Идея и мир (критика оригенизма)

The name of Origen appears in the works of St. Maximus as rarely as the name of Evagrius. The author, so often condemned, having already become only a bogeyman for integralists, was one of those who could not be openly invited to establish Orthodoxy. But meanwhile, the “Gnostic Centurions” of the Monk Maximus prove that he carefully read Origen, appreciated him and deeply revered him, since in them he collected what was most characteristic of the great teacher of spirituality, and, without naming him, passed it on to posterity. He rendered a similar service to Evagrius of Pontus in his “Centuria on Love.” Origenist spirituality penetrated into the East mainly thanks to him, just as it took root in the West thanks to Blessed Jerome, St. Ambrose and St. Cassian. However, the Monk Maximus “filtered out” Origenism and pulled out its poisonous teeth. His main work almost immediately begins a major philosophical and theological polemic with Origenist cosmology, and this polemic is perhaps the only significant anti-Origenist document of Greek patristics 60 that does not reject the doctrine of the enads (ενάς, ενάδος, unit - Trans.); condemning it for heresy, he reveals it with understanding, overcoming it from the inside and isolating in it the core of truth. One part of this polemic is directed against the idea of ​​the original constancy (στάσις) of all created spirits in God, of the origins of all movement in the Fall, of the evil infinity of movement in ever new zones; the other tries to state the positive meaning of the myth 61. Thus, according to opponents, there is “an original enad of rational beings, according to which we, being in a natural affinity with God, have a part in His constancy and strength, on which is based the movement in which rational beings multiplied in various ways and prompted God to create this corporeal world, the purpose of which was to imprison them in bodies for the original sin” 62. Let us leave aside for now the anthropological grounds cited by St. Maximus and St. Gregory of Nyssa against the independent pre-existence of the essential part of man, which, nevertheless, if correctly understood, represents the inseparable unity of body and soul. The main proof of the absurdity of this mythical doctrine about the origin of the world lies elsewhere; the idea of ​​the original immobility of creation contradicts itself, for the concepts of emergence and immobility are mutually exclusive, or better yet, opposed to each other without any connection. “It is incompatible with truth to place becoming before permanence, which by its nature is motionless, and it is equally impossible to consider permanence to be a consequence of motionless becoming or, finally, to equate them. For constancy is not a potential state of becoming, but, on the contrary, the result of the realization of power in the becoming of created things. Or in short: constancy is a relative concept, which, however, does not refer to becoming, but to movement, with which it is in a relationship of contradiction” 63. Consequently, Origenists distort the meaning of being when they take permanence as a product of becoming, and movement as a product of permanence. The true semantic vector of being can only be found in the sequence of formation – movement – ​​constancy (γένεσις – κίνησις – στάσις). For “everything that receives its existence from non-existence is also in motion, since it is raised to a certain foundation” 64. And only when it has achieved this and fulfilled its existentially destined path from potency to act, can we talk about peace. The relationship between formation and movement on the one hand, movement and rest on the other, for St. Maximus is an analytical truth and the basis of any creative ontology. “Before any natural movement of things, it is necessary to think about their becoming, but for any rest it is naturally necessary to assume movement as a prerequisite. Therefore, it is impossible for becoming and rest to simultaneously enter into being, because they are naturally separated by the core of movement” 65. Origenism, which establishes this simultaneity, thereby pushes movement out of its natural place and isolates it; Thus, he gives the creature endless anxiety and through it despair. Despite its seductive mythology, it is fundamentally tragic: “That spirits are mobile and can neither have an unshakable basis of standing in goodness, nor hope for it - what despair could bear this?” 66 For if “movement” and at the same time falling away are conceptually compatible with the really achievable goal of contemplation of God, “if God can once diminish for the sake of knowledge (πείρα) of contradiction, then there is no reasonable hope that this will not happen again and again” 67. Here the true core of the controversy comes to light. The metaphysics of “On Principles” was in fact the metaphysics of experience (πείρα), that is, the necessary, albeit painful, “knowledge” of sin and abandonment by God. It seemed that only in this way could the soul be inspired with sufficient commitment and desire for the abandoned primary