Понятие бесконечности в толковании предшественников Св. Григория

In order to be able to assess the extent to which Gregory’s idea of ​​an infinite God and human life as an endless path is original or secondary, let us trace, at least briefly, the formation of the very concept of infinity in the thinking of his predecessors, starting with the philosophers of Ancient Greece 4 . As is known, with the concept of άπειρον - indefinite, unlimited, infinite 5 - Anaximander described the first beginning from which all things come, in order to then disappear into it again 6. The Pythagoreans believed that the basis of the universe was a unit that limits the infinite 7, and in their interpretation it was something obviously negative 8. This is probably why Parmenides considers the very definition of boundaries to be the fundamental characteristics of being, which as such has neither beginning nor end 9. Only Melissus of Samos directly identifies this being with infinity (ἄπειρον): if Being/the One is limited (by something else), then it is no longer one 10. Plato, on the contrary, emphasizes the definiteness of ideas, which means they are delineated by boundaries, without which their mutual difference is impossible 11 . Boundaries and restrictions are a necessary condition for beauty 12, while uncertainty, inaccessible to measurement, according to the testimony of Aristotle, was also negative in Plato’s understanding 13. Aristotle himself held a similar opinion 14: the unlimited and infinite is unknowable, it is a kind of pure potentiality that can never be fully actualized 15. From a logical point of view, Aristotle denies not only the movement “towards infinity” 16, but also the idea of ​​infinite space, an unlimited body and an infinite cosmos that has no middle, where neither movement to a natural place, 17 nor the circulation of stars 18 would be possible. In turn, for the Epicureans, as well as for the ancient Greek atomists, the original idea was an infinite, unlimited cosmos and even an infinite number of worlds, which in reality do not have a specific center, being a collection of atoms in constant motion 19 . In the interpretation of Plotinus, the infinite/boundless (τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον) is also associated with matter 20, but here too a semantic connection of the unlimited (lack of form) with evil is assumed 21. At the same time, for Plotinus, not only sensually perceived, but also intelligible matter is the speculative basis of forms/ideas, a certain image of the very first principle, the One, an image that has neither form nor boundaries, and therefore is also understood as infinite 22. Meanwhile, unlimitedness as δύναμις (energy, force) does not mean here pure Aristotelian potentiality, but rather means the power to bring things into being. Therefore, Plotinus could characterize his unlimited First Principle in the light of both negative and positive infinity 23 . Moreover, Plotinus is also aware of the idea of ​​infinite love, correlated with the infinite One 24. If we talk about the Christian predecessors of Gregory, it is necessary to recall the idea of the apostolic men and apologists about God’s otherness, perfection and incomprehensibility 25 (a very similar understanding of the Divine can be traced in the ancient mystery cults, and in the heritage of the Jewish scientist Philo of Alexandria, and among some Gnostics) 26, most clearly formulated in the theology of Clement of Alexandria, for whom God is equally incomprehensible, how boundless and endless (ἄπειρον) 27. His student Origen, also a native of Alexandria, had a completely different opinion, who, on the contrary, represented the power of God as limited, since otherwise it could not comprehend itself, embrace itself 28. This Aristotelian idea, which has a