Синтез космологии

We have already described the fundamental scheme of created ontology: its essence is in the fundamental non-identity of existence in its very being, in discreteness and distance (θιάστημα, διάστασις “distance, separation”), which find expression in existential generation (φορά), and from here - in the triad “emergence – movement – rest” (γένεσις – κίνησις – στάσις). The middle of the concepts of this triad - movement - expresses that although the origin and goal, the emergence and rest of finite being as such are identical, yet they themselves are not for finite being; its discreteness, its formation, force it to find refuge in the moving process. Finitude, non-identity and becoming are concepts of similar content. “For duality is neither infinite, nor beginningless, nor motionless” 545. But all created things are arranged according to the principle of polarity - both sensual and spiritual; just as the sensory consists of matter and form, so the spiritual consists of the species concept and individual properties 546. But at the same time nature (“what”) and personality (“who”) are inseparable, but at the same time unmerged. Or, if we transfer the division to the essential sphere itself: being-in-general and objectivity (in the terminology of M. Heidegger - “whatness” - Dr. M.P.). “So, a thing that in any way essentially needs objectivity in order for its special existence to manifest itself, is not simple in the true sense of the word” 547. Along with these instructions of St. Gregory of Nyssa, the Monk Maxim also accepted his basic concept, according to which finite being is essentially discrete (διάστημα “distance, interval, interval”) and therefore mobile. Finite being for both discreteness and movement is essentially time. “Having a beginning, a middle and an end is the hallmark of things separated by time; It will not be a mistake to say - things comprehended in the zone (αιών). For time, whose movement has measure, is limited by number; the eon, whose existence is correlated with the category when, undergoes division (διάστασις “separation”) to the extent that it has the beginning of its existence. But if time and the eon are not without cause, then even less so are the things that are encompassed by them” 548. Any finite being, even if comprehended through the time of sensory things or the duration (eon) of spiritual things, has this primary existential certainty of place (“where”) and time (“when”), which embeds it in the coordinate system of the Universe. “No matter what we say that the very being of things as such has existential objectivity [qualitatively colored], and not pure being, which is the first type of limitation and powerful proof that things in their being and becoming had a beginning - who could deny that every conceivable essence (with the sole exception of the Divine essence, located on the other side of being itself), in order to have the ability to be conceivable, presupposes the concept of place (“where”), to which always and every In this way, the concept of time (“when”) is necessarily invented. They relate to juxtaposed concepts, since one does not exist without the other” 549. According to St. Maximus and St. Gregory of Nyssa, time and space are the expression of finitude itself, these are pure boundaries. Space is not primarily a physical and astronomical reality, but an ontological category: “the limitation of the world, realized by itself.” Time is its “dispersion” invariably given to this finitude of being. It expresses that fundamental non-identity, for which scholasticism uses the doctrine of the real difference between essence and this-worldly existence. As in the case of locality (“where”), “all things are revealed simultaneously as subordinate to time (“when”) precisely because their existence is not simple, but qualitative. For that which always has qualitative existence once did not exist, even if it exists now” 550. Therefore, for St. Maximus and St. Gregory of Nyssa, the very idea of ​​infinite space and infinite time is internally contradictory. Since the universe is defined as “limited space,” then time is “limited movement” (ό χρόνος περιγραφομένη καθέστηκε κίνησις)" 551. St. Maximus agrees with St. Gregory of Nyssa in that from formation as the primary cause of existence (γένεσις “origin”) he both directly and analytically deduces movement, and in that he designates it as always finite, but disagrees with St. Gregory regarding the unconditional equality of movement and temporality. For St. Gregory, there was a dual form of created movement, even if he did not attribute to this dualism an absolutely unambiguous philosophical expression as an essentially finite and closed cyclical movement, measured by time and eon. Even if “time” rather expresses the becoming of material things, and “eon”, on the contrary, rather expresses the limitation of the universe as a whole as becoming, then at their core both concepts still presuppose the same reality. Based on this, Saint Gregory recognizes the “eternal becoming” that befits the spirit in its movement towards the unattainable God and which is absolutely infinite, 552 even if in otherness the sting of despair is removed from it due to direct unity with the object of