good, which - at least for a long time - would protect it from a new falling away from God. We have already shown how much this teaching is conditioned by the intellectualism of Origen and the ancient Platonic Demonia 68 . Saint Gregory of Nyssa took a decisive step in overcoming this tragedy, naturally linking, on the one hand, movement with formation, on the other hand, excluding from the essence of eternal contemplation of God the very possibility of “saturation” and “satiety” (κόρος) as unthinkable. This contemplation was so all-fulfilling for him that it simultaneously concealed within itself an eternal blissful longing for more. But therefore, Saint Gregory’s eternity was in some identical way correlated with the current state of formation, the “leap” between them was rather proclaimed than proven. Speaking against the metaphysics of πείρα, St. Maximus simultaneously revealed the positive philosophical meaning of Origen’s “constancy” and thereby eliminated from the ideal of the eternal blissful aspiration of St. Gregory the last remnants of the absolutization of human aspiration. “If they tell us that although spirits could [follow the divine good], they just did not want to do so in order to experience the opposite, then in this case the beautiful would be a necessarily desired good, not because of itself as beautiful, but only because of its opposite, and it would not be worthy of love as taken absolutely by its nature” 69 . Again and again, right down to Hegel and Berdyaev, this illusory-profound thought demonstrates its essence in Christian metaphysics, asserting that love without suffering and sin remains only fun and games 70 . Seduced by the spectacle of the formation of man and the cross, which exhausts the last possibilities in the drama of God and the world, one might think that only metahistory is able to interpret the metaphysics of world existence as such. When the Monk Maximus in another connection threatened to fall under such danger himself, 71 he nevertheless clearly recognized it and found the surest means to overcome it: he laid new foundations in the concept of movement. While in Origen the movement is entirely based on the indifference of the free choice of the creature, which must sooner or later inevitably plunge it into sin due to its extreme lability, in St. Maximus the movement is based on the semantic vector of nature, which in itself is good. The freedom of the creature was no longer elevated to a quasi-divine level and was not left entirely to itself; she rested on the foundation of nature, and all she had to do was follow in the direction predetermined by that direction. Thus, the movement of St. Maximus, even to a lesser extent than that of St. Gregory, is a movement of restlessness and aspiration, rather a movement of surrendering oneself to the existential proportionality of good formation and the flow that draws into the ocean of Divine peace. Before we move on to the description of this movement, it is worth noting the positive meaning that the Origenistic myth acquires from St. Maximus. Here the Origenistic problem refers us to the problem of ideas: the original “enada” of spirits is in fact a single undivided being of world ideas in the Logos. What kind of person, “wisely observing the essences translated by God from non-existence into being, and wisely directing the contemplative faculties of his soul to the infinite variety and diversity of natural things and intelligently directing his searching gaze to the idea (logos) in accordance with which these things were created,” would not recognize the one Logos as a plurality of logoi, as a result of which the infinite variety of things brought into being is distinguished due to their mutual otherness and undoubted self-identity? And the multitude of logoi, in turn, would not recognize the one Logos, which undoubtedly exists in Himself thanks to the elevation to Himself (άναφορά) of all things as the essential and hypostatic God, the Word of God the Father, the Source and Origin of all things, by Whom “everything was created, that is in heaven and that is on earth, visible and invisible: whether thrones, dominions, principalities, powers “All things were created by Him and for Him” (Col 1:16). For “since He possessed from eternity the ideas of things as existing in His good will, He created from them the visible and invisible creation out of nothing” 72 . “Thus, He is inexpressible and incomprehensible in Himself because of the complete limitlessness and exaltation above all creation and above the differences and divisions that dominate and are perceived in it, and He is One and the same in all things that have come from Him and is revealed and multiplied with that measure of beauty that is characteristic of each essence, and thus embraces everything in Himself” 73. Thus, in the simple structure of the analogy between God and the world, the problem of the original unity of the world and its fragmentation is resolved. However, this structure also contains the following problem: how does the “idea” of the creature as its perfect integrity and inclusion in God relate