Толкование Екклесиаста

Human life as διάστημα is presented in most detail by Gregory in eight conversations of the Exact Interpretation of Ecclesiastes of Solomon (Εἰς τὸν Ἐκκλησιαστήν όμιλίαι). The Old Testament Book of Ecclesiastes is a very mysterious work in its structure 424 and purpose 425, not without hesitation included in the Jewish canon of Holy Scripture 426. Christian commentators from Origen to medieval exegetes 427 perceived it as a kind of physical treatise (“Physics of Christian Philosophy” 428). Origen presented the three Old Testament books of wisdom traditionally attributed to Solomon—Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Song of Songs—as analogous to the ancient classification of sciences into ethics, physics, and metaphysics (“Epoptik” 429). In the Book of Proverbs, he found teachings from the field of morality, in Ecclesiastes - information relating to physics, and, finally, in the Song of Songs - a certain peak of human knowledge, metaphysical or mystical comprehension of final causes (that is why Origen called this specific discipline epopticism 430). Gregory, who knew Origen's Hexaples (and also, very likely, Origen's lost interpretation of the Book of Ecclesiastes 431), clearly indicates that the Book of Ecclesiastes leads the reader prepared by Proverbs to "more perfect knowledge" 432. The spiritual meaning of Ecclesiastes, according to Gregory, is already captured in the words of the introduction: “Vanity of vanities” (Ματαιότης ματαιοτήτων, Eccl. 1:2 O’). Gregory defines the meaning of the word “vanity” (ματαιότης) in everyday speech: empty word, meaningless action, vain effort 433 - recalling that the figure of genitive repetition in Scripture denotes intensification 434. Gregory applies the general judgment of Ecclesiastes only to the material and sensory sphere: it is subject to death, fleeting, and in comparison with the life of the soul, to which eternity belongs, it is invalid and has no essence 435. However, it would be insulting for the Creator, according to Gregory, to evaluate His creation so low. And the fleeting area of ​​the sensory-perceptible, insignificant in itself, can lead to the knowledge of the invisible “really existing good” (τὸ ὄντως ὂν ἀγαθὸν 436). This is precisely its real meaning, to the understanding of which, according to Gregory, Ecclesiastes 437 wants to lead. At the same time, the Book of Ecclesiastes (or at least some parts of it) also has Christological significance. Ecclesiastes, Ἐκκλησιαστής, convening the Church (ἐκκλησία 438), “king over Israel” and “son of David” (cf. Eccl. 1:1), is, according to Gregory, Christ Himself, gathering the scattered into a single pleroma 439. Since, according to Origen's version of the story of the beginnings of existence, human nature unwisely used its freedom and was torn out from the original fullness - pleroma - of spiritual beings, lost like a lost sheep (cf. Matt. 18:12 and below; Luke 15:3-7) from the “holy hundred of spiritual sheep” 440, Christ came to bring it back so that the original number could be restored replenished (this is how Gregory comments on the verse Eccl. 1:15 “what is not there cannot be counted” 441). However, in order for Christ to be able to gather back everything that was lost, He must “take upon Himself our weaknesses” (Matt. 8:17), be “tempted in all points like us” (Heb. 4:15), just as the wise Ecclesiastes decided to explore and know everything human (cf. Eccl. 1:13–17) 442. Only in this way can the end again bring the fullness that was in the beginning, evil can go into oblivion (see Eccl. 1:11 “there is no memory of the former”), the righteous can return again to the original beauty: the purified soul will again be the image and likeness of God (cf. Eccl. 1:9a “what has been, that will be”), the resurrected body will again be the same as it came out of God’s hands in the beginning (cf. Eccl. 1:96 “what has been done will be done” 443). To explore our topic, the most interesting are Gregory's conversations 6–8 on verses Eccl. 3:1–13, dealing with “the time of every thing under heaven,” or time itself. Verse Eccl. 3:1 contains two key concepts at once: χρόνος (current time 444) and καιρός (time of a certain thing, opportune moment) - “For everything there is a season (χρόνος), and a time (καιρός) for every thing under heaven.” In these and subsequent words, Gregory tries to find the teaching of Ecclesiastes on how to “live virtuously” 445, and even some “art and way to succeed in life” 446. As in any art, this requires rules 447 and samples, as a kind of guidelines 448. Based on Eccl. 3:1, Gregory indicates two such “criteria of beauty” 449 in the art of life: proportionality and timing (τὸ σύμμετρόν τε καὶ τὸ εὔκαιρον 450). The latter corresponds to both key categories: time - χρόνος and favorable moment - καιρός. Gregory understands time-χρόνος as a relatively long time interval: Therefore, time (χρόνος) is understood by us as a measure (τὸ μέτρον), because time serves as a measure for each individual