striving. This dynamic of the endless rush into - and through - the essential finitude of creation, a dynamic which in St. Gregory simultaneously expressed the highest nobility of creation - its god-like infinity - and its deepest need - its endless, irreplaceable emptiness - disappears in the synthetic thinking of St. Maximus. He takes seriously the equality of temporality and finitude. The movement of the spiritual creature does not extend beyond the boundaries of “nature” and the “world”; it is not something in between the world and God, as with St. Gregory of Nyssa, but only a conscious, reflective accomplishment of the fundamental structure of creation as such - its final run from the source through the middle discreteness to the goal. The concept of an eon took on a different meaning for him. Although in the "Chapters on the Theology and Economy of the Son of God", preserving the heritage of Origenism, this word is still found in the old sense of the world period and even more - the superposed systems of various cosmic "durations" through which souls pass in their journey towards God, in order to ultimately reach a super-aeonic place beyond all world movement and the final transcendental solidity in the Absolute 553. But this idea at its core, as the style of the chapter clearly shows, is a historical reminiscence from Origen; it only reflects the own views of the Monk Maximus to the extent that he, together with Origen, was convinced of the finitude of the entire world and aeonic movement. True, they proceeded from different grounds: for Origen, movement is associated with falling away, and for St. Maximus it is an ontological manifestation of created being. John of Scythopolis introduced a new meaning of eon. In his vocabulary, an eon is an attribute of God Himself, since He alone is the source and end of all finite world time 554, and the aeonic essence of the created spirit consists in its participation in the “eternity” of God. For the word eon is formed from άεΐ ών (“always existing” - ever-present) - and is defined as “infinite life, already whole”, which is not fragmented (άδιάστατος “not divided”) 555. Therefore, for a creation, an aeon coincides with the end point of its limited movement, or better, with that ecstatic moment when its own circle is closed and its absolute otherness is revealed. At this moment, created time is no longer perceived in itself, that is, not in its existential departure from eternity (καθ ’ ύπόβασιν “by descent”), but in its original existential inclusion in this eternity (έν τώ άεΐ όντι άναπαύεσθαι “to rest in the ever-present”) 556. In essence, St. Maximus accepts this interpretation, which is quite appropriate within the framework of his ontology of creatureliness. For at the moment of transition from the idea and life form of God into the discrete and distanced own existence of the creature, the connection between time and eternity is revealed: “Aeon [eternity] is time if it is distanced from its movement, and time is an eon if it becomes measured as introduced [immersed] in movement” 557. But if, in terminology, together with the Holy Scriptures (and in the sense of St. Gregory), we try to understand by aeon the totality of world time, which includes pure spirits, then the aeon is “the fulfillment of time returning back [ending],” above which God exalts the deified creation 558. This concept of St. Maximus, defending the finitude of time, and thereby its ecstatic withdrawal, corresponds to the spirit of later times, from which monastic hesychasm was to develop and which, like blessed Augustine, seeks in eternal life, first of all, peace for the “restless heart.” The heroic sense of divine risk, which dominates St. Gregory of Nyssa’s concept of eternity, gives way to the liturgical spirit of worship in silence and silence. However, the main intuition of St. Maximus, despite the apparent opposite, remains closer to St. Gregory than to St. Augustine. Therefore, the calming of the seeking impulse does not at all have the character of self-loss, but contains all the truth and positivity of the movement as such. Rest is not only strengthening, but also, as it were, super-movement (υπέρ πάσαν κίνησιν “above all movement”) 559. For the concepts of rest and movement, opposed in themselves, that is, outside of God, like all world antitheses, are united in God, since they are surpassed. “God cannot be moved in any way, but He is in no way inaction, since it is appropriate only for essentially limited things that have a beginning of their being” 560. But it was precisely this synthesis of being and movement that St. Gregory already strived for with his paradox of desire, which is eternally fulfilled and yet its fulfillment is eternally postponed: “For this is the highest paradox of all: how movement and rest can be one and the same” 561. He expressed this paradox allegorically, recognizing that the soul can simultaneously, like an arrow, pierce eternal space and, having been satisfied, rest under the roof of the Almighty 562. In Saint Maximus, this desire for the “arrow” appears only more restrainedly in an allegory of absolutely proportionate beauty; this allegory embraces and completes mobility and rest, just as they are balanced in the archaic