐκ ἀτιμάσαντος νόμους ; col. 21; s, II, col. 28: quod un. s. Chr. Migne, LXXV, 1332: ἠ φίει οἰκονομικώς τοῖς τῆς ἀνθρωπότηζος μέτροις εφ ’ ἑαντῷ τὸ κρατεῖν. Particular attention should be paid to this point in Cyril’s teaching. The solution to the question of the reality of the sufferings and infirmities of Christ often fluctuates between Docetism and Nestorianism. A solution alien to either extreme constitutes the great problem of Christology, brilliantly solved by Cyril. On the one hand, his teaching is opposite to Nestorianism, but, on the other hand, it is alien to docetism: the self-abasement of Jesus Christ extended to the subordination of the Son of God to the laws of human life. About this combination of the freedom of the Son of God with the necessity of human nature, cf. Athanasius Ex tractatu in illud: nunc anima turbata est: Migne, XXVI, 1241.
Adv. Nest. lib. III, Migne, LiXXVI, 116. This is the essential difference between Cyril and Nestorianism.
Quod un. s. Chr. Migne, LXXV, 1332; adv. Nest. lib. I, p. 1: Migne, LXXVI, 21; lib. V, p. VIII: 228.
Thesaurus, ass. XXVIII: Migne, LXXV, 428; adv. Nest. lib. III, p. IV; LXXVI, 153: πῶς ο ὖ ν ἂ ρα προκάπτειν εἴρηται; συμμετροῦντος. ὥ ς γε ο ἶ μαι , τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου τ ῇ τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος α ὔ ξ ῃ τε καὶ ἡλικί ᾳ, τῶν ἐνόντων αὐτῷ θεοπρεπεστὰτων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ἔκφανσιν.
Adv. Nest lib. II, p. I: LXXVI, 73. 76; With. III: 77; lib. IV, p. II: 176; de r. f. ad Theod. XLIV: 1200; ad regin. I, p. XIII: 1304; epist. I ad mon. LXXVII, 29; ad Nest, de excom. col. 112.
Defens. III anath. c. Theod. Migne, LXXVI, 405, – Acts. II, 143.
Blazh. Theodorit repreh. IV anath. Migne, LXXVI, 412. 413, – D. II, 149.
Defens. an. III c. or. Migne, LXXVI, 332, – D. II, 64; de r. f. ad Theod. With. XXV: 1168; ad Nest, de excom. LXXVII, 116, – Acts. I, 447.
Consequently, the heterogeneity that Cyril speaks of (cfr. John Chrysostom: Christ = τὸ φαινόμενον θεὸς: hom. VII, 2: Migne, LXII, 231) does not exclude the relationship of man to God, that man is the image of God... Here we must keep in mind the patristic view of the relationship of man, created in the image and likeness of God, to God as the visible to the invisible, revealed in him. See, for example, Gregory the Theologian's word XXXVIII: Migne, t. XXXVI col. 321–324, – Creation. Part III, 199–200.
Thesaur. XXI: Migne, LXXV, 281: τὴν ἡμῶν σάρκα περιεβάλετο , – τὸν ἀτελὴ ἄνθρωπον περιεβἀλετο; dialog.cum. Nest. Migne, LXXVI, 252; τὸ ἡμέτερον ἐνδυσάμενος σῶμα ; de r. f. ad Theod. With. XIX: 1160: ἡμπίσχετο τὴν ὁμοίαν ἡμῖν σάρκα; With. XXXV: 1185; de r. f. ad reg. I, p. VIII: 1209; II, p. VI: 1344; Migne, LXXVI, 1440, - Acts. V, 112. 180: the Son of God was not simply a man, but in human form (the same adv. Nest. lib. V, p. II: 224); in Sch. de inc.Unig. With. II, VII the name Emmanuel is explained in see Var. III, 38; er. XLVI ol. XXXIX ad. Suc. II: LXXVII, 240. 241.
In addition to general expressions of this truth (cfr. previous note, - also De inc. Unig. Migne, LXXV, 1220: Θεὸς ἐπέφανεν ἡμῖν ; Thesaur. XXVIII: 428: ἀποκαλυπτομένης καὶ φανερουμένης τῆς ἐν αὑτῷί ; p.VIII: Migne, LXXVI, 1144: λόγος ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί ... φανέρωσις ἐν σαρκί ). Cyril explains this truth in more detail and in detail, especially in the meaning of the story of the healing of the man born blind (adv. Nest. lib. II, p. XI: LXXVI, 105; de r. f. ad Theod. imp. XXXIV: 1184), also in the meaning of the words of John. 10 (de r. f. ad Theod. p. XXXIII: LXXVI, 1181); In. 20:30–31; Acts 4:8,10–12 (pp. XXXV: 1184. 1185; c. anthrop. pp. XXII: 1117–1120); 1John 1 (adv. Nest. lib. V, p. 1: 241); according to him, even the Holy Spirit Christ ὡ ς ἄνθρωπος ἐνέπνει σωματικῶς (de r. f. ad Theod. p. XXXVI: 1188) and so on. Cfr. Afanasia Al. Or. III c. Ar. With. XXXI: XXVI, 389, etc.
