The theme of describing a person through the “convergence of characteristics” in St. Basil the Great and its church-historical and historical-philosophical context

In texts important for the history of patristic thought and, in general, the history of philosophy, there are key passages that are significant for several directions in the subsequent development of thought. We would like to focus on one of these places in the works of St. Basil the Great, Archbishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia, is the beginning of the second book of the treatise “Against Eunomius” 1. Speaking against the provisions expressed in the “Apology” 2 of the leader of the Neo-Arians (Anomeans) Eunomius, who insisted on a strict relationship between the name of an individual and his essence, St. Vasily comes to distinguish between the general essence and special properties united by the name: But which sane person would agree with the idea that those whose names (τὰ ὀν ό ματα) are different must necessarily also have different essences (τὰςοὐσ ί ας)? Peter and Paul and all people in general have different names (προσηγορ ί αι), but the essence is the same for everyone. Therefore, we are in many ways the same as each other, but we differ from one another only in the features (τοῖς ἰδι ώ μασι) that are seen in each. Therefore, the names (αἱ προσηγορ ί αι) do not mean essences, but properties (τῶν ἰδιοτ ή των), characterizing (χαρακτηρ ί ζουσιν) each individually. So, having heard “Peter”, we do not understand from this name the essence of Peter (I call the material subject here the essence (τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκε ί μενον), which the name does not mean at all), but only capture the concept of the features seen in it. After all, immediately with this word we think of Peter, son of Jonah, from Bethsaida, brother of Andrew, from among the fishermen called to apostolic service [and] for the excellence of his faith, who took upon himself the creation of the Church. None of this is an essence that could be thought of as a hypostasis (ἡ ὑπ ό στασις). Thus, the name (τὸ ὄνομα) highlights (ἀφορ ί ζει) for us the character (τὸν χαρακτῆρα) of Peter, but in no way represents his essence. In turn, having heard “Paul”, let us imagine the descent ( συνδρομ ή ν ) of other characteristics ( ἰδιωμάτων ) - a Tarsus, a Jew, a Pharisee according to the law, a disciple of Gamaliel, out of zeal a persecutor of the Churches of God, turned to knowledge by a terrible vision, Apostle of the Gentiles. For all this is defined by one word - Paul. However, if it is true that those who have different names (τὰ ὀν ό ματα) have opposite essences, then it would behoove both Peter and Paul, and in general all people to be different in essence (ἑτερουσ ί ους) to each other. But since there is not a single person who would be so rude and ignorant of the nature common to us all (τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως) to dare to say this, for it is said: “Thou art made of clay, even as I was also” (Job. 33, 6), and these words mean nothing more than the consubstantiality (τὸ ὁμοούσιον) of all people - then he is lying who thinks that from the difference in names (τῶν ὀνομάτων) the difference in essence follows 3. Next St. Basil argues that the relationship between the names of the Divine Persons and Their common essence must be understood in the same way as in the case of Peter and Paul. As A. Shufrin showed 4, it is to this place from St. Vasily was supported by his brother, St. Gregory of Nyssa, who in the so-called 38th letter, currently attributed by most researchers to St. Gregory of Nyssa, not St. Basil 5, consolidating and developing this found by St. Vasily analogy, illustrated the specificity of the community and differences between the Hypostases of the Holy Trinity, relying on the example of human individuals 6. Let us clarify the range of issues addressed in this passage. This is the relationship between the general and the particular, the problem of the possibilities of human cognition and the definition of the object of cognition, the question of the status of names, the problem of describing and representing the human individual. This article is devoted to clarifying the position of St. Vasily regarding these issues and some other philosophical and theological topics based on a study of the historical, philosophical and church-historical background of this fragment. One of the most important questions raised in this fragment is related to the principle of individuation, and this issue is resolved by St. Vasily, in particular, through the use of the concept of convergence (συνδρομ ή) of qualities (properties). Let's dwell on this topic first. To do this, let us turn to the teachings of the Stoics. When the head of the skeptical Academy, Arcesilaus, spoke out against the Stoics, one of the stumbling blocks was the so-called. “Discourse on the Growing” (περὶ αὐξ ή σεως λ ό γος), compiled by the comedian Epicharmus (d. 1st half of the 5th century BC) 7, which questions the self-identity of an individual who is in the process of quantitative change, for example, during the absorption of food. This understanding of man as such a whole, which is identical to the sum of its parts and the principle of individuation of which is the amount of matter 8, was contrasted by the Stoic Chrysippus († c. 206 BC) with a concept in which for the first time, as David Sedley noted, 9 an attempt was made to answer the question of what allows a person to carry his identity through the flow of time. The specificity of the Stoics' position on this issue was determined by two factors: first, the self-evidence of the identity of the human individual throughout life; secondly, the peculiarity of the epistemological position of the Stoic doctrine, which rejects academic skepticism, according to which there are possible infallible “comprehending impressions”, accessible to every true sage 10 . Insisting on the ability to know the singular, the Stoics argued that every thing is unique and that no two things are indistinguishable (at least to the wise man). In this regard, Chrysippus distinguished in a person the underlying substrate, which is in constant change, and unchanging qualities - general quality and special quality (ἰδ ί ως ποι ό ν), individual for each person and which is his essential characteristic. This quality allows an individual to maintain self-identity despite the passage of time and stability throughout human life 11 . According to Chrysippus, it can be formalized and expressed in language. The concept of a special quality in the Stoic system was intended to individualize a person, and not an individual thing in general 12. Although the special quality of an individual, in the understanding of the Stoics, “preserves from birth to death,” it nevertheless “grows and decreases” 13. Thus, having differentiated the levels of existence when describing an individual, distinguishing the substrate and the special unique quality of the individual accessible to knowledge, Chrysippus proposed a solution to the problem that was original for his time: the individual is known as a non-merged, but inseparable unity of an ever-moving material substrate and a special quality that is stable throughout life. What is important here is the fact that the Stoics insisted that a special quality cannot be the same for several individuals (this follows from the general principle of Stoic philosophy: there are no two things indistinguishable from each other, and therefore no individuals), and vice versa - one individual cannot have two special qualities 14. This doctrine of general and special qualities is reflected in the Stoic doctrine of parts of speech. According to Diogenes Laertius, Chrysippus distinguished between a proper name (ὄνομα) and a common noun (προσηγορ ί α). Chrysippus’ student Diogenes of Babylon gives them the following definition: “A common noun (προσηγορ ί α) is a part of speech that denotes general quality (κοινὴν ποι ό τητα), for example, “man”, “horse”. A proper name (ὄνομα) is a part of speech indicating a special quality (ἰδ ί αν ποι ό τητα), for example, Diogenes, Socrates” 15. A similar distinction between proper and common nouns was used by Alexandrian grammarians. Moreover, sources indicate that there were two traditions of defining ὄνομα and προσηγορ ί α. If Apollonius Discolus (2nd half of the 2nd century AD) and the subsequent tradition 16 correlate them with the special and general qualities of the denotation of the utterance 17, then Dionysius of Thracia (c. 170 - c. 90 BC) and his grammatical tradition 18 – with the general and particular essences, which researchers associate with the Aristotelianization of Alexandrian grammar 19. Based on the evidence of some later sources, it can be assumed that the Stoics could understand a special quality as a set of qualities. The testimony of Dexippus 20 has been preserved, who, wondering about the principle of individuation of individuals of the same essence, writes: Those who resolve this difficulty through a special quality (τὸ ἰδ ί ως ποι ό ν), saying that one is distinguished by a hooked nose, fair hair and other convergence of qualities ( συνδρομ ῇ ποιοτ ή των ), another with snub nose, baldness or gray eyes, another with other qualities, it seems to me that they do not solve this issue well 21 . A. Long and D. Sadley, based on the fact that the quoted passage refers specifically to qualities, classify this fragment as evidence of Stoic ontology 22 . Nevertheless, they note the strangeness of the fragment, since the substantial status of the special quality sought by the Stoics here seems somewhat vague due to the fact that the listed general qualities can change during the life of the individual 23 . However, there are a number of considerations that suggest that the fragment from Dexippus, which speaks of the revelation of a special quality through a set of general qualities, may still reflect authentic Stoic teaching. In particular, as A. Lloyd rightly notes, in accordance with the Stoic doctrine of categories, the special quality of a person can be considered as a complex set of qualities 24. Lloyd has in mind the normative principle for Stoic doctrine of considering a subject from several points of view - through four Stoic categories, each of which is revealed by the next, revealing the subject as it moves from the point of view of lesser to greater certainty, and from the point of view of irrelevance (corresponding to the category of the substrate) to the one that shows all possible relations of the subject with the world (corresponding to the category of relation) 25 . Overall, however, it remains unclear whether the Stoic tradition can be said to have progressed from understanding a particular quality as capable of increasing and decreasing (i.e., changing) to describing a particular quality in terms of a collection of qualities. But at least the difference in emphasis is obvious: in the latter case, much greater emphasis is placed on the epistemological function of the individual’s special quality, the possibility of its determination in knowledge. In the Platonic school, the theme of “convergence” (συνδρομ ή) arises, on the one hand, within the framework of the skeptical New Academy to express the need to have many true ideas in order to acquire a single true idea of ​​a sensory thing (which can be played by a specific person). For example, our idea of ​​Socrates, according to Carneades 26 , will be true if each of our converging ideas about him points to what is really characteristic of Socrates 27 . On the other hand, this topic relates to the way of representing material things through a collection (τὸἄθροισμα) of qualities, which goes back to Plato 28 and is found, in particular, in Albinus 29 (mid-2nd century AD). In Plotinus, the theme of “convergence” appears in the Enneads (VI 3. 