Greek “sacred dance” 563. In order to better understand the meaning of this going beyond the bounds of a closed temporal limit, let us again return to the “discreteness” of creation. Understanding the circle as a predetermined path that creation must overcome leads St. Maximus to a deeper metaphysical justification for the identity of source and goal in finite being than could be given by St. Gregory of Nyssa. “Everything created passively has its own movement, since it is neither movement nor dynamics as such. Consequently, if spirits are created, then they are necessarily mobile, while they, starting from the very source, are naturally brought on the basis of their existence (διά τό είναι “because of being”) to the goal, and this happens in a volitional manner for the sake of a value-filled existence (διά τό εΰ είναι "because of prosperity"). For the purpose of the movement of what is moved by them is eternal good existence (άει εΰ είναι “eternal goodness”) in general, just as the first cause is existence in general, that is, God. For He is the giver of being and gives the grace of well-being, since He is the first cause and goal. After all, from Him only movable existence in general is given, since He is the first cause, and qualitatively colored movement towards Him, since He is the goal. And only when a spiritual being moves spiritually in accordance with its nature, does it necessarily become a cognizing spirit, but as soon as it cognizes, it necessarily loves what it knows, and as soon as it loves, it must stretch, seeking, and as soon as it reaches out, seeking, it strains and powerfully accelerates the movement and does not calm down until it penetrates as a whole into the integrity of the Beloved and is completely Him. embraced, and will not voluntarily accept entirely by his own choice the saving involvement, in order to belong entirely to the Involving One” 564 . Thus, a new triad of concepts of being - well-being - ever-being arises, which in the future becomes the leitmotif of the thinking of the Monk Maxim and is congruently superimposed on the first triad of root cause - movement - goal. The “being” of the first cause is, first of all, still pure becoming (γένεσις “emergence”) and as such the pure being of mobility (απλώς κινείσθαι “simply moving”) and weariness (φέρεσθαι “to rush, to strive”). In order to become the kind of being that was abandoned, lying behind its original source, namely God, this pure becoming must be transformed into qualitative movement (πώς κινείσθαι “as it moves”), fill the emptiness of its existence with the meaningful fullness of being (its “transcendentals”, truth - good - beauty are united by St. Maximus in the concept of εΰ "good" as a set of values), self-realize in the free fulfillment (κατά γνώμην “by will”) of its natural semantic orientation (κατά φύσιν “by nature”), and thus, on the way to its goal, return to the same original source left behind, which already contains within itself the identity of being and the fullness of being and therefore was absolute eternal being. This also indicates the ontological basis of why movement, although it is circular and finite, nevertheless cannot be contained in itself in the sense of self-sufficiency: “What is not created is its own goal, since it is not its own primary source. For everything self-sufficient is in one way or another causeless” 565. “Consequently, the creation cannot cease to move before it has reached the one and final cause that gives essence to its being” 566. “Consequently, there are three most general modalities of being: being, being-being, ever-being, of which both extremes depend only on God, who causes them, and the middle one is also conditioned by our free achievement and our movement, and only it gives both extremes a complete idea of ​​themselves,” since being reaches itself only in its self-realization, and ever-being is the expression of this fulfillment 567. So, the decision about our own existence (κυρίως εΐναι), which is realized in spiritual co-realization and in mastering the natural structure, depends on this transitory middle (μέσον). Therefore, this scheme of “transcendental” filling of being 568 can take two other forms; first of all, psychological: the first stage then corresponds to the state of possibility, the ability of action inherent in nature (δύναμις), the second - the state of implementation (ενέργεια “action”), the third - rest and peace (αργία “inaction, idleness, peace”) 569. But this scheme sends us back to the ontological-theological scheme, in which the first state corresponds to pure essence or “nature” (οΰσία), the second to the spiritual and free realization of this nature as “correlatedness” (“intentionality”) (σχέσις “relation”), and the third, as breaking through the boundaries of natural completeness, must be attributed to grace ( χάρις "gift") 570. For the essence brought into being cannot by its own power reach the state of its rest and complete fulfillment; she can only, like an oarsman rowing a boat against the current, assimilate her existential movement and spiritually give it more and more tension and intensity (έπιτείνειν τό σφοδον τής κινήσεως “increase the power of movement”) 571. “Thus, being as such, which by