measure. Whatever happens, without a doubt, happens in time, and with the continuation (τῇ παρατάσει) of everything that happens, the extension of time continues together (τὸ διάστημα τοῦ χρόνου), the small extension of time - with the small, and the greater - with the greater 451. Time, according to Gregory's observation, is a measure of womb-bearing, a measure of maturity and growth, a measure of the path, a measure of the life of each person in its individual periods. And although time does not measure out the same measure of duration to everything that happens, it is a general measure of everything and covers everything 452. Who keeps track of time 453, i.e. the proper duration of everything, he avoids immoderation 454, putting the correct measure between unreasonable length and excessive brevity. In a similar sense, virtue is a measure, a middle way between unreasonable extremes 455: for example, the correct measure of courage is a middle way between insolence and cowardice 456. Gregory even points out the connection between time-χρόνος (the proper length of the time interval) and virtue as the mean among extremes. Gregory also applies the criterion of the golden mean to determine the appropriate moment (καιρός). And here everything depends on neither overtaking nor being late 457 - whether we are talking about the time of harvest, the time of sailing or treatment. Good, therefore, cannot be called either immoderate (ἄμετρον) or untimely (ἄκαιρον 458), since it is associated with the right moment and the right measure. At the same time, one can hardly succeed without the other; both are necessary for each other, just as we need both legs at once to walk: “in time, proportionality is beneficial, and in measure, timing is beneficial” 459 . Time-χρόνος, thus, covers everything that happens, but it also covers the duration of the existence of each individual thing. The general period (διάστημα 460) of time thus includes separate intervals or intervals (παρατάσεις) of individual things. In this second meaning, time-χρόνος is closer to time-καιρός, but Gregory reserves the second term for “the time of every thing,” the time (εὐκαιρία) of each object, the appropriate placement of the interval of a given thing within the comprehensive diastema of time. As if in the margins, Gregory also analyzes examples - individual pairs of actions and events that have their own καιρός: the time of birth and death, planting and harvesting, killing and healing, destruction and construction, etc. (see Eccl. 3:2–8) and first of all seeks their spiritual meaning. It is interesting for us how Gregory explains “a time to be born and a time to die.” In his opinion, the wise Ecclesiastes shows here to a person absorbed in the present moment, “loving the present,” the inevitable future of everything born - death. This memento mori should “awaken those immersed in carnal life, make those subject to vain aspirations 461 care about the future and lead those wandering in the meaningless circles of the labyrinth of the world onto the straight path of virtue 462.” Unlike walking in a circle and wandering in a labyrinth, the path of virtue, for Gregory, has its own goal, which must be strived for, towards which one must go straight, i.e. the shortest possible path: the path of virtue or virtue itself means “not to turn the soul to anything here, but to strive diligently towards what is offered in the hope of faith” 463. In these lines one can hear echoes of Phil. 3:13, however, from here we learn more about the character of human παράτασις, i.e. the interval defined for a person in the all-encompassing diastema of time. A person tends to forget about why he lives, to immerse himself in the present and its worries, wandering in circles which distract from the thought of the end. Virtue, on the contrary, means an awareness of the end, even a desire for it, “concern for the future” instead of concern for the present. This understanding of the present not from himself, but from the future, understanding life on the basis of death, does not at all mean only understanding a person based on his finitude, since by the future Gregory means not only death. As can be seen from his last quoted statement, the saint has in mind the future, which we know by “faith” and to which we strive “in hope.” Elsewhere, discussing “a time to weep and a time to rejoice” (Eccl. 3:4), Gregory points out that “reasons for joy” in the age to come await those who understand how deplorable the present human condition is. However, the question remains open of what death is for the paratasis [extent] of human life. If this is its limit, then human life is stretched between birth and death. Then the existence that awaits a person after death must be “aparatatic”, “adiastematic”, without the character of a path. The second possibility (more plausible in the light of the previous analysis of On the Inscription of the Psalms and the dialogue On the Soul and Resurrection) is that death is not the limit of the paratasis of human life, but