«Об устроении человека»

The treatise on the structure of man (Περὶ κατασκευῆς άνθρώπου), in which Gregory developed his anthropological ideas in the most detail, was popular not only in the Christian East, but was also translated into Latin four times (between the 6th and 16th centuries 515). Drawing from Stoic sources (Posidonius 516), from biblical interpretations 517 inspired by Philo and Origen, and from information from ancient medicine (Galen 518), Gregory created a completely independent anthropological treatise, which obviously deserves separate consideration, although it only partially touches on our topic. Gregory presents his work as an addition to the Shestodnev 519 of Basil the Great, which lacks 520 the story about the man created last. As an Easter gift, this work is dedicated to brother Peter 521. The initial question that the thinker asks is the discrepancy between the original state of man, which corresponded to God’s plan, and the wretchedness in which we find ourselves today 522 . Royal dignity of man To explain what a person’s position is in the world, Gregory must first talk about what the world itself looks like. According to the saint, “the firmament of heaven embraced the Universe all around” 523, and in the middle of it “heavy and downward bodies found a place” 524, i.e. earth and water. The main pair of opposites – “heaven and earth” (Gen. 1:1) – are united by the principles of rest and motion 525: the sky rotates around the earth as around an unshakable axis. One moves while remaining unchanged, the other changes without leaving its place. Rest and movement, thus, are present in both and connect everything created as if with one breath 526: “the creature (...) agrees with itself [lit. sighs].” In addition to the bonds of rest and movement, heaven and earth are connected by two more intermediate links - air and water. Air imitates the eternal mobility and weightlessness of the fiery element (i.e. ether), but is not flowing and constantly dissipating (by itself), i.e. is not devoid of an affinity with solids. It represents something like a border that combines and separates opposites 527. Water or moisture 528 is endowed with similar functions, the heaviness of which makes it similar to the earth, and its mobility is related to the light elements: fire and air. She also connects 529 opposites, combining them 530 . All four elements, according to the biblical narrative (cf. Gen. 1), the Creator decorated with splendor 531: the sky with the brilliance of stars, the sea and air with fish and birds, the earth with plants and land animals. Everything was prepared for the arrival of man, who was to become a spectator (θεατής), or master (κύριος) of everything 532, as a king over all created things 533 or as a guest at a magnificent feast 534. The special dignity of man in the biblical narrative is emphasized by the reflections of the Creator before the creation of people: “Let us make man in Our image, in Our likeness; and let them have dominion...” (Gen. 1:26). Regarding all other creations, the origin of which the biblical text narrates, it is not indicated from what, why (ὅθεν) or how (ὅπως) they were created, and only in relation to man do we learn about the material (ὕλη) from which he was created, about the prototype (ἀρχέτυπον κάλλος), to which its form is likened (μορφή), as well as about the very purpose (σκοπός) of its creation 535. Gregory, however, has to combine both biblical stories about the creation of man (Genesis 1:26, 2:7) into one whole in order to come to a description that approximately corresponds to at least three of the four Aristotelian causes (material, formal, purposeful - and the efficient cause, obviously, must be the creative power of God itself). However, most of all he is interested in the motive of man’s likeness to God (“image”, εἰκών, and “likeness”, ὁμοίωσις, are equivalent for Gregory). The saint sees it in the royal destiny of man 536, in the inexplicable bliss that virtue gives him 537, in human speech and thinking (λόγος καὶ διάνοια 538), reflecting God’s mind and word 539, but also in love (ἀγάπη 540), which God Himself is, which man is also capable of, as well as in man’s desire to penetrate into everything with knowledge, as God Himself penetrates 541. Just as God is simple and undivided, having separate abilities, so in different human abilities there is one force (δύναμις) - the mind (νοῦς), present in all sense organs 542. The principle of a single mind permeating everything, borrowed by Gregory from Stoic anthropology, is used by him not only as another moment of man’s similarity to God, but also as an anti-Arian trinitarian argument. If man is the image of God the Trinity - and the plural form “let us create” indicates to Gregory the trinity of the Divinity - then how can a single human mind be the image of different essences (if, as the Arian anti-Homousians argued, the Son differs in its essence from the Father 543)? The similarity of man to the Creator is thus a source of inspiration not only for Gregory's idea of ​​man, but also - and this is very important - for his science of God 544. At first glance, a person’s physical structure does not at all correspond to his royal dignity, and in comparison with animals it even looks pathetic. For protection, humans have neither horns, nor claws, nor poisonous thorns, nor even full fur 545. However, in what seems to be a lack, Gregory, on the contrary, sees a reason (ἀφορμή 546: starting point, means) to possessing the rest of creation. It was precisely because the man himself was “slower than all fleet-footed ones” that he bridled the horse. Since man is born naked, sheep were introduced. Since he felt the need to transport supplies from different countries, pack animals were harnessed. The man's assistants were a bull and a dog. In wartime, iron replaced man's horns and claws, bow and arrows - the swift flight of birds 547. The royal dignity of a person is also indicated by the straight and elongated structure of the body itself, 548 which distinguishes a person from other, downcast creatures. Human hands also play a special role, helping the needs of speech in their own way. With their help, we can write words 549, but, most importantly, the dexterity of the hands freed human lips from much work on processing food (which is used to graze animals) for the articulation of words 550. Therefore, a person can use his voice like a musician - his instrument, say, like a combination of a pipe and a lyre: the air directed upward moves through the pipe-shaped passage and, thanks to the cheeks, tongue, teeth and lips, turns into sound - as if under the action of a bow moving along the strings 551. The biblical narrative, dividing living creatures into plants, animals and humans, shows the care with which the Creator prepares food for each creature, and reveals to us “a certain hidden teaching” and “philosophy about the soul” 552. We are talking about a three-part division of the vital force or soul into abilities: plant and nutritional 553, which we call “natural” (φυσική) and are already observed in plants; the faculty of sensory perception 554 which is manifested in animals; and, finally, literature (a nature that “has the gift of speech and is governed by reason” 555), which of all corporeal creatures is found only in humans. Endowed with all three faculties, man is the most perfect form of bodily life. The biblical story, which begins with inanimate things, and then moves from plants and animals to man, thereby shows successively (ἀκολούθως 556) an ascending hierarchy of creatures. The three components of man are also known to the Apostle Paul, but he calls them “body, soul and spirit” (σῶμα, ψυχή, πνεῦμα, cp. 1 Thess. 