clearly anti-Gnostic orientation 29 but is alien to Christian orthodoxy, caused a lot of difficulties for Origen's translator Rufinus 30 . Theologians of the 4th century, like Clement, speak of God’s unknowability and infinity 31 . Basil the Great in every possible way emphasizes God's unknowability 32 and the infinity (ἄπειρον) of God's power 33. Gregory of Nazianzus calls God elusive, incomprehensible (ἄληπτός τε καὶ ἀπερίληπτος) 34 and immeasurable (ποῦ δὲ μετρεῖται τὸ ἄπειρον;) 35 . It is the infinity of God that, according to Gregory of Nazianzus, is the only thing in which He is accessible to comprehension 36 . Researchers are still debating how much Gregory of Nyssa relies on ancient Greek and early Christian thought in his idea of ​​infinity. Frankly opposing positions are defended by two authors of monographs on this topic - Ekkehard Mühlenberg and James Emmet Hennessy. If Muhlenberg sees in Gregory's presentation of infinity a kind of revolutionary completion of Greek metaphysics 37, then Hennessy, on the contrary, considers it a completely natural summing up and a deeper understanding of the previous philosophical and theological development 38. Meanwhile, the assessment of the concept of infinity in Gregory by modern researchers deserves deeper coverage. In this review I rely primarily on the following works: J. E. Hennessy, The Background, Sources and Meaning of Divine Infinity in St Gregory of Nyssa (Fordham University, New York 1963, microfilm Ann Arbor 1963) and E. Mühlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von Nyssa, Göttingen 1966. An interesting attempt is made by Anna Tumarkin to derive the Greek expression τό άπειρον not only from the Ionic τὸ πεῖραρ (= border, limit) and understand it as “boundless, boundless”, but also from ἡ πεῖρα (= test) and interpret it as “that which we have no idea experience, the untestable." See A. Tumarkin, “Der Begriff des ἄπειρον in der griechischen Philosophie” // Jahrbuch der Schweizerischen Philosophischen Gesellschaft. Annuaire de la Société Suisse de Philosophie, 3,1943, 55–71, especially 56. See Simplicius, Phys. 24.13; Diels-Kranz 12 [2] V 1. See Aristotle, Metaphys. I, 5, 986a15: Diels-Kranz 58 [45] B 5. See Aristotle, Eth. Nic. II, 5.1106b29: Diels-Kranz 58 [45] B 7. See Parmenides: Diels-Kranz 28 [18] B 8, p. 26 and below, 42. See Simplicius, Phys. 29, 22; 109, 20; 109, 29; 110, 2; 110, 5; his, De coelo 557.14: Diels-Kranz 30 [20] B 2–6. See Plato, Soph. 256e-257a. See Plato, Phileb. 24th-26th. See Aristotle, Metaphys. 1.6: 987b25 and below; 988a8–15. See Aristotle, Eth. Nie. II, 5: 1106b29. See Aristotle, Phys. III, 6: 207a21–26. See Aristotle, Anal. post. II, 19–22: 81bl0–84b2. “Natural place” is the concept of Aristotelian physics, according to which each entity (element) has its place in space relative to its center. – Approx. ed. See Aristotle, Phys. III, 5: 204b3–206a8; De coelo I, 5: 272b21– 273a6. See Epicurus, Er. ad Herodot. 41–45, 60: Krautz 8 and below, 22; Titus Lucretius Carus, De rerum nat. I, 958–1051: Buchner 37 and below. On this see D. J. Furley, “The Greek Theory of the Infinite Universe,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 42, 1981, 571–585. See Plotinus, Enn. II, 4 [12], 15. See Plotinus, Enn. I,8 [51], 3. See Plotinus, Enn. VI, 7 [38], 32; VI, 5 [23], 4; VI, 9 [9], 6; V, 5 [32], 10–11. Plotinus’s “positive” understanding of infinity is questioned by L. Sweeney, who sees in it only the equivalent of “non-being” or some “external” description of the power of the One based on its actions, or even only the absence of restrictions given by something previous (see “Infinity in Plotinus” // Gregorianumy 38,1957,515–535 and 713–732 = aka, Divine Infinity in Greek and Medieval Thought, New York 1992, 167–222). This interpretation is based on Enn. VI, 7, 32 