only a certain transition within its framework. Beyond the threshold of death, however, this interval must open up indefinitely. The meaning of search is in the search itself The relationship of human life with the comprehensive context of time - χρόνος is considered even more closely by Gregory in the interpretation of the verse of Eccl. 3:6: “There is a time to seek, and a time to lose; a time to save, and a time to throw away.” Gregory does not doubt for a minute that the “search” is the search for God, ...finding (Whom) is itself an everlasting search. For there is nothing else to seek this, and nothing else to find; but the benefit of acquisition is the quest itself 465. The “favorable time” for such a search is throughout life. In this single case, καιρός, opportuneness or opportune moment, lasts throughout life, and life is the only time (καιρός) of such a search 466 . That is, the “timeliness” of the search does not imply any specific period of time, but something completely different – ​​that “the seeker should never stop doing this” 467 . The entire human paratasis, according to Gregory, must be filled with the search for God, and this search itself is already an acquisition, and there is no other acquisition except a constant search. Gregory does not at all mean a search in which nothing is found, as follows from his words about preserving what has been found. Preserving what is found is a much more difficult task than the search itself 468, and the time period of life is not only the time of searching, but also the time of preservation 469, the time of love for God 470, as Gregory speaks of this elsewhere. And here, therefore, the dialectic of aspiration and accomplishment, which we have already encountered, is repeated. Finding is in the search itself; However, in this search they actually find something: we are dealing with development or growth. Each acquisition is a threshold for further search, and there is no place to rest where the search does not continue. After all, it is impossible to get enough of the good, as Gregory says about this in another place in his sermons: ...and they do not expect satiety, and there is no satiety in it, but even with satisfaction, lust continues, along with pleasure, desire intensifies, and is not limited to achieving what it strives for 471. What cannot be spoken about must be kept silent about What the soul strives for, what it “constantly seeks, and with which, having found it, it desires to be united” 472, while surpassing any concept, cannot be expressed in words as unlimited (τὸ ἀόριστον 473). Here Gregory directly calls the Divine unlimited. At the same time, he defends not so much the idea of ​​​​an endless path as an apophatic approach, inspired by the verse of Eccl. 3:76: “a time to be silent, and a time to speak.” What must be kept silent, says Gregory, is the Divinity itself, which surpasses any idea, any concept 474 and any attempt at explanation 475. Anyone who tries to squeeze it into the meaning of words is eo ipso [thereby] already mistaken regarding its nature 476. After all, what we consider to be the highest of all obviously exceeds our reason / our words (λόγος): And whoever undertakes to embrace the indefinable (τὸ ἀόριστον) in a word, does not he already agree that what he introduces is above all, instead of the all-exceeding, because he considers his own word to be something similar to this and just as great, since and to what extent this word has contained, not knowing that the divine concept of the truly existing (ἡ θεοπρεπὴς περὶ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος... ἔννοια) is preserved only with the confidence that the Divine is above knowledge (ὑπὲρ γνῶσιν εἶναι τὸ θεῖον)? 477 Gregory explains this inability of the created spirit to comprehend the unlimited Divinity with a whole specific ontology. Nothing created can exceed its boundaries: “until then it exists as long as it remains within its own limits” εἶναι μένει 478 ). In this case, being appears as a whole, held together by mutual sympathy. The universe itself is tightly connected (συνεχές ἐστι τὸ πᾶν ἑαυτῳ), and there is no gap in the harmony of the intelligible, but on the contrary, creatures have some kind of unanimity among themselves (τίς ἐστι σύμπνοια τῶν πάντων πρὸς ἄλληλα). And nothing is separated from the mutual connection of everything; on the contrary, everything remains in being, content by the power of Being δυνάμει περικρατούμενα) 479 . What really exists, Gregory also calls ἡ αὐτοαγαθότης 480 (good that has a source in itself), because he knows that it is impossible to give it an adequate name. This “good greater than good” (τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἤτοι ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν 481) gave everything the power to arise and gives everything the power to remain in being. And without the source of being, this stoic cosmos*, built on Platonic “real being,” is only non-being (ἀνυπαρξία 482). It is into the sphere of non-existence