De r. f. ad Theod. With. XXI: Migne, LXXVI, 1164 (de inc. Unig. LXXV, 1213–1216): ᾳ σαρκί.
Ep. ad mon. aeg. (XXI): LXXVII, 32. 33.
Here the difference is in the use of the word ὄργανον by Nestorius and Cyril. Adv. Nest. lib. II, p. VIII: LXXVI, 93. 96.
Adv. anthrop. XIV: LXXVI, 1101–1104; ad reg. II, XVI: 1353; Thesaur. LXXV, 373. 376; def. IV anath. c. Theod. LXXVI, 416.
Quod un. s. Chr. LXXV, 1332; ad reg. de r. f. II, XVI: LXXVI. 1353; Thesaur. LXXV, 428.
Adv. anthrop. XIV; LXXVI, 1101; def. IV anath. c. Theod. 416. Cp., above.
Eg. divine freedom and human slavery. Adv. Nest. lib. II, p. VIII: LXXVI, 92. Usually, the disputes between Cyril and the Nestorians about the relationship of natures in Christ on both sides boiled down to the question of the relationship of divine knowledge to human knowledge, and “everything else” was understood similarly.
Ep. XLVI (ol. XXXIX) ad Succ. II: Migne, LXXVII, 241; also in adv. Nest. lib. II: LXXVI, 61–64, where Cyril gives other examples of such unity: fire and wood in coal and under.
It is remarkable that Theodoret, who can no longer be reproached for heretical docetism, saying in one place that by the image of a slave one must understand not the likeness, but the nature of man, then even in this connection he says that God, having become incarnate, seemed to be a man: ἄνθρωπος ε ἶ ναι δό ἳ ν ἀνείληφε φύσιν . Eran. dial. 1: Migne, LXXXIII, 73.
Adv. Nest. lib. IV, p. II: LXXVI, 176: σαρκὶ μι ᾷ καθ ’ ὑπόστασιν κεκοινωνηκότος .
Ep. ad mon. aeg. (p. XX fin. XXI): LXXVII, 32. 33.
De r. f. ad. reg. II, p. XXI: LXXVI, 1364: ? ῳ λέγοιτο κατοικεῖν τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ , οὐχ ἕ τερον ὄν παρ ’ αὐτὸν ; ad Nest, de excom. LXXVII, 112.
Explicit. III anath. LXXVI, 300–301.
De r. f. ad Theod. XL: LXXVI, 1193: φύσει ὑπάρχων Θεὸς – οὐ δίχα σαρκός ; de r. f. ad reg. 1: 1209; adv. Nest. lib. II, p. VII: 84. 85.
Ep. XLVI Col. XXXIX ) ad Sucс. II, LXXVII, 241: πλὴν οὐκ ἄσαρκρς , οὐδ ’ ἔξω σώματος .
Quod un. s. Chr. LXXV, 1332; Thesaur. XXVIII: 428.
Apolog. XXI: Migne, s. lat. 1, 403. Of course, in this connection it is necessary to consider the expressions of Cyril, in which the reality of the incarnation and infirmities of Christ is identified with the faith of people in His incarnation, as with its purpose: He took upon Himself infirmities in order for them to believe that He had become a true man: Migne, LXXVI, 177. 188. 441. 1169.
Sch. de inc. V. D. Migne, LXXV, 1416.
Mansi, IV, 673: ο ὕ τως πιστεύομεν ὡ ς Κύριλλος.
Cfr. Kopallik, Cyrillus von Alex. eine Biogr. Mainz, 1881, S. 233.
Arr. to ed. mв. St. O. O. Part XIII, 304. True, Theodoret of Cyrus, a strong opponent of Cyril in the Nestorian disputes, reproached the Alexandrian saint for Arianism, for Apollinarism, for the doctrine of the confusion of deity with humanity, of the passion of the divine nature (Migne, LXXVI, 389, - Acts. II, 126; ibid. 400, - D. II, 136. 448, - D. II, 188; Migne, LXXXIII, 1417, - D. V, 221; I, II, III passim). Nestorius made similar reproaches to Cyril (Mansi, IV, 1021–1024, – D. I, 371–378); the members of the apostate council in Ephesus, chaired by John of Antioch, also judged in general (Mansi, IV, 1267 cfr. 1411, - D. I, 651). Therefore, Kirill very often defends himself from such reproaches. But the injustice of these reproaches is more than obvious from the presentation of Cyril’s Christology; they are easily explained by the polemical passion of his opponents. The most that can be said in this case is the inaccuracy of Cyril’s language. But this is only partly true and mainly in relation to the term μία φύσις.