5:23; Gregory mistakenly refers to Eph.), and even Christ Himself mentions them, speaking of loving God “with all the heart, with all the soul and with all the mind” (καρδία, ψυχή, διάνοια, Mark 12:30 et al.) 557 . Gregory obviously places the highest value on the rational components of the human being (also called νοῦς and φρόνησις 558), calling them “divine grace” 559, which the Creator gave to man. However, “in the proper sense, he did not so much give them ([οὐ] δέδωκεν), but rather communicated them (gave them, μετέδωκε), providing the image with his own beauties of His nature” 560. The human mind (νοῦς 561), thanks to its connection with the body, receives from the senses images (τὰ εἴδωλα 562) of external things that are collected in a certain “inner container” 563 - in other words, the mind “writes in itself the outlines of everything that is subject to vision” 564. The mind, according to Gregory, is like a vast city with a large number of gates, through which many people constantly pass, arriving from different directions and for different purposes: the mind distributes individual sensations and assigns each its place within the framework of knowledge. Correlating sensations may enter through different gates, like people making an appointment in a city, while sensations entering through the same gate are not necessarily related to each other. It is the mind and only it that is capable of analyzing the entire confusion of incoming sensations, using them for knowledge (γνῶσις 565). What, in its essence, is the mind itself, which through sensory perception comes to knowledge, cleared of all confusion of sensory data? Obviously, it varies from sensuality. When the apostle asks: “Who understands the mind (νοῦν) of the Lord?” (Rom. 11:34), - Gregory adds: “who has understood his own mind?” 566 If the mind is compound, how can it be intelligible (τὸ νοητόν 567)? How does it combine heterogeneous things? But if the mind is simple, how does it dissipate in the “sensory multipartiteness” 568? How is there one in the plural? How is there plural in singular? Gregory finds an answer to these perplexities that is very interesting for our study - in the vision of man as the image of God: the incomprehensibility of human nature reflects the incomprehensibility of his Prototype 569. It is precisely because the nature of our mind eludes knowledge that our mind is similar to its Creator, whose nature is also incomprehensible 570. The similarity of the human mind to the divine, for Gregory, lies not in the fact that our mind contemplates and knows itself (as, for example, in Augustine), but, on the contrary, in the fact that our mind can neither be known nor comprehended. Next, Gregory asks a question that already worried ancient authors: where exactly in the human body is the sovereign (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν 571) mind located. A brief overview of the controversy between representatives of two opinions 572 follows: some (some Stoics 573) argue that the mind is in the heart - the center of the body, from where warmth, akin to the mobility of the mind, spreads throughout the body; others (Platonists 574) believe that the mind is located in the head, the exalted citadel of the body, more precisely (according to some) - in the meninges 575, called ἡ μῆνιγξ 576 and which is the basis of all sensory faculties. Gregory accepts the arguments of both sides: the heart as a source of heat and the meninges as a receptacle of feelings are important (he will later pick up Galen's thoughts on the brain, heart and liver as the three main organs that are the source of movement, heat and moisture and maintain the balance of the body through their interaction 577). What Gregory does not agree with - and here he approaches the Platonists rather than the Stoics - is the very idea of ​​\u200b\u200blocalizing the mind in a certain organ, since the mind, being incorporeal, cannot be located in any place 578. It is present equally in all organs, but the manner of its presence is inexplicable 579 . The mind does not fill any voids in the body and is not displaced by the body. He uses his body like a musician uses his instrument, however, only as long as everything is in order with the body 580. Next, Gregory dwells in detail on the problem of how the mind can be present throughout the body without having a specific place of residence in it. The three components of the soul with which we have already met - nutritional, vegetable and verbal - are in reality one soul, the verbality of which permeates the other two faculties 581. In animals lacking language, we speak of a “soul” in an improper sense (ὁμώνυμον 582): they do not have a soul, but only “a certain vital energy” 583. The verbal soul, the soul in the proper sense, is intelligent and immaterial (νοερά καὶ ἄϋλος 584), but through the senses it is mixed with material nature 585. Thus, the mind (νοῦς 586), actually identical to the verbal soul, is present in all parts of the body and produces in them movement corresponding to their nature 587. After all, sensory perception is impossible without the participation of the material in the spiritual 588. And life itself and growth are possible only as participation in vital energy, otherwise they will turn into decay 589. Everything material is subject to variability (τροπή, ἀλλοίωσις 590), just as the flow of a river moves along a bed that remains filled, although the water does not remain in the same place 591. So our bodily life is constant movement and constant change. If this movement stops, life 592 will cease to exist. Moreover, the essence of life's movement is the alternation of opposites: filling is always followed by exhaustion 593, and both are repeated in an incessant round dance. In a similar way, the relaxation of sleep alternates with the tension (τὸ σύντονον 594) of wakefulness - only in this way can a living being maintain health and protect its nature from disturbances. Such reasoning in the spirit of Posidonius 595 could lead to a stoic idea of ​​the pulsation of the cosmic pneuma, but Gregory is very circumspect in this matter. He confines himself to the statement that the mind is not localized in the body, but is present everywhere and produces all bodily movements 596 . The union of the mind with the body is indescribable and incomprehensible 597: the mind does not embrace the body from the outside and does not control it from the inside 598, because the incorporeal does not contain the corporeal and is not contained in it. The mind, approaching nature and coming into contact with it, is noticed both in it and around it (καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν θεωρεῖται), but not sitting in it and not embracing it with itself 599. However, according to Gregory, the activity of the mind still depends on whether the body is in order and whether its condition is not defective. Otherwise, the movement of thinking 600 will also be limping. For Gregory, this is the most obvious (and perhaps the only convincing) evidence of the connection of the mind with the bodily nature. “Natural (i.e. natural-scientific, φυσικώτερον 601) speculation” about the relationship between mind and body, according to Gregory, is capable of revealing “the subtlest teaching” 602 about the relationship of the mind to nature/nature. The mind, itself created as an image of the “most beautiful and most excellent good” 603, its Creator, also adorns the “nature governed by it,” which, “by the same analogy” 604, appears as a kind of “mirror of a mirror” 605 or “image of an image” 606. And this