8. 20, 26), where he says that the sensible essence is an accumulation (συμφ ό ρησις) or a mixture (μ ί γμα) of qualities. It should be noted that the intention characteristic of Plotinus, when he speaks of essence as a combination of qualities, and in general for the entire Platonic tradition, is to show that the sensual individual essence is “as if an essence” 30, an essence not in the proper sense of the word, but only an imitation of the true intelligible essence 31. However, St. has a certain attitude towards the topic of convergence of qualities. Vasily may have an interpretation of it in the logical works of Porfiry 32, since it was among the representatives of the Platonic tradition that the theme of the convergence (collection) of properties appears in his description of the human individual. In his logical treatises, Porphyry twice mentions the individuation of individuals through a set of properties: he speaks about this more extensively in the Isagoge and briefly in his Brief Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. Let us quote a passage from the Isagoga: It is called singularity (τὸ ἄτομον) “Socrates” and this white one, and this approaching one, and the son of Sophroniscus 33, if the latter has only one son - Socrates. So, everything like this is called singularity because each of them consists of special properties (ἰδιοτ ή των), a collection (τὸ ἄθροισμα) of which can never be the same in another. For the special properties (ἰδι ό τητες) of Socrates cannot be the same in anything else 34. Let's try to understand the philosophical context of this place. Porfiry, in his logical treatises, tried to neutralize the anti-Platonic orientation of Aristotle’s “Categories” TD-0.002 and therefore insisted on understanding Aristotle’s “Categories” as a treatise on ways of speaking, and not on the ways of the existence of things (Porfiry - Brief Commentary. 58. 4–21), implying that this treatise describes only the reality of thinking (or the reality of the logical). Based on the tree of universals he built, Porfiry distinguished predicates in accordance with the vastness of classes they covered: the highest genus is predicated about all the subject genders, the lower – about those below it, etc. In such a system, the rule applies: each term is predicated either about what is wider than it, or about what is identical to it in extent. Porphyry called the lowest class of terms, which can only be said about themselves, the class of “singularities” (τὸ ἄτομον) (Isagoga. 7. 18–19). Thus, Porfiry makes the statement, impossible for Aristotelian realism, that singularity itself is a predicate 35 , and, unlike Aristotle, according to whom the individual attributes of a thing are in the subject, but do not affect it 36 ​​, he admits that the individual can be expressed in a statement in the same way as the other higher elements of the generic tree. Having reached the point of the need to specify a “zero” class corresponding to the singularity of a given species, which would simply require pointing with a finger, Porfiry, in order to express this specification in thought and language, proposes to consider singularity as if from the other side: not through the prism of generic-species relations, but through a unique collection of properties. In the above passage, Porphyry ranks “Socrates”, “this white one”, “this one approaching” and “the son of Sophroniscus” as certain “units”, that is, in Porphyry’s understanding, individual terms (which can indicate both inanimate things and human individuals). In order to express these individual terms in a statement, Porfiry modifies the above rule: he says that certain predicates can be expressed about each of them, the collection of which is unique for each, and this collection should constitute, as it were, a definition of this individuality 37 . Thus, the principle of the collection of properties is illustrated here by Porfiry’s approach, which excludes any super logical consideration. Returning to the evidence cited by Dexippus, we point out that there is evidence according to which Porphyry could use the Stoic teaching in his logical works 38, in connection with which it can be assumed, as R. Chiaradonna does40 39, that Dexippus combined Porphyry's discourse of singular terms with the Stoic doctrine of a special quality, polemicizing with Porphyry and having in mind the influence on him elements of Stoic teaching, but without wanting to criticize Porfiry directly. Dexippus may also have meant that Aristotle, the author of the Categories (a work which Porphyry explains in his Isagoge), criticizes the mode of individuation through the aggregate of qualities 40 . Among church writers, the predecessor of St. Vasily in relation to the discourse of describing an individual through a set of qualities is Origen.R. Sorabji points 41 to a passage from Origen that probably brought St. Vasily on the idea of ​​using the example that he gives in the fragment under discussion, namely Origen. About prayer. 24: So, the name (ὄνομα) is the main adjective (προσηγορ ί α), which represents the special quality (τῆς ἰδ ί ας ποι ό τητος) of the named. Such, for example, is a certain special quality (ἰδ ί α ποι ό της) of the Apostle Paul - for his soul, according to which (καθ ̕ ἣ ν) it is such and such, for the mind, according to which it can comprehend such and such, for the body, according to which it is such and such. The peculiarity (τὸ ἴδιον) of these qualities, not found (ἀσυντρ ό χαστον) in others (after all, in being there is no one else indistinguishable from Paul), is indicated by the naming Paul. If people’s special qualities change, then according to Scripture (κατὰ τὴν γραφ ή ν) 42 their names change accordingly. After all, after the change in quality (ποι ό τητος), Abram was called Abraham, Simon was called Peter, and Saul, who until that time was the persecutor of Jesus, began to be called Paul 43. The influence of Stoic doctrine in this passage is obvious. Origen uses the Stoic concept of ἰδ ί α ποι ό της (special quality) 44 , and quite in the spirit of its technical use by the Stoics in the sense of the unifying principle of plurality bound by internal unity 45 . In addition, Origen, following the Stoic tradition recorded in Diogenes of Babylon (see above), associates names with qualities, although he does not follow the Stoic distinction between ὄνομα and προσηγορ ί α. So, Origen reproduces the idea of ​​the Stoics, according to which the name of an individual is in accordance with his individual characteristics, which distinguishes him from other people 46. As we have noted, according to Chrysippus, the two special qualities corresponding to proper names cannot coexist in the separate essence of a given individual. Chrysippus illustrates this point with the example that if there is a certain Dion, whose special quality is such that he has all members, and Theon, whose special quality is such that he does not have a leg, then if Dion loses a leg, he will become Theon, and the former Theon will disappear 47. This example confirms the fact that within the framework of the Stoic doctrine a one-to-one correspondence was postulated between a special quality and the name of an individual. Origen follows a path similar to Chrysippus’s: with a significant change in quality, the name of the individual also changes, and within the framework of Origen’s model, the instrument that ensures the individual’s self-identity is a “special quality” that can change. The difference in the language of Chrysippus and Origen is that Chrysippus, when talking about human individuals, speaks of “entities” in which there are special qualities, and Origen does not 48 . It should also be noted that in the discussed fragment “Against Eunomius” by St. Vasily’s stoic overtones are quite clearly visible. On the presence of the discourse of Stoic usiology (the doctrine of essence) in St. Basil, as far as we know, was first drawn to the attention of R. Hübner, who notes that for both ontological orders distinguished by St. Basil (for created and uncreated being), the saint uses the Stoic model in relation to essence; in the case of uncreated being - by analogy with created 49. One can agree with R. Hübner with the caveat that this is only one of the discourses of usiology in St. Basil's 50 is on a par with Aristotle's 51. However, Hübner is wrong in asserting 52 that this substratum, the material subject (τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκε ί μενον) for all people, mentioned by St. Basil in the passage we are discussing, corresponds to the “general quality” (κοινῶς ποι ό ν) of the Stoics, since the general quality could not be considered by the Stoics in a “generic” relation in any sense. Apparently, Hübner was confused by the words of St. Basil that all people are created “from clay”, i.e. made of clay, and it is this clay that Hübner equates with “general quality.” But St. In this case, Vasily simply quotes the book of Job, understanding clay metaphorically - as something that indicates a qualityless primary substance that is subject to formation, and does not at all mean that all people are composed directly of clay (this would be absurd), i.e. that clay is really present in them as a certain quality common to everyone. When St. Vasily speaks of essence as a material subject; he relies on one of the understandings of “essence” in the doctrine of the Stoics - in the sense of a qualityless substrate, formed by qualities 53. The saint needs this in order to, by analogy, lead the reader to think about the inexpressibility in speech and incomprehensibility in thought of the Divine Essence - just as the first matter is inexpressible and inconceivable in contrast to the manifestation of special qualities in thought 54 . Identification of St. Basil in the discussed passage of the “essence” and “hypostasis” understood in this way 55 says only that the saint here refutes the thesis of Eunomius, using his own terminology 56 . So, it can be argued that the theme of “convergence of qualities” in the fragment under discussion refers to various historical and philosophical contexts. On the one hand, this is the Stoic tradition, and more specifically, the ontological-physical perspective of the Stoic tradition. In this regard, the discourse of St. Vasily suggests that there is a material substrate that constitutes the common essence of all people, as well as the entire created world 57, and it is shaped by the properties of Peter and Paul. On the other hand, these properties in the description of St. Vasily are not quite similar to physical properties (which alone