Here it should be noted that this expression, which since the time of the IV Ecumenical Council has become unsuitable for the purposes for which it was used by Cyril, was not his only one, but the same idea was expressed by another term μία ὑπόστασις, ἕ νωσις καθ ' ὑπόστασιν. (That μία φύσις = μία ὑπόστασις is evident 1) from the same combination of both terms with σεσαρκωμένη: Adv. Nest. lib. II, p. VIII: Migne, LXXVI, 93; ad Nest, de excom. LXXVII, 116; cfr. epist. ad Succ. col. 240. 241; 2) from the same explanation of both expressions in the sense of a true connection: defens. II anath. With. Theod. LXXVI, 401, – D. II, 138; adv. Nest. lib. 1, p. I: 17; II, VIII: 92; 3) from replacing one with another: defens. II anath. c. Theod. LXXVI, 401. In relation to man μία φύσις ἀνθρώπου καὶ ὑπόστασις : epist. L (ol. XLIV) ad Vater. LXXVII, 260). And while the first term turned out to be unsuitable, the second should be considered as Cyril’s precious contribution to Christological terminology: from the time of Cyril to the present, “hypostatic union” is the only term to designate the true unity of the divine-human life.
Eran. dial. 1, Migne, s. gr. t. LXXXIII, 45.
True, according to the “Eranist”, the prophet (Bar. 3:38) does not speak about the flesh or human nature. But 1) there is no doubt that Cyril in the sense of Var. 3explains the name Emmanuel, indicating the incarnation (Sch. de inc. Unig. pp. II, VII: cp. p. 98 ex. 1 – Note 270. – Editor’s note of the electronic edition); 2) Theodoret himself applies the text cited by the “Eranist” to the incarnation; 3) Theodorite elsewhere (Synodic. p. XL; Migne, LXXXVI, 646) in Var. 3sees an indication of human nature, cfr. his Sott. in h. 1.
Made visible through the medium of the flesh to both men and angels. Col. 48.
52 cfr. dial. II, 164, etc.
52 cfr. haer. fab. comp. lib. V, p. XII: 497; demonst. per syllog. 320. 321.
This work was placed by Migne among the works of Cyril (t. LXXV) and in Chr. Thurs. 1847, part III, also translated with the name of Kirill. But they firmly believe that de inc. Domini (like de sancta et vivifica Trinitate, placed there by Migne and translated there in the Chron. Reading) belongs not to Cyril, but to Theodoret. N. N. Glubokovsky Blazh. Theodoret, bishop Kirsky vol. 2, M. 1890, 87 next.
De inc. Dom. With. XIV, ХVIII, XXI, XXIII, XXIV, XXVIII, XXIX, XXX. The same thoughts and expressions are found in Theodoret and in other works. In the same way, Nestorius persistently applied to the humanity of Jesus Christ the expressions: church, veil, clothing, instrument, etc.
De inc Domini p. XXIV: Migne, LXXV, 1461, – p. 219.
Haeret, fab. comp. lib. V, p. XIII: Migne, LXXXIII, 497, – Creation. Part VI, p. 53.
Haer. fab. cell Lib. V, p. XII: Migne, LXXXIII, 496, – Creation. VI, 51.
De inc. Dom. With. ΧΙ II: Migne, LXXV, 1437–1440, – p. 189.
De inc. Dom. XXI: Migne, LXXV, 1457, – p. 214; repreh. IV anath. M. LXXVI, 412, – D. II, 151.
Haeret. fab. comp. lib. V, p. XII: Migne, LXXXIII, 496, – Creation. VI, 51.
De inc. Dom. With. XIV, XXIV, etc.
Mansi, IV, 1065, - Acts. I, 434–435. It is indisputable that Theodoret used the name Theotokos in relation to St. Virgo: repreh·I an Migne, LXXVII, 393, – Acts. II, 129. 130; de inc. Dom. XXXV: LXXV, 1477, – Chronicle. Thurs. 1847, III, 237.
Repreh. III anath. Migne, LXXVI, 401–404, – Acts. II, 140; cfr. “Eastern” objection to the same anathematism: Migne, LXXVI, 325, – Acts. II, 58.
Repreh. III anath. Migne, id. 404, – Acts. II, 141.
Repreh. IV anath. Migne; id. 409. 412, – Acts. II, 148–151.
Repreh. Xanath. Migne, id. 436. 437, – Acts. 11, 177. 178: “Who is this who is accomplished by deeds of virtue, and not by nature? who discovered obedience without knowing it until he experienced it? who lived in reverence, with a strong cry and with tears brought prayer, not having the strength to save himself, but prayed to the one who could save him and asked for liberation from death? Not God is the Word... But this is what He received from the seed of David, which is mortal, subject to suffering and trembling at death. (This is) nature taken from us” and so on. Also de inc. Dom. With. XI. XIV. XV. XX. XXI, XXIX: Migne, LXXV, 1433. 1443. 1444. 1453. 1457. 1469; haer. fab. comp. V, ХIII: LXXXIII, 497, – Creation. VI. 93.
Repreh. IV anath. LXXVI, 412, – Acts. II, 149. 151; de inc. Dom. XXI: LXXV, 1456. 1460.
Repreh. IV anath. Migne, LXXVI, 413, – Acts. II, 151 and many more. etc.