nature influences the very substance from which it is composed 607. According to the same “analogy,” everything has communication with real beauty, and always directly through the very top of the hierarchy. If this relationship (συμφυΐα 608) is broken or changes its direction, the reflection of beauty will be lost. If matter avoids nature, it will reveal its fundamental amorphousness 609. Thus, nature itself will lose its beauty, and even the mind, instead of endowing nature with beauty, through nature will be struck by the ugliness (τὸ αἷσχος 610) of matter. Instead of the beauty of the divine Prototype, it is likened to amorphous matter. This is how he loses the reflection of good and this is how evil arises 611. The reason for this misfortune is the turning (ἡ ἐπιστροφή 612) of nature not to the mind, which imparts beauty, but to matter, which itself requires decoration. Matter, which should have been transformed by the beauty of form, as a result of this substitution becomes amorphous and ugly. This interpretation, in which it is easy to recognize the trend of Plotinus, in the context of Gregory’s thinking is surprising in that the source of misfortune appears not to be the human mind (the freedom of which is usually called the source of evil), but “nature”, which turns the mind to the material. Gregory calls this misadventure “passion” (πάθος 613), without thinking about what role the mind plays in it (it even seems that the mind is its passive victim). He only states that through passions nature deviates from its natural structure 614 and interferes with the proper functioning of the mind. In another place in his work, Gregory also mentions that the mind (νοῦς) should be governed not by passions (πάθος), but by reason (λόγος), and then nature “follows in its footsteps” 615. Thus, man is called upon to extend the cosmic order, present in himself as λόγος, to all nature. Contrary to ancient views, which are already noticeable in this concept (especially Stoicism and Neoplatonism), in Gregory’s interpretation a significant place is given to the human mind, which actually replaces the world Mind. It is the human mind, and not the Soul of the world, that acts as a mediator between nature and archetypal beauty, endowing nature with a participation in this beauty. In his anthropological treatise, Gregory explicitly rejects the parallel between man and the cosmos 616, although, as we remember, he himself defended this idea in the treatise On the Inscription of Psalms 617, and will return to it in the dialogue On the Soul and Resurrection 618. But here he denies that a person is a “small world (microcosm)” only because he consists of the same elements as the rest of the cosmos - after all, a fly or a mouse also consists of a mixture of four elements! And how much honor does a person have in resembling the rotating sky or the changing earth 619? According to biblical teaching, man is not like the creature, but the Creator Himself (see Gen. 1:26 ff). Here Gregory asks a question that is key for our research - however, leaving it unanswered: Therefore, what is meant by the word “image”? ... how is the incorporeal body, the eternal, temporary (τῷ ἀϊδίῳ τὸ πρόσκαιρον), unchangeable - what changes in a circle? How is it that man - a mortal, passionate, transient being - is an image of an unalloyed, pure, always existing nature? 620 Man is the image of God and his present sufferings Only on this question does Gregory actually approach the original problems of his work. Previous reflections can be considered nothing more than preparation. Gregory tries to explain the obvious discrepancy between the idea of ​​man as the image of God and the experience of suffering to which we are subject as passionate and mortal beings with the help of the biblical story about the first human couple (Gen. 2–3). Gregory perceives this story as a continuation of the story about the initial creation of the universe and man in it - God's image and likeness (Gen. 1). Already the text of Gen. 1 forces Gregory to think about two seemingly incompatible statements about man: man was created as God's image and likeness, and at the same time - as man and woman (Gen. 1:27). How can these two provisions be fair if the difference between the sexes is completely alien to the Divine (as evidence, Gregory cites not the transcendence of God, but the thought of the Apostle Paul that in Christ “there is neither male nor female”, Gal. 3:28). The Book of Genesis presents us, Gregory believes, with some “two creations” or “two dispensations” (διπλῆ κατασκευή 621) of human nature: in the first creation man is like God, in the second he is like animals. The meaning of this riddle, according to Gregory, is that man is a certain middle (μέσον 622) between two extremes, between the Divine and the animal, participating in both poles 623. However, later this explanation is not enough for Gregory. He cannot come to terms with the fact that man, as we now know him, like a “statue with two faces” 624 - reflection (διάνοια) and passions (πάθος) 625 - corresponds to the original divine plan. Passions and the “wordless” component of man 626 that gives rise to them, according to Gregory, cannot relate to the original creation. This is a consequence of the fall (ῥοπή 627) of man, who was once “like cattle,” and who voluntarily lost his original angelic nature 628. The method of reproduction characteristic of animals, due to the difference in the sexes, according to Gregory, also does not correspond to the original divine plan of a being created in the image of God. It is not that man, the image of God, should not reproduce. However, the Creator, according to Gregory, prepared for him an inexplicable method of reproduction, by which angels reproduce 629. After all, according to Jesus (Mk. 12:25), people after the resurrection will neither marry nor be given in marriage, but will be like angels, which means that in the beginning they were like angels. According to Gregory, the end is nothing more than the restoration of the original state (ἀποκατάστασις 630). Since God foresaw the fall of humanity from the angelic nature, He initially provided for a different method of reproduction, by which, as a kind of substitutionary method, the fullness of the number of souls 631 should be achieved. When this number is fulfilled, human history will cease, the time of the world will end 632 and man will return from his present mortal state to his original state, when he was free from passions and time 633. Man (ἄνθρωπος), created “in the beginning” (cf. Gen. 1:26), according to Gregory, means all of humanity (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον 634). Gregory distinguishes him from Adam (Αδάμ, Gen. 2:16 ff.), taken from the earth (Gen. 2:7 635), about whom Gen. narrates. 