can shape matter). In fact, their vocation is to present a narrative in their entirety, a story about each individual, which, as P. Calligas rightly notes, 58 is the novelty of St.’s approach. Vasily. And in this regard, St. Vasily constantly emphasizes the mental imaginability of these properties 59 , which brings his approach closer to that of Porfiry 60 , for which properties that individualize singularity have the status of intelligible. In addition, the speech of St. Vasily is similar to Porfiry’s language and the language he uses: to indicate the properties of St. Basil uses the concepts ἰδ ί ωμα and ἰδι ό τητες 61, which is close to the usage of Porphyry, while the Stoics traditionally used the concepts ποι ό ν or ποι ό της for this purpose. Thus, given the likely interpenetration of the Stoic and Neoplatonic traditions in late antiquity in terms of the theme of the convergence of qualities, it can be argued that St. Vasily, a synthetic position is visible. This duality of aspects of the physical and the intelligible is reflected in the functions of the word χαρακτ ή ρ in the discussed fragment “Against Eunomius” by St. Vasily: the totality of the properties behind each name that arise in our mind when hearing someone’s name forms the imprint/character of the person. On the one hand, the theme of character and ra-imprint, indicating a certain unity that arises in the human soul from many thoughts or ideas about something 62, appears in the first book of “Against Eunomius” 63 and can be traced in the fragment under discussion. On the other hand, another function of this concept here, reflecting how it would be used in Byzantium over time, is to indicate the individuality of a person 64, his fate, what “happens” to him 65. In general, it can be argued that we are talking about the material essence in the works of St. Vasily is twofold - he can talk about it from the perspective of both the Platonic and Stoic traditions. The Platonic theme in this regard is visible in a passage from the “Sex Day” of St., widely discussed in scientific literature. Vasily, where he speaks of material essence as a subject, composed and exhausted by a set of intelligible qualities 66. This theme was developed by Brother St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa, who in his “Six Days” 67, as well as in the works “On the Soul and Resurrection” 68 and “On the Structure of Man” 69, emphasizes that a material thing is composed of intelligible qualities, as if from ideas. A. Armstrong suggested 70 that the position of St. Basil, according to which the material subject is a set of qualities, was perceived by him as a result of reading the Enneads of Plotinus, namely St. Basil borrowed his position from unknown Platonists who interpreted the Timaeus. 52A8 and criticized by Plotinus in treatise II 4 71. However P. O'Clairy 72 suggested (in our opinion, quite convincingly) that St. In this case, Vasily starts from the idea expressed in the 4th book of Origen’s On Elements 73 . In any case, one can agree with R. Sorabji that the representation of St. Basil about material essence as a subject composed of a set of intelligible qualities, developed by St. Gregory, within the framework of his teaching that matter is a collection of immaterial ideas, is in line with the Platonic tradition 74. Understanding the sensory essence in line with the Stoic tradition, which we talked about above, implies precisely the inexhaustibility of the essence with qualities, because after deducting the intelligible qualities, there remains a certain remainder, a qualityless substrate, which cannot be grasped by the mind and expressed in speech. Thus, in the fragment under discussion, as in other places in “Against Eunomius”, there are 75 St. Vasily, we find an understanding of the material essence based precisely on the Stoic philosophical tradition, and not on the Platonic one. This conclusion can also be correlated with the fact 76 that St. Vasily, unlike St. Gregory, uses the concept of “convergence” (συνδρομ ή), taken as a philosophical terminus technicus, when talking exclusively about human individuals, but does not use it in this capacity in relation to inanimate material things. However, as we have already said, if within the framework of the Platonic tradition the concept of “convergence” or “gathering” of qualities was used indifferently in relation to human individuals or inanimate material objects, then it was within the framework of the Stoic philosophical tradition that the idea of ​​a method of individuation through the convergence of properties, applied only to the human individual, was formed. Thus, the noted fact may also indicate a Stoic background in terms of the specific use of St. Vasily of this concept. In turn, what St. Gregory of Nyssa, speaking about the convergence of qualities, quite in the spirit of the Platonic tradition, does not distinguish between human individuals and inanimate objects, correlates with the fact that St., who is prone to Platonism. Gregory probably did not accept the ideas adopted by St. Basil from the physical-ontological tradition of Stoic teaching, namely, the emphasis of St. Vasily on the understanding of created essence as a material substrate. As D. Balas shows 77, St. Gregory in his treatise “Refutation of Eunomius”, commenting on the fragment discussed in the article, in contrast to the emphasis of St. Vasily on the understanding of the consubstantiality of people in terms of a common underlying substrate emphasizes the Platonic (with certain reservations) understanding of a single human nature as a generic essence common to all, having existence in individuals. At the same time, St. Gregory, when quoting the fragment of St. we are discussing. Vasily, having reached the words: “I call the material subject here the essence (οὐσ ί αν δὲ λέγω νῦν τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκε ί μενον),” brings them in a modified form: “I do not call the material subject here an essence ( οὐσ ί αν δὲλέγω νῦν οὐ τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκε ί μενον 78. D. Balas pays special attention to this fact, assuming that St. Gregory here “corrected” a passage from St. Basil that was inconvenient for his views and for his polemics with Eunomius. The indicated subtext of Stoic physics in the discussed fragment from St. Basil is not taken into account by P. Kalligas, who constructs the philosophical background of the discussed fragment of St. Basil to the Platonic tradition 79, which allows him to talk about the presence of St. Vasily of extreme nominalistic tendencies, comparable to the nominalism of W. Occam 80. We can agree that the discussed discourse of St. Basil is, in a certain respect, nominalistic precisely in the Occamian sense - that is, in the sense that in order to construct it, like Occam, St. Vasily does not need to build a generic hierarchy. However, the saint's emphasis on physical realism, associated with his use of the Stoic philosophical tradition, indicates the impossibility of attributing to St. Vasily, nominalism in some other, more normative sense, when it is believed that general concepts do not correspond to objects in reality. Now, in order to be able to bring together the main provisions of the position of St. Basil, let us consider the argumentation of Eunomius, with whom, in fact, the saint polemicizes in his work, which contains the fragment we are studying. St. Basil refutes the following passage from Eunomius' Apology 81: So, there is one Son (for “Only Begotten”), about whom I could imagine the words of the saints, in which they say that the Son is generation and creation 82 (by the very difference of names (τῶν ὀνομάτων) showing the difference in essence [of the Father and the Son]), and thus would be freed from cares and labors. According to the teaching of the Scriptures, we say that the Son is a generation (γέννημα), meaning by this that the essence is not one thing, but something other than it - the signified (τὸ σημαιν ό μενον), but the hypostasis itself is what the name signifies, certifying the essence by the name 83. Let us recall that Eunomius emphasized the non-existence of God and Christ (the Son), deducing this non-existence, in particular, from the fact that Their true names have different and opposite meanings. Those. the idea of ​​God and Christ, according to Eunomius, is formed in a person by grasping certain meanings corresponding to Their nature, and, based on these meanings, a person selects the name that most perfectly conveys the grasped meaning. The names characteristic of God and the Son - “unbegotten” (ἀγέννητος) and “generation” (γέννημα) - for Eunomius are not names understood in a magical sense, like the Iamblichian names of the gods, as his position is often misunderstood 84, but these are concepts most suitable to God and the Son, based on true understanding of Their nature, according to which God does not have a cause of existence for Himself, but the Son does 85. The difference between Eunomius’s understanding of the names of the Hypostases of the Holy Trinity and the magical understanding of names, which was presented, in particular, in the works of Origen and Iamblichus, is as follows: for the teaching of Origen, as well as for the teaching of Iamblichus on theurgic practices, it is characteristic that from the position of the natural connection of names and things, opposed to the conventional connection, a conclusion is drawn about the importance of the formal side of naming, i.e. the sound of the name, while the meaning of the name does not play any significant role 86. This is expressed in the fact that both Origen and Iamblichus recognize the exceptional importance of a certain sacred language, the meaning of whose words is not necessary. Therefore, Origen emphasizes the power of the Hebrew names of God, denying any power of the name if translated into another language 87 , and Iamblichus argues that the names of the Oriental gods should be preferred 88 . However, Eunomius lacks magicism understood in this way. On the contrary, the names that are essential for the teaching of Eunomius carry an unambiguous semantic load (for example, the name “Unborn” contains a meaning indicating the specificity of Divine existence in its difference from created things). This semantic load is due to the fact that Eunomius constructs names based on his understanding of the Named; he shows at length, from predetermined principles, why the true name of God is “Unbegotten,” and of the Son “Generation.” In the above passage, Eunomius uses the argument "from names", according to which the essence of Christ and the "signified" (τὸ σημαιν ό μενον) of His name ("Generation"), corresponding to the result of the mind's comprehension of His essence, cannot diverge. Eunomius's argumentation "from names" is based on ideas common in classical antiquity and the Hellenistic era about wise men who know the nature of things, as well as the names that suit things and correspond to their nature 89 . T. Kopeček believes 90 that in this case there is an influence on Eunomius of Middle Platonic ideas; in particular, this position is most clearly expressed in Albin 91. But, in our opinion, the Stoic terminology used by Eunomius allows us to speak