Часть вторая, догматическая

The dogmatic and polemical works of Maximus the Confessor, dedicated to the disclosure of the dogmatic teaching about two wills in Christ, are divided into many letters and treatises intended for various individuals. Due to the latter circumstance, the works of St. Maxims in the form in which they exist, and in their totality, do not represent an ordered, integral work. From the brief outline we presented at the end of the first part of our study of the main content of the dogmatic and polemical works of St. father, it is clear that the letters and treatises addressed to various individuals do not represent, in relation to each other, any continuation, no further development and logical consistency, no generalizations and conclusions or anything like that; in a word, from the outside they do not represent an integral systematic work. However, they are more than just rich dogmatic material, as some view the dogmatic-polemical works of St. Maxima 182. Connected by the unity of a common subject and purpose, regarding individual provisions in the majority (especially the debate with Pyrrhus and the dogmatic message “about the two wills of Christ”), they represent obvious traces of an internal connection, due to which their content can be viewed as individual moments of that holistic view that St. should have had. Maxim on the Christological teaching revealed in his works. To connect these individual points into one whole, that is, through a general overview of all the dogmatic and polemical works of St. father to give a holistic idea of ​​Maximus’s Christological view or - what is the same thing - to present a systematic outline of Maximus’s Christological view of the teaching revealed in his works is the task of the present, second, part of our study. The path or direction that we must follow in carrying out this difficult task is outlined in part by Maximus himself: the analogy of the “hot sword”, which he uses on a wide scale to approach the human mind’s understanding of the mysterious and unprecedented appearance of God the Word in the flesh, greatly facilitates the work of reproducing the image of a holistic idea of ​​​​the Christological view of Maximus the Confessor. With all this, it is possible that a strict systematization of the teachings of St. The maxim about two wills in Christ is truly a difficult matter. A subject full of theological subtleties, what is the doctrine of two wills in Christ, is clothed in St. father in the form of abstract philosophical speculations, complicated by the introduction of a moral or psychological element into them. The serious difficulty of the work is essentially increased due to the fact that the dogmatic and polemical works of Maximus have so far, as far as we know, not been subjected to more or less thorough (not to say special) study by learned theologians. The fame and significance of this remarkable scholarly polemicist in his time died with him. Everything that has been done so far in terms of studying the works we are considering is limited to small treatises of German, Catholic and Protestant theologians: Braun, Schwane, Dorner, Baur, Thomasius and some others, who in their more or less special studies devote only a few pages to discussions regarding the teachings of Maximus. Moreover, they all pay the main attention to the dispute between Maximus and Pyrrhus, as the main point of the Monothelitian disputes, indicating the main features of its content and in places inserting brief critical remarks regarding certain provisions of St. Maxim and his opponent. Brown's small work, valuable in itself, almost does not touch upon Maxim's teachings at all. And in fact, for us it is of interest only because, correctly understanding the tasks of the Monothelitian movement and partly the essence of Diophelitism, it can serve as a true indicator for us of what direction we should follow when explaining the doctrine, not fully and clearly expressed in Maximus, about the relationship of the two perfect natures of Christ to the one hypostasis of the Word. In this regard, Brown provides us with an important and irreplaceable service. Among the other theologians mentioned above, the first place undoubtedly belongs to the Catholic theologian Shvane. His reasoning is distinguished by a sobriety of view that does credit to a venerable theologian, but it lacks what we call the depth of analytical thought. Citing the well-known position of diophelitism or monothelitism, Schwane’s explanation of it does not go further than what is clearly expressed in it, which explains, among other things, the fact that when explaining the teachings of Maximus, he limits himself to citing and selecting the saint’s own expressions. father. Another prominent advantage of Schwane’s reasoning is that there are traces of some systematization of Maximus’s teachings. He consistently and separately treats: under headings 1 and 2 - about the positive evidence given by Maxim to justify diophelitism; 3 – about the integrity of both natures of Christ, as “the most important rational basis for diophelitism”; 4 – about the mode of operation of Christ’s human nature; 5 – about the free will inherent in the humanity of Christ and the absence in him of “θέλημα γηωμικόν”; 6 – about a well-known foundation borrowed from the mystery of the Trinity; 7 – about the difference between the object of the will and the ability of the will (natural will); and 8 – about the fallacy of knowing the essence of things through opposition 183 . As a Catholic, he remains faithful to Maximus in the latter’s view of Honorius 184: in this respect he is impartial, although not inconsistent. With a high view of the personality of Maximus as a polemicist theologian, the judgments of the Protestant theologian Dorner are mostly biased and essentially erroneous. Giving due credit to the significance of Maximus' polemical activity and highly appreciating his merits as a dogmatist theologian, 185 Dorner, as a true Protestant, completely mistakenly considers Maximus an exponent, even the first herald of the principles of “moral” Christology, 186 which, in his opinion, borders on Nestorianism. The views of another Protestant theologian Baur are no less erroneous, but even more one-sided. This latter does not attach any importance at all to diophelitism as a historical phenomenon, seeing in it a step back and putting it on the same level as monothelitism 187. Baur's personal view of diophelitism as an orthodox teaching is the same as Dorner's view 188 . Tomasius 189 holds the same view of diophelitism. It is worthy of attention that all three - Dorner, Baur and Thomasius (especially the first and last) - look at Maxim as an exponent of that true diophelitism, which, according to their Protestant views 190, he should actually be. In the phenomenon of church diophelitism (i.e., as it was determined at the VI Ecumenical Council), which they distinguished from the view of St. Maxim, they see a deviation from the true diophelitism of Maxim 191 or an error that is more or less close to monothelitism. That's almost all that can be found in the foreign literature of our subject. And in Russian (printed) theological literature you will not find a word about the study of the subject that interests us; the very works of Maximus the Confessor have not yet been translated into Russian. Fully aware of the difficulty of completing the task, it would be safer to call the second part of our study an attempt to systematize the teachings of Maximus under consideration. Considering the dogmatic and polemical works of Maxim, it is easy to notice that the dogmatic teaching about two wills in Christ is revealed everywhere by Maxim from two sides: on the positive side (the positive teaching of the Orthodox Church) and on the negative side (by refuting and rejecting monothelitism). Moreover, these two sides of the disclosure of the said teaching are so tightly intertwined that an attempt at a completely separate presentation in this sense, no matter what motivates it, would be completely vain and inappropriate. Nevertheless, in terms of separateness of presentation, where and to what extent, of course, it is possible, we offer an outline of Maximus’s Christological view, first from the positive side. Due to the close connection of diopheliteism (as we will call, for brevity, the Orthodox doctrine of two wills in Christ) with the definition of faith of the Council of Chalcedon, the starting point in resolving the question directly posed at the very beginning of the monothelitism movement, for Maxim, as for any other defender of the Orthodox teaching, was that side of the conciliar definition of faith, according to which Christ is recognized as having two perfect natures, Divine and human. The reason for this particular formulation of the matter, and not for any other way, lies in the nature or character of the subject about which the question was raised. “There are two natures in Christ” (δύο φύσεις) - this is a position that some accepted as unconditionally true, others, on the contrary, more or less decisively rejected. The dissimilarity of such an attitude depended solely on the dissimilarity in the definition of the concepts “φύσις” and “ύπόστασις”. In defining the concepts “φύσις” and “ύπόστασις,” Maximus’s Christology stands on the point of view according to which φύσις and ούσία (essence) are one and the same 192. What differs from them is ύπόστασις, identical with πρόσωπον 193, but not the same with τό άτομον (individuum), which has a slightly different meaning than ύπόστασις 194. This is not the use of these concepts among the Monophysites, and Monothelites, and partly among the Nestorians. Monophysites, and after them the Monothelites, do not distinguish between the concept “φύσις” and the concepts “ύπόστασις” and “τό άτομον” [indivisible]: all three concepts are used by them as identical. In their view of the meaning of the concept “ούσία,” the two large parties of Monophysites, the Severians and the Julianists, disagree with each other. The Severians distinguished it from the concepts of “hypostasis”, “nature” and “individual” 195. Teaching about one nature (φύσις) of Christ, they distinguished in Him two essences (ούσίαι). And the Julianists identified all four concepts: according to their teaching, in Christ there is not only one nature (μία φύσις), but also one essence (μία ούσία) 196. In the language of the Nestorians, the concepts “φύσις” and “ύπόστασις” also come down to the same thing: in Christ there are two natures, therefore (they concluded) – two and persons (ύποστάσεις). But along with the recognition of two persons, they secretly taught about “έν πρόσωπον” 197, referring to the image of the expression of Cyril of Alexandria, who (in the second letter to Success), by the way, has the following expression: “After receiving flesh, rationally animate, ούκ εις δύο μερισθήσεται δια τούτο πρόσωπα και υιούς, άλλα μεμένηκεν εις, πλην ούκ άσαρκος "[would not be divided because of this into two persons and into two sons, but remained one, perhaps not incorporeal] 198. Maxim connects the following meaning with the concepts “φύσις” and “ύπόστασις”. Nature (φύσις) or essence (ούσία) conceivable in abstracto is something common (κοινόν) – “τό είδος [species, genus], applied to many, numerically different, through which something becomes what it is” (έν τω όποιον τί έστι) 199. Face (ύπόστασις), in contrast to nature, is something special (ίδιον) 200. For example, the concept of “man” is a designation of nature common to all people, and the name of each individual person (Peter, Paul, etc.) n.) is the designation of a person or individual, distinguished from all other people by individual characteristics (ιδίοις προσωπικοίς ίδιώμασι) 201. As something common, like τό είδος, nature is simply a predicate of everything that has. the being that exists , και τον τού καθ᾿ εαυτό είναι) [nature has a general logos of being, and hypostasis also has a logos of being in itself (i.e., independent, individual)] 202, and in itself does not have independent real existence. Every nature receives independence and reality of being in the individual 203, and human nature - in a hypostasis or in a person, the distinctive feature of which is independent, independent being (τό καθ᾿ εαυτό είναι) 204. Hence nature is called ένυπόστατος - existing in hypostasis, since in reality, in concreto, nature is never ανυπόστατος, i.e. impersonal 205. In fact, we do not know of a single example where, for example, human individual nature does not actually belong to any person: individual impersonal nature does not exist at all. Consequently, since the general nature is thought of in reality, in concreto, it is thought of as necessarily belonging to one specific person, that is, every nature in reality is certainly individual 206. And since every general nature acquires the reality of being or actual existence precisely through belonging to a specific individual, the very existence of a specific nature has a necessary connection with the attribute of individuality: the latter constitutes an indispensable condition for the former. Consequently, the existence of a general rational nature (ούσία έμψυχος Λογική [an animate, rational entity] or νοερά [smart]), i.e., the nature of rational beings, is associated with belonging to a specific individual, bearing the special name of a person ( ύπόστασις), which (the name) has its own deep meaning. Thus, the concepts “individuum” and “ύπόστασις” have a connection with each other and are to some extent unambiguous. Their distinctive feature is one thing (since τό ύφιστάμενον, applied to the individual, is equal to τό καθ᾿ εαυτό είναι, applied to the person 207), and this one is a separate, independent existence, being through itself (as opposed to the general nature); hence, individuality is a certain sign of personality. This is where the basis for identifying these two concepts among Monophysites and Monothelites is hidden. Under the condition of individualization of general nature, the latter acquires a certain real content: it is the totality of all properties, essential and accidental ( επιστήμη εν ψυχή [knowledge in the soul] and χρώμα έν σώματι [color in the body]), which in themselves do not constitute the essence and do not exist separately from it, but are always thought of as existing in the essence and inseparable from it 208, which is why their entire set is called “ τό ένούσιον " [essential] 209 or " τό φυσικον " [natural] 210. Essential properties have a special name: " ιδιότητες φύσεως " 211, “properties of individual nature” is a name indicating precisely that nature receives true perfect being (reality of content) in one or another individual, which is why ιδιότητες φύσεως are called “γνωρίσματα της τεΛειότητος "[signs of perfection] 212, "signs, signs of the perfection of nature" or simply "perfections of nature." Among the perfections of nature are, by the way, those that serve as indicators of the relative perfection of different (by kind) natures. Besides "της θείας ζωής" [divine life], Maximus distinguishes three 213 kinds of essences (ούσία) or three kinds of life (ειζωής): "ούσια αυξητική" [growing life] or » φυτική ζωή « [vegetative life] (plant), » ουσία έμψυχος αύσθητική « [animate sensory essence] or » αύσθητική ζωή « [sensual life] (every animal) and "ούσία έμψυχος αύσθητική και Λογική " [sensual and rational essence] or "νοερά ζωή " [intelligent life] 214 (man). Each kind of life is characterized by a certain characteristic (ίδιον), indicating the degree of its relative perfection. A rationally animated being, man belongs to the highest degree of perfection. By his very nature he has freedom (ή αύτεξούσιος κίνησις [autocratic movement]) or will. θέΛησις), since according to the use of the fathers, the concepts of “will” and “freedom” are in some sense identical 215. In addition to the properties common to all individuals of a certain nature, each individual has certain individual characteristics (ιδίοις προσωπικοίς ίδιώμασι), distinguishing him from all others who are ομοούσιοι [consubstantial] with him 216. Such are, for example, in God the ungeneracy of the Father, the eternal birth of the Son from God the Father, and the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father 217. All φυσικόν [natural], all ιδιότητες φύσεως [features of nature] are equally essential for the concept of animate nature (individual, of course), as essential as the sign of being 218, and in fact inseparable from nature. But of all the essential definitions for the concept of rationally animated nature, the most essential, the most characteristic 219 is “αύτεξουσιότης”, inherent in the soul and as “γνώρισμα” of relative perfection, indicating the special significance of the soul for human life 220. In looking at the relationship between ύπόστασις and φύσις, Maxim adheres to the dominant view on this subject in Christian patristic literature of the 3rd and 4th centuries. This relationship is presented here as follows. Since in reality nature belongs to one or another specific person, the relationship between ύπόστασις and φύσις is presented as the relation of the owner, possessor to what constitutes the object of his property, the object of possession, the instrument of his action: the person is the bearer, owner, master of nature; nature is an instrument of action that is his property. This kind of relationship between ύπόστασις and φύσις is completely analogous to the relationship that exists between soul and body 221. The comparison of these two relations, beloved by the Fathers of the Church, has its deep basis in the unchanging status quo of the existence of individual human nature, according to which the soul appears to be the seat of personality in man and the principle of rest and movement 222. By virtue of the dominant relation of the person to nature, the person is attributed, as his property, not only the existence of nature, but also all the various properties and actions of the intellectual nature inherent in the soul and arising from it, 223 and the person is interpreted on this basis as the subject of everything that is characteristic of the intellectual nature. A person acquires existence because nature receives the reality of existence under the condition of belonging to a specific person. All the properties of nature are attributed to the face, because nature also acquires reality in the face. The person finally assimilates the actions and deeds of nature on the basis that only concrete nature can act, and concrete nature exists only in the face. Thus, in reality, the concepts of “φύσις” (intellectual nature, and, therefore, at the same time individual) and “ύπόστασις” (person) come down to almost the same thing. Coming from here, it was easy to come to a complete identification of these two concepts, which is what the Monophysites and Monothelites did. Intellectual nature is certainly ένυπόστατος, therefore (the Monothelites concluded) φύσις is certainly also ύπόστασις. The fundamental error of monothelitism was precisely the false concept of ύπότασις. It is known that the impossibility of assumption. in Christ there are two wills, the Monothelites argued mainly by the fact that together with the concept of will (θέλημα) the concept of “willing” (ό θέλων [willing] πρόσωπον ύπόστασις) is introduced, and that the assumption of the coexistence of two wills in one person The words are tantamount to dividing Christ into two persons, which is impious. This is how Sergius reasoned in a letter to Honorius, Pyrrhus in a conversation with Maximus, Paul in a letter to Pope Theodore; all the Monothelites reasoned this way, following the suggestions and way of thinking of their leaders. The main misconception of monothelitism is the illegal identification of the concept of personality, subject with the concept of will, since it embraces all the properties of intellectual nature. Absolutely rightly, Maxim argues, that in reality nature (φύσις) is never impersonal (ανυπόστατος). But “the lack of hypostasis (τό μή άνυπόστατον), according to the tradition of the saints, makes nature not a hypostasis, but only existing in hypostasis (ένυπόστατον)”, i.e., it provides it only with what is in hypostasis or in the person of nature, as form (είδος), receives true, real existence, ceasing to be something random, existing only in the mind. “In the same way, the non-deprivation of essence (τό μή άνούσιον) does not make hypostasis an essence, giving it only existence or being in essence inseparable from nature.” So in reality there is “not a naked ιδίωμα (ύπόστασις)”, not an abstract concept of the totality of all individual characteristics, but a ιδίωμα, clothed with that in which it exists, that is, an active being 224. Thus, on the basis that nature in reality always exists in the form of a person, it is unlawful to “reduce existing in hypostasis in hypostasis” and identify nature with hypostasis. This is equally unlawful, as if someone, from the fact that the body is not independent of form or color, began to conclude that form or color is the body, and is not seen only in the body 225. If the conclusion drawn by the Monothelites from the indicated fair premise were legal, then the opposite position would also be legal: hypostasis is nature, since “hypostasis is never devoid of essence” (i.e., a person is in reality inseparable from nature). Meanwhile, the falsity of this reverse conclusion will not be disputed by the Monothelites themselves: ύπόστασις is not the same as φύσις, therefore, φύσις is not identical with ύπόστασις. The dogma of the Trinity excludes any possibility of identifying the concepts “ύπόστασις” and “φύσις” 226. Maxim’s just cited reasoning boils down, in essence, to the affirmation of the truth that although in reality nature and person are inseparable from each other, the inseparability of existence does not give the right to identify them. Despite all the similarity of content conceivable in the concept of a concrete intellectual nature and in the concept of a person as an individual of spiritual nature, there is a real difference between them that can be experienced. To the concept of a person as a bearer of spiritual nature, we always come up with something that actually distinguishes ύπόστασις from φύσις and makes the intellectual nature personal; this is the concept of personality. Personality is nothing more than a certain way of existence of intellectual nature in a person (τρόπος της ύπάρξεως), a certain way of life of a spiritual and moral being (τρόπος ζωής), placing nature in a certain indicated relationship to a person 227. As a “modus existendi”, the personality does not add to the whole of the intellectual nature existing in the person anything that could be considered as an essentiality, a reality different from the content of nature. The application of the concepts “φύσις” and “ύπόστασις” to the dogma of incarnation provides a complete opportunity to experimentally verify the validity of the expressed understanding of personality. According to the teaching of the Fathers of the Church, the human nature of Christ was not devoid of anything that constitutes the essential content of the intellectual nature, while the latter did not have in Him its own, corresponding personality 228. After everything that has been said about the meaning of the concepts “φύσις” and “ύπόστασις,” it becomes clear why for Maximus, as for any other defender of Orthodox teaching, the starting point (termino a quo) in resolving a controversial issue was the Chalcedonian definition of the duality of natures, and why this point of view was unsuitable for the other disputing party, proceeding from the doctrine of the single hypostasis of the Word, a doctrine constituting the other side of the same definition of faith. In Maximus’s teaching about the duality of the natures of Christ, attention is drawn to the special way of expressions used by him, as well as the fact that wherever we talk about the natural duality of Christ, Maximus’s mental gaze turns to the teachings of St. Kirill and to the teachings of the North. The special significance and connection of these two phenomena will become completely clear to us if we turn to the teaching of the Monophysites in general and in particular to the teaching of the North. Well aware of the well-known requirement of the idea of ​​incarnation, by virtue of which the reconciliation of man with God and God with man could only be accomplished through such an intermediary (μεσίτης) as the God-man 229, and having behind them the sad phenomenon of docetism, the Monophysites, and after them the Monothelites, could not, of course, completely deny the duality of the natures of Christ and, in principle, recognized it. But the recognition of two different, perfect natures seemed to them (from their point of view on φύσις and ύπόστασις - completely consistently) nothing more than a return to Nestorianism. The Monophysites, therefore, were faced with the task of reconciling natural duality with the unity of the hypostasis of the Word in Christ. The more moderate ones, such as the North, indicate this path of reconciliation. Following the teaching of Cyril of Alexandria, Severus taught that Christ consists of “two natures” (έκ δύο φύσεων) 230, which, when united, did not suffer any change. Upon joining, they lost their integrity and formed one complex nature, called “god-married” after the initiative of Dionysius the Areopagite 231. In the hypostasis of Christ it is no longer possible to distinguish between two natures: the difference between them exists only in mental representation, 232 although it is possible to distinguish between the properties of one and the other nature. “To say that there are two natures in Christ (δύο φύσεις επί Χριστού) is worthy of all condemnation, even if by many St. it was said by the fathers." “And let no one say that the expression “two natures” was used by some of the fathers, because they used it innocently; when in the time of St. Cyril, the plague of Nestorius’s innovations began to devastate the churches, this expression was not approved by the majority. You cannot refer to passages from the fathers who harmlessly used this expression, even if these were passages from Cyril himself” 233. But the difference in natural qualities (διαφορά των φυσικών ποιοτήτων) or essences 234 is only visible or, as Maximus calls it, bare (ψιλή), since the essential properties of united natures always reside in Christ as potential forces and in reality is never discovered 235 ; so that in Severus there also emerged a certain combination or fusion of essences (συνουσίωσις), similar to the combination of essences in Arius, Apollinaris and Eutychius 236. Some semblance of the complex nature of Christ is represented by the human individual nature, consisting of two essences of soul and body. Since the natures that were included as parts in the composition of the “one whole” nature of Christ, upon union, lost their natural character, then all the actions of Christ should be attributed not to one or another part, but to the whole - to one divine nature or to the complex hypostasis of Christ. Hence, all the actions of Christ, according to Severus, must be godly, such as, for example, the well-known “walking on the waters” 237. However, the North itself, trying to follow both in everything and in this the teaching of the great Alexandrian teacher, recognizes that not all of Christ’s actions are such that there are apparently human actions and there are apparently Divine actions. In perfect agreement with such a recognition of him are the following own words of his: “After all, in many (cases) the Word did not allow his own flesh to follow the laws of the flesh” 238. This means that in some cases the flesh, by the will of the Word, acted in accordance with the laws of the flesh. Therefore, some actions, as the “product” of human action, must be attributed directly to the humanity of Christ. Such, for example, according to Severus himself, are all the so-called voluntary and sinless passions (τά πάθη τά εκούσια και αδιάβλητα); such are the sufferings that “Emmanuel, as God, endured visibly (δοκήσει), and as a man, really (άΛηθεία)”; such is the fear of death, revealed during suffering 239. On the other hand, the North also distinguishes such actions that by nature are characteristic only of the Divinity of Christ: such, for example, miracles 240. In a word, the North is not unaware of the distinctive properties and actions of the Divine and human natures, which are included in the one complex nature of Christ, to which, and only to it, he would like to attribute all the properties and actions of Christ, like all Monophysites, illegally identifying it with the complex hypostasis of Christ 241. If we now ask directly the question of whether, according to the view of the North, the flesh of Christ suffered any change from the union with the Word, then it cannot be decisively answered either positively or negatively, although one can rather say “yes” than “no.” The main idea of ​​Severus, undoubtedly, was that the flesh of Christ, by union, was free from the laws of existence of human nature. This is quite obvious from the connection of the above words (“For in many...”, etc.) with what is said immediately before and after them. In the “Truth-loving Word” of Severus we read the following: “If the Word acts characteristic of the Word, and the body (τό σώμα) performs characteristic of the body, one shines with miracles, the other undergoes suffering 242, then there emerges some relative communion of natures, communion by voluntary disposition, as the insane Nestorius said. If, and this is really so, the Word changed (μετεστοιχείωσεν) the flesh (την σάρκα) into the image of His glory and action (ένέργειαν), then how can we say, according to Leo’s volume, that both natures are without damage (sine defectu) retains its peculiarity? It is clear that in many cases the Word did not allow his own flesh to follow the laws of the flesh. What does this have to do with the peculiarity (ϊδιον) of the body when (Christ) walks on water, or when after death from a blow from a spear a stream of hot blood and water pours out? But the North did not carry out his main view of the flesh of Christ to the end, to say the least: already in the above tirade there is a note of limitation (only εν ποΛΛοΐς [in many], and not in all), which in other places we have indicated above turns into a sharp dissonance with the main tone of the view. In fact, it turns out that the considered view of the North is not only inconsistent, but is not even devoid of internal division and contradiction. The inconsistency of the North in this case can quite plausibly be explained, firstly, by the obviousness of such facts of gospel history, which in no way could be subsumed under the indicated basic view, and, secondly, by the desire to follow in everything the teaching of the great Alexandrian teacher, who distinguished in the life of Christ the manifestations of the Divine properties from the manifestations of the properties of His humanity, although he pointed to cases of joint manifestations of the properties of both natures 243 . And the North’s self-contradiction can only be explained by the politics of relations. The fact is that in those cases where the North reveals its teaching in contrast to the Catholic teaching (as, for example, in a letter to John the leader and in the “Truth-loving Word”), he insists only on the need to confess one God-married (in the indicated sense) nature. And as soon as he begins to develop his teaching about μια θεανδρική φύσις, bearing in mind the teaching of the Julianists (in the books contra Iulianum or Julianists, cited above), he leaves the main point of view on the subject and, taking a completely different one, begins to treat at some length about the visible difference in the properties of one and the other nature Christ. Such duality is a rather ordinary phenomenon. Bearing in mind the stated teaching of Severus and in contrast to the latter’s “Exposition of the Faith,” in a letter to John the cubicular, Maximus gives an “Exposition of the Orthodox Faith.” Here, by the way, it is said that, following the teaching of the Fathers of the Church, we must confess in Christ two different natures in essence (δύο φύσεις άνομοίους κατά τήν ούσίαν [two natures, unequal in essence]), which are also united ( μετά τό ένωθήναι) invariably remain the same as they entered the union, or what they were, as the North puts it, at the union. That is, even by the personal union of the two natures of Christ, the latter remain in the hypostasis of the Word as essentially or qualitatively different natures, and do not merge (φύσεις άσυγχύτους [unmerged natures]) into one nature, quantitatively and qualitatively different from the hypostatically united natures 244. The union conceived in Christ is personal, hypostatic, and not substantial 245: not the Divine nature of Christ (it itself is conceived of existing in the hypostasis of the Word), but the hypostasis of God the Word enters into the closest union with the humanity of Christ, or the humanity of Christ is perceived in the hypostasis of God the Word. Consequently, in relation to Christ there can be no talk of “a natural indivisible formed through addition,” that is, of the merging of two natures into one as a kind of physical mixture 246. The assumption of the existence in Christ of one complex nature is tantamount, firstly, to the denial of the consubstantiality of Christ in Divinity with the Father and in humanity with the Mother, and in her person - with all humanity 247; secondly, the transformation of the Trinity into a quaternity, since Christ, as the bearer of a complex nature, is not consubstantial by union (as the Monophysites themselves, opponents of the Severian Julianists, noted) with God the Word, and as God will be the fourth person next to the three persons of the Holy Trinity 248. It is illegal, therefore, to call the two natures of Christ by the name of one complex nature, and to transfer the name from the hypostasis of the Word upon union to His nature. The expressions of the Fathers of the Church, which are usually referred to by all Monophysites in general and in particular the North, contain, in Maxim’s opinion, a completely different meaning than what the Monophysites and Monothelites give them. And, first of all, with regard to the famous saying of Dionysius the Areopagite, which, by the way, the North refers to, it should first be noted that in the works of Dionysius the Areopagite there is nowhere such a saying that would speak of a “god-male” nature 249. He has a similar saying, but it does not speak about godly nature, but about godly action. And the Monophysites had no right to apply what was said about action to nature, since, according to them, action corresponds not to nature, but to a person. By the way, regarding the actual saying of Dionysius the Areopagite, very popular among the Monothelites 250, it must be said that sometimes (for example, in the III letter of Severus to John the leader and in the VII anathematism of Cyrus) it is given with the addition of the word “μίαν” in front (i.e. it reads like this: “Christ showed us μίαν καινήν τινά τήν θεανδρικήν ένέργειαν "[one new certain godly action]), and sometimes (for example, in a conversation with Maximus at Pyrrhus) - without this addition. Maxim 251 refers to this saying several times and everywhere quotes it without the addition “μίαν”; he directly and positively says that the doctrine of the numerically one action of Christ is alien to Dionysius, 252 which makes it clear that the addition of “μίαν” is of later origin and is illegal. Turning to that place from the works known with the name of Dionysius the Areopagite, we, indeed, see that in the original there is no word “μίαν”. In the IV letter of Dionysius to a certain Caius, we read: “Christ performed Divine deeds (more precisely: those characteristic of God) not only as God, and human ones - not only as a man, but as God incarnate, He showed us a new, in a sense, God-manly action” 253. What is the meaning of the above saying, it will be more appropriate to say later; here it will be enough to note that if the Monophysites, contrary to their main view of φύσις, found it possible to transfer what was said about action to nature, then Maxim could quite legitimately and consistently assert that the descriptive expression “θεανδρική” indicates the dual nature of Christ 254 and precisely - the way of existence of two natures in Christ. Let us now turn to another saying, which was a common formula in the language of the Monophysites: to the famous saying of Athanasius the Great: “One nature of God the Word is incarnate” (μία φύσις Θεού Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη) 255. Link Monophysites to these words of the Holy Father, as if by them he confessed natural (in the Monophysite sense) unity, according to Maxim, is unfounded. “We recognize,” says Maxim, “the one nature of God the Word, incarnate. This descriptive expression regarding the union clearly indicates two natures; differences; and the term “incarnate,” according to Cyril’s own explanation, indicates the same essence as ours, that is, the nature of the flesh, which has a thinking and rational soul. So, the person who says “one nature of God the Word is incarnate” (thereby) indicates that God the Word abides together with animate flesh.” In short and simpler, the meaning of this expression, which is not entirely easy to understand, as explained by Maxim, is this: God the Word took human nature into hypostatic unity, that is, rationally animated flesh. The very form of the expression indicates the hypostatic unity, and the name (the nature of God) and the term “incarnate” indicate the two natures of Christ, hypostatically united in the Word. The relevance and legality of such an understanding on the part of Maximus will become completely clear to us if we remember that St. Athanasius expounded the doctrine “about the incarnation of the Word”, firstly, in contrast to the teaching of Arius about the merging of two essences in Christ and about the inequality (non-consubstantiality) of the Son with the Father (which is why Maxim equates the teaching of Arius with the teaching of the Monophysites in general), and secondly, in contrast to the teaching of the Apollinarians, these earlier Monophysites (which is why Maxim equates Apollinaris and Severus are on the same level) 257, who, rejecting the presence of a rational soul in Christ, taught about the merging or mixing of the two natures of Christ through the elevation of the flesh to the degree of nature, consubstantial with the nature of the Word, and through the absorption of the latter by the former 258. So, the expression of Athanasius the Great in no way speaks of a natural unity formed through the fusion of essences, that is, as the Monophysites understand it. It contains the idea of ​​a hypostatic union of natures, which can otherwise be called “natural” (φυσική έ᾿νωσις), but natural, according to the explanation of St. Cyril, “not in the sense of the destruction of the two natures of which Christ consists after the union” 259, but simply in the sense of the belonging of the two natures to one and the same person. The explanation that Maxim gives for this expression, which is common in the language of the Monophysites, in the eyes of these latter could have weight in view of the significant circumstance that Maxim bases the validity of his understanding on the authority of St. Kirill. In addition to what has been said regarding Maximus’s agreement with Cyril in the understanding of this passage, the same letter to John Cubularius (col. 477) cites the original words of Cyril from a letter to Eulogius, eloquently indicating the complete solidarity of Maximus with Cyril in this regard. These are the following words: “So, although Nestorius recognizes two natures, thereby pointing out the difference between the flesh and God the Word, he does not confess unity with us (τήν ένωσιν). But we, speaking about their union (literally: “uniting them” - “ένώσαντες ταύτα”), we confess one (ένα) Christ, one Son, one Lord and, finally, one incarnate nature of the Son” 260. Based on the connection in which the words “one incarnate nature of the Son” stand, Maximus tries to clarify, among other things (the main subject is the position on number), that under the unity, which is spoken of in the expression “one incarnate nature of God the Word,” St. Cyril understands hypostatic unity, which does not violate natural duality, or, more precisely, the duality of natures by union. Now, since the natures of which Christ is composed retain their natural character and essential difference also by connection, that is, they exist in the hypostasis of the Word unfused and unchangeable, then, along with the expression “έκ δύο φύσεων,” receives the same legal right to use and the expression “έν δύο φύσεσιν " Their meaning is the same: “Saying that Christ consists of two natures, we think of Him as consisting of Divinity and humanity, as a whole of parts (ώς έκ μερών öAov); in the same way, saying that after the union (He abides) in two natures, we believe that He abides in Divinity and humanity, as a whole in parts (ώς όλον έν μέρεσι). The parts of Christ are His Divinity and humanity, from which and in which He personally exists (ύφέστηκε)" 261. From here it is obvious that both expressions “from two natures” and “in two natures” indicate the relationship of the natures of Christ to the hypostasis of the Word: the hypostasis is the whole, and the natures are the parts that make it up. The difference between these two expressions is that the first (“of two”) indicates the union of natures 262, and the second (“in two”) indicates their non-fusion in connection. The non-fusion is also indicated by the expression “two natures”, which in its form has its own special meaning: the one that “one and the same is truly God and at the same time man” 263. The expressions “in two natures” and “two natures” take on a very definite meaning depending on how one understands the non-fusion of the two natures of Christ. And the Orthodox Church teaches about the non-confluence of the two natures of Christ, not in the sense of dividing the same thing into two persons, but only in the sense that the difference of natures always remains unchanged 264. The number “δύο” itself should not tempt, since “every number in general, according to Gregory the Theologian (in orat. IV De theologia), serves to designate quality (difference), and not division” 265, the validity of which was witnessed by the “Holy” Cyril himself 266. So, in Christ there are two natures, qualitatively different: Divine and human. The holy fathers and teachers of the Orthodox Church “all taught in agreement about both the other and the other, that is, the Divine and human, and the (numerically) dual nature of the One and the Same” 267 . “Christ is truly God and at the same time man.” It goes without saying that Christ is a perfect God and a perfect man, because the concept of the Divine and human natures is thought of with all the essential properties or qualities, the so-called “perfections” of nature, without which the very existence of nature is unthinkable. So Christ would not have been God if He had not been a perfect God, and would not have been a man at all if He had not been a perfect man 268. This means that the position about the duality of the natures of Christ is reduced to the position about the perfection or integrity of natures, and the image of an unfused union of natures means nothing more than the preservation of the integrity of both natures of Christ after the union. That Christ is the true and perfect God in everything, no one - neither the Monophysites nor the Monothelites - disputed this, not only in principle, but also in their conclusions. On the contrary, in the teaching of the Monophysites-Severians 269 about one God-masculine nature and the Monothelites-Monoergists about one God-masculine action, a clear advantage was always on the side of the Divinity of Christ; Christ's humanity was interpreted as a soulless organ of the actions of the Divine, moved by the Word 270. A position that does not need to be explained in detail; it is enough to note that Severus’s teaching “about a single God-masculine nature” consistently led to the affirmation of the absurdity that the very Divinity of Christ was subject to the laws of the existence of the flesh, which, however, contrary to its consistency, Severus denied. It is enough to recall the usual argument in the monuments of Monothelite thought in favor of “single action”: “the flesh of Christ did not perform its natural movement from its own impulse, contrary to the beckoning of the Word hypostatically united with it.” Thus, the truth of the Divinity of the person of Christ was not included in the program of the then polemics, but the question of the integrity or perfection of the humanity of Christ was emphasized here. In Maxim's works we find a complete response to this kind of polemic request. Wherever there is talk about the natural duality in Christ, Maxim insists with particular force on the need to recognize the integrity of the humanity of Christ. This idea is dominant in the dogmatic-polemic works not only of the first group, but also of the second. Everything that Maximus says in various places about the integrity of the human nature of Christ can be reduced to the following four provisions: a) Christ as a man is like us in everything except sin 271; b) God the Word united human nature with Himself in the form in which He Himself first created it 272; c) Christ took on our flesh with all, without any deficiency, the essential qualities and distinctive features of human nature 273; i.e. – and this is especially important; d) Christ took on a thinking and rational soul (ψυχήν νοεράν και λογικήν) with a body akin to it (μετά του συμφυούς σώματος ), i.e. the whole, perfect human nature (i.e. τέλειον άνθρωπον [perfect man]) 274 . K a). The image of the birth of Christ according to humanity, similar to the image of the origin of the first man, should not serve as an obstacle to the identification of the human nature perceived by Christ with ours, 275 just as the birth of the Son does not in the least violate the consubstantiality of the Son with God the Father. In a mysterious and inexplicable way, formed “from the purest blood of the Most Holy Virgin and Mother of God,” the flesh of Christ was completely identical with ours in essence, was consubstantial with ours (ταυτόν τή ούσία) [the same in essence] 276. And since the flesh of Christ was formed, in addition to the participation of the seed of the husband, by the power of the life-giving influx of the Holy Spirit, or, as Maximus expresses it in one place 277, since “His birth (i.e., Christ according to humanity) was governed not by the law of sin, but by the law of Divine truth,” then by virtue of its very birth, the flesh of Christ was completely free from that ulcer of sin, which is passed on from generation to generation through natural birth: “there was none in its members.” another law (sin) opposing the law of the mind.” Although Maxim does not directly say anywhere that, by virtue of birth, the flesh of Christ was free only from hereditary, ancestral sin, and that mentally, outside of union with the Word, the possibility of evading the prevailing inclination towards good was not excluded for it, but, undoubtedly, Maxim distinguished between this abstract sinlessness of the humanity of Christ, which can be called relative, and that absolute, excluding any possibility of a mental inclination to sin, real sinlessness, which in fact, was inherent in Christ the man due to the perception of the flesh in the hypostasis of God the Word. That such a distinction was presented to the mind of Maximus is quite clear, firstly, from the difference in the arguments given for the sinlessness of Christ’s humanity: the sinlessness (in the indicated sense) of the birth of Christ in the flesh and the perception of the flesh into hypostatic unity with the Divine; secondly, from the comparison of Christ with Adam according to the image of origin (δίχα σποράς - without the seed of a man) 278. We believe that neither one nor the other reason needs clarification. In addition, there is one place where Maxim directly recognizes everything natural as non-sinful: “After all, everything natural and immaculate (that is, not having the ulcer of vice) does not resist God (and sin is resistance to God), although it is not entirely united with God” 279. From a comparison of this expression with nearby words that say that, due to hypostatic unity, human nature was completely deified, as a result of which it was in fact completely uninvolved in sin 280, it is obvious that Maxim distinguished between the abstract relative and the absolute real sinlessness of Christ. The comparison of Christ with Adam, not limited to one origin, leads to another position: b) God the Word united with Himself human nature such as He Himself first created it; that is, Christ, as the new Adam, had everything in the same form that the old Adam had in an innocent state. With this comparison, among other things, 281 Maxim wants to point out, mainly, that Christ, in his humanity, had a natural will, 282, but we will talk about this later. c) Christ took on our flesh with all the essential properties and distinctive features of human nature (μετά πάντων των προσόντων αύτη φυσικώς). To the first, Maxim includes everything that constitutes a distinctive feature of a living being, for example, breathing, voluntary movement, external and internal physiological feelings (hunger, thirst, fatigue, etc.), the need for appropriate satisfaction of them and similar bodily states 283. The totality of all of them constitutes the manifestation or detection of the so-called “vital energy” or vital force (ζωτική ενέργεια), emanating from the soul and inherent in the body (έκ της ψυχής ένδιδομένη τω σώματι [from the soul given to the body]) 284. The distinctive features of human nature itself are everything in which the life of the spirit is reflected, and is generally called “mental ability” (Λογική ένέργεια) or simply “will” (θέΛησις or θέλημα), since will, as the life of the spirit, is “ ένέργεια ψυχής Λογικής "[action of the rational soul] 285. Thus, the flesh of Christ was not only έμψυχος αισθητική φύσις [animated sensible nature], but έμψυχος αισθητική και Λογική ή νοερά φύσις [animate sensory and rational or thinking nature]; that is, the body of Christ was characterized not only by vital force, but also by a thinking soul. Hence, the position under consideration can be more accurately expressed, in the words of Maxim himself, in the following form: d) “Christ took on a thinking and rational soul with a body akin to it.” The concept of “thinking and rational soul” is identical with the concept of “spirit”. With this meaning of the words “a thinking and rational soul,” the above definition of the flesh of Christ takes on the following meaning: the flesh of Christ was not only animated or animated (like all living creatures), but also spiritualized (like all people); in the human body of Christ a human soul lived, a human spirit lived. It is to this, to this highest side of human nature, that those most essential distinctive properties of a spiritual and moral being, which Maxim generally calls “the action of the thinking soul” or “will,” should be attributed. Due to this significance of the soul for the human body, the recognition of the flesh of Christ as possessing a rational and thinking soul receives special importance in Christological teaching. Only with such a view of the flesh of Christ does it become clear, on the one hand, why the confession of two perfect natures in Christ is tantamount to the recognition of two natural energies and two natural wills in Him; and on the other hand, why the Monophysites-Julianists and their predecessors in time (Arians and especially Apollinarians), denying the presence of a rational soul in the body of Christ, had to deny the duality of actions and wills; and why the North, teaching about one complex nature, could at the same time talk about the difference in properties and, pronouncing an anathema (in epist. ad Pmosdocium medicum) on the Catholics who taught about the difference between two actions, in the end, had to admit (to the extent that he attributed to Christ the so-called “sinless” passions and denied their belonging to the Divinity of Christ) that the flesh of Christ has something different from the action The deity of Christ is "life force" (ζωτική ενέργεια). In addition, only from the point of view of the considered view of the flesh of Christ does it become possible for the constant inextricable communication of the Word with His humanity, which did not cease during Christ’s stay in the tomb. Beyond all this, the presence in the body of Christ of a thinking and rational soul elevates the human nature of Christ to such a degree of perfection and integrity that, despite the fact that the flesh of Christ did not have a possessor or bearer inherent in its nature, that is, a person, different from the hypostasis of the Word, it lacked nothing of what the intellectual nature actually is. To the question: if the human nature assumed by Christ had not been hypostatically united with the Word, would it have been a person? – Maximus, we believe, would have answered in exactly the same way as Hugo Victorinus answered a similar question: “Esset quidem persona et haberet suam personantiam ex sua rationalitate” [Would, of course, be a person and would have its personality from its rationality] 286. But the rationality or generally spirituality of nature, as noted above, is not identical with personality: spirituality is, so to speak, the physical reality of nature, and personality is only a metaphysical image of the existence of intellectual nature, adding absolutely nothing to the content of the latter. If this were not so, that is, if the concept of spiritual nature and the concept of personality were identical, then the number of persons would always correspond to the number of spiritual natures. In God, on the basis of the singularity of the spiritual nature, one would have to recognize one person (Sabelianism) and at the same time, on the basis of the Trinity of Persons, one would have to admit the triplicity of the Divine nature (Arianism). The same would have to be said regarding the unity of the spiritual nature common to all people and the multitude of persons 287. And if in fact the number of persons does not correspond to the number of natures and vice versa, then the duality of the perfect natures of Christ does not at all oblige, as the Monophysites think, to the recognition in Christ of two different persons corresponding to two natures: the spirituality of the human nature of Christ does not necessarily require one person corresponding to it. The usual accusation leveled against the Orthodox by opponents (Monophysites) of a return to Nestorianism is, to say the least, unfounded. It is true that spiritual nature, no matter how closely it is united with another, cannot exist except in person, but it is unfair that it itself is a person. The Orthodox Church teaches this: although the rationally animated flesh of Christ did not have one corresponding person, another near the hypostasis of God the Word, it was not impersonal, since it was received into the hypostasis (was ένυπόστατος) of God the Word, which from the unconditionally first moment of union, without ceasing to be the hypostasis of the Divinity of the Word, became the hypostasis of the flesh Christ 288. So, in Christ there are two perfect natures, Divine and human, unchangeably and unfusedly existing in the hypostasis of God the Word and by union. The integrity of both natures of Christ by union constitutes, according to Maximus, the main basis for the recognition in Christ of two actions and two wills - in accordance with the two natures 289. Everyone certainly agrees on this, 290 and it could not be otherwise. In fact, if both natures of Christ, during the union, did not lose in any way their essential and distinctive properties, i.e. (since action or will constitutes, as noted above, the most essential property of nature) was not deprived of the natural action and natural will characteristic of it 291 - and this is indeed the case - then the direct conclusion followed from this that in Christ δύο [two natural will and equivalent essential actions] 292. The legitimacy of such a conclusion was generally recognized by the Monophysites themselves (at least the Northerners), since they taught about the difference in properties in Christ on the basis of the difference between two essences 293 . They only disputed, and even completely denied, its applicability to action or will on the basis that ένέργεια or θέλημα constitutes, according to them, not a property of nature, but a property, a definition of a person, a sign of personality. Thus, in the transition from the doctrine of the two natures of Christ to the doctrine of the duality of actions and wills, the tasks of polemics required, first of all, to clarify what will is in general, what action is, what do they follow: nature or person? Let's start with will. Will (θέλησις or θέλημα), according to the teaching of the Orthodox, defended by Maximus, constitutes an essential distinctive property of spiritual or rationally animated nature, which is why it is called natural will (τό φυσικόν θέλημα) 294. In Maximus we find two kinds of reasons for such an understanding of the will: one of them he borrows from the Orthodox teaching about the Trinity, the other - from the position of the will in man. Maximus formulates the essence of the first kind of grounds in a conversation with Pyrrhus 295 as follows: “Does the God of the universe and the Father will (θέλει) like the Father or like God? If (He wills) as the Father, then His will will be different from that of the Son (άλλο αύτού έσται παρά τού Τίού θέλημα), because the Son is not the Father; if - like God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, then they (Monothelites) must admit that the will is a property of nature, or natural” (φύσεως είναι τό θέλημα, ήγουν φυσικόν). Elsewhere 296 regarding the same reason, considered only from the negative side, Maximus seems to be reasoning approximately like this. If we concede to the Monothelites that the will corresponds not to nature, but to the person, and, therefore, to recognize the strength of the objection they put forward against the duality of wills in Christ, that the concept of will brings with it the concept of the willing, then it will be necessary to admit that in God, by virtue of the unity of the will, there is one hypostasis (which, indeed, is what Savvel came to). And since, from the point of view of the objection raised, it is impossible to deny the validity of the reverse side of the relationship between the will and the willer, it will be necessary to admit that in God, due to the Trinity of persons, there are three wills (of course, three different ones, because quantitative difference serves as the basis for qualitative), and therefore three different natures (Arianism). From the falsity and inconsistency of the conclusions following from the Monothelite view of the will, Maximus concludes that the reverse side of the situation is correct, that is, that in God the will corresponds to nature and not to person. This particular principle, when applied to Christ, gave the consistent conclusion that Christ, in His Divinity, has a will as God, and not as the Word, the Son of God 297. Keeping silent for now about the direct purpose of the negative arguments just given, in this case we will limit ourselves to the simple remark that a completely legal conclusion on the indicated legal basis from the Monophysite point of view on person and nature for the Monothelites did not have the force of binding at all. This last circumstance, by the way, reveals the falsity of the Monophysite view of ύπόστασις and φύσις as applied to the doctrine of the Trinity. In man, the will also corresponds to nature, and not to the face. In a conversation with Pyrrhus 298 Maximus gives the following four reasons for attributing the will to nature: a) Will, as the ability to want (τό θέλειν) is innate to man, and is not the result of the personal experience of each of us: “no one ever teaches another to want.” b) Man is by nature reasonable, and rational nature has freedom (αύτεξούσιον) or, since freedom is the definition of will - will (θέλησις), which controls nature (as opposed to unreasonable creatures, the principium movens [moving principle] of which is nature itself - έν τοίς άλόγοις άγει μεν ή φύσις [the dumb are moved by nature]). c) Will as the ability to want is common to all people, and what is common to all characterizes the nature of indivisibles of the same kind. Finally - d) man is the image of the Divine, and God by nature has freedom; therefore, man, as such, by nature has freedom or will (θελητικός άρα φύσει ό άνθρωπος). Thus, everywhere, both in God and in man, the will corresponds to nature, that is, in general, will is an integral property of spiritual nature, which is why it is called natural will (φυσικόν θέλημα), and human will is also innate (έμφυτος θέλησις or θέλημα) 299. It is invariably thought of as existing in nature and, together with other properties of nature, constitutes what is generally called τό ένούσιον. From this theoretical foundation of diophelitism, of course, two further conclusions regarding natural will followed: a) in creatures that are different in nature (τά έτερούσια), the will is also different, and vice versa - b) in creatures that are homogeneous in nature (τοίς όμοφυέσι και όμογενέσι), for example - among people, there is one will, unchanged in all individuals. With these two conclusions, Maximus refutes, among other things, two rather shallow objections of Pyrrhus 300, directed against the fundamental principle of diophelitism in question and based on the arbitrary confusion of the will as an innate ability of the soul (τό θέλειν) with the object of the will (τό θελητόν) and with personal direction will (τό πώς θέλειν) in each of us, as with a way (τρόπος modus) of using natural ability. What is “natural” will, and how wide is the area covered by this concept? In many places in Maxim’s works we find the following absolutely identical definition of will: “natural will is the power (or ability) of striving for what is in accordance with nature, embracing all the properties that essentially belong to nature” ( θέλησιν , δύναμιν του κατά φύσιν οντος όρεκτικήν και των ουσιωδώς τή φύσει προσόντων συνεκτικήν πάντων ιδιωμάτων ) 301 . Here, in this definition, first of all, the duality in the name of will attracts attention: to express the same concept, two names are used: “θέλημα” and “θέλησις”. In his letter to Stephen Dorsky, where (col. 185) this definition is given in exactly the same form, Maxim explains that “θέλημα” and “θέλησις” are non-identical concepts. Between them there is the same difference as between “βούλημα” and “βούλησις”, between “κίνημα” and “κίνησις”, i.e., according to the meaning of the inflections themselves, “θέλησις” denotes a certain activity of the soul, and “θέλημα” is an external discovery or the result of this activity. But in reality we see no traces of such a distinction in him. Like other Church Fathers 302, Maximus uses both concepts as completely unambiguous 303, although he gives clear preference to “θέλημα” over “θέλησις” 304. The above definition of natural will includes two essential features that characterize will as such. The first feature is that natural will is the power of striving (δύναμις ορεκτική) to be in accordance with nature; the other, will, as such, is characterized by the same properties that essentially belong to rationally animated nature. Our desires, as private manifestations of the will, are extremely changeable and impermanent, which depends on many reasons. And the force acting in them is unchangeable: as “natural force” (δύναμις φυσική) 305 or as an innate ability, will is equally inherent in everyone. Our desires are always more or less definite: they are always directed in one direction or another, sometimes completely opposite, they always have in mind one or another specific object. The power of desire does not have such certainty of its activity: from this side, will is simply an ability innate to the soul (τό πεφυκέναι θέλειν 306 or simply τό θέλειν τό απλώς θέλειν) 307, mere desire (απλή τις ορεξις) 308, as opposed to personal will, which can therefore be called τό πώς θέλειν [to will in some way] or ποια φυσική θέλησις [this or that natural will] (βούλησις), σύνοδος of individual volitional moments 309, etc. But, not having objective definiteness of desires, “natural will” has, so to speak, a certain sphere of activity, crossing the boundaries of which it ceases to be such; has a certain law of motion: the activity of the natural will is limited to the limits of what is “in accordance with nature” or inherent in nature, natural. And nature is characterized, first of all, by being 310. Natural will strives for everything that contributes to the maintenance and continuation of the existence of individual nature, avoiding everything that in one way or another leads to the cessation of existence 311. It is therefore fair to call the natural will “vital aspiration” (όρεξις ζωτική) 312. And since human nature is endowed with reason, it is φύσις Λογική και νοερά, then the will of rational beings, in contrast to the unconscious instinctive life desire inherent in “sensually animated” nature, is not just a life desire, but a rational or conscious life desire ( όρεξις Λογική και ζωτική ) 313 or will in the proper sense; since it is characteristic only of rational nature, it constitutes “the most typical and first feature” of this latter 314. The concept of rationality as an essential property of the soul is thus inseparable from the concept of will and, in a sense, is even identical with it 315. Therefore, the will is called “the will of the rational soul” (θέλησις τής νοεράς ψυχής) 316 or, as Clement of Alexandria defines it in the VI book of the Stromatov, “the aspiration of the mind” (νους ορεκτικός ) 317 . Another essential definition of natural will, as the will of a rationally animated being, is the freedom of its activity (ή αύτεξουσιότης). This definition is so essential for the concept of natural will that the latter is absolutely unthinkable without it 318. Due to the inherent freedom of will in human nature, in its activity it is not determined by any extraneous motives that act forcibly, constraining the freedom of its movements in a manner: it acts freely, according to its own motives, from itself or, more precisely, from itself. Freedom thus constitutes the principle, the basis of the activity of the will. Due to the connection between the cognitive and volitional abilities of the human soul, “we consult with ourselves (regarding the object of desire - τό βουλητόν), and we decide (to choose), and we choose (one is preferable to the other), and we strive (to possess what we want), and we use it freely (κατ᾿ έξουσίαν)" 319. Free will is in no way contradicted by the well-known law of the activity of natural will, by virtue of which it strives only for “what is inherent in nature” and cannot have as its object that which lies beyond the limits of what is inherent in nature, without violating the natural law of its existence. The objection of the Monothelites against natural will is known, which Pyrrhus, in a conversation with Maximus, formulated as follows: “what is natural, what is innate, is perfect and necessary (τό δέ φυσικόν πάντως και ήναγκασμένον)” 320 ; i.e., what is characteristic of human nature, he cannot help but desire: he necessarily desires it as his own, and is unable to desire anything other than someone else’s. Against the general position on which the objection is based, Maxim notes that if this position were true, then it would be necessary to admit that “God is God by necessity (ανάγκη), by necessity good, by necessity the Creator.” And in refutation of the conclusion drawn from this position in relation to natural will, Maxim builds the following conclusion: if we assume that the possession of natural will deprives nature of the possibility of any free movement (i.e., the movement of desire), then at the same time it will be necessary ( ανάγκη ) to recognize as true that “willing by nature ( τα μεν φυσικώς θέλοντα), i.e., having a natural will, has involuntary movement (άκούσιον εχειν κίνησιν), i.e., is not free in desires; and by nature the non-willing (τα δέ φυσικώς μή θέλοντα) has a free (έκούσιον) desire. Consequently, everything rational, which by nature wills, will not be free in its movements, but everything inanimate, which does not have the ability to will, will be free” 321. It is not difficult to notice (although we do not see Maxim’s opponent notice) that Maxim’s given argumentation is not entirely correct and smacks of sophistry. What makes it such is the illegal opposition of the “willing by nature” to the involuntary, the rational to the inanimate, closer – the illegal transfer of the negation “μή” (in the position “τα φυσικώς μή θέλοντα”) from the word “φυσικώς” to the word “ θέλοντα ". That is, in accordance with Pyrrhus’s objection (and Pyrrhus wanted to say in the conclusion precisely that only what is not limited in its desires by the framework of the natural is completely free), the emphasis should have been placed on the word “by nature,” contrasting with it the expression “not according to nature (that is, not in accordance with nature, arbitrarily) willing.” And with such a legal opposition, the conclusion that would be obtained would not be the same as that obtained with the indicated, illegal, opposition: then the conclusion that Pyrrhus But such a conclusion, legal in form and consistent from Pyrrhus’s point of view on the freedom of the will, from Maximus’s point of view on the freedom of natural will seems essentially unjust. The constant and ever-present desire for what is “inherent in nature” is in fact not only not a denial of free will (as Pyrrhus thinks), but does not even constitute a limitation of this latter. Since it is not natural for nature to desire anything outside of what was laid out for it by the Creator, then it itself, without being restrained by anything external (and this, indeed, would be a limitation of its freedom), cannot desire it. “Freedom (εξουσία),” says Maximus, 322, “is legal dominion over that, unhindered power in the use of that, free striving for that which is embedded in our nature, which is in us.” And this is true freedom, in a higher degree of perfection than man, inherent in angels and most perfectly characteristic of God 323. And since each of us puts his personal desires above the demands of nature and subordinates the latter to the former, he becomes unfree, making himself a slave to his desires and passions: natural will then takes on the character of personal arbitrariness, becomes what is called “γνωμικόν θέλημα” 324 or simply “γνώμη”. For the closest definition of the meaning connected with the expression “γνωμικόν θέλημα”, one must turn to the very concept of “γνώμη”. Γνώμη constitutes a special, fifth 325, moment of the volitional process, following determination (κρίσις), characterized disposition, inclination towards what is decided after a consultation with oneself (βουλή) 326. According to this meaning, γνώμη, γνωμικόν θέλημα can be defined as a finally formed, completely determined desire, calculated for a real or nominal good 327; (τό πώς θέλειν), an image, a way of using will, as an innate ability 328; or, more broadly (as Pyrrhus defined it, following Cyril of Alexandria) - as a “way of life” (τρόπος ζωής) 329 And since the way of using the natural ability of the will or way of life is. is different, depending on the individual, and constitutes a characteristic of the person, and not of nature 330, then θέλημα γνωμικόν or θέλησις γνωμική is nothing more than another name for the hypostatic, personal will (θέλημα ύποστατικόν), but only of personal “human” will 331. And since the personal will of each of us, that is, our private desires, does not correspond to the requirements of nature, it is “arbitrariness,” a violation of the freedom of natural will. Considering everything that has been said about natural will in comparison with what is called personal will, we obtain the following general conclusion regarding the meaning and scope contained in the concept of “natural will”. Natural will in general is natural life (ζωή φυσική), the life of the spirit in the broad sense. In particular, when applied to man, it is the life of the spirit or rational soul, both δύναμις Λογική και ζωτική, reflected in the phenomena of spiritual life, equally directed both ad extra [outward] and ad intra [inward]. More specifically, as δύναμις ορεκτική, it is the driving, controlling principle (principium movens) for the private desires of human nature, by nature directed towards the fulfillment of the will of God as the highest norm of human activity 332. Action (ενέργεια), like will, also corresponds to nature, and not to the person and is inseparable from nature, which is why it is called natural (ενέργεια φυσική) 333 or essential, i.e. belonging to the essence (ούσιώδης) 334, action, and human action, moreover, is innate (έμφυτος ένέργεια) 335. Therefore, everything that has been said regarding natural will is also true regarding natural action, with which even the defender of monothelitism (and therefore monoergism) Pyrrhus agreed, declaring in a conversation with Maximus 336 that he finds it unnecessary to subject the question of action to special study after the question of will has been completely exhausted. But the area captured by the concept “ένέργεια” is wider than that embraced by the concept “θέλησις” or “θέλημα”. The relationship between action and will is the relationship between the general and the particular: will is the life of the “spirit,” and action is life “in general,” , which, as noted above, stems from the soul, is inherent in the body and is revealed in various factors of a person’s bodily life. Thus, all natural and blameless infirmities are manifestations of natural action, and not of will. So, will and action, as such, are the inherent distinctive properties of nature (and not of a person). This theoretical principle of diophelitism, when applied to the doctrine of the face of Christ, fully authorized a certain completely legal conclusion. In Christ there are two perfect natures; therefore, in Christ there are “two natural wills” (δύο φυσικά θελήματα), and “two natural actions” (δύο φυσικαί ένέργειαι); two and two are “different”, just as the natures themselves are different: Divine and human 337. The Fathers of the Church, when they talk about two wills and actions, they mean “natural” wills and actions, 338 and, therefore, different. “After all, everyone (i.e., the fathers and teachers of the Holy Catholic Church) taught both about the other and the other, that is, the Divine and human, and the dual nature of the One and the same; and they just as clearly announced to everyone another and different will, that is, Divine and human, therefore, two wills; as well as another and another action, Divine and human, and again - a double action, that is, two. In the same way, they clearly designated the entities numerically and by their very names” 339 . But “as the number of natures of one and the same thing, correctly thought and interpreted, does not divide Christ, but indicates the preservation of the difference of natures in union (i.e., hypostatic); so the number of His wills and actions essentially inherent in the natures (and after all, according to both of His natures, as it is said, He was willing and active in our salvation) does not introduce division (let it not be!), but indicates their safety and soundness even in combination, and this is precisely what it points to” 340. Against the applicability of the considered theoretical principle of diophelitism to the doctrine of the face of Christ, that is, against the duality of wills and actions in Christ, the Monothelites raised many different objections, apparently motivating them with the fear of falling into Nestorianism. Thus, in a conversation with Maximus, Pyrrhus raises the following objections to the assumption of two wills in Christ: 1) The recognition of two wills in Christ is equivalent to the recognition of two willers, two subjects, i.e., two persons. – We have already talked about how Maxim refuted this objection. We know from what basis, from what theoretical foundation of monothelitism such an objection comes, but we also know in what or where such an objection, as coming from a known basis, receives complete resolution for itself. 2) The coexistence of two wills, qualitatively different, places the natures of Christ in conditions of struggle and opposition (εναντιώσεως της μάχης) that contradict even the moral union. – Maxim responds by pointing out the absence of a reason that could give rise to such a struggle ( έσται [it is obvious that when there is no cause, there will be no cause]). It is impossible to consider natural will itself (κατά φύσιν θέλησιν) as such a cause: otherwise one would have to admit that God Himself, the Creator of nature, as such is the originator of the struggle, which is unthinkable. Nor could it arise as a result of sin, because “God did not create sin” (άμαρτίαν ούκ έποίησε, i.e. ό Θεός), and Christ, as possessing natural wills, is free from any contradiction (ουδέ τήν οίανούν έναντίωσιν έν τοις κατά φύσιν αύτού ό σαρκωθείς Θεός είχε θελήμασι [the incarnate God did not have any contradiction in His natural wills]) 341. 