2–3 636 . However, Gregory describes this “Man” as a “whole nature” 637, and not as a higher genus, further divided into “species” determined by sex (as, for example, Philo believed 638). Rather, the saint presents him as a kind of completeness (pleroma) of the human race 639 or a collective being, gathered “as if in one body,” including all of humanity 640, all individual people in all of history, as they are simultaneously seen by God, in Whom there is neither past nor future 641. And it is this “Man,” meaning all of humanity, that, according to Gregory, is the image of God. Only additionally 642, in some “other creation” 643, thanks to the unerring insight of the Creator, he was endowed with the ability of reproduction characteristic of animals, which was useful to man after his tragic fall from the angelic nature 644. The human pleroma, called “man,” as it was in the beginning, must reappear at the end, but due to the unfortunate fall of human nature, the road of human history full of suffering and the multiplication of the human race in time now leads to it. And only when the original pleroma is replenished will time stop. Gregory here associates time (χρόνος) with the “bestiality” of man and the “substitute” way of replenishing the human pleroma. Literally, he says that God “provided for a time commensurate with the structure of people, so that the appearance of a certain number of souls would correspond to the continuation of time” 645. Thus, time has the same status as the division of the sexes in Gen. 1:27: it does not relate to the original human pleroma as its necessary feature, it is only a certain way out of the current situation, and after the end of history it will also cease (just as people will no longer get married). This “alternative measure” was originally provided by God, but it was actualized only by the free choice of man. It might be easier to imagine that time and the division of the sexes arose precisely at the moment of the Fall, but this is too clearly contrary to the account of the Book of Genesis. Therefore, Gregory works with the theory of the “double creation” that preceded the Fall, speaking of the original “equal-angelic” pleroma of humanity (cf. Gen. 1:26), to which the sexual division of man seems to be additionally added (Gen. 1:27). However, the actual beginning of human history (time as a measure of the substitutionary filling of the pleroma) obviously should be correlated not with the second creation, but only with the Fall. The implementation of history, i.e. Man’s falling away from the angelic nature, his “bestiality” and “temporality,” immersion in time, is thus the result of human freedom. The “second creation” only initially provided assistance in the new situation, but was not the cause of it. Between the original pleroma of equal angels and the historical man marked by the Fall, obviously, one more, purely speculative link should be placed - the pleroma, endowed with sexual distinction and a certain “time in possibility” 646. The question remains open to what Gregory refers to the creation of corporeality: either a special form of corporeality should have already related to the pleroma of the soul (this is evidenced by the special significance for Gregory of the theme of the simultaneous emergence of body and soul, see below), or corporeality itself was additionally added in the second creation along with the separation of the sexes (this seems obvious, but Gregory himself does not talk about this 647). Gregory's axiom about the end being equal to the beginning 648 could perhaps provide some help. The eschatological completion of history will bring with it the resurrection of the body, but not “marriage and marriage”: according to the logic of Gregory’s interpretations, it will mean a transformed physicality without sexual differences (see Gal. 3:28), necessary only for “bestial” reproduction. The most plausible hypothesis is that Gregory correlated such asexual corporeality with the original human pleroma. Full measure of evil and unlimited movement towards good The fateful human mistake that caused the real beginning of history, according to Gregory, has other consequences. We know that the Book of Genesis describes man's ill-fated choice as eating from the tree of good and evil (see Gen. 3:1–6). According to Gregory, this means that the result of human falling away is the inevitable confusion of good with evil: in the historical perspective, going back to free human choice, neither good nor evil ever appeared in a pure form, but were always in an inseparable mixture of one with the other. It was this mixture, according to the saint, that brought the fruit of the forbidden tree 649. Since human nature is mobile, it can never stop in its chosen movement. If it is directed towards good, it constantly moves forward, since what it seeks is unlimited, and therefore its movement will never reach a limit at which it could stop 650. But if it is directed to the opposite, nature plunges deeper and deeper into evil until it reaches the very bottom 651. Evil, unlike good, according to Gregory, has its limit and its full measure, its distance (διάστημα 652), which can be passed to the end, and then the movement of the incessantly moving human essence must necessarily turn to good 653. After all, evil, according to Gregory, is not unlimited (άόριστον 654), it is contained within prescribed limits. The ongoing movement of a constantly mobile entity therefore “necessarily” requires turning to the good (and not, say, marking time). Since this belief in the necessity of turning the full measure of evil into good would be difficult to verify experimentally, Gregory derives it from the belief in the superiority of good over evil 655. It would be very tempting to connect this belief with the idea of ​​​​the final renewal of everything, when evil, after reaching its full extent, due to the lack of other possibilities, must turn to good. However, here Gregory does not draw such a conclusion from his idea of ​​​​the “full measure of evil,” although eschatology is presented quite extensively in this treatise. The saint is especially interested in the question of how the human body, having decomposed into separate elements, will be reunited with its soul (Gregory gives, in particular, an amusing example of a man-eating fish, which itself will become human food, which will lead to an amazing mixture of elements 656). Gregory claims that the immortal soul retains a connection with the form or eidos (εἷδος 657) of the body with which it was united, retaining a certain imprint of this form 658 even after its death 659. Therefore, at the resurrection, the soul will recognize the elements that made up this eidos and will gather them together again, just as a shepherd gathers the sheep of his flock that have mixed with other people's cattle 660. For us, perhaps, more interesting is another objection to the resurrection, with which Gregory argues. According to this argument, anything that moves cannot stop, and anything that does not cannot be resurrected 661 . Gregory points his supposed opponent only to the evidence of Scripture, 662 without dwelling specifically on what the fate of the incessantly moving entity will be after its resurrection. His ideas about this in his treatise On the Structure of Man are apparently contradictory: on the one hand, the movement towards good is endless, on the other hand, after the completion of history, time will cease and all movement will stop 663. Does Gregory limit the endless movement towards goodness only to the present century? Does he really expect - since the end will bring the return of the beginning - the re-condensation of time into timelessness and the re-generalization of all people into a single human pleroma? One can only say with certainty that Gregory resolutely denies the idea of ​​repeating the entire cycle in line with metempsychosis (it’s not that the unique individuality of a modern person is dear to him - he simply cannot imagine how a soul that had fallen, say, to the level of an inanimate entity, could return again to its original state, which is required by the idea of ​​apocatastasis 664). Gregory also unequivocally denies Origen’s idea of ​​​​the pre-existence of souls, subsequently imprisoned in bodies, as well as the idea (Methodius) of the chronological pre-existence of the body (this teaching, polemicizing with Origen, was based on the verse Gen. 2:7, where God allegedly first formed the human body from the dust of the earth and