Eran. dial. III: Migne, LXXXIII, 221. 233: κρείττων πἄθους μεμένηκεί cfr. col. 261, · repreh Χ II anath. Migne, LXXVI, 449, – D. II, 191.
Eran. dial. III: Migne, LXXXIII, 237 sequ. 249 sec. 277–280 sec. demonstr. per syll. – quod impatibilis sit divinitas Salvatoris, p. XVI: LXXXIII, 336; repreh. XII anath. LXXVI, 449, – D. II, 191.
Eran. dial. III: LXXXIII, 252.
Defens. IV anath. c. Theod. Migne, LXXVI, 417, – Acts. II, 156.
And only in this sense was humiliation applied to the Son of God, which, however, while differing from Cyril, significantly distinguished Theodoret from the extremes of Paul of Samosata and Nestorius.
Haer. fab. cell. lib. V, XI: LXXXIII, 489–492, ῥᾴ διον ἦ ν αὐτῷ καὶ δίχα σώματος ὁφθῆναι .
Defens. IV anath. c. Theod. Migne, LXXVI, 416, – Acts. II, 155. It must be assumed that Theodoret considered the images of God and man to be similar (ein repreh. III anath. Migne, LXXVI, 404); however, in Eran. dial. II: LXXXIII, 156 Theodorite contrasts the relationship between deity and humanity with the relationship between related natures and recognizes an infinite difference between deity and humanity (τὸ διάφορον ἄπειρον).
Defens. I anath. c. Theod. Migne, LXXVI, 396, – Acts. II, 132: repreh. III anath. 404, p. 141. In view of this difference between Theodoret and Cyril, with the general position about the personal union of natures, we would like to point out that the personal (or hypostatic in the same sense) union of natures is a very vague expression and can have a perceptible meaning only in connection with others that define it either in the spirit of the Christology of Cyril, or of Theodoret: one thing definite!
This is how this difference varied in the private expressions that Cyril and Theodoret exchanged in Cyril’s anathemas, in Theodorit’s refutations of them, and in Cyril’s defenses of them. Cyril (Anath. 6) fully accepted the saying of the evangelist λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο (John 1:14), although he combined it harmoniously with Phil. 2:7; on the contrary, according to Theodorit, “perception precedes unity” (Migne. LXXVI, 421. The expression λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο Theodorit may have rejected and in any case equated it with Phil. 2:7: Eran. dial. I: M. LXXXIII, 73). Cyril (Anath. 1) decisively called St. The Virgin Mother of God, because in the flesh she gave birth to the Word, who is from God the Father, who became flesh; and Theodoret called St. The Virgin Mother of God because she gave birth to a man united with God, Who formed him, that is, he called her both the Mother of God, by union, and the mother of man, considering only this latter to be appropriate to apply to education and conception (Migne, LXXVI, 393, - D. II, 129. 130). Cyril (Anath. 2) confessed that the Word was hypostatically united with the flesh and that Christ is one with His flesh, i.e.
one and the same God and at the same time man (= one and the same royal son by birth, and a slave by voluntary position: the royal son took on the form of a slave), and Theodoret called Him God and man (= a state of two parts under a single head, somewhat weaker than Theodora Mops. husband and wife = one flesh). Cyril (an. 3) spoke about natural union, and Theodoret taught about combination (συνάφεια) as the copulation of the distinguished, about the union of two hypostases and insisted on the freedom of self-abasement of the Son of God. Cyril (Anath. 4) attributed godly and derogatory sayings to the one Christ, and Theodoret attributed godly things to God the Word, and humbly assimilated what was said and done to the image of a slave. Cyril (Anath. 5) called Christ the true God incarnate, and Theodoret found it possible to call Him a God-bearing man (LXXVI, 420, - Acts V, 158. The reference to Basil the Great has no meaning in this case: the point is not in terminology, but in the system). That (anaf.
7) recognized the human nature of Christ as a service organ of the deity, just as the flesh is an organ of the spirit (or the word is an organ of thought), so that God-worthy actions performed through the body were attributed to the one Christ, and at the same time rejected the idea that Jesus as a man was an instrument of the actions of God the Word, and Theodoret recognized that the image of a servant was glorified through the image of God, received what he did not have, and so on. glorified by the one from whom he received (LXXVI, 425, - D. II, 165. With the same term, Cyril, Theodoret and Nestorius have a big difference in meaning: just as Theodoret stood the ghost of Arianism: haer. fab. comp. lib. V, p. XI: LXXXIII, 489. 492, - Creation. VI, 46. 47; so Cyril suspected "eastern" in ὄργανον θεοῦ = ἄνθρωπος θεοφόρος; epist. ad mon. XIX, XX, XXI, ΧΧ II, XXIII: Migne, LXXVII, 29–36). One (Anath. 8) said that Christ in divinity and flesh is the only one worshiped, and the other - that the Lord must be worshiped together with the flesh. The Bishop of Alexandria (Anath. 9) argued that Christ performed miracles with his own Spirit and generally received humanity from his own Spirit; on the contrary, the Cyrus shepherd taught that he received the image of a servant from the Holy Spirit. (Migne, LXXVI, 432, – D. V, 170.