nature possesses only the potential for actualization, cannot fully achieve its full actualization without free fulfillment, and at the same time, on the other hand, the one who possesses only the actuality of natural potency as the will to well-being can possess this potency in full only if nature supports it. On the contrary, the mode of ever-being, fully describing the previous modes, both potency and action, is in no way immanent to essence as natural potency and does not necessarily follow from the free intention of the will (for how could causeless and purposeless ever-being dwell in things that by nature have a first cause, and by virtue of movement - a goal?), but, on the contrary, represents a boundary” 572 . Consequently, it is not required of the creation that it save itself, but it is only required that it “strive, always striving” and eagerly fall to the movement, which has a first cause before its being, and a goal above it. Since the creation, being passively mobile, does not belong to itself, it does not need to concern itself with its own complete completion. “What benefit,” the saints probably thought, “what benefit could an entity, which does not owe its existence to itself, find in choosing itself or some thing outside of God as the goal of its movement, since it cannot acquire even the smallest in relation to its existence either through itself or through something else that is not God?” 573. By this, it would only fetter the meaning and vector of its existence, would lag behind itself and would not achieve its fulfillment at all. “Everything,” says St. Maximus, “exclusively everything is in motion, pure spirits, as well as rational souls that move, cognizing and contemplating, since they are neither knowledge as such, nor contemplation as such” 574. “Spirits move spiritually, sensual things move sensually,” and “neither straight, nor in a circle, nor along a curve” 575. But doesn’t this rapture of becoming ultimately dissolve all being in becoming? Two points distinguish the teaching of St. Maximus from the philosophy of pure becoming. First of all, there is unflagging optimism in him regarding the reason of natural movement, its justification and therefore the correctness of this thinking, and consequently, trust in the existential good of nature, which seeks to reduce the difference between the ontological (transcendental) and moral good and brings St. Maximus closer to Aristotle and Aquinas. Then the natural movement itself, having received its primary source in the transcendent, again strives beyond its limits. Thus, here the question of supernature is raised, which is internally connected with the problem of movement that supports and embraces supernature. Both of these aspects should only be considered separately. Since being is certainly determined by its movement, then this movement itself must be something natural (φύσις). Indeed: “The definition of any nature is correlated with the concept of its essential action (ενέργεια “action, energy”)” 576. The essence of a thing “is exclusively and truly revealed through its natural and being-based potency of action (συστατική δύναμις “constitutive force”), which can also unmistakably be called the natural energy of action (φυσική ένέργεια “natural energy, natural action”), with which this thing is primarily and initially characterized, since this essence is a species-forming movement (ειδοποιός κίνησις “species-forming movement”), and since this movement embraces every other feature correlating with it as its most general property, outside of it there is nothing that would have existence or movement" 577. Thus, nature itself is nothing more than organized movement, as was also shown by the congruence of both schemes: becoming - movement - rest and nature - potentiality-reality. Nature is the basis, the plan (λόγος "logos"), the field and the system of movement. One can guess how important this position will be in Christology: in this case, nature without action will turn out to be internally contradictory, just as, on the other hand, “it is impossible for dual existence and physical energy to exist within the same essence and nature” 578 . But since this natural movement is purposeful and the goal cannot be anything other than God - the First Cause - then the main tendency of nature must bring the good inherent in it, and the spirit has only one thing left: to transform the naturally prescribed good into a good that is consciously assimilated. The boundaries between physical and moral good become fluid to a certain extent. The natural movement of the spiritual essence, as will be shown, is itself already to a certain extent spiritual, while the most free action can be carried out only within the “framework” of natural movement. In this sense, the Monk Maxim also comments on the Areopagite’s thesis about the “non-existence” of evil. Evil is neither a substance nor something that complements the substance as such 579; and the nature of demons is and remains good and even light-like 580. And yet “their natural energy” is captured and weakened by their spiritual malice 581. John of Scythopolis advanced even further along this path and with all consistency allowed for a type of weakening of being itself 582. Now