then breathed life into it 665). According to Gregory, the unity of man requires that soul and body be created simultaneously 666. This is reproduced in every generation of the human race: body and soul are created simultaneously and develop from the embryo, where human organs and mental abilities are contained only in possibility, until the formation of an adult 667. Thus, the very corporeality of man, according to Gregory, must be attributed to the original intention of the Creator, although sexual discrimination and the “animal” method of procreation, which includes time, are only a kind of “last resort”. The development of man from an embryo into an adult being, analogous to the hewing of a sculpture from stone, where it was previously present only as a possibility 668, is a kind of faute de mieux [“for lack of a better”], which would not have existed without the Fall 669. A person goes through stages when only his vegetative component manifests itself, then perception is updated, and only over time rationality is realized 670. This situation of man, as a physically developing being, corresponds spiritually to the fact that the image of God, the original human purpose, is not immediately visible in a person; it is only necessary to grow towards it 671 by putting off the “old man” and putting on the “new man created according to God” (see Eph. 4:24) 672. Reflecting on the end, which means the restoration of order, Gregory points out that the idea of ​​the end of the world is closely related to the belief in its beginning 673. However, the object of this faith is not any self-evidence. How can one imagine that the material world has its beginning in the immaterial Creator? How did the incomposite God create matter (ὕλη 674) which is not in Himself? Was there matter in Him from the beginning? Or did He take it from somewhere outside 675? Gregory, of course, knows that only faith can answer these immodest questions, but for apologetic reasons he still tries to carry out an analysis 676. Gregory builds his reasoning about the creation of matter by an immaterial Creator based on how our immaterial mind perceives matter. Gregory notes that matter is inherent in certain qualities 677, without which (if we were to abstract them speculatively) the mind cannot comprehend it in any way. These qualities themselves, or their eidos (εἷδος), can be speculatively separated from their subject (τοῦ ὑποκειμένου 678) and cognized separately. The measurement (λόγος 679) of these qualities is necessarily intelligible (νοητόν 680), since the mind can comprehend them. In addition, the mind is able to distinguish between them: the concept of color, the concept of gravity, the concept of quantity, the concept of tangibility 681 are different from each other. They do not mix with each other or with physicality. If now these intelligible qualities are speculatively taken away from their subject, along with this the very concept of body 682 will disintegrate. “If with the removal of each of these properties from the subject, every concept of the body is destroyed, then it should be assumed,” Gregory concludes, “that we find the reason for the destruction of the body in the absence of something, and the total confluence (συνδρομή) of the same produces material nature” 683 . A body cannot exist without its qualities (size, weight, appearance, etc.), but none of these qualities is a body. Only in their totality do they give corporeality the opportunity to arise. However, there is nothing surprising in the fact that these intelligible qualities as “reasons” (ἀφορμαί 684) for the emergence of matter come from the intelligible Deity, namely, from the incorporeal Deity intelligible qualities come as certain possibilities (δυνάμεις 685), in their totality creating material nature. This doctrine of the origin of matter, already known to Origen 686 and Basil 687, comes from the kinship of the human mind with the Divine, in which knowledge is identical to creativity. If the human mind can perceive matter only as a set of intelligible qualities, but not as the subject of these qualities, since matter itself avoids knowledge, then in God only intelligible qualities can be present, and not their subject. Therefore, such a subject, according to Gregory, does not even exist, because intelligible qualities, by their totality, create matter without any carrier. From the point of view of Aristotelian metaphysics, this idea is quite complex and unusual, but in any case we are dealing with an interesting attempt to think about matter in general (although, obviously, any attempt to grasp matter with the mind is conditional). Gregory’s pattern of reasoning in this analysis is also worthy of attention. We are talking, in fact, about a kind of phenomenology, which is ontologized post factum on the basis of faith in the similarity of the human mind to the Divine. In Gregory's treatise on man we find surprisingly little overlap with the main topic of our study. For example, there is also the idea that a person’s movement towards good is endless, since this goal is unlimited (moreover, it is in some paradoxical way expanded by its opposite - connection with evil, which has its own boundaries). However, this motif can be said to be only incidentally adjacent, without any attempt to reconcile them, with the idea of ​​the end of time and the return to a timeless beginning. At the same time, it is explained in detail that the temporary or historical addition of the human pleroma with the help of the “cattle-like” method of reproduction is an unfortunate, although foreseen, result of man’s falling away from the original equal-angelic nature. Man, so to speak, himself has chosen the historical and temporal nature of existence, according to the laws of which he develops from the embryo and passes through the lower levels of biological life until he grows to full rationality and similarity to the Creator. Only at the end of history will the initially predetermined number of human souls be fulfilled, time will end, and the end will bring the restoration of the beginning - obviously, the human pleroma, compacted in the course of history into Divine timelessness. Time past and completed will be a kind of eschatological opposite of “time in possibility.” This “filled time” instead of the original timeless equal-angelic pleroma is a consequence of the fateful faute de mieux, with which Gregory represents the second creation, bringing the difference of the sexes; Moreover, the temporality of this second creation turns into its indefinite, apparently endless duration. For Gregory, the question, which, it is possible, obviously has no answer, does not lose its significance: how can a person, changeable and subject to time, be like the unchangeable and eternal God. The answer, according to which man is likened to the eternity of God by his endless movement, has not yet been formulated. The most important feature of human likeness to God, which Gregory speaks about in his anthropological work, remains the incomprehensibility and elusiveness of the human mind, which makes man the image of God. Also significant is the very opposition to the idea of ​​man as a microcosm with this position defended by Gregory: man is, first of all, the image of God. Both ideas are characterized by an emphasis on Divine transcendence: man is undoubtedly similar to the cosmos in the material composition of his body, but at the same time the human mind is mysteriously present in all members, without being homogeneous with it, just as God is mysteriously present everywhere in the world, without being contained in it. So, the main thesis about man is his