Similar in many other places, for example, Theodoret attributed “anointing” to what was received from David: de inc. Dom. With. XX: LXXV, 1456, p. 211). Cyril (Anath. 10) wrote that God the Word himself, having become incarnate, became the high priest and intercessor of our confession, and Theodoret attributed suffering and accomplishment of deeds of virtue to the image of a slave who did not have the power to save himself and prayed to the one who could save him (LXXVI, 436. 437, - Acts II, 177). One (Anath. 11) confessed the Lord’s flesh as life-giving, as belonging to the Word of God the Father, and the other did not refuse to call it that because it was united (in the unity of person) with the divine life-giving nature. Cyril (Anath. 12) confessed God the Word as suffering in the flesh, and Theodoret attributed suffering to the image of a slave who has a mortal nature...
Prof. V.V. Bolotov, Chr. Thurs. 1885, I, 64–65, writes: “the center of gravity of the misunderstanding (between Cyril and Theodoret) lay not in the special theological area, but in the psychological, not in Theodorit’s special views on the face of Christ, but in his manner of expressing himself about a completely empirical fact: while according to Cyril it is impossible to “separate the natures” of one person, according to Theodorit it is impossible not to “separate” them... In any case, the “misunderstanding” left room for many coincidences between the Christology of Cyril and the Christology of Theodoret (besides those indicated above). It is remarkable that Cyril and Theodoret equally strenuously affirmed the truth of the unity of sonship with God, although for Cyril the one Son of God = Jesus Christ, and for Theodoret the one Son of God (if not always, then in most cases) = the only begotten and eternal Son of God (one Father, one Son, one Holy Spirit: Epist. CXLV: Migne, LXXXIII, 1377; epist. CXLVI: 1388). This is indifferent before the court of “Orthodoxy”, but is very characteristic of the directions of Christology, as the doctrine of kenosis.
It is even more remarkable that both Cyril and Theodoret equally persistently use the analogy of man, who, consisting of soul and body, is one living being (for Cyril, see above, for Theodorit epist. XXI: Migne, LXXXIII, 1201; epist. CXXX: 1345; repreh. III anath Migne, LXXVI, 404, - Acts. II, 141; de inc.Dom. XXXII: LXXV, 1473, - Chr. 1847, III, 233), - both are used to show the truth of unity in two parts, and the unity of parts in unity. But is there a difference here between Cyril and Theodoret? After all, the relationship between soul and body in man, even for modern science, is not something self-explanatory, but, given the concrete unity of man and the duality of mental and physical phenomena, it is defined differently by dualists and monists: weren’t there similar differences in the view of human nature in ancient times?
Is it possible to think that Cyril understood this relationship between soul and body in such a way that the whole person is body and the whole person is spirit, that everything corporeal in him is spiritual and everything spiritual is corporeal, that the body and soul in a person are the visible and invisible sides of one hypostasis - nature - the essence of the animal, that the soul and body, differing in appearance, are one in essence, that there is one spiritual-corporeal essence of man, just as angels, animals, plants (a kind of transcendental monism)? and Theodoret looked at human nature dualistically, considering spiritual and physical phenomena to be really different natures (without, therefore, going beyond the limits of phenomenal reality), united in the unity of an empirically composite person? Here is Cyril: “every person, composed of soul and body, is thought of as one (so it is all the more necessary to confess that Christ is one and Son and Lord). There is one human nature and one hypostasis, although it is made up of different and foreign objects.
It is clear that the body is something different from the soul, but it is its own body (the body of the soul, not a person) and together with it forms the hypostasis of one person, one animal-man. In accordance with this, the Word of God did not reveal Himself as man through the acceptance of man, but became man” (Migne, LXXVII, 260, - D. II, 417); but here is what we read from Theodoret: “if in one person we separate the natures, we say - a mortal body and an immortal spirit, and both are one - man: then it is all the more in accordance with sound reason to recognize the peculiarities of the nature of the perceiving God and the perceived person. And blessed Paul divided man into two people: if our outer man is decaying, then our inner man is being renewed day by day” (2 Cor. 4:16; also Rom. 7:22; Eph. 3:17; repreh. III anath. Migne, LXXVI, 404, - Acts II, 141. 142): already one understanding of 2 Cor. 4:16, etc. says too much about human nature!
An indication of Theodorite διαιρεῖν τὰς φύσεις = γνωρίζέιν τὰ ἴδια with reference to Cyril, who the legality of the division of the purely theoretical, as an abstract thought process (as opposed to the physical action of dissection), recognized both in application to a living person and to the God-man (Migne, LXXVII, 192. 232. 245. 260: Chron. Thu. 1885, 1, 64 65; for διαίρεσις = διαφορὰ = distinctio: Chron. Thu. 1892, II, 119. 120), in this case cannot serve as an objection, because we are talking about dualism in view of the empirical unity of man: just as the latter, remaining itself, allows monism and dualism in understanding, so does γνωρίζειν, sufficient to justify Theodorite from Nestorian habitation = the union of husband and wife, not excludes such dualism. Speaking languages com V.V. Bolotov, this dualism refers “not to a special theological area, but to a (philosophical) psychological one.”