to its independent existence? “Thus,” continues St. Maximus, “every spirit endowed with reason or understanding, be it an angel or a man, taking into account the idea by which he was created and which exists in God and with God, can be called a certain part of God, since he really is such, if he acted in accordance with this idea, then he could abide in God, in Whom the idea of ​​his being preexists as its first principle and first cause. And if his aspirations and thirst did not want to prefer anything to his own fundamental principle, then he would not fall away from God, but rather he himself would be called god and a part of God thanks to his aspiration towards Him, since he is endowed with an image and has a part in God” 74. The uniqueness of the creature’s position lies in the fact that it is ontologically incapable of seeking itself and the fulfillment of its idea without simultaneously striving for something Other than itself, that is, without loving the Infinite, which lies at the basis of its own foundation. Therefore, for St. Maximus, the immanent perfection of creation is inconceivable, and since his thought initially moves in the realm of the grace-ascended universe, he accepts with satisfaction the breakthrough from the “personal” idea to the “idea in God” and to the “idea as God” as a transition from the natural (or world) sphere to the sphere of grace (or God). Thanks to the performance of a free spiritual act, which realizes and at the same time qualitatively fills the potential of being 75, the distance between simple “being” (είναι) and “idea” (λόγος) is reduced. Being “approaches” to its idea (διά φυσικής κινήσεως έγγίζοντα “approaching, thanks to natural movement.” - Trans. ) But to the same extent that this tendency is realized, the idea escapes into the transcendental and henceforth appears no longer as a naturally achievable goal of aspiration, but as grace. The intersection of being and idea, which is impossible in a natural way, since the idea is timeless in its essence and the creature is temporal, can only occur through a completely transcendental Divine intervention, in which the idea, however, appears at the same time to return to its ultimate basis, that is, to God Himself. And for the sinner who did not follow the aspiration to his basis, the same transcendental revelation of this basis as God takes place, but he is also punished by torment - like an abyss that can no longer be filled, because of which he cannot achieve the ideal 76 . Thus, in the Logos all the individual ideas and ideals of creatures converge, and therefore they must all, as long as they seek their own reality, love Him and meet each other in His love. Therefore, Christ is the center of the plan of the universe, around which all individual lines are concentrated in an orderly manner. In this regard, the truth of this Origenistic myth becomes clear: the ultimate goal of the world can be to return back to the pre-world state, if it is understood not as a real, pre-emergent existence, but as an ideal timeless super-existence of all essences in their Divine idea, which super-essentially and super-existentially pre-contains the essence and being of all creatures. “The One Logos is a multitude of Logos, and the multitude of Logos are the One Logos, in accordance with Which the God-like, creative and preserving procession of the One into the world is the One-Many. And in accordance with Divine providence and the inverse and educational raising of the other to the One as to the omnipotent First Principle or the center of the lines that originated from Him, they are the Many-One” 77 . Thus, the Origenistic “falling away” from the original unity finds its justification: it is possible only as the absence of the original identity of the idea in God and existence outside of God, and only thanks to the actual, and not the necessary sin of this existence, which “does not act in accordance with the idea that pre-exists about it in God.” 78 This correction of Origenism leads us, however, not to Hegel or even to John Scott Eriugena. The rhythm of the origination and return of the Divine is in no way a necessary metaphysical process that was inherent in the very concept of God, but is based on free decision and will. After all, God remains Himself in this appearance of the undiminished Absolute, “inexpressible and incomprehensible because of His own immeasurable abundance” 79 . If God is the beginning and end of created movement, then this is just as little pantheism as it is a philosophy of unity, which embraces the movement of number from the atomistic one to the synthetic. What appears from the Divine as a cycle (since in God the beginning and the end are one and the same), can appear from the initial state of the world as a true development and movement: a loving movement towards “pre-existing ideas in God, or rather towards God Himself” 80 . Self-realization in freedom allows us to move from a state of simple natural godlikeness (εΐκών) to a state of equally spiritually acquired self-control and godlikeness (όμοίωσις) and thus realize the plan of God, who created us in His “image and likeness” 81. However, this entry of the world into God is accomplished primarily through the incarnation and the hypostatic unity of created and uncreated natures realized in it, in which both of them become εν και ταύτόν (one and the same - Transl.) 