constant self-overcoming, and therefore the inability of the human mind to comprehend itself, just as the main thesis about God is His transcendence in relation to the world. Perhaps it is precisely the polemic against the immanentization of God that leads Gregory to emphasize the self-transcendence of the human mind as the image of God. Is it possible, on the basis of this similarity, to consider that God Himself, by His unlimitedness, cannot comprehend Himself (contrary to Origen’s teaching about a limited God who knows Himself in Self-contemplation)? If we used Grigori’s method of ontologization of phenomenological analysis in this question, then, obviously, the answer would be positive. However, Gregory himself does not give an answer. Gregory's treatise On the Constitution of Man was available in Syriac and Armenian translations; Latin translations were created in the 6th century. Dionysius the Small, in the 9th century. - John Eriugena, in the 16th century. (independent of each other) – Ambrose Ferrari and Johannes Lewenklaius, for more details see Ph. Levine, "Two Early Latin Versions of St. Gregory of Nyssas Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου” // Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 63, 1958, p. 473–492 (the author most of all appreciates Dionysius’s translation for his understanding of essential relationships). E. von Ivánka drew attention to the similarity of Gregory's interpretation with the description of Cicero in De nat. deorum II, 45–60. This shows that both authors drew from the same source - the lost work of Posidonius Περὶ θεῶν, see E. von Ivánka, “Die Quelle von Ciceros De natura deorum II. 45–60 (Poseidonios bei Gregor von Nyssa)” // Archivum philologicum, 59,1935, p. 10–21. On the combination of biblical disciplines, on the one hand, and ancient science and philosophy, on the other, see E. M. Young, “Adam and Anthropos. A Study of the Interaction of Science and the Bible in Two Anthropological Treaties of the Fourth Century” // Vigiliae Christianae, 37, 1983, p. 110–140, esp. 110–125. The author points out that Gregory introduces many ancient ideas, both medical and philosophical, into the basic anthropological scheme “creation - fall - eschatological restoration,” but he does not directly analyze the sources used by Gregory. See Basil of Caesarea, Homiliae in Hexaemeron, ed. E. Amand de Mendieta – S.Y. Rudberg, G.C.S., N.F. 2, Berlin 1997. Cm. De hom. opif. praef.: PG 44,125c. Cm. De hom. opif. praef.: PG 44,125ab. Cm. De hom. opif. praef.: PG 44,128ab. . the dispensation of man - according to the publication: Works of St. Gregory of Nissk, Moscow, 1861, vol. 1). ... τὰ βαρέα καὶ κατωφερῆ (De hom. opif. 1: PG 44,128c). Στάσει γὰρ καὶ κινήσει (De hom. opif. 1: PG 44,128c). ... ξυμπνέοι πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ή κτίσις (De hom. opif. 1: PG 44,129c). ... τι μεθόριον ... μιγνὺς ἅμα καὶ διαιρῶν (De hom. opif. 1: PG 44, 129b). ... ἡ ὑγρὰ οὐσία (De hom. opif. 1: PG 44,129b). ... ἁρμόζεται (De hom. opif. 1: PG 44,129b). ... μίξις τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ σύνοδος (De hom. opif. 1: PG 44,129bc). On the theories of cosmic harmony in the first part of Gregory's work De hom. opif. see E. Corsini, L'harmonie. ... τῷ καταλλήλῳ κάλλει τὰ καθέκαστον διεκοσμήθη (De hom. opif 1: PG 44,132a). De hom. opif. 2: PG 44, 133a. Cm. De hom. opif. 2: PG 44.132d. Cm. De hom. opif 2: PG 44.133ab. Cm. De hom. opif. 3: PG 44.135a. Cm. De hom. opif. 4: PG 44.136b-d. ... ἐν ἀφράστῳ μακαριότητι κατ’ ἀρετὴν (De hom. opif. 5: PG 44, 137a). De hom. opif. 5: PG 44.137c. ... μίμημα τοῦ ὄντως νοῦ τε καὶ λόγου (De hom. opif. 5: PG 44,137c). See De hom. opif. 5: PG 44, 137c. On various aspects of Gregory’s idea of ​​man as the image of God, see S. Militello, “La categoria di “immagine” nel Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου di Gregorio di Nissa per una anthropologia Cristiana” // Ho theologos. Cultura Cristiana di Sicilia, 2, 1975, p. 107–172; B. Salmona, “II progetto di Dio sull’uomo. Analisi del “De hominis opificio” di Gregorio di Nissa” // E. Ancilli (ed.), Temi di anthropologia teologica, Roma 1981, p. 343–376. Cm. De hom. opif. 6: PG 44, 140a. Cm. De hom. opif. 6; 16: PG 44, 140bc; 180d. For this teaching and its main representative, Eunomius of Cyzicus, see below, the introduction to the chapter Refutation of Eunomius. See De hom. opif. 16: PG 44, 180d. Gregory ascribes to the Son His Own creative role, but the prototype of man is directly the Father. This idea is somewhat different from the ideas of other interpreters, who see in man the image not of the Father, but of the Son-Logos - one might say, the image of the Image (see, for example, Philo, De opif. mundi 25; Athanasius, S. gen. 2: Thomson 6, 6-9). See De hom. opif. 7: PG 44,140d-141a. Ancient authors repeat this observation quite often, see, for example, Plato’s myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus. Prot. 320d-322d. De hom. opif. 7: PG 44.141b. Cm. De hom. opif. 7: PG 44.141c-143a. Cm. De hom. opif 8: PG 44, 143b. Cm. De hom. opif. 8: PG 44, 144bc. Cm. De hom. opif. 8: PG 44, 148d-149a. For ancient and early Christian assessments of the human hand that influenced Gregory’s extraordinary attention to this motif, see K. Gross, “Lob der Hand im klassischen und christlichen Altertum” // Gymnasium, 83, 1976, p. 423–440. Cm. De hom. opif. 9: PG 44, 149c-152a. Similarly in In inscr. Ps. I, 3: GNO V, 33.4 ff, op. above, chapter On the inscription of the Psalms, approx. 42. ... δόγμα τι τῶν κεκρυμμένων... καὶ τὴν περὶ ψυχῆς φιλοσοφίαν (De hom. opif. 8: PG 44.144d). ... ἡ ... αὐξητικὴ ... καὶ θρεπτική (De hom. opif. 8: PG 44,144d-145a). ... τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ἐνέργειάν τε καὶ ἀντίληψιν ἔχει (De hom. opif 8: PG 44,145a). ... καὶ λόγου μετέχουσα, καὶ νῷ διοικουμένη (De hom. opif. 8: PG 44, 144d-145a). De hom. opif. 8: PG 44.145b. Cm. De hom. opif. 8: PG 44, 145cd. De hom. opif 9: PG 44, 149b. ... θεοειδὴς χάρις (De Not. opif. 9: PG 44,149b). Cm. De hom. opif. 9: PG 44.149b. De hom. opif. 10: PG 44.152c. ... τὸ πλάτος... τοῦ ἔνδοθεν χωρήματος (De hom. opif. 10: PG 44,152c). ... τοὺς χαρακτῆρας τῶν ὁρατῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καταγράφων (De hom. opif 10: PG 44,152c). See De hom. opif. 10: PG 44,152c-153c. De hom. opif. 11: PG 44.153d. De hom. opif. 11: PG 44.156a. ... πῶς εἰς τὴν πολυμέρειαν τὴν αἰσθητικὴν διασπείρεται (De hom. opif. 11: PG 44.156a). ... τὸ ἀκατάληπτον τῆς οὐσίας (De hom. opif. 11: PG 44,156b). Ἐπειδὴ δὲ διαφεύγει τὴν γνῶσιν ἡ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἡμέτερον φύσις, ὅς ἐστι κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος, ἀκριβῆ πρὸς τὸ ὑπερκείμενον ἔχει τὴν ὁμοιότητα, τῷ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἀγνώστῳ (De hom. opif 11: PG 44,156b). De hom. opif 12: PG 44.156c. The same controversy is also mentioned by Cicero, Tusc. disp. 1.19. See eg. SVF II, 837; II, 838; and SVF II, 836. See Plato, Tim. 69с-70а. ... ὁ περιεκτικὸς τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου ὑμήν (De hom. opif. 12: PG 44,157a). De hom. opif 12: PG 44.157a. Cm. De hom. opif. 30: PG 44, 241b-253a. On the influence of Galen on Gregory in De hom. opif. 30 says J. Daniélou, Grégoire de Nysse, La création de l'homme, SC 6, Paris 1944, note to p. 228–240. In this case, the author relies on the work of E. Chauvet, La Philosophie des médecins grecs, Paris 1886, p. 322–342. Cm. De hom. opif. 12: PG 44,157cd. Tὸν δὲ νοῦν ὁμοτίμως ἑκάστῳ τῶν μορίων, κατὰ τὸν ἄφραστον (De hom. opif. 12: PG 44,160d). See De hom. opif. 12: PG 44.161ab. Cm. De hom. opif. 14: PG 44.176ab. De hom. opif. 15: PG 44.178a. ... τις ἐνέργεια ζωτική (De hom. opif. 15: PG 44,178a). De hom. opif. 14: PG 44.176b. ... διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τῇ ὑλικῇ καταμιγνυμένη φύσει (De hom. opif 14: PG 44,176b). De hom. opif. 14: PG 44.173d. ... κίνησιν (De hom. opif. 14: PG 44,173d). ... τῆς νοερᾶς δυνάμεως χωρίς (De hom. opif. 14: PG 44,176b). De hom. opif. 13: PG 44.165a. See Heraclitus, passage Diels-Kranz 22 [12] A 6. See De hom. opif. 13: PG 44, 165ab, also: Plato, Phaedo 72; Phaedr. 