it is clear why St. Maxim always describes retribution for sin as a consequence of evil that resides in sin itself. “Natural law punishes those who use nature against nature. To the same extent, nature punishes those who try to corrupt it with abuse, when they dare to live against nature, while by nature they no longer possess all their natural strength, but are deprived of their integrity and as a result are punished” 583. The teaching of St. Maximus on original sin is completely based on this position, and accordingly, his positive ethics is built to a greater extent from the natural basic tendencies of nature, rather than from an analysis of free action. “Everything that is in any way based on a natural process and is opaque to everyone has a strong and irrefutable evidence of truth” 584. Therefore, the ideal remains the complete congruence of nature and freedom. Sin remains alien to nature, “suitable for all that is good” 585. The second problem introduced by the doctrine of motion is the problem of nature and supernature. How can a being that is so completely outside itself be complete in itself in accordance with nature, and how can a being be so radically “open” without thereby losing its own existential meaning? In other words: doesn’t the direct parallel between nature - potency-reality and being - well-being - ever-being (the last of this triad was later understood as grace) completely remove the difference between nature and grace? It would be an obvious anachronism to look for the Tridentine or even only Thomistic teaching about nature and supernature in St. Maximus. The subject of his thinking is a concrete world order; he knows no other nature than the supernaturally ascended one. Like all the Greek Fathers, he is unaware of the question of a possible pure natural purpose. But today, too, such a hypothesis has again become controversial among us, 586 and therefore we will do the right thing by not presenting to the Greek theologian demands that we ourselves are only half satisfied with. On the contrary, we will have to be content if we find in St. Maximus two necessary statements, the proof of the irreducibility of which was as little possible for him as the desire for systematization is for us: the teleological structure of beings, especially conscious finite spiritual beings, and then the transcendence of its ultimate goal relative to all this teleology. Even Thomas Aquinas could not overcome this duality, moving towards a closed system. That is why it would be correct not to bring together potency and action, on the one hand, and natural movement and grace-filled accomplishment (εΰ είναι - άεί είναι “being-ever-being”), on the other, and not considering them through the eyes of a scholastic. The parallelism of the above triads always stems from St. Maximus’s desire for order and systematization, which in an instant pushes towards the most risky combinatorics, without connecting oneself exclusively with the scheme. The more important question is how he describes this transition from the realm of natural movement into complete gracious fulfillment and peace. This transition is essentially passive. Since the starting point of being was transcendental and in no way located in nature itself, and this starting point is identical to the goal, then we cannot reach this height on our own. “We undergo deification passively; we do not achieve it, since it is taken outside the boundaries of nature. For in our nature there is no perceptive [natural] potency (δεκτικήν δύναμιν “power capable of perception”) in order to become deified” 587. So, the acceptance of a person in God is πάθος, passivity, this action is only for the Receiver 588. This acceptance is not accompanied by any ability to one degree or another defined for it, because otherwise it would no longer be grace, but the evidence (φανέρωσις “appearance, revelation”) of an action inherent in natural potency. And moreover, deification would no longer be a paradox (παράδοξον), if it were accomplished in accordance with the natural ability of perception. Deification would be a work of nature, and not a gift of God; the one deified in this way would have to be “by nature God and so in the proper sense be called And I am not able to see how the deification of such could ecstatically drive him out of himself, as long as it was confined within the boundaries of nature” 589. But for St. Maximus this “frenzy-of-oneself” is always a sign of the achieved goal of the movement. “So, nature is not able to embrace the supernatural. Thus, nothing created can achieve deification by nature, since it is not capable of comprehending God Himself. Only Divine grace is able, in its own way, to proportionally grant deification to every being, to enlighten nature with supernatural light and, thanks to the abundance of glory, to exalt it above its own limits” 590. Therefore, the “ideas of nature and grace” remain in the closest unity “... forever and without confusion” (ούδαμώς άλλήλοις συμφυρέντων “in no way mixed with each other”). “Grace does not remove the passivity of nature” 591. As for this passivity, the first of its manifestations, befitting this world, is mortality and transience, and the second is not the entry into God, but the