that, obviously, everything that crosses its own boundaries, that is torn away from the totality of what is related (τὸ συγγενές 483) must fall. Each thing exists only as long as it remains within its boundaries, and therefore in the sphere of being 484. Individual sense organs cannot exceed their boundaries, the eye can only see, the ear can only hear: every creature cannot, by the vastness of its vision (διὰ τῆς καταληπτικῆς θεωρίας), come out of itself, but always remains within itself, and whatever it looks at, sees itself (ὅπερ ἂν ἴδῃ, ἑαυτὴν βλέπει), although he thinks he sees something higher than himself, he does not by nature have the ability to look outside himself (τὸ ἐκτὸς ἑαυτῆς ἰδεῖν φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει) 485. This interpretation of Gregory obviously does not imply any epistemological solipsism of thinking, but there is an attempt to explain that even thinking - just like other parts of the cosmic whole - cannot overcome its own boundaries and see the Uncreated. The capabilities of a created thing, including its ability to know, are limited by the limits within which the created thing operates, by the boundaries assigned to it. Gregory explains this with the following example: thinking sometimes seems to be forced to overcome its “diastematicity” (τὴν διαστηματικὴν ἔννοιαν 486), but it will never succeed: For with every newly acquired idea, it certainly perceives the space encompassed by the essentiality of what is represented by the mind. Space is nothing other than a creature 487. Thus, thinking is always connected with the diastema, at a certain interval. Gregory obviously means not only the time interval (although that too), but also the distances between things that distinguish and delimit one thing from another. This is the basic property of every created thing and even creation as a whole. Everything that thinking captures in the form of concepts is always reflected in it as a kind of diastema, an interval with set limits. That which is unlimited, “infinite” or “limitless” cannot be thought. Therefore, the good that we must seek and preserve exceeds our understanding, since it exceeds the created, i.e. diastematic nature: For our thought, making its way along spatial extension (τῇ διαστηματικῇ παρατάσει ἐνδιοδεύουσα), how will it comprehend non-spatial nature (τὴν ἀδιάστατον φύσιν), always searching through the decomposition of time, which of those found is older than it? Although with her curiosity she flows through everything knowable, she nevertheless does not find any way to transcend the idea of eternity (τὴν τοῦ αἰῶνος ἔννοιαν) in order to place herself outside, to become higher, both of the being first of all contemplated, and of eternity itself (ὅπως ἄν ἔξω ἑαυτὴν στήσειε καὶ ὑπερθείη τοῦ προθεωρουμένου τῶν ὄντων αἰῶνος) 488 . Here, obviously, Gregory implies that our knowledge, which has a discursive, diastematic character, bypasses the limits of individual things, driven further and further by curiosity. The concept of “age” (αἰών) as the totality of all times is added as a third term to the concepts of “duration” (χρόνος) and “timeliness” (καιρός), and its meaning is closer to the first of the terms 489. “A century” (“all the time”) cannot pass, which means that it cannot be “left behind”, it is impossible to get out of it. We can only look from a distance at what we have already passed, but not at what is (partly) still in front of us. Therefore, our thinking cannot overcome time, get rid of its diastematic character; for this reason, a person is always directed (or should be directed) forward and into the future, realizing the incompleteness of the entire present. Gregory explains the inability of human thinking to overcome time with the following example: imagine a person who stands on the edge of a steep and slippery cliff hanging over a vast, literally endless abyss 490. If he tries to feel the depth with his foot, he will have nothing to rest his foot on and nothing to grab onto with his hands. This is exactly how Gregory says the soul feels when it tries to leave the solid ground of diastematic thinking and seeks something that precedes all the time and has no distance 491. She has nothing to rely on, since there is no place, no time, no measure 492, and nothing like this, and without a point of support she is open to fall, unless, overwhelmed by dizziness and confusion, she returns to what is related to her, “loving only such a measure of knowledge about the Supreme, at which one can be convinced that It is something different from the nature of knowable things” 493. This “climbing” example shows why the beyond, the transcendental is unknowable: not only because it cannot be passed over or left in front of oneself (just as time cannot be passed through entirely), but also because it cannot be entered into at all. For this it would be necessary to leave time and the diastematic thinking associated with it. What cannot be grasped by thinking - Gregory returns to the commented verse