Likewise, Kirillovo: “Theodorit himself, when he takes man as an example, of course, does not think about cutting him in two, although the idea of him allows for a certain division and, as it were, dissection, which comes down, of course, to the knowledge that the soul is different in nature and the flesh is different” (Migne, LXXVI, 408) does not give reason to think that Theodorit looked at the nature of man through the eyes of the Alexandrian Bishop that Theodoret not only recognized the empirical unity of man, but also metaphysically recognized the “single nature” of man. Is “division in reason” impossible, presupposing empirical unity, even with a dualistic view of the nature of man and a corresponding view of the nature of the God-man? Kirill himself wrote to Bishop. Valerian (epist. L ol. XLIV) about his opponents: “if they said that God and man, united together, made one, and the hypostasis of both remained unmerged, which however is divided by reason, then you can easily see that they do not think or say anything true and reliable in this matter” (Migne, LXXVII, 260, - Acts II, 416), etc.
(Perhaps it is worth paying attention to the fact that Theodoret not only has γνωρίξειν τὰς ἰδιότητας τών φύσεων Migne, LXXVII, 404, but also ε ἷ ς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὁ Χριστὸς θεορεῖται Migne, LXXXIII, τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδέναι Yἱὸν Θεοῦ καὶ Yἱὸν ἀνθρώπου, Μ. LXXXIII, 1345 and many others). True, Theodoret quite expresses his view of human nature, as if common with the view of Cyril, in the name of the connection between soul and body with the name φυσικὴ ἡ ἕ νωσις (Eran. dial. II: 112. 145; dial. III: 237); but calling this the connection between soul and body (and here, however, there is probably a difference from Cyril: Theodorit, perhaps, means here nothing more than a connection “driven by necessity, and not freedom” (cfr. repreh. III anath.) as opposed to a free connection, by good will and love: Migne, LXXXIII, 145), Theodorit does not liken it to the union of Divinity and humanity in Christ (Chronicles Read. 1892, II, 119), but what distinguishes it from it is the union in Christ of divinity and humanity out of benevolence, philanthropy and love from the natural union of created, equally slave and simultaneously created parts (Migne, LXXXIII, 145).
As for the likening of the union of deity and humanity in Christ to the relation of fire to iron or gold (in Cyril LXXVII, 785; cfr. LXXVI, 61–64; in Theodoret LXXXIII, 156, also: light and air, dry or wet), then it must be borne in mind that this analogy is common in Theodorit not only with Cyril, in whom it is, however, not among the ones used ( Chr. Thu. 1885, 1, 69), but also with Apollinaris (Migne, LXXXIII, 216. 220), which alone exposes this comparison as an analogy with a very elastic meaning. – Thus, about the now-mentioned coincidences in the Christologies of Cyril and Theodoret, one should say the same thing that was said about their common name Theotokos, the relationship of the deity to humanity as the invisible to the visible, and so on. These coincidences sufficiently indicate that both Cyril and Theodoret are equally Orthodox, but they turn out to be tinged with a difference - that subtle difference that speaks of two directions in explaining the mystery of God-manhood. All this confirms the idea that the “misunderstanding” lay not in the specifically theological, but in the psychological area and is nothing before the court of Orthodoxy.
But at the same time, isn’t it obvious that from the point of view of the “philosophy” of dogma this is far from an insignificant difference?.. We fully accept the assessment of the “misunderstanding” given by Prof. V.V. Bolotov, but we look at Christological constructions from a different point of view, we judge them by the criterion of the idea of kenosis. In any case, we prefer this point of view on the relationship between the Christologies of Cyril and Theodoret to the opinion that the entire dispute between them rested on the fact that Cyril and Theodoret were “mistaken” regarding each other.
Mansi, IX, 292, - Acts. V, 233.
V.V. Bolotov: “in their passion, Eastern theologians write a refutation of the “chapters,” ignoring the identical elements in them - they do not think of reducing the dispute to particulars”... But these particulars, from the point of view of the idea of kenosis, are of significant importance.
But these terms were extremely vague. Ancient philosophy did not distinguish between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις; ἣ τε γὰρ οὐσία τὸ ἂ ν σημαίνει, καὶ τό ὑφεστὸς ἡ ὑπόστασις. According to the teaching of the fathers, οὑσία differs from ὑπόστασις as the general τὸ κοινὸν from the particular τὸ ἴδιον, or the genus τὸ γένος from the species τὁ ε ἶ δος ἢ τὸ ἄτομον (Eran. dial. I: Migne, LXXXIII, 33). Theodoret equates A ὑπόστασις with φύσις, considering it possible to say about Christ that two hypostases, or natures, were united in Him (δύο τὰς ἑνωθείσας ὑποστάσεις εἴτουν φύσεις λέγειν οὐκ ἄτοπον: Migne, LXXVI, 404, - Acts II, 141), and rejecting the expressions of Cyril as μία φύσις = ἕ νωσις φυσικὴ , and μία ὑπὁστασις = ἕ νωσις καθ ’ ὑπόστασιν: repreh. III anath. Migne, LXXVI, 404, – Acts. II, 140; repreh. II anath. 400. p. 136: “we do not know the unity of the hypostases, as strange and alien to Him (Christ), in any way either from the divine scriptures or from the fathers who explained the scriptures.” We know that Cyril also used φύσις in the same sense as ὑπόστασις, namely μία φύσις = μία ὑπόστασις.