3) The assumption of natural wills in Christ is tantamount to the denial in Him of any free movement, i.e., free will. – We are already quite familiar with the basis of this objection and Maxim’s answer to it. Against the applicability of the Monothelite view of free will to Christ, Maximus notes that “not only does the Divine and uncreated (unoccurred) nature have nothing naturally necessary, but also the rational and created nature has nothing of the kind” (Ού μόνον ή θεία καί άκτιστος ? κτιστή ) 342 . The monothelites raised exactly the same objections against the duality of natural actions in Christ as against two wills. So, for example, the objection of Pyrrhus that “those who recognize two actions in Christ defend the wicked teaching of Nestorius” is essentially exactly the same as a similar objection against two wills 343. The objections to the two wills were joined here by only one, which Pyrrhus exposes by formulating it approximately like this. If, in reasoning about the actions of Christ, we take as the basis the difference in the natures of Christ (διά τό διάφορον τών δύο έν Χριστώ φύσεων [due to the difference of the two natures in Christ]), and not the individuality of the person ( μοναδικόν του προσώπου), then Christ will have to be attributed not two, but three actions, “due to the difference in the essences of soul and body.” We know Maxim's answer, which boils down to the following: the natural action of man is κατ᾿ είδος ένέργεια [generic action], and not κατ᾿ ούσίαν ψυχής καί σώματος [consistent with the essence of soul and body] 344. The essence of Maxim's answer is obviously the following: the human body (σώμα) in itself is lifeless and inactive; form, what is called “είδος άνθρωπου” [the appearance of a person], is given to a person by the soul (ψυχή) - the beginning of life and movement; from it comes the ενεργεία ζωτική, inherent in the body. If you look more closely at the background of all, both these and other objections put forward by the Monothelites, it is not difficult to notice that the real basis of all objections is the actual denial of the “human” natural will and the “human” natural action of Christ: from him they all proceed and are directed towards him. This is already clear enough from the second and third objections to two wills and from the last objection to two actions. But among all the various objections put forward by the Monothelites, there is one in which the denial of the special human activity of Christ appears, so to speak, in all its nakedness, undisguised by anything. This is the most famous argument in favor of μία ενέργεια, which Pyrrhus puts into the form of the following objection: “Did the movement of the flesh depend on the wave (νεύμα) of the Word connected with it?” Maxim understood his opponent well when he answered: “The all-essential Word, which became essentially man, had the power of self-preservation (τήν άνθεκτικήν δύναμιν) inherent in human nature, aspiration (όρμήν) and removal (άφορμήν) which it revealed voluntarily (θέλων) through action (δι᾿ένεργείας)… using what is inherent in nature and voluntarily constraining Oneself with fear during suffering.” Maximus's thought is precisely the opposite of that which is contained in Pyrrhus's objection; that is, the flesh, hypostatically united with the Word, performed its natural movements according to its own natural impulse, by virtue of special ones, “the Word Himself creatively put into it without any lack of laws (Λόγους rationes) of its existence, without which the very existence of nature is impossible” 345. True, the more moderate and amenable to concessions in favor of Orthodoxy, the Monothelites did not at all deny the special human will inherent in Christ, different from the Divine will of the Word, of course - in the sense of individual, private manifestations. They recognized the qualitative difference or otherness of wills and actions, but under no circumstances did they want to allow “two” wills in Christ. That is, not agreeing to recognize the legality of the formula “δύο ένέργειαι” and “δύο θελήσεις ή θελήματα”, because they did not agree to recognize its legality, because the recognition of the difference or otherness of actions and wills in such a form assigned such wide boundaries to the relevance of the definitions of the humanity of Christ that from the Monophysite point of view, it (the humanity of Christ) seemed to them to be nothing more than a completely independent nature, existing only next to the Divine nature of the Word. So, for example, Bishop Theodosius, in a conversation with Maxim, reported that they (i.e. Monothelites) along with the difference in natures also recognize the difference in “wills and actions,” realizing that without them “animate” flesh is unthinkable. Only in relation to the latter, following the fathers, they do not use the very term “two” or “two” in order to avoid the division of Christ, but say that in Christ there is “another and another, both Divine and human, and twofold and twofold” (i.e., will and action). It is known that Maxim answered him to this. He said that to say that in Christ there is “another and different, both Divine and human, double and double” will and the same action is the same as recognizing two wills, two actions, and this is as certain as it is certain that “twice two is four” 346. There is no doubt that the relevance of the definitions of the human nature of Christ in the teachings of the Monothelites suffered severe damage, if not completely reduced to zero, and the main issue of the controversy at that time - the question of the truth and perfection of the humanity of Christ - was resolved here, in any case, negatively. It is clear why, wherever the duality of natural definitions is discussed, Maxim insists, as in relation to natures, on the need to recognize precisely “human” will and action. And not only as potential forces, which have no detection at all or, in extreme cases, with a weak moment of actuality, but as active, active forces, acting from themselves and constantly being realized. Maxim seems to be thinking like this. The very fact of the perception and existence of human nature in the person of Christ speaks sufficiently for the fact that Christ must also have had human natural will, since the former is even unthinkable without this latter; its absence turns the humanity of Christ, and with it the economy itself (closely, the incarnation) into a ghost (την οίκονομίαν έφάντασεν) 347. Yes, Christ, as a “new man,” as the second Adam, could not help but have a human will: God the Word became human, became a “new” man, perfect in everything, that is, he took on a “thinking and rational soul with a body akin to it.” Consequently, He undoubtedly had the free will of the nature He perceived 348. The fact is that the fall of the “old” man, the first Adam, was free: “Adam voluntarily (θέΛων) inclined his ear (i.e., listened to his wife), voluntarily looked (at the fruit) and of his own free will (since, having seen the fruit, he considered) he ate; therefore, our will (ΘέΛησις) was the primary cause of the fall” 349. And if so, then she had to take an active part in the work of redemption. Without such participation of our will, Christ could not deliver us from sin (αμαρτίας) and bring salvation; at least, our salvation would be incomplete, and the gifts of sanctifying and saving grace would not be communicated to us in full, because “what is not received,” says Gregory the Theologian in a letter to Kledonius, “is not subject to healing,” that is, it is not freed from the hereditary ulcer of sin 350. Let us assume for a moment that the salvation brought to us by Christ is not complete (which could only happen if He did not take on a whole person). This would mean that He either did not want or could not completely save 351; but both are unworthy of Christ as God and unthinkable. Consequently, as a “new” man, as the second Adam, Christ could not help but have a human natural will, and He, indeed, had it. This is most convincingly evidenced by the facts of His earthly life, especially, for example, that striking fact when He, as a man, would like to avoid the mortal cup and prayed to God the Father: “Father! if it is possible, then let this cup pass from Me” 352. As God, He could not, of course, fear death, because the fear of death is not characteristic of God, and if, nevertheless, He revealed this fear through the evasion of the will from accepting the mortal cup, then this was solely due to His humanity, His human will, which by nature is characterized by evasion from everything that one way or another leads to the cessation of the existence of nature 353. So, undoubtedly, Christ possessed a human natural will in accordance with his human nature. But the human will of Christ was somewhat different from the will that we have, just as the very human nature of Christ was somewhat different from what we bear. In essence, both were completely identical with ours 354. The whole difference in the nature and will of Christ's humanity consisted in the fact that, having been perceived by Christ as they originally came from the hands of the Creator, they were free from the defect that appeared in our nature as a result of the ancestral crime, that is, they were “different regarding the inclination to sin” (τή άμαρτισία) 355. This means that by virtue of nature itself, the human will of Christ was sinless. Above, in the first chapter, we had a judgment about how we need to understand the sinlessness of the human nature of Christ. The following should be added to what was said there in discussing the sinlessness of Christ’s human will. In explanation 356 of the famous 357 saying of Gregory the Theologian: “His (Christ’s) human will, as completely deified (θεωθέν οΛον), does not resist God (ούδέ ύπεναντίον Θεώ),” Maxim says, between other things: “After all, the human will (actually “will”, “τό ΘέΛειν”) of the Savior, although it was natural (φυσικόν), was not simply human - like humanity itself, not just as such - but as if superhuman, since through the (hypostatic) connection it was completely deified, on which it depended that she was in fact completely innocent of sin. Our will, obviously, is simply ours alone and in any case is not innocent of sin, on which the variability in its direction depends” 358 . From these words it is only clear that the human will of Christ was completely sinless in the power of hypostatic unity. But if we compare these words with the earlier (in the first part, to “a”) expression given: “everything natural and immaculate does not resist God, although it is not entirely united with God,” and also with the following expression, similar to this last one: “Since the will is natural, it does not resist; and since it receives from us a direction that does not agree with nature, it obviously resists and in most cases opposes, the companion of which is sin” 359 - then it will be impossible not to come to the conclusion that the human natural will itself does not have a natural (active) inclination to sin, although it is not absolutely sinless. Meanwhile, regarding the human will of Christ, deified by virtue of the hypostatic unity of natures, Maxim expresses that it is completely uninvolved in sin, about the human “natural” will in itself he only says that it does not resist God. Obviously, by the very nature of his expressions, Maxim wants to express the indisputably true idea that the human “natural” will, although in fact it does not have a real inclination to sin and in this sense is sinless, but for it the possibility, the potency of sin is not excluded (as, indeed, was the case with the will of the first Adam). Thus, the human will of Christ “by nature is not different (αύδέ άΛλο) than ours, although the image of will is different, superior to ours (ΘέΛειν άΛλως ύπέρ ήμας) 360. What is the “otherness of the image of will” of the human will of Christ, we will see later; in the present case, we are talking, in fact, about the human will of Christ without the actual relationship of His Divine will to it, about the fact that Christ had a “human natural” will. So, on the basis of the integrity of both natures of Christ, it is necessary to recognize as undoubted that Christ had “two natural wills” corresponding to His two natures, and “two natural actions”: Divine and human. In confirmation of the truth of the duality of natural wills and actions in Christ, Maxim refers to the facts of gospel history, so that the many sayings of the Holy Scripture cited by Maxim can be considered as a special class of evidence of the duality of wills and actions in Christ. The sayings of Holy Scripture, as such, fall into three groups: sayings, a) speaking exclusively about the Divine natural will and action of Christ; b) testifying exclusively to human natural will and the same action; c) confirming the reality of the coexistence in the person of Christ of two natural wills and actions. a) As for the evidence of the Holy Scripture of the first kind, Maxim limits himself to indicating two or three places, and he does so in this case for the same reason why he does not find it necessary to expand on the need to recognize the Divine natural will on the basis of the integrity of the Divine nature in Christ. Here, first of all, the words of John should be included. V:21: "As (ώς) the Father raises the dead and gives life, so the Son gives life to whomever he will." Maxim interprets these words as follows. Since only “identical essences” can be compared (and the particle “ώς” indicates comparison) (and the Divine and human wills do not belong to the same essence, that is why they are different), then, obviously, the above words cannot be attributed to human natural will, but must be attributed to the Divine natural will, which in the Son is completely the same with God the Father, because Their nature is the same. Due to this sameness, the Son belongs, equally with the Father, to the omnipotent action of the Divine: the resurrection and revival of the dead 361. Words of Matt. XXIIÏ 37 – 38: “Jerusalem, Jerusalem!.. how often have I wanted to gather your children, as a bird gathers its children under its wings,” should also be attributed to the Divine will and action of Christ, because they clearly indicate the various ways of God’s merciful providence for the sinful human race 362. The following places are also indicated: In. V: 17, 19; In. X: 38, 25 363 . b) There is no deficiency in the sayings of Scripture cited by Maximus to certify the reality of the human natural will of Christ. So, Maxim refers to John. I43: “The next day Jesus wanted to go to Galilee.” Since Jesus could only want to go where He was not present at that time, and He could not be present in a certain place at a certain moment of time only due to His humanity, then Jesus’ desire to “go to Galilee” can only be attributed to His humanity. A similar example is presented in another place - John. XVII 24: “I want them to be (with Me) where I am.” As God, Christ stands above any limitation by spatial definition (“where”). When applied to the limited nature of man, this limitation is inevitable; therefore, the desire of Christ expressed in the above words can again be attributed only to His humanity. The following passages in the New Testament testify equally clearly to the reality of Christ’s human will: In. XIX: 28: “After this, Jesus, knowing that all things had already been accomplished, that the Scripture might be fulfilled, said, “I thirst.” The manifestation of a feeling of thirst, the desire to satisfy it and the reluctance to drink the drink provided are all phenomena that are characteristic only of the human nature of Christ. In. VIÏ 1: “After this Jesus walked through Galilee; for he did not want to walk through Judea, because the Jews sought to kill Him.” Walking, naturally, is characteristic only of nature, which has organs adapted for this. Therefore, walking in Galilee and not wanting to walk in Judea are manifestations of human will and the actions of Christ. A similar example of the discovery of the human will and the action of Christ is represented by the following two almost similar sayings: Mk. IX: 30 and VII, 24 art. the same evangelist. In both places, Christ’s reluctance for anyone to know His whereabouts with His disciples could come from Him, of course, as a man, because the path of earthly wandering was characteristic of Him by nature, not as God, but as a man. Mk. VIÏ 48: “About the fourth watch of the night (Jesus) came to them (i.e., the disciples), walking on the sea, and wanted to pass by them.” Walking cannot at all be attributed to the Divine nature of Christ, because the Divinity stands above any limitation by bodily and spatial definitions; therefore, the words in question must be attributed to the humanity of Christ, as speaking about the action inherent in the human nature of Christ 364. It is known that this fact of gospel history was also referred to by the Monothelites in confirmation of the fact that in Christ there is one godly act. Of course, the Monothelites were wrong when they saw in the fact of “walking on the waters” a manifestation of the action characteristic of Christ as a “whole.” Because they were wrong because they placed God in the conditions of existence of a nature limited by bodily, spatial definitions. But it seems that Maxim is also wrong, seeing in this fact a manifestation of the exclusively “human” natural action of Christ, since it is unusual for a person to walk on the surface of water. However, if we compare the act of walking on the sea with the circumstances that accompanied it - namely, with the fact that the disciples, sailing in a boat on the sea, saw Jesus, were afraid of Him, mistaking Him for a ghost, and with the response of Jesus in connection with this circumstance: “It is I, do not be afraid!” - an answer that has the following meaning: “it is actually I, a real person, and not My ghost,” then it will become completely clear why in the fact of the famous walk on the sea Maxim sees an indication of the manifestation of the humanity of Christ. OK. XXIÏ 8–9. Eating the Passover was characteristic of those who were under the law, and Christ was under the law as a man (Galat. IV: 4); therefore, as a man, He was hungry and ate Passover. Philip. IÏ 8: “He humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death, even death on the cross.” To show obedience is characteristic, according to the expression of Gregory the Theologian (I orat. de Filio), “second and subordinate,” and about Christ, as God, one cannot say either that He was “obedient” or that He was “disobedient”; therefore He was obedient as a man 365 . What is pointed out here is the human “will” of Christ, the “new” man, which followed in everything and always showed obedience to the Divine will, in order to thereby atone for disobedience to the will of God on the part of the will of the “old” man, the first Adam. Ps. XXXIX: 7–9. According to Divinity, the will of the Son is identical with the will of the Father, but according to humanity it is different from the will of the Father, because according to humanity the Father is God to Christ. Consequently, as a man, Christ wanted to fulfill the will of God the Father 366. c) Finally, with regard to confirming the reality of the coexistence of two natural wills in the person of Christ, Maximus points out a well-known, so to speak, classical passage in this regard: Matt. XXVÏ 39 (“My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me; however, not as I will, but as You will”). It is impossible to attribute, as Maxim argues, the words “not as I want” to the Divinity of Christ, because otherwise what Christ wanted, that is, not accepting the cup, will have to be attributed to the Divinity, and an absurdity will result, namely, that the Divine by nature had to drink the mortal chat. Consequently, they must be attributed to man, conceived in the person of the Savior, who, due to the weakness of the flesh, prayed to God the Father that “if possible, the cup of death might pass from Him.” But, rising above the weakness of the flesh by virtue of “vigor of spirit,” He voluntarily subordinated the will of His humanity to the will of the Father, saying: “Nevertheless, not as I will, but as You will.” Thus, Christ Himself here directly distinguishes the will of His humanity from His Divine will, which is identical with God the Father, through which He reveals Himself to have not only one will equal with the Father, but also another, different in nature from it, therefore, two different wills 367. A special class of evidence of the duality of natural wills and actions in Christ is represented by the testimonies of the Church Fathers. Maximus points out numerous and decisive expressions, clearly indicating that when the fathers speak of two wills, they mean precisely natural wills 368. Thus, in his dogmatic letter to Stephen, Bishop of Dor (col. 160 - 165), Maximus refers to the following Church Fathers: on Athanasius of Alexandria, who in the book “On the Incarnation and the Trinity” in his explanation of the words of Matt. XXVÏ 39 (“My Father, if it is possible, let it pass…”, etc.) and 41 verses (“The Spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak”) says that Christ “discovers here two wills: human, which, due to weakness (the flesh), fears death, and Divine,” which stands above any limitations of the flesh 369; on Gregory the Theologian, who, in “And the Word about the Son” says: “... seventhly, consider the saying that the Son came down from heaven to fulfill not His will, but the will of Him who sent Him. If this were said, continues Gregory the Theologian, not by the One Who Descended, then we would answer that these words were spoken on behalf of a person, not what we mean in the Savior (περί του ανθρώπου ..., ού του κατά τον Σωτήρα νοουμένου) (after all, His will, as completely deified, is not contrary to God), but similar to us, since the human will does not always follow (the Divine), but in most cases contradicts and opposes it” 370. In this last position, it should be noted, the Monothelites found a contradiction to the position affirmed by Maximus that “nothing natural is disgusting to God.” If “nothing natural resists God,” then on what basis, objected the Monothelites, Gregory the Theologian expressed himself about the human natural will not at all in such a way that it “follows, obeys God,” but this way: “usually, in most cases (ώς τά πολλά) it opposes?” Maxim resolves this apparent contradiction in this way: “to the extent that the will is natural, it does not tend to resist, and to the extent that it receives from us a direction that does not agree with nature, it clearly resists and opposes, and its companion (of such a direction) is delusion and sin; but this does not always happen: sometimes she does not resist. Why did Gregory the Theologian not say here: “it should not be at all,” but moderated the harshness of his thought with the expression “ώς τά πολλά.” The human will of the Savior, although it was natural, was not simply human: as deified by virtue of hypostatic unity, it was completely sinless 371. Gregory of Nyssa (in the word for Easter) in explanation of Matt. VIIÏ 2–3 says that in healing the leper, Christ revealed human will (“the soul wants”) and human action (“the body touches”) 372. The same Father of the Church in his explanation of Matt. XV: 32 and following says that in Christ’s desire to satisfy the multitude of people accompanying Him in the wilderness and in His breaking of bread, the dual nature of Christ was reflected: Divine - “through the striving of the will inherent in the soul,” and human - “through the action of the flesh” (breaking bread with hands) 373. The same father in the second book against Apollinaris testifies that with the expression “not mine, but thine” (Luke XXIÏ 42) Christ revealed Himself to have two different natural wills: Divine and human 374. John Chrysostom, in his word against those who left the meeting, says that the words: “Father, if it is possible..., however, not as I will, but as You” - indicate not only the manifestation of the natural fear of death, inherent in the humanity of Christ, but also the duality of natural wills in Christ. These words cannot be attributed entirely to the Divine will of Christ, because in this case a contradiction will arise. Cyril of Alexandria in chapter 24 of “Treasures” says that with the words: “If it is possible, let it pass...”, etc., Christ testified to the reality of His human will, which by nature tends to fear death 375. Finally, Severian, Bishop of Gabala (Γαβαλών) testified to the duality of wills in Christ when explaining Matt. XXVI, 39 and 41 verses. For the duality of actions, Maximus points out 376 expressions of the Church Fathers that are equally decisive. Ambrose of Milan, in the second book of Gratian, argues this way: as God, Christ is equal to God, but as a man, He is lesser. One and the same nature cannot be both less and equal at the same time; therefore, in Christ there are two different essences or natures. And if so, then He also has two different actions, because with the difference of essences, one action is unthinkable. Cyril of Jerusalem testifies that in the miraculous fact of transforming water into wine 377 “The Lord showed a double action, feeling like a man and Himself acting like God; and it was not another and another, although it acted in a different and different way" ( γαρ άλλος και άλλος , εί και άλλως και άλλως ). Pope Leo in his letter to Flavian says: “In one and the other form (nature), with their mutual communication, He (Christ) acts characteristic of each (ένεργεί γαρ έν έκατέρα μορφή μετά της θατέρου κοινωνίας, όπερ ίδιον έσχηκε) 378. The Word acts as is characteristic of the Word, and the flesh acts as is characteristic of the flesh: one shines with miracles, the other undergoes humiliation.” John Chrysostom also clearly testifies that in Christ there are two different actions: the action of humanity and the omnipotent action of the Divine. Thus, “he works on earth and feels tired, but in heaven he controls the elements; on earth he hungers, but in heaven he rules over the winds; on earth it experiences fear, but in heaven it thunders; there will be a judgment seat on earth, but in heaven the Judge Himself.” Finally, Cyril of Alexandria in the 32nd chapter of “Treasures” also commands to recognize two natural actions in Christ when he says: “We will in no way allow that there should be one natural action of God and creation, lest through this we either raise the created to the level of a Divine being, or reduce the superior Divine nature to the place proper to the creature: with the perfect sameness of the action, the nature is the same” 379 . In addition to the above, Maxim points out some other testimonies of the Church Fathers about the two wills and actions of Christ, especially Dionysius the Areopagite and Cyril of Alexandria. But since the Monothelites also referred to the sayings of these fathers, we find it more convenient to consider them when presenting the Monothelite teaching on the basis of the dogmatic-polemic works of Maximus. Having cited all the considered evidence of the indicated Church Fathers about the duality of natural actions in Christ, Maximus concludes: “from the cloud of evidence (Heb. XIÏ 1) their right faith and right confession of the Savior of all Christ is quite clear, relying on which, they commanded the churches to recognize two natures of the same thing and in the same quantity - will and action” 380. Against such clear and decisive evidence of Holy Scripture and the authoritative fathers of the Church, confirming the truth of the unfused existence in the person of Christ of two natural wills and actions, the Monothelites could not put forward anything other than the abundant evidence of their Monophysite forerunners and their like-minded people, branded by the Ecumenical anathema. As for some of the few expressions of the Orthodox Church Fathers, on which the Monothelites tried to rely, then, as we have partly already seen, and partly we will see later, they more or less arbitrarily distorted their true meaning in relation to their tendencies. The previous study showed that the two natures of Christ exist in the hypostasis of the Word “unconfused and unchangeable.” Without undergoing quantitative and qualitative changes, the two natures of Christ, according to the Chalcedonian definition of faith, exist at the same time “inseparably.” The inseparability of the existence of the Divine and human natures of Christ should be understood in such a way that the two natures of Christ belong not to two different persons, connected with each other, perhaps by close moral ties, as Nestorius thought 381, but to one person, a single hypostasis of the Word: in it alone, one and the other nature of Christ acquires the reality of existence, has its own bearer or owner. The hypostasis of the Word, existing from eternity as a Divine hypostasis, as one of the Three Bearers of the Divine nature, then becomes, from the very first moment of the hypostatic union, the bearer or owner of the human nature of Christ, so that this latter becomes in time the same property of God the Word as the Divinity was for Him from eternity. The relationship of both natures of Christ or the incarnate God of the Word to the hypostasis of the Word becomes completely identical: the hypostasis of the Word is the bearer, the owner equally of both natures; and Divine and human nature to the same extent are an object of possession, the property of the Word 382. In close connection with this kind of relationship between the person and natures of Christ is the usual image of expression used in the doctrine of the incarnation: “God the Word (Θεός ό Λόγος) became incarnate, became man (σαρξ έγένετο, άνθρωπήσας, αληθώς γενόμενος άνθρωπος [became flesh, became man, truly becoming a man]) 383; “God the Word took the flesh into personal unity with Himself” or – “God the Word united the flesh with Himself” (ήνωσεν έαυτω τό καθ᾿ ύπόστασιν [united with Himself that which is hypostatic]) 384, etc. All such and expressions similar to them indicate that it is not the Divinity of Christ, which itself exists from eternity in the Word, as well as in the Father, and in the Holy Spirit, and, therefore, not the entire Holy Trinity, but God the Word, one of the Persons of the Holy Trinity, became the actual bearer, the owner of the humanity of Christ. The participation of other Persons of the Holy Trinity in the act of the incarnation of the Son consists in the fact that the Son of God became incarnate by the will of the Father with the creative influx of the Holy Spirit. Otherwise: in the incarnation of the Son, the will of the Father was expressed, realized through the creative influx of the Holy Spirit 385. In the light of this understanding of the nature of the relationship between ύπόστασις and φύσις as applied to Christ, the meaning of the expression “συγγενής”, used, by the way, in the famous saying of Cyril of Alexandria: “Christ revealed one of his (own) actions” 386. The relation of the hypostasis of the Word to the human nature of Christ is expressed in simple form by the Apostle Paul in the following words: “He made Himself of no reputation, taking the form of a servant” (Phil. IÏ 7). Some indication of this attitude of God the Word to the humanity of Christ can be seen in the image of the expressions of the following words of Maximus: “And that which has dominion (τό αύτό έπικρατούν) takes possession of that over which it has dominion” (κρατείται ύπό τού έπικρατουμένου ) 387 . A more direct and accurate indication lies in the word “οικείος” [domestic, i.e. one’s own], equivalent to “συγγενής” [akin], used in application to the human nature and will of Christ 388. Thus, the hypostasis of God the Word, without ceasing to be what it has always been, from the very first moment of the reception of flesh into it, ceases to be only an exclusively hypostasis of the Divinity existing in the Word, equally and completely becoming a hypostasis for both natures of Christ. So, from the time of the Incarnation, the simple eternal hypostasis of God the Word becomes a complex hypostasis (σύνθετος ύπόστασις), the hypostasis of the God-man, uniting in itself, as if in some “whole,” two natures with all their essential definitions, which (i.e., natures) in relation to it can be called in a certain sense “parts of the whole” 389. In a word, the hypostasis of Christ is complex in the combination of the natures existing in it (κατά σύνθεσιν έκ των φύσεων) 390. The complexity of the hypostasis is indicated by the name “Christ” 391; and since Christ is one and only of his kind, then the person of Christ, strictly speaking, cannot be called individual (άτομον individuum), because there is no such general genus (είδος) that could be called by the name “χριστότης” [“Christhood”], and under which Christ would fit as indivisible 392. All of Maximus’s explanations regarding the “complexity” of the hypostasis of Christ are directed mainly against the teaching of Severus about the “one godly hypostasis” of the incarnate Word, in the sense of “one godly or complex nature.” And with such a goal of these explanations, it seems completely appropriate and understandable that in the teaching of Maximus about the hypostatic or personal union [union according to hypostasis]) the first thing that attracts attention is the relative complexity of the hypostasis of Christ, i.e., the unfused and immutable, although inseparable, union of two natures with the preservation of all their essential definitions. The true, highest connection - and this is the “hypostatic” connection 393, which takes place where different essences or natures are united in one hypostasis or person 394 - consists in the fact (and this is its difference from the “substantial” and “affectual” connections) that, despite the reduction of the natural division of the parts united in a complex hypostasis to the greatest identity and unity 395, the qualitative the difference of united natures remains inviolable 396. So Christ, as Sophronius put it, at the same time is “έν καί δύο” [one and two]: one in hypostasis and face (κατά τήν ύπόστασιν καί πρόσωπον), and two in themselves natures and their natural characteristics (κατά τάς φύσεις αύτάς καί τάς φυσικάς αύτών ιδιότητας) 397. Exactly the same meaning, according to Maximus’s explanation, have the following two expressions of Gregory the Theologian: one (from a large apologetic speech): “one (person) from both (natures), and both through one” (έν έξ άμφοίν, καί δι᾿ένός αμφότερα ); another (from the second word about the Son): “Although both (i.e. Divinity and humanity) are one (έν), but not by nature, but by union (τή δέ συνάδω)”; and the following saying of Cyril of Alexandria (from the second letter προς Σούκενσον): “So the two (i.e. Divinity and humanity) are no longer two, but through both one living being is manifested (ώστε τά δύο μηκέτι μεν είναι δύο, δι άμφοίν δέ τό έν άποτελείσθαι ζώον)" 398. So, in one hypostasis of Christ there are two natures: neither unity breaks (merges or transforms) duality, nor does duality dissolve (separate) unity 399 . The conceivability of combining the duality of natures with the unity of hypostasis is evidenced by the doctrine of the Trinity God and the composition of human nature. Just as in God the identity or unity of essence and the trinity of hypostases or persons, and as in man, on the contrary, the unity of the face and the difference of the essences of soul and body do not exclude each other; Likewise, in Christ, personal unity or identity and natural difference (duality) do not contradict each other. And “as much as it is impossible that, recognizing the unity of the Divine nature, we should not at the same time confess hypostatic difference in the Holy Trinity, it is just as necessary to confess both unity and difference in One of the Holy Trinity” 400. Regarding the reference to the doctrine of the Trinity God, it should be noted that, in itself, little understanding of the possibility of combining two natures in one person of Christ, since the doctrine of the Trinity God and the doctrine of the person of Christ represent two examples of the mutually inverse relationship between ύπόστασις and φύσις, from the quantitative side 401 this analogy made, however, accessible to the imagination each is the indisputable theoretical foundation of the Orthodox teaching that the concepts “ύπόστασις” and “φύσις” are not identical, and that, therefore, the number of persons does not correspond to the number of spiritual natures and vice versa; and thereby negatively pointed to the conceivability of combining natural duality with personal unity in Christ. As for the composition of human nature, it represents a phenomenon somewhat similar to the complex hypostasis of Christ and somewhat clarifies the conceivability and possibility of combining two natures in one person of Christ. It is remarkable that opponents of the Orthodox (for example, Severus, Pyrrhus, etc.) also pointed out the complexity of man, seeing in it a phenomenon similar to the “complex nature” of Christ, with a difference in essences. Both of them, from their point of view, were right, and the question of the legality of using the analogy in question on the part of the Orthodox and their opponents is resolved from the point of view of the obligatory basic view of both of them on ύπόσασις, φύσις and ούσία. The only point is that the analogy in question is a double-edged sword, namely: just as in a person the beginning of life and movement is the soul, which spiritualizes the body and acts through it, as through an organ that is lifeless in itself (let us remember here what we said earlier in explaining the essence of Maximus’ answer to Pyrrhus’s objection, that if in the question of the number of actions in Christ we proceed from the difference of essences or natures, then Christ will have to be ascribed not two, but three actions, since man consists of two different essences), and in Christ - opponents of the Orthodox could object and, in fact, objected - every natural movement comes from the Word, sometimes acting through the flesh, as through a natural, but in itself motionless organ. Maxim could not help but see what kind of weapon he had to fight with, and therefore he did not carry out the analogy in question beyond the indicated relationship, as he did with the analogy of the “hot sword.” True, using such a weapon, Maxim is not defenseless: in refutation of the objection raised, which they want to say, mainly, that the action of Christ is one, just as the action of the instrument (οργάνου) and the doer (τού κινούντος) is one, Maxim says 402, that “complex action (σύνθετος ενέργεια) also belongs to complex nature; meanwhile, the genesis of parts of any complex nature is mutually modern (όμόχρονον) and dependent (άκούσιον), that is, limited by space and time; This means that the Word is contemporary with the flesh, and the flesh is co-eternal