of Eccl. 3:76, - we can’t talk about that. Here speech comes across something beyond speech (τὰ ὑπὲρ λόγου 494), so that all that remains is, in the words of Gregory, “to contain the inexplicable miracle of this unspeakable power in the secret of the inner understanding” 495. After all, even Scripture does not speak directly about God, but talks about His deeds, and it does not even dare to say that “there is no end to the essence of God” 496, but says that “there is no end to the splendor of the glory of His holiness” (Gregory combines the verses Ps. 144:3 and 144:5 O') 497. Therefore, Gregory does not at all dare to reflect on the essence of God; he only “expresses in words surprise at the splendor seen in the word,” and through this at His shrine 498. He sings of “splendor” because he wants to show that our thinking cannot embrace the boundaries of the Sung 499. So, it is necessary to remain silent about God’s essence; we can only talk about “some good action, the knowledge of which descends to us” 500. These discussions about the unknowability of God sound like a lecture on Christian apophatics. Gregory's epistemological skepticism, however, is much more radical: if the creature has not known itself, has not comprehended what the essence of the soul and the nature of the body is, where the being comes from, where the birth of one from the other, how the non-existent is realized, how the existing is resolved into the non-existent; what harmony is there in this world of opposites - if the creature has not known itself; then how to explain what is higher than it? 501 Gregory comments in a similar way on the verse of Eccl. 1:8 (“All things are labor: man cannot tell all things” 502): If human words cannot describe even visible things, how can they comprehend the Word and His Father? And even if we use all the power of our thinking and try to delve into each of the names attached to God, it will never be the true λόγος, the final meaning or exhaustive description of what we are looking for 503. In Gregory's conversations on the Book of Ecclesiastes we find extremely important points. First of all, you should pay attention to the concept of time in the sense described here - time as an interval (diastema). Gregory borrowed it from Basil's polemic with Eunomius's definition of time as the “movement of the stars.” Vasily points out that “time is an interval coextensive with the duration of the world” 504, and as such is a measure of movement and in no way vice versa. Otherwise, according to Vasily, any movement can serve as a measure of time - not only stars, but also, for example, a crawling scarab 505. Researchers emphasize that the concept of time among the Cappadocians is a kind of logically (although in no case historically 506) intermediate link between Plotinus’ idea of ​​time as a diastema 507 of the World Soul (see Εnn. III, 7 508) and Augustine’s analysis of time as a distentio animi (“extension of the soul”; cf. Confess. XI 509). Like the World Soul of Plotinus, in Gregory the universal diastema of all time is aware of itself in the human understanding of temporality, in man’s striving for the future. This “psychological” understanding of time as the “extension” of the human spirit between the past and the future will be further developed by Augustine 510. It is worth noting that the Stoics understood time as διάστημα, which accompanies the movement of all things 511. Researchers suggest that the coincidence here is “purely verbal” 512. Indeed, Gregory here (unlike Vasily) does not connect time directly with movement, but he understands that time is the measure of every thing, every action. In this regard, it is interesting to note, for example, that Chrysippus speaks of two types of time (χρόνος): time as a “whole” and time from separate “parts”. He also points out that time is infinite (ἄπειρος) both in the past and in the future. Time has no absolute beginning and can be divided indefinitely 513. Gregory, on the contrary, obviously accepts the idea of ​​​​the absolute beginning of time. An important difference from Stoic cosmology, obviously, lies in the fact that Gregory understands the universe not as a cyclic repetition: for him the time interval is unique. This is a diastema of freedom, predetermined by a person’s choice either as a movement towards emptiness, or as an endless increase in good that cannot be satisfied 514. For our research, the apophatic motive of God’s unknowability and inscrutability, based on the adiastematic essence of God, beyond our knowledge, is also interesting. After all, human knowledge is always necessarily connected with diastema in two senses: on the one hand, with an interval of time from which we cannot exit, since we cannot pass through it entirely; but also, on the other hand, with the certainty that defines the boundaries. The unlimited cannot be conceived, just as it is impossible to walk on the abyss. In conversations on the Book of Ecclesiastes we also find a description of the endless path - no less