refutes W. N. Clarke (“Infinity in Plotinus: A Replay” // Gregorianum, 40, 1959, 75–98). L. Sweeney remained unchanged in his opinion, although he clarified it: The One exceeds both the finite and the infinite (see L. Sweeney, “Another Interpretation of Enneads, VI, 7, 32” // Modern Schoolman, 38,1961,289–304 = aka, Divine Infinity, 223–241; Sweeney once again summarized his interpretation of Plotinus in article “Basic Principles in Plotinus’s Philosophy” // Gregorianumy 42,1961, 506–516 = aka, Divine Infinity, 243–256). This discussion is summarized by F. Karfík, Prolegomena k metafysice svobody a vule v Plotinovë pojednání VI, 8 [39]. Komentár k Enn. VI, 8[39], 1–12 (unpublished dissertation in FF UK, Prague 1996), 106ff, approx. 86 (about the unlimitedness/infinity of the One, see also 93, note 14). Οὐ γὰρ ὥρισται ἐνταῦθα ὁ ἔρως, ὅτι μηδὲ τὸ ἐρώμενον, ἀλλ ἂπειρος ἂν εἴη ὁ τούτου ἔρως (Plotinus, Enn. VI, 7 [38], 32). P. Hadot interprets this place as a finding, equivalent to a constant search (see P. Hadot, introduction to Plotin, Traité 50 (III 5), Paris 1990, p. 81). See J. E. Hennessy, The Background, p. 113–127. See J. E. Hennessy, The Background, p. 68–74. See Clement of Alexandria, Strom. V, XII: GCS (Clemens I), 380, 23. In a letter to Patriarch Mena, Justinian quotes Origen’s words about the “limited power of God” (πεπερασμένην γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμιν): “if if it were infinite, therefore, it could not think of itself, since the nature of the infinite is incomprehensible" ( μηδὲ έαυτήν νοεῖν τῇ γὰρ φύσει τὸ ἄπειρον ἀπερίληπτον), according to the book: SC 253, 211 and below, approx. 2. This circumstance is emphasized by W. Ullmann, citing as evidence Hippolytus’ review of the Gnostic Μεγαλὴ ἀπόφασις (Ref. VI, 7–20: Marcovich 212–229), which speaks of the unlimited power of God (ἡ ἀπέραντος δύναμις), penetrating space. See W. Ullmann, “Der logische und der theologische Sinn des Unendlichkeitsbegriffes in der Gotteslehre Gregors von Nyssa” // Bijdragen, 48, 1987, p. 150–171, especially 153 and below, as well as approx. 14.15. Rufinus' translation speaks of the necessary limitations of creation, which otherwise God could not control, since it would escape from its limits (... non enim... finem putandum est non habere creaturas, quia ubi finis non est, nec conpraehensio ulla uel circumscriptio esse potest. Quodsi fuerit, utique nec contineri uel dispensari a deo quae facta suntpoterunt. Naturaliter nempe quidquid infinitum fuerit, et inconpraehensibile erit). Deprinc. II, 9,1: SC 252, 352,11–16. On this see J. E. Hennessy, The Background, p. 1–186. For example, Hilary of Pictavia ascribes to God infinity (infinitas) and, accordingly, His incomprehensibility by thinking, which would encounter the impossible - the task of grasping the immensity (see De Trin. 1.6; 1.7; 1.13; II, 6: CChr. SL 62, 5.17; 6.27; 7.3 and below; 13.22; 14.26; 42.4; 43.21). Therefore, J. M. McDermott claims that Hilary, even before Gregory of Nyssa, knew the idea of ​​“positive” infinity (although, most likely, the author does not mean the definition of God’s essence, but only infinity in the sense of endless development), see J. M. McDermott, “Hilary of Poitiers: The Infinite Nature of God” // Vigiliae Christianae, 27, 1973, p. 172–202. See, for example, Basil of Caesarea, Er. 234 (ad Amphilochium): PG 32, 868c-872a. See, for example, Basil of Caesarea, In Hexam. I, 11: GCS, N.F. 2, 20.6 and below. See Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. theol. 2 [Or. 28], 5: FC 22, 102, 3. Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 18.16: PG 35.1005a. ἀ ἡ ἀπειρία (Or. 45.3: PG 36.628a). See E. Mühlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit, p. 19 and other places. See J. E. Hennessy, The Background, p. 202 and in other places.