with the Word... just as the soul and body are contemporary.” The image of the hypostatic existence (τρόπος της ύπάρξεως) of the natures of Christ is expressed in the language of Maximus by the concept “τιεριχώρησις εις άλλήλας” [the transition of one into another], denoting “circulation”, mutual penetration of natures 403. Being hypostatically united, the natures of Christ are so closely intertwined with each other that they seem to mutually penetrate each other. The consequence of this relationship of natures is “άντίδοσις ιδιωμάτων” (reciprocatio) - “communication of properties” of one and another nature or, as is commonly called, “communicatio idiomatum”. A further consequence of the mutual penetration of natures is “θέωσις” - the “deification” of human nature 404. But άντίδοσις and θέωσις constitute only a logical consequence of what is called “περιχώρησις”, and this latter is only the logical prius [starting position] of the former; in fact, they are all given at once. The personal union of natures cannot be viewed as a process that occurs gradually and has certain gradations of union: such a point of view is appropriate only with the Nestorian image of the union of the natures of Christ. With the moral union of natures conceived by Nestorius, the two natures of Christ still remain two different subjects at the end of the process of union. With a strictly substantial or physical union of natures, as the union appears from the point of view of the Monophysite view, the duality of natures included in the union is destroyed after the union through a merger or through the transformation of natures or essences. Only with the Orthodox image of representation, the union of natures with the preservation of duality with personal unity at each mental moment of the connection remains in the same form: without change or fusion at the beginning and without division at the end of the connection. And that logically περιχώρησις precedes and conditions άντίδοσις and θέωσις is quite clear, firstly, from the very name of the image and the consequences of the connection, and secondly, from that very successful comparison, which, following the example of other fathers, Maxim uses to clarify the image and consequences of the hypostatic union of natures, denoted by the indicated concepts, - from the comparison with the “red-hot sword” (πεπυρακτωμένη μάχαιρα). An iron sword, put into fire, becomes so hot that it itself becomes like fire (πυρ τή ενώσει γεγένμται [becomes fire from the connection], i.e. τό σίδηρον [iron]), completely imbued with it: fire penetrates into every smallest particle of iron. From here it happens that iron perceives or assimilates the property of fire - burning (ή καύσις). But fire, connecting with iron and penetrating it, does not remain without influence on it from the iron: it, too, is, as it were, penetrated by iron, acquiring the property of section (τομή) belonging to the latter. Thus, when combining (ένωσις) two dissimilar elements - fire and iron - their mutual penetration and the resulting mutual transfer, communication of properties belonging to both (άκρα τούτων εις άλληλα) is observed τιεριχώρησις καί άντίδοσις [the highest degree of this is mutual penetration and exchange]) 405. Maxim very consistently carries out the analogy with the “hot sword” beyond the indicated relationship, almost to the end, using it to clarify the essence and image of the hypostatic union of natures. So, first of all, the example of a red-hot sword partially explains the possibility of the co-existence of two natures in the one person of Christ with the preservation of the integrity of both natures and upon union. Just as two different elements - fire and iron - although they form one fiery sword when combined, they do not merge to the point of indistinction, they do not each lose their characteristics: fire - burning, and iron - heaviness (βρϊθος) and cross-section, but, preserving them, remain the same as they exist outside the connection, and by natural duality do not in any way violate the unity of the object. Likewise, the two natures of Christ, even when united in one hypostasis, remain qualitatively different natures, so that neither the unity of the person destroys the duality, nor the duality of natures violates the unity 406. Further, the example of a fiery sword helps to clarify the indicated image and consequences of the hypostatic union. From combining with fire, without losing its characteristics, iron acquires the property of fire and itself becomes like fire. So the humanity of Christ, “losing nothing of its nature and characteristic of its nature of action” from the union with the Divine, δια τήν άκραν φύσεων εις άλλήλας περιχώρησιν [due to extreme penetration natures into each other] is so imbued with the Divine or deified that, rising to the level of the nature of the Word, it acquires the dignity and greatness naturally inherent in the Divine nature of Christ 407. Just as fire and iron act inseparably (άδιστάτως indivise) in relation to what is inherent in each other by nature (τα τε κατά φύσιν ιδίαν), so the Divinity and humanity of Christ act what is characteristic of each in communication with each other (cum alterius communione μετά της θατέρου κοινωνίας [with the inclusion of another]), as Pope Leo put it in his dogmatic letter to Flavian 408. But, despite the inseparability (μή διήρηνται) of images or works (αποτέλεσμα) of the actions of fire and iron, combined in a fiery sword, the action of fire (ή τού πυρός ένέργεια ) and iron (ή τού ξίφους ένέργεια) are different. The same must be said regarding the actions of the Divinity and humanity of Christ 409. Finally, “nothing prevents us from naming or calculating the nature of iron, although it is connected with fire, and its natural action, despite the fact that the latter is inseparable from the action of fire. In the same way, there is no point in not calculating the will that is naturally inherent in human nature and not recognizing the perfection in this regard of God the Word according to humanity, despite His inseparable union and closest communication with everything that is characteristic of human nature (except, of course, sin), and, consequently, with nature itself, which was accomplished for the sake of our salvation by the good will of the Father with the active participation of the Holy Spirit" 410. Hence the legitimacy of the formulas “δύο φύσεις”, “δύο θελήματα or θελήσεις” and “δύο ένέργειαι”. In addition to all the relationships indicated by Maxim, the complexity of the hypostasis of Christ can also be partially understood using the same example. It is impossible not to admit that the above analogy is very successful in all respects: it greatly helps to bring the mysterious teaching about the image and consequences of the hypostatic union of the natures of Christ closer to ordinary human understanding through likening it to an accessible representation of each phenomenon. Beyond all this, Maximus’s teaching about the image and consequences of the hypostatic union requires some clarification. So, first of all, regarding the very image of the hypostatic existence of natures, it should be noted that although it is said that both natures penetrate each other, penetration in the proper sense belongs, as was shown by the example of the red-hot sword, to the Divine nature of the Word. Just as fire, penetrating into every smallest particle of iron, colors it and in its action makes it similar to itself, so the Divinity of the Word penetrates, so to speak, into the flesh and blood of the human nature of Christ and sets its seal on all the movements of the human spirit, so that the human nature of Christ in fact in all its movements and actions is expressed as the own nature of the incarnate God of the Word, as a second, but, nevertheless, true and actual nature; in short, she is “deified.” The deification of the human nature of Christ should be understood not in the sense of a change or transformation of humanity into Divinity, 411 since, despite the union with the Divinity, humanity, like iron, “loses nothing of its nature and its characteristic action,” but in the sense of “being likened to the Divinity.” The Godlikeness of human nature reaches in Christ the highest degree of perfection: the human word is powerless in depicting the immeasurable participation of the human nature of Christ, as the second nature of God the Word, in the unspeakable greatness and dignity of the Divine nature of the Word. Attempts by the theological mind to grasp this greatness in thought were often resolved into a formula inconvenient for the Orthodox Church. So, for example, regarding the deification of the human nature of Christ, Gregory of Nazianzus (in orat. XLII) expresses himself this way: being completely imbued with the Divine, the flesh of Christ “became that which is what it is imbued with, and - I dare say - “όμόθεον” [equally divine] 412.” Such an expression, in any case, cannot be called accurate. In short: the penetration and resulting deification of the human nature of Christ must be understood in the sense of the inseparability of the existence and mode of action of the humanity of Christ from the existence and mode of action of the Divinity of the Word 413; and, as such, penetration belongs to some extent to the humanity of Christ. God the Word is the true bearer of human nature, and, therefore, the responsible owner, in the full sense its master; This means that penetration belongs in the strict sense to the Divinity of the Word. But it, as such, does not remain without influence on it, although to a lesser extent, from what it owns. “So, for example, gold, having dominance over silver and, perhaps, copper mixed with it, is itself subject to possession by these latter, although to a lesser extent, in accordance, of course, with the amount of mixing” 414. Thus, in fact, there is a mutual penetration of natures (περιχώρησις εις άλλήλας). The hypostatic union of natures or the mutual, possibly close, to the point of impossibility of separation, vital communication of natures is constant and unchangeable. Having begun from the primary moment of union, it then never, not for a single minute, ceases so that in everything that Christ experiences, no matter what He does in one way or another, Christ, the Word incarnate, is known in everything. “Unchangeably made man” (άτρέπτως γενόμενος άνθρωπος) God the Word wanted and acted “not only as God, in accordance with his Divinity, but at the same time as a man, in accordance with his humanity,” because the one and only Christ is equally true God and perfect people 415. So, for example, the Divine performed miracles, but not without the participation of the flesh; humiliation and suffering were endured by the flesh, but not separately from the Divine; hence – “the community of glory (κοινόν της δόξης) and the community of humiliation (κοινόν της ύβρεως communitas contumeliae), which the Church Fathers speak of τω της άντιδόσεως τρόπω [in the image of mutual exchange]" 416. In the same exact sense, we call God suffering for sins, and the assumed flesh - completely deified: “we confess the One and the Same as subject to suffering and impassive, as created and uncreated, as earthly and heavenly, as visible and intelligible, known and (sensually) incomprehensible” 417. That is, by virtue of the hypostatic union of natures, everything that in one way or another comes from Christ as God or as man, every Divine and human movement and action, we attribute to one and the same Christ, as a whole, 418, as the only owner of both natures, thereby pointing to the way of existence of natures and to the new and mysterious way of revealing the natural actions of Christ arising from it (ό καινός καί απόρρητος τρόπος τής των φυσικών τού Χριστού ένεργειών έκφάνσεως ) 419 . In this sense, it is permissible to talk about some θεανδρική ένέργεια and we should not at all shy away from the expression: “ή συγγενής δι᾿άμφοίν (i.e. manifested through the powerful Divine command and the touch of the flesh) μία ένέργεια ”, in thought and in the way of expressing it, it is close to the expression of Dionysius 420. An example of the combined action of the natures of Christ is the miraculous fact of the resurrection of the daughter of the leader of the synagogue, which took place by the omnipotent wave of the Divine with the participation of the flesh. Bringing her back to life with His all-powerful command (“maiden, arise!”), Christ took the deceased by the hand (Luke VIII: 54), touched her hand with His most pure flesh 421. True, this is not a particularly good example, because the participation of the flesh here is limited to this kind of manifestation of the natural energy of humanity, which was not disputed by both Monophysites and Monothelites. But there is another similar example, indicating the participation of the flesh of Christ more complete and perfect. Such an example is represented by the Savior’s prayer for the cup, to which Maxim turns more than once 422. Seeing the approach of the mortal cup, Christ prayed to God the Father: “My Father! if possible, let this cup pass from Me.” Christ, as a man, would like to avoid death, would like not to drink this cup - not out of cowardice (excessive, unreasonable timidity), but by instilling a “natural fear” of death, as a natural indicator of the power of self-preservation inherent in Him as a person 423. The awareness of the full weight of responsibility for human sins, for which He voluntarily doomed Himself to death on the cross, suppressed at that moment His human well-being so much that, allowing human nature to act in its own way, He voluntarily constrained Himself with the fear of death. This was not a manifestation of cowardice, since the suffering of Christ had not a punitive, but a cleansing meaning 425. And the consciousness of the terrifying responsibility was balanced and even completely paralyzed in Him by the consciousness of the work for which He came, and in the name of which Christ, as a man who had just expressed the desire not to drink the cup for fear of death, willingly goes towards death, directing His human will to fulfill the will of God, and with humility says: “... however, let it not be as I want, but as You! 426" Here Christ is seen acting and conscious of Himself, mainly as a man, but not separately from God, or, to be more precise, God the Word, acting through the medium of his own human soul. And in general, no matter what Christ did, His human soul mediated in everything: God the Word, as the owner of human nature, controlled the body like a human, lived, thought and acted like a human, and all this was accomplished through the medium of the soul, just as the very union of the Divine with the body and their constant and inextricable communication was possible only through the medium of a thinking and rational soul. God is spirit; the highest mind and freedom could be united in a hypostatic way only with the spirit, reflecting in itself the highest perfections of God; and through the soul, God the Word was also united with the body, existing inseparably with the soul. The personal union of God the Word with human nature is precisely because human nature itself, as noted above, is God-like and in this sense not undivine: as the image of the Divine, it naturally strives for Its prototype. The human “natural” will naturally strives to fulfill the will of God, as the highest law, as the highest norm of its activity; deviation from this law is a sin, which later entered into human nature 427. This means that in human nature, as it emerged from the hands of the Creator, there was nothing that would hinder, make unthinkable and impossible the free union of the Divine with humanity. In relation to the humanity of Christ, the news and mystery of the mode of action of the God-man denotes the inseparability of the mode of action of the humanity of Christ from the mode of action of the Divinity of the Word. All movements and actions of the human nature of Christ, as the nature of the incarnate Word, are elevated and assimilated to the Word, as a person responsible for His own actions, as a result of which the mode of action of the humanity of Christ was different, superior to ours 428. This superiority consists in the fact that Christ acted completely freely as a human being. So, if He was indeed beset by hunger and thirst, then not as we are, but as One who is higher than us, and precisely: He submitted to them voluntarily 429. Let us explain with a specific example. Jesus Christ felt hunger in the desert. He could, of course, satisfy the natural feeling of hunger: as an omnipotent God, He could, for example, turn stones into bread and be satisfied. But, since He Himself was pleased to “give human nature the time to act characteristic of it,” He voluntarily refuses such satisfaction of natural feelings and stands above it. Or, for example, He voluntarily constrains Himself with the fear of death and at the same time does not succumb to it, willingly meeting it halfway. That is, we personally do not have the power to prevent our desires and, striving to satisfy them, sometimes act contrary to reason, giving our will a direction that is inconsistent with nature. And this depends, mainly, on the fact that the course of our life, the direction of our natural activity, is led by us ourselves - responsible bearers of human nature corrupted by sin. The life of Christ’s humanity was different: everything inherent in His human nature did not constrain the freedom of His actions and, as invariably obedient to reason, was certainly in accordance with the will of the Word 430. An example of “greatest agreement” (“άκρα σύννευσις” or, as elsewhere it is called – “όλον δι᾿ολου σύννευσις καί συμφυΐα [whole in the rapprochement and fusion of all]”) of the human will of Christ with His Divine will, which is identical with God the Father, is represented by the famous words: “...however, let it not be as I want, but as You want” 431. The direction of the natural powers and faculties of Christ's humanity depended on the Divine will of the Word: “The Word incarnate, as man, had an innate faculty of will, moved and shaped by His Divine will.”432 In a word, the mode of action of Christ's humanity was determined by the Word: the life and movement of Christ's human nature, having a sufficient basis for itself in nature itself, was formed by the ruler of human nature - the Word, as a personal principle, the seat of which was the human soul, the human spirit. Hence, the Word controlled directly himself, and through him, the body akin to him. The general supernatural character of the humanity of the Word, along with the will, is shared by the human mind (νους) of Christ. Maxim assigns the most modest place to the question of knowledge of Christ: with a judgment that is quite brief and general, although not vague,! St. father about this subject we meet only once 433. But the little that the dogmatic-polemic works of St. represent in this regard. Maximus, can easily be completed with the help of those general provisions that the closest application in Maximus’ Christology has to the question of the will in Christ. In the question of the knowledge of Christ, Maxim stands on the basis of the teachings of Gregory the Theologian, who in the second word about the Son, taught about it this way: it is absolutely clear to everyone that, as God, He has perfect knowledge; and His own words about what He does not know must be applied to Him as a person and considered in the mental separation of what is visible or manifested from what is thought or imagined. From here Maxim draws the fair conclusion that it is permissible to attribute ignorance to Christ under one condition only: with the mental separation of essences. And since the two natures of Christ actually exist inseparably in the single hypostasis of the incarnate God the Word, then in reality Christ should not be able to assimilate anything that is conceivable in Him “in separation” 434 . Thought of St. Father, obviously, is this: the human nature perceived by Christ in itself did not possess perfect knowledge, it was “ignorant”; but, having become the nature of the Word and the receptacle of eternal truth and hypostatic wisdom, it received complete and perfect knowledge. From what has been said, it is obvious how Maxim should have looked at the teaching of the Agnoites: Maxim directly calls their teaching a heresy (ή ήδη τών Αγνοητών κατακριθεΐσα αι [the already condemned heresy of the Agnoites]) 435. So briefly and generally expressed by Maxine, the opinion about the knowledge of Christ requires some reservations and clarifications. God the Word assumed human nature, similar to us in everything except sin. Consequently, the thinking soul perceived by Him, “the natural action of which (according to the definition of Gregory of Nyssa) is the movement and reflection of the mind” καί διάνοια) 436, or the mind (νούς) had the same character of naturalness as the will 437, that is, by its very nature it was distinguished by imperfection. But the mind, like the will, is an innate ability of the soul, it is ενέργεια of the spirit, “the natural life of people” (ζωή φυσική) 438. This means that the imperfection of the mind in question is an imperfection of the cognitive ability itself and is related to the content of knowledge acquired by this latter to the extent that it depends on the ability itself. Now, Christ accepted a thinking and rational soul, or mind; perceived him as he is by nature, that is, an imperfect mind. From the union with hypostatic wisdom he became perfect in everything, that is, he received the ability of complete and perfect knowledge. But from the union with the Word, the mind did not lose its natural movement, and Christ, after the union, did not cease to live and think humanly (the opposite thought is the Monophysite one), did not cease to live the life of the thinking spirit of the human, so that this latter was not completely obscured by the power and wisdom of the Word, eclipsing all greatness (1 Cor. I24), as Origen thought, and was not completely supplanted by the Divinity of the Word, as they thought Arius and Apollinaris, or did not transform into Divinity. “The mind of the Lord,” rightly argues Athanasius the Great, “is not yet the Lord, but either the will, or the rational desire, or the desire (strength, ability to strive) for something” (Νούς Κυρίου ούπω Κύριος, άΛΛ᾿ ή θέΛησις, ή βούΛησις (βουλή), ή ενέργεια τιρός τι) 439. Remaining even after the mind united the human nature of Christ, the human spirit received only the ability not only to reflect in itself the life of the Divinity united with it, but also to actively comprehend the Divine nature of the hypostatic wisdom of the Word; and, therefore, received the full opportunity to actively reach the knowledge of absolute truth (which, by the way, is the ultimate goal of human life, so the example of Christ represents in this, as in all others, an unattainably high ideal for imitation). But such activity of the human spirit of Christ does not mean that Christ gradually improved in knowledge, in fact not knowing at first what he learned only later: Maxim decisively rejects the idea of ​​​​a (non-Thorian) “gradual” development of the human mind of Christ. This only means that Christ, as a man, immediately, at the very union, received the ability of complete and perfect knowledge and had no need “for learning and progress” (μάθησις καί προκοπή) 440. The words of the evangelist (Luke IÏ 52 Lk. I40) about “the advancement of Jesus in wisdom, and age, and love” (καί Ιησούς προέκοπτε σοφία καί ηλικία, καί χάριτι ...) and the words of Himself The Savior (Mark XIIÏ 32 Matthew XXIV: 36) that no one knows about the time of His second coming except the Father, even the Son, should be understood in the sense that He used this ability οικονομικώς, wisely applying it to the circumstances of human life, since He Himself “gave nature the time to act characteristic of it.” Thus, being in a state of humiliation, to the question of the disciples about the last days and the future fate of the world, Christ answered that no one knows about it except the Father. And He said this when he so vividly painted for the eyes of his disciples a picture of the future, as if it were past or present. After His resurrection, being in a state of glorification, Christ answered the same question of the disciples somewhat differently: it is not given to you (He is silent about Himself here) - as Christ would say so - to know the secrets of the Kingdom of God (Acts I7) 441. Maximus’s view of the “knowledge” of Christ can be roughly represented in this way. The same circumstance that in the works of the fathers and teachers of the Orthodox Church, and in particular Maximus, we do not find a more or less clearly and definitely expressed teaching on this subject does not mean at all that the fathers and teachers of the Church did not attach any importance to the question of knowing Christ in relation to the hypostatic union of natures, as Brown thinks, among other things, 442 . Neither Maximus nor the other Church Fathers reject the truly human activity of the human mind in Christ (although it is immeasurably superior to the activity of the ordinary human mind), although they do not directly define what exactly this activity consists of. Unfortunately, in the present case we do not have the opportunity to trace the history of the development of the teaching of the Church Fathers on this subject for a very simple and understandable reason. Revealing and proving the Orthodox teaching about two wills in Christ, Maxim at the same time subjected to the most detailed analysis the teaching of the Monothelites, which constitutes the negative side of his dogmatic and polemical works. “In Christ there is one will, and this is personal will” - this is the main principle of monothelitism, constituting its essence. But this far from exhausts the area of ​​error of monothelitism. As a doctrine, monothelitism was not so stable and consistent as to maintain its basic view from beginning to end: in its entirety, it is a rather confused and contradictory doctrine. Maxim sees an example of the instability and inconsistency of monothelitism, by the way, in the person of Sergius, this outstanding figure of the famous union and the first exponent of the principles of monothelitism proper. “To tell the truth,” says Maximus to Pyrrhus 443, “nothing repels me so much from your predecessor (i.e., Sergius) as the resourcefulness of his (mind) and the resulting variability and inconstancy of his (thoughts). Either he shares the opinion of those who attribute to Christ only the Divine will, and represents Christ simply as God incarnate; then he thinks in the same way with those who consider Christ nothing more than an ordinary person who is no different from Pyrrhus and Maximus; then, calling the will personal, together with the difference of persons, introduces the difference of wills with the sameness of essences; then recognizes the relative union (of natures); then he takes the side of those who attribute choice and spontaneous inclination to Christ, and thinks of Him as a simple man, subject even to variability and sin; then he agrees with those who think of Christ, outside the economy, as not possessing a will; and other countless absurdities, whatever would follow from this doctrine, as devoid of a true basis, for the presentation of which there would not be enough time, he shared. If such diverse and diverse versions of the same teaching could coexist in the head of one, then there is no need to say that in the person of several of its representatives, monothelitism has experienced a whole history of changes, complications and alterations. In the overall form in which Monothelitism is outlined in the dogmatic-polemical works of Maxim, it is a doctrine so confusing that it is absolutely not easy to determine what the Monothelites themselves actually recognized as undoubted and what they merely admitted in one form or another. One thing is certain that the relatively later monothelitism (Pyrrhus and Peter) bears major features of difference from the earlier monothelitism (monoergism of Theodore of Paran, Cyrus and partly Sergius): not maintaining the character of strict monism, which is the original monothelitism, it introduces significant complications, some of which are even in direct contradiction with the main principle of monothelitism. Maxim does not believe that there is a difference between the original framework of monothelitism and its later layers, and everything that has one or another relation to monothelitism is considered in general connection as one and the same teaching. Based on the truth of the unity of the hypostasis of Christ and assimilating the will of the hypostasis, monothelitism affirmed the singularity of the will in Christ. “Christ is one; This means that there is one and one who wants, one and one who acts; and if so, then one, certainly, is the will of Christ, and not two, one and His action as one,” argues, for example, Pyrrhus in a conversation with Maximus 444. Maxim sees the entire impossibility of conceiving one will in Christ in the circumstance that such a fundamental position consistently leads to a change in the natural character of united natures through the reduction of the omnipotent Divinity to the level of humanity, which is limited in the beginning and continuation of its existence, through the elevation of this latter to the height of the first and through their perfect equalization. By one and the same omnipotent action, with which, as God, Christ brought everything from non-existence into being, contains everything and controls everything, He, as a person, also performs ordinary human affairs (such as eating and drinking, moving from place to place, feeling thirst, hunger, fatigue, needing sleep, etc.) etc.), so that “the Divinity of Christ is subject to affects and suffering” 445. Since the will, according to the teachings of the Monothelites, constitutes an essential determination of the person, and not of nature, the character of the will of Christ is entirely determined, according to them, by the character of the hypostasis of the incarnate Word. The hypostasis of Christ is “complex”: it is the hypostasis of God the Word, which has completely become the hypostasis of humanity received by the Word; such must be the action and will of Christ. To Christ, as a whole, 446 must be attributed in a certain sense a complex will and a complex godly action, that is, such a will and such action as should be characteristic, in their opinion, of the bearer, the owner of one complex nature. It is not impossible, says Pyrrhus, for us to attribute to Christ one, in some sense, complex will, formed from the combination of two natural wills, complex in the same sense in which we speak of one (person), formed from the combination of two natures of Christ 447. Reasoning in this way, the Monothelites take the view that the whole (person) is something other than its own parts (natures) of which it consists and which exist in it ( οικεία μέρη, εξ ών καί έν οίς συνέστηκεν), that it has a natural existence other than its constituent parts (έτέραν παρά τήν των οικείων μερών κατά φύσιν ύπαρξιν εχειν τό όλον ). If this is so, then Christ, as a whole, should rightly be ascribed another action, in addition to the actions essentially characteristic of his parts ( μέρεσιν ούσιώδεις ένεργείας ) 448 . This point of view is wrong. In fact, the whole is identical with its parts: the whole (person) brings absolutely nothing to the essential content of its constituent parts (natures) and has no “other” natural existence (μή έτέραν κατά φύσιν ύπαρξιν), other than that belonging to the nature existing in it; does not, therefore, have “other” natural action (ούδ᾿ έτέραν δηλονότι κατά φύσιν ένέργειαν) 449. And Christ, as a whole, as a complex hypostasis, “has only that which is characteristic of each of His natures (τά έκατέρας ίδια φύσεως κατά φύσιν έχει ό Χριστός), i.e. e. Divine will and action and human will and action,” and does not have anything other than what is characteristic of His natures, so that in no way can one be attributed to Him one action or, in addition to two natural ones, another third action 450. True, Sergius’s immediate successors, Pyrrhus and Peter, proposed recognizing precisely these three actions and wills in Christ; but it is unlikely that even they themselves looked at their invention other than as a last resort to reach an agreement, which had nothing in common with the basic view of monothelitism. If, in fact, it were possible to attribute to Christ as a whole, in a sense, a complex will, different from natural wills, then, first of all, it would not be a personal will, simply because the face of Christ is complex not in itself, but only in relation to the inseparably existing natures in it. A personal complex will, if it were possible to think of such a thing in Christ, would be a combination of two personal ones (and “τό γνωμικόν θέλημα” used here by Maximus is, as was said above, only another name for “θέλησις ύποστατική") will: Divine and human, - a mental connection of two impossibilities 451. A hypostatic Divine will does not exist at all, and such a will is absolutely impossible to attribute to Christ without violating the equality of the Son with God the Father and with the Holy Spirit regarding will 452. As for the personal human will, called γνωμικόν θέλημα, although such a will actually exists as a way of using the volitional ability of the innate soul, in application to Christ there can be no talk of it because of its imperfection, which is certainly alien to Christ as a person 453. The mental complex will of Christ could rather be “natural,” that is, one that would represent a real unity of two natural wills and could be called personal only in the sense of union (ένώσεως τρόπω), since the beginning of unity is represented by a person. According to Pyrrhus, the Monothelites, in essence, imagined the will of Christ in this way 454. Not to mention the very name of the one complex will of Christ (and it cannot be called by the name of those natures, in the combination (έν σύνθεσι) of which they see the basis for recognizing such a will for Christ 455), the assumption of such a will leads to no less absurdities in dogmatic terms. If we attribute to Christ action (and, consequently, will) “from union,” says Maximus, then we will have to admit that “before union” He had no action, and in order to create the world it was necessary to first arouse in Him the power of creativity. In addition: since the Father and the Holy Spirit stand outside the actual union with the flesh, then they, like the Son, do not have the ability to act, and therefore the power of creativity, to say the least 456. Maximus’s thought is that even before the union of natures, from eternity, God the Word possessed the Divine will, which could not change or merge with the will of humanity perceived by Him, so that, despite the hypostatic union of two natures and the fact that everything natural, as real property, belongs to one person, two actions, as well as other features of the united natures, cannot be considered as one and only object of possession, as one “complex” action. So, one complex, called “godly” action (μίας θεανδριχής ενεργείας) cannot in any way be allowed in Christ. The Monothelites, therefore, had one of two options: either, remaining true to their fundamental principles, strictly adhere to the doctrine of μία ενέργεια and έν θέλημα, or, sacrificing their fundamental principles, completely abandon the thought of one action and will. Monothelites choose the first path and, from the point of view of their basic view, try to clarify the role of humanity in the hypostatic union of natures. The Monothelites justify their teaching about έν θέλημα by the fact that although Christ assimilates “one action of the whole” (μία ενέργεια όλου), composed of three parts: the Divinity, the rational soul and body, but since “the producer and author of the action is God, and humanity is only only an organ" (τεχνίτης καί δημιουργός ό Θεός, όργανον δέ ή άνθρωπότης), then the active will in Christ is only one, and namely the Divine (αυτού τό θέλημα έν έστι καί τούτο θεϊκόν) 457. These three provisions, first expressed by Theodore of Paran, constitute the final basis and real essence of the Monothelite doctrine of έν θέλημα, disguised by the doctrine of μία ένέργεια όλου. The view of subsequent representatives of monothelitism essentially boils down to these three provisions. True, without speaking out as openly as Theodore regarding the role of humanity, they find it possible, when teaching about έν θέλημα, to interpret the participation of human nature in the accomplishment of what is characteristic of Christ as a whole, and they speak of “relative assimilation” (σχετικν \ οίκείωσις) Christ of human will 458. But it is not dark to anyone that their conceivable assimilation of the human will does little to distinguish the humanity of Christ from the non-self-moving instrument of action of its owner and in actu almost does not even complicate the activity of the Divine will of the Word. “Relative” assimilation, which, in contrast to “essential” or natural (ούσιχυδη οίκείωσις [essential assimilation]) can be called personal and affective, consists in the fact that “out of sympathy, out of disposition” we assimilate to ourselves and only apparently experience what we like in another, in reality in fact, without experiencing anything from it 459: this is simply an adaptation to the lifestyle and method of action of another. The assimilation in this sense of the human will by Christ does not mean that the human will constitutes the inalienable property of Christ as its true owner, but simply that out of love for the human race, οίχωνομιχώς [economically] God the Word was applied to the way of life and actions of people 460. Coming from here, it was easy to come to the idea that Christ adapted to the way of life of the flesh He assumed only at times, only when it was especially necessary to achieve the goal of the incarnation, and precisely only “during saving suffering” (έν τω καιρώ μόνω του σωτηρίου πάθους ) 461 . Considering it completely unnecessary to enter into a detailed discussion of Christ’s so-understood assimilation of the human will, Maxim pronounces the following fair sentence over the Monothelites. Teaching about the relative assimilation of the human will, “they surpassed the North itself in wickedness, being more daring in words (μάλλον ύπεραυδήσαντες), since he did not rebel against the truth with such recklessness” 462. As for the opinion about the temporary assimilation of human will, it represents the height of all untruths and inconsistencies associated with the Monothelite teaching. “The idea that only during the time of saving suffering Christ actually revealed Himself as possessing two wills, I believe, is unproven. How is this so, on what