But he added to the root meaning of the word φύσις its regional use in the assuratory sense: τὸ φύσει, ἀντὶ τοῦ, ἀληθῶς (Eph. 2:3; explic. III anath. LXXVI, 300, - Acts II, 34; V.V. Bolotov Xp. 1892, II, 94 seq.). However, due to the fact that Cyril attaches the meaning of “true connection” not only to the expression ἕ νωσις φυσικὴ, but also to ἕ νωσις καθ ’ ὑπόστασιν, which is the expression ἕ νωσις φυσικὴ he also denotes the connection of the soul with the body, which is also designated by Theodoret; it seems possible to recognize the regional meaning of the word φύσις in the terminology of the Alexandrian bishop only to the extent that there is no contradiction between Cyril’s teaching about μία φύσις with the definition of faith IV of the Ecumenical Council about δύο φύσεις (however, in addition to the message “let him rejoice” cf. def. III anath. Migne, LXXVI, 329, - Acts. II, 63), and this contradiction is inevitable if here and here φύσις has the same meaning - without exhausting, however, the entire meaning of φύσις - ὑπόστασις with this meaning. The actual meaning of these terms may be sufficiently clarified by contextual word combinations (see above).
In any case, φύσις = ὑπόστασις of Cyril is not the same as φύσις and ὑπόστασις of Theodoret. – Equating φύσις with ὑπόστασις, Cyril further equates ὑπόστασις with πρόσωπον: so anath. IV cfr. epist. ad Acac. LXXVII, 192. 193. But, probably, this equation had for him not the meaning that πρόσωπον = ὑπόστασις in its entirety, but the one that πρόσωπον is a necessary sign of every reasonable ὑπόστασις, therefore μία ὑπόστασις necessarily leads to ἓ ν πρόσωπον, and ἓ ν πρόσωπον necessarily presupposes μία ὑπόστασις. Cyril first puts forward unity, then, as a sign of this unity, ἓ ν πρόσωπον: “if our Lord Jesus Christ is one, then His face must be one, as one” (defen. anath. IV p. Theod. Migne, LXXVI, 413, - Acts II, 152). That is why Cyril speaks more often about the one Christ, about the one incarnate Word, Lord and Son, than about the one person. Kirill's Πρόσωπον is weaker than ὑπόστασις. Theodoret also taught about ἓ ν πρόσωπον, but for him δύο ὑποστάσεις = ἓ ν πρόσωπον. It is obvious that his πρόσωπον is not the same as Cyril’s πρόσωπον.
For Theodoret, πρόσωπον may be the result of the union of soul and body in man, divinity and humanity in Christ - there is something complex. That such a concept of πρόσωπον was possible and was not alien to the Antiochian school is shown by the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia: ex lib. de inc. VIII: Migne, LXVI, 981. And Theodoret says: τῷν προσώπων τῷ ἑνὶ (Eran. dial. III: Migne, LXXXVI Ι, 252), ἕ νωσις προσώπου (De inc. Dom. XXII: LXXV, 1460), while Cyril declared such expressions inconsistent with the teaching of the Word of God (ep. I ad reg. XII: LXXVI, 1220). Further, Theodorit expresses ἓ ν πρόσωπον ἀδιαίρετον (with the abstract possibility διαιρεῖν : Eran. dial. III: LXXXIII, 252) because, of course, ἕ νωσις = ἓ ν πρόσωπον presupposes division (as previously given: repreh. III anath. Migne, LXXVI, 404)...
Epist. XL (XXXV) ad Acac. Migne, LXXVII, 192. 193 cfr. epist. XLV (XXXVIII) ad Succens. Migne, LXXVII. 232.
Migne, s. gr. t. LXXXIII, 1489–1492, – Acts. V, 227–230, etc. However, Theodoret’s letter to John Ant. (Domnu) is recognized by many as inauthentic.
Mansi, V, 1374 (p. III): totus in suis, totus in nostris, - Acts. III, 521.
Mansi, V, 1378 (p. IV), – p. 523.
Mansi, V, 1371–1374 (p. III), – 520 next.
Mansi, V, 1374 (p. iii). “Glorified humanity”: thus, Leo views the incarnation of the Son of God not only as a humiliation of the Son of God, but also as a glorification of humanity.
Ibid. with fr. 1374–1375 (p. III); 1375 (p. IV).
Mansi, V, 1374 (p. III), – p. 521.
Mansi, V, 1375 (p. IV), p. 522.