explicit than the description of God's infinity, i.e. endless acquisition, which in itself is the search, endless striving, which constantly increases through participation in the search. What is missing in this work is the combination of both motifs. Also, the question of eschatology remains unanswered: what will happen to the paratasis of human time when we cross the threshold of death? Will we enter the adiastematic “space” of God Himself, i.e. will we lose the character of the created (after all, the diastema is creation itself!), or will this paratasis continue into other “impenetrable” diastemas, another, new eon, into a new path without end? The disjointed (or seemingly disjointed) sequence of thoughts in the Book of Ecclesiastes is now usually explained by its genre: a collection of short notes or observations in the form of a diary of reflections on the main themes of human life. An overview of the most varied interpretations is given by D. Michel, Qohelet (Erträge der Forschung, vol. 258), Darmstadt 1988, p. 9–45. The book of Ecclesiastes is completely silent about the history of salvation. Her God is the Creator of the universe, Who remains a mystery to man. A person must live the time allotted to him, although in this time itself there remains much that is incomprehensible, and it is just a moment in the constantly repeating cycle of the world. A review of research on this interesting topic is provided by D. Michel, Qohelet p. 95–103. For example, Jerome testifies to the doubts of Jewish scholars (In Eccles. 12,13–14: Chr. SL 72,360,384 – 361,399). These doubts, naturally, concerned not the canonicity of the work, but its conversion; see about this S. Z. Leiman, The Canonization of Hebrew Scripture. The Talmudic and Midrashic Evidence, Hamden, Connecticut 1976, 72–86 a 121; R. Beckwith, The Old Testament Canon of the New Testament Church and its Background in Early Judaism, London 1985,281 ff, 287 ff. For the history of interpretation of the book of Ecclesiastes, see Ch. D. Ginsburg, Coheleth, commonly called The Book of Ecclesiastes (1861), reprinted in: aka, The Song of Songs and Coheleth, New York 1970, p. 27–243; a review is also provided by A. Rayez, in: H. Duesberg - ibid., article “Ecclésiaste” // Dictionnaire de Spiritualité, IV/1, Paris 1960, p. 47–52; and R. Berndt, “Skizze zur Auslegungsgeschichte der Bücher Proverbia und Ecclesiastes in der abendländischen Kirche” // Sacris erudiri, 34, 1994, p. 5–32. This is what Th. calls the Book of Ecclesiastes. Kobusch, “Zeit und Grenze. Zur Kritik des Gregor von Nyssa an der Einseitigkeit der Naturphilosophie" // S.G. Hall (ed.), Gregory of Nyssa, Homilies on Ecclesiastes. An English Version with Supporting Studies (Proceedings of the Seventh International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa, St Andrews, September 1990), Berlin – New York 1993, p. 299–317, especially 302. Cp. Origen, Comment, in Cant., prologue 3, 1–15: SC 375, 128–138. See also S. Leanza, “La classificazione dei libri salomonici e i suoi riflessi sulla questione dei rapporti tra Bibbia e scienze profane, da Origene agli scrittori medioevali” // Augustinianum, 14,1974, p. 651–666. The concept of "epoptika" apparently comes from the designation of the highest level of initiation in the Eleusinian mysteries (see Plutarch, De Iside 77: 382d). See also P. Hadot, “Les divisions des parties de la philosophie dans l'Antiquité” // Museum Helveticum, 36, 1979, p. 201–223, especially 218 ff. The scholia of Origen and the eight homilies on Ecclesiastes were already known to Jerome (see Ep. XXXIII ad Paulam: CSEL 54, 256.15; 257.12 ff). Today we can get an idea of ​​them from fragments in the Greek catenas. On this see S. Leanza, “Lesegesi di Origene al libro dell’ Ecclesiaste”, Regio Calabria 1975; also “Ancora sull’esegesi origeniana dell’Ecclesiaste” // E. Livrea – G. A. Privitera (ed.), Studi in onore di A. Arizzoni, Messana – Roma 1978,1, p. 491–506. Cm. In Eccl. hom. 1: GNO V, 277.4 – 278.5. Cm. In Eccles. hom. 1: GNO V, 281, 3 – 282.9. ... τὸ ἀνυπέρθετον ... τῆς ἐν τῷ ματαίῳ ὑπερβολῆς (In Eccl. hom. 1: GNO V, 283.16 ff). See entire passage 282.10 – 283.17. ... ἀνύπαρκτός τις καὶ ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν (In Eccl. hom. 1: GNO V, 284,11). See entire passage 284.1–11. In Eccl. hom. 1: GNO V, 285.11. See In Eccl. hom. 1: GNO, V, 284.11 – 285.12. Heb. the name Qohelet (from the root qhl = to collect) does not in principle exclude this interpretation. However, this root (at least in Syriac) can also mean “to think intensely.” Some commentators, therefore, read the book's title as "skeptic." A review of interpretations is given by D. Michel, Qohelet, p. 4–8. ... ὁ τὰ ἐσκορτησμένα συνάγων εἰς ἓν πλήρωμα (In Eccl hom. 1: GNO V, 280, 8 ff). See entire passage 280.8 – 281.2. ... εἰς τὴν ἱερὰν τῶν λογικῶν προβάτων ἑκατοντάδα (In Eccl. hom. 2: GNO V, 305, 2). See In Eccl. hom. 2: GNO V, 298, 5–9; 304.23 – 304.13. Cm. In Eccl. hom. 2: GNO V, 305,14–22. Cm. In Eccl. hom. 1: GNO V, 294.18 – 296.18; 