82. St. Maximus clearly says that the Incarnation, that is, the drama of the cross, tomb and resurrection, is not only the central point of world history, but also the idea underlying the world 83 . The Savior is the limit of all mental and spiritual movement 84. For Him all ages were created, together with everything that they contain, and this synthesis of God and the world is the Divine idea, which is more ancient and more mysterious than all, and in which alone lies the path and mode of existence of everything, 85 and since the Monk Maximus thinks to discover here not a necessity in a metaphysical sense, but the meaning of history as such, and, moreover, of all history, he includes in this highest synthesis the economy of guilt. The sin and rebellion of the world has seen its ultimate meaning: the greatest manifestation of love imaginable becomes possible, and the death of God in the world bears fruit as a revelation of His pre-life-giving self-exhaustion. Here the Confessor's correction first appears in all its significance. As soon as movement (κίνησις) ceases to be the Platonic falling away, which has the character of guilt, but becomes the Aristotelian good existential movement of the unfolding nature, the highest ideal from the gnosis of self-destructive contemplation can turn into the agape of the preserving affirmation of even finite entities. In this case, finitude is not evil, and the original and ultimately returning Divine unity no longer implies the destruction of the boundaries of being. It can pre-exist not as a concept excluding differences, but as a concrete idea including all particularities; now the synthesis can be carried out by God who became Man, primarily in free love, just as the Incarnation of the Son, fulfilling the commandment of love as the idea of ​​this His humanity, is consistent with freedom and produces it. At the same time, the great Evagrian concepts for explaining the world - κρίσις (judgment) and πρόνοια (providence), which can now be used in a different, new sense, have lost power in their primary meaning. Κρίσις can now no longer mean “the directive guidance of spirits in their bodies, received on the basis of their turning away from God,” but πρόνοια – “the providential return of this judgment of the creature to the original spiritual unity.” Moreover, the Areopagittic ontology can be subsumed under these concepts: κρίσις refers to the good, essentially grounded variety of things, which itself is a form of imitation of God. And πρόνοια does not abolish this diversity in the direction of entities towards God, but gives it a foundation and strengthens it by bringing those who are immersed in bad diversity through saving love to a God-pleasing and God-like integration 86 . Thus, the demonic nature of the Origenistic philosophy of the “experience of the opposite” as a path to the knowledge of good was overcome, the true essence of which, however, was assimilated. In this case, the vision of the world given in the Areopagitica was used as a means, which St. Maximus had to first consider and correct himself. At the same time, complementing Origen and Dionysius with each other, he builds his own philosophy of world movement, to which we now turn. "A refutation perhaps unique in Greek patristic literature." – Sherwood R. An Annotated Date‑List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor Rom, 195. – P 3. Ambigua // PG 91, 1077B του πώς μοίρα οντες Θεοΰ άπερρυμε. – Auth. Ambigua (hereinafter – Amb.) is a Latin abbreviation generally accepted in patristics for the title of the main work of St. Maximus “On various difficult passages in St. Dionysius and Gregory.” – Per. Amb // PG 91, 1069A, cf. ibid // PG 91, 1089CD, 1100V. Ibid // PG 91, 122 °CD. Ibid // PG 91, 1069С. Exactly the same arguments were made by Blessed Augustine against the Neoplatonists, defining eternal return as the perpetuation of hellish torment (On the City of God XII, 20). Urs von Balthasar N. Parole et Mystère chez Origene. Paris, 195. – P 113–116. Cp. Hegel Phenomenology of Spirit (lectures), 13. Wed. below "Sexual Synthesis". Amb. // PG 91, 1077С-1080А. (according to the qualitative and quantitative movement of free choice - Trans.). Ibid // PG 91, 1329A. Ibid // PG 91, 1084A. Wed. also Disdier M. Th. Les fondements dogmatiques de la spiritualité de St Maxime le Confesseur // Echos d’Onent, 1930, No. 3. – P 296 et seq. Cent Gnost 1, 66–67 (Gnostic centurions) // PG 90, 1108AB. This statement was not sufficiently taken into account in the dispute about this place (cf. Straubinger. Die Christologie des hl Maximus Confessoi. Bonn, 190. - S 126-130). Quaestiones ad Thallasium, 62 // PG 90, 656D (“Questions to Thalassius”, hereinafter referred to as Qu. a. T.). Ibid., 60 // PG 90, 621B. This new combination of Evagrius's concepts is especially clear in Amb. // PG 91, 1133С-1136А.