245; Aristotle on Plato, Met. 1.6:987a32–35. ... διεδέξατο τὸ πλῆρες ἡ κένωσις (De hom. opif 13: PG 44,165ab). De hom. opif. 13: PG 44.165b. See E. von Ivanka, Die Quelle, c. 10. … ἐπίσης ἐν πᾶσι καὶ διὰ πάντων ἐστίν (De hom. opif. 15: PG 44,177b). … ἄφραστον τε καὶ ἀνεπινόητον (De hom. opif. 15: PG 44,177b). … οὔτε ἔξωθεν περιλαμβάνων, οὔτε ἔνδοθεν κρατούμενος (De hom. opif. 15: PG 44.177b). De hom. opif. 15: PG 44.177bc. ... σκάζει ... καὶ τῆς διανοίας ἡ κίνησις (De hom. opif. 15: PG 44, 177c). De hom. opif. 12: PG 44.161c. ... τι τῶν ἀστειοτέρων δογμάτων (De hom. opif. 12: PG 44,161c). ... τὸ κάλλιστον πάντων καὶ ἐξοχώτατον ἀγαθόν (De hom. opif. 12: PG 44,161c). … κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν (De hom. opif. 12: PG 44,161c). ... κατόπτρου κάτοπτρον (De hom. opif. 12: PG 44,161cd). … εἰκὼν εἰκόνος De hom. opif. 12: PG 44, 164a. In Philo (De opif. mun. 25) this expression means both man as the image of the Logos, and the world as the image of the Logos, i.e. the sensory world as a likeness (μίμημα) of the intelligible. See De hom. opif. 12: PG 44.161d. De hom. opif. 12: PG 44.161d. ... τὸ ἄσχημον, ἄμορφον ... ἀκατάσκευον (De hom. opif. 12: PG 44, 161d). De hom. opif. 12: PG 44.161d-164a. ... τοῦ κακοῦ ἡ γένεσις (De hom. opif. 12: PG 44,164a). De hom. opif. 12: PG 44.164b. De hom. opif. 12: PG 44.164d. ... τῆς φυσικῆς καταστάσεως (De hom. opif 12: PG 44,164d). … ἡ δὲ φύσις κατ’ ἴχνος ἕπεται τῷ προκαθηγουμένῳ (De hom. opif. 14: PG 44,176a). ... τῶν ἔξωθέν τινες ἐφαντάσθησαν (De hom. opif. 16: PG 44,177d). Cm. In inscr. Ps. I,3: GNO V, 30.25 ff. See about this above, chapter On the inscription of the Psalms, approx. 38. See De an. et res.: PG 46, 28b. See about this below, chapter On the soul and resurrection, approx. 21. De hom. opif. 16: PG 44.177d-180a. De hom. opif. 16: PG 44,180ab. De hom. opif. 16: PG 44.181b. E. Corsini considers this place “a real revolution in Gregory’s anthropology” (see E. Corsini, Vharmonie, p. 461): instead of the classical idea of ​​man as a link between the sensual and the speculative within the framework of cosmic harmony, we see a theory of man as an intermediate link between the divine and the animal, choosing his position independently. J. Daniélou, L’être, p. 126–132. See De hom. opif. 18: PG 44.192c. Cm. De hom. opif. 18: PG 44.192d. Cm. De hom. opif. 18: PG 44.192ab. De hom. opif. 17: PG 44.192a. ... ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγγελικῆς ὁμοτιμίας (De hom. opif. 17: PG 44,188c). Cm. De hom. opif. 17: PG 44.188ab. De hom. opif. 17: PG 44.188c. Cm. De hom. opif 17: PG 44,189cd. ... φύηται δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον De hom. opif. 22: PG 44.205c). ... ἀπό τοῦ φθαρτοῦ καὶ γεώδους ἐπὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀΐδιον (De hom. opif. 22: PG 44.205c). See De hom. opif. 16: PG 44.185b. From “those versed in the Hebrew language” (apparently from Origen’s lost commentary on Genesis) Gregory knows of the etymological relationship between the words ‘âdàm and ‘adâmâ (= earth), so Adam from Gen. 2 he calls “early” (γήϊνον πλάσμα) De hom. opif 22: PG 44, 204d. Philo also speaks of the duality of man (ἄνθρωπος) - spiritual and subject to passions - on the basis of two different Greek verbs with which the Septuagint describes the creation of man: one God “created” (ἐποίησεν, Gen. 1:26) to be “in His image” (κατ’ εικόνα), “formed” the second (ἔπλασεν, Gen. 2:7); the first was supposed to guard paradise (according to Philo, the paradise of virtues), the second was expelled from it (see Leg. all. 1.53–55). See De hom. opif. 22: PG 44, 204d. In the Hebrew text in both places there is ‘âdâm = man, Adam. ... ἡ καθόλου φύσις (De hom. opif. 22: PG 44,204d). See Philo, De opif. mundi 76; Leg. all.II, 13 … ἅπαν ἀθρόως τὸ τῆς φύσεως πλήρωμα (De hom. opif. 22: PG 44, 204d). … καθάπερ ἐν ἑνι σώματι ὅλον τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος πλήρωμα (De hpm. opif. 16: PG 44, 185c). See De hom. opif. 16: PG 44.185d. The nature of this pleroma is the subject of numerous hypotheses of researchers (earlier discussions are summarized by N. Urs von Balthasar, Présence, p. 52 ff, note 5). G. Militello (La categoria, p. 144) emphasizes the timeless-spatial character of this “concrete universal”. E. Corsini points out that we are not talking about the Platonic idea of ​​man and not about a higher race according to the teachings of Philo, but about the timeless creation of the human race in all its integrity, which, on the other hand, unfolds in time. A similar motif is the original synchronic creation of the world, which, from a human point of view, unfolds over six days, as Gregory considers it in his In Nehaet. (see E. Corsini, “Plérôme humain et plérôme cosmique chez Grégoire de Nysse” // M. Harl, ed., Écriture, pp. 111–1 26). R. Hübner also proves that we are not talking about a “body” in the sense of an ordered organic unity, a parallel to the eschatological body of Christ (as earlier researchers believed), not about an ontological, but about a purely logical concept and a simple collection of separate, limited beings (see R. Hübner, Die Einheit des Leibes Christi bei Gregor von Nyssa. Untersuchungen zum Ursprung der "physischen" Erlösungslehre, Leiden 1974, pp. 67–94). ... προσκατεσκευάσθη τελευταῖον τῷ πλάσματι (De hom. opif. 16: PG 44,185d). On the idea of ​​“double creation” in Gregory, see U. Bianchi, “Presupposti platonici e dualistici nell’ anthropologia di Gregorio di Nissa” // he (ed.), La “doppia creazione” dell’uomo: negli Alessandrini, net Cappadoci e nella gnosi, Roma 1978, p. 83–115. Philo also knew the idea of “double creation,” but he understood it differently than Gregory: on the one hand, man in his current state, consisting of soul and body, endowed with sensory perception (αἰσθητός) and the difference between the sexes, on the other, intelligible man (νοητός) as “a certain idea or genus” (ἰδέα τις ἢ γένος), he is “in the image”, see Philo, De opif. mundi 134 (see about this A. M. Mazzanti, “L’aggetivo μεθόριος e la doppia creazione dell’uomo in Filone di Alessandria” // U. Bianchi, ed., La “doppia creazione”, pp. 25–42). Origen’s idea of ​​“double creation” is also different: Origen speaks of the original community of incorporeal beings, some of whom, through their negligence, fell into corporeality; this new situation was caused by free human choice and not created by God. See De princ. II, 3, 1: SC 252, 250, 9 ff, where such a view is formulated only as a hypothesis, but Origen's understanding of the fate of incorporeal beings as corresponding to their own choice seems to only confirm this hypothesis, see De princ. I, 6, 2: SC 252, 198, 64 – 202, 121 (see G. Sfameni Gasparro, “Doppia creazione e peccato di Adamo nel Péri archon di Origene: fondamenti biblici e presupposti platonici dell’esegesi origeniana” // U. Bianchi, ed., La “doppia creazione”, p. 43–82). See about this F. Floeri, Le sens. ... (De hom. opif. 22: PG 44,205c). H. Urs von Balthasar even counts four “stages” that humanity has gone through according to Gregory: 1. the state of sinless man, who had to reproduce in the way of the angels (“pure possibility”); 2. the