resurrection of the flesh, thanks to which the continuing difference between God and creation is sealed. It is necessary that “the world of phenomena also dies like a man, in order to rise again, rising young from decrepitude in the soon-anticipated resurrection, in which man, as we all are, being part of the whole, a small thing in the big world, will be co-resurrected with him and receive the power of ever-flowing incorruptibility, the body will become like the soul, and sensory things will become spiritual, while the Divine power will shine over everything in its visible and effective presence from now on - directly through Himself - will provide to each in his own way the indissoluble bonds of unity in endless eternity" 592 . But until this moment, the creature cannot move on its own roots, “on those deep and all-penetrating roots that hold and carry it” 593, “for the created cannot embrace the uncreated, and the finite cannot embrace the infinite” 594. Therefore, the creation does not know its own limit at which it comes into contact with God. God alone “is the measure of things and knows the beginning and limit of everything, since only He is the Creator” 595. The ascent of creation to its idea, which is also its truth, thereby cannot at all be a direct approach; this is as little possible as that the movement of number from atomic status to synthetic unity was a direct path to transcendental unity. Nevertheless, doesn’t this path lead, simultaneously with the “improvement” of the creature, to its ever-increasing self-knowledge of its insignificance before God, its pure passivity regarding free causeless grace; and this very knowledge will be grace. But if this, apparently, closes creation in itself, then this closedness, precisely because it is accomplished through grace, nevertheless opens up again. “For the power of God always reveals everything, because it is able to influence everything” 596. In this revelation, the creature realizes that it cannot understand itself and that it cannot comprehend not only the essence of God, but even His being 597. Thus, to the end, it is all passivity and need: “For the one who dares to believe that he has reached the limit of virtue will no longer seek the generating first cause of the beautiful, will limit the power of his striving to himself and, by his own will, will exclude the crown of salvation: God. The one who retains the awareness of his natural weakness for good will not miss the opportunity to recklessly strive for the One who is able to fully satisfy his need” 598. So, the world in this radical openness to the transcendental - the “closed house” as Aristotle and St. Gregory of Nyssa saw it - is the same universe “which, for the sake of improvement, needs neither to be supplemented nor to be diminished” 599. And when Christ “gathers all things in a divine manner in His Person and exalts them, then through Him it will be revealed that the whole creation is a unity, which finds completeness in the interaction of its parts and is turned towards itself through the totality of its being in accordance with the one, simple, self-defined and unchangeable idea - origin from non-being. In this concept, the entire creation can appear as a single, identical and indivisible idea, namely, as non-existence having the basis of its existence” 600. Based on what has been said, it is possible to correctly interpret the words of St. Maximus about God, Who “hiddenly implanted in all spiritual beings as the prime mover the possibility of cognizing Him, and as a magnanimous Master instilled into nature for us, pitiful people, aspiration and eros towards Himself, as well as an incentive to seek Him behind all earthly things” 601. And whether this eros was conceived as a gift of grace or rather in the sense of the Thomist "desiderium naturale visionis" ("natural desire of contemplation"), it does not cancel what has been said, since it is in no way capable of achieving its goal by natural forces, but overcomes the apparent deep difference between nature and supernature; at the same time, the fulfillment of grace is understood as the goal of every aspiration of a specific nature. d) Between East and West There are clearly two motives that allow St. Maximus, the thinker of goal-setting, to state this leap: the motive of the Areopagite, directed against the Alexandrian school of θεία παθεΐν (“divine suffering”), is realized thanks to the awareness of the absolute transcendence of the Divine essence, and the second is defense against the still effective pagan Neoplatonism (for example, the teachings of Ammonius Hermeia, with whom Philoponus and Zechariah already fought), who argued that the essences (“essences”) of things are as eternal as God, being divine ideas. In contrast to this, the Christian must defend the fact that all created being - substances and accidents - equally comes from nothing and therefore, in its dignity, stands significantly lower than Divine being, and also needs the free action of Divine grace in order to be raised by participation into the sphere of this dignity of ever-being 602. In this case, you will not discard anything; in an extreme case, one can raise the question of whether the system sufficiently takes into account