basis only at this time, and not before? After all, if He had (human will) then, then He had it from the very beginning (from the moment) when he became a man, and did not add it later; and if he didn’t have it at first, then he didn’t have it during his suffering and only revealed in a ghostly way all that through which we were saved... Why is it like this (i.e. only during suffering), and not otherwise? And what is the point of this? 463 It goes without saying that Maximus’s assimilation of the human will, conceived by the Monothelites, extends to the very human nature of Christ 464. In confirmation of the truth of their teaching, the Monothelites referred to some of the illustrious fathers and teachers of the Church: snatching from their works fragmentary sayings that, out of connection with the whole, seemed to them to speak most expressively in favor of their own teaching, they interpreted them in their own way, in relation to their tendencies. Maxim’s task, it would seem, was to clarify the real meaning of these latter by restoring the actual connection of the fragmentary expressions indicated by the Monothelites. But Maxim does not do this. Such an apologetic technique partly takes place only in relation to the sayings of Cyril of Alexandria. In relation to all others, Maxim uses the same means of struggle as when assessing the Monothelite teaching in general, namely: everywhere he speaks about the impossibility of understanding this or that passage from the works of the Church Fathers in the sense assimilated to him by the Monothelites, arguing for the falsity of those conclusions that are connected with such an understanding. The fact that the sayings of Cyril of Alexandria represent the only exception in this regard can only be understood in the light of the well-known attitude of Monothelitism to the teaching of the great Alexandrian teacher - an attitude that does not extend to the teaching of other Fathers of the Church, to whose sayings the Monothelites pointed. The Monothelites referred to the sayings of the following Church Fathers: Gregory the Theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, Athanasius of Alexandria, Dionysius the Areopagite, Cyril of Alexandria and others (Patriarch Mina, Honorius and even Nestorius) 465. Thus, in a conversation with Maximus, Pyrrhus exposes the already known saying of Gregory the Theologian (from the second word about the Son) - “His will (the humanity of Christ), as completely deified, had nothing contrary to God” (That γάρ εκείνου θέλειν ούδέν ύπεναντίον τω Θεώ, θεωθέν όλον) - as one that allegedly contradicts the recognition of two wills in Christ 466. Against this understanding of the present passage, Maxim notices that, on the contrary, it is more expressive than all others (τών άλλον πάντων έχφαντίχώτερον), speaks for the duality of wills, namely: “no relation (σχέσίς relatio) cannot be conceived without objects of relation (άνευ τών σχετών).” Hence: just as the concept of “cooling” is connected with the idea of ​​the cooled and the cooling, with the concept of “thinking” (νόησις) - about the subject of thinking and about the thinker (τό νοούν καί νοούμενον), etc. In the same way, the concept of “deification” presupposes “deified and deified”, participating in the Divine and communing ( θεώσαν [thus, therefore, both deified and deified]) 467. In addition, if the deification of the human will prevents, as the Monothelites think, the recognition of two wills in Christ, then the deification of human nature - and deification extends, according to the teaching of Gregory the Theologian, equally to nature as to the will - would also prevent the recognition of two natures 468. In the words of Gregory of Nyssa, spoken by him in explanation of Matt. VIIÏ 3 Mk. I41 Lk. IV: 13 (“the soul wants, the body touches, and by the combined influence of both, leprosy is driven away” – ή ψυχή θέλει, τό σώμα άπτεται – δίάμφοτέρων φεύγει τό πάθος), which allegedly contain the idea that “the soul of the Lord wills with the Divine will (τω θείω θελήματί) of the Deity hypostatically united with Him (αύτω”), the monothelites, according to Pyrrhus, see an indication of έν θέλημα 469. Consistently pursuing the understanding of the Monothelites further, Maxim says that from the point of view of such an understanding, one would have to admit the validity of the extremely absurd position that “the body of the Lord is touched by the Divine touch” (τή θεία αφή). The words of Athanasius the Great - "Νούς Κυρίου ούπω Κύριος, αλλ᾿ ή θέλησίς, ή βούλησι, ς (ή βουλή ), ή ενέργεια προς tl " 470 – regarding the meaning of which Pyrrhus spoke indecisively 471, and which we have already had occasion to mention, according to the explanation of Maximus, contain the direct meaning that the natural life of the human soul inherent in Christ, no matter how it is called according to its distinctive characteristics, from the union flesh with the Word did not change one way or another, remaining in connection with what it was before the connection. Regarding the reference to them, Pyrrha Maxim notes that the basis of these words was the definition “θελήσεως, βουλήσεως καί ένεργείας” given by “the philosopher of philosophers” (φιλόσοφος των φιλοσόφων) Clement (in Book VI of Stromat). Of much greater interest to the Monothelites was another passage from Athanasius the Great, which reads like this: “He (Christ) was born of a woman, from the first moment of conception representing the image of a man in the revelation of the flesh, without carnal desires and human considerations, in the form of news. After all, (in Him) there was a single will of the Divine, since (His) nature was entirely Divine” 472. Tempting, as can be seen from Maxim’s explanations, with the last words (“έν είχόνι χαινότητος. Ή γάρ θέλησις, θεότητος μόνης” [in image of renewal. For the will of the deity alone]), which, without connection with the previous one, have a rather vague meaning (αμφίβολος) and represent the full possibility of understanding them in one way or another, in the place under consideration the Monothelites thought to find the expression of their teaching. The present place, according to Maxim, speaks sufficiently for itself (αύθερμήνευτος). The “news” that is spoken of here, according to Athanasius, relates to the mode of existence of the flesh of Christ, and not to its natural meaning ( τρόπου τής κατά σάρκα αύτού ύπάρξεως ); the way of existence of the flesh became new (sinless) in Christ due to the fact that the birth of Christ according to the flesh was a matter of the will of God alone. The Monothelites especially liked to refer to the following two sayings, of which one is adopted by Dionysius the Areopagite, and the other belongs to Cyril of Alexandria. Regarding the first of them (“Christ showed us a new, in a sense, godly action”; καινήν τινα τήν θεανδρίκήν ένέργειαν) it was noted above that some of the Monothelites arbitrarily added to it " μίαν ", meaning a quantitatively new action. Pyrrhus, in a conversation with Maximus 473, reads it without the addition “μίαν,” although he also understands “news” in the quantitative sense (ή καινότης έστί ποσότης [news is quantity]). Based on the fact that news, opposed to antiquity (παλαίοτης), constitutes not a quantitative, but a qualitative definition of things (ποίότης έστίν ή καινότης [news is quality]) and, even more so, is not the essence (ούκ ούσία ή καίνότης, άλλά ποιότης [news is not an essence, but a quality]), Maxim explains that the expression “καινή ενέργεια” [new action] means “qualitatively new and an inexplicable image of the discovery of the natural actions of Christ, in accordance with the inexplicable image of the mutual penetration of natures, and a new kind of life of the humanity of Christ himself, unheard of and unknown to the nature of things, and an image of communication occurring as a result of an ineffable unity.” As for the expression “θεανδρική”, it is “least” capable of denoting μίαν ένέργειαν: descriptively it indicates two different actions corresponding to the two natures counted in it (τούναντίον γάρ περίθμουμένων φύσεων τάς αυτών ενεργείας παραδέδωκεν [for on the contrary, this expression allegorically indicated their actions through countable natures]). That, indeed, this is precisely the thought contained both in this one word and in the whole given expression, Maximus proves in other places 474 (not in the conversation with Pyrrhus) on the basis of the context of the speech in Dionysius himself. In the IV letter to a certain Caius 475, immediately before the expression under consideration, it is said about the communication of the images of the action of both natures of Christ, due to which He performed what was characteristic of Christ as God and as a man not only as God and not just as a man, but as the God-man. The admission of one essentially or quantitatively new action equally leads to the denial of the consubstantiality of the Son with God the Father and their equality with respect to the Divine action manifested in creation, and in providence, and in the performance of miracles. As for another expression of Cyril of Alexandria - “Christ revealed one of his own actions in two ways” ( ό Χριστός ) 476 - since it most expressively speaks of a numerically one action, it apparently contradicted dio-felitism and most decisively favored monothelitism. Indeed, we see that the Monothelites have always and everywhere presented this expression as decisively contradicting the recognition of two actions in Christ. Thus, Sergius undoubtedly means him in his letter to Honorius when he says that some fathers have a teaching about μία ένέργεια. Cyrus also points to it, in Anathematism VII, referring to the teachings of Cyril; Pyrrhus also exposes him in a conversation with Maxim. Based on the fact that “St. the father did not know the most characteristic property of each nature (Christ), embracing all other natural properties,” that he clearly distinguished in Christ “the creative and vital energy originating from the soul and inherent in the body,” and comparing the expression in question with another, which says: “no sane person would agree to allow one action of the creator and the creature,” Maxim firmly stands on the fact that this expression in no way speaks of one action of both natures of Christ and, therefore, it does not at all contradict the recognition of two actions. Its direct meaning is that the action of the Divinity of Christ is “one,” both “before taking on” and “after taking on the flesh.” How fire has exactly the same (one) effect, both outside of connection with matter and when connected with it; in a similar way, the incarnate Word, acting in a twofold manner characteristic of God: incorporeally, “by omnipotent command” and with the participation of the flesh (“the touch of one’s own flesh”), had one action with God the Father, acting incorporeally, so that “the Divine and Fatherly action, essentially characteristic of the incarnate God the Word” and manifested in a twofold way, was in fact one 477 . Maximus's explanation of the given expression of St. Cyril gives us reason to mention another (unless it is another, and not the same expression, peculiarly formulated) expression of the same father, to which, by the way, Sergius refers in a letter to Cyrus: “Christ, our true God, has one life-giving action” (μία ζωοποιός ενεργεία). From the point of view of the explanation presented, this expression has the same meaning as the first, which is guaranteed by the words “with Christ, the true God.” That is, the image of Christ’s action as God is different, but His natural action as God is the same as that which belongs to Him from eternity as God the Word. The named fathers of the Church almost completely exhaust the circle of church authorities on which the Monothelites tried to rely, in the given fragmentary expressions they biasedly and erroneously saw confirmation and justification of their own teaching. The considered passages from the works of the mentioned Church Fathers, as far as one can judge about them from the explanation presented by Maximus, do not contain anything that could serve as a sufficient basis for understanding them in the sense adopted by the Monothelites. All the more unfounded is the claim of the Monothelites to see in the named fathers exponents of their own teaching. Monothelites could rightfully refer only to the teachings of those unrecognized teachers over whom, even before the rise of Monothelitism, a fair judgment was pronounced by the Universal Church, as heretics and leaders of heresy, such as: Apollinaris, Polemon, Themistius, Nestorius, Paul the Persian and others, short excerpts from whose works were collected and given by Maximus in his dogmatic letter to Stephen, Bishop of Dor. 478. The Roman Bishop Honorius should rightly be counted among them, to whom, indeed, the Monothelites (for example, Pyrrhus, in a conversation with Maximus) referred to, as one who definitely spoke out for “εν θέλημα of our Lord I. Christ.” But the fact is that Maximus holds a completely opposite view of the way of thinking of Honorius and even takes upon himself a rather bold defense of the more than dubious Orthodoxy of Honorius, in a rather lengthy apology 479 trying to prove that Honorius’s response letter to Sergius, both in its entirety and in parts, is strictly Orthodox. The circumstance that gave rise to the accusation of Honorius of monothelitism, as is known, was mainly the following expression found in his response letter to Sergius: “From here (όθεν unde) (i.e., on the basis of the ineffable union of the Divine and human natures) we recognize one will (εν θέλημα) of the Lord our I. Christ.” This expression was interpreted (of course, primarily by the Monothelites) in the sense that they recognize the one will of the Divinity and humanity of Christ. The content and tone of the entire message fully justified such an understanding. Maxim, of course, does not agree with this understanding of the above words. In his opinion, Honorius wanted to say the following with them: since the seedless conception and sinless birth of Christ in the flesh, which took place by inspiration of the Holy. Spirit, was the work of the will of God alone, then Christ as a man was completely free from the sinful carnal will (θέλημα σαρκός, ή λογισμόν έμπαθή [will of the flesh or passionate thought]), that “there was no other law in his members” ( έτερος νόμος) or will opposing the holy and Fatherly will (θέλημα διάφορον ή έναντίον τω Πατρί [will different or contrary to the Father]); and that, therefore, He had only a natural sinless will (άνθρώπινον θέλημα καί φυσικόν [human will and natural]) 480 Maximus points out two reasons for understanding the controversial expression in the anti-Monotheletian sense: one he sees in the connection. the expression in question with the words immediately following it, the other is in the content of the entire message. Due to the closest union of both natures in Christ and the resulting mutual exchange of their properties, “we recognize,” says Honorius, “the one will of our Lord I. Christ.” And immediately after that he continues: “since (έπειδή quia) our nature received education, undoubtedly, from (the action of) the Divine, and not from sin”; that is, by its supernatural birth, the flesh of Christ was sinless 481. It is obvious that Honorius Maximus places all the strength of the argument in this “επειδή” (quia), etc., and completely ignores the meaning of what “όθεν” (unde) points to. The further content of the message fully justifies, in Maxim’s opinion, its understanding. In the whole message, the idea is developed that Christ was completely free, again, only from the sinful carnal will (that is, εμπαθές θέλημα libidinosa ac vitiata voluntas), which has a direction that is inconsistent with nature (παρά φύσιν). In fact, some genuine expressions from the message of Honorius are cited, speaking about the sinless conception, the integrity of the flesh, the absence of a different law in the members of Christ’s flesh, and the absence in Christ of a “different” will, understood by Maximus in the sense of an opposing one 482 . But Honorius, according to Maximus, did not extend such a legal denial to natural will. “Honorios took away from Christ,” says Maximus, “not the natural, but the sinful will, not in agreement with nature” 483. And the fact that he denied an opposing will in Christ and, therefore, Maxim concludes, thought in Him a will that was in everything consistent with the Divine and Fatherly will, clearly speaks for the fact that he recognized a natural will in Christ, since the denial of something contrary to nature is tantamount to the recognition of the natural. From this it clearly follows that Honorius recognized two natural wills in Christ 484. Understanding Honorius’ message in this way, Maximus comes to what, in his opinion, is a plausible conclusion: that the opponents are lying, imposing on Honorius something that he did not write in his writings, and that Honorius is “clean from all suspicion” (of monothelitism) 485 . Maximus sees confirmation of the validity of his view of the way of thinking of Honorius in the agreement of the apology presented in defense of Honorius by Pope John IV with his own defense 486. The inconsistency of the defense of Honorius presented by Maximus is quite obvious: his proposed explanation of the reply letter to Sergius is somewhat confused, strained and rather strange. At first glance, it seems unclear what exactly Maxim means by Honorius’s “έν θέλημα”? Judging by the explanation presented by Maximus, with which, according to Maximus, the explanation given in the conversation with Pyrrhus, given in the apology of John IV, is in complete agreement - and here, meanwhile, the meaning of this expression is directly and definitely indicated 487 - it would seem that Maximus means by it exclusively the human natural will of Christ. The content of the entire message, as Maxim understands it, would be completely reconciled with such an understanding. Meanwhile, Maxim leaves no room for doubt that “έν θέλημα” cannot be understood exclusively in this way. Maximus compares the controversial expression of Honorius with the expression of Athanasius the Great, which we discussed above (“He was born of a wife, etc.” etc."), finding that their meaning is the same: “and understanding this ineffable image (" λόγος " or, as above - " πρόοδος ") of the birth of the Word according to the flesh, one (Athanasius) speaks of one will of the Divinity in Him, and the other (Honorius) - of one will of our Lord I. Christ; since, he says, our nature received its formation, undoubtedly, from (the action of) the Divine, and not from sin” 488. In full agreement with this kind of understanding are the following words of Maximus, spoken by him in the conclusion: “in short, I believe that by the expression “έν θέλημα” Honorius wanted to say that the birth of Him (Christ) according to the flesh was the work of the Divine will alone” 489. Thus, the Honorian “έν θέλημα”, according to Maximus, has a double meaning: it points simultaneously to the Divine will of the Word, as the reason for the absence in Christ of the carnal will opposing the spirit, and to the human natural will of Christ, opposed to the sinful will of the flesh. Commenting in a similar way on the formula under consideration, Maximus, of course, could say that with the expression “εν θέλημα” Honorius does not deny “the duality of natural wills in Christ, but rather defends and recommends it as fair” 490. But it is clear to no one that the explanation he offers, which in essence does not in the least resolve the troubling question, is rather far-fetched and no less strange. It is strange especially because it is not at all justified from the point of view of the general methods of polemics that Maxim follows everywhere, remaining completely alone. Nowhere and under no circumstances does Maxim allow the formula “έν θέλημα” and everywhere and always remains true to himself. Here, in relation to the case under consideration, he not only does not find it unorthodox, but does not even consider it inaccurate (of course, with the meaning that he himself assimilates): there is not a single word of this kind, it is impossible to indicate the slightest hint of anything like that. Regarding the content of the entire epistle, it should be noted that its general idea is indeed the same as Maxim presents it: throughout the entire epistle the thought runs that the flesh of Christ, sinless by its very birth, did not have a sinful human will, “resisting and opposing” (έναντίον καί άντιπράττον ή άντικείμενον θέλημα ). But the well-known conclusion drawn by Maxim from this is completely arbitrary and erroneous. The fact is that Honorius looks at human nature as nothing other than damaged by sin. This is the same and only this way that the human will appears to him: such a one-sided view runs throughout the entire message. It is clear that from the point of view of such a view of the flesh, denying the sinful human will in Christ, Honorius could not allow in Him another will, different (διάφορον) from His Divine will, and had to recognize in Christ only one Divine will of the Word. With such a legitimate understanding of the basic view of Honorius on the flesh, the formula “έν θέλημα”, surrounded by the indicated arguments, and the denial of otherness or difference in the will of Christ 491, unfairly interpreted by Maximus in the sense of resistance and opposition to the will, and the content of the whole epistle, and hostility in relation to Sophronius, omitted Maxim out of sight. Certain considerations concerning, on the one hand, the state of the Eastern Church during the troubled time of the Monothelite movements, which followed the time of the appearance of Honorius’s response letter, and, on the other hand, the importance of the Roman bishop in matters of faith at that time, raise doubts about the impartiality of the defense of Honorius presented by Maximus, which finds some justification for itself in the fact that the defense reveals a rather lenient attitude towards a document that eloquently testifies to the guilt of the accused. Considering everything that has been said regarding the Monothelite teaching, we come to the conclusion that in the dogmatic-polemical works of Maximus it is presented as a complete heresy, as an absolutely untenable doctrine, false in its basis and absurd in its conclusions, characterized by amazing instability and inconsistency. The name of Maximus the Confessor is very remarkable in the history of the Christian Church and Christian theological literature. He was a naturally highly gifted man, philosophically and theologically educated, well acquainted with the pagan philosophical and Christian theological literature of the previous time. He was a serious philosopher-theologian and, moreover, a very skilled polemicist, possessing a remarkable wit 492 . It is not for nothing that Christian antiquity honored the name of St. Maximus with excellent epithets: “philosopher” 493, “theologian and confessor” 494; and among Christian theologians, fathers and teachers of the Church, she gave him a very respectable place. As far as we know, after Gregory of Nazianzus Maximus was the first “theologian” in the Greek Church, so the author of the accusatory word against Constantinople (placed in 11. Op. Max.) is a person not for us well-known - rightly calls Maxim τρίτος θεόΛογος - the third theologian (after the Evangelist John and Gregory the Theologian) 495. About the meaning of St. Maxim in the history of the contemporary Eastern Church is more eloquently evidenced than any reviews by the fact that in the East at one time he was the only prominent representative of the Church who held the banner of Orthodoxy firmly and high. During the period of open persecution of Orthodoxy by the monothelitist government and, apparently, the general dominance of monothelitism in the East, St. Maxim, to a certain extent, fairly and legitimately could say regarding those who were like-minded with him: “We are the Church of Christ!” - as, indeed, was the case during one of his interrogations 496. The most interesting thing here is that Maxim’s opponents themselves attached no less value to him than he himself, which can be judged on the basis of some data provided by the history of the famous trial of Maxim. In judging the meaning of St. Maximus as a theologian, it will be enough to note the outstanding phenomenon in the history of Christian theological literature that “all subsequent (i.e., those who lived after Maximus) Greek theologian writers: dogmatists, polemicists and even moralists,” according to Combefi, “turn to Maximus with great honor” 497, while dignifying him with the most flattering epithets for him. To confirm the validity of his review, Combefi refers to “Orthodox Greece” by L. Allation. The authors below named in the first volume of this collection of treatises, indeed, speak of Maximus the Confessor with great praise 498 and cite rather lengthy excerpts from his works. But, firstly, their reviews, as persons who are not at all authoritative for “Orthodox Greece,” have almost no weight in judging the significance of Maximus; secondly, for our purpose they are not at all suitable, as they are not at all related to the works of St. father (excerpts are given exclusively from Maximus’s treatises on the origin of St. Spirit; These reviews are mainly related to them). In addition to the reviews indicated by Combefi given by Allius, we know the reviews of the Patriarch of Constantinople Photius I (from 857) 499, who calls Maximus “a divine man and an undaunted confessor” (ό θειος άνήρ καί γενναίος όμοΛογητής ) 500 . We are dealing only with the dogmatic-polemical, and precisely Christological, works of St. Maxima. And regarding these latter, we have reason to assert that their significance is incommensurably higher than the significance of all the other works of Maximus taken together, and that John of Damascus “turns to Maximus with great honor” and to his greater glory. In fact, to what else than his polemical activities directed against monothelitism, the historical monument of which are the dogmatic-polemical works we have considered, does Maxim owe his high significance in the history of the Church and Christian literature? In perfect agreement with the fact that Abba Maximus’s entire life was spent in a continuous, intense struggle against monothelitism, in the midst of which the Orthodox Christological teaching was revealed, and depending on it stands the phenomenon that the name of Abba Maximus is inextricably linked with the idea of ​​a confessor, that is, a defender and exponent of the Orthodox teaching about two wills in Christ. Of the other works of Maximus, let us note in passing, which make up approximately two-thirds of all his works, the five dialogues “on the Holy Trinity” (περί τής αγίας Τριάδος) are of comparatively greater interest for the history of the Christian Church and doctrine - very significant interest - and it is precisely the fourth and fifth dialogues against Apollinaris, on the procession of St. Spirit. Maxim's dogmatic and polemical works are valuable simply because they represent the first and, one might say, the only one of its kind, completely independent experience of a complete and comprehensive disclosure of the mysterious teaching about the face of Christ. True, the question of the wills in Christ in the 7th century did not arise for the first time in the minds of theologians and was not the first time it was discussed in the works of Maximus. We meet with its solution in essence and with rather extensive judgments regarding it much earlier than the time of Maximus in the works of the illustrious saints. Fathers of the Church: Athanasius the Great, both Gregori, Cyril of Alexandria and partly some others, far from unknown to Maxim. In one of his letters, Maxim directly states that he is not offering his own thoughts, not his personal judgments, but those expressed before him by others 501. Therefore, Schreck’s low opinion of Maximus’s works is partly understandable, who says the following: “His discussions about the two natures in Christ, various definitions and other little things (Kleinigkeiten) of this kind,” like his two treatises on God and on the incarnation of the Son of God, “do not contain anything that could not be found in the other Fathers of the Church, as well as in Damascus.” But, firstly, the question of wills in Christ acquired special interest and special significance, thanks to its very formulation, only in the 7th century and found a corresponding solution for the first time in the works of St. Maxima. Secondly, its solution here, thanks to the same circumstance, undoubtedly represents something new (not in essence, of course, of the teaching, but in the way of revealing the eternal church teaching), which cannot be found in the Christological works of the earlier fathers of the Church, which Schreck, in part, finds worthy of primary attention from all the provisions of Maximus on two wills 503. Thirdly, and finally, in the disclosure of those few points of Christological teaching that at that time formed the subject of the literature of the past, there is not even the slightest trace of what is called lack of independence: with the exception of those places (mentioned above) that are given by Maximus as literal excerpts from the works of the previous fathers of the Church, the development of patristic opinions in the works of Maximus is of a completely independent nature. In this, mainly, we consider the undoubtedly important merit of St. Maxim for the Church and the significance of his dogmatic and polemical works in the history of theological literature. The general meaning of Maximus's Christology is this: the humanity of Christ is as true and perfect as the Divinity of the Word is true and perfect. Everything that is characteristic of human nature flows from the depths of the human nature of Christ and is assimilated to the Word, as the true ruler of humanity, acting in two ways and inseparably, both proper to God and proper to man, from the soul and directly through the soul, and through its mediation through the body. This dominant feature, consistently carried out in the Christology of Maximus, which constitutes its outstanding advantage, distinguishes it from the Christology of the fathers of the previous time (especially the 4th century), where the true image of Christ the God-Man is, as it were, somewhat obscured by the power and greatness of the Divinity of the Word, and Christ is acting primarily as God through the medium of body and soul. At the same time, the orthodox Christology of the fathers of previous centuries, starting with Athanasius the Great and ending with Cyril of Alexandria, is not free from some inaccuracies in the way of expressions (like those given above), which, of course, cannot be blamed on them. But this circumstance, in any case, pointed to the imperfection of the dogmatic formula and could give rise to abuse. Inaccurate expressions relating mainly to the duality of natures in Christ, with a certain biased view of them, could be interpreted as a denial of natural duality, no matter how this latter was justified. And since, in the event of such inaccuracies, a visible predominance always remained on the side of the Divinity of Christ, then on the basis of them it was possible to arrive at such a view of the hypostatic union of natures, in which the humanity of Christ seemed to have somehow lost its integrity. This is, indeed, how they were interpreted by the Monophysites and Monothelites. In the Christology of Maximus, the truth of God-manhood found its most perfect expression. That is the everlasting teaching of the Church about the two natures of Christ is brought here to such a state in a formal sense that neither isolation nor preponderance in one direction or the other becomes absolutely unthinkable. Christ here is as perfect a man as he is true God. Everywhere, the equally strict and precise way of Maxim’s expressions fully corresponds to the internal side of the matter. In a word, Maxim’s diophelitism is strictly orthodox and in all respects impeccable. The weak side of Maxim's dogmatic and polemical works is the logical and partly stylistic structure of his speech. The first of these shortcomings - the lack of strict connection and consistency in the general development of thoughts - was noted above; it depended partly on the very type of Maxim’s works and on their purpose. Photius says, among other things, about Maximus’ style: “His speech always develops periodically, the arrangement of words is confusing, the composition of words is complex; although, strictly speaking, he cares little about this. Therefore, in his presentation there are often passages that are unclear and difficult to understand. As a norm in his speech (since it is a question of its construction), he takes the severity of pompous presentation, without caring about the pleasantness of the ear. Moreover, the arrangement of words does not in the least contribute to gaining favor on the part of the reader: it is simple and careless” 504. Although the above review by Photius specifically refers to the so-called “άπορήματα γραφικά” (De variis dubiis S. Scripturae, ad Thalassium presbyterum. Op. Max., 1.1, col. 244 et sq.) and, therefore, directly related to the dogmatic-polemical works of St. It does not have Maximus, but it is enough to read any of the dogmatic-polemical works to see that their style (there is no question of a dispute with Pyrrhus) 505 in general differs much from the style of the exegetical works of St. Maxim: the same periodicity in the construction of speech, carelessness and confusion in word arrangement and complexity in word composition, although the speech cannot be called “unclear” and the presentation “rough”. At least here there is a noticeable desire for clarity and the absence of roughness 506. Besides Maximus, and much later, only one of the Church Fathers - John of Damascus - gave a fairly detailed presentation of the doctrine of two wills in Christ. Comparing the Christology of Damascus with the Christology of Maximus led us to the following results. It turns out that in the formulation and development of the doctrine of two wills in Christ, I. Damascene’s “Exact Exposition of the Faith” is directly dependent on the dogmatic and polemical works of Maximus, and that this dependence extends so far that in places, and there are many such places, Damascene (it would not be an exaggeration to say) follows Maximus word for word. And first of all, in explanations concerning the metaphysical and psychological background of diophelitism (the relationship between φύσις and ύπόστασις and the ability or power of the soul), Damascus does not go further than a simple repetition of what Maximus said, in places only modifying and extending the provisions of the latter, and in places literally repeating them. Thus, by the way, the depiction of a consistent process of thinking, consisting of six moments (terminus a quo - νόησις [thinking] and terminus ad quem - προφορικός λόγος [oral speech]), which we find in Damascus, represents a literal repetition, with very minor exceptions, of what was said in Maxima 507. The image of the volitional process, consisting of eight successive moments (final moments: βούλησις [volition] and χρήσις [application]) is completely similar for both, 508 in places (the definition of the ability itself, the first and third moments) even in letter. A few very insignificant features concern details and particulars. In his discussion regarding the theoretical foundation and essence of diophelitism, Damascus cites the same foundations as Maximus, i.e., the doctrine of the Trinity God and the duality of natures in Christ 509. In revealing and arguing individual provisions that touch upon and illuminate the doctrine of the face of Christ from various angles, Damascene reveals a whole series of rather extensive 510 borrowings from Maximus. Leaving aside passages that are similar only in content and quite vividly reminiscent of Maxim’s reasoning, we will limit ourselves to indicating literal borrowings. The following provisions, interpreted in some detail, turn out to be literally borrowed from the dispute between Maximus and Pyrrhus: a) Number is not a principle of division. Damasc., 1034 – 1036 Max., 289. b) It is necessary to distinguish between τό θέλειν and τό πώς θέλειν. Damasc., 1036 Max., 292. c) Distinctive features of the three kinds of life 511. Damasc., 1037 Max., 301. d) Natural – natural, not artificial, that is, not acquired through exercise. Damasc., 1037 Max., 304. e) Three brief proofs that will is inherent in man by nature. Damasc., 1037 Max., 304. f) Conclusion from the previous position in relation to Christ 512. Damasc., 1040 Max., 305. g) Leaving the mystery of the Trinity, it is impossible to attribute to Christ any other - “personal” or “extra-natural” (τό παρά φύσιν θέλημα) - will, other than natural; and on the basis of the integrity of both natures it is necessary to recognize in Him two natural wills. Damasc., 1040 Max., 313. h) Three sayings 513 of Holy Scripture: Matt. XXVIÏ 34, II Cor. XIIÏ 4 and Philip. IÏ 8, which attests to the reality of man's natural will in Christ. Damasc., 1040–1041 Max., 321. i) Rational nature has nothing coercive in itself. Damasc., 1041 Max., 293. j) The unequal meaning of the word “αύτεξουσιότης” as applied to God, angels and man; It is impossible to take away the human will from Christ if human nature is allowed in Him. Damasc., 1041 Max., 325. j) It is impossible to allow one complex will in Christ. Damasc., 1044 Max., 296. k) It is impossible to attribute to Christ the so-called “arbitrary inclination” (γνώμη). Damasc., 1044 – 1045 Max., 308 – 309 514 . A note on the various meanings of this word in Holy Scripture. Damasc., 1045 Max., 312,515. m) Consubstantiality of the Son with the Father both before and after the incarnation. Damasc., 1052 – 1053 Max., 348 – 349. The calculated places of literal borrowings of Damascus from the works of Maximus have as their subject the duality of natural wills in Christ. We find many borrowings of this kind in the reasoning of Damascus regarding the two natural actions in Christ. This includes the following provisions, no less detailed than the provisions of the first group: m) The duality of actions in Christ does not violate the unity of His hypostasis, and the unity of the hypostasis does not prevent the recognition of two actions, since action constitutes the essential definition of nature, and not of person. Damasc., 1053 Max., 336 – 337 516 . o) It is impossible to attribute one action to Christ, no matter how it is understood: the merging of two different actions into one, as well as the accomplishment by one action of what is characteristic of two different natures, is absolutely unthinkable. Damasc., 1056 Max., 340, 341, 344. π ) The meaning of the