297.11–298.3. On the concept of χρόνος, see R. Zemp, Die Grundlagen, p. 79–97. ... πῶς ἄν τις κατ’ ἀρετήν βιῴη (In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 373.12). ... τινὰ τέχνην καὶ ἔφοδον πρὸς τὴν τοῦ βίου κατόρθωσιν (In Eccl hom. 6: GNO V, 373, 12 ff; Russian translation “Accurate presentation of Ecclesiastes Solomon” - here and further from the edition: Works of St. Gregory of Nissk, Moscow, 1861, vol. 2. – p. ... κανών τις (In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 374.12). In Eccl. hom. 6: 374.10 ff. ... τοῦ καλοῦ κριτήρια (In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 374.15). In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 374.16 ff (Russian translation – p. 294). In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 376, 23 – 377, 4; pyc. nep. – c. 297. We read something similar in another place, where time replaces measure, “because time is associated with everything that comes into being” (παντὶ τῷ γινομένῳ συμπαρατείνεται χρόνος, In Eccl. 6: GNO V, 374.19 ff. ... ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιέχων τὰ πάντα (In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 377.13 ff). ... ὁ χρόνον ὁρίζων (In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 378, 3). ... χωρίζει... τὴν ἐξ ἀμετρίας κακίαν (In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 378.4). ... καί ἡ ἀρετὴ μέτρον ἐστί τῆ μεσότητι τῶν παραθεωρουμένων μετρούμενον (In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 375.4 ff). See Aristotle, Eth. Nie. II, 6–8: 1106b36–1109al9; Philo, De poster. 102. ... οὔτε τὸ προλαμβάνον ... ούτε τὸ ἐφυστερίζον (In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 375.17 ff). See In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 376.12 ff. ... ἐν τῷ καιρῳ ἡ συμμετρία καὶ ἐν τῷ μέτρῳ ἡ εὐκαιρία (In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 376.21 ff. nep. On this key concept of Gregory, see R. Zemp, Die Grundlagen, p. 63–72; T. P. Verghese, “Διάστημα and διάτασις in Gregory of Nyssa” // H. Dörries – M. Altenburg – U. Schramm (ed.), Gregor von Nyssa und die Philosophie, p. 243–260; D. L. Balas, Eternity and Time in Gregory of Nyssas Contra Eunomium, ibid., p. 128–155. ... πρὸς τὴν φροντίδα τῶν μελλόντων διαναστήση (In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 378, 15; Russian translation - p. 298). ... ἐπὶ τὴν σύντομον τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁδὸν ... ἄγουσιν (In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO, V, 379.10 ff). ... συντετάσθαι τῇ σπουδῇ πρλπίδι προκείμενον (In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 379, 12 ff; Russian translation - p. 299). See In Eccl. hom. 6: GNO V, 388, 10 ff; rus. lane - With. 309. ... οὗ ἡ εὕρεσίς ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀεὶ ζητεῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο τί ἐστι τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ ἄλλο τὸ εὑρίσκειν, ἀλλὰ (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 400, 21 – 401, 2; Russian translation – p. 320). Ἐπὶ τούτου γὰρ μόνου εἶς καιρὸς τῆς σπουδῆς ἐστιν ἡ ζωὴ πᾶσα (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 401.4 ff). ... τὸ μηδὲ ὅλως διαλείπειν ἀεὶ ζητοῦντα τοῦτο ἐστι ἡ ἀληθὴς εὐκαιρία (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 401, 7 ff; Russian translation - p. 320). ... μεῖζον γὰρ τοῦ εὑρεῖν τὸ φυλάξαι (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 404, 20 ff). ... τὸν τῆς φυλακῆς καιρόν (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 405.4 ff). (In Eccl. hom. 8: GNO V, 425, 16 ff). ... συμπαρατείνεται τῇ μετουσίᾳ ἡ ὄρεξις, καὶ συνακμάζει τῇ ἀπολαύσει ὁ πόθος καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητοῦ ἐπιτυχίᾳ οὐ περιγράφεται (In Eccl. hom. 2: GNO V, 313,10–13). ... ὁ ... καὶ ζητεῖ διὰ παντὸς καὶ ἐνραφῆναι τῷ εὑρεθέντι ἐφίεται (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 411.4 ff. – pp. 329–330). In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 411, 9. ... τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ... νόημά τε καὶ ὄνομα (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 411, 3). ... πάσης ἑρμηνευτικῆς φωνῆς ἐστι ὑψηλότερον (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 411.5 ff). ... πλημμελῶν εἰς τὸ θεῖν (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 411.6 ff). In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 411.9–14; rus. lane – c. 330. In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 411, 16. In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 406, 3–7; pyc. nep. – c. 325. In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 406, 7. In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 406.13; rus. lane - With. 325. In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 406.15. In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 411.15. ... ἔστιν, ἕως ἂν ἐντὸς τῶν ἰδίων ὅρων μένῃ (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 411.19 ff). In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 412.6–10; rus. lane – c. 