Mansi, V, 1375 (p. IV), p. 523.
Mansi, V, 1378–1379 (p. IV), pp. 523–525.
Mansi, V, 1371 (p. III), p. 520. The creed of IV ec. consistent with the epistle of Leo. The council in its negative part is directed against Nestorian and Eutychian, and in its positive part it gives three theses: a) the fullness of natures in Christ; b) their connection is unfused, unchangeable, inseparable, inseparable; c) their union into one hypostasis.
Macarius of Antioch: “there is one person in Christ the Savior and He, as one, has one desire” (Mansi, Χ I, 516, - Acts VI, 352); “we confess in our Lord Jesus Christ one hypostatic will and His divine action, because God the Word became man performed both the divine, not as God, and the human, not as man, but performed some new divine action” (Mansi, XI, 349, p. 177); also Anthimus (Mansi, XI. 516, – p. 353)
At many points, the message of Sophronius represents a mechanical combination of the Christological views of Cyril and Leo, literally repeating their expressions about the single nature of God the Word incarnate, about the complex hypostasis, etc.
Mansi, XI, 473. – Acts. VI, p. 308.
Mansi, XI, 473, p. 309.
Mansi, XI, 485, p. 322.
Mansi, XI, 473, p. 310.
Mansi, Hee, 476. 477, pp. 311–314.
Mansi, XI, 477, – pp. 314–315.
Mansi, XI, 480, p. 316.
Mansi, XI, 481, p. 317.
Mansi. XI. 484. 485, – pp. 320–322.
Mansi, XI, 485. 488, – pp. 323–324.
Mansi, XI. 488, p. 325.
Mansi, XI, 238, 239. 243, – Acts. VI, pp. 65. 66. 72–73.
Mansi, XI, 250, – pp. 77–79.
Mansi, XI, 251, – p. 81.
Mansi, XI, 247, – p. 77. General patristic teaching that humanity was accepted sinless by Jesus Christ.
Mansi, XI, 239, – pp. 66–67.
In relation to natures, the task of Jesus Christ was to reconcile divine unlimitedness with human infirmities
Mansi, XI, 247, – p. 77.
Mansi, XI, 246, – p. 73.
De fide, ad Grat. lib. II, p. VII § 53: Migne. s. lat. XVI, 570; Mansi, XI, 246, – p. 78.
Mansi, XI, 246, – p. 74. For Ambrose still cfr. De fi.de ad Grat. lib. II, p. VII, § 52: Migne, s. lat. XVI, 570; § 56: 571; Gregory of Nyssa adv. Apollo, c. XLI: Migne, s. gr. XLV, 1217; Mansi, XI, 258, - p. 86. 87: “there is another divine will and another human: he who has perceived our suffering speaks (Matthew 26:41) according to humanity that which is in accordance with the weakness of the flesh, fulfills the second half of his saying, expressing the desire to fulfill for the salvation of people a divine desire rather than a human one”; John Chrysostom homil. εἰς τὸ, Πάτερ, εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι: Migne, s. gr. t. LI, col. 36 sec. writes: “in the words of Christ (Matthew 26:39) we literally find two desires opposite to one another - the Father wants Him to be crucified, but He Himself does not want it,” etc. Athanasius de inc. V. D. et c. ar. c. 2: Migne, s. gr. XXVI, 1021; Mansi, ΧΙ 246, - p. 74, also Migne, XXVI, 1241: “The Son calls His will the flesh, since the flesh became His own, and the divine will of the Son is inseparable from the will of the Father.” Cfr. ex tractatu in illud: nunc anima etc. M. XXVI, 1241.
Mansi, XI, 247, – pp. 76–77.
Definition VI all. The council took place in strict agreement with the message of Agathon and is understandable only when compared with it.
De fide orthodoxa, lib. III, p. II: Migne, s. gr. t. XCIV, 985–988, – p. lane Bronzova, pp. 122. 123.
De f. orth. lib. III, c. III: Migne, XCIV, 996, – p. 127.
De f. orth. lib. III, p. VI: Migne, XCIV, 1004, – p. 134.
De f. orth. lib. III, c. VII: Migne, XCIV, 1012, – p. 138. However, John of Damascus also speaks of the complex hypostasis and complex nature of Christ and speaks of the communion of natures not in themselves, but only according to the unity of the hypostasis: p. III: 988. 993; With. IV: 997 (de f. orth. lib. III).
De f. orth. lib. III, p. XV: Migne, XCIV, 1049–1057, – pp. 164–170; With. XX ΙΙ: 1088,– page 188.
De f. orth. lib. III, p. XX: Migne, XCIV, 1081, – page 185
De f. orth. lib. III, p. XXI: Migne, XCIV, 1084, – p. 186.
De f. orth. lib. III, p. XV: Migne, XCIV, 1060–1061, – pp. 171. 173; c. XVIII: 1073. 1076; With. XX: 1084.
De f. orth. lib. III, p. XIII. XIV: Migne, XCIV, 1033–1045, – pp. 152–161; With. ХVIII: 1076, – p. 181.
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