various names of human movement found in the Fathers of the Church. Damasc., 1060–1061 Max., 349 – 352. ρ) One action of a person consisting of two entities. Damasc., 1065 Max., 336. c) Manifestation of the power of self-preservation inherent in the humanity of Christ. Damasc., 1088 – 1089 Max., 297. τ ) Maximus’s favorite analogy of a “hot sword” should also be included here. Damasc., 1053 – 1056 Max., 337 – 40, 341. Almost all of the calculated places of literal borrowings, with the inclusion of several more, very similar in thought, were chosen by Damascene from the reasoning of Maximus in a conversation with Pyrrhus. If from that part of the conversation between Maximus and Pyrrhus, which Damascene uses, we exclude reasoning of a purely polemical nature - which, as noted above, is what Damascene does - then it turns out that the whole half of the “Disputation with Pyrrhus”, almost without any changes, Damascene inserted into his “Accurate Exposition of the Orthodox Faith.” It was precisely “inserted”, since we do not see any special traces of systematization of the material borrowed from Maxim in the said work of Damascus. In confirmation of what has been said, it is enough to point out the fact that the above-mentioned places of borrowing are given by Damascus in almost the same order as they follow in the “Disputation with Pyrrhus.” And if we take into account, on the one hand, that the indicated passages almost completely exhaust the doctrine of two wills and actions as formulated by Maximus, and on the other hand, the important circumstance that in a conversation with Pyrrhus, constrained and guided by the latter, Maximus was not free in the deliberate arrangement of individual provisions, then we will come to the conclusion that Damascus cannot even be called a systematizer of the doctrine Maxim about two wills and actions in Christ. Something else must be said regarding the presentation and disclosure by Damascene of the other side of the teaching about the face of Christ - the teaching about the unity of the hypostasis in Christ and the relationship of natural duality to personal unity. If in this regard there are still no traces of a desirable systematization of the meager material that Maxim gives, then in terms of revealing this side of the teaching, Damascene takes a decisive step forward compared to Maxim. Damascene's important merit here is that he already boldly and definitely develops some dogmatically profound positions that Maximus does not have the desired completeness and certainty. These provisions should include: a) the idea that “Christ assumed an ignorant and slave nature,” so that, according to Gregory the Theologian, “in the separation of the visible from the mental, the flesh (of Christ) must be called both slave and ignorant; but due to the unity of the hypostasis and the inextricable union (of the two natures), the soul of the Lord was enriched with the knowledge of the future” 517; Almost all of the calculated places of literal borrowings, with the inclusion of several more, very similar in thought, were chosen by Damascene from the reasoning of Maximus in a conversation with Pyrrhus. If from that part of the conversation between Maximus and Pyrrhus, which Damascene uses, we exclude reasoning of a purely polemical nature - which, as noted above, is what Damascene does - then it turns out that the whole half of the “Disputation with Pyrrhus”, almost without any changes, Damascene inserted into his “Accurate Exposition of the Orthodox Faith.” It was precisely “inserted”, since we do not see any special traces of systematization of the material borrowed from Maxim in the said work of Damascus. In confirmation of what has been said, it is enough to point out the fact that the above-mentioned places of borrowing are given by Damascus in almost the same order as they follow in the “Disputation with Pyrrhus.” And if we take into account, on the one hand, that the indicated passages almost completely exhaust the doctrine of two wills and actions as formulated by Maximus, and on the other hand, the important circumstance that in a conversation with Pyrrhus, constrained and guided by the latter, Maximus was not free in the deliberate arrangement of individual provisions, then we will come to the conclusion that Damascus cannot even be called systematizer of Maximus’s teaching about two wills and actions in Christ. a) the idea that “Christ took on an ignorant and slave nature,” so that, according to Gregory the Theologian, “in the separation of the visible from the mental, the flesh (of Christ) must be called both slave and ignorant; but due to the unity of the hypostasis and the inextricable union (of the two natures), the soul of the Lord was enriched with the knowledge of the future” 518; b) the idea that “although both natures of our Lord penetrate one another, but... penetration (in the strict sense) belongs to the Divine nature, since one Divine nature passes through and penetrates everything as it wants, without itself being penetrated by anything” 519, and c) the idea that the human will (of Christ) followed and submitted to His (Divine) will in everything, not acting according to its own arbitrariness (μή κινουμένου γνώμη ίδια) 520 - a thought first expressed in the “District message" Sophronia. All such and similar thoughts, precisely and definitely expressed by Damascene, are unoriginal: before him they were expressed by Sophronius and, mainly, Maximus, and the latter received some development. But they received a more complete, essentially the desired development only from Damascus. But, striving for a more complete development of these provisions, Damascus fell into some inaccuracies, which are alien to the Christology of Maximus. As such an inaccuracy, we should point out the following opinion of Damascus: “His holy soul did not have a special inclination or object of desire, contrary to His Divine will or different from the object of His Divine will” (ούδέ άλλο παρά τό θείον αυτού θέλημα [nothing other than His divine will]) 521. It is true that “His holy soul did not have an object of desire that was contrary to His Divine will.” But the second half of the position (“different…”, etc.), reminiscent of the point of view of Honorius, standing on which he identifies θέλημα έναντίον [opposite will] with θέλημα διάφορον [excellent will], represents an inaccurate expression, since Christ was characterized by purely human movements, different, no doubt, from the Divine movements. One noted inaccuracy, we believe, is quite enough to have reason to say that when resolving the problems outlined by the Chalcedonian definition of faith, it was difficult to maintain (from the formal side) the two series of activities of the God-man Christ in the balance in which they are placed in the Christology of Maximus. In the very fact of Damascene’s rather extensive and most literal borrowings from Maximus, the highest, although still not yet clearly conscious, expression of recognition of Maximus’s dogmatic-polemical works of their real significance and unprecedentedly high importance is hidden. At the same time, this fact also suggests that Maxim is a completely independent and most skillful exponent of the Orthodox teaching about two wills in Christ. After everything that has been said about the significance of Maximus’s dogmatic-polemical works, it seems incomprehensible and somewhat strange that the Sixth Ecumenical Council, which finally formulated the doctrine of two wills in Christ, is completely silent about the polemical activities of St. Maxim, without even mentioning his very name. In this very circumstance, Protestant theologians see confirmation of their above-mentioned view of the relationship between Maximus’ diophelitism and church diophelitism (i.e., as he decided at the council). Since the basis of the conciliar definition of faith, according to the statement of the council itself 522, was the dogmatic message of Pope Agathon to the Emperor Constantine, then in order to resolve the confusion arising from this it is necessary to compare the Christological view of Maximus with this latter, and this is all the more necessary because, in the opinion of some Protestant theologians (for example, Thomasius 523), the Western Roman Church had its own special point of view on the question of wills in Christ, accepted by the council. The essence of the positive Christological teaching of Agathon is almost fully expressed in the following words of his epistle: “According to the Gospel tradition, we recognize in one and the same Lord our Lord Christ all that is twofold (omnia duplicia), that is, we confess in Him two natures (duas Ejus naturas): Divine and human, from which and in which He abides and after inseparable connection (ex quibus et in quibus etiam post... inseparabilem unionem subsistit). We also confess that each of His natures has a natural characteristic (Et unamquamque Ejus naturam proprietatem naturalem habere confitemur). And we recognize both natures of the one and the same God the Word incarnate, that is, in man, to be united inconfusedly, inseparably and immutabiliter, only in abstraction separating what is united in order to avoid the error of confusion. Recognizing two natures, and two natural wills (duas naturales voluntates), and two natural actions (duas naturales operationes) in our one Lord Jesus Christ (in uno Domino nostro Iesu Christo), we do not say that they are disgusting and hostile to each other (non contrarias, dog adversas ad alterutrum), ... Nor do we say that they are divided, as it were, into two persons or personalities (pes tanquam separatas in duabus personis, vel subsistentiis έν δυσίν προσώποις, ήγουν ύποστάσεσιν [in two persons, that is, hypostases]); but we say that one and the same Lord, I. Christ, possesses both two natures and two natural wills and actions, that is, Divine and human” 524. From this short passage it is quite clear that Agathon, like Maximus, stands on the basis of the Chalcedonian teaching, recognizing in Christ two natures with the characteristics characteristic of each of them and thinking of them as being in an unfused, inseparable and immutable union; that the main basis for recognizing two wills and actions in Christ for him, as for Maximus, is the Chalcedonian teaching about the integrity of both natures of Christ by union. The message as a whole develops the idea expressed at the beginning. The well-known theoretical principle of diophelitism is exposed: will is a property of nature (naturalis voluntas), deduced from the doctrine of the Trinity; and from here, in turn, a well-known conclusion is drawn regarding the number of wills in Christ 525. To confirm the truth of the duality of wills and actions, the Gospel and patristic passages are cited, most of them the same as those of Maximus, and in the same order 526. One of the objections to the conceivability of combining two wills in one person, coming from the usual, narrow view of the nature of the human will, is resolved here in exactly the same sense as in Maximus, as can be seen in part from the above passage. Mention is made of one of the consequences of the hypostatic union: the deification of the human will of Christ. Both in Maximus and here it is considered, among other things, as proof of the duality of wills 527. The doctrine of one will with its supposed fusion of natures is certainly denied 528. These features completely exhaust the essential content of the message. It is not dark to anyone that the teaching revealed in the whole epistle has the character of strict diophelitism 529, but this is precisely the character of the teaching of Maximus. And in general, the teaching of Agathon set forth in the epistle, both in general and in particular, is completely in agreement with the teaching of Maximus corresponding to the content of the epistle. True, in comparison with the integral view of Maximus, there is a lack of teaching about the image of the hypostatic existence and action of natures, denoted by Maximus by the concepts “περιχώρησις” and “άντίδοσις”, about the nature of the hypostasis, etc.; and in general the doctrine of the unity of the hypostasis is given a relatively small place here. This very circumstance gave rise to Protestant scholars to equate the diophelitism of Agathon with Nestorian dualism and to distinguish it, and at the same time, on the indicated basis, partly church diophelitism, from the diophelitism of Maximus. The harshness of dualism, in their opinion, is not balanced here by the doctrine of hypostatic unity and the resulting doctrine of the inseparability of the modes of action of both natures 530. We agree that the doctrine of hypostatic unity in the epistle of Agathon is poorly illuminated; but this circumstance alone does not give absolutely any right to the bold conclusion that is drawn from it. If due attention is paid to the purpose for which the message is written, it will not be difficult to understand the relevance of its actual content. As a model of confession, the epistle presents a direct and strictly defined answer to the controversial question regarding the number of wills in Christ, which boiled down to the question of the truth of the humanity of Christ. From here it is completely clear why the doctrine of hypostatic unity is completely undeveloped in him, although the point of view on this subject is clearly outlined and, in general, is no different from Maximus’s view on the same subject. The creed of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, both in general and in particular, is completely similar to the confession of the Roman bishop. Like this last one, it does not deviate one step in spirit or letter from the Chalcedonian definition of faith and, strictly consistently developing it further, repeats in essence what was said in the letter of the Roman bishop. Although some provisions (for example: about the absence of contradiction and opposition in the directions of the will of Christ and regarding the deification of the human will of Christ) from those available in this latter in the conciliar oroa receive a more accurate description. As for the actual sample confession of faith compiled at the Sixth Ecumenical Council 531, i.e., a small addition to the Chalcedonian oros concerning the doctrine of two wills in Christ, it speaks only of two natural wills and actions of Christ and the relationship of the human will of Christ to His Divine will. This nature of the conciliar definition fully corresponds to the purpose of convening the council, which was the desire to eradicate “the heresy of one will and one action in two natures, one from the Holy Trinity, sown in the Orthodox people” 532 . It is unnecessary to talk about the agreement of Maximus’s Christological view with the conciliar definition of faith after comparing this latter with the message of Agathon. So, the Christological teaching of Maxim, as completely consistent with the Ecumenical teaching, precisely and definitely formulated at the Sixth Ecumenical Council, is strictly Orthodox: no one has ever doubted his strict Orthodoxy. Why, one may ask, did the Ecumenical Council react so silently to the personality and works of such a major and in the East at one time almost the only outstanding figure in favor of Orthodoxy, which was Abba Maxim? This circumstance, passed by everyone in dead silence, seems to us not without some interest. What mattered here: whether Maxim’s low rank as a simple monk or the sad outcome of his life, or maybe something else - we are absolutely at a loss to answer this question. The first circumstance, perhaps, could have some significance, but there is nothing incredible in the assumption that the recent, just some 18 - 20 years ago, state reprisal against Maxim, as a political criminal, served as a serious obstacle to the mention of Maxim’s name in conciliar acts. One way or another, the memory of him was quite fresh; The fathers present at the council, of course, well remembered the glorious confessor of the faith and, of course, knew about his recent fruitful activity in favor of Orthodoxy. Is it therefore possible to seriously assert, together with Thomasius, that the works of Abba Maximus did not meet with any sympathy from the council? 533 In conclusion, we consider it useful to make a brief summary of the results of our research in the following provisions: 1) Polemical activity of St. The maxim was caused by unique attempts of an ecclesiastical and political nature in the first quarter of the 7th century. The soul and primary figure of the Union of Alexandria in 633 on the principles of monoergism (the formula “μία ενέργεια”) is the cunning and resourceful Patriarch of Constantinople Sergius, a Monophysite. Emperor Heraclius and Cyrus are his main collaborators, acting on his initiative. The further, actually monothelitism, movement also owes to Sergius, and precisely to his supposedly flattering message to Pope Honorius, in which a draft of a new unique plan on the principles of monothelitism was outlined (the formula “έν θέλημα”), unconditionally approved by the pope and implemented in the imperial decree “Ektesis” authorized by Sergius 638 year. Both unions, Cyrus and Sergius, were equally unsuccessful due to the discrepancy between the goals of their foundations. 2) Maxim’s polemical activity falls into four successive periods, taking their name from the centers of his activity. The initial Alexandrian period (633 - 639) - a period of episodic struggle against monophysitism and monoergism - is extremely sparse in information. The most flourishing and fruitful period, the African one (640 – 645 and 647) was a period of continuous oral and written polemics against monothelitism, which ended with the actual triumph of Orthodoxy in the dispute with Pyrrhus and at African provincial councils. 3) The successors of Pope Honorius: Severin, John IV, Theodore and Martin - all openly and more or less decisively declared themselves opponents of monothelitism, in one form or another condemning the way of thinking of the leaders of the union and the unique decrees. Other western provinces reacted to monothelitism in a similar way. The main consequence of the ecclesiastical separation of East and West was the replacement in 648 of the "Ektesis" by a new unified edict "Typos" (Τύπος τής πίστεως). Its author is Patriarch Paul of Constantinople, a far-sighted and courageous representative of monothelitism. The reason for the failure of the new attempt lies in the imaginary impartiality of the “Typos”. 4) Nothing is known about the details of Maximus’s activities during the third period - Roman (actually from 649 to 653), except for one message from Theophanes, which does not need to be verified. The last period - Constantinople (655 - 662) - a period of civil proceedings and government persecution of Maxim. All charges (counting up to six) are purely political in nature, with the exception of one. The ultimate goal of a prolonged pursuit with promises and threats is to obtain from Maxim a recognition of “Typos” and a promise to remain silent. 5) Our proposed division of Maxim’s dogmatic and polemical works – according to content – ​​seems to be the only appropriate one, in view of the impossibility of dividing them according to the periods of Maxim’s polemical activity. An exact determination of the time of writing of most works (mainly letters) is impossible, due to the lack of more or less decisive data, represented only by Maxim’s works themselves. There is no sufficient reason to doubt the authenticity of the “Disputation” in the form that has come down to us. 6) The dissimilarity of attitude towards the original position (δύο φύσεις in Christ) of Maximus’s Christology depends on the dissimilarity of the basic view of φύσις and ύπόστασις. The main misconception of monothelia gism - the identification of ύπόστασις with φύσις and the resulting confusion of personality with the distinctive features of spiritual nature, embraced by the concept of "θέλησις" or "θέλημα" - stems from a misunderstanding of the way of existence of individual nature (τό ένυπόστατον ). What distinguishes ύπόστασις from τό ένυπόστατον is a certain “way of life” (τρόπος τής ύπάρξεως ή ζωής [way of existence or life] modus existendi) spiritual and moral being (expressed by the concept of “personality”), in itself meaningless. The basis and criterion for the correctness of such a view is the doctrine of the Trinity and the Incarnation. To reproduce the teachings of the North, against which Maxim mainly polemicizes in the doctrine of “two natures,” there is not enough data contained in Maxim’s works. The tendentiousness of the source that replenishes them is proven partly by himself, partly by Maxim. The predominance of explanations about the integrity and integrity of human nature in the doctrine of δύο φύσεις is directly dependent on the demands of the controversy. 7) "Will" ("θέλησις" or "θέλημα") is the most essential property of spiritual nature (and not a person). "Natural will" (φυσικόν θ., έμφυτος θ., τό πεφυκέναι θέλειν) embraces everything essentially inherent in spiritual nature, and is generally the life of the spirit (δύναμις λογική καί ζωτική); ενέργεια φυσική or ούσιώδης, έμφυτος) is life in general (ζωή φυσική). actions in Christ constitutes a denial of the “natural” will of Christ’s humanity, understood in the sense of “γνωμιχόν θέλημα.” This mainly explains the primary importance of Maximus’s reasoning regarding the human natural will of Christ, like nature itself, essentially identical with ours, in actu sinless in itself. The hypostatic union excludes for it only the potential for evasion from the prevailing inclination towards good, conceivable in primordial nature; this is its difference from our will. 8) Only with a “hypostatic” union are the integrity of both natures of Christ and the unity of the hypostasis, given its relative complexity, compatible. Logically consistent moments of the union of two natures: περιχώρησις εις άλλήλας , άντίδοσις ιδιωμάτων and θέωσις - are actually given at once The analogy of a “hot sword”, consistently carried out to the end, helps a lot in clarifying the image and consequences of the hypostatic union. The relation of the human nature of Christ in all its manifestations to God the Word is the relation of the true nature to the real person, complicated by the relation of the creature to the Creator. 9) Monothelitism as a doctrine is extremely unstable, confusing and inconsistent. The real essence of monothelitism is the doctrine (first expressed by Theodore of Faran) about “the one Divine will of Christ.” The activity of the human will of Christ, with all the complications of monothelitism, is somehow denied. Some basis for understanding some patristic sayings in a sense favorable to the Monothelite view is solely the image of the expressions of fragmentary sayings. The defense of Honorius presented by Maximus is biased and untenable. 10) The high importance in the history of the Church and theological writing of St. Maxim owes this mainly to his dogmatic and polemical works. The prominent advantages of these latter are the independence and comprehensiveness of the disclosure of Orthodox teaching and the complete correspondence of the image of expressions to the content of the teaching. The fact of extensive borrowings from St. I. Damascene from Maxim's creations most eloquently testifies to their high significance. Comparing them with the message of Pope Agathon leads to the conclusion that the Christological view of St. Maxim is in complete agreement with the Ecumenical Teaching, finally formulated at the VI Ecumenical Council. This view is held, for example, by Brown - s. 157. Schwane, Dogm. gesch., s. 505 – 516. Dorner, Entwickl. gesch., t. II, s. 236. According to Protestant scholars, true diophelitism consists in the fact that both natures of Christ, Divine and human, are each thought to belong to their own (separate) personality. “Hardly a true Protestant scientist,” says Dorner (in the above-mentioned work, t. II, s. 1225), “will dare to deny human nature (Christ) its own personality, characterizing it as impersonal.” The point of view on which Protestant theology stands is clearly Nestorian: the will, together with self-consciousness, according to the Protestant theologians, makes human nature a person (Bur, t. II, s. 126 - 127), so that the two series of natural activities in Christ are controlled by two personal principles (See Dorner - t. II, s. 1262). See, for example, Thomasius – s. 371. Op. Max., t. II, col. 149. When Eulogius says that "the distinction between φύσις and ούσία was invented by heretics for the purpose that it might be said that in the Trinity there are τρεις φύσεις [three natures] and μία φύσις in Christ, and to avoid the use of expressions" τρεις ούσίαι “[three essences] and “μία ούσία” (Braun, s. 3), then, obviously, he means only the Severians here. And Maxim, polemicizing against Monophysitism, has in mind mainly the teachings of the North and his followers. This phenomenon is explained by the fact that the teaching of the North, being closer than the teaching of another Monophysite party, standing to the teaching of Cyril of Alexandria, seemed more attractive to the Monophysites themselves and had more numerous adherents, but at the same time it was also more dangerous for Orthodoxy. Gieseler, Variae opinionses Monophysitarum de Christi Persona, part I, p. 11, 2; part II, p. 9. Regarding the teaching of the North, compare: Op. Max., t. II, col. 40 – 41; Schwane, s. 468. The use of this term in the sense of a person was rejected by the Orthodox in the middle of the 4th century. (at the Council of Alexandria in 362) after the Apollinarians, in justifying their false teaching, began to refer to its use in the sense of person in Athanasius the Great. See Brown - s. 4. Vid. Gieseler, part. I, p. 12. Op. Max., t. II, col. 149, 276. Op. Max., t. II, col. 152. Op. Max., t. II, col. 264. "" αύτό άτόμοις (in individuis) πραγματικώς ύφιστάμενον (realiter subsistit), και ούκ έπινοία ψιΛή Φεωρούμενον "[The hypostatic is a species (the general essence of nature), in the indivisible subjects (i.e., individuals) that really exists, and not just mentally contemplated] T. II, col. Op. Max., t. II, col. 261 – 264. Ούδέ γάρ άτομόν έστι , προς είδος ή γένος άναγόμενον [For it is not indivisible, being raised to species or genus]. Col. 204. The conclusion from here is obvious. Quotes are listed above. The expression “πραγματικώς ύφεστάναι” [to really exist] (- realiter sabsistere), used by Maximus in application to individual nature, is identical with the expressions “καθ᾿” quite common in the language of Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus and Cyril of Alexandria έαυτό ύφεστάναι" [exist by itself], "ιδία ύπαρξις" [separate existence], "ύπαρξις καθ᾿ έαυτό" [existence by itself], as a designation of the personal existence (See Brown - s. 17) is undoubtedly identical with another given expression of it, used in application to a person. Both of them mean individual, and in this sense, personal being, as opposed to being in general, what is nature or essence in abstracto. Since the times of the ancients, it has become a custom, which is still valid today, to designate personal existence with the Latin term “subsistere” (Greek: “ύφεστάναι”) and to call the person who owns the essence with the word “subsistentia” (as opposed to “existentia”). Αι (i.e. αί ποιότητες ούσιώδεις και έπουσιώδεις) ούκ έισίν ουσία, ουδέ καθ᾿ έαυτά , αλλ᾿ έν τή ούσία τυγχάνουσι , και δίχα ταύτης τό είναι ούκ έχουσιν [Which (i.e., essential and supra-essential qualities (i.e. added to essence - trans.)) are neither essence nor [existing] in themselves, but are found in essence, and without it do not have existence]. Col. 261. Op. Max., t. II, col. 261. Op. Max., t. col. 300. By “ιδιότητες φύσεως” one cannot understand only the distinctive properties of various natures or characteristics of the “three kinds of life”. This is quite clear from what Maximus (here) refers to these ιδιότητες φύσεως. It should be noted that in Maxim’s language the concepts “ίδιότης” and “ιδίωμα” have exactly the same meaning: to designate the essential properties of nature, Maxim uses both the same concept in the same way (see the same col. 300). We say this because, according to Brown (p. 19), these concepts do not express the same thing. Brown refers to the use of these words in Basil the Great and Gregory of Nazianzus. But what Brown himself says regarding the meaning associated with these words in the named Fathers of the Church does not at all reconcile with his opinion regarding the dissimilarity of the meaning of two unambiguous concepts. First, Brown himself insists (arbitrarily, let us say) that Basil the Great identified ιδίωμα (in God) with ύπόστασις; on the other hand, he is not unaware of the expression of Gregory of Nazianzus “μία φύσις εν τρισί ίδιότησι ύπάρχει” [one nature exists in three individuals]. With Brown's understanding of “ιδίωμα” of Basil the Great, “ιδίωμα” and “ίδιότης” are identical concepts. Secondly, Brown contradicts himself; imposing on Basil the Great the understanding of “ιδίωμα” in the indicated sense, he explains (s. 7) that “ιδίωμα” of Basil the Great has a double meaning: the meaning “ιδιώματος ύποστάσεως” and the meaning “ ιδιώματος φύσεως ", i.e. exactly the same meaning that is associated with this word in Maxim. And in Gregory of Nazianzus, one might think, “ίδιότης” also has a double meaning. In fact, therefore, it turns out that the concepts “ιδίωμα” and “ίδιότης” are identical in use. "Τρία ειζωής " [three types of life], besides the Divine, Maximus distinguishes in a dispute with Pyrrhus. In another place, from where we give the first names, he distinguishes four kinds of essences: in addition to the three counted in the text, he distinguishes here as a special kind of essences "ούσία παν τό καθ᾿ εαυτό ύφεστώς "[essence - everything that exists in itself], what a stone is. There is no mention of the Divine essence here. This feature in the division of essences, in itself indifferent to us, attracts our attention by the very name of this special kind of essence: from here it becomes obvious that the independence (complete - "παν ") of existence ( τό καθ᾿ εαυτό ύφεστάναι) constitutes the difference (in comparison with the general nature) of the indivisible of all nature (and non-spiritual), and not only rational; therefore, this is not a feature of the personality that distinguishes the latter from the individual spiritual nature. Εί ούν κατά φύσιν πρόσεστι τοϊς νοεροϊς , ή αύτεξούσιος κίνησις , άρα παν νοερόν και φύσει θελητικόν. Θέλησιν γάρ τό αύτεξούσιον ό μακάριος ώρίσατο Διάδοχος όΦωτικής είναι [So, if by nature intelligent [beings] have autocratic movement, then every intelligent [being] will by nature also have will. After all, the blessed Diadochos of Photiki defined will as autocracy] Col. 301. Yποστατική δε ποιότης, Πατρός μεν τό άγέννητον, Τίού δε τό , και ή γέννησις και ή έκπόρευσις , άπερ και ιδιότητας όνομάζουσι [The hypostatic the quality of the Father is unbornness; Son - birth; and the Holy Spirit - outgoing, that is, non-generation, birth and procession, which are also called distinctive features]. Col. 249. Κυριώτερόν τε και πρώτον ιδίωμα πάσης μάλιστα φύσεως Λογικής κατ᾿ έφεσιν αύτής καλέστηκε κίνησις [The most important and first distinctive property of any rational nature is movement according to its aspiration]. Col. 56. Τό γάρ της κατ έφεσιν ορεκτικής έστερημένον κινήσεως , και πάσης ζωτικής δυνάμεως άμοιρήσειεν αν [For one deprived of purposeful movement would be alien to all vitality]. Col. 49. Εί μεν φυσικόν τό όργανον φατε, σύγχρονος έσται καθ᾿ ύμας ό Λόγος τή σαρκί , ή ή σαρξ τω Λόγω συναΐδιος · παν γάρ κεχρημένον φυσικώ [If you call an organ natural, then the Word will, in your opinion, be modern flesh, or flesh is coeternal with the Word: after all, everything that uses a natural organ has it co-temporal with itself, just as the soul has a body]. Col. 64. [Nature, according to philosophers, is the beginning of movement and rest]. Col. 276. This is how the following Church Fathers looked at the essence of the matter: Irenaeus, Justin, Origen, Tertullian, Athanasius the Great and others. Braun, s. 6 – 10. Although in the writings of Maximus there is no special teaching on this subject, some positive data contained in them represent an undoubted guarantee that Maximus’s view of the relationship between ύπόστασις and φύσις in general is no different from the above teaching on this subject of the named Fathers of the Church. Such data should include: a) the doctrine clearly and definitely expressed by Maxim (as stated above) about the mode of existence of a specific rational nature; b) the definition of “personal” julia, as a way of using the volitional ability of the innate soul, belonging to the “user” (person); c) the given comparison of the relationship in question with the relationship between soul and body, complemented by an indication of the dominant relationship of the soul to the body (see in the third chapter), and d) various names attached to the person, such as “willing”, “acting” and the like. Ότι φύσις μέν ούκ άν εΐη ποτέ ανυπόστατος , ού μην ή φύσις ύπόστασις [Due to the fact that nature is never without hypostasis, nature is not [yet] hypostasis] (Col. 264). Εί γάρ τό μή άνυπόστατον είναι την φύσιν, ύπόστασιν ταύτην ποιεί, πάντως δήπου κατά τό άκόλουθον , και τό μή άνούσιον τήν ύπόστασιν ... τό μή άνυπόστατον , ούχ ύπόστασιν είναι τήν φύσιν ποιεί , άλΛ᾿ ένυπόστατον ιμή ώς συμβεβηκός έπινοία μόνη Λαμβάνηται, άλλ᾿ ώς είδος πραγματικώς θεωρήται. Ούτω δε και τό μή άνούσιον, ούκ ούσίαν ποιεί τήν ύπόστασιν, άλλ ένούσιον παριστά , ίνα μή ψιΑόν ιδίωμα ταύτην , άλλά μετά τού έν ω τό ιδίωμα κυρίως γνωρίζωμεν. 'Ώ σπερ ούν έκεί τό ένυπόστατον δηλοί τό ένύπαρκτον · ένύπαρκτον δέ τό For if it is that nature is not selfless, makes it a hypostasis, then, of course, the fact that the hypostasis is not insubstantial represents it as an essence... According to the tradition of the saints,... the lack of hypostasis does not make nature a hypostasis, but an hypostatic one, so that it is not perceived as an accident only mentally, but is actually contemplated as a species. Thus, the non-deprivation of essence does not make hypostasis an essence, but represents it as something that is in essence (realized), so that we know it not as a bare idiom, but at the same time with that in which the idiom actually [resides]. Thus, just as there the hypostatic points to the immanent, and the immanent is a participant in essential and natural existence, so here the acting, that is, active, means in the proper sense invested with power] Col. 205. Ότι ού δέον όυτε τό ένυπόστατον εις ύπόστασιν συνάγειν , ούτε τό ... ?? συμπεραίνει, τό σχήμα, ή τό χρώμα σώμα Λέγων είναι, άΛΛ᾿ ούχί έν ?? ανυπόστατος, είτα τό μή άνυπόστατον εις ύπόστασιν συνάγων, ούκ ορθώς διακρίνει [Because it is not proper to reduce what is hypostatic to hypostasis, nor to translate what-in-essence into essence... Because if someone says that there is no formless or colorless body, this will be correct, but he will draw the wrong conclusion from this if he says that form or color is a body, and is not contemplated in body; so if someone expresses himself by saying that “there is no nature without hypostasis,” and then reducing the lack of hypostasis to hypostasis, then he is reasoning incorrectly] Col. 261 – 264. Cf. col. 204. Op. Max., t. II, col. 468. Op. Max., t. II, col. 493. So, for example, in III Epist. ad Ioannem ducem The North says: “κατά τήν φωνήν τού Διονυσίου τού Αρεοπαγητικοϋ ... μίαν όμολογουφύσιν τέ και ύπόστασιν θεανδρικήν , ώσπερ και τήν μίαν "[according to the words of Dionysius the Areopagite... we confess one divine-human nature and hypostasis, as well as one incarnate nature of God the Word]. A little further in the same letter, we read: “we anathematize all who confess in Him by union (μετά τήν ένωσιν) the duality of natures and actions (δυάδα φύσεων και ενεργειών)". Gieseler, part I. p. 14 – 15; cf. Op. Max., t. II. col. 40 – 41. "" [That, what in the mind is seen as two, does not tolerate being two in hypostasis]. Ex libr. Grammaticum, part I. p. Passages from "Ἐκθεσις της πίστεως προς Νηφάλιον" [Exposition of the Faith to Nephalius] of the North. Gieseler, part I, p. 10. Epist. II, Severi ad Sergium Grammaticum. Gieseler, part I, p. 21. Op. Max., t. II, col. 40, 41, 44, 49. Op. Max., t. II, col. 49. See, for example, “Λόγος φιλαλήθης” [Word for the truth] of the North or “Λόγος εις τά γενέθλια” [Word for Christmas], Gieseler, part I, p. 16 – 17. "" τής σαρκός έρχεσθαι νόμων “[For the Word appears in many, not allowing His flesh to come according to the laws of the flesh]. Ex Severi contra Iulianum libris. Gieseler, part I, p. 22, 23. In their view of the origin of sinless passions, suffering and physical death and the attitude of Christ towards them, Severians and Julianists differ. According to the Severians, both of them, and the third, were in the nature of an innocent person. Adam was created immortal only according to his soul, and death, which is spoken of in the commandment not to eat from the “tree of the knowledge of good and evil,” is, of course, spiritual, moral (enslavement to sin), which is a consequence of sin. Indeed, after eating the fruit from this tree, Adam did not die physically, but became morally dead. And since Christ accepted human nature as it initially came from the hands of the Creator and was in Adam in his innocent state, then both suffering and death (physical) were naturally inherent in the human nature of Christ: Christ was subject to both by virtue of the perceived nature itself. Moral death was far from it: there was no cause (sin), and there could be no effect. And if it is said about Christ that He submitted to them voluntarily (nevertheless, in reality, and not illusory, not adaptive), then this should be understood only in the sense that, being at the same time God, He could not submit to them, as He could, for example, call upon legions of angels to help the “weak flesh.” According to the teachings of the Julianists, physical suffering and death are the result of damage to human nature, and the human nature of Christ, as sinless, was naturally free from them (Vid. Gieseler, part II, p. 7, 8). True, the Julianists found it possible to argue in such a way that although Christ was innocent of such laws of a damaged nature, He nevertheless accepted food and drink and underwent suffering. And this is not φαντασία [in the imagination] or δοκήσει [opinion], but in reality and, moreover, not εξ ανάγκης φυσικής [by natural necessity], but εκουσίως [voluntarily], for the sake of accomplishing our salvation (Ibid. p. 8). But we believe that it is obvious to everyone that such reasoning is nothing more than a gross obvious contradiction. Ex Severi contra Iulianum libris. Gieseler, part I. p. 22, 23. The basis for identification is the same as for all Monophysites: see the excerpt from Severus’s letter “ad Prosdocium medicum”, in Gieseler – part I, p. 9. The words of Pope Leo in his letter to Flavian. About Cyril of Alexandria (three classes of sayings of Holy Scripture) see: Or. Max., t. II, col. 121 sq. Op. Max., t. II, col. 499; compare: col. 525. "[For nature will never join nature by nature]. T. II, col. 108. Ού γάρ φυσική μονάς κατά σύνθεσίν έστιν ό Χριστός κατ᾿ ?? [For Christ, as a result of addition, is a natural unit, according to Apolinarius and Severus, as long as and after union the difference of the natures of which He consists remains unfused]. Col. 525; compare: col. 501. Op. Max., t. II, col. 489; compare: col. 517, 252. Conversation with Bishop Theodosius. T. I, col. 141. According to Gieseler, the creator of the saying about the godly nature is pseudo-Dionysius, no doubt a follower of Cyril. Gieseler, part I, p. 14. Cyrus refers to him in Anathematism VII, Sergius in his letter to Honorius, Pyrrhus in his conversation with Maximus. Op. Max., t. II, col. 84 – 85,100,108, 345,1056. Όθεν ουδέ δι αριθμού ταύτην ώνόμασεν , εί και μοναδιχώς τήν των [Therefore, he did not name it by number, although and taught about it, calling it in the singular the combination of natural actions]. Col. 85. "Ού κατά Θεόν τα θεία δράσας, ού τα ανθρώπινα κατά άνθρωπον, άΛΛά άνδρωθέντος Θεού , καινήν τινα την θεανδρικήν ένέργειαν ήμίν πεπολιτευμένος "Op. S. Dionysii Areopagitae, p. 707. "" περιφραστικώς δηλονότι σημαίνει “[For “godly-husband”...descriptively indicates the dual action of what is dual in nature]. From a letter to Marin the deacon, col. 84 – 85; compare: col. 100. Assume. ex Libello "de Incarnatione Dei Verbi", attributed to Athanasius and classified among the "dubia". Migne, t. XXVIII, col. 25 – 29. The small treatise “on the incarnation of God the Word” (begins with the words “Όμολογούμεν τον Τίόν Θεού” [We confess the Son of God]), in which the above passage takes place, has long raised doubts about its ownership by Athanasius. Leontius of Byzantium in his work “De sectis” comes to the conclusion that this treatise was compiled by one of the Eutychians and inserted into the works of St. Kirill with the name Afanasy. At the time of Maxim, one must think that there was no doubt about its authenticity, since Maxim directly presents it as genuine. Here, by the way, we read: “Όμολογούμεν δέ είναι τον αύτόν Τίόν Θεού, καί Θεόν κατά πνεύμα · υίόν δέ ανθρώπου κατά σάρκα . Ού δύο φύσεις, τον ένα Τίόν, μίαν προσκυνητήν, καί μίαν άπροσκυνητήν · αλλά μίαν φύσιν τού Θεού Λόγου σεσαρκωμένην, μετά της σαρκός αύτού μία προσκυνήσει καί προσκυνούμένην. Ούδέ δύο υιούς, άλλον μέν Τίόν Θεού, άληθινόν Θεόν καί , "We confess that One and the same is the Son of God and God in spirit, and the son of man in spirit flesh. We do not confess two natures of the one Son, one worshiped and one unworthy of worship, but we confess the one nature of God the Word incarnate, one worshiped and worshiped together with His flesh. And not two sons: one - the Son of God, true God and worshiped, and the other - a man [who came] from Mary, not worshiped, who became by grace a son of God, like [other] people]. Και μίαν δέ του Θεού Λόγου φύσιν σεσαρκωμένην , σαρκί ψυχήν έχούση την νοεράν τε και Λογικήν Λέγομεν εύσεβώς , δια τοΰ έπάγειν τό Σεσαρκωμένην, της καθ᾿ ή μας, ουσίας την δήΛωσιν είσκομίζοντες. Περίφρασις γάρ έστιν έν ταυτω καθ᾿ ένωσιν , δι ονόματος και όρου τάς δύο φύσεις έμφαίνουσα · ονόματος μεν , της μιας του Λόγου φύσεως , της τό κοινόν της ουσίας μετά τοΰ ιδίου της ύποστάσεως ?? Τί γάρ έστιν άνθρωπότητος φύσις , πλην ότι σαρξ έψυχωμένη νοερώς . Ώ στε ό Λέγων μίαν τοΰ Θεού Λόγου φύσιν σεσαρκωμένην , μετά σαρκός εμψύχου είναι τον Θεόν Λόγον δηΛοΐ .