331. In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 412.10. Παντὶ γὰρ τῷ εὑρισκομένῳ νοήματι συνθεωρεῖ πάντως τὸ ????? διάστημα οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κτίσις ἐστίν (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 412, 12 ff; Russian translation - p. 331). The extension of the concept of διάστημα not only to the sensory, but also to the intellectual realm, and not only to space, but also to time, A. A. Mosshammer considers a turning point in Gregory’s thinking. In this case, the conversations on the Book of Ecclesiastes appear as an intermediate link between the early works of Gregory (De hom. op., commentary on the Sixth Day, De an. et res.), where διάστημα is understood as the spatial dimension of sensory things, and C. Eun. I, where Gregory develops more and more deeply the idea of ​​the universe as a diastema. At the same time, the author rightly points to the spatial metaphors of time in Gregory, associated with the concept of diastema (see A. A. Mosshammer, “Time for All and a Moment for Each: The Sixth Homily of Gregory of Nyssa on Ecclesiastes” // S. G. Hall, ed., Gregory of Nyssa, pp. 249–275). A similar development of Gregory’s ideas is also indicated by R. Zemp, Die Grundlagen, p. 69–72. In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 412.18 – 413.5; pyc. nep. – c. 331. On this concept of Gregory, see R. Zemp, Die Grundlagen, p. 73–79. ... εἴς ἄπειρον μῆκος ἀνατεινομένη (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 413.7 ff). ... (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 413, 13–414, 2). ... οὐ τόπον, οὐ χρόνον, οὐ μέτρον (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 414, 3). ... (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 414, 7 ff. – p. In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 414.9. ... ἀνερμήνευτον ἐν τῷ ἀπορρήτῳ τῆς συνειδήσεως ... τὸ θαῦμα (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 414, 11 ff. - p. 332). ... τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ θεοῦ πέρας οὐκ ἔστι (In Eccl hom. 7: GNO V, 415.5). Τῆς μεγαλοπρεπείας τῆς δόξης τῆς ἁγιωσύνης αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν πέρας (In Eccl hom. 7: GNO V, 415.16 ff). See In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 415.1–15; rus. lane – c. 333. ... οὐ γὰρ διέλαβε τῇ διανοίᾳ τοῦ θαυμαζομένου τὸ πέρας (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 415.15 ff). ... περί τινος ἀγαθῆς ἐνεργείας, ἧς ἡ γνῶσις καὶ μέχρις ἡμῶν καταβαίνει (In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 415.19 ff; Russian translation - p. 334). In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 416.1–6; pyc. nep. – c. 334. Πάντες οἱ λόγοι ἔγκοποι οὐ δυνήσεται ἀνήρ τοῦ λαλεῖν (Eccl. 1, 8a θ’). See In Eccl. hom. 1: GNO V, 293, 12 – 294, 5. Χρόνος δέ ἐστι τὸ συμπαρεκτεινόμενον τῇ συστάσει τοῦ κόσμου διάστημα (Basil, S. Eun. I, 21: SC 299, 248, 28 ff. Russian translation according to: St. Basil the Great. Against Eunomius, Book 1., M., 1846, vol. 7, p. 51, with changes). See the entire argument of Vasily, S. Eun. I,21: SC 299,246–250. According to J. F. Callahan, the common source regarding the concept of time for Gregory and Augustine was Basil's reflection on the diastema of time in Adv. Eun. I, 21. The researcher comes to this conclusion by comparing the passages of Basil, Adv. Eun. I, 21 and Augustine, Confess. XI, 23, where both authors argue with the idea of ​​time as the movement of stars. However, Callahan does not explain how Augustine (usually referring to Latin translations of Greek texts) could have become acquainted with the book of Basil (see J. E. Callahan, “Basil of Caesarea, a New Source for St. Augustines Theory of Time,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 63, 1958, pp. 437–454). In the concepts of diastema and diastasis in Gregory (in the sense of state and action), i.e. spatial and temporal interval, Th. Böhm sees a clear Neoplatonic influence, see Th. Böhm, Theoria, p. 193 ff. The interpretation of this Ennead is given by W. Beierwaltes, Plotinus, Über Ewigkeit und Zeit. Enneade III, 7, Frankfurt a. M. 3 1981. A very interesting interpretation of the concept of time in Augustine is given by P. Ricoeur, Temps et récit, Paris 1983–1985, 1, p. 19–53. On this see J. F. Callahan, “Gregory of Nyssa and the Psychological View of Time” // Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia (Venezia, Sept. 1958), XI, Firenze 1960, p. 59–66. See Chrysippus in Stobaeus, Eclogae I, 106 = SVF II, 509. On the Stoic concept of time, see V. Goldschmidt, Le système stoïcien et l'Idée de temps, Paris 4 1979. So says J. E Callahan, Gregory, p. 63. See Chrysippus in Stobaeus, Eclogae 1,106 = SVF II, 509. See In Eccl. hom. 7: GNO V, 406.16 – 407.17. About Gregory’s assessment of time as a diastema of freedom and the only one, i.e. not repeated cyclically, for possibilities see B. Otis, “Gregory of Nyssa and the Cappadocian Conception of Time” // Studia patristica 14 (= Texte und Untersuchungen 117), 1976, p. 327–357.