rather about the influence of Stoic discourse on him. The concept of τὸ σημαιν ό μενον (signified), identical to the concept of λεκτ ό ν, is of fundamental importance for the Stoics. The introduction of this concept by the Stoics led to a deeper understanding of language and linguistic processes compared to Aristotle. In fact, Aristotle’s three-part scheme of language: signifier (sounds) – representation (thought) – subject 92, thanks to the concept of “meaning” among the Stoics, was transformed into a four-part scheme: signifier (sounds) – signified (semantic objectivity revealed in the word, or “lekton”) – representation (thought) – subject 93. The doctrine of the “designated,” which among the Stoics acts as an intermediary between word and thing 94 and connects what was separated in Aristotle (i.e., thought and word 95 ), in turn, is very suitable for developing the doctrine of the possibility of choosing and knowing the correct names for things whose nature is known. This teaching was widespread in the Hellenistic era, but is found among the Stoics 96 and later among Eunomius precisely in connection with the concept of τὸ σημαιν ό μενον 97 . These are the premises of the teaching of Eunomius about the necessary connection between the name and essence of the Son. Accordingly, the tactics of St. Basil in his refutation of Eunomius’s approach to naming, which requires the establishment of a strict connection between name, meaning, thought and subject, consists in the transition from Eunomius’ discourse, which involves working with common nouns (referring to a specific meaning), to the area of ​​proper names - lexical units, by definition, which do not allow the application of the concept of “meaning” in relation to themselves. Without using the concept of "meaning", St. Vasily instead actively uses terminology that refers to thought processes. Now we can summarize what has been said. St. Basil, in order to refute the position presented in the “Apology” of Eunomius, transferring speech from the sphere of theology to the field of the material world, uses the discourse of Stoic physics, accepting in accordance with it the concept of the essence of people in the sense of a common material substrate, formed by qualities, which - unlike the understanding of material essence within the framework of Platonic discourse (which St. Basil could use in other writings) - is not limited to qualities. St. needs this. Vasily, to emphasize that the essence itself is unknowable and inexpressible in speech, namely, created essence and, by analogy with it, uncreated, while qualities (properties) are knowable and expressible. Following one of the themes of the teachings of the Stoics or the ideas of the Alexandrian grammarians, in whom this theme was developed, and also, probably, relying on a passage from Origen’s work “On Prayer,” St. Basil develops the thesis according to which names correspond not to essences, as Eunomius claims, but to qualities. Please note that St. Vasily, speaking about the fact that proper names correspond to qualities, and the essence common to all people is a material subject, uses elements of Stoic teaching only as a tool to illustrate his points. This is confirmed by the fact that the saint, turning to Stoic discourse, does not accept the Stoic system in its entirety, since Stoic teaching is characterized not only by the idea of ​​essence as a qualityless general underlying substratum, but also by the idea of ​​a single essence that is a “part” of the underlying substratum 98 . The Stoic doctrine of individual essences, individualized by a special property accessible to knowledge, would rather testify in favor of the position of Eunomius, therefore St. In the fragment under discussion, Vasily emphasizes the essence as a qualityless subject and the individual as described through a collection of qualities, but does not mention the way of considering human individuals as individual entities. While Eunomius uses the four-part division of language dating back to the Stoics to prove the unambiguous correspondence between name and essence, the position of St. Basil's in terms of understanding language in this regard can be characterized as close to Aristotle's. Indeed, there is nothing in his argumentation that would point to the concept of “meaning”, but it involves a three-fold scheme: word (name) – representation (thought) – object, characteristic of Aristotle’s position. In order to avoid the possibility of an unambiguous indication of the individual, which would testify in favor of the argumentation of Eunomius, St. Basil has to abandon the Stoic idea of ​​the special essential quality of man, characteristic of Origen (on whom St. Basil probably relied), as well as Origen’s idea, consistent with the philosophical position of the Stoics, namely, that when the special quality of the apostles and other biblical characters changes, their name changes. Bypassing this thorny issue, St. Vasily does not mention at all the fact of the apostle’s name change. Pavel. Refusal of the Stoic idea of ​​a special quality entails ignoring the very division of qualities into general and special (accordingly, in linguistic terms, ignoring the distinction between ὄνομα and προσηγορ ί α, which, according to the teachings of the Stoics, correspond to them 99). Instead, St. Basil, individualizing a person, lists many different properties and, unlike the Stoics, does not distinguish them by class, bringing them into unity through the use of the principle of “convergence (συνδρομ ή) of properties”, borrowed from Stoic-Platonic discourse, i.e. using a description (enumeration) of properties. A place of the most special quality at St. Basil is occupied by the concept of χαρακτ ή ρ (“character and p”), which, on the one hand, has psychological connotations: it indicates a set of ideas about the apostles Peter or Paul (this is an echo of the ancient philosophical tradition), and on the other hand, this concept indicates the individuality of each, the special nature of his path (here is a foreshadowing of the use of this concept later in Byzantium). Among the properties listed by St. Vasily, there are properties both general and relative, and uniquely characterizing a person in the context of the event series of his life path 100. Of all the fragments we have cited with a description of a person through the convergence of properties, the peculiarity of the passage under discussion from “Against Eunomius” by St. Basil is that his description is the richest, since in addition to the general properties and properties of relationships, according to the saint, a person is defined through the entire spectrum of what “happens” to him, through the history of his fate 101. This is a rethinking of the principle of “convergence of properties” of St. Basil in comparison with the philosophical tradition that preceded him, expressed, so to speak, in the “deployment” of these properties outward, can be compared with the theme of the convergence of properties in the so-called 38th letter of St. Gregory of Nyssa: Since the Holy Spirit, from Whom every gift of good to created things flows, is connected with the Son, with Whom it is inseparably comprehended, and its existence is dependent on the Father as the Cause, from Whom it proceeds, it has the following distinctive sign of hypostatic originality: after the Son and with Him it is recognized and from the Father it has Its existence. The Son, through Himself and with Himself making known the Spirit proceeding from the Father, having alone shone forth from the Unborn Light, has in His own characteristics no participation with the Father or the Spirit, but alone is recognized by the above-mentioned features. But someone might think that the teaching we have presented about hypostasis does not agree with the thought of the apostle when he says: “The radiance of His glory and the image (χαρακτ ή ρ) of the Hypostasis” (Heb. 1:3). After all, if we have presented the Hypostasis as the convergence of properties (τὴν συνδρομὴν ἰδιωμάτων) of each Person, and we admit that just as the Father has something discernible in particular, through which only He alone is known, and in the same exact way we believe about the Only Begotten, then how then does Scripture testify about the name “hypostasis” in connection with the Father alone, but about the Son he says that He is the image of the Hypostasis, distinguishing Him not by His own, but by the Father’s signs? Having carefully peered with the eyes of the soul into the image of the Only Begotten, one approaches the understanding of the Hypostasis of the Father, but not because at the same time the distinctive features appearing before the eyes are confused and confused to such an extent that we begin to attribute either begottenness to the Father or unbegottenness to the Son, but because it is impossible, having separated one from the other, to comprehend the remaining in itself. For it is impossible, having named the Son, not to come closer to understanding the Father, since naming the Son along with Him necessarily reveals the Father as well 102. The fact that here, judging by the context, we are talking specifically about the convergence of properties indicates that through this expression the author of the letter indicates the need to correlate each Hypostasis with the others; this implies the inseparability of the Persons of the Most Holy Trinity, Their joint existence - what later began to be called “perichoresis” 103 Hypostases 104. Verlinsky. Ancient theories. – Verlinsky A.L. Ancient theories about the origin of language. St. Petersburg, 2006. Shufrin. Development of the concept of “hypostasis”. – Shufrin A.M. Development of the concept of “hypostasis” in St. Basil the Great // Problems of Theology. Vol. 3. Part 2. Ekaterinburg, 2006. P. 3–28 (English original article: Choufrine A. The Development of St. Basil’s Idea of ​​“Hypostasis” // Studi sull’Oriente Cristiano. Vol. 7 (2). 2003. P. 7–27). Balas. The Unity of Human Nature. – Balas D. The Unity of Human Nature in Basil’s and Gregory of Nyssa’s Polemics against Eunomius // StPatr. Vol. 14 (5). 1976, pp. 275–281. Kalligas. Basil of Caesarea on the Semantics. – Kalligas P. Basil of Caesarea on the Semantics of Proper Names // Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources / Ed. K. Ierodiakonou. Sedley. The Stoic Criterion. – Sedley D. N. The Stoic Criterion of Identity // Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy. Vol. 27(3). 1982. P. 255–275. Lloyd. Grammar and Metaphysics. – Lloyd A. Grammar and Metaphysics in the Stoya // Problems in Stoicism. L., 1971. R. 58–74. Long, Sedley. The Hellenistic Philosophers. – Long A. A., Sedley D. N. The Hellenistic Philosophers. Robertson. A Patristic Theory. – Robertson D. A Patristic Theory of Proper Names // Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. Bd. 84. 2002. S. 1–19. Regarding the dating of the treatise “Against Eunomius,” scientists agree that this work was written at the beginning of the theological activity of St. Vasily, i.e. in the first half of the 60s of the 4th century. The most cautious researchers date it to the period between 360 and 366 (Dams Th. La controverse Eunomeenne. P., 1952. P. 6). The exact dating of the treatise depends on the date of writing two letters to St. Basil (Ep. 20 and Ep. 223), where there are references to him. On this see: Hildebrand S. A Reconsideration of the Development of Basil’s Trinitarian Theology: the Dating of Ep. 9 and “Contra Eunomium” // VC. Vol. 58. 2004. R. 390–403. “Apology” of Eunomius was written, apparently, by the time of the Council of Constantinople, held in December 359, and read at the Council as a response to accusations from representatives of the Omiusian [from ὁμοιούσιος - sub-existent] party (see: Kopecek Th. A. A History of Neo-Arianism. Camb.; MÄ Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1979. Vol. 2. P. 305–306. (Patristic Monograph Series; 8)). Theological works. No. 42. 2009. pp. 87–109. Against Eunomius. II 4 // PG. 29b. Col. 577c-580b; Basile de Cesarée. Contre Eunome.T. 2. P., 1983. R. 18–22. (SC; 305). Translations hereinafter are ours, unless otherwise stated. – D.B. Shufrin. Development of the concept of “hypostasis”. pp. 22–24. See in particular the conclusions of R. Hübner and P. Fedwick: Hübner R. Gregor von Nyssa als Verfasserder sog. Ep. 38 des Basilius: Zum unterschiedlichen Verständnis der ousia bei den kappadokischenBrüdern // Epektasis: Mélanges patristiques offersts au cardinal Jean Daniélou / Eds. J. Fontaine, Ch. Kannengiesser. P., 1972. P. 463–490; Fedwick P. Commentary of Gregory of Nyssa on the 38th Letter of Basil of Caesarea // OCP. T. 44, fasc. 1. 1978. P. 31–51. There is no doubt that the so-called The 38th letter was written to St. Gregory later than “Against Eunomius” by St. Vasily. [Cm. also: Zachhuber J. Nochmals: Der 38. Brief des Basilius von Caesarea als Werk des Gregor von Nyssa // Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum. 2003. Vol. 7 (1). P. 73–90. – Ed. ] Letter. 38. 3 // PG. 32. Col. 328с-d. Let us note that the understanding according to which a certain special quality is placed in accordance with the hypostasis, used in the 38th letter and implied in the above passage of St. Basil (who in this case does not use the concept of “hypostasis” in the technical sense), goes back to the sub-priests (Basily of Ancyra and George of Laodicea), see: Epiphanius of Cyprus. Against heresies [Panarion]. 73. 16 // PG. 42. Col. 432–433. DK 23 B 2 // Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: Griechisch und deutsch von H. Diels; 9. Aufl.hrsg. v. W. Kranz. B.; Wiedmann, 1960. Bd. 1. S. 195–197. It is obvious that the philosophical context here is the teaching of Heraclitus (DK22 B 91 // Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker... S. 171). The doctrine of the constant changeability of man in his material component is also found in Plato (Pir. 207d-e). Plato mentions Epicharmus as having taught, along with Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles and Homer, about the constant fluidity of the material world (Theaetetus. 152e), but despite this, Plato was accused by Alcimus of borrowing ideas from Epicharmus (see: Diogenes Laertius. On the lives, teachings and sayings of famous philosophers. III 9–10). However, the problem of finding the principle of identity of a person as a material being, implied in the plot of Epicharmus’s comedy, was not central in the philosophical studies of Plato or Aristotle, and only in the polemics of the Stoic and academic schools, the resolution of the question of the principle of human identity became the main direction of development of philosophical research (see: Sedley. The Stoic Criterion. P. 255). Cicero. The teaching of academics. II 41, 77–78; Diogenes Laertius. VI 162, 177. See: SVF. II 395, 762. Further, the Roman numeral and the following Arabic numeral without a comma indicate the volume and fragment of the collection of J. von Arnim. Sedley. The Stoic Criterion. P. 272, n. 16. See: Plutarch. About general concepts. 44.1083d; Posidonius. Fr. 96 // Long, Sedley. The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 2. P. 171 (LS 28D). This position allows us to say that the preservation of an individual’s identity when something happens to him is due to the presence of a special individualizing quality. For more details, see our article: Biryukov D.S. The Stoics and the principle of human identity // Plutarch. Works / Trans. T. Sidasha. St. Petersburg, 2008.P. 351–381. Although Plutarch reproaches the Stoics for the fact that, according to their teaching, “two special qualities can appear in one essence, and ... the same essence, having one special quality, then takes on another and retains both” (Plutarch. On General Concepts. 36. 1077d), this is a conclusion that is in no way shared by the Stoics themselves, but imposed on them by Plutarch, as an alleged consequence of their concept of the world ignition, during which Zeus and the world Providence come closer and coexist in one ethereal essence (Fragments of the early Stoics. Vol. II. Chrysippus from Sol / Translation and commentary by A. A. Stolyarov. M., 1999. Part 1. P. 214). Actually, the idea of ​​the Stoics, mentioned by Plutarch there, according to which Providence relates to Zeus as the soul relates to man, excludes the validity of Plutarch’s opinion (see: Sedley. The Stoic Criterion. R. 267). Diogenes Laertius. VII 58 // SVF. III 22). See, for example: Apollonius Discolus. Syntax // Apollonius Discolus. De constructione libri quattuor / Ed. G. Uhlig. Lpz., 1910. P. 142. L. 1 – 143. L. 3. (Grammatici Graeci; Vol. 2, pars 2); Scholiik to Dionysius of Thracia // Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem grammaticam / Ed. A. Hilgard. Lpz., 1901. P. 358. L. 28–32, P. 524. L. 9–10. (Grammatici Graeci; Vol. 3, pars 1). Denotation is a real object denoted by one or another proper name or subject in a statement. Dionysius of Thracia. The Art of Grammar // Dionysios Thrax. Ars grammatica/Ed. G. Uhlig. Lpz., 1883. P. 33. 6 – 34. 2. (Grammatici Graeci; Vol. 1, pars 1); Georgius Choeroboscus. Prolegomena et scholia in Theodosii Alexandrini canones isagogicos de flexione nominum et verborum / Ed. A. Hilgard. Lpz., 1894. P. 105. 23–25. (Grammatici Graeci; Vol. 4, pars 1). Robertson. A Patristic Theory. S. 3; Mazhuga V. The categories “quality” and “action” in the philosophy of the Stoics and in grammatical doctrine (On the definition of “name” among Greek grammarians) // Theoretical problems of linguistics. Collection of articles for the 140th anniversary of the Department of General Linguistics at St. Petersburg State University. St. Petersburg, 2004. P. 481. The last article provides a review on the correlation of name with quality or essence among various ancient grammarians. Dexippus (1st half of the 4th century) – Neoplatonist philosopher, student of Iamblichus (d. ca. 325/330); synthesized the logical ideas of Aristotle, Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus. On "Category". 30. 20–26 // Long, Sedley. The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 2. P. 173–174 (LS 28J). This is evidenced by the fact that Long and Sadley place this fragment in the section “Ontology” (Ibid. pp. 166–185). Ibid. Vol. 1. P. 174; Vol. 2. P. 174–175. Lloyd. Grammar and Metaphysics in the Stoya. R. 66. A. Stolyarov has a somewhat similar view, who starts from the comprehension of the Stoic understanding of the varieties of qualitative certainty. A. Stolyarov, distinguishing the Stoic terms ἰδ ί ως ποι ό ν (special or individual quality) and ἰδ ί α ποι ό της (individual quality), writes, noting the hypothetical nature of his words: “...“General” quality is that which a given substance shares with another or others, and “individual” quality... is identical to the totality of unique essential properties of the “pneumatic” structure [meaning the Stoic teaching about pneuma, permeating all material things. – D.B.], taken independently, without relation to anything. Then “quality” (ποι ό της) would mean the combination of the first two positions [i.e. general and individual quality – D. B.] and the whole variety of secondary accidental properties acquired situationally, in relation to “something”; in other words, an extremely specific and most complete description of a substance taken at a certain moment of its existence in all possible unique parameters” (Fragments of the Early Stoics... Vol. II. Part 1. P. 203). This understanding of a special quality fits well into the picture of the representation of ἰδ ί ως ποι ό ν through a set of general qualities that we have in Dexippus. Carneades (c. 214/3–129/8 BC) – Greek. philosopher, head of the so-called New Platonic Academy. “...He who has formed an idea of ​​a person, of necessity, uses both the idea of ​​what relates to himself and of things external to him: from what relates to himself - as an idea of ​​color, size, figure, movement, conversation, clothing, shoes; from the external - as a representation of air, light, day, sky, earth, friends and everything else. Therefore, if none of these ideas carries us here and there by the fact that it seems false, but they all seem to agree to be true, then we have more confidence in [this] general idea. Indeed, we are convinced that this man is Socrates from the fact that he has everything that is ordinary [for him] - color, size, figure, way of thinking, an old cloak, and then from the fact that no one else can be confused with him. And, just as some doctors recognize a person in real heat not by one sign, such as pulse rate or abundant warmth, but also by a combination of [signs], such as: warmth along with the pulse, uneven breathing, redness, thirst, and the like, in the same way the academician creates for himself a judgment about the truth on the basis of convergence (τῇ συνδρομῇ) [ideas]; and if none of the ideas (τῶν φαντασιῶν) in this convergence distracted him in the other direction as false, then he claims that what is happening is true” (Sextus Empiricus. Against scientists. 176–179; trans. A.F. Losev with minor changes: Sextus Empiricus. Works in two volumes. M., 1976. T. 1. P. 96). Plato. Theaetetus. 157b-c; cf.: Ibid. 209c; aka. Philebus. 14a, 15b.v (ἄτομα), Albin (Alkina). Textbook of Platonic philosophy. IV 7 (Russian translation, see: Plato. Collected works: In 4 vols. M., 1994. T. 4. P. 628–629). This is rightly noted by J. Rist, see: Rist J. Plotinus: the path to reality. St. Petersburg, 2005. pp. 122–123, 130. See: Plotinus. Enneads. VI 3. 8. 30–37. Wed. further, when Plotinus moves from speech about the sensory essence in general to speech about the sensory essence of the human individual: “Since there is a logos, according to which there is Socrates, the sensually perceived Socrates should not be called Socrates, but these are colors and colors that imitate and represent here the one who is in the logos” (VI 3. 15. 32–36, trans. T. G. Sidash with changes). Porfiry (232/233–304/306) – Neoplatonist; student of Plotinus, author of his biography and publisher of his works. Regarding the words “...and this approaching one, and the son of Sophroniscus,” we follow the reading of the last publisher of the Isagoge, J. Barnes (Porphyry: Introduction / Trans., comm. J. Barnes. Oxf., 2003. P. 8), while the reading in the classic edition of A. Busse is as follows: “... and this approaching son of Sophroniscus.” For details, see: Ademollo F. Sophroniscus’son is approaching: Porphyry, Isagoge 7. 20–1 // The Classical Quarterly. Vol. 54(1). 2004. P. 322–325. In addition to textual considerations, in support of his reading, Barnes points to an example from the works of Aristotle, on which Porphyry probably relied, see: Aristotle. First analytics. 43 a35–36 (about the “approaching man” and the “white thing”). Porfiry. Isagoga. 7. 19–24. In the “Short Commentary” Porphyry, using a similar discourse, uses precisely the concept of “convergence” (συνδρομή) of qualities: “Socrates differs from Plato not through any difference, but by a different convergence of qualities (συνδρομῆςποιοτήτων), in respect of which Plato differs from Socrates” (129.9–10). See: Lloyd A. The Anatomy of Neoplatonism. Oxf., 1990. P. 43–44. Aristotle. Categories. 1a23–29. For discussion, see J. Barnes's commentary on the Isagoge: Porphyry: Introduction…P. 151–153. The influence of Stoic discourse on Porphyry is noted by Simplicius in his “Comments on the Categories” (2. 8–9). Clear Stoic connotations can be seen in a fragment from Porphyry cited by Simplicius in the same work: Ibid. 48. 11–16. Chiaradonna R. La teoria dell’individuo in Porfirio e l ἸΔΙΟΝ ΠΟΙΟΝ stoico // Elenchos: Rivistadi studi sul pensiero antico. Vol. 21(2). 2000. R. 317–328. Aristotle. Metaphysics. 1040a8–15; This fact is pointed out by J. Barnes, see: Porphyry: Introduction... P. 153. The Philosophy of Commentators, 200–600 AD / Introd., editorial material and arrangement by R. Sorabji. Vol. 3. Cornell University, 2005, pp. 226–227. In the translation given by R. Sorabji: “by letter,” which is incorrect. We follow A. Stolyarov, who conveys ποι ό της with the concept of “quality” (Fragments of the early Stoics... Vol. II. Part 1. pp. 203–204). Origen was quite strongly influenced by the understanding of names in a magical sense, widespread in Middle Platonism (see: Dillon J. The Magical Power of Names in Origen and Late Platonism // Origeniana Tertia. R., 1985. P. 203–216). However, here, due to the general Stoic context, we should talk specifically about the influence of the Stoic ontological-semantic teaching. “Chrysippus, in his essay “On Growing Things,” gives the following intricate reasoning. Having substantiated the statement that in one and the same essence (οὐσ ί ας) two special qualities (ἰδ ί ως ποιούς) can in no way coexist, he says: “For a better understanding, let us imagine [two people] - one with all the members, and the second without a leg; let the full-fledged person be called Dion, and the defective one - Theon, and then let Dion lose one of his legs.” If you now find out which of the two died (ἔφθαρται), then it is better to answer: “Theon.” But...how could the one from whom not a single member was taken away, that is, Theon, be destroyed, and how could Dion, whose leg was taken away, not perish? “This,” explains Chrysippus, “is inevitable, because Dion, having lost his leg, passed into the inferior essence of Theon (ἐπὶ τὴν ἀτελῆ τοῦ Θέωνος οὐσ ί αν), and two individual qualities cannot coexist in the same substrate ( τὸ ὑποκε ί μενον) Therefore, Dion must remain, and Theon with the same necessity must perish (διεφθάρθαι)” (Philo of Alexandria. On the Eternity of the World. 48–49 (SVF. II 397); lane A. A. Stolyarov with modifications). J. Bowin argues that in this case Chrysippus, in polemics with academics, probably disputed the premises of the “Discourse on the Growing,” presented in the comedy of Epicharmus, see: Bowin J. Chrysippus’ Puzzle about Identity // Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. Vol. 24. 2003 (May). R. 244–246. In turn, D. Sadley showed that the reasoning presented by Philo of Chrysippus assumed that the one-legged Theon is part of Dion, which has all members, i.e. that Theon’s name is here given to Dion’s body minus one of Dion’s legs: Sedley. The Stoic Criterion. P. 269. Note that Eunomius, the enemy of St. Vasily, followed a similar logic, according to which the name unambiguously corresponds to the feature, i.e. special essence (Eunomius did not distinguish between “essence” and “peculiarity”). He argues in his Apology that the Son and the Father cannot be of the same essence, since one essence cannot be both begotten and unbegotten, and if the Son becomes of the same essence as the Father, He will become unbegotten and, accordingly, the Father will cease to be begetter, i.e. both will lose their characteristics (Apology XIV // Eunomius. The Extant Works / Text and transl. by R. P. Vaggione. Oxf., 1987. P. 50). Thus, the communion of essence, according to Eunomius, entails communion by name (cf.: Apology IX.10–12 // Eunomius. The Extant Works... P. 44). However, judging by the terminology used by Eunomius, which is generally accepted, it does not appear that he was using Stoic doctrine in this regard (the influence of the Stoic tradition is more likely to be seen in his doctrine of language, see below). Hübner. Gregor von Nyssa als Verfasser... P. 478–481. On the Stoic elements in the usiology of St. Vasily also draws attention to D. Balas, see: Balas. The Unity of Human Nature. P. 279. The most detailed discussion of the elements of Stoic teaching in the usiology of St. Basil, see the article by D. Robertson: Robertson D. Stoic and Aristotelian Notions of Substance in Basil of Caesarea // VC. Vol. 52. 1998. R. 393–417, esp.: P. 396–406). A. Shufrin does not agree with this thesis of R. Hübner on the grounds that St. Basil rejects the divisibility of the Divine essence (Against Eunomius. I 19 // PG. 29b. Col. 556a; cf.: He. Letter. 361 // PG. 32. Col. 1101a), while divisibility is characteristic of the essence understood as a substratum (Shufrin. Development of the concept of “hypostasis.” P. 13, note 2). To this it can be objected that the property of divisibility of the substrate in the understanding of St. Basil is, in principle, irrelevant for the Divine essence, described by analogy with the substratum, since the first is taken precisely by analogy with the second (as R. Hübner notes) and for certain purposes - in order to indicate that the Divine essence is unknowable and inexpressible in speech (see below). The formalization of the concept of essence through the use of Aristotelian discourse was manifested in the use of St. Basil of the fundamental expression for Aristotelian philosophy “logos of essence” (λ ό γος τῆς οὐσ ί ας), or “logos of being” ( τοῦ ε ἶ ναι) (Against Eunomius. I 5, 19 // PG. 29b. Col. 520, 556), reflecting the unity of the essence of the Hypostases of the Holy Trinity, while to indicate the peculiarity of the existence of each Hypostasis in “Against Eunomius” St. Basil uses the expression τρ ό πος τῆς ὑποστάσεως (Ibid. I 15 // PG. 29b. Col. 548a), and in the sermon “Against the Sabellians, Arius and Anomeans” - the expression τρ ό πος τῆς ὑπάρξεως that later became common in the Byzantine theological tradition (PG. 31. Col. 613a), which perhaps goes back to the logical commentators works of Aristotle (both expressions can be translated as “way of existence” or “way of being”). For a discussion of the relationship between Stoic and Peripatetic elements in St. Basil’s philosophy, see: Robertson. Hübner. Gregor von Nyssa als Verfasser... S. 476. See: SVF. I 493; II 318, 374, 376, 380. Compare: “...From what has been said it is clear that in both the Father and the Son the names do not represent the essence, but only show special properties, so that one cannot in any way conclude from the difference in names to the opposition of the essence” (Against Eunomius. II 5 // PG. 29b. Col. 580c). See also: Ibid. I 12–13, 15 // PG. 29b. Col. 540c-541b, 548ab. “...None of this is an essence that could be thought of as a hypostasis (ἡ ὑπ ό στασις).” Wed. the words of Eunomius: “...But that is the hypostasis itself (ὑπ ό στασις), which means a name, certifying the essence by name” (Apology XII. 9-10 // Eunomius. The Extant Works... P. 48 for a more extensive quote from Eunomius, see below). Using the term ὑπ ό στασις in the above passage, Eunomius follows the terminology characteristic of the Arian movement (originating from Origen), in which we are talking about the three Hypostases of the Trinity (so that the Hypostasis of God is infinitely higher than Christ, and the Hypostasis of Christ is infinitely higher than the Spirit), see respectively. place in the “Thalia” Aria given by St. Athanasius of Alexandria in: On the Councils. 15 // PG. 26. Col. 708a. From what has been said it is clear that there is no reason to contrast this place with St. Basil's theological language of the 38th letter of St. Gregory of Nyssa, as does A. Shufrin, who writes: “...Although proper names [in the 38th letter. – D.B.] and do not denote the essence (on this issue the author of the letter agrees with Vasily), they still denote hypostases (contrary to what Vasily claims)” (Shufrin. Development of the concept of “hypostasis”. P. 23). St. In this case, Vasily simply did not use the concept of “hypostasis” in its technical theological meaning, which was finally formed somewhat later, i.e. in the same meaning as the author of the 38th letter. See: Against Eunomius II 24 // PG. 29b. Col. 628c, and also: Balas. The Unity of Human Nature.P. 278. Kalligas. Basil of Caesarea on the Semantics. P. 45. Compare: “So, having heard “Peter”, we do not understand by this name the essence of Peter... but with this word we immediately think of Peter, son of Jonah, from Bethsaida, brother of Andreev... Also, having heard “Paul”, we think of the convergence of other features...” However, as J. Rist shows in his brilliant analysis, the presence of a direct influence on St. Basil of the Neoplatonists after Plotinus (in particular, Porphyry) is unlikely (see: Rist J. Basil’s “Neoplatonism”: Its Background and Nature // Basil of Caesarea Christian, Humanist, Ascetic / Ed. P. Fedwick. Toronto, 1981. P. 212–215). Throughout the article, we usually convey ἰδ ί ωμα through the word “feature”, ἰδι ό τητες as “property”, ποι ό ν as “quality”, and ποι ό της as “quality”. These words, on the one hand, have a close meaning and can be used synonymously by ancient authors, but on the other hand, ἰδι ό τητες has a connotation of intelligibility to a greater extent than ποι ό ν and ποι ό της, which refer rather to physical discourse, and ἰδ ί ωμα to a greater extent indicates an intelligible property characteristic of a given individual. The concept of χαρακτ ή ρ, understood in this sense as a certain imprint formed in the soul from a set of “thoughts” about a certain object, has Stoic connotations. According to Zeno, Cleanthes and some other Stoics, impression (φαντασ ί α) is “an imprint (τύπωσις) in the soul,” like the imprint that is obtained from a seal on wax (SVF. I 58; II 53, 55–60). Philo, when talking about this imprint, uses the word χαρακτ ή ρ and notes that such impressions are perceived by the mind and stored in memory (Philo of Alexandria. That God does not know change. 43). J. von Arnim places this fragment from Philo in his collection of Stoic fragments (SVF. II 458), however, Philo’s language already represents the assimilation of Stoic ideas, so in this case it is possible that the language of St. Basil, not so much the Stoics themselves, as Philo or some other author. Note that both the Stoics and Philo spoke about the imprint on the soul from the perception of sensory objects. “So, among the names with the help of which they speak about God, some show what is inherent in God, while others, on the contrary, do not exist. For in these two [ways] a certain imprint (χαρακτ ή ρ) of God is born in us - by the denial of the absurd and the confession of the existing” (Against Eunomius. I 10 // PG. 29b. Col. 533c). On the influence of the discussed discourse of St. Basil on the understanding of the concept of χαρακτ ή ρ in line with the polemics around icon veneration and iconoclasm, see: Baranov V. A. On the issue of exegesis of the patristic text on triadological issues in iconoclastic disputes // “St. Trinity" St. Andrei Rublev in the light of Orthodox apophatism. November 18, 2005; Iconoclasm: yesterday and today. September 22, 2006 Conference proceedings. St. Petersburg, 2007, pp. 127–143. On the concept of χαρακτ ή ρ in Byzantine literature in the sense of indicating a person’s individual style, see: Averintsev S.S. The problem of individual style in ancient and Byzantine rhetorical theory // Literature and art in the cultural system. M., 1988. pp. 23–30. See also: Mikhailov A. From the history of character // Man and culture. Individuality in the history of culture. M., 1990. pp. 43–72. Taking this aspect into account, D. Robertson's hypothesis, according to which in this case there is an influence on St., should be considered unlikely. Basil's "Syntax" by Apollonius Discolus, where the concept of χαρακτ ή ρ is put in correspondence with the name of the subject of the statement, declined by case to avoid homonymy, see: Robertson. A Patristic Theory. P. 19. “The search for the essence of all existing natures: both those that are accessible to us in speculation, and those that are revealed to us in sensation, is a long conversation and takes us far beyond the limits of our interpretation... We should give ourselves the same advice when it comes to the earth: not to inquire in vain what the essence is (τὴν οὐσ ί αν) it, and do not waste time trying to find, with the help of reasoning, the very subject (τὸ ὑποκε ί μενον) of it, and do not strive to find some nature devoid of qualities, some qualityless (ἄποιον) in the proper sense of this name, but it is good to understand that everything the [qualities] observed in it constitute the logos of its being (τὸν τοῦ ε ἶ ναι λ ό γον), being present in it as that which replenishes (συμπληρωτικά) with itself its essence. For, trying by the effort of reason to take away from it all the qualities present in it, you will ultimately come to nothing (οὐδέν). After all, if you put aside its inherent blackness, coldness, heaviness, density, its taste and all the other qualities that we observe in it, then there will be nothing left (οὐδέν) that would serve as their subject" (Conversations on the Six Days. 1. 8 // PG.29b. Col. 20–21, trans. O. Nesterova with changes: Basil the Great, St. Homilies on the Sixth Day // Symbol. No. 36. 1996. P. 201). The opinion of I. Zachhuber (Zachhuber J. Stoic Substance, Non-Existen Matter? Some Passages in Basil of Caesarea Reconsidered // StPatr. Vol. 41. 2006. P. 425–431), according to which St. In the above fragment, Vasily does not mean that after the removal of all qualities from the material essence of the earth, “nothing” remains, but that searching for the essence of the earth is an insignificant task, and, of course, should be considered untenable. "We hear others say: “If God is not material, then where does matter come from? How is the quantitative from the non-quantitative, the visible from the invisible, from the one without size and definite outline, necessarily determined by volume and size?” ... The Almighty, by his wise and powerful will to perfect beings, laid the foundation in the aggregate for everything from which matter is composed: lightness, heaviness, density, porosity, softness, hardness, moisture, dryness, coldness, warmth, color, image, outline, extension. All these properties in themselves are concepts and mere mental representations. For none of them in itself is a substance, but converging (συνδραμόντα) with each other, they become substance” (Gregory of Nyssa, St. On the Sixth Day / PG. 44. Col. 69b-c; trans. according to: TSO. T. 37. Book 1, with changes). As can be seen from this fragment, the goal of St. Gregory - to clarify how the immaterial God can be the cause of the material world. It's him. About the soul and resurrection // PG. 46. ​​Col. 124b-d. “For example, when the object of contemplation is an animal, a tree or something else that has a material composition, then by mental discrimination we understand many things around the subject, and all these many things, contemplated together, have their own logos separately and unmixed... And then, since the intelligent is color, the intelligent is elasticity, quantity and all other such features, and moreover, with the removal of each of them from the subject, the entire logos of the body will disappear together, we must to conclude: that in the absence of which we find the cause of the disappearance of a body, collected together, forms material nature. After all, just as there is no body that does not have color, appearance, elasticity, volume, heaviness and all other features, each of which is not a body, but in itself turns out to be something different from the body, so vice versa - through the convergence of the named, a bodily hypostasis is produced" (About the structure of man. 24 // PG. 44.Col. 212d-213b; trans. V. M. Lurie with changes: Gregory of Nyssa, St. On the structure of man / Transl., afterword and note by V. M. St. Petersburg, 2000. pp. 96–97). Armstrong A. H. The Theory of the Non-Existence of Matter in Plotinos and the Cappadocians //StPatr. Vol. 5. 1962. P. 427. Also A. Armstrong points out this in his comments to Plotinus’s “Ennea-dames”, see in the Russian edition. translation of the Enneads by T. Sidash, where the comments belong to A. Armstrong, although this is not specifically stated: Plotinus. Second Ennead. St. Petersburg, 2004. P. 213. “...It is not necessary for the first bodies to have matter, but each of them is a whole, and an extremely diverse whole, so that each has its own composition, thanks to the mixing of many eidos; therefore, [your] matter devoid of magnitude is an empty sound” (Plotinus. Enneads. II 4. 11. 10–13, trans. T. Sidash). O’Cleirigh P. M. Prime Matter in Origen’s World Picture // StPatr. Vol. 16. 1985. P. 262–263. “But some, desiring to explore this question more deeply, have ventured to say that bodily nature is nothing other than qualities. After all, if [, they say,] hardness and softness, warmth and cold, moisture and dryness are qualities, and after the removal of certain qualities of this kind, of course, no other basis remains, then, obviously, qualities make up everything. From here, those who claim this also tried to prove the following: since everyone who calls matter uncreated recognizes [its] qualities as created by God, then, therefore, in their opinion, matter cannot be considered uncreated, because qualities make up everything, and qualities unquestioningly recognize everything as created by God" (Origen. On the principles. 4. 7 (34) // Origène. Traité des principes. T. 3 / Introd., texte critique de la Philocalie et de la version de Rufin, trad. par H. Crouzel et M. Simonetti.P., 1980. P. 416–418 (SC; 268); Origen. Novosibirsk, 19932. P. 322. From this fragment it is clear that St. Vasily, borrowing relevant ideas from the text “On Principles,” polemicized with the idea of ​​​​the uncreatedness of matter. See: Sorabji R. Gregory of Nyssä The Origins of Idealism // Idem. Time, Creation and the Continuum.Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. L., 1988. P. 292–293. As an analogue of these ideas in Platonic philosophy, R. Sorabji points to Plotinus’s Ennead (VI 3.8) and Simplicius’ retelling of Porphyry’s ideas in the Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (230.34–231.7). In general, R. Sorabji correlates the corresponding teaching of the Cappadocian fathers with the idealistic philosophical position of J. Berkeley. Compare: “So, what is the essence of the earth, and what is the method of comprehension? What is perceived in the earth by sense is either color, or volume, or heaviness, or lightness, or coherence, or flowability, or persistence, or softness, or coldness, or warmth, or qualities in moisture, or differences in outline. But they [anomeans] cannot call any of this an essence, although they are ready to easily assert everything. They, not even knowing the nature of the land they trample, boast that they have penetrated into the very essence of the God of all” (Against Eunomius. I 12 // PG. 29b. Col. 540c, 541bc). As far as we can tell based on the TLG search results. See: Balas. The Unity of Human Nature. P. 278–279. Gregory of Nyssa. Refutation of Eunomius III 5. 22. 7–8 // Gregorii Nysseni opera / Ed. W. Jaeger. Vol. 2. Leiden, 1960. P. 168. Kalligas. Basil of Caesaria. P. 46–47; the same position is presented in the articles of L. Turcescu dedicated to the 38th letter of St. Gregory of Nyssa, see: Turcesku L. “Person” versus “Individual”, and Other Modern Misreadings of Gregory of Nyssa // Modern Theology. Vol. 18 (4). 2002. P. 530; Idem. The Concept of Divine Persons in Gregory of Nyssa’s to His Brothers Peter, on the Difference between Ousia and Hypostasis // GOTR. Vol. 42 (1–2). 1997, pp. 74–77. “...We conclude that Basil, in his attempt to refute the naturalistic theory of names of Eunomius, developed the ontological theory that we find in Porphyry (but which has roots in the skeptical Academy) into an extreme nominalist position regarding the semantics of proper names - a position that remained the most perfect and most seductive contribution to philosophical thought, at least until the time of William of Ockham" (Kalligas. Basil of Caesaria. P. 47). Apology. XII 1–4, 6–9 // Eunomius. The Extant Works... P. 46–48. We present a more extensive fragment from Eunomius than St. Basil (Against Eunomius. II 1 // PG. 29b. Col. 573), since his refutation is based on work with the more extensive text of Eunomius. Proverbs 8, 22; cf.: 1 Cor. 1, 24. ἀλλ ’ αὐτὴν ε ἶ ναι τὴν ὑπ ό στασιν , ἣ ν σημα ί νει το ὔ νομα ἐπαληθευούσης τ ῇ οὐσ ίᾳ τῆςπροσηγορ ί ας . J. Daniélou proceeded from a similar premise, proving the influence of the exegesis of “Cratylus” of the Iamblichian school on the theory of names of Eunomius in his famous article, see: Daniélou J. Eunome l’arien et l’exégèse néoplatonicienne du Cratyle // REG. Vol. 69. 1956. P. 412–432; in domestic literature, this position is presented in the publication: Mikhailov P.B. Language argument in the polemic of St. Basil against Eunomius // Alpha and Omega. 2005. No. 42 (1). P. 103. For criticism of this understanding, see J. Rist: Rist. Basil’s “Neoplatonism”: Its Background and Nature…P. 185–188, as well as in our article: Biryukov D.S. Ideas about the nature of language in Arian disputes and their historical and philosophical background: Eunomius and St. Basil of Caesarea // Bulletin of the Russian Christian Humanitarian Academy. Volume. 8 (2). 2007. pp. 92–110. Eunomius. Apology VII // Eunomius. The Extant Works... P. 40. On Iamblichus, see: Shaw G. Theurgy and the Soul. The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus. The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, pp. 111–112. “The nature of names is by no means reducible, as Aristotle believes, to [arbitrary] institutions (ν ό μοι). [Names] that have power in any particular language, when translated into another language, lose their natural power (δυναμένοις), being unable (δύνασθαι οὐκέτι) to perform what was possible when pronounced in the native language. The names “Sabaoth” or “Adonai”, being translated into Greek according to what appears to be their meaning (εἰς ἃ δοκεῖ σημα ί νειν), will not be able to fulfill anything” (Origen. Against Celsus. V 12.45 // PG. 11. Col. 1249c, 1253a). “But the listener, you say, pays attention to the signified (τὰ σημαιν ό μενα), and therefore his thought remains self-sufficient and unchanged, no matter what name is used does not retain the same power (τ ή ν γε δύναμιν)" (Iamblichus. On the Mysteries. VII 5. 257; our translation, taking into account the translations of L. Lukomsky and I. Melnikova).[apparently, these are the words of Porfiry. – D.B.] However, the situation is not as you assume. After all, if the names were by agreement (κατὰ συνθ ή κην), then it would be indifferent whether to accept one or the other. (τ ῇ φύσει) existing, then the gods will, of course, be more favorable to those of them that are more consistent with it. Therefore, it is obvious that the language of the sacred peoples should be preferred to the language of other people, they no longer retain the same power (τ ή ν γε δύναμιν)." (Iamblichus. On the mysteries. VII 5. 257; our translation, taking into account the translations of L. Lukomsky and I. Melnikova). Regarding ancient ideas about the wise founder of names, see: Verlinsky. Ancient theories. pp. 86–91. Kopecek. A History of Neo-Arianism... Vol. 2. P. 321, 329–332. Albin (Alkina). Textbook of Platonic philosophy. VI 10–11 (Russian translation, see: Plato. Collected Works... T. 4. P. 632–633). “So, what is in the sounds (τῇ φωνῇ) are signs of ideas (παθημάτων) in the soul... However, the ideas in the soul, the immediate signs of which are what is in the sounds, are the same for everyone. In the same way, the same objects (πράγματα), the similarities of which are representations” (Aristotle. On interpretation. I 3; trans. E. Radlov with changes). See: Sextus Empiricus. Against scientists. VIII 11–12. Sextus here mentions, but does not specifically highlight, the third member of the indicated sequence, i.e. thought. Specifically about the “signified”, see: “The signified is that [semantic] objectivity revealed in sound (φων ή), which we perceive as established in our thought (διανο ίᾳ) and which barbarians do not perceive, although they hear the word” (Ibid. (SVF. II 166); trans. A. Stolyarov with changes). Those. “signified” differs from thought in that the latter is not a linguistic reality, while the former refers to the reality of language (cf.: “... which barbarians do not perceive, although they hear the word”). On the four-part linguistic system of the Stoics, see: Perelmuter I. A. Philosophical schools of the Hellenistic era // History of linguistic teachings. Ancient World. L., 1980. pp. 188–190. Aristotle's teaching assumed isomorphism not between word and thought, but between thing and thought. See: Lloyd. Grammar and Metaphysics. P. 65. See Long-Sadley's comments on a fragment from Diogenes Laertius. VII 83 (LS 31C): Long, Sedley. The Hellenistic philosophers. Vol. 2. P. 187–188, as well as the article: Long A. A. Stoic linguistics, Plato’s Cratylus, and Augustine’s De dialectica // Language and Learning. Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age / Ed. D. Frede, B. Inwood. Toronto, 2005, pp. 36–55. That Eunomius understood language as a four-part structure including the concept of “meaning” follows, in particular, from the following fragment of the Apology: “We should not try to establish a complete correspondence between names (τοῖς ὀν ό μασι) and meanings (τὰςσημασ ί ας), nor try to change one [i.e. meaning] depending on another [i.e. name], but one should pay attention to the concepts (ἐννο ί αις) of the subjects and bring the naming (τὰς προσηγορ ί ας) into correspondence [with them], since the nature of things in no way follows sounds. But it is necessary that the meanings of names adapt to things according to their rank” (Apology. XVIII 4–9 // Eunomius. The Extant Works… P. 54–56). The importance of the doctrine of “meaning” for Eunomius is also evidenced by a passage from “Against Eunomius” by St. Gregory of Nyssa, dedicated to the refutation of Eunomius’s refutation (in the “Apology on the Apology”) of the fragment of St. discussed by us in the article. Vasily: “I have no desire to insert into my works the disgusting chatter of this rhetorician and, among my words, to expose his ignorance and senselessness to shame. He sets out some kind of praise for the denoting words that reveal the subject (λ ό γων τῶν σημαντικῶν τὸ ὑποκε ί μενον φανερούντων), and with his usual way of expression, he composes and glues together the rags of words rejected even in the squares...” (III 5. 23. 4–24. 4 // Gregorii Nysseni opera... P. 168. Quoted from the publication: St. Gregory of Nyssa Refutation of Eunomius. T. 2. Krasnodar, 2003. [Rep. from the ed. 1864 g.] P. 77, as amended). The fact that Eunomius did not identify the lexical with the ontological is evident, in particular, from his words: “God, whether we are silent or speak, both after the origin of beings and before, was and is unborn” (Apology. VIII. 5 // Eunomius. The Extant Works... P. 42). On “essence”, understood as a single entity, see above: Philo of Alexandria. About the eternity of the world. 48–49 (SVF. II 397). For the fact that the individual essence is part of the essence-prime matter, see SVF. I 87 SVF. II 316: ““Essence” and “substance” have a double meaning - in relation to the whole and in relation to the parts. The essence, or substance of the whole, does not increase or decrease, but in parts it increases and decreases” (Fragments of the Early Stoics... Vol. I. P. 46). One might pay attention to the rather strange phrase of St. Basil in the passage under discussion: “The names (προσηγορ ί αι) of Peter and Paul and of all people in general are different...” This phrase seems strange in the context of the fact that there are many more people than their names, so the difficulties caused by homonymy (i.e., in this case, the same names of people) already in the time of Democritus worried the minds of philosophers (see: Verlinsky. Ancient theories. pp. 106–117), and later they were also studied in ancient grammar textbooks and St. Vasily could not help but know about this. Taking into account the following phrase: “...Names (αἱ προσηγορ ί αι) do not mean essences, but properties that characterize everyone,” one could decide that St. Vasily means that for all people the set of common properties is different, which is indicated through the concept of προσηγορ ί α, but not the names themselves (ὄνομα). However, if you trace Vasily’s word usage throughout the fragment, it becomes clear that he still uses ὄνομα and προσηγορ ί α synonymously. The fact that St. Basil represents the human individual, in particular, through general properties, points out the obvious incorrectness of the statements of H. Yannaras, who, referring to the Cappadocian fathers, develops an understanding of “personality” (which he correlates with “hypostasis”) as something that is opposed to the community, universality characteristic of the “essence”. Accordingly, “personality”, or “face”, according to Yannaras, is something that cannot be described through any general qualities inherent in it (Yannaras H. Favorites: Personality and Eros. M., 2005. pp. 101–102). It is curious that this specificity of the approach of St. Basil was taken up by the iconoclastic patriarch John the Grammaticus (9th century), who challenged the epistemological position of the icon venerators, following the contextual identification of the denotation of the name. As V. Baranov points out, in one of the most important surviving fragments of Patr. John, he relies on the passage discussed in this article from St. Vasily (Baranov. On the question of exegesis of the patristic text... P. 131). Let us quote this fragment: “It is impossible to characterize a specific person except by a concept derived from verbal definitions through which each of the existing things is known in a certain way. Visual cognition in no way conveys the personal adjunct characteristics of a particular being, by which it is separated from beings of the same species and, on the other hand, by which it is associated with [beings of other species], since it is impossible to deduce someone’s genus, or to determine where he comes from, or what craft he practices, what company he keeps, and other types of his behavior worthy of praise or blame, in any other way than through concepts derived from words, whereas through images it is truly impossible to know anything.” (translated by V. Baranov, ed.: Gouillard J. Fragments inédits d’un antirrétique de Jean le Grammarien // REB. Vol. 24. 1966. R. 173–174). Generally speaking, the concept of convergence of qualities, as far as one can judge, in Byzantium was most often used within the framework of a philosophical understanding that was quite common in antiquity, which did not take into account the contextual factor when identifying a human individual. See, for example, a fragment from Ps.-Zonara: “An essential property (Ἐνούσιον) is not only perceived. In itself - a certain set of characteristics (τὸ τῶν ἰδιωμάτων ἄθροισμα), thanks to which one can recognize another, but also what actually has in common for a given entity; a special essential property (ἐνούσιον ἴδιον) means that which actually exists and carries within itself the genuine features (χαρακτῆρας) of all the characteristics of a person” (Ps.-Zonara. Lexicon. 737. 19–25; trans. Yu. A. Shichalina). See also a selection of fragments from Byzantine authors illustrating the concept of “unity” (ἕ νωσις): Shichalin Yu. A. ἕ νωσις in Greek theology and among the Neoplatonists // XVI Annual Theological Conference of PSTGU. T. 1. M., 2006. P. 47–55; in these passages the concept of a convergence of qualities is applied to both human individuals and inanimate objects. Letter. 38. 4, 6–7 // PG. 32. Col. 329c, 336c-337a, 337d-340a (translated by A.V. Ivanchenko, A.V. Mikhailovsky with changes: St. Basil the Great Archbishop of Caesarea of Cappadocia letter (38) to Gregory brother about the distinction between essence and hypostasis // Historical and Philosophical Yearbook (1995). M., 1996. pp. 274, 275, 277). From Greek περιχώρησις – interpenetration. This approach leaves no room for understanding the 38th letter as a manifesto of Aristotelianism among the Cappadocian fathers, which is often found in scientific literature. Indeed, the Aristotelian theme is outlined in this letter, but it is creatively processed and is not the main one in it. I express my gratitude to A. G. Dunaev, A. M. Shufrin and especially S. V. Mesyats, whose productive criticism helped me rethink some of the provisions of this article in the process of finalizing it.