[ Η one we piously call the nature of God the Word embodied in flesh possessing a thinking and rational soul, introducing - by adding “incarnate” - an indication of our essence. For this [i.e. e. the word “incarnate"] is a descriptive expression, through the name and term, indicating collectively, thanks to the connection, two natures: the name “single nature of the Word,” denoting the community of essence together with the peculiarity of the hypostasis, and the term “human,” as the teacher himself says: “After all, what is human nature, if not flesh, intelligently animate?” So whoever speaks of the one incarnate nature of God the Word shows God the Word as existing with animate flesh] Col. 501; cf. col. 525, 584. Op. Max., t. And, col. 501, 525; compare: col. 49. Col. 49. Compare: Gieseler, part II, p. 15. Col. 501; compare: col. 525. The passage just considered from Athanasius the Great is not the only one in expressing the dogmatic truth contained in it. Maxim compares with it the other two sayings of the Fathers of the Church, saying: “It is worthy of attention that regarding natures and natural actions, along with expressions denoting duality (προς ταιδυικαίς φωναΐς), among the Fathers of the Church we find expressions speaking about unity (και ", " and "ένέργειαν"; meanwhile, regarding natural wills, as far as I know, it is impossible to find any expression of unity (ούδε μίαν μοναδικήν): (there are) all such expressions that speak of duality both in name and in number." T. II, col. 88 – 89. Assume. ex Epist. XLIV, ad Evlogium presv. C. P. Migne, t. LXXVII, col. 225. The difference in the reading of this passage between Cyril and Maxim is insignificant, namely, Maxim lacks the words against Cyril “έτερα γάρ ή του Λόγου φύσις, και έτερα ή της σαρκός" [for the nature of the Word is different, and the flesh is different] and the words "τον αυτόν" [the same], standing after "ένα Yίόν" [one Son]. Op. Max., t. II, col. 524 – 525. "" έκ θεότητος και άνθρωπότητος συγκείμενον “[We confess our Lord Jesus Christ as formed from two natures, that is, from divinity and humanity]. “We will not cease to confess that Christ is” τε όμοΰ τον αύτόν όντα , και άνθρωπον πιστεύοντες “[from two natures... and in two natures... and two natures, believing that One and the same is at the same time God and man]. Col. 501. Τού άσυγχύτους αύτάς μεμενηκέναι Λέγειν , ού διαίρεσιν την οίανοΰν παρεισάγοντος ...; [By saying that they remained unfused, no division is introduced..., but it is indicated that the difference remains unchanged]. T. II, col. 469. T. II, col. 473; compare: col. 477, 513. From an analysis of the contents of Maximus’ letter to John Cubularius, it is clear that there this position is explained using the example of a two-color or five-color stone. The essence of the explanations there boils down to the following conclusion: with a difference in colors, “the stone is the same: neither the quality (i.e., the difference) of the colors separates it, nor the singularity of the object (μητέ τω μοναδικω τού ύποκειμένου) merges (i.e. e. qualitatively different colors).” Col. 476. Πάντες γάρ ( οί άγιον της καθολικής Εκκλησίας διδάσκαλοι ) ώσπερ άλλην και άλλην , θείαν φημί και άνθρωπίνην , και διπλήν φύσιν έπί τού αύτού και ένός έδογμάτισαν [After all, all (the holy teachers of the Catholic Church) both about the other and the other - I mean divine and human - taught about the dual nature of One and the Same]. Col. 84. T. II, col. 96, 49, 76, 289,1052. According to the teachings of another party of Monophysites, the Julianists (for example, Sergius Grammar), although the nature of Christ was also formed from the combination of two, but by connection it should not be called complex. It is more correct to say that by union in Christ there is one nature, one essence and one property, and such one nature is Divine, to which everything that is said about Christ (even passions and suffering) should be attributed. Vid. Gieseler, part II, p. 9. Op. Max., t. II, col. 49. δηλονότι ψυχήν, ης χωρίς ούδέ σαρξ ύποσταίη ποτ᾿ αν. Ούκούν ψιΛή μορφώσει σαρκός την οικονομία ν έφάντασεν [Not having by nature vital force, nor, obviously, any kind the soul, without which the flesh cannot exist. Therefore, by the mere appearance of the flesh [Christ] depicted the dispensation [of salvation]. Christ " κατά άνθρώπους χωρίς άμαρτίας άληθώς γενόμενος άνθρωπος " [for the sake of men he truly became without sin person]. From a letter to Julian the scholastic, col. 581; compare: col. Όυτω τήν φύσιν Λαβών ήνωσεν ( Θεός ό Λόγος ) έαυτώ τό καθ᾿ ύπόστασιν , ώς άπαρχής ταύτην έδημιούργησε [Thus, having accepted nature, (God the Word) united with Himself according to hypostasis, [the same] as He originally created it]. From the dogmatic epistle to Stephen Dorsky, col. 157; compare: col. 77. "ἘΛΛείψας ούδέν εις πρόσΛηψιν των ήμετέρων" [Not neglecting anything of ours in the humanity perceived [by Him]]. From the same letter, col. 156. From the dogmatic epistle to Stephen Dorsky, col. 157; compare: col. 581. One of the earlier exponents of the Julianist view, Timothy Elur, by the way, taught that the flesh of Christ by its very birth was the flesh of God. If it were human flesh, different from the Divine nature of the Word, then its birth could take place no other way than according to the law of the natural birth of people. In fragments from the works of Timothy Elur, preserved by the monk Eustathius (in Ang. Maji Scriptorum veterum nova collect., VII. I), there is, by the way, the following passage: “Εί γάρ ήν άνθρωπος κατά φύσιν και νόμον ό μέλλων άποτελείσθαι άνθρωπος έν μήτρα της παρθένου, ούκ "For if he were a man by nature and [natural] law He intended to become a man in the womb of the Virgin, He would not have been born of Her if virginity had not been broken first]. See: Gieseler, part Π, p. 26. Letter to George, col. 60. The sinlessness of Christ's humanity by birth itself is treated in some detail in the Apology for Honorius. See: col. 237 – 241. That γάρ τού κατά τον Σωτήρα ανθρωπίνου θέΛειν , εί και φυσικόν ή ν , άΛ Y ?? ήμάς τή ενώσει κατάκρον § εω § έν , ω και τό άναμάρτητον κυρίως έπήρτηται. Τό δέ ήμέτερον προδήλως ψιΛόν, και ούδαμώς άναμάρτητον, διά τήν τήδε κάκειγινομένην περέγκΛισιν [For the will of the Savior’s humanity, although it was natural, was not naked like ours, as well as [His] humanity itself, as being above us in the highest degree deified by the union [with the Divine] to which sinlessness also belongs in justice. Ours is clearly naked and by no means sinless, due to the deviation that happened here and there]. Col. 236; cf. col. 60: « αύτός δέ πάσης κατά φύσιν ελεύθερος ών αμαρτίας , ώς άνθρωπος ού ψιΛός, άΛΛ᾿ ένανθρωπήσας Θεός, ούδέν εναντίον είχεν "[He, being by nature free from all sin, if not naked man, but God incarnate, had [in Himself] nothing contrary]. Παν γαρ εί τι φυσικόν, καί άδιάβΛητον ( nec vitii labem habet), ούκ εναντίον μέν, ού πάντως δέ καί ήνωμένον Θεω [For everything that is natural is also blameless: not contrary, but, in every way, not united with God]. Col. 236; compare: col. 56, 80. “How,” says Maxim in a letter to Stefan Dorsky, “the all-essential God the Word, who became incarnate for our sake, after receiving from the Holy Spirit the Virgin Mary and the Mother of God of rationally animated flesh, becoming by nature a new man and remaining such (νέος τέ χρηματίσας φύσει καί γενόμενος άνθρωπος), would have renewed the ancient man (καινουργήσει τον πάλαι), if he had not accepted all of him, with the exception of sin alone, which is what oldness consists of (ή παλαίωσις)?" Col. 136. Col. 157 and many other places. From a letter to Marin the deacon, col. 77; compare: col. 345 (from "Disputation with Pyrrhus"). Col. 345; compare: col. 157. L. s. apud. Braun, s. 96.Ex. III torn. Apologiae de Verbo incarnato. Dispute, cum. Pyrrh., col. 289. Letter to Cosmas the Deacon. T.I, col. 560. “The Fathers of the Church,” says Maximus (col. 300), “commanded us to recognize (in Christ) not only natures, but also the distinctive properties or characteristics (ιδιότητες τά γνωρίσματα της τεΛειότητος) of each nature: not only One and the same, as perfect God and perfect man, but also their perfection...; In accordance with such a pious thought, they also taught about two wills of the One and the same, numerically (δύο) and qualitatively different (άΛΛο και άΛΛο)." Op. Max., t. And, col. 80, 84, 96, 289 and many others. "Disp. from Pir.", col. 289; compare: col. 201, 96. Thus, Severus, in a letter to Sergius the Grammar, convinces the latter to abandon his (Julian’s) teaching and recognize in Christ one complex nature, but two essences and two properties. Vid. Gieseler, part II, p. 9. "Disp. from Pir.", col. 301. Ibid., Col. 289; compare: col. 273. The Protestant theologian Dorner does not give the force of evidence to the foundation borrowed from the Trinity. Dorner, by the way, says: “The basis borrowed from the Trinity is, of course, unsubstantiated, because if three persons (in God) can have one will, then one person must even more so have one will, even if it is composed of two natures or essences.” Dorner, apparently, forgets, or rather deliberately ignores, what exactly Maximus wants to prove in relation to Christ on the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity. Maxim does not at all want to say that on the basis of the unity of the wills of the three persons of the Holy Trinity in Christ, it is necessary to recognize two wills: the conclusion from this basis seems to be quite obvious. Thus, Dorner’s conclusion (“... then one person, especially, should...”, etc.) is completely arbitrary and erroneous. As if correcting himself, Dorner nevertheless continues to sing in unison with monothelitism, saying: “Certainly the diophelites say that in God there is one nature of all three Persons, and therefore one will in Them, if the will everywhere follows nature. But, not to mention the fact that, coming from here, it was possible to come to the recognition of one will in different human personalities, the monothelites could object (and they, indeed, objected) that the duality of the essences of which the God-man consists does not necessarily lead to the acceptance of a duality of wills; after all, man consists of two essences: body and soul, and, however, only one will is thought of in him.” Dorner, Th. And, s. 244. As for this position (“not to mention the fact that from here it was possible to come to the recognition of one will in different human personalities”), it is absolutely incomprehensible how Dorner could say this after Maxim more than once and very definitely declares that where there is one nature, there is one will, and that, therefore, all people, as homogeneous and consubstantial, are characterized by one natural will? Such obviousness of Maxim’s propositions could not be overlooked in any way, treating them untendentiously. We will talk about the objection of the Monothelites, shared by Dorner, ahead. Op. Max., t. II, col. 209. Col. 292 – 293. See: Part I of our research, Content analysis “Disp. from Pir.”, pp. ??. Letter to Presbyter Marin, t. And, col. 12. Exactly the same definition is given on col. 45 and 185; it is not fully given in many places: see, for example, col. 153, 192, 280. It should be noted that Maximus does not offer his own definition of natural will, as indicated by the expression “φάσιν” (“they say”). On col. 185 Maximus more definitely says that this definition was compiled by one humble monk (ευλαβής μοναχός). In a note to these words, Combefi says: “Non facile existimandus Sophronius.” We more decisively hold the same opinion, although on a completely different basis than Combefi: the latter bases his guess on the fact that “at the time of writing this (epistle) Sophronius was either already a bishop (and the definition was compiled by a monk), or he was not alive.” In any case, when writing both this epistle and the other (to Presbyter Marinus), from which we cited the definition in question, Sophronius was not alive; Yes, even if he were still alive, being a bishop, Maxim still could not express himself this way about Sophrony: ό ευλαβής μοναχός. It can hardly be assumed that Stefan Dorsky, who enjoyed the confidence of Sophronius, allowed himself to turn to Maximus for the latter’s opinion regarding the correctness of this definition: “εί ου έχει, ή μή” (col. 185). These, of course, are all more or less witty guesses, but here is the true, in our opinion, reason why Sophronius cannot be considered the author of the above definition. Sophronius’s polemical activity falls entirely on the first period in the history of the development of Monothelite disputes, when the controversial issue was revealed exclusively under the form of the concept “ενέργεια”, and not “θέλημα” or “ θέλησις ". The actual author of the definition is unknown to us. "Εί καί θέλησιν τό θέλημα προσαγορεύουσιν [although they call will volition], that is, the Fathers of the Church, αλλ᾿ ουδαμώς θεληθέν ή θελητόν [but not at all willed or desired]." Col. 188. Of all the fathers of the Church (Irenaeus of Lyons, Clement of Alexandria, Eustathius of Antioch, Athanasius of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, Diadochus of Photica, Anastasius of Antioch, Nemesius of Emesus, Justin the Philosopher), definitions of the will of which are given in Maximus (t. I, col. 276 - 280), only one Anastasius of Antioch has the name “θέλημα”, while all the others have only “θέλησις”. Thus, in a letter to the presbyter Marin (col. 13) Maximus equally defines both θέλημα and θέλησις as “ορεξις λογική καί ζωτική” [reasonable and animal desire]. In the dogmatic treatise “On the Two Wills of Christ Our God,” the word “θέλημα” appears more than 30 times, while “θέλησις” only once. The numerical superiority in the use of the first compared to the second appears even more clearly in the “Disputation with Pyrrhus”: here, if we take into account the use of these terms by Pyrrhus, “θέλημα” appears more than 90 times, while “θέλησις” only 15 times. It is worthy of note that in the formula “two wills” Maximus always uses the word “θέλημα”: “δύο θελήματα” (See, for example, col. 193, 196, 289, 300, 301), with the exception of a single case in a conversation with Theodosius (t. I. col. 141), where “θέλησις” is used: “δύο θελήσεις”. (Like Maximus, Pyrrhus also uses "θέλημα" preferably before "θέλησις"). Separately, to designate both Divine and human will, Maxim uses both terms equally; For an example of the use of "θέλησις" see col. 209. "Disp. from Pir.", col. 293. Letter to Presbyter Marin, col. 48. "Disp. from Pir.", col. 292. Letter to Presbyter Marin, col. 13. Quotes corresponding to the previous three links. Natural and personal will, as such, is compared in Maximus (see, for example, col. 293) with the natural ability to see (τό όραν) and with the direction of vision in one direction or another (τό πώς όραν). Col. 263; compare: col. 297. Col. 12, 297; compare: col. 192. Ibid; compare: col. 293, 77. From a letter to Marinus the presbyter, col. 56. “Being by nature God, possessing perfect freedom, and the Author of the freedom of all, as a man He was not deprived of reason (ουκ άνους γέγονεν άνθρωπος) or the natural life of people (ή ζωής ... φυσικής), but was a thinking person (νοερός), i.e. (ήτοι) actually by nature (φύσει) possessed will and action (θελητικός και ένεργητικός ). Col. 128. Col. 317. Exactly the same definition, according to Maximus, is given by Irenaeus of Lyon; Athanasius the Great, Gregory of Nyssa and others also determine the will in the essence of the matter. See: Op. Max., t. II, col. 276 – 277. Maxim does not indicate where, from what writings of the named Fathers of the Church he borrowed such a definition of will. "Κατ έξουσίαν γάρ βουλευόμεθα, και κρίνομεν, και προαιρούμεθα, και όρμώμεν, καί χρώμεθα τοιέφ᾿ ήμίν “[For we freely will and decide, and choose, and use what is in our power]. Κατά φύσιν δέ ήμίν, ώς εϊρηται, προσόντος του Λογικώς όρέγεσθαι, ήγουν θέλειν, και Λογίζεσθαι βουλεύεσθαί τε και ζητείν, και σκέπτεσθαι, και βούλεσθαι, και κρίνειν, και διατίθεσθαι, και αίρείσθαι, και όρμάν, και κεχρήσθαι ούκ άρα ήναγκασμένα τά τών νοερών φυσικά “[Since it is in our nature, as has been said, to strive rationally, that is, to desire and calculate, to plan and seek, and to think, and to want, and to decide, and to tune in, and to choose, and to strive, and to use, then what is not forced is what is related to the nature of thinking [creatures]]. By the way, note that in the just cited tirade the entire volitional process is indicated, composed of eight consecutive moments. In the words given in the text (col. 17 - 20), two initial moments are omitted: “βούλησις” (will, i.e. desire for something) and "ζήτησις, και σκέψις " (finding means (τό βουλευτόν) leading to the realization of the goal (τό τέλος), which is βουΛητόν, and doubt about the possibility of achieving the goal if the desire extends to the impossible (έπί τών άδυνάτων) See: col. 13) and the fifth moment - τό διατίθεσθαι or, as it is usually called, γνώμη - arbitrary inclination. See: col. 17. ή ££ έ £ ουσία , κυριότης έννομος των έφ᾿ ήμίν πρακτών ή κυριότης άκωλυτ oc της των έφ᾿ ήμϊν χρήσεως ή όρεξις των έφ᾿ ήμίν αδούλωτος . Col. 17. "Disp. from Pir.", col. 325. This name, as far as can be judged based on the words of Pyrrhus in a conversation with Maximus, was invented by the Monothelites for a well-known purpose. Look: the first part “Content Analysis”. disp. with Pir." Although in a letter to Presbyter Marin about γνώμη is interpreted after choice, Maxim himself directly says that “choice comes after inclination and arises from it” (μεθ᾿ ην, i.e. γνώμην, ή κυριώτερον ειπείν, εξ ης ή προαίρεσις). Col. 17. "Disp. from Pir.”, words of Maxim. Col. 308. Col. 293. "" κεχρημένω προσόν , καί των άλλων αύτόν χωρίζον “[To desire in a certain way... is a way of using [the ability] to desire, characteristic only of the one who uses [it] and distinguishing him from others]. The basis for attributing the name “γνωμικόν” only to human personal will can be seen in the fact that, speaking about the impossibility of attributing to the human nature of Christ “θέλημα γνωμικόν” (“Disp. from the Pir.”, col. 308), Maximus at the same time (ibid., col. 313) says that Christ cannot be attributed, by the way, with one personal will (ύποστατικόν θ.), i.e., obviously, Divine, to which, of course, the name “γνωμικόν” is inapplicable, for a very simple reason hidden in the concept itself. The reason for the evil that in us in our present state our personal will is such a dominant principle lies in the depravity of our nature, in the removal of our will from the will of God, in the exaltation of the personal principle over the natural. Col. 56. For an explanation of this position, see, for example, the letter to Stephen, Bishop of Dor, col. 197 – 201; and also col. 64, 97, 333 and many others. Op. Max., t. IL, col. 105, 84, 289. Πάντες γάρ ώστιερ άλλη ν και άλλην , θείαν φημί και άνθρωπίνην , και διπλή ν φύσιν επί τού αύτοϋ και ενός έδογμάτισαν ούτως διαπρυσίως τοις πάσιν έκήρυξαν και άλλο και άλλο θέλημα , θείόν και δύο θελήματα και άλλην και άλλην ένέργειαν , θείαν τε και άνθρωπίνην και διπλήν αύθις ένέργειαν , τουτέστι δύο. Ούτω γάρ και των ούσιών τήν εν αριθμώ σημασίαν προδήλως έξεφώνησαν . Col. 84; regarding wills compare: col. 300. Ώ σπερ γαρ ό των τοΰ αύτοΰ καί ένός Χριστού φύσεων αριθμός , εύσεβώς νοούμενος τε καί Λεγόμενος, ού διαιρεί τον Χριστόν, άλλα ?? καίό αριθμός των ούσιωδώς προσόντων ταίς αύτού φύσεσι θελημάτων καί ενεργειών κατ᾿ άμφω γάρ, ώς εϊρηται, τάς αύτού φύσεις θελητικός ην ό αύτός καί ενεργητικός της ήμών σωτηρίας ού διαίρεσιν εισάγει μη γένοιτο άλλα την αύτών δηλοί καί μόνον , κάν τή ενώσει φυλακήν καί σωτηρίαν . Col. 289. Col. 289 – 292. See: Part I, “Content Analysis.” disp. with Pir." Col. 293. See: “Content Analysis.” ..." Col. 336. See: “Content Analysis.” ..." Col. 297. See: “Content Analysis.” ..." 0 εοδοσ > Και ημείς όμολογοϋμεν και τάς φύσεις και διαφόρους ? την θεότητα , και θελητικήν αύτοΰ την άνθρωπότητα επειδή ούκ άνευ θελήσεως ήν ή ψυχή αύτοΰ . [Theodos.: And we confess both nature and various actions, that is, divine and human; and to those who have will [we confess] His deity, and [also] to those who have will – His humanity, since His soul was not without will. We don’t say “two” so as not to introduce a contradiction into Him]. Μαξ. Τί ούν; ?? και ένεργειών λεγόμενος, διαιρέσεως έχει δύναμιν; [Max.: What does it mean that, being applied to natures, number does not divide, but when spoken of in relation to wills and actions, it has dividing power?] Θεοδ. Πάντως και οί πατέρες έπί θελήσεων και ένεργειών ούκ εΐπον, φεύγοντες τήν διαίρεσιν, άλλ᾿ άλλην και άλλην, και θείαν, και άνθρωπίνην, και διπλή ν, και διττήν · και ώς είπαν λέγω, και ώς είρήκασι λέγω [Theod.: Undoubtedly, the fathers did not speak about wills and actions [this], avoiding division, but [they said] “other and different,” “divine and human,” “double” and “twofold.” And as they spoke, so I speak, and as they spoke, I speak]. Μαξ. → δύο, ή δις πέντε, τί νοούντες τοις λέγουσιν άποκρίνεσθε; και είπαν. ?? άλλην , δύο νοούμεν · και δις δύο , τέσσαρα νοου [For the Lord’s sake, if you hear “one and one” or “other and another” or “twice two” or “twice five” answer those who say, what do you mean? And they said: since you have cursed us, then “one and one” means two, and “other and another” also means two, and twice two means four]. Op. Max., t. I, col. 152–153. Ει δέ πρωτοπαθής έν ήμίν ή ΘέΛησις , ταύτην δέ μετά της φύσεως κατ᾿ αύτούς ού προσείληθεν ό Λόγος ένανθρωπήσας – ούκ άρα εγώ χωρίς άμαρτίας γέγονα. Ει δέ εγώ χωρίς άμαρτίας ού γέγονα , ούκ άρα έσώθην – είπερ τό άπρόσΛηπτον, άθεράπευτον [If the will is first of all defeated in us, but the Word did not accept this together with nature when it became man, then I did not become without sin. If I did not become without sin, then I was not saved, unless what was actually perceived was not healed]. Col. 325; compare: col. 156. Apology of Honorius, col. 237. Dogmatic Epistle to Prester Marinus, col. 233 et seq. Monothelites, for example, Pyrrhus, referred to this saying. See: “Disp. from Pir.", col. 316. The Greek text of this passage is given in the first chapter (ref. 278). Φαμέν, οτιπερ κα § ό μεν φυσιχόν (i.e. in general τό άνθρώπινον and in particular τό ΘέΛειν), ? ύπεναντίον, και ώς τα ποΛΛά άντιπίπτον, ώ και τό άμαρτάνειν έφέπεται. Col. 236. "Disp. from Pir.", col. 325 – 328; compare: col. 349. Ει μεν καθ᾿ o Θεός, τοϋτό τις περί αύτοΰ είρήσθαι έκΛάβη, πέρασι σωματιχοίς, τω άνω φημί, και τώ κάτω · τω έμπροσθεν και τω οπίσω · τω δεξιά και τω άριστερά , διαΛήφθαι την θεότητα Λέγειν άναγχασθήσεται . Εί δέ καθ᾿ ο άνθρωπος ταύτα είρήσθαι περί αύτοΰ Λέγει · άρα θελητιχός ην ό αύτός και καθ᾿ o άνθρωπος [If anyone understands that this is said about Him as God, then he will be forced to say that the Divinity is encompassed by bodily boundaries - I mean, top and bottom, front and back, right and left. If he asserts that this is said about Him as a man, it means that the same One was endowed with will as a man]. Col. 321 – 324. Yπήκοος δε ού καθ ο Θεός, άΛΛά καθ ο άνθρωπος, γέγονε "Καθ᾿ δ γαρ Θεός, ούτε ύπήκοος, κατά τούς Πατέρας, ούτε άνήκοος." – "Των γαρ δευτέρων, και των ύπό χείρα ταύτα", φησίν ό Θείος Γρηγόριος · άρα και καθ᾿ ο άνθρωπος ΘεΛητικός ήν [He became obedient not as God, but as man: “for as God, He, - according to the fathers, - neither obedient nor disobedient.” - “For this,” says the divine Gregory, “is characteristic of inferiors and subordinates”; This means that He, as a man, was endowed with will]. Col. 324. All the considered passages of Scripture, to which Maximus refers in confirmation of the reality of the human will and action of Christ, are cited by him in a conversation with Pyrrhus. See: col. 321 - 324. In a letter to Stephen, Bishop of Dor (col. 160), the same places are cited for the same purpose, with the exception of two: Philip. IÏ 8 and Ps. XXXIX: 7–9. Col. 81, 68. It should be noted that Maximus cites this saying as proof, mainly, that Christ has, although different, but not contradictory wills. But if the possibility of thinking in one person of Christ, according to the Monothelites, was hindered, among other things, by the contradiction of the human will with the Divine will, then the example of this saying could serve as the strongest proof of the reality of the combination in the person of Christ of two natural wills. Therefore, Baur's remark (Baur, b. II, pp. 122 - 123) that, cited in the epistle of Pope Agathon as proof of the reality of the existence of two wills in Christ, this saying is “not mentioned in Maximus” (i.e. not mentioned as such), is incorrect. It is not mentioned in the “Disputation with Pyrrhus,” where all other places are given, but Maximus’s dogmatic and polemical works are not limited to just a conversation with Pyrrhus. Col. 45 (special treatise, Sar. 51). L. sumpt. ex Lib. de incarnatione Verbi Dei et contra Arianos. Op. Athanasii Alexandrini, t. II, col. 1021. It should be noted that Maxim’s present place is somewhat curtailed. In Athanasius it reads like this: “Καί όταν λέγη, Πάτερ, ει δυνατόν, παρελΘέτω άπ᾿ εμού τό ποτήριον τούτο – πλήν μή τό έμόν , άΛΛά τό σον γενέσθω Θέλημα – καί πάλιν. Τό μεν πνεύμα πρόΘυμον, ή δέ σαρξ ασθενής, δύο Θελήματα ενταύθα δείκνυσι – τό μέν άνΘρώπινον ( όπερ εστί τής σαρκός τό δέ Θεϊκόν, όπερ Θεού. "[And when He says: "Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me, even so not Mine, but Thy will be done,” and again: “the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak,” He thereby shows two wills: human (which is the will of the flesh, and the other - divine, which is God) due to weakness avoids suffering, and His divine will is vigorous]. In reading Maxim, the words we put in brackets are missing, and the word “πάλιν” turns out to be superfluous. In Epist. I Agathonis papae (Mansi, t. XI, p. 248) the present passage is read in full, that is, the same as in Athanasius himself. L. sumpt. ex II orat. (theologica IV) de Filio. Vid. Op. Gregorii theology, t. II, col. 117 et sq. Col. 236; compare: col. 316. L. sumpt. ex I orat. in Christi resurrectionem (vel in sanctum Pascha). Op. Gregorii Nysseni, t. Ill, col. 616. Regarding the reading of the cited passage in the works of Gregory of Nyssa in its current form, it should be noted that it is incomplete. Here it is presented in this form: “Ή ψυχή ΘέΛει και τό σώμα ... ή Λέπρα" [The soul wants the body... leprosy]; the following words are expected to be omitted: “και τό σώμα ( άπτεται · δι᾿ αμφοτέρων φεύγει τό πόνος · απήλθε γάρ, φησίν , απ᾿ αυτού ) ή Λέπρα "[and the body (concerns: through both the disease goes away, for leprosy has receded, the verb says, from it]. Cf. Op. Max., t. II, col. 161; on col. 317 Maxim's last sentence is omitted. The present place in the works of Gregory of Nyssa (col. 616) and Maximus (col. 161) stands next to the first. The following words of Gregory of Nyssa: “Επειδή τοίνυν άΛΛο τό άνθρώπινον Θέλημα, και τό θείον άΛΛο , ? ") τής φύσεως πρόσφορον , ό τά ήμέτερα πάθη οίκειωσάμενος – επάγει δέ την δευτέραν φωνήν , τό ύψηΛόν τε καί θεοπρεπές βούΛημα κυρωΘήναι παρά τό άνθρώπινον ύπέρ της των ανθρώπων (from Maxim: “τού κόσμου ") σωτηρίας ΘέΛων. Ό γαρ ειπών · Μη τό έμόν , τό ανθρώπινο ν τω Λόγω έσημανε · προσΘείς , ής ούδεμία Θελήματος έστι διαφορά, διά την κοινωνίαν της φύσεως "taken from his Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarem. Op. Gregorii Nysseni, t. II, col. 1193 et ​​sq. Cf. Op. Max., t. II, col. 161. For the Russian translation of the above passage, see “Acts.” VI Century E.”, p. 233. Assume ex XXIV assert. (Λόγος KD) Thesavri de sancta et consubstantiali Trinitate. Op. S. Cyrilli Alexandrini, t. VIII, col. 392. In the same letter to Stephen, Bishop of Dor, col. 165 – 169. Combefi notes that “haec (h.e. verba) de vini miraculo non exstant inter Opera S. Cyrilli Hierosolymitani” (pag. 167. Var. lect. 10). In fact, these words of Cyril belong to the fragmenta deperditorum S. Cyrilli operum. The present passage, according to Tute, is given only in Maximus and in the acts of the Lateran Council of 649. Vid. Opera S. Cyrilli Hierosolymitani, col. 1181. In the original Latin text, these words read like this: “Agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione, quod proprium est” - “both forms, in communication with the other, act in their own way.” At the VI Ecumenical Council, these words were also read in this form: “utraque forma” “έκατέρα μορφή” (Apud. Mansi, t. XI, p. 421 - 422 Acts. VI Century e., p. 255). It is known that the Monothelites also referred to this saying in confirmation of the unity of action, for example, Sergius in his letter to Cyrus and Honorius; Meanwhile, this place clearly and decisively testifies to the duality of natural actions. Dorner (Dorner, th. II, s. 216, note 27) believes that the Monothelites made a grammatical distortion of this classical passage in their favor, reading instead of “utraque forma” (pot. s.) - “έκατέρα μορφή” (dativ. s.). And the following meaning was obtained: not “this and that nature”, but “in this and that nature” (and in principle they did not reject the duality of natures) one person acts. Whether Dorner’s assumption is fair or not (and in the copy of the epistles of Sergius to Cyrus and Honorius, read at the VI Ecumenical Council, the nominative case form was used: apud Mansi, t. XI, p. 525 – 526 and 537 – 538), in any case, Maximus’s use of the form of the expression “έκατέρα μορφή” cannot be equated with the use of this expression in the same form among the Monothelites. It must be remembered that Maxim strictly distinguishes between the concepts “ένεργών” and “ένέργεια”, and with such a distinction the formula “έκατέρα μορφή” cannot in any case be interpreted in the Monothelite sense. It is equal to an expression often used in the language of Maximus, such as the following: “by one and the other nature” (καθ 7 έκατέραν αυτού φύσιν: col. 128) or “by both natures (καθ 7 άμφω τάς αύτού φύσιν: col. 160) Christ had will and action.” Ού γάρ δή που μίαν είναι φυσικήν την ένέργειαν δώσομεν Θεού και μήτε μήν τής Θείας φύσεως , τό έξαίρετον εις τον τοις γενητοΐς πρέποντα κατάγωμεν τόπον. Οίς (in Maxim: ών) γάρ ή ένέργεια και ή δύναμις άπαραΛΛάκτως μία, τούτοις ανάγκη και τήν τού είδους (in Maxim: “γένους”) ενότητα σώζεσΘαι. L. sumpt. ex XXXII assert. Thesauri. Op. S. Cyrilli, t. VIII, col. 453; op. Max., t. 168 – 169. Op. Max., t. II, col. 41, 44, 481, 525. Ούκουούχ ύπόστασις ή τού Θεού Λόγου καλέστηκε σάρξ . Ούδέποτε γάρ … καθ 7 έαυτήν τό παράπαν ύπέστη τοιάφορίζουσιν αύτήν ίδιώμασι διωρισμένη τών ομογενών , ή προς τον συγκείμενον καθ᾿ ύπόστασιν Λόγον , τού κοινού τό ίδιον έχουσα κεχωρισμένον – αλλ᾿ ένυπόστατος ώς έν αύτώ καί δι αύτόν λαβούσα τού είναι την γένεσιν · καί αύτού γενομένη καθ᾿ ένωσιν σάρξ , καί προς αύτόν κα $' ύπόστασιν ένιζομένη , τω Λόγω τής τών Λοιπών ανθρώπων άφοριζούσης αύτήν ιδιότητος. Καί σαφέστερον ειπείν , αύτού τού Λόγου καθ ύπόστασιν ποιουμένη τό ' ένωσιν γέγονεν [So the flesh of God the Word did not become a hypostasis. After all, she never... did not exist by itself at all, being delimited from its homogeneous [with] its defining characteristics, or possessing [any] separate from the common [for all] feature, except for the Word assigned to it by hypostasis, but [has always been] hypostatic, as in Him and through Him having received the beginning of being and having become by union with His flesh and with Him in hypostasis one by virtue of its distinctiveness her features are different from other people. And, more clearly speaking, becoming hypostasically a peculiarity of the Word Himself, as in a certain sense and general in essence, whose flesh she truly became as a result of the union]. Col. 560.0 “complexities of the hypostasis” of Christ, see the following excerpt, col. 529. Op. Max., t. II, col. 124 – 125,101 – 104. The expression of Cyril of Alexandria “μίαν τε και συγγενή δι άμφοίν έπιδείκνυσι ( ό Χριστός ) ένέργειαν "taken from IV Lib. In Ioannis Evangelium. Op. S. Cyrilli Alexandrini, t. VI, col. 557. Maximus the Confessor gives it in a slightly modified form: ένέργειαν" (col. 124) or "μία τε καί συγγενής δι άμφοίν έπιδεδειγμένη ένέργεια "(col. 101, cf. col. 85). Pyrrhus, in a conversation with Maximus, gives it in this form: “μίαν (" τε καί " - omitted) συγγενή δι άμφοίν έπιδεδειγμένον ένέργειαν (Col. 344). Such, for example, is the expression: “ήν (i.e. Θέλησιν) φυσικώς τυπών τε καί κινών, ώς οίκείαν, καί ? ήμών οικονομίας μυστήριον "[to which (i.e. will) naturally giving shape and movement, as His own, and natural to His soul, He unimaginatively accomplished the great mystery of [His] looking at us]. Col. 32. Λέγομεν δέ έκ δύο φύσεων τήν ένωσιν γεγενήσΘαι · μίαν δέ τήν έξ αύτών ύπόστασιν άποτετελέσΘαι τού Χριστού σύνθετον , έκείνας αύτάς τάς έξ ών συνετέθη φύσεις , ώς όλον ίδια μέρη ανελλιπώς μετά τών ? καί έν αύταΐς φυλαττομένην καί σωζομένην ώς όλον έν μέρεσιν [We say that from two natures a union occurred, and one of them turned out to be a composite hypostasis of Christ, invariably containing and preserving those two natures from which it was composed, as a whole [contains] its parts without derogation from their inherent natural properties, and [itself] is contained and preserved in them, as a whole in parts].Co1.492–493. Compare: col. 529: « , - καί δι ή μας, άπλούς κατά φύσιν καί ασώματος, έξ, ήμών γέγονεν [Being by nature God and the Son of God by nature, simple and incorporeal, and coeternal with the Father, and the Creator of all ages, He, having willed mankind, became man as a result of taking flesh, and for our sake, simple by nature and incorporeal, He was economically born from us complex in hypostasis and in the body]. The same idea from a negative side is developed in many other places, for example, on col. 517, 525, 557. that ύποστάσεως [The name “Christ” is an indication not of nature, but of a complex hypostasis]. Col. 268. Και παρώ Λέγειν , ώς ούδέ άτομον κυρίως τό κατά Χριστόν σύνΘετον Λέγεται πρόσωπον. Ού γάρ σχέσιν έχει προς τήν έκ τού γενικωτάτου γένους διά των ? και έν αύτώ τήν οίκείαν πρόοδον περιγράφουσαν... έστι, προς είδος ή γένος άναγόμενον, ή κατ᾿ ούσίαν ύπό τούτων περιγραφόμενον άΛΛ᾿ ύπόστασις σύνθετος ... [Not to mention the fact that the complex face of Christ is not called indivisible in the proper sense. For He has nothing to do with the division that goes from the most general genus through subordinate genera to the most particular species and completes its path in it... After all, He is not indivisible, raised to a species or genus, or essentially described by them, but a complex hypostasis] Col. 201 – 204. Compare: “An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith” by I. Damaskin, p. 143. The union of natures, conceived by the North, is in the proper sense a connection or fusion (σύγχυσις) of essences, it is a substantial union (ούσιώδης ένωσις), in which, with personal unity (έν), there is no place for natural duality (δύο); it is, strictly speaking, not a connection, but a “natural unity formed through addition” (φυσική μονάς κατά σύνθεσιν). And the union of natures, conceived by Nestorius, is a relative or affective union (σχετική ένωσις), agreement in the direction of thought and will: the natural duality here is at the same time personal (ύποστατική δυάς). See: col. 149 – 152, 40 – 44, 525. ή τάς διαφόρους ούσίας ήγουν φύσεις εις έν πρόσωπον , καί μίαν καί τήν αύτήν ύπόστασιν συνάγουσά τε καί συνδέουσα [Conjunction is hypostatic or bringing together and connecting different entities, that is, natures, into one person and into one and the same hypostasis]. Col. 152. The name "Christ" indicates the διαίρεσιν έν έαυτή κατ᾿ άκρον ταυτίζουσα , καί εις έν άγουσα τή τών οίκείον ενώσει μερών [complex hypostasis, the natural division of extremes (i.e., natures) in itself identifying to the extreme and bringing together by the combination of its parts]. Col. 204. Epist. Sophronii ad Sergium, in Hardouin – p. 1272; compare: Op. Max., t II. col. 493. Op. Max., t. II. col. 493 – 496. In Cyril of Alexandria, this expression is most closely related to the nature of man, an example of which is taken to easily explain the position that “although it is said about the Divine and human natures of Emmanuel, but one Son (εις Yιός) is thought of together with humanity, which has become the property of the Word” (ή άνθρωπότης γέγονεν ιδία τού Λόγου ). Op. S. Cyrilli Alexandrini, t. Χ, Epist. XLVI, II ad Succenum, col. 245. Πώς ή άκρα ένωσις καί ταυτότητα έχει, καί ετερότητα; Οίον επί τής άγιας Τριάδος , ταυτότης μεν έστιν ούσίας έτερότης δέ προσώπων · μίαν γάρ ούσίαν όμοΛογούμεν · τρεις δέ ύποστάσεις . Ἐπί δέ τού άνθρώπου , ταυτότης μέν έστι προσώπου · έτερότης δέ ?? άΛΛης ή σάρξ. ' Ομοίως δέ καί έπί τού Δεσπότου Χριστού ταυτότης μέν έστι, προσώπου · έτερότης δέ , ούσιών · ένός γάρ οντος προσώπου , ήτοι ύποστάσεως , έτέρας ούσίας έστιν ή Θεότης , καί έτέρας ή άνθρωπότης . Ώ σπερ γάρ άδύνατον τής άγίας Τριάδος όμοΛογεΐν μέν τήν ένωσιν, μή έκφωνειδέ τήν διαφοράν · ούτως άνάγκη πάσα έπί τού ένός τής [How does an extreme conjunction have both identity and otherness? Because, in relation to the Holy Trinity, identity refers to the essence, and difference - to the persons: after all, we confess one essence and three hypostases. And in relation to a person, identity refers to the person, and difference - to the essences, for while the person, that is, the hypostasis, is one, another essence is the soul, and another is the flesh. In the same way, with the Lord Christ, identity refers to the Person, and difference - to essences, for despite the fact that the Person, that is, the hypostasis, is one, of a different nature - deity, and a different nature - humanity. For just as it is impossible to profess the unity of the Holy Trinity and not proclaim the difference, so it is in every possible way necessary, in relation to the One of the Holy Trinity, to preach both unity and difference] Col. 145 β᾿ – 148 γ᾿. Baur (Baur, th. II, s. 127) arbitrarily considers Maximus’s appeal to the doctrine of the Trinity God as a kind of proof of the possibility of combining two natures, and, consequently, two wills in one person of Christ, and from this point of view he comes to that sharp conclusion (explanations of Maximus, in a conversation with Pyrrhus, col. 313, using the analogy represented by the doctrine of the Trinity, directly calling “empty, meaningless formalism”) that, as such, it proves the completely opposite of what, in his opinion, Maxim is trying to prove with its help. Col. 64 – 65: two very small treatises. This is how Dorner, by the way, understands the meaning of this word, saying: “Dazu (i.e. zu τρόπω άντίδοσεως) komme als weitere Folge der hypostatischen Einigung die geheimnissvolle Weise des Kreisens der Naturen Christi in einander.” Dorner, s. 235. The concept “περιχώρησις” appears for the first time in Maximus, so he is rightly considered the creator of this concept. See Lib. III, col. 994 - 995; "άντίδοσις" and "$ έωσις" are found in patristic literature of an earlier time. Thus, in Gregory of Nyssa we find a fairly accurate definition of what is called "άντιδοσις " "Because of the close connection of the received flesh and the received Divinity," says Gregory of Nyssa. (Op. Gregorii Nysseni, t. II, Adversus Apollin. ad Theoph., fine torn., col. 1277), - there is a mutual exchange of names (άντιμε $ ίστανται τά ό νόματα communicantur et mutuo dantur nomina), so that and the human (τό άνΦρώπινον) is called the name of the Divine, and the Divine (καί τό Θείον) is called the name of the human. This is why it is said that the Lord of glory was crucified, and the one worshiped from every creature of heaven, earth and the underworld is called Jesus.” In our existing dogmatic systems, άντίδοσις and $ έωσις are considered as consequences of the hypostatic union of the natures of Christ in relation to Christ Himself. Not a word is said about περιχώρησις, as an image of the hypostatic existence of the natures of Christ. See, for example, “Dogmatic Theology” by the Right Reverend Macarius, vol. I, § 139, pp. 93 et ​​seq. Op. Max., t. II. col. 168; compare: col. 352. Καί ούτε τήν φύσιν αύτού, φημί δέ τού σιδήρου, καν μετά πυρός όράται, κωλυόμενα τό παράπαν όνομάζειν ή άριθμεϊν, ούτε τήν καί έχει προς ταύτην διάστασιν διαφαίνεται καί γνωρίζεται ). Τίς ούν ό Λόγος τού τό φυσικώς τη φύσει προσόν μή άριθμείν, τουτέστι τό Θέλημα ( ύπερτελεί καί ?? άδιάστατον τών τής φύσεως κεκοινωνηκότι , καθάπερ ούν καύτής ( ήν, άλλά γνώμης, παρά τον λόγον καί τον νόμον κεκινημένης τής φύσεως, έκτροπή καί ολίσθημα); col. 189 – 192. Ού γάρ άν $ ρωπον άπο $ εω $ έντα του Χρίστου καταγγέλλομεν , άλλα Θεόν τελείως έναν $ ρωπήσαντα , καί τής οίκείας άφράστου Θεότητος τήν άπειρον , άπειράκις απείρως ύπεράπειρον δι᾿ ενεργούς φύσει [For we do not declare Christ to be a man deified, but to be God completely made man and His ineffable Divinity, infinite, infinite number of times, infinitely-infinite power made manifest through the nature of active flesh, intelligently animated]. Col. 36. Ἐμπαλιν δέ δια τήν ένωσιν , τά έκατέρας ίδια φύσεως κατά άντίδοσιν τή έτερα προσάπτομεν · εξ ού καί Θεόν παθητόν κατά τής άμαρτίας φαμέν "" Θαρρώ λέγειν, όμόθεον ", κατά τον Θεολόγον Γρηγόριον [On the contrary, due to the connection, we apply the own properties of each nature to the other by mutual exchange, which is why and we call God suffering against sin, and the flesh “perceived and become as anointed and - I dare say - equally divine,” according to the theologian Gregory]. Col. 120. In explanation of the above words (“we preach Christ not as a deified man...”, etc.), indicating how the deification of Christ’s humanity should be understood, St. Maxim expresses himself, by the way, like this: “Θεός γάρ υπάρχων τέλειος, καί άνθρωπος τέλειος ό αυτός κα $' " [For, being perfect God and perfect man, He acts naturally in each of the [natures] of which He was a hypostasis, without being divided]. Col. 36. Photos τήν $ είαν φημί – καί μίαν κρατουμένην · τήν άνθρωπίνην δηλονότι … Τό γαρ έπικρατοϋν , πάντως καί αυτό τών πασχόντων εστί · καί αυτό γαρ κρατείται υπό του έπικρατουμένου. Εί γάρ καί έλασσον , όμως δέ κρατείται πάντως · ώσπερ χρυσός ? χαλκού – κρατούμενος δέ καί αύτός , εί καί ήττον , δήλον δέ οτι κατά τήν ποσότητα τήν προσμιγείσαν [Firstly, you also profess two actions: one predominant, I mean divine, and the other subject to possession, that is, human... After all, the predominant is everyone and itself from among those subject to influence, for it is also possessed possessed. Although to a lesser extent, everything is possessed, just as gold, predominating over silver and, perhaps, copper mixed with it, is itself subject to possession by these latter, although to a lesser extent, in accordance, of course, with the amount of admixture]. Col. 64. Ημείς δέ τοίς άγίοις Πατράσιν, ώς έν άπασι, κάν τούτω έπόμενοι, , , , , , ? ώς άνθρωπος ό αύτός καταλλήλως τή αύτού άν $ ρωπότητι [We say to the Holy Fathers, both in everything and in this following, that He Himself is the God of all, having immutably become a man, not only as God Himself desired the image corresponding to His deity, but also as a man Himself - in the image corresponding to His humanity]. Col. 297; cf. col. 593. The present passage is similar in thought and partly in letter to one passage from Dionysius the Areopagite, literally cited by Maximus on col. 100 to clarify how “Θεανδρική ενέργεια” should be understood. What Dionysius argues for the communication of the modes of action of both natures of Christ can be reduced to the position we have put forward. Col. 120 ; compare: col. 1056. Όμως δ᾿ ούν ώς ολω τω αύτω και ένί και μόνω Χριστώ κατά φύσιν , όλα παρέχομεν τά τών, έξ ών έστι, φύσεων [However, as a whole, we attribute to one and the same Christ by nature everything pertaining to those natures from which He is]. Col. 120. One should not be confused by the expression “κατά φύσιν” found here, since it does not refer to “τω αύτω και ένί και μόνω”, but to κ “Χριστώ” and has a connection with the words that follow it. Col. 85 – 88; compare: col. 101, 344. Col. 124; compare: col. 345. Col. 80 – 81, 65 – 68,196,197, 268, 297. Ύ περούσιος Λόγος , άν $ ρωπικώς ούσιω $ είς , έσχε καί του οντος τής αυτού άνθρωτιότητος τήν άν $ εκτικήν δύναμιν · ής τήν όρμήν καί άφορμήν $ έλων öl ενεργείας έδειξε ... τήν δέ άφορμήν έν τω καιρώ του ?? γάρ καί κατά φύσιν καί παρά φύσιν δειλία · καί κατα φύσιν μέν δειλία , παράλογος συστολή. $ έλων δι ήμάς , ώς άγαθός , έδέξατο [The all-essential Word, humanly existing, had a power reaching out to what belongs to His humanity, which attraction and aversion, willing, manifested through action... aversion - in an hour suffering, voluntarily saddened in the face of death... For there is timidity, consistent with nature and contrary to nature. And timidity, which is in accordance with nature, is [manifested] in depression as a force of attraction to existing things, and that which is contrary to nature is unreasonable depression. So, the one that is against nature... The Lord did not allow us to approach Him at all, but voluntarily accepted what was in harmony with nature for our sake, as the Good]. Col. 297; cf. col. 48,196,197, 297. "Ἐξουσιαστικώς ώς Θεός, έδίδου τή φύσει καιρόν, όταν έβούλετο, τά εαυτής ένεργήσαι “[He freely, like God, gave nature the time when he wanted to perform its inherent actions,” says Maximus in the words of Gregory Max., t. II, col. Ού γάρ έκτισις ήν , ώς εφ᾿ ήμίν , αλλά κένωσις υπέρ ήμών τού σαρκωθέντος Λόγου τό πάθος [The suffering of the incarnate God was not payment [of a debt], as with us, but exhaustion for us]. Col. 120. Cf. col. 48: “Ού γάρ ϊνα πάθη, σώση δέ, προηγουμένως γέγονεν άνθρωπος. Δίο φήσι · Πάτερ, εί δυνατόν "[For not in order to suffer, but in order to save, He first became man. That’s why He says: “Father, if it is possible to eat”], etc. Εναντίωσις δέ ποία, says St. Maxim, in refutation of the extreme Monothelite opinion about the temporary assimilation of human will by Christ (about which see below), - τό προσεύχεσθαι, καί φυσικής έκουσίως, τής κατά τήν σάρκα Λέγω , πρόσδειξιν άσθενείας ποείσθαι διά τής συστολής, καί μή άντιτείνειν όλως, αλλά Λέγειν. Εί δυνατόν, καί · Μή τί έγώ θέλω, άλλ᾿ εί τι σύ · καί συνάπτειν τή ?? Ἐτύπου μέν γάρ πραγματικώς έν έαυτώ τό ήμέτερον , διά τής φυσικής προς μικρόν άγωνίας ϊνα καί ταύτης ήμάς έλευθερώση , καί τής οικείας σαρκός τήν φύσιν πιστώσηται , καί πάσι καθαράν τήν παρίστη δέ πάλιν εύθύς τήν κατά τού ?? ??? έπικρΐναι τούτο καί φάσκειν · Μή τό έμόν, άλλά τό σον γενέσθω. [What is the contradiction in praying and yielding to natural - that is, according to the flesh - weakness through depression, and [at the same time] not resisting at all, but saying: “if it is possible” and “not as I will, but as You,” and applying to depression a strong and voluntary movement towards death? For He really imprinted ours in Himself through a natural short-term struggle, in order to free us from it and confirm the nature of His flesh and clearly demonstrate the economy to everyone, and immediately presented the greatest desire towards death and the extreme fusion and union of His humanity with His own and Fatherly will by choosing this and saying: “Not Mine, but Thine be done”] Col. 196 - 197. See col. 304, 233, 56, 80. Ουκ έστι ούν άλλο τό καθ᾿ ή μας, και άΛΛο τό κατά τον Σωτήρα άν § ? και άλλως ύπέρ ήμάς [So humanity is not different with us, and humanity is different with the Savior, and the will is also not different, at least according to the logos of nature, although in a different way [carried out] above us]. Col. 237. Ού γάρ προσηγείται έν τω Κυρίω κα § άπερ έν ήμίν , τής θελήσεως τά φυσικά – άλλ᾿ ώσπερ πεινάσας άληΟώς , και διψήσας , ού τρόπω τω καθ ήμάς έπείνασεν και έδίψησεν , αλλά τω ύπέρ ήμάς έκουσίως γάρ ούτω καί δειλιάσας αληθώς, ού καθ ήμάς, άλλ᾿ ύπέρ ήμάς έδειλίασε. Και καθόλου φάναι, πάν φυσικόν έπί Χριστού, συνημμένον έχει τω κατ᾿ αύτό λόγω καί τον ύπέρ φύσιν τρόπον · ίνα και ή φύσις διά τού λόγου πιστωτή, και ή οικονομία διά τού τρόπου [For with the Lord, natural [needs] did not prevail over the will, as with us, but also as one who was truly hungry and thirsty, he did not in our opinion, he hungered and thirsted, but above us - for it was voluntary; in the same way, having truly feared, He feared not according to us, but above us. And generally speaking, everything natural in Christ has, united with its logos, a tropos that exceeds nature, so that nature also receives identification through the logos, and the economy through the tropos]. Col. 297 – 300; cf. Schwane, s. 509. For the Greek text, see note 429. Concerning the intelligence of the human movements of the Word, compare the following passage: οιανοϋν έκέκτητο παρά φύσιν ένέργειαν , ούτε μήν κατά ψυχή ν θελήματος έναντίαν ή παράλογον κίνησιν, ώσπερ ήμείς, "επειδή to αχ ύπέρ νόμον άνθρωπίνης φύσεως έτέχ § η "" [As a man, neither in body He had in the members any action contrary to nature, nor, of course, in soul - contrary to the will or unreasonable movement, like us, "because and above the law of human nature was born."] Col. 241. On agreement with the Divine will of the Word, see, for example, the above quotation, col. 196 - 197. Είχεν q πεφυκέναι θέλειν ό σαρκώδεις λόγος ώς άνθρωπος , τω αύτοΰ § εϊκώ Οελήματι κινούμενόν τε καί τυπούμενον . Col. 48; cf. 81: “Ώ στε θέλειν είχεν άνΟρώπινον ,… ού μήν Θεώ καΟοτιούν ? έτύγχανεν , ύπό τής αύτοΰ κατ᾿ ούσίαν θεότητος τυπούμενον άεί καί "[So He had a human will... not in any way contrary to God, since it was not at all gnomic, but remained in the precise sense of the word natural, formed and moved by His deity to the fulfillment of the economy]. Maximus’s brief discussion on the issue of knowledge of Christ was caused by the objections of Deacon Theodore, a Monothelite, synodicary of the Constantinople Archbishop Paul, proposed to Maximus during interrogations. For Maxim’s interrogations and responses to them, see Op. Max., t. II, col. 216 et seq. "Ή πάσιν εύδηλον, οτι γινώσκει μεν Θεός, άγνοείν δέ φησιν ώς "" Τίθεται ούν τήν μέν άγνοιαν τή κατ᾿ έπίνοιαν διαστολή τών ούσιών ... γινώσκομεν Λόγον , ούδέ κατ έπίνοιαν ψιλήν φανταζόμεΟα , αλλ᾿ έν άκρα τή καθ᾿ ύπόστασιν ένώσει τών φύσεων όντα πιστεύομεν · δήλον ώς ούδέ τι τών έν διαιρέσει κατ᾿ έπίνοιαν λαμβανομένων παράπαν έστίν ["Or it is absolutely clear to everyone that God knows, and He speaks of ignorance as a man, if anyone separates the visible from the mental." So he believes that ignorance can only be attributed to the mental unification of essences... After all, if we do not know the incarnate Word in disunity, and do not imagine by mere mental representation, but believe that It exists in perfect unity according to hypostasis, it is clear that nothing mentally perceived in separation is absolutely His [genuine property]]. Op. Max., t. II. col. 280 – 281. Τω γάρ § εΛήματι καί τήν άγνοιαν οι Πατέρες (Athanasius the Great in the word against the Arians, Gregory the Theologian in the first word about the Son, etc.) συνέταξαν, τον αύτόν αύτη φυΛάξαντες Λόγον [For the fathers added ignorance to the will, retaining the same meaning for it]. Col. 216. Op. Max., t. II, col. 128. Επειδή ή έπιτηδειότης εκ μαθήσεως ποιείται τήν έξιν καί τήν προχείρησιν · από μαθήσεως άρα καί προκοπής έσχεν ό Χριστός κατ᾿ αυτούς τήν έξιν τού ^ εΛήματοί :, καί τήν προχείρησιν · καί προέκοπτεν , άγνοών προ τής μαθήσεως τά μαθήματα [Since ability from learning becomes skill and mastery; From learning, therefore, and success, Christ acquired, in their opinion, the skill of will and skill, and succeeded, not knowing science before learning]. Col. 313; compare: In. VIÏ 15. This is, by the way, how the question of knowing Christ is looked at, and this is the meaning that His Eminence Innocent, Bishop of Kherson, assimilates to Christ’s response to the words regarding the future fate of the world. See: works of Innocent, vol. VI, p. 207. "Disp. from Pir.", col. 329 – 332. Ει ούν εις ό Χριστός , ώς εις πάντως καί ήθελε ν εί δέ ώς εις ήθελε ν, έν πάντως αύτοϋ καί τό θέλημα · καί ού δύο. Col. 289. So, if there is one Christ, then, undoubtedly, as one He wanted; if He wanted as one, then, undoubtedly, His will is one, and not two]. Col. 340. T. I, col. 141; t. II, col. 341, 272, 53. “In your writings,” says Maximus to Pyrrhus (col. 333), “I found that you teach about one action of Christ as a whole” (μιαν Χριστού, ώς όλου, ένέργειαν). Compare: letter to the Sicilians, col. 117: “What shall we attribute, say (Monothelites), to the whole (τω όΛω), if we do not recognize in Him, due to the combination of one action, as one whole” (εί μή τήν μίαν ώς ένί τω οΛω διά τήν ένωσιν διδούμεν ένέργειαν ). Δυνατόν δέ ώσπερ έκ τών δύο φύσεων έν τι σύνΟετον Λέγομεν [Perhaps - just as we talk about something complex of two natures - talk about some complex [will] from two natural wills]. "Disp. from Pir.", col. 296. Letter to the Sicilians, col. 117. The positive thought about the identity of the whole with the parts in content and in the way of existence is only the reverse side of the monothelitian view on this subject, which is certainly rejected by Maximus. “No one,” says Maximus, “will reject the proposition that it is impossible to attribute two gnomic wills to Christ” (τήν των γνωμικών θελημάτων δυάδα). Col. 45. "Disp. from Pir.", col. 340. Εί έκ τής ένώσεως αύτώ , κατά τον ύμέτερον Λόγον , προσγέγονεν ή , καθ᾿ ύμάς, δημιουργήσας. Καί αύθις, εί έκ τής ένώσεως αύτώ προσγέγονε τό ένεργεϊν ό Πατήρ δέ καί τό άγιον Πνεύμα ούχ ήνώΟησαν καθ᾿ ύπόστασιν σαρκί , ούκ άρα ένεργητικοί. Εί δέ μή ένεργητικοί , ούδέ δημιουργοί – Ινα μη Λέγω , ότι ούδέ όλως είσίν. [If, as you say, action arose in Him from the union, then, therefore, before the union He was inactive, and, in your opinion, was forced to create. And again, if action arose in Him from union, and the Father and the Holy Spirit were not united hypostatically with the flesh, then They are not active. And if they are not active, then They are not Creators, not to say that they do not exist at all.] Col. 340. Treatise of Theodore of Parano, addressed to Sergius of Arsenoite, Harduin, p. 1344 et sq. Acts VI Century p., pp. 402 et seq. “According to the Byzantines,” says Pyrrhus, “the fathers taught that Christ has a human will κατ᾿ οίκείωσιν ... σχετικήν [by assimilation ... relative].” "Disp. from Pir.", col. 304; cf. col. 125, 200, 220, etc. Ka§' ήν (i.e. σχετικήν οίκείωσιν) τά αλλήλων φυσικώς στέργομέν τε καί οίκειουμεθα, μηδέν τούτων αύτοί πάσχοντες ή ενεργούντες [By which (i.e. relative assimilation) we naturally we love and assimilate what relates to each other, without doing or suffering any of this ourselves]. Col. 220. For the difference in assimilation, see the same page. Cf. Op. Damasc., col. 1093. Εί δέ τήν δευτέραν (i.e. σχετικήν οίκείωσιν), ούδέ άν § ρωπον όλως, καί ούχ ώς ανθρώπου τά φυσικά φυσικώς οίκειούμενον μετά τού είναι καί μένειν Θεόν [If the second (i.e., relative connection), then He was not a man at all [He was], but only an incorporeal God, as only relatively assimilating to Himself what is related to the flesh, and not in a natural way - what is related to the nature of man, continuing at the same time to be and remain God]. Col. 220. that ήμέτερον έτύπου πραγματικώς έν έαυτώ , καί ώς άνθρωπος παρητειτον θάνατον), δύο θελήματα έχων έδείκνυτο, άποφαντικόν, ούκ άποδεικτικόν μοι δοκεΐ. Πώς γάρ έν τούτω μόνω τώ καιρώ, καί μή προ τούτου, καί δι ήντινα τήν αίτίαν; Εί μεν γάρ είχε τότε, καί απ᾿ αρχής είχεν έξ ού γέγονεν άνθρωπος, άλλ᾿ ούκ ύστερον έσχεδίασεν · εί δε απ᾿ αρχής ούκ είχεν , ούδέ κατά τον καιρόν τού πάθους , άλλα μόνον έφάντασε τήν παραίτησιν , καί ... δέ; Καί τις ό Λόγος; col. 196. The sayings of all the named Church Fathers are cited, among other things, by Pyrrhus in a conversation with Maximus. See: col. 316 et seq. Some basis for such an understanding of the above saying was seen by the Monothelites, it must be assumed, in the words that follow it, cited in the explanation of John. VÏ 18. “Since this (i.e., the Gospel words) is the speech of the one who received, and not the received, then,” the theologian argues, “we will give the following answer: this is said not because the Son’s own will is really different from the will of the Father, but because there is no such will, and the meaning contained in the words is this: “Let me not do My will, because I have no will separate from Your will, but there is only a common will for both Me and You. Just as we have one Divinity, so we have one will." Ex II orat. de Filiö Op. Gregorii theologi, t. XXXVI, col. 117–120. In explanation of the present place, Gregory of Nyssa says the following. Since both parts of human nature (soul and body) were guilty of death for sin, the “life communion” (επιμιξία της ζωής) of Divinity and humanity in Christ was supposed to deliver both from it. Indeed, both parts of the human nature of Christ show signs of the superhuman nature (έπίδιΛα της ύπερεχούσης φύσεως τα γνωρίσματα): the body, by touching the sick, testifies to the action through it Deities; the soul, by its imperious will, manifests its inherent Divine power. Vid. I orat. in Christi resurrectionem (vel in s. Pascha): Op. Gregorii Nysseni, t. III, col. 616. The last thought about the supernatural action of the soul of Christ gave the Monothelites a reason for an incorrect understanding of the above saying, which was favorable to their own ideas. Ex I lib. de incarnatione Domini nostri I. Christi, contra Apollinarium. Op. Athanasii Alexandrini, t. II, col. 1128. “What shall we say,” Pyrrhus seems to ask (col. 317), “about those examples that are borrowed from the great Athanasius?” ( Αθανασίου χρήσεων ). "" έαυτώ άναστηςάμένος, έν έπιδείξ, ει σαρκός, δίχα δε σαρκικών Θελημάτων, καί λογισμών άνθρωπίνων, έν είκόνι καινότητος Ή γάρ. Θέλησις, Θεότητος μόνης ". Col. 240. ex II lib. 1148. Regarding the reading of the passage in question, the following should be noted: a) in the “Disputation with Pyrrhus”, col. 320, “κ o ινότητος” is mistakenly printed: “κ α ινότητος”, as read by Athanasius himself and by Maximus in another place, in the apology for Honoria, col. 240; b) in Athanasius himself and in Maximus, in the apology, his reading is completed with the words: “έπειδή καί φύσις όλη Θεότητος” [since all nature belongs to the deity]; “ή γάρ Θέλησις, θεότητος μόνης”, or (as it is read in Athanasius and in the apology) “μόνη” (and without a comma after “θέλησις”). real place at St. Athanasius is that the flesh of Christ by its very birth, which took place solely by the will of God, was sinless, so that “the devil, approaching Christ as a man, and not finding in Him traces of the ancient seed (μή εύρίσκων δε έν αύτω τής παλαιάς αύτού έπισποράς γνώρισμα), the defeated one had to retire in shame.” Ibidem. Col. 345 et seq. The original text (Maxim's words in explanation of “καινή ενέργεια”) is given above. Letter to His Holiness Bishop "Nikander", col. 100; cf. Scholia Maximi in epist Dionysii ad Caium, t. II, col. 1056 – 1057. Op. Dionysii Areopagitae, Epist. IV ad Caium, p. 767. Col. 344 – 345; cf. col. 85. Assmupt. ex IV Lib. in Ioannis Evangelium. Op. S. Cyrilli Alexandrini, t. VI, col. 577. Explanation of St. Cyril in this place is directed to prove that Christ gives life not only by word (almighty command), but also with the participation of His body, through its touch ( τήν τών νεκρών άναβίωσιν , άΛ Y ίνα δείξη ζωοποιόν τό ίδιον σώμα [and not only allows the word to accomplish reviving the dead, but also to show His body to those who give life]). Ibidem. Ού μάχεται όλως ή παρούσα χρήσις ταΐς δύο ένεργείαις · τουναντίον δέ, καί συνιστησιν. Ού γαρ μίαν φυσικήν ένέργειαν της θεότητος τού Χριστού έφη, καί ?? καί ποιήματος μίαν ένέργειαν , ούκ άν τις δοίη σωφρόνων " άλλα δείξαι καί άνευ σαρκός , καί μετά σαρκός. Ώ ς εϊ τις μίαν τού πυρός ένέργειαν μετά ύλης καί άνευ τής ύλης δείξαι θέλων, φήσειεν, οτι τό πύρ καί άνευ ύλης καί μετά ύλης καίει. Ούτω καί ό Πατήρ ού μίαν τήν τών δύο φύσεων είπεν ένέργειαν · άλλά μίαν τήν ένέργειαν εΐπε τήν θείαν καί τήν Πατρικήν , ούσιωδώς ? ?? ειπερ καί μετά σάρκωσιν όμοεργός έστι τω οίκείω γεννήτορι, άσωμάτως ένεργούντι · άλλά καί τή τής οικείας σαρκός άφή ταύτας έδείκνυ σωματικώς. Τούτο γάρ βούλεται τό, "Δι άμφοίν"... Ούκήγνόησεν ούν ό Πατήρ τήν έκάστης φύσεως κατ᾿ έξαίρετον ίθιότητα, καί τών άλλων φυσικών ιδιωμάτων περιληπτικήν · τήν τε δημιουργικήν φημι , καί τήν έκ τής ψυχής ένδιδομένην τω σώματι · εύκρινεϊς καί άσυγχύτους έδειξε. [The present usage of words does not at all contradict the two actions, but on the contrary, it contributes. After all, he did not speak about one natural action of the deity of Christ and His humanity, because [otherwise] he would not have said in another place that “no one of common sense will agree with the one action of the Creator and the creation,” but, wanting to show that one is the action of the deity - both without flesh and with flesh. As if someone, wanting to show one effect of fire, whether with matter or without matter, said that fire burns both without matter and with matter. So the Father did not speak about one action of two natures, but spoke about one action, divine and Father, essentially abiding in the incarnate God the Word, according to which He not only performed signs incorporeally by an omnipotent command, as he himself says, if indeed He, even after the incarnation, is coequal with His Parent, who acts incorporeally, but also with His flesh by touching them (i.e. e. signs - trans.) showed in a bodily way.]Co 1. 344 - 345. Dogmatic letter to Presbyter Marinus, col. 237 et seq. Ειπών γάρ , οτι διά τήν άφραστον ένωσιν τής άνθρωπίνης καί θείας φύσεως, καί θεός Λέγεται παθείν, καί άνθρωπότης έκ τού ούρανοΰ κατελθεΐν μετά τής τής θεότητος καί ταύτη δεΐξαι τήν τών φυσικώς προσόντων έκατέρα φύσει τών τού ένός Χριστού καί Yιού κατ᾿ έπαλλαγήν άκραν άντίδοσιν, έπάγει Λέγων, "Όθεν καί έν θέλημα όμολογούμεν τού Κυρίου ήμών Ιησού Χριστού, "Πώς, φησίν; " ούχ αμαρτία "τουτέστιν, ούκ έκ τής άμαρτίας. [For having said that because of the ineffable union of human and divine natures, it is said of God that He suffers, and of humanity that it came down from heaven along with the Divinity, and thus [to] show the interchange of properties naturally inherent in each nature of the one Christ and the Son, perfect by the mutual communication [of natures], he continues, saying: “From here we confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ.” How? - speaks. “Because it is clear that our nature was received from God, and not sin,” that is, not from sin.] Col. 237–238. Nam cum dixisset ob ineffabilem naturae humanae ac divinae unionem, tum dici Deum passum esse, tum humanitatem cum divinitate de coelo descendisse; atque in eum modum, eorum quae natura insunt utrique naturae unius Christi ac Filii, summam reciprocationem, quae est per commutationem, ostendisset, subjungit, dicerts: “Unde et unam Domini nostri Iesu Christi voluntatem confitemur.” Quonam id modo? “Quia profecto a deitate assumpta est natura nostra, non culpa,” hoc est, non ex peccato. Col. 239 – 240. "ή θέλημα διάφορον ή έναντίον ού γέγονε τω Πατρί “[For no other law arose in His members, or a will different or contrary to the Father]. “Alia enim lex in membris ejus, aut voluntas diversa, vel Patri contraria, non fuit in membris ejns.” Col. 241 – 242; compare: below reference number 484. Ούκ άναίρεσιν ούν, ώς έφην, τού φυσικού καί ανθρωπίνου θελήματος, αλλά τού εμπαθούς καί παρά φύσιν ποιεί . Col. 241. "Ούκ είσί ταύτα (i.e. John VÏ 38), φησί, διαφόρου θελήματος " ["Non sunt haec diversae voluntatis"], τουτέστιν εναντίου καί αντικειμένου, εξ ού τό δύο κατά φύσιν ύπάρχειν έν τω Σωτήρι θελήματα προδήλως συνάγεται . έναντίον ούκ είχεν, φυσικόν είχεν ώς άνθρωπος Τό γάρ ούκ. έναντίον , φυσικόν πάντως , καί ούδείς άντερεί · ούδέν γάρ έν τή φύσει ή τοις κατά φύσιν παντελώς έναντίον [“These [words] are not [a sign],” he says, “of an excellent will,” that is, contrary and opposing, from which it follows that The Savior has two natural wills. For although He did not have the opposite, yet as a man he had the natural. For what is not contrary is undoubtedly natural, and no one argues with this, for nothing in nature and in that which is according to nature is entirely contrary.] Col. 244. Δέος ούν πολλά βαίνειν [έπιβαλείν: vid. not. Combefisiï “Istud erroris scribae palam est”; in Latin, vers.: “Itaque verisimile est eos mentiri ac subdere"], ö μή κυρίως έν τοίς έαυτού γέγραφε λόγοις, καί ?? ... ύπολαμβάνω, πάσης όντα καθαρόν ύποψίας [So, I am afraid, they add a lot of things that he did not actually write in his words, and they think to make the writings of [this] man a cover for their own contrary teaching, if not the very one. better... And thus, I consider him to have a mind free from all suspicion] Col. 244. “We,” says the apology of John (the author of the apology speaks about Honorius and himself), “said that the Lord has one will; one - not His Divinity and His humanity together, but only humanity (άλλά μόνης τής άνθρωπότητος). Since Sergius wrote that some recognize in Christ two opposing (εναντία) wills, we responded that Christ does not have two opposing wills, that is, the will of the flesh and spirit (as we have them after the fall), but only one will (έν μόνον), which naturally characterizes His humanity (τό φυσικώς χαρακτηρίζον τήν αύτού ανθρωπότητα )”, etc. Col. 329. Καί ϊν᾿ έπιτόμως είπω, δια τού ενός θελήματος, τό μόνην τής αύτού σάρκα αύτόν οίμαι. Col. 244. Τον δέ γε τής Ρωμαίων η άπαν Όνώριον , ού καταγορεύειν οίμαι τής τών εμφύτων Θελημάτων επί Χριστού δυάδος , έν τή γραφείση προς Σέργιον έπιστολή δια τό έν Θέλημα φάναι , συναγορεύειν δέ μάλλον , καί ταύτην ώς είκος συνιστάν [So I believe that the Pope of the Roman Church Honorius, having spoken about one will in the letter addressed to Sergius, does not condemn the duality of natural wills in Christ, but rather defends and rightly recommends]. Col. 237. This includes expressions of Honorius cited in Maximus, such as the following: “μή ύπαρχειν θελήματος διαφοράν” [there is no difference of will] or “ούκ είσί ταύτα (John VÏ 38) διαφόρου θελήματος ". Col. 244. Compare review of Maxim Schröckh: Schröckh, s. 412. This, by the way, is how Maxim is named in the title of “General Places” (Op. Max., t. II, col. 721): “Αββά Μαξίμου του φιλοσόφου καί μάρτυρος” [Abba Maxim, philosopher and martyr] ... Fabricius, p. 655; cf. Notitia ex Fabricii bibliotheca in Op. Max., 1.1, p. 9. L. Allatius, p. 609. John. Plusiadeni, Pro concilio Florentinö words Rhacenditae. Unum hoc sufficiat, nullum Craecorum, qui post cum theologica, polemica, seu etiam ethica scripserit, a Maximi sibi testimonio summa cum laude abstinuisse. Vid. Combefisii praefatio, Lectori, p. 59, in Op. Max., 1.1. So, for example, John (XI) Veccus, Patriarch K.P. (1275 - 1282: Vid. le Quien, p. 288) calls him “an expert on dogmatism” (δογματικότατος) and “truly great” (Allatius, p. 76 et 85. Vecci, patriarchae S. R., De unione Ecclesiarum, orat I.); Gregory (II, Cyprus), Patriarch K.P. (1283 - 1289; Le Quien, p. 289) calls him “the divine and learned father” (Ibid., pp. 440 et 448. De additione facta in Symbolo per Latinos, et aliis); George of Trebizond and John Plusiadinus title him in the same way (L.S., pp. 493, 501 et 608). Photii Bibliotheca, p. 156, code. 192(A). Intending to offer a brief separate outline of the successive moments of the volitional process and an assessment of the opinions of opponents about the one future will of God and the saints and about the one water of Christ, Maximus warns: “ούκ έμούς έγχαράττων Λόγους .. αλλά τούς περί τούτων άλλοις πονη § έντας έρανισάμενος "[Not writing my own words..., but collecting what others have said about these subjects]. Beginning of a letter to Presbyter Marin, col. 12. Ἐστι δέ τήν φράσιν σχοινοτενής καί χαίρον ύπερβατοίς , ένακμάζων τε ταΐς περιβολαίς , καί κυριολογεΐν ούκ έσπουδασμένος έξ ών αύτώ τή συγγραφή καί τό ασαφές καί δυσεπισκόπητον διατρέχει · τω τραχεί δέ τού όγκου, όσα περί συνθήκην καί αναπαύσεις, τον Λόγον ύποβάλλων, ούδ᾿ ήδύς είναι σπουδάζει τή ακοή · καί ή μεταφορά αύτώ τών Λέξεων ούκ εις τό χαρίεν καί γεγοητευμένον περιήνθισται, άλλ, ούτως άπλώς καί άπεριμερίμνως παραλαμβάνεται . Photii Bibliotheca, p. 156, code. 192(A); cf. Migne, t. CHI, col. 645; Cave, p. 586. Photius expresses himself about him, by the way, like this: διεσκευασμένος” [Moreover, the dialogue is written even more vulgarly]. Ibid., p. 159, code. 195. Cf. Migne, col. 657. Photius responds about Maximus’s letters, excluding the letter to Deacon Cosmas: “Ἐν ταύταις ... έπιστολαϊς, ό μέν άλλος χαρακτήρ αύτού τών λόγων, καί ή εύσέβεια μάλιστα διασώζεται, τό δ᾿ άσαφές … ούκ έσχε τό άνοικονόμητον. Δήλον , δ᾿ ότι καί ά τήν άσάφειαν , έποίει , τά μέν έρριπται τά δέ κεκόλασται ". [In these... letters the character of his words is different, and piety is rather preserved, and obscurity... has not led to disorder. It is obvious that from what was causing the confusion, one was discarded and the other was corrected] Regarding the style of the letter to Deacon Cosmas, Photius expresses himself as follows: “Ή φράσις δέ τό σαφές διώκει καί ούκ άκομψον "[The syllable strives for clarity and is not devoid of grace]. Ibid., p. 159; apud Migne, col. 649 et 653. Op. I.Damasc., t. I, col. 944; cf. Op. Max., t. II, col. 21. The difference is in Maxim: “Τήν ... κίνησιν, νόησιν καλοΰσι · τήν ... νόησιν, ένοιαν λέγουσι "[movement is called thinking; thinking is called thought]. Superfluous words against Damascus: “παρά τοις ταύτα δεινοίς.” In Damascus: “Ή… κίνησις, νόησις Λέγεται · ή… νόησις ένοια καλείται” [Movement is called thinking; thinking is called thought]. Extra words against Maxim: “καί τυπώσασα τήν ψυχήν προς τό νοούμενον” [and imprinting the conceivable in the soul]. Damasc., t. I, col. 944 – 945; cf. Max., t. II, col. 12 – 17 et Dispute, cum. Pyrrh., col. 293. The third volitional moment in Damascene is complicated by the introduction of the concept of “σκέψις”. Damasc., 1033; cf. Max., t. II, col. 289. Thus, one of them (about the impossibility of knowing the essence of things by opposition and about the various names for human movement found in the Fathers of the Church) is a tirade of 42 lines of Greek text. Damasc., 1060 – 1061 Max., 349 – 352. The peculiarity of Damascene's presentation of this passage is only that the dialogical form of reasoning is omitted. The polemical side of Maximus's reasoning in this place (the impossibility of admitting will in Christ according to assimilation and the inconsistency of the supporters of Sergius's opinion) is omitted from Damascus, which is observed - and this is in the order of things - in all other places of borrowing. The interpretation of the first two sayings is not quite literally repeated in Damascus. From Maxim's rather lengthy discussion on this topic, Damascene literally borrows only a few provisions, but in general this place is similar in both of them only in thought and its development. The real place in Damascene is somewhat curtailed, and this is the whole peculiarity. The only difference between Damascene and Maximus in the disclosure of this position is that the name of Nestorius and everything related to him is omitted from Damascene. The polemical tone of Maxim's reasoning in Damascene is of an irrespective character (“they will say”, etc.), and Maxim, conducting lively polemics and referring to certain opponents, almost always uses the second person (“you say”, “you will have to assert this and that”, etc.). Op. Damasc., col. 1084, 948; cf. Op. Max., t. II, col. 221. Damasc., col. 1012 – 1013. In the acts of the VI Ecumenical Council, among other things, we read: “The real St. and the Ecumenical Council, accepting with open arms the presentation of the most holy and blessed Pope of ancient Rome Agathon to ... Emperor Constantine, and with the same sympathy accepting another conciliar presentation from St. a council of 125 bishops, presided over by the same holy pope, who agreed with St. the council of Chalcedon, with the epistle of Leo to Flavian, as well as with the conciliar epistles of Cyril..., following the five Ecumenical Councils and the holy glorious fathers, we define and confess, etc. Mansi, t. XI, p. 636; Harduin, p. 1400 Acts, 6th century, pp. 470 – 471. Epistola I Agathonis rarae (“Consideranti mihi…”) – Mansi, t. XI, p. 238 – 239; Harduin, p. 1079 Acts VI Century e., pp. 66 – 67. Mansi, p. 243; Harduin, p. 1083,1090 – 1091 Acts. VI Century e., pp. 72 and 81 – 82. The following Scriptures are cited here as speaking of a) two wills in Christ: Matt. XXVÏ 39 (Mark XIV: 36 L. XXIÏ 42) with an explanation of it by Ambrose of Milan, Athanasius and Cyril of Alexandria, I. Chrysostom and St. Augustine; and In. VÏ 38; b) only about the Divine will and action of Christ: Ps. CXXXIV, 6, Matt. VIII, 3 and Matt. XI, 27; and c) only about the human will and action of Christ: Matt. XIV: 25 (John VÏ 19), Mark. VIÏ 24, John. IV: 37, John. VIÏ 1, Philip. IÏ 6 – 8, etc. From the Church Fathers, the sayings of both Gregory, Athanasius and Cyril of Alexandria, I. Chrysostom, Ambrose of Milan, Blessed Augustine, Leo the Great, etc. are cited. See Mansi, p. 246 et sq. and 258 et sq.; Harduin, p. 1083 et sq. and 1099 et sq. Acts VI Century e., pp. 73 et seq. and 93. Mansi, p. 259; Harduin, p. 1095 Acts VI Century e., p. 88. Mansi, p. 243 – 244; Harduin, p. 1083 Acts VI Century e., 71 pp. Compare: a look at Agathon's message to Schwane: Schwane, s. 520 – 521. This view is expressed, by the way, by Thomasius, s. 369 and 371. QH reads like this: “Καί δύο φυσικάς θελήσεις ήτοι θελήματα έν αύτώ, καί δύο ? κατά τήν τών άγιων πατέρων διδασκαλίαν ωσαύτως κηρύττομεν καί δύο μέν φυσικά θελήματα ούχ ύπεναντία, μή γένοιτο, καθ ώς οίάσεβείς έφησα ν αιρετικοί , άλλ επόμε νον τό άνθρώπινον αύτού θέλημα , καί ή άντιπίπτον, ή άντιπαλαίον, μάλλον μέν ούν καί ύποτασσόμενον, τώ " Mansi, t. XI, p. 637, Harduin, p. 1400 – 1401. “According to the teaching of the holy fathers, we also preach that in Him there are two natural wills or desires, and two natural actions, existing inseparably, immutably, inseparably and unfused, and that the two natural desires are not contrary, as the wicked heretics said - let it not be! - but His human will does not contradict or oppose, but follows or - better said - submits to His Divine and omnipotent will. Compare: Acts. VI Century e., pp. 472 – 473. Mansi, XI, b. 637; Harduin, 1397. Acts. VI Century e., p. 469.