creation of concrete humanity, but in its ideal; 3. the first real man is placed in heaven, man is divided into two sexes; 4. a person who has sinned (see N. Urs von Balthasar, Présence, p. 52 ff, note 5). However, Gregory's idea of ​​an eschatological return to the first stage makes one doubt that he considered this state to be only a “pure possibility”, i.e. that he distinguished between the first and second stages. It is also not obvious what the “first real man” (third stage) was, if time (the accompanying “alternative” addition of the pleroma) begins only after the fall. Gregory appears to have rather identified man, prudently divided into two sexes (Gen. 1:27), with Adam and his wife before the fall (Gen. 2). We could be talking about some kind of modified human pleroma, containing the difference between the sexes and “time in opportunity,” i.e. time condensed into a single moment (Adam and his wife before the fall). However, Gregory does not speak clearly enough on this issue, so all reconstructions are inevitably hypothetical. P. Zemp sees De hom in the treatise. opif. two different “protological schemes”: ch. 1–15 describe man both as a unity of soul and body and as the image of God; Ch. 16–18 introduce the idea of ​​double creation, namely, on the one hand, the spiritual human pleroma as the image of God, on the other, the corporeal and divided into two sexes of man, created in anticipation of the fall (see R. Zemp, Die Grundlagen p. 155 ff). However, the researcher believes that there is no clear boundary between the two schemes. Already in ch. 1–15 Gregory leaves the reader in doubt whether the likeness of God is reducible to the human mind. In ch. 16–18, he calls only sexual difference introduced additionally, and not physicality as such. Ch. 28–29 show quite clearly that Gregory did not consider human corporeality as something secondary [Protology - reasoning about the principles of being. – Approx. ed.]. On this belief, adopted from Origen, although later modified, see M. Alexandre, “Protologie et eschatologie chez Grégoire de Nysse” // U. Bianchi - H. Crouzel (ed.), Arché e Telos. L'anthropologia di Origene e di Gregorio di Nissa. Analisi storico-religiosi (atti de colloquio, Milano, maggio 1979), Milano 1981, c. 122–159. J. Daniélou and other researchers therefore believe that the “first creation” is rather intentional in nature; it will be realized only at the end of time, when God will be “all in all.” Thus, the human pleroma, created “in the image of God,” is the “whole Christ,” i.e. Christ clothed in the body of the Church (see J. Daniélou, Platonisme, p. 57 ff). ... σύμμικτος δι’ ἑκατέρων τοῦ ἀπηγορευμένου ξύλου τὸν καρπὸν εlvai (De hom. opif. 20: PG 44,200b). Τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ πάντως κινούμενον, εἰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἔχοι τὴν πρόοδον, διὰ τὸ ἀόριστον τοῦ διεξοδευομένου πράγματος οὐδέποτε λήξει τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ πρόσω φορᾶς. Οὐδὲ γὰρ εὑρήσει ζητουμένου πέρας ούδὲν, οὗ δραξάμενον στήσεταί ποτε τῆς κινήσεως (De hom. opif. 21: PG 44,201b). Therefore, H. D. Dei understands this endless movement towards good as an optimistic version of man’s constant balancing between being and non-being; see H. D. Dei, “En torno al problema de la libertad y el mal según el tratado “Acerca de la creación del hombre” de Gregorio de Nyssa” // Revista de la Universidad de Marón, 13,1986, p. 57–79. ... ἐπὶ τὸ ἀκρότατον τοῦ κακοῦ μέτρον ἀφίκηται (De hom. opif. 21: HG 44, 201bc). On the idea of ​​the “full measure of evil” in Gregory, see J. Daniélou, L’être et le temps, p. 186–204. De hom. opif 21: PG 44, 201c. ... ὰγαθὸν τρέπει τὴν κίνησιν (De hom. opif. 21: PG 44,201c). De hom. opif. 21: PG 44, 201c. Cm. De hom. opif. 21: PG 44, 201ab. See De hom. opif. 26: PG 44.223c. De hom. opif. 27: PG 44, 228b. Cm. De hom. opif. 27: PG 44, 228b. Cm. De hom. opif. 27: PG 44.225bc. See De hom. opif. 27: PG 44.225bc. ... κινούμενα μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι (De hom. opif. 25: PG 44,213c). De hom. opif. 25: PG 44, 213d-216a. See also De hom. opif 23: PG 44, 209b. Cm. De hom. opif. 28: PG 44, 233ab. Cm. De hom. opif 28: PG 44, 229b-d. Cm. De hom. opif 29: PG 44, 233d. Cm. De hom. opif. 29: PG 44.236b-240b. Cm. De hom. opif 30: PG 44.253c. Cm. De hom. opif. 30: PG 44.253d. Cm. De hom. opif. 29: PG 44.237c. ... όδῷ τινι καὶ ἀκολουθίᾳ (De hot. opif. 30: PG 44,256a). See De hom. opif 30: PG 44, 256c. The dynamism and moment of development declared in the eschatology of the last chapters of the treatise De hot. opif., E. Corsini considers the result of the new anthropology of the saint, where man appears not as a mediator in the cosmic “mixture”, but as a creature “on the border”, which itself chooses its place: “By refuting the teachings of mixing, Gregory first of all frees man from this cycle and thus makes possible the constant and unceasing movement of the mind” (E. Corsini, L’harmonie, p. 461). See De hom. opif. 23, PG 44.209b. De hom. opif 23: PG 44, 212a. Cm. De hom. opif. 23: PG 44,212ab. Cm. De hom. opif 23: PG 44.209c. In his (probably later) work On Perfection, Gregory, on the contrary, rejects any speculation about the origin of matter as misplaced curiosity (πολυπραγμοσύνη), see De perf.: GNO VIII/1,189,18–190,2. ... ἐκ ποιοτήτων τινῶν συνεστῶσαν τὴν ὕλην (De hom. opif. 24: ΡG 44,212d). De hom. opif 24: PG 44, 212d. De hom. opif. 24: PG 44.213a. De hom. opif. 24: PG 44, 213a. ... (De hom. opif. 24: PG 44,213a). De hom. opif 24: PG 44.213ab. De hom. opif 24: PG 44.213b. De hom. opif. 24: PG 44.213b. Origen, however, only quotes this opinion: “But some, wanting to explore this question more deeply, have dared to say that bodily nature is nothing more than qualities. After all, if (they say) hardness and softness, warmth and cold, wetness and dryness are qualities, and after taking away certain qualities of this kind, of course, no other basis remains, then, obviously, qualities make up everything (his autem ... amputatis nihil aliud intellegitur subiacere, uidebuntur qualitates esse omnia).”, De princ. IV, 4, 7: SC 268, 416, 247–251. Origen himself, apparently, does not share this opinion (see De princ. II, 1, 4: SC 252, 240, 108–242.17), although in his interpretation he refers to the fact that matter is not eternal, since an uncreated subject cannot be the bearer of created qualities (see about this N. Crouzel - M. Simonetti, note 55, SC 269,260 ff). See Basil of Caesarea, In Nekhaet. 1.8: GCS, N. E 2.15.3–12. According to A. H. Armstrong, this opinion (apparently contained in some commentary on Tim. 52a8 ff) was known to Basil from the polemical statement of Plotinus in Enn. II, 4 [12], 11 (see A. N. Armstrong, “The Theory of the Non-Existence of Matter in Plotinus and the Cappadocians” // Studia patristica 5 [= Texte und Untersuchungen 80], 1962, pp. 427–429). However, it can also be imagined that Basil knew it from the writings of Origen, see previous note. The idea that matter consists of qualities arose earlier, but it presupposed a different understanding of qualities: Plutarch already polemicizes with the Stoic opinion about what exactly - οὐσία or ὕλη - consists of qualities; according to this idea, the qualities themselves are material, which Plutarch precisely refutes (see Plutarch, De comm. not., 50). Marius Victorinus also expresses the opinion that “qualities are matter proper” (qualitates igitur ὕλη), but understands qualities as elements: fire, air, water, earth (see Marius Victorinus, Ad Candidum 10: SC 68, 144,13–16). In both cases we encounter ideas different from those we find in Plotinus, Origen and the Cappadocians.