the immanent teleology of the created, whether, therefore, the natural goal remains “sublated” in the position of the supernatural final goal - “sublated” in a benign, and not just in a threatening sense. Until now we have had no reason to doubt this, and only when considering the doctrine of original sin will certain shadow sides of the system appear. It is on the border between the two meanings of “sublation” that the thinking of St. Maximus acquires historical significance. Underestimation of the natural goal, subsumed at the same time in the supernatural final goal, necessarily leads the idea of ​​the fulfillment of the world to the ideal of pure illumination and overlapping by God of everything finite; then the Sabbath of the world (especially in the “Chapters on the Theology and Economy of the Incarnation of the Son of God”) is understood as the suspension and cessation of every created aspiration and the pure replacement of the latter by Divine action: God is all in all thanks to His all-enlightening presence. This is the Eastern, Asian ideal, at least if there is no complementary expansion. But St. Maximus has such an addition, since for him the radiance of the Absolute, despite its gracious character, is the positive goal of all created, natural and spiritual action, and thus, the immanent fulfillment and “reward” of this aspiration 603. It is also clear that he who, like St. Maximus, placed creation from nothing at the beginning, has the right to interpret the deification of finite things always only as the accomplishment of finite creation. But such thinking is predominantly Western; St. Maximus is at the point of equilibrium of both tendencies, and Christology receives decisive importance. Let us note in advance that the dimension that opens up here between φύσις “nature” and ύπόστασις “hypostasis” will lead Greek thought into the sphere of inseparable duality: on the other side of nature (φύσις) the reality of personality appears, and on the other side of ousia appears the abyss of being; and just as, in continuation of this intuition, revealed in the light of Christology, man appears “composed” of spiritual nature and personality, so creation in general is of essence and being: thus personality and being must draw closer, and from the same depth of being, which is greater than all things, rises the call of the Divine Person to the created child, which belongs to a different order than any teleology of spiritual nature, no matter how she was not mystical. And even if these dimensions are not reflected in St. Maximus, it will still be shown to what extent they are present there and appear as present in the background of his mental efforts. As a thinker occupying a position between East and West, he considered the totality of the Christian worldview - explicitly based on the mystery of Christ. Outwardly, the East still dominates here; This is the mindset of detachment, the mindset of a monk who is turned only to God and awaits the coming of His Kingdom. Despite all the Aristotelian categories, this space has not yet been freed up for the theology of history, not to mention the theology of culture, - and yet the seeds have already been sown: the goal that God pursues in the world is not only the ascension into God, but also (in the incarnation of His Son) the promised completion of created things - άσυγχύτως “unmerged.” Only when considered with such breadth can the first of the cosmological syntheses, the synthesis of being and movement, finally become unambiguously a synthesis of eternal being and the finite being produced from it and moving towards it. This synthesis forms the basis for all subsequent ones as their goal, condition and internal form on which they are built. Ambigwa; 91, 140 °C. Despite the Latin translation (potestatis “[from] strength”), this should be read έξ ουσίας “from essence”, and not έξουσίας “from force”, as the phrase proves: τηούσίςι ... την διαφοράν συνεπιθεωρουμένην “difference is contemplated together with... essence.” Ibid; S. The Scholium of John of Scythopolis on the Areopagite develops this teaching in a certain direction. Referring to Dionysius, their author speaks of the simplicity of pure spirit. But a literal reading is impossible here, although these spirits are immaterial, at least the highest of them (Scholia on the heavenly hierarchy 2; 4, 37B). They are simple, being άσύνθετοι “uncomplicated,” that is, their unity is not the result of a natural synthesis of body and soul (Ibid., B; cf. 13; 4, 97C: άσΰνθετα καί αΰλα “uncomplicated and immaterial” (Scholia on the Church Hierarchy 6; 4, 172C). In turn, St. Maximus wrote a treatise proving the immateriality of some created spirits (Epistle 6; 91, 424f). Due to such simplicity, the pure spirit possesses virtue and knowledge not as accidents (κατά συμβεβηκός), like us, to whom they come as if from outside ( ώς άλλος έν άλλω “as another in another”), but as a natural property. Accident and ' Yποκείμενον “subject” (For more information on the meaning of this term in the system of St. Maximus, see: Alpha and Omega. 1999. No. 1(19). pp. 95–96. – d. M. P.) have no place here, since all synthesis and ugliness of matter are removed here (Scholia on the heavenly hierarchy 6; 4, 65B). Therefore the polarity implied here, which does not apply to angels, is due to corporeality. “Contemplation is introduced to souls as if from outside (εξωθεν), while angels perceive through themselves and in themselves due to the fact that God has endowed them with form” (Scholia on On the Divine Names 7; 4, 345C). Consequently, the state (habitus) of spirits is rightly called substantial (ουσιώδεις έξεις – Scholium to O church hierarchy 4; 4, 157C), emanating from its own substance (έξεις αύιουσιωμέναι – Scholium to O heavenly hierarchy 7; 4, 65C), since their very substance is spiritually conscious. But even if their knowledge is not “brought in from outside,” nevertheless it is still “brought in”—from God; it was “poured out” by Him, as the scholastic said ταύτην ένέργειαν “They have mental activity as brought from a cause - from God.” - Scholium on the divine names 7; Unintroduced knowledge is only with God (οΰκ έπείσακτον τό φρονεΐ) – Scholium to On the Divine Names 5; 4, 320B), since He Himself is substantial knowledge in the fullness of actuality, without an admixture of potentiality (όλη ανεργία ... οΰ δυνάμει “entirely in reality... not in possibility”), since only He is knowledge, the basis of which is not laid down (even if de facto it is always overcome) ignorance, madness (πρότερον οΰσα αφροσύνη, εινους ένεργεία γινόμενη “first there is unreason, which then becomes the effective mind” - Scholium on On the Divine Names 5; 4, 320V). (On this, cf. Schelling. Philosophie der Freiheit. Sämtl. W. 7. S. 465–466). If, therefore, the action of pure spirits is “substantial”, since they are always in a state of fulfillment (απαυστοι ένεργειαι “incessant actions, energies” - Scholium on the Heavenly Hierarchy 7; 4, 68D), like a voice that does not cease (άσίγετοι “unceasing”), then their immutability (άπαράλλακτον) is supported by the Divine creative act (Scholia on the heavenly hierarchy 13; 4, 101C). “Thanks to the free decision due to their immeasurable attraction to God, they seem to be immersed in the Divine in a motionless state” (Ibid. 7; 4, 68C). “For only God is motionless by nature itself” (Ibid.). Chapters on the theology and economy of the incarnation of the Son of God 1, 5; 90. Ibid; CD. Gnostic centurion 2, Epiphanes. 34. Questions and answers to Thalassia 65; 90, 757D. See Urs von Balthasar, Hans. Presence et Pensée. Essai sur la Philosophie religieuse de Grégoire de Nysse. Paris, 1942. P. 10–19. “Chapters on the theology and economy of the incarnation of the Son of God” (2, 85; 90, 1164D-1165A; Russian translation: Chapters on the theology and economy of the incarnation of the Son of God // Works of St. Maximus the Confessor. T. 1. M., 1993. pp. 251–252) distinguish, according to Scripture, “temporary aeons" and "other aeons free from time", as well as "the fullness of aeons", "eons of aeons" (saecula saeculorum "age of ages"), "aeon of an aeon" (saeculum saeculi "age of centuries"), "aeonic time" and "aeonic generations". Chapter (2, 86; 90, 1165AB; Russian translation: Ibid. P. 252) repeats Origen’s interpretation of the words of the Holy Scripture The Lord reigns... in the age and beyond (cf. Exodus 15:18; Church Slavonic translation, literally reproducing the text of the Septuagint, to which the Confessor addressed: The Lord reigns forever, and forever, and also; Russian translation: - The Lord will reign forever and ever. - D. M. P.) deduces, based on this ex ultra “beyond that”, peace on the other side of any aeonic movement. Scholium on the Divine Names 5; 4, 313С. Ibid; 91, 1377D-1380A. (Cf. “Chapters on the theology and economy of the incarnation of the Son of God” 1, 70; 90, 1109A: πας ό κόσμος ιδίοις περιοριζόμενος λόγοις καί τόπος λέγεται καί αιών “the whole world, limited by its logoi, is also called a place and an eon”). Saint Gregory of Nyssa. Life of Moses // PG 44, 405С. Homilies on the Song of Songs; PG 44, 852B-853A. Ambigwa; 91, 1292С; “Chapters on the theology and economy of the incarnation of the Son of God” 2, 78; 91, 1161C. St. Maximus returns to this again and again: Ambigva 91, 1329AB; 1348D; 1392AD. Ibid; 1392B. Love Chapters 3:27–29; 90, 1025AC; rus. trans.: Works of St. Maximus the Confessor / Translation, intro. article and comments by A. I. Sidorov. Book 1. M., 1993. pp. 124–125. Ibid; 91, 1072AB. On the movement of bodies cf.: Scholium of John of Scythopolis on On the Divine Names 8; 4, 381 VS. Scholium to On the Divine Names 4; 4, 296A. Ibid; A – C; (apparently this obscure text arrived with errors). Scholium on the celestial hierarchy 3; 4, 141D. We are talking about Catholic theology of the mid-20th century. – Per. Questions and answers to Thalassia (hereinafter referred to as Questions and Answers), 22; 90, 324A. Rus. trans.: Works of St. Maximus the Confessor / Transl., intro. article and comment. A. I. Sidorova. Book II. M., 1993. P. 64. Questions and Answers, 22; 90, 321–385A. Mystagogy 7; 91, 685BC. Rus. trans.: Works of St. Maximus the Confessor. Book II. P. 168. Scholium to On the Divine Names 4; 4, 245D. There are also 8; 4, 356С. (text structure is not clear). Scholium to On the Divine Names 4; 4, 246C (text not clear). Questions and Answers, 52; 90, 493D. Rus. trans.